By David Bandurski — It’s purportedly for sale on the Internet at the deal-stealing price of seven dollars. So why is it so impossible to track down a copy of Gongjian: A Report on Political Reform in China After the 17th Party Congress? For starters, the book, purported to be Hu Jintao’s blueprint for political reform, is in high demand among scholars, analysts and journalists. Rumors and conjecture about its existence have been flying ever since last fall’s congress, and everyone is eager to know what it says and what it signifies. [CORRECTION: The book is reportedly now available widely in Beijing bookstores].
A Reuters report last month made passing mention of the book, for which Central Party School vice-director Liu Junru wrote the preface, but offered no details and did not suggest it reflected Hu Jintao’s own views or plans. [CORRECTION: Reuters reporter Chris Buckley did the first detailed report of the study in a February report. See it here.]
The word on the street, though, is that it does.

[ABOVE: Cover of Gongjian: A Report on Political Reform in China After the 17th Party Congress, published by the Xinjiang Production and Building Corps Press in October 2007.]

The report, though circulating among China’s top leadership since last October, has been published by the little-known Xinjiang Production and Building Corps Press, an eccentric choice for such a significant work.
So what has all the quiet fuss been about?
Over the next few weeks, we’ll look more generally at the topic of political reform in China as glimpsed through Gongjian. What sort of path does it blaze? Where does it stand on electoral democracy, intraparty democracy, religious freedom and the growth of civil society?
For the moment, though, we’ll deal more specifically with the media-related portions of the document and how it envisions the role of the press in China.
The report, first of all, is prepared by Zhou Tianyong (周天勇) and Wang Changjiang (王长江), both scholars at China’s Central Party School we mentioned as key figures for journalists to interview in the run up to last year’s Party Congress.
Zhou Tianyong is vice-director of the Research Office of the Central Party School and one of several authors of the Party School’s “Political Reform Research Report” (政治体制改革研究报告), which was published in book form as Political Reform in China in 2004. The preface to Gongjian, written by Li Junru, makes specific mention of the 2004 book.
Wang Changjiang is director of the Central Party School’s Party Building Division (党建部). Wang wrote an essay in May last year called, “Answering a Few Misgivings About Issues Concerning Democracy” (辨析关于民主问题的几个疑虑). Published in Beijing Daily, the article argued that democratization could happen even under a one-party system.
While Gongjian does note in passing in chapter one that “freedom of speech is an inevitable development trend,” it argues that the CCP must continue to control media as a fundamental condition of political reform. Party control of the press, in other words, must remain intact even as the country moves toward so-called “political reform,” or zhengzhi tizhi gaige (政治体制改革).
One of the most revealing formulations employed at the outset of the report is the “three controls,” in which we may be witnessing the birth of a new party catchphrase for the conditions under which the CCP will allow political reform to move ahead, including media control.
Summing up the challenges that will attend efforts at political reform — for example, the party “must eliminate factors of instability that might emerge in the midst of the political reform process, and must ensure that political reform goes ahead step by step and in an orderly manner under the leadership of the CCP” — the authors write:

We must uphold the CCP’s leadership of the political reform process, and we must implement the three controls (三项原则), which are that the party controls the army (党管军队), the party controls cadres (党管干部), and the party controls the press (党管新闻).

Falling back again on the lessons of USSR disintegration, the authors write that “in the 1980s and early 1990s, as the former Soviet Union and eastern Europe underwent dramatic change, there were many reasons that the party of Socialism progressively lost hold of political power, but one important reason was that the ruling party gave up control of the military, with the result that in the moment of truth the army did not heed the words of the party and even stood on the side of the opposition.”
“The ‘control’ in party control of cadres,” the authors write, “should be understood as both control and leadership.” It essentially means that the role of party leaders is to carry out the policies and work of the party, and be obedient to the party line. “In this way, party control of cadres means that the party leads the work of cadres.” And: “For the Chinese Communist Party, party control of cadres is undebatable.”
Then comes the chapter one section on the press control aspect of the “three controls”:

Party control of the press. The press sytem is an important and integral part of the national political system. Freedom of speech is an inevitable development trend. But in the period of social and economic transition, the question of what function the press should have becomes for us a question that must be met with extreme caution. We believe that when a market economy system is not yet mature, and when the nation’s political culture and the democratic character [of the population] continue to show a marked gap with developed nations, a one-sided emphasis on freedom of speech could potentially create chaos in public opinion, which would be disadvantageous to the stable achievement of transition of the social and economic systems under a situation of centralized political control. Therefore, the party’s leadership and control of the press system is necessary for the stable transition of the social and economic systems, and an important integral component suited to a centralized political system.

The fear, an all-too-familiar one, is that political reform might unleash demands for greater political freedoms and bring the kind of social chaos we saw in the spring of 1989. Hence the imperative, from the CCP’s vantage point, of controlling or “guiding” public opinion by means of press control.
On pages 65 through 67 of the report, in a section called “Improving the Ruling Party’s Influence on the Media,” the authors write that “there are two primary avenues by which the ruling party can influence the media: the first is to control, the second is to use” (一是控制, 二是利用).
The second aspect of this formula is a testament to the priority the CCP now places on finding new ways to “use” and “influence” media as opposed to the old emphasis on “control” (for which “guidance” has been the operating term since 1989).
With a tinge of alarm, the report cites the recent history of “color revolutions” in Eastern Europe and Central Asia as urgent lessons in the growing power of media as a vehicle of popular participation in political affairs, a challenge to the party’s leadership:

Traditionally, political parties were the most important tools for the people to express their interests, hopes and expectations. Now, media have also emerged as a tool for political participation, and have played a role of ever-growing importance. This means that the things people accomplished in the past predominantly through political parties they can now accomplish through media channels. As a result, the influence of the ruling party faces [new] challenges. This is especially the case with the development of the Internet and technology, which has not only broken through the monopoly of information by restricted to certain levels of society, but has also broken through national boundaries as restrictions on the dissemination of information, actually usurping a number of roles political parties played in the past. Many members of society no longer view participation of political parties as the only channel for obtaining information . . . People have seen that when media play an independent role they can even have a substantial impact on politics. For example, while the ‘color revolutions’ occurring in Eastern Europe and Central Asia in recent years have complex causes, the control of the media and public opinion is a factor that cannot be overlooked. All of this has meant that the traditional mode of participating in politics via the political party faces many new problems. Faced with the immense utility of the media, nations across the world are all seeking policies for dealing with this issue, striving to enhance their influence on the media. Summed up, there are two primary avenues by which the ruling party can influence the media: the first is to control, the second is to use.

As many of our analyses at CMP attest, China’s media landscape has changed over the last two decades, the CCP’s regime of media control notwithstanding. The complexities of media commercialization, growing journalistic professionalism and the rise of the Internet and other new technologies have demanded the party change its approach to public opinion control.
An important part of this change in recent years has been an intensified focus on “using” media, including the Internet, to further the party’s interests rather than employing a one-dimensional control approach.
It’s not enough, in other words, to silence voices the party views as unfavorable — the party must find new ways to get its message out in an increasingly competitive, market-oriented media environment.
As we’ve written elsewhere, the CCP views media development as a critical factor in a global war for public opinion.
Likewise, many CCP leaders have come to regard “Western” media as pawns working for the interests of Western governments in spreading their ideology and influence — hence the party’s obsession with “color revolutions” and the role of the press.
This is a tactic and/or position we’ve seen frequently in recent weeks, as China has turned its own press apparatus against foreign media.
It was no surprise, therefore, as China’s foreign ministry turned on CNN for comments made by Jack Cafferty, that Chinese media coverage included comments from “famous American scholar” F. William Engdahl alleging that March chaos in Tibet was the “latest ‘color revolution’ cooked up by Washington.” [Xinhua News Agency: “CNN, Cafferty need to make a sincere apology to the Chinese people.”]
Most readers would probably think it fantastical to relate the controversial comments of a single pundit on one major news network to a supposed “color” conspiracy against China’s ruling party. But for China’s leadership this thesis has become a matter of faith and policy in the last few years.
For the authors of Gongjian, the recent history of “color revolutions” in Eastern Europe and Central Asia is a lesson in the dangers of freer media, and it underpins the CCP’s determination to “control” and “use” the press.
The reform document suggests control will continue to be the party’s guiding principle for media policy for years to come, that a change in the role of the press is not in the cards even as the party pushes ahead with “political reform.”
Gongjian does make other statements about the need for media development, “supervision by public opinion” and the creation of a press law. Look for more about these topics in a future post.
[Posted by David Bandurski, April 18, 2008]

The China Media Project is pleased to extend an invitation to our readers to attend a lecture on April 23 by Li Wenkai, a key figure in China’s newest generation of professional journalists and currently acting head of the editorial page of Southern Metropolis Daily. The title of Li’s talk will be: “The Joys and Misgivings of a Media Upstart: A young editorial writer’s observations on China’s media.”

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“The Joys and Misgivings of a Media Upstart: A young editorial writer’s observations on China’s media”
SPEAKER: Li Wenkai, head of editorial page at Southern Metropolis Daily
Lecture will be conducted in putonghua.
When: April 23, 2008 (Wednesday), 5:30pm to 7pm
Where: Foundation Chamber, Eliot Hall, the University of Hong Kong
What are current affairs editorials and why are they necessary? How does one set about writing them? This question is not just for this or that newspaper, but for the whole of Chinese society. Li Wenkai’s journey from the halls of Peking University to the top spot at Southern Metropolis Daily’s editorial page was a short one with few turns. His fellow journalists chided him for rocketing straight to the top without paying his dues. How could someone with so little life experience be put in charge of current affairs editorials at a leading newspaper? But is Li Wenkai’s experience an accident of fate, or does it tell us more about the state of China’s media today?
About the speaker:
One of the key figures in China’s newest generation of professional journalists, Li Wenkai is currently assistant to the editor-in-chief and acting head of the editorial page of Southern Metropolis Daily. From 1994 to 2001 Li studied in the School of International Relations at Peking University, earning a bachelor’s degree and a master’s in French Studies. From 2001 to 2004, Li served as a reporter and editor at Southern Weekly.
THERE IS NO NEED TO RSVP FOR THIS LECTURE.
For further questions, please contact Rain Li at (852) 2219-4001

The China Media Project is pleased to extend an invitation to our readers to attend a lecture on April 16 by Zhang Ming, a professor of political science at Renmin University of China. Zhang, an expert on political systems in China, will discuss the challenges facing China’s push to improve its higher education system.

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The Quagmire of China’s “Great Leap Forward” in Higher Education
WHEN: 5:30pm to 7pm, April 16, 2008 (Wednesday)
WHERE: Foundation Chamber, Eliot Hall, The University of Hong Kong
China’s “Great Leap Forward” in higher education originated as a reform project in the second half of the 1990s. The idea was to rapidly improve China’s universities by making major capital contributions, but officials gave little thought to the need for structural reforms. The result was the rapid bureaucratization of China’s higher education system, undermining the scholastic environment and encouraging academic corruption. In this lecture, Professor Zhang Ming, one of China’s most active scholar-bloggers, will analyze the root causes of the current predicament facing higher education reform in China, and discuss possible solutions.
About the speaker:
A professor in the political science department at Renmin University of China, Professor Zhang Ming is an expert on the history of political systems and rural politics in China. Professor Zhang is also well known for his commentaries for various Chinese media, and as an active blogger at http://blog.sina.com.cn/zhangming1.
Enquiries: Ms Rain Li (2219 4001/ [email protected])

By David Bandurski – Media reform is an indispensable part of the overall process of economic and political reform in China, veteran magazine editor Hu Shuli (胡舒立) told a packed auditorium at the University of Hong Kong last week.
“What do we mean when we say media reforms and economic and political reforms go together? Broadly speaking, we mean the sharing of ideas,” said Hu, who launched Caijing magazine in April 1998 and helped craft it into one of China’s most respected business publications.

Hu’s talk, “Ten Years at Caijing,” was hosted by the China Media Project of the Journalism & Media Studies Centre, where Hu was recently a visiting fellow.
Tracing the development of what she called “relatively independent” and diverse media with a “popular hue” (民间色彩), Hu stressed that while China’s government has “accommodated” changes in the domestic media industry, it has not been a primary motivating factor.
She also disregarded the idea, which she called an “overseas thesis” (外国结论), that the reasons behind China’s growing media diversity were principally economic.
Included on Hu’s short list of relatively independent media dealing with business and the economy were weekly papers like 21st Century Economic Herald (21世纪经济报道) and The Economic Observer (经济观察报), and such magazines as Business Watch Magazine (商务周刊), New Fortune (新财富) and Business (商界).
Among the principle factors spurring the rise of more “independent” media in China, Hu included a strong “tradition of seeking independence” among journalists, the push for financial independence (freedom from government subsidies), the rise of the advertising sector, and Internet growth.
[Posted March 26, 2008, 12:06pm HK]

By David Bandurski — As Reuters and AFP reported today on the “life or death struggle” in Tibet, they touched unwittingly on one of the most noteworthy aspects of how Tibetan unrest has been handled and reported within China, where the basic formula has been: harsh words for the Tibetans, a harmonious front for the Han. [MAIN PAGE: Tibetan uprisings shown on the Chez Oimdu blog].
The English-language wire reports, which feed on the graphic language of Tibet’s top party leader, Zhang Qingli (张庆黎), will undoubtedly be a source of frustration for Chinese leaders as they attempt to manage the global blowback and present a face of tolerant resolution.
AFP and Reuters both report Zhang Qingli’s words as reflective of China’s official line (which of course they ultimately are as Zhang is Tibet’s top party party leader and enforcer). But the image of Tibet as a “life or death” struggle of “blood and fire” is not being pushed outside the party’s inner circle — nor is it the image top leaders wish to project to the world.
So what happened here?

[ABOVE: Screenshot of “life or death” wire stories as they top a Yahoo! News “China” search this afternoon.]

The source of Zhang’s comments, as quoted by Reuters and AFP, is China Tibet News, an official online news site based in the autonomous region, and the comments originate from an editorial appearing yesterday in Tibet’s official mouthpiece, Tibet Daily. Zhang reportedly made the comments in a closed telecast meeting with other top officials.
A portion of Zhang’s comments are as follows:

We are now fighting a bitter struggle of blood and fire against the Dalai clique, a struggle of life and death. The stability of Tibet concerns the stability of the whole nation, and the safety of Tibet concerns the safety of the whole country.
AFP: “We are currently in an intensely bloody and fiery struggle with the Dalai Lama clique, a life or death struggle with the enemy.”
REUTERS: “We are in the midst of a fierce struggle involving blood and fire, a life and death struggle with the Dalai clique.”

Interestingly, China Tibet News is one of just a few sources available online or anywhere else for Zhang’s comments. They have not appeared on major Web portals. Nor have they appeared in newspapers outside Tibet.

[ABOVE: Screenshot of Chinatibetnews.com, an official news portal for the autonomous region.]

A search on Baidu News for the phrase “life and death struggle with the enemy” (“你死我活的敌我斗争”), comes up with Zhang’s editorial from Tibet Daily via the Xinhua News Agency website, and the Phoenix TV website.
A search in the WiseNews database of Chinese language periodicals, covering over 130 major party and commercial newspapers, turns up no reference to “life and death struggle with the enemy” in coverage since the uprising. The database does not include Tibet Daily.
The important point to recognize is that while leaders in Tibet have resorted to the fiery vocabulary of Maoist-era jargon (“people’s war,” for example) to send the message that they will deal with protests with an iron hand, media across the country (party papers, commercial papers and websites) have used more restrained language.
Nowhere is the Maoist-era rhetoric more apparent than in the reference in Zhang Qingli’s editorial and related coverage to the need to “take a clear-cut stand against separatism” (旗帜鲜明地反对分裂). That phrase is of course redolent of Deng Xiaoping’s call in 1983 to “take a clear-cut stand against bourgeois liberalization” (旗帜鲜明地反对资产阶级自由化).
More poignantly, the phrase recalls the People’s Daily editorial of April 26, 1989, that presaged the crackdown on student demonstrators. The title of that editorial was, “We Must Take a Clear-Cut Stand Against Chaos” (旗帜鲜明地反对动乱).
[Posted by David Bandurski, March 19, 2008, 9:53pm]
MORE SOURCES:
“Images and News of Tibet Riots Seep Onto Web, Despite Chinese Authorities’ Clampdown“, China Digital Times, March 19, 2008
“Simmering Resentments Led to Tibetan Backlash,” New York Times, March 18, 2008
Links and roundup of Tibet coverage at Roland Soong’s ESWN.

March 2008 — Hu Shuli is the founding editor of Caijing, China’s leading finance and economics magazine. Ms. Hu started Caijing in April 1998. Under her leadership, Caijing has become one of China’s most respected business publications. Internationally recognized for her work in journalism, Ms. Hu was selected as one of BusinessWeek’s “50 Stars of Asia” in 2001 and named “International Editor of the Year” by the World Press Review in 2003. Ms. Hu was also recommended as the most powerful commentators in China by Financial Times in 2006. The Wall Street Journal listed her as one of the “Ten Women to Watch in Asia”. She was the winner of 2007 Louis Lyons Award for Conscience and Integrity in Journalism by Nieman Foundation at Harvard University.

The China Media Project is pleased to extend an invitation to our readers to attend a lecture on March 19 by Caijing chief editor Hu Shuli, one of China’s top journalists. Hu Shuli is the founding editor of Caijing, China’s leading finance and economics magazine. In this lecture, Hu Shuli will address the question of what role an independent-minded news magazine can play in a changing China.

———–

“Ten Years at Caijing: Glimpsing the development of China’s media through one of the country’s leading news magazines”
Speaker: Hu Shuli, chief editor of Caijing
Lecture will be in Putonghua.
When: March 19, 2008 (Wednesday), 5:30pm to 7pm
Where: Foundation Chamber, Eliot Hall, the University of Hong Kong
Caijing, one of the mainstays of professional journalism in China, has for ten years pushed openness of information, watchdog journalism and accurate, in-depth news through its editorial philosophy of “independent, exclusive and original.” The magazine has had a major influence as a documenter of social change in China. It has also pioneered commercial reforms in China’s media. In this lecture, Hu Shuli will address the question of what role an independent-minded news magazine can play in a changing China.
About the Speaker:
Hu Shuli is the founding editor of Caijing, China’s leading finance and economics magazine. Ms. Hu started Caijing in April 1998. Under her leadership, Caijing has become one of China’s most respected business publications. Internationally recognized for her work in journalism, Ms. Hu was selected as one of BusinessWeek’s “50 Stars of Asia” in 2001 and named “International Editor of the Year” by the World Press Review in 2003. Ms. Hu was also recommended as the most powerful commentators in China by Financial Times in 2006. The Wall Street Journal listed her as one of the “Ten Women to Watch in Asia”. She was the winner of 2007 Louis Lyons Award for Conscience and Integrity in Journalism by Nieman Foundation at Harvard University.
THERE IS NO NEED TO RSVP FOR THIS LECTURE.
For further questions, please contact Rain Li at (852) 2219-4001

By David Bandurski — Military spending, inflation and terrorist conspiracies may be dominating the China headlines in the West, but the big news on the home court this week is China’s push for reform of its numerous government ministries to create more streamlined super-ministries — a process known in Chinese as da bu zhi gaige (大部制改革).
As the National People’s Congress proposal for widespread ministry reform tops the official agenda, one of the most pleasant surprises is the way a number of mainland commentators are either downplaying or analyzing seriously what others are simply ballyhooing as a grand vision for change.
In a news release Monday, the official China News Service enthusiastically jumped the gun with the headline: “Ministry reform proposal on March 11 to embody thinking on ‘separation of powers.'”
Wow! Really?
That was quite a bold claim for yesterday’s NPC proposal considering that “separation of the three powers,” or san quan fenli (三权分立), historically has a somewhat sensitive association (and rightfully so) with Western-style democracy. It wasn’t long ago that this buzzword was on the list of taboos.
Given the usual understanding of “separation of powers”, the trias politica, the China News Service report’s claim was also entirely implausible. How can you have separation of powers within a single branch of government? These “reforms,” let’s remember, are to be confined to the State Council .
But we are seeing the term — and everywhere. So what’s going on? More on this question further down.

[ABOVE: Screenshot of online coverage at Sohu.com of a Southern Weekend graph comparing the number of government ministries in various countries. From left: China, U.S., Britain, France, Germany, Japan, South Korea and Singapore.]

First things first, the general idea behind “ministry reform” is to merge various government agencies to eliminate overlapping responsibilities (政府职能交叉问题), resulting (hopefully) in greater efficiency and cost-saving.
The topic has actually been in the headlines for several months in China. A January 24 article run on Sina.com and other websites talked about the pending merger of government agencies dealing with the telecoms industry, including the Ministry of Information Industry .
The Beijing Star reported, also back in January, that reforms would begin with modest experimentation in 2008, with more ambitious changes slated for 2009. Mergers would probably begin, the paper said, with the creation of a National Bureau of Energy subsuming related departments.
We now see that this is the case. China’s ministry reform proposal does include the creation of a National Bureau of Energy, as well as the following five ministries: the Ministry of Industry and Information, the Ministry of Environmental Protection, the Ministry of Human Resources, the Ministry of Housing and Urban-Rural Construction and Social Security and the Ministry of Transport. [More from AFP here].
Official party newspapers have loudly touted “ministry reforms” this week, and identical online feature spreads appeared at major Web portals aggregating news, history and favorable commentary on the topic.
Behind the rhetoric, however, there are some very basic questions that leave “ministry reforms” landing, according to some readings, with an inconsequential THUD. Given the party’s clear efforts to champion these so-called reforms, it is interesting that we should be hearing these dissenting views at all.
Yesterday’s The Beijing News included a fairly comprehensive dialogue between three academics with somewhat varying, but mostly positive, takes on ministry reforms.
First off, Liu Xutao (刘旭涛), a professor at the China National School of Administration, expressed his support for ministry reforms, emphasizing that they did not mean bigger government. Instead, he said these latest reform efforts were part of an overall attempt to make government more responsive to the needs of the people.
Another scholar participating in the dialogue, Renmin University professor Mao Shoulong (毛寿龙), was less enthusiastic about the reforms and said they faced a “number of difficulties,” notably an entrenched bureaucratic culture based on privilege rather than service.
Du Gangjian (杜钢建), a professor from Shantou University’s School of Law, emphasized that a “system of power separation”, or fen quan zhi (分权制), was an integral part of this latest push for ministry reform, distinguishing it from past shake-ups like those in the 1980s. That was critical, he said, because “if there was only a consolidation of central ministries to create bigger ministries with broader responsibilities, without a system of power separation, the result could only be the further concentration of administrative power and deepening of the government’s autocratic hue.”
Many of the views on the strength or weakness of these proposed ministry reforms seem to turn on this pivotal question of “separation of powers.”
But what exactly is meant by this “separation of powers”, which has in recent days been variously rendered in the Chinese media as san quan fenkai (三权分开), san quan fen li (三权分立) and san quan fen zhi (三权分制). Is this the move toward greater political reform we’ve been anxiously anticipating?
There are a lot of interesting issues here, but we’ll try our best to keep things simple.
The important thing to know about the notion of “separation of powers” in China is that it has transmogrified in the hands of Chinese political theorists in recent years and gained some currency among the political elite. There are now, as Wu Jiaxiang (吴稼祥) informed us on his Weblog yesterday, three separate Chinese versions of Baron de Montesquieu’s famous theory:

In terms of the notion of the value of “stand”, or li (立), [Bandurski NOTE: the Chinese term for separation of powers is literally “three + powers + separately + standing”], there are two levels we can talk about. The concept of “small government” lies behind “ministry reform,” and this cannot simply be regarded as a Chinese version of the “night-watchman state” (守夜人) we talk about for Western nations with market economies. It is in fact the political ideal of non-action (or wu wei, 无为) as it arises in Taoism (NOTE: the phrase in Lao Zi goes: “道常无为，而无不为。侯王若能守之，万物将自化.”] On another level, this “stand” means separation of powers (分权). For this, Zheng Xinli (郑新立), vice-director of the CCP’s Policy Research Center, offers a very good explanation. He says that as a key component of administrative system reforms (行政体制改革), carrying out super-ministry reforms with an accord on responsibilities is an irresistible trend, and that thinking on “separation of the three powers” of “decision-making, implementation and monitoring” would be revealed in the process of State Council system reforms. Ministry reforms will encompass “separation of powers.”

This “separation of powers” of course is still not the “separation of powers” Montesquieu spoke of. Separation of powers can be divided into three types — small, medium and large (大中小). Small separation of powers is the kind of intra-departmental separation of powers Zheng Xinli is referring to. It is a kind of arrangement of administrative organs, dividing them [internally] into “decision-making, implementation and monitoring,” letting each part carry out its own responsibility. Medium separation of powers is what Montesquieu refers to. It is a kind of political arrangement pointing to the separate standing of the legislative, administrative and judicial powers, which mutually check one another. Big separation of powers points to separation of political parties and legislative and executive powers.

Wu Jiaxiang does not offer his own views on the effectiveness this so-called “small separation of powers.”
He does, however, conclude by mentioning that the appearance of “separation of powers” in public debate at all in China is a positive development. “‘Separation of powers’ was in the past a taboo term,” he writes. “That it is now a term with currency among officials, this alone is a major step forward for ministry reforms.”
But can this “small” notion of “separation of powers” really work?
For one of the most outspoken criticisms of ministry reforms and their bold claims to political reform, we can turn to an editorial appearing in last Sunday’s edition of Southern Metropolis Daily, by Wang Jianxun (王建勋), an assistant professor at China University of Political Science and Law.
Wang carefully picks apart the suggestion there was anything at all substantive to claims ministry reform would more effectively check abuse of power by government agencies. He also strenuously objects to the conflation of ministry reform with political reform, or zhengzhi tizhi gaige (政治体制改革).
The full text of Wang’s editorial follows:

During this annual session of the ‘two meetings’ (the NPC and CPPCC) one focus of attention has been ministries reform. More than a few people believe that “ministries reform” can promote a change in the role of the government, making it transform from a control posture to a service posture, that it can resolve the problem of redundancies in responsibilities and raise administrative efficiency, even that it can help promote political reform, bringing democracy and rule of law to China. It must be said that if these goals can be achieved, we should all put our hands together in applause. But if we look more carefully at the logic and preconditions of “ministries” reform, I’m afraid the outcome won’t be so ideal as we imagine.
It can be taken for granted that the main role of the ideal government is to efficiently provide public services to citizens, meeting their needs as citizens. This is easier said than done. Why? Because if a government holds power it will metamorphose, becoming the “ruler” of citizens rather than a “provider of services.” This is a puzzle for any nation, China included. Experience shows that if you want the government to become service-oriented, you must ensure power is effectively checked. That is to say, you must build a government of limited power. There are two principle means of limiting government power, and these are: 1) separation of powers, including vertical and horizontal, 2) clearly stipulating the basic rights and freedoms of citizens, and protecting these by means of the judicial system.
Returning to ministries reform, it’s tough to say whether it will be of any use in limiting power. The spearpoint of ministries reform is directed at administrative power, and this is much needed. After all, in modern society administrative power, unlike legislative power, abides everywhere and is so easily abused. People come into contact with administrative power on a daily basis — for example, the police, the commerical bureau, city inspectors — and these powers are not exercised with the same caution and gradualism we see with legislative power. Nor is administrative power as passive or procedural as judicial power. This is patently clear when we look at China, where almighty administrative power obstructs judicial and legislative power. Therefore, an important task in the checking of power must be the checking of administrative power, and this is accomplished principally through judicial and legislative power as balancing forces.
Well then, can “ministries reform” bring us closer to checking this ever-present and expanding administrative power? The answer is: not likely. Why? Because, speaking on a number of levels, “ministries reform” is about the centralization and consolidation of power and not about separating and distributing power. Put another way, it means taking what were formerly several different departments and merging them under a single department. For example, creating a large “Transportation and Transport Bureau” concentrating management authority for the areas of air transport, the rail system, highways and even ocean transport. This kind of concentration and unification not only means no particular advantage the checking of power, but in fact raises many negatives. Originally, the separate departments dealing with air, rail, highway and ocean gave rise to a definite degree of competition owing to their varying interests, and this competition often led to benefits for the consumer. The end result once these departments are merged could very well be that their competition is lost and power becomes stronger and less subject to checks and balances.
Some people might say that “ministry reform” means carrying out mutual checks and balances between decision-making, implementation and monitoring within departments. My answer to that would be that using internal department separation of powers (部门内部的分权) to limit administrative power is like hoping to summon a genie from a lamp, because expecting departments whose goals and interests are one and the same to carry out their own internal checks is just as untenable as expecting officials’ wives to ensure they are not corrupt. Said another way, the primary task of any administrative department is implementation, because decision-making depends upon legislative organs and monitoring on judicial organs, the media and public opinion. Therefore, it is not too meaningful to divide administrative departments internally into decision-making, implementation and monitoring functions.
Then there is the matter of “efficiency.” People are bound to believe that if there are fewer departments then efficiency gains will necessarily follow. This is not necessarily the case. Why? Because efficiency demands a number of different factors, for example incentive mechanisms for officials, external pressures, etc. If, for example, an official is not driven to give his job his best, it makes little difference to their work that there are fewer departments. If, for example, an official does not face the pressure of public opinion, fewer departments won’t prevent them from dragging their feet. In fact, under “consolidated ministries” (大部制) officials will have even greater power, and I’m afraid that if there is no external monitoring it will be even easier for them to slack off . . .
It is also necessary at this point to realize that inter-ministry redundancies are difficult to avoid because they arise from the complexities of social life. Establishing absolutely clear lines of responsibility is an impossible mission. The important thing is to establish coordination mechanisms to deal with departmental overlaps. When some problem arises that concerns a number of different areas, various government departments should be able to work together to resolve it.
Finally, as for that view that equates “ministry reform” with political reform (政治体制改革), there is no evidence in support of such a claim. I’m afraid that’s nothing more than wishful guesswork.

[Posted by David Bandurski, March 12, 2008, 10am HK]
UPDATE: The lead editorial in today’s Southern Metropolis Daily concludes that the present round of ministry reforms “can only be seen as a small step forward.” The following are selected portions, including the final graf:

Of course, ministry reforms need to be completed step by step, and we can’t get there with just one step. But our report card for the early stages in this war [to reform government ministries] reveals an unavoidable fact: as they go forward ministry reforms will definitely face resistance, and this resistance will be more formidable than people suppose. The root of this resistance is the tendency of government agencies to work for their own interests, a trend that has worsened in recent years. In fact, it is this tend of self-interest that has brought us to this point of overlaps in function.
Of course . . . we can see with some degree of optimism that the ruling party has already made attempts at addressing this phenomenon [of self-interested government agencies]. We hope that these attempts ultimately target the root of the problem: the fact that government departments have power but no responsibility. What is needed, clearly, is a round of real system reforms.

Page two of today’s official People’s Daily loudly touts the State Council reform plan.
UPDATE 2 (March 13, 2:44 am HK)
An editorial by Renmin University professor Zhang Ming (张鸣) in today’s Southern Metropolis Daily cuts to the heart of the issue of separation of powers and government monitoring – namely, the need for political reforms that give people’s congresses real power to represent the interests of the people:

The most crucial thing is monitoring that comes from those to whom [public] services are provided. Under China’s present system, this means monitoring from people’s delegates and from the media. Therefore, if we really want to build a service-oriented government, one intrinsic institutional need is the activation of the people’s congress system, allowing people’s congress delegates to speak on behalf of the people and not principally on behalf of the government. At the same time, we should clearly set out the media’s right to monitor government – we can’t hesitate on this, sending down a gag order at the critical moment. Of course, media might say things carelessly, but all we need is to pass the right kinds of laws, specifying what are violations, and handle cases according to that law. Moreover, those media that are careless will lose the confidence of the public and therefore lose their market. In fact, much more harmful than media speaking carelessly is the government handling things carelessly.
Without monitoring, and particularly monitoring from those who are served [by governments], there’s no such thing as a service government. This is as simple as one plus one equals two.

The following are a few Web user comments on the above editorial in the order they appear on QQ.com:

From Tianjin:
Zhang Ming has a great point. I’m in favor! When can we have elections for people’s congress delegates? I’d like to serve as a qualified people’s congress delegate, making petitions on the peoples’ behalf. Why wouldn’t people elect me?
From Taiyuan:
If they’re not elected, what good will it do to have them do the monitoring?
From IP 123.187.131.*
When you’re out of order and I’m helpless, all I can do is scream out, “I want the vote!”
From Hunan Province:
We should mobilize the people to monitor government policies!
From IP 122.137.241.*:
If there are no general elections there can be no real monitoring.
From Weihai City:
These ideas speak the voice of the people and set down the principles of social progress!
From IP 116.224.174.*:
Under China’s present system, this means monitoring from people’s delegates and from the media . . . . . Well, people’s congress delegates = dupes, and the media = mouthpieces.