Author: David Bandurski

Now Executive Director of the China Media Project, leading the project’s research and partnerships, David originally joined the project in Hong Kong in 2004. He is the author of Dragons in Diamond Village (Penguin), a book of reportage about urbanization and social activism in China, and co-editor of Investigative Journalism in China (HKU Press).

Was the 90th anniversary of the "October Revolution" a missed opportunity for reflection in China?

By David Bandurski — In a CMP-sponsored lecture at the University of Hong Kong last week, Lu Yuegang talked about the role of journalists in documenting the facts of history, and how, in an open society, people must be free to seek historical truth. But as Chinese web users put one up on the scoreboard last month by exposing the South China tiger hoax, did China’s public miss an opportunity to re-visit a critical moment in PRC history?
That’s exactly what Li Gongming (李公明) suggested when he wrote last month in Southern Metropolis Daily, a commercial spin-off of Guangdong’s official Nanfang Daily, that “the writings of various scholars in recent days reflecting back on Russia’s ‘October Revolution’ actually should have drawn more attention from the public.”

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[ABOVE: An image from Guangdong’s Tongzhou Gongjin, November 2007, of Soviet leaders, with the headline, “1917-2007: Here We Soul-Search History”.]

Attention to the anniversary had, in Li’s view, been disappointingly scant. “In contrast to the ‘South China Tiger’ affair, which has bubbled with activity all along, attention to the 90th anniversary of the October Revolution has languished. But while the former is all about public opinion in pursuit of the truth, the latter is in fact provides us with a historical case of much deeper importance for this kind of factual pursuit.”
But seriously now, who cares about the October Revolution?
Well, China’s Communist Party used to care, and care very much — and that’s precisely what made this year’s 90th anniversary (which should, numerically speaking, have been a whopper) so interesting.
The anniversary of Russia’s October Revolution, the 1917 coup d-etat that brought the Bolsheviks to power, once loomed large on China’s social and political calendar. The gunshots of that event, as Mao Zedong once said, brought Marxism-Leninism to China — and that was cause for celebration, for a real honest-to-goodness holiday, or jieri (节日).

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[ABOVE: Front page of the November 7, 1957, edition of the official People’s Daily.]

But the hold of ideology has progressively weakened in China since the launch of economic reforms more than three decades ago. By the time the revolution’s 70th anniversary arrived on November 7, 1987 — the revolution happened in October of the Julian calendar, hence the “October Revolution” — the day no longer merited distinction as a holiday.
Not surprisingly, this year’s 90th anniversary passed without fanfare. No official celebrations were planned. No top officials stepped out to commemorate the event. The anniversary barely merited mention in the official People’s Daily, where decades ago it would have commanded the front page.
A lone article in the back pages of People’s Daily on November 23 this year announced that “the World Socialism Research Center and Marxism Research Academy of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences and other units” had held a discussion forum in Beijing on ‘”The October Revolution and the Contemporary Socialist Road.” The subtitle of the event was: “Studying the Spirit of the Party’s 17th National Congress, Commemorating the 90th Anniversary of the October Revolution.'”
“Those at the meeting believe,” said the article, lamely parroting Mao’s famous saying, “that the ‘gunshots of the October Revolution brought Marxism-Leninism to China.’”
In closing, the article invoked Hu Jintao’s recent political report to the 17th National Congress, saying the party must “press ahead on the road to Socialism with Chinese characteristics” (坚定不移地走中国特色社会主义道路).
Most interesting about this year’s anniversary, however, was the extent to which it WAS covered by non-party media, particularly in more outspoken Guangdong.
Back at Southern Metropolis Daily, Li Gongming wrote that today “there is already an objective and impartial reckoning of the October Revolution among historians internationally . . . and we can say that these historical truths are beyond a shadow of a doubt, unlike the smoke of the South China tiger affair.”
The problem, said Li, was that many people in China were still covering up the truth about the October Revolution and its implications for contemporary Chinese politics as well as history:

The problem now is that more than a few people are still keeping mum about the facts of history, still protecting those myths instilled in us for so long. It seems that determining the fact or fiction of a tiger isn’t too difficult, but letting everyone recognize clearly the fact or fiction of that tiger is not so easy. Why is it that even when the truth has been spoken, falsehood can still obstruct everyone’s vision? We’ve all heard this saying before about lies – that if they are repeated a thousand times they become truth. Jin Yan tells us that hundreds of thousands of copies of the mythical Soviet work “The October Revolution” were printed . . .
For more than a half century these historical materials as broad as the open sea, plus an even vaster volume of ordinary reading material and children’s books, works of art, all were inculcating historical lies. And this raises another question: how is it that lies can survive for so long?

Then comes the fundamental issue at hand, the way the Soviet Union failed by not instituting socialist democratic reforms (with China’s own failure presumably the subtext):

In fact, as early as 1918, not long after [the Bolshevik’s] had come to power, [Rosa] Luxemburg issued a warning to Lenin: “Without general elections, without unrestricted freedom of press and assembly, without a free struggle of opinion, life dies out in every public institution, becomes a mere semblance of life, in which only the bureaucracy remains as the active element.” [NOTE: The rest of Luxemburg’s quote, as often cited, goes: “Public life gradually falls asleep, a few dozen party leaders of inexhaustible energy and boundless experience direct and rule. Such conditions must inevitably cause a brutalization of public life: attempted assassinations, shootings of hostages, etc.”]

A feature article by Wang Kang (王康) in Southern Weekend called “Redemption, Tragedy and Inspiration”, running over 13,000 words, said that “whether you support or oppose it, no one can deny the earth-shaking importance Russia’s October Revolution had for human destiny in the twentieth century … ”

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[ABOVE: Front page of the November 8 edition of Guangdong’s Southern Weekend, picturing an October Revolution commemoration ceremony in Moscow.]

Wang’s article took an in-depth look at the October Revolution and its significance for world history. The article, which took a centrist position stripped of official ideology, contrasted the hopes of Marx and Engels for the “liberation of mankind” with the failures of the Soviet system, including the evils of Stalinism, over-concentration of power and cults of personality.
The article concluded:

Not only did the October Revolution fail to achieve its beautiful ideals, but in the end was not able to build a modern society of a higher order than that of Western capitalist societies.
The tragedy of this revolution was the material, spiritual, humanitarian and institutional gap that separated their [revolutionary] ideals from the historical conditions and the moral and spiritual force they had rallied.

The most important modifier in the above passage was “institutional”, the “institutional gap” (制度上的鸿沟), the recognition that the Soviet Union had failed to create an adequate political system to ensure the “liberation of mankind”.
Of course, these criticisms of the Soviet Union can apply as well to contemporary history in China, a fact of which writers like Wang Kang are doubtless well aware. It was, after all, Deng Xiaoping who broached the issue of “party-government separation” in the 1980s to resolve the problem of over-concentration of power (权力过分集中), which was seen as having directly caused such calamities as the Cultural Revolution.
The publication that seems to have offered the most in-depth exploration of the institutional implications of the October Revolution is Tongzhou Gongjin (同舟共进), a monthly magazine published by the executive committee of Guangdong’s Political Consultative Conference.
Tongzhou Gongjin‘s November issue was star-studded with leading Chinese thinkers, including Xie Tao (谢韬), the scholar whose call for democracy earlier this year touched off a debate over political reform in China, and Gao Fang (高放), one of China’s leading experts on Marxist history.
“The October Revolution had an immense impact on the lives of people of my generation,” begins Xie Tao, who was born in December 1921, just four years after the revolution:

The buffeting winds of decades, the various difficulties and hardships, gropings and desires [we have endured], the joys of work and the pain of error, all are directly or indirectly connected with it.

In a later section, Xie Tao explores the question of institutional weakness, drawing on the words of Chinese Communist Party founder Chen Duxiu (陈独秀):”‘If we don’t seek out weaknesses in the system and learn from these, merely shutting our eyes and opposing Stalin, then we will never see with clarity. When one Stalin falls, numerous others will emerge in Russia and elsewhere.”
Xie Tao writes:

Why was the Soviet-style path of socialism unable, after the end of the Second World War, to compete with capitalist countries? What happened to the “superiority of socialism”? This question of course has deep institutional and theoretical roots. My feeling is that this was due to inherent weaknesses in the Soviet system.
Simply speaking, the Soviet system was characterized by: a high level of concentration of power and the economy, the application of force to promote economic development, and reliance on force to restrain normal thought [and discourse].

In another essay in Tongzhou Gongjin, Cao Lin (曹林), an editor at China Youth Daily, picks up on the institutional threads of earlier articles (such as Xie’s) dealing with democratic socialism. In the piece, “Who Says Ordinary People Can’t Compete with Officials?”, Cao writes directly about the virtues of competitive electoral politics, drawing on recent regulations passed in some areas of China that establish acceptable ratios of party cadres in local people’s congresses.
Xinjiang, for example, reportedly passed a regulation on September 19 this year saying that at least 75 percent of delegates to city and district-level congresses in the autonomous region must be workers, farmers, intellectuals or other “ordinary” people (NOT, that is, party officials).
But why, asks Cao, do we need quotas of this sort when free, competitive elections would do the trick?:

If an industrial worker can represent the interests of farmers after being elected as a delegate, if he can submit proposals that reflect the interests of farmers, then farmers can put their votes in for this worker. In the same way, if a cadre can win an election on a pro-business platform, then he can earn the votes of business people . . . If its a competitive election, then having more cadres isn’t a problem — the presence of cadres would indicate that they had greater trust among voters. If elections are the result of competition, there’s not way you can control ratios, and there’s no need to do so, because competition ensures delegates speak for the interests [of others] and not for their own interests . . .
. . . In this way, there’s fundamentally no need to limit the ratio of cadres [in people’s congresses]. Who says ordinary people can’t beat out officials?

December 3 — December 9, 2007

December 4 — In a meeting attended by representatives from top Web portals across China, Cai Mingzhao (蔡名照), vice-minister of the State Council Information Office, underscored four priorities for Internet development in the country following the party’s recent 17th National Congress. At the top of the list: propaganda control, or “grasping correct guidance” (把握正确导向). Consistent with state media policy under Hu Jintao, Cai’s speech emphasized the need for commercial development of the Internet even as control remained the paramount priority. While Cai said Internet media needed “first to have a firm grasp of correct guidance, creating a favorable online opinion environment for the building of a harmonious society,” he also emphasized the “need to build a main online media force (网络媒体主力军) with comprehensive strength, major influence and broad coverage”. The latter phrase, with it militaristic metaphors, invoked Hu’s policy of media strengthening, or zuoqiang zuoda (做强做大), which calls for the creation of integrated media groups that are at once commercially powerful and mindful of party propaganda discipline. [More from CMP].
December 4 — Nick Young, founder and editor of the China Development Brief, a nonprofit publication covering Chinese social, political and economic affairs, wrote in the Christian Science Monitor about the circumstances surrounding the shutdown of the journal last summer. State security officials, Young said, had presented him with a simple choice: “You can be the government of China’s friend or our enemy; there is no other way.” [CMP on shutdown of China Development Brief and Minjian]
December 7 — According to a report by China Intellectual Property News, Morgan Stanley Executive Director Li Weidong said at a recent China IT forum that the value of the country’s new media sector had already surpassed 60 billion U.S. dollars, up from roughly five billion U.S. dollars in 2003. China’s top 20 websites accounted for one-quarter of the total market value. Li Weidong quoted back back on December 2 as saying that the number of digital TV users in China would triple during each of the next three years, and that digital TV would be the fastest growing consumer sector in China.
December 7 — Fresh from a victory in exposing fake photos of the endangered South China tiger, Chinese Web users attacked a lunar photograph recently released by China’s space administration and which it said had been taken by Chang’e 1 lunar probe, alleging the photo was a copy of one taken by NASA. Outside commentators, including Emily Lakdawalla of the Planetary Society, joined in the debate, which was also covered by international media. [Coverage from Danwei.org]. [Telegraph coverage]. [Reuters coverage].

"Tolerance evaporates": Editors from two ill-fated journals try in vain to reason with Chinese authorities

By David Bandurski In an article earlier this week, Nick Young explained the circumstances surrounding the shutdown this summer of his non-profit journal, the China Development Brief. Based on Chinese journalist Zhai Minglei‘s (翟明磊) account of the closure of the civil society journal Minjian, both publications seem to have been the victims of a concerted campaign by government authorities against publications servicing the NGO sector in China.
The decisions to shut down the China Development Brief and Minjian were not made in consideration of China’s laws, but administrative regulations offered the pretext when those in power — fearful, says Young, of “color revolutions” elsewhere in the world — felt it was time to move against them. Alluding to periodic law-enforcement crackdowns, Zhai has suggested the recent moves are part of an “intellectual strike hard campaign.”
Both journals had taken advantage of a degree of apparent tolerance in China’s publishing sector that allowed them to operate without official publishing licenses, or kanhao (刊号).
Young and Zhai Minglei cite similar reasons for deciding to publish in the way they did:

YOUNG: “Neither [our English or our Chinese] newsletter complied with China’s highly restrictive publishing laws, which entail political controls that prevent the kind of objective and independent reporting that we offered. But we seemed to have found a lacuna of tolerance that, I believed, might presage the gradual advance of free expression.”
ZHAI: “One reason Minjian did not have a publishing license is because under China’s current publishing environment, publishing licenses are held and controlled by publishing organs designated by the state . . . As a resource for the public good promoting action on public welfare, Minjian had no aims to profit in the marketplace, nor did we want to bear this unjust cost. Even more important was the sponsoring institution and press censorship that would come with the publishing license. [Note_Bandurski: In China all licenses for publishing are held by sponsoring institutions, or zhuguan danwei (主管单位), that are responsible for ensuring party propaganda discipline at publications under their watch.] Minjian had no intention of tying its own hands and feet.”

Zhai and Young were not alone. Literally thousands of magazines and newsletters, academic and otherwise, continue to publish in China without licenses. And as Zhai points out, if the authorities were to uniformly apply their logic in going after Minjian and the China Development Brief , then . . .

“all of the internal organizational publications and materials of NGOs in China are illegal publications . . . [a]nd so it is with all of those small booklets we circulate among friends and acquaintances in China as a form of interaction or to seek the appreciation of friends, or those various poetry collections we call people’s publications (民刊), all reading materials shared among colleagues. All they need is to be printed and they are illegal publications.”

The experiences of Zhai and Young suggest publications in this grey area may be living on borrowed time as Chinese leaders grow ever more wary of China’s nascent civil society, particularly amidst growing civil unrest.
As Young put it: “The tolerance evaporated this summer.”
In many cases, the accusations leveled against the editors by state police cross the border into the bizarre, suggesting Chinese leaders are growing increasingly paranoid about social and political unrest and the role information might have in organizing resistance.
Both Young and Zhai attempt to reassure authorities that their actions are not politically motivated, that they are not “enemies” taking part in conspiracies against those in power. Nevertheless, Zhai is accused at one point, utterly without basis, of helping form a “reactionary organization” with U.S. backing:

Last year the Center for Civil Society held a workshop and posted a pre-announcement online. After the announcement appeared, the abovementioned Web authorities maintained that a reactionary organization called “Workshop” had recently been formed, supported by Americans. Only after a lot of explaining from a number of sides did the authorities admit they had been seriously misinformed by this grave notice of enemy threats.

Likewise, when facing his mysterious interlocutor, Mr. Song, Young gets a glimpse of the brutal, manichean logic of Chinese security officials, for whom there are only enemies and friends. “You can be the government of China’s friend or our enemy; there is no other way,” he is told.
In an interesting parallel with Zhai’s case, Mr. Song tells Young police have “evidence” that the China Development Brief was linked to Xinjiang freedom fighters:

He began by saying he had evidence of our links with Xinjiang separatist organizations. This opening gambit shows both how closely we had been monitored and how sensitive an issue Xinjiang is for Beijing. The “evidence” almost certainly referred to an e-mail exchange two years ago with a Uighur exile group. We contacted them while researching a report that, in the end, I did not publish because it had been too hard to find information that was both new and reliable.

In both cases, the editors fail ultimately to reason with authorities. In response to the suggestion of “links” with Uighur separatists, Young says to Mr. Song:

I told Song this [about an e-mail contact with a Uighur exile group], adding that I believe Beijing is courting disaster in Xinjiang by using heavy-handed treatment against its Muslim population. China, I argued, should learn from rather than mimic the calamitous failures of Western countries in their relations with the Islamic world.

Young’s only answer is his brutal choice: enemy or friend. When he attempts to re-enter China after a stay overseas, he is turned back and his visa nullified.
As a Chinese citizen, Zhai Minglei potentially faces more serious consequences for his actions –even if they do not violate Chinese laws — and that could include a prison term.
Nevertheless, Zhai too attempts to meet the authorities with reason. Faced with the same confrontational logic, Zhai Minglei’s first words to his own interlocutors last week re-iterate that he is not an enemy.
The following is a translation of Zhai’s exchange last Friday with officers from the Cultural Sector Enforcement Squad. The entry was posted on his personal blogpaper, Yi Bao, which Zhai continues to maintain:

An Unforgettable Night
On the morning of the 29th, five people from the Cultural Sector Enforcement Squad (文化市场执法大队) paid a visit to my home and took away my hard drive and copies of the magazine. To guard against the unforeseen, I went to an internet bar and sent an urgent message to a friend, asking him to post it on Yi Bao. I suppose I was thinking that if things got worse that would be my goodbye to readers.
That afternoon and evening I received more than 40 phone calls and short messages from friends and fellow journalists.
Haipeng was the most amusing. As soon as he opened his mouth it was: “Ah, Minglei, don’t go and do this Minjian — do a pornographic magazine instead. Look, I had a word with the head of the squad and told him you had a bunch of ancient Chinese pornographic art stashed away at your place, and it would be a lot less trouble if they went after you for that. As a prize for informing against you they’re going to give me a post as number two at Wenhui Publishing … ” Before long, he called again. He was clearly trying to get me to relax.
When Wang Keqin called it was with a strand of strange laughter. “Ay, Brother,” I said, “How is it that you’re laughing up your sleave when I’m beset with troubles?”
“I never thought the axe would fall on you, my chubby friend!”
“Yeah, I know,” I said, “I’m the least combative one in our circle!”
“Ha ha. So, have they found any gold bullion yet?”
“No, but they did find the sword Chiang Kai-shek gave me.”
“Well, I didn’t call last time you were shut down, so I thought this was a rare opportunity to call and express my condolences.”
When I heard Wang’s great big laugh, I felt like there was nothing on earth to worry about.
“Hey there, Matador,” another old friend began when they called.
“What matador?” I said. “Fighter of dogs, more like it.”
It’s funny, but the first thing I think of with all of these friends in support of me is that shady third party [i.e., the authorities].
There are other calls etched in my heart.
After that came a lot of calls for interviews, from as far away as Spain and as near as Hong Kong. When it was time to sleep I was tired but couldn’t settle down.
Thoughts kept running in my head: Running Minjian, being shut down, doing Yi Bao online, being blocked, and now my hard drive gone so I can’t even write with my computer. If I must, I’ll take my pen out onto the streets and scribble on the walls.
At 3:30 in the afternoon on the 30th I was talking with a couple of old guys from the enforcement squad. According to their way of talking I was ‘accepting questioning and cooperating with the investigation’.
First, I said a few things: “You guys are enforcement, and you’re my antagonists, but we are not enemies. In my 13 years as a journalist I’ve criticized many people, and some of these have later became my friends because of that criticism.”
“I ask that you please let those men pulling the strings behind the scenes know that I thank them for their help in making my journey toward winning freedom of speech and press. And now that I’ve started I won’t stop. As a veteran journalist with a calling I will not rest until I’ve reached my goal. And that goal is to rehabilitate Minjian, to make clear that it is not an illegal publication. Please also thank them for opting for these comparatively civilized tactics, even if this began with a rather undignified raid of my personal residence.”
“I ask that you inform me of what organization you are from, and as you are not police, what legal grounds you have for searching a citizen’s place of residence.”
(After this my lawyer informed me that now even police need a warrant to search the residence of a private citizen. With only a Certification of Illegal Publication (非法出版物鉴定书) the Cultural Squad cannot enter a private residence. Thinking back now to that morning I realize that those five men standing in my doorway did not express any intent whatsoever to search my home. They said only that they wanted to come in and talk, and only then did I allow them in. After that they searched everything, including the paper for my printer. Is that not false pretenses? Afterwards, when my wife asked why a policeman had come along with them — this policeman never came in) — they joked and said, “We have to have police along for all our enforcement activities. They’re afraid you’ll pull knives on us.”)
I pointed out that the determination Minjian was an illegal publication violated the constitution. As soon as they heard that they cut me off. That was a question about the system, and we didn’t need to talk about that, they said. Do with it what you like, but I’ve got to say it, I said. Article 35 of the constitution says that citizens of the People’s Republic of China enjoy freedom of speech, of the press, of assembly and of demonstration. The constitution defines the boundaries between the government and civil rights and is the highest law of the land. You have entered a private resident bearing only a publishing ordinance from the State Council — and, notice, that this is a regulation, only a regulation, NOT a law passed by the National People’s Congress. That ordinance says: publications that are not approved … are illegal publications. As to who must approve, what agency must approve, it says nothing. Is there not a contradiction here between this approved publication and the freedom to publish? This is where our grief lies, and it’s a problem for you too [because your enforcement actions are based on a contradiction]. We don’t have a press or publishing law, and you guys can enter people’s homes holding just an ordinance and violate their private property! The constitution guarantees citizens the right to publish, and the government prevents it. In advanced nations, publishing licenses are there for the taking. There is not need for approval! But even if this ordinance from the State Council stands, Minjian is not in violation. We have approval from Sun-Yatsen University, with more than 20 public seals.
They said to me: “Now, now, let’s not get carried away!”
I said, “Besides that, we were circulated internally. Please show me the regulation that says internal materials require a publishing license. When authorities in Guangzhou did a search they were bearing a document from Guangdong provincial authorities saying ‘printing and reproduction of books, periodicals, audiovisual materials, etc, for internal use without prior approval from administrative offices dealing with publishing’ is illegal. Well, does Shanghai have this sort of decision on record?
They said: “Whether or not it is an internal publication is not for you to say.” I responded: “Nor is it decided by you.” They said: “We are acting with the approval of authorities.” Then they pulled out a document from the Shanghai Administration of Press and Publications (上海新闻出版局) signed by Zhang Yongfa (张永发). On it was the following passage:
“According to the State Council’s Publishing Management Ordinance (of December 25, 2001, No. 343), Clause II, Article 9: Newspapers, periodicals, books, audiovisual materials and electronic publishing must be published through a [designated] publishing unit.”
“According to Article 12: The set up of a publishing unit must be approved by the publishing agencies of the people’s government of the relevant province, autonomous region or municipality following application by the sponsoring institution (主办单位).
“According to Article 24 of ‘Regulations on Management of the Publishing Market’, No. 20, 2003, issued by General Administration of Press and Publications (GAPP) of the People’s Republic of China, and Article 22 of ‘Shanghai Municipal Ordinance on Management of Circulation of Published Materials’, we determine that the following publication is an illegal publication.”
I laughed out loud. “Exactly what office of GAPP is this? I’ve heard that in Guangzhou there is some so-called Publications Authorization Committee (出版物鉴定委员会). It resembles a religious inquisition, and if this group of guys decides your an illegal publication, then you are.”
I emphasized again that Minjian was an internal academic publication put out by a university, that it was nonprofit and had no content of a reactionary, religious, political or pornographic nature. Whatever regulation they were trying to nail us with, it didn’t apply.
I asked for a copy of this document and they refused, so I took a picture:

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“You use an order from an invisible office to limit freedoms. You say it proceeds from China’s unique character and situation (中国国情), and that the Chinese people must respect it. Well, foot-binding is also a product of China’s unique character and situation — should we bind our feet too?”
“Look, we’re not out to get you,” they said.
“I’m not afraid if you’re out to get me. My letter to Minjian readers was a personal statement I made out of conscience as a journalist.”
They eventually admitted that I wasn’t an editor acting on my own, but that I was hired by a university. I said that any questions concerning the content [of Minjian] could be addressed to me.
“Why do you insist on carrying this rotten potato all by yourself?” one of the officers said.
“What are you saying? Minjian is a publication with dignity, not a rotten potato. It would be more appropriate to call it a hot potato.”
This guy said: “We’ll give you three ways out … ” And I broke in, saying, “I’m not a criminal, I don’t need your way out!”
Then I showed them four documents of proof stamped by Sun-Yatsen University and demanded they return my hard drive as they had arranged for the day before. Much to my surprise, they refused. I was furious. I had my reasons, so I stood firm. “You’re not living up to what you promised,” I said.
In the end they referred the matter to their superiors and compromised, saying they would return my hard drive after they had confiscated all of the materials concerning Minjian.
In my anger I said, “This damned kid!” Later I apologized to the guy for this. Through the whole process I rationally defended my rights, dealing with matters not with men.
Because they had entered my home and confiscated all copies of 10 issues of Minjian I had saved, this meant they might deal with me more severely [having more physical evidence against me]. One of officers joked, saying: “Guangzhou fined you 30,000 yuan, so we’ll fine you 300,000.” I laughed out loud: “Money is the root that feeds me, so you might as well take my life.”
The way I see it, things could get rough for me, and this might even mean jail time. But even if it means giving up everything I have, I’ll continue this precious journey toward freedom of expression. I have no idea what’s in store for me.
If I go to prison for my words (坐文字狱), I won’t be the first, nor will I be the last — but I can make it mean something.

Pulling the Strings of China's Internet

[From the Far Eastern Economic Review] When some of the world’s top technology companies, including Yahoo!, Intel, Nokia and Ericsson, formed the Beijing Association of Online Media three years ago, the group seemed to be a typical trade association, sponsoring social activities and facilitating networking. Even when its activities widened last year to include “self-policing” the Internet, it seemed to be benign, targeting content that “contradicts social morality and Chinese traditional virtues,” i.e. pornography. The message was that the companies were providing a public service in spaces used by Chinese teens, not helping the government maintain political control . . . [Click here for a full version at FEER.com]

State Council vice-minister reiterates control as top priority of Internet development in China

By David Bandurski – In a meeting attended today by representatives from top Web portals across China, Cai Mingzhao (蔡名照), vice-minister of the State Council Information Office, underscored four priorities for Internet development in the country following the party’s recent 17th National Congress. At the top of the list: propaganda control, or “grasping correct guidance” (把握正确导向).

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[ABOVE: Screenshot of QQ.com coverage of Cai Mingzhao’s December 4 address to an official Internet forum in Hainan.]

Consistent with state media policy under Hu Jintao, Cai’s speech emphasized the need for commercial development of the Internet even as control remained the paramount priority.
While Cai said Internet media needed “first to have a firm grasp of correct guidance, creating a favorable online opinion environment for the building of a harmonious society,” he also emphasized the “need to build a main online media force (网络媒体主力军) with comprehensive strength, major influence and broad coverage”.
The latter phrase, with it militaristic metaphors, invoked Hu’s policy of media strengthening, or zuoqiang zuoda (做强做大), which calls for the creation of integrated media groups that are at once commercially powerful and mindful of party propaganda discipline. These groups, which party officials believe are necessary to compete globally with the likes of Rupert Murdoch’s News Corporation, have been referred to as “aircraft carriers” (航空母舰).
The third and fourth priorities Cai listed in his speech were as follows:

3) Promoting the coordinated development of content and technology, striving to increase the core competitiveness of online media (三是要推动内容和技术协调发展,不断增强网络媒体的核心竞争力)
4) Renewing mechanisms and systems and strengthening the ability of online media to achieve sustainable development (四是要创新机制体制,增强网络媒体的可持续发展能力).

Chinese authorities intensify pressure on veteran journalist Zhai Minglei

By David Bandurski Last week CMP reported on the troubles facing veteran journalist Zhai Minglei and the ill-fated Minjian magazine. Yesterday, Zhai posted an urgent message on his blogpaper, Yi Bao (壹报) saying police had raided his home, confiscating his last remaining copies of Minjian and taking away Zhai’s hard drive [coverage by John Kennedy at Global Voices here].
According to Zhai Minglei’s post, police should be proceeding with their investigation against him today.

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[ABOVE: Zhai Minglei on a visit to Hong Kong as a China Media Project fellow in 2004.]

As we wait for further news from Zhai, one of our earliest research fellows, CMP would like to share more information with readers about the important work of this dedicated investigative reporter and civil society advocate.
One of Zhai Minglei’s earliest successes as a professional journalist was his investigation into Project Hope, the Chinese government-run charity, as a reporter for Southern Weekend. What follows is a case study on that investigation prepared by Zhai Minglei, David Bandurski and Martin Hala.
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“Unmasking the Demons of Charity”
Through the 1990s, Project Hope, an education assistance program set up through the China Youth Development Foundation (CYDF), was the sentimental darling of the Chinese public. Chinese prize education above nearly all other pursuits, and this program offered a ray of hope to many impoverished rural children for whom school remained an impossible dream.
The basic model of the program, founded in October 1989, was sponsorship. Chinese individuals, companies, and officials of every stripe – including Deng Xiaoping and Jiang Zemin – could sponsor as many children as they wished. Account numbers were established for each child, and donations were transferred directly from the foundation to the child’s local school, specifically earmarked to cover the tuition and other institutional costs. In exchange, sponsors received heart-warming photographs of the children and letters thanking them for their priceless gift. They could even chart a child’s progress through reports on their grades and schoolwork.
The system was transparent, transforming, and heart-warmingly personal. And the joy of watching as a child prospered! Who could put a price tag on that?
By the late 1990s, however, there were whispers pointing to serious problems at Project Hope. No one could substantiate the claims. But eventually Hong Kong’s Next weekly made bold to print the accusations, saying there were problems in the foundation’s accounts. The decision brought the magazine to its knees, as CYDF launched a libel action against it in the Hong Kong courts. On June 21, 2000, judge Andrew Chung ordered the magazine to pay 3.5 million Hong Kong dollars, or 500,000 U.S. dollars, in damages to the foundation.
“THIS IS ALL A MISUNDERSTANDING”
During National Day celebrations in early October 2001, a letter arrived at the headquarters of Southern Weekend, a newspaper that for years had earned a reputation as China’s foremost muckraking publication. At the time, the paper was struggling to preserve its reputation for hard reporting and outspokenness in the face of intense pressure from the highest levels of Chinese leadership. The paper’s envelope-pushing former top editors, Jiang Yiping and Qian Gang, had been forced by authorities to leave their posts in January 2000 and June 2001 respectively.
The letter’s return address was for a private enterprise in Shanghai called Keyon. As Wu Xiaofang, the editor of the news desk, poured over the contents of the letter, his eyes lit up. The company alleged Project Hope had deceived it about the allocation of funds it had given for sponsorship of 24 children in Sichuan’s Xuanhan County.
Keyon said in the letter it had sponsored 24 schoolchildren through Project Hope as part of a corporate community initiative. In return for its contribution the company had received 17 letters, ostensibly from the students, thanking the company for its generosity.
Keyon’s chief executive had decided to pay a surprise visit to Xuanhan over the National Day holiday. He wanted to see for himself the fruits of their initiative. To his extreme consternation, he that found only three of the children under his company’s sponsorship had received Project Hope money. The chief executive then looked more closely at the letters they had received. He found the handwriting on many of the letters was identical. Most of the children under the company’s sponsorship denied ever writing thank-you letters.
Wu Xiaofeng, editor of Southern Weekend’s news desk, assigned two reporters to the story. The first was Xu Liuwen, a veteran Southern Weekend reporter and a native of Sichuan province. Xu set straight off for Sichuan to pick up the trail where the Keyon chief executive had left off. The second was Zhai Minglei, a young reporter who had worked for less than one year at Southern Weekend but had previously done a three-year stint at the Chinese language edition of German-invested Cash magazine. Zhai was given the comparatively mundane task of meeting up with Keyon officials in Shanghai and getting their side of the story.
After little more than a week in Sichuan, Xu Liuwen returned to the office empty-handed. He had spoken at length with the county secretary for the Chinese Communist Youth League (CCYL) and visited several local schools. Nothing at all seemed out of place, he said. Unfortunately, heavy rains had prevented his traveling into the mountains to visit more remote schools.
The county CCYL secretary, Li Xiaodong, presented Xu with bank receipts for the 24 students under Keyon’s sponsorship. All of these receipts bore signatures from parents as well as by teachers and local education officials. Project Hope’s account books were rock solid, said Li. Under Project Hope policy, all donations were transferred directly from the foundation to county and district committees of the CCYL. From there they were disbursed to local education offices, where officials responsible for administering Project Hope could draw funds only with invoices from the local CCYL committee. No one along this chain could draw cash, so the misdirecting of funds was not possible, he said.
More surprising and convincing was the fact Xu Liuwen had managed to track down the mastermind behind the fake thank-you letters, who insisted there was nothing amiss. The man was Tang Chunxu, who was in charge of political and ideological education in Fengcheng District, and was also responsible for disbursement of Project Hope funds to local schools.
“I engineered the writing of the fake letters,” Tang said matter-of-factly. “During the first half of the year one of the donors came from Shanghai to see how the money was being applied. There were, of course, no problems whatsoever with the money. No cash passes through anyone’s hands, and we delivered the funds one time in three separate payments. In most cases, it was the teacher in charge of the class who directly withdrew the Project Hope funds, so the students and parents don’t have a very clear sense about where the money comes from. When you ask the kids to write letters, they’re not too keen. The eight cent postage is also a big expense for them.”
“So I had the head teacher write letters and pass them on to me. I bought the envelopes, addressed them, sealed and stamped them and sent them out myself. Of course, some of the children had no idea we were writing letters on their behalf, but we meant well. It’s not what you think. Just deception with the best of intentions,” he said.
When Xu Liuwen asked Tang why the office claimed some students were in school when in fact they weren’t, the official said this was done so as not to discourage donors. While Project Hope donations helped pay a portion of school fees, they didn’t cover everything. Inevitably, some hard-luck cases couldn’t keep up with their schooling. When this happened, the office continued to report that the child was in school, and sometimes even provided records of their grades, so as not to make donors feel they had contributed in vain.
Did he regret his actions, Xu had asked. “Not at all!” said Tang. “I only regret not doing a more delicate job of things. Not sending letters wasn’t an option, of course. That would have been inconsiderate.”
The ruddy-faced Tang had a perfectly reasonable explanation for everything. He faced the facts straight on, and Xu Liuwen admired his way of handling things. Was there any reason to doubt an official so candid? “I’m telling you, this is all a misunderstanding,” Xu told his editors. “The real reason [for the Project Hope kids not going to school] is regional poverty.”
The story might have stopped right there. But Zhai Minglei was not convinced. He told editor Wu Xiaofeng there were still things that couldn’t be explained. Why, for example, were some of these children totally unaware they had been sponsored? Even more to the point, where had the money earmarked for these children gone?
If the Shanghai company was giving a truthful account, there had to be some merit to the rumors about mismanagement at Project Hope. Zhai Minglei made a careful list of each point that didn’t tally. ”We should go out there and take another look,” he said to Wu.
Unfortunately, the story was still in Xu Liuwen’s hands, and Xu needed to take care of some family matters first. The trip was postponed again and again. After nearly two weeks had passed, Zhai Minglei grew anxious. “Why don’t I just go out to Sichuan myself?” he suggested again to Wu.
This time the editor relented. He wasn’t ready to drop a story about possible corruption at one of China’s most sacred institutions.
The next day Zhai Minglei was on the road.
When he arrived in Sichuan, Zhai made no attempt to speak with Xuanhan County officials. Instead, he met up with Zhou Haolan, a local Sichuan reporter who had expressed interest in working for Southern Weekend, the assignment with Zhai being a kind of informal job interview. The two of them hired motorcycle drivers and traveled straight into the mountains. They blended in with the locals by wearing drab trousers and shirts, and donning faded blue revolutionary-era caps.
It wasn’t long, however, before Zhai Minglei began to feel he had set an impossible task for himself. They were on the road sometimes more than 12 hours at a time, and this went on day after day. The journey was often four or five hours between schools, the monotony of the landscape unyielding. Peaks rose constantly ahead of them, and at the top of each agonizing climb another row of peaks emerged. The rain fell everyday. The roads became mires. There seemed to be landslides waiting around every turn.
By the end of the first day, Zhao Haolan’s ass was so badly bruised he couldn’t lie on his back or sit up in bed. Zhai had lost some of the feeling in his legs. They slept in roadside shops or whatever else they could find. In one place they paid five yuan for their beds and the proprietor tugged a sleeping villager from his mattress saying, “There’s your bed.”
It was obvious that in the two weeks since Xu Liuwen’s return, local education officials had launched a campaign of damage control. In village after muddy village, schoolmasters and teachers yielded nothing. Four full days into their trip they were still empty-handed.
As trying as the physical hardships were, they were nothing against the hopelessness the reporters felt in their hearts. “There’s not a shred of real evidence, and suddenly it dawns on you that perhaps you are wrong,” Zhai Minglei later reflected. “You think to yourself, ‘You doubted a veteran journalist who came up with nothing. But maybe he was right and you’re wrong. These people greet you with calm eyes and innocent smiles. Where are the lies you’ve come looking for? It’s you who are wrong.’”
Zhai Minglei started to obsess over the thought that perhaps his own bearings, his own judgments, were horribly askew. His mood reached its apogee in a mountain village so remote the local people called it Outer Mongolia. It was pitch black there, so black the stars were pinpoints right above their heads. That day they had traveled eight agonizing hours.
For the first time in his career, Zhai Minglei resigned himself to defeat. He phoned his editor, Wu Xiaofeng. “Damnit, Wu Xiaofeng! You’re going to put me through the grinder for this. But we’re at the ends of our ropes and we haven’t come up with anything.”
“You have to find something, no matter how long it takes,” was Wu’s unsatisfying answer. “Every Weekend reporter has an impossible assignment at least once a year. It comes with the territory.”
Zhai Minglei’s journal entry that night was a picture of despair hardening into resolve: “When someone has arrived at the absolute threshold of psychic and physical endurance, can they go on? When all hope is gone, can they still go forward? A friend once shared a passage of T.S. Eliot with me. It went:
I said to my soul, be still, and wait without hope
For hope would be hope for the wrong thing; wait without love,
For love would be love of the wrong thing; there is yet faith
But the faith and the love and the hope are all in the waiting.
Wait without thought, for you are not ready for thought:
So the darkness shall be the light, and the stillness the dancing.

“These words perfectly express the feelings I now have in taking on this assignment. I won’t throw up my hands, even though I have passed my own limits. I’ll come out of this a new person, a reporter always expanding his boundaries.
“Your heart settles. You accept that the hopeless is real, and suddenly your heart grows calm. You burst through your own bounds. Perhaps in such situations, when everything is hopeless, we have no choice but to press on. Your heart settles, and the truth emerges spontaneously, like water flowing from a spring.”
Zhai Minglei had found an existential and journalistic second wind.
A BAD PASTING JOB
At dusk several days later, Zhai Minglei and Zhao Haolan came to the home of Project Hope recipient Zhang Qiang. They had crossed four mountain passes that day to reach the small village of Nanping.
As the reporters spoke with his mother, Xiong Shengbi, Zhang Qiang looked on quietly. His big toes poked out where the soles of his shoes were completely worn down. Xiong insisted they had not received money from Project Hope until just days before, on October 31, when the schoolmaster gave them 150 yuan.
The schoolmaster in Nanping, Yuan Shuhong, insisted that what he had told the executive from Keyon the month before – that he had never received 50 yuan from Project Hope – was a misunderstanding. In fact, he said, the money had been disbursed on time.
“Well then, where did this 150 yuan payment in October come from?” Zhai Minglei asked.
The schoolmaster changed tack. “At the time, I knew Zhang Qiang’s money had gone through. So we advanced the family 150 yuan, 50 yuan for each of three school terms. According to regulations, the Project Hope money and the school waivers are lumped together in one payment,” he said. This was in fact untrue.
“If that’s the case, why did you give the 150 yuan to Zhang Qiang’s mother and not to the school?” Zhai Minglei asked.
“We realized Zhang’s family needed help, and we didn’t need the money right then. So we offered the money to give them a leg up,” said the schoolmaster.
“You’re a school, not a charity organization. Why would you offer assistance to families?”
The schoolmaster paused for a moment and then said, “The 150 yuan payment came from above,” by which he seemed to be referring to the education office.
There was a long silence. The reporters waited.
“It was given to the school,” the schoolmaster elaborated.
The reporters glanced across to one another. This was the first bite on the line. The schoolmaster’s story didn’t add up. They asked to see the school’s account ledgers.
It was perhaps 40 minutes before the schoolmaster emerged from the schoolhouse across the way with the bookkeeper, carrying a stack of account books. Sure enough, there was an entry for a Project Hope disbursement back in January, close to a year earlier. “Zhang Qiang, 100 yuan,” it said in tiny print. On another entry, dated June 10, Zhang Qiang’s mother had signed for 50 yuan. This was curious indeed. Had she lied to the reporters, and to the Keyon executive, about not receiving Project Hope money?
A short time later, Xiong Shengbi herself came by, apparently suspecting something was wrong. She had come over to tell the reporters, right in front of the schoolmaster, that she hadn’t received any money until October 31. She and the schoolmaster stepped outside to talk things through.
It was then Zhai Minglei noticed the June 10 entry in the account ledger had just been pasted onto the page. The glue had not yet dried, in fact. A bolt of clarity shot through his mind. He turned to the bookkeeper: “This entry has just now been pasted in! Why would you do a thing like that?” he asked. Flustered, the bookkeeper could only blurt out, “The schoolmaster told me to do it!”
The game was up. They confronted the schoolmaster and he finally relented: “When the executive came from Shanghai we were totally mystified,” he said. “We had no idea the company had made a contribution to the district office [of the Communist Youth League] the September before. We had paid Zhang Qiang’s reductions out of our own pockets for three school terms. Soon after the executive’s visit, Tang Chunxu, (the ruddy-faced district official who seemed so convincing to Xu Liuwen on the first Southern Weekend mission), came from the education office with 150 yuan for me to give to Zhang Qiang’s mother. He also knew she couldn’t read or write, so he wanted me to make up fake account slips for all three school terms and have her sign these when she collected the 150. This way, we could paste the entries in and they would bear her signature.”
As for the rest of the accounts, the schoolmaster said, Tang had asked them to lump Project Hope funds together with the school’s own tuition and fee subsidies. This way, if anyone grew suspicious, they could just say the funds were all rolled into one, and it would be virtually impossible to conduct an audit.
By these means, the district official responsible for disbursing Project Hope funds had been able to obfuscate the money’s track and eventually to divert it indefinitely. Many schools were left with no means of assisting children sponsored under Project Hope, but parents and schoolmasters were led to assume that the funds had simply not yet been disbursed to the county.
After the year 2000, the district education office, at Tang’s bidding, had ended the practice of listing the names of Project Hope recipients when settling accounts. Instead, they simply entered the total number of children. This way, they could shift funds around as they pleased and schoolmasters had no way of knowing which of their students were slotted for aid. In order to further impede efforts at auditing and oversight, Tang abolished the practice of disbursing funds for each of the three school terms. Instead, he disbursed them in one lump sum, drawing off a portion to pay funds owed the district education office. If, for example, a school owed the education office money for the purchase of new desks that year, Tang would slash the school’s Project Hope disbursement, ostensibly to settle these debts.
Given the extraordinary debt owed by many of these poor country schools, this practice effectively cancelled out Project Hope altogether. “Typically, schools owe thousands or tens of thousands of yuan each year. When accounts are handled in this way, some schools have no hope of seeing money from the foundation,” said Yuan, the schoolmaster. The payment of cash to Zhang Qiang’s mother in October was also strange, he said. According to his understanding, Tang should not have been able to draw cash. How had he managed to do this? And where had the money been going all along?
That night the sweetness of their breakthrough was mixed at first with fear. The education official, Tang Chunxu, had succeeded in drawing schoolmasters and teachers throughout the county into this deception. How could they be sure they would sleep safely that night? They considered traveling straight through, but eventually settled into their beds and slept more soundly than they had for days.
The confession of Nanping’s schoolmaster proved the key they needed to throw the case wide open. They worked solidly for the next 11 days, traveling a total of more than 2,000 kilometers, mostly by motorbike, and interviewing more than 60 people. They rested for just one of those days.
Confronting the children, Zhai Minglei recalled, was a painful process. They had been coached and coerced into lying about letters they had written to Project Hope donors. Zhai watched as one child struggled to recall the lies she had committed to memory. Moments like this hardened his resolve to overthrow what he called, “The Kingdom of Lies”.
The teachers always began with the same story, about how the funds had come on time and as promised. When the journalists refuted these claims with contrary testimony, the teachers fished about desperately for other explanations. In every case, the parents told a different version from that of the teachers. The versions offered by school bookkeepers were at odds with those of the schoolmasters. It was a nest of lies and contradictions.
In some ways, this confusion was both an asset and a liability. The fact that it had taken Southern Weekend two full weeks to organize another trip after Xiu Liuwen had come up empty-handed gave local education officials time to orchestrate a broad cover up. But while Tang Chunxu had gotten many schools to doctor their account ledgers and carefully coached them, the cover up was incomplete. One reason, perhaps, was that Tang suspected Southern Weekend would not return. In any case, there was still much evidence to be found, and the cover up was powerful story in its own right.
Zhai Minglei was baffled by the determination of the teachers and schoolmasters to hold this fabric of lies together, but he knew the reasons for their determination. First of all, Tang Chunxu was familiar, however questionable his motives. The reporters were outsiders, nosing into their lives, so choosing sides was simple. The more important reason, though, was the concept of face, the need to preserve the local reputation. As ugly as it was, this business was their own. No good could come from airing it out before the world.
Once the reporters had broken through the lies, these fragile loyalties crumbled. Schoolmasters and teachers brought truer feelings to the surface and shared their real views on Project Hope’s operations in the area.
Having succeeded in building their story, Zhai Minglei and Zhao Haolan turned more attention to examining the conditions in which the local people lived. Although most of this material never made the Southern Weekend report, the reporters nevertheless felt it was important. Poverty in the area was simply astounding. People slept on blankets black with filth, on beds soiled with crumbs of earth. When it grew dark, there were no oil lamps, much less electricity. The schools were the nearest symbols of hope. But they were black and cavernous, full of crooked, unbalanced desks. In place of blackboards, there were rough-hewn planks.
DIGGING FOR THE DEEPER STORY
In his report about Project Hope, Zhai Minglei’s was careful not to scapegoat the local education official, Tang Chunxu, but rather show how gaping loopholes had resulted in systematic abuses at the foundation. The newspaper’s editorial committee took the story in another direction, however, by centering on Tang’s actions in Xuanhan County. Their decision was based on a calculation of political risk. It was dangerous to attack a prized national institution like Project Hope.
The portions removed from Zhai Minglei’s original version concerned the systemic failure to keep the Project accountable and transparent:
In interviews with Southern Weekend at least four schoolmasters and assistant schoolmasters pointed out that Project Hope had substantial loopholes.
Before 1996 every Project Hope child were assigned an account number. Only when approval came from the local Chinese Communist Youth League (CCYL) could teachers access the funds. After 1996 this system changed. Funds were transferred directly from the Communist Youth Development Foundation (CYDF) to district education offices, which then distributed money to the schools. This created endless opportunities for abuse. Xuanhan County is Sichuan Province’s model county for Project Hope, and has repeatedly been given a stamp of approval by the central government and by the provincial committee of the Communist Youth League. Over the last 10 years, the county has assisted 9,800 children with their school fees, more than any other county in Sichuan. Now problems like these came to light. But if it hadn’t been for the extraordinary efforts of Keyon and this newspaper in getting to the bottom of the issue, these problems would have been kept in the dark.
One assistant schoolmaster said poor management of the Project Hope funds potentially enabled schoolmasters to have head teachers withdraw the funds. When a child graduated, he said, the school could continue drawing money in the child’s name, applying it for the school’s general use, giving it to others, or pocketing it. The failure to separate Project Hope funds and general funds from the district education office put the basis for corruption firmly in place. The disbursing of Project Hope funds to schools from the education office in no way guaranteed they would be used for children. Schoolmasters could apply these in whatever way they wished.
Given the extreme remoteness of this region, misuse of funds by the education office, schoolmasters or head teachers was nearly impossible to detect. Parents have no way of knowing when they can expect Project Hope funds for their children. At least five parents in Xuanhan County had no idea their children were even on the list of Project Hope aid recipients until an executive from the donor company, Keyon, visited Sichuan to see the results of the program.
Three schoolmasters said the Communist Youth Development Foundation should establish accounts for Project Hope children and disburse the aid money directly, allowing access to the money only when the head teacher and the parent are present. After withdrawing the funds, parents could apply these directly to the child’s tuition and fees. This, they said, would remove the potential for misapplication of funds and ensure parents did not use the school fees for household expenses.
Despite the surgical hand of Southern Weekend’s editorial committee, Zhai Minglei received hundreds of letters praising the paper’s coverage of the issue. Soon after, CCTV’s “Eastern Horizon”, a news talk show, ran an interview with Xu Yongguang, the top official at Project Hope. Xu acknowledged there had been a few hiccups at the Project, but said the Communist Youth Development Foundation was looking at nationwide changes to the program. The news program had also interviewed Zhai Minglei, who spoke about endemic institutional problems at Project Hope. This part of the interview was removed before the segment aired, meeting the same fate as similar comments in Zhai’s article. China’s media minders were not interested in casting the story as anything more than an isolated case of corruption. The local official Tang Chunxu would remain the scapegoat.
When news came of Tang’s public admission of guilt shortly after the CCTV segment aired, no one was the least bit surprised. The Party committee in Xuanhan County pledged to deal harshly with Tang, and this seemed to quench the media’s thirst for blood. Eventually, Tang was condemned to a punishment befitting his crime, if otherwise a bit worrisome – he was packed off to a village school, where he was to teach classes in moral education.
The story, fortunately, did not end there. Two whistleblowers, former employees of the Project, came forward with accusations that challenged not only the charity’s system of administration in general, but implicated Xu Yongguang personally. They were Liu Yang, former deputy head of the accounting department at Project Hope, and another former Project Hope employee named Yi Xiao. Liu presented Southern Weekend in early 2002 with evidence of financial machinations that had defrauded the charity of some 12 million yuan. Based on this new information the paper’s deputy editor in chief, Fang Jinyu, wrote a report implicating Xu Yongguang.
In light of the report’s sensitivity, the editors agreed it would be difficult, potentially disastrous, to print an unexpurgated version in the paper. Instead they explored the option of running it in an “internal reference”, or neican, where it might draw the attention, and perhaps the action, of China’s political elite. According to his own account, Fang tried to offer the story to several internal references, including those of his former employer, Xinhua News Agency. The expose was too hot to handle, apparently, and Fang had no takers.
Fang’s sources, having risked their own hides, became anxious about the delays and resolved on leaking the materials to Hong Kong media. Fang helped arrange a meeting between Liu Yang and a mainland correspondent for Ming Pao newspaper.
According to some sources, the leading Hong Kong English-language daily South China Morning Post was also offered Liu Yang’s documentation on Project Hope, but declined to print the story because of fears of possible fallout on the Post’s Malaysian-Chinese owner Robert Kwok’s extensive business interests in China. If true, this would demonstrate even further the potential dangers of the story for Southern Weekend, which had so much more to lose than the Hong Kong-based Post.
Once Ming Pao had broken the story outside China, the South China Morning Post joined in. Encouraged by the overseas publicity, Liu Yang called a news conference in Guangzhou for domestic Chinese media. On March 20, 2002, the day of the news conference, Southern Weekend put Fang’s four-page expose on the front page and sent the issue off to the printers. But Xu Yongguang was charging into action too. He called the allegations circulating in the Hong Kong press “a terrorist attack on Project Hope” and pressed the Propaganda Department to issue a ban on the story. The ban was enforced through the local propaganda office in Guangdong and Southern Weekend’s entire print-run of some 300,000 copies was destroyed.
What Fang did next was a huge gamble – he decided to post the article on the Web in its entirety, under his own name rather than that of the newspaper. Within hours the story had made it around the globe and everyone knew the truth about years of mismanagement at Project Hope. One of the most damning revelations of Fang’s report was that the Communist Youth Development Foundation had changed disbursement procedures in 1996 to simplify the diversion of funds by high officials into other speculative ventures. Chinese readers were saddened and angered to learn that a sizeable portion of donations to Project Hope had never been used to assist poor rural children in their dream of going to school.
The Southern Weekend reports forced Project Hope down from its prized position as a model of Chinese social conscience. In the year after the report appeared, contributions to the fund dropped by more than 60 percent. Domestic Chinese media turned more earnestly to the question of how to ensure proper oversight of charity organizations. It had been a process of disillusionment for the entire country, which had glimpsed behind the faces of children in need the cynical manipulation and unbridled greed made possible by the general lack of transparency and accountability.
Postscript
Zhai Minglei called the hostile environment he faced in remote Sichuan Province a “kingdom of lies”, and the Project Hope case makes clear the immediate practical difficulties involved in doing investigative feature stories under such conditions in China, where infrastructure is underdeveloped and local leaders work to forestall the efforts of journalists. As difficult as these obstacles were, though, they paled against the political problems facing the story. Having uncovered the facts in Sichuan, Zhai Minglei and others at Southern Weekend faced a more daunting kingdom of lies, subject to the machinations of Xu Yongguang, the powerful and well-connected official a the top of Project Hope.
In the end, the unraveling of this more formidable network of lies required two acts of desperation on the part of Fang Jinyu, the Southern Weekend editor who undertook the second Project Hope report. The first was to hand the story, in lieu of domestic publication, over to media outside China, an agonizing choice for any professionally minded journalist. The second was the leaking of the full second Project Hope report on the Internet subsequent to international coverage. These “leaks” highlight two important forms of last resort for Chinese journalists.
How and whether the development of the Internet over the last decade is changing the practice of journalism in China is a terribly complicated question. It is already clear, though, that e-mail, blogs and personal Websites have helped Chinese reporters establish and maintain contacts with the outside that can prove an important means of getting stories out when the reins are tightened on the home front.
For an example, one need look no further than the explosive international controversy in February 2006 over the Propaganda Bureau’s closure of “Freezing Point”, a weekly section of China Youth Daily and for more than ten years one of China’s leading sources of investigative reporting and commentary. When Li Datong, the section’s editor, received notice from China Youth Daily’s editor in chief on January 24, 2006, that “Freezing Point” would be “suspended and put in order” he wrote an open letter protesting the decision and sent it by e-mail to friends and colleagues outside China. The letter bounced through cyberspace and quickly made the section’s closure international news. The “leak” upped the ante for Chinese leaders, who had hushed domestic media by banning coverage of the incident even before Li Datong had learned himself what happened, and brought international pressure to bear.
The Internet played a similar role in getting out the full Project Hope story. Zhai Minglei’s first report, with its unfortunate editorial changes, was in fact well received in official circles. The head of Project Hope, Xu Yongguang even sent a letter thanking the paper for exposing the corrupt education official in Sichuan and helping the Project correct this (minor) kink. He encouraged the newspaper’s work and even invited reporters in for a personal interview. His enthusiasm cooled as Southern Weekend’s Fang Jinyu unearthed even more damning information in the wake of the first story.
Of course, the best possible scenario for Fan Jinyu would have been printing his full report in Southern Weekend. As we have seen, the political obstacles made this impossible. Not just any charity, Project Hope was hailed as a model and yardstick of social progress in the official yearly “white books” on human rights through most of the 1990s. Government employees and party members were encouraged to contribute as part of their “ideological education”. In 1994, then Premier Li Peng made a point of emphasizing the Project’s achievements in his “Government Work Report” to the National People’s Congress.
Established just a few months after the crackdown on student demonstrators on Tiananmen Square in 1989, Project Hope boasted direct political support from China’s highest leadership. The project, created under the auspices of the Communist Youth League, typified the “GONGO”, or government-organized non-governmental organization. Deng Xiaoping, Jiang Zemin and Li Peng, at the time China’s three most powerful men, all wrote ceremonial inscriptions for the Project in their personal calligraphy styles. The organization’s supervisory organs were staffed with retired high-ranking cadres from institutions like secretariat of the State Council, the Ministry of Education and the People’s Political Consultative Conference. It was, in short, politically armed to the teeth.
It’s not surprising then that editors at Southern Weekend were at first reluctant to directly confront this institution. Fang first tried finding a home for the story in an internal reference, where it stood a chance of catching the eye of influential Party officials. With no takers and his inside sources growing nervous, he made the agonizing choice of taking a back seat and relinquishing his scoop to media outside the mainland. It was a frustrating compromise: “Here I am, a Party news worker, meeting with a mainland correspondent [for a foreign publication] and sifting through the evidence against a corrupt mainland official; why must things turn out this way?” he wrote.
Immediately after the ban on the story on March 21, 2002, he put the article online under his own name. This was a risky step, but also the only way Fang could reach a wider audience. The story traveled fast on the Internet, both domestically and internationally. By March 24, an article on the exposé’s suppression at Southern Weekend appeared in The New York Times.
Once again, the Internet proved instrumental in breaking official censorship. The victory was a dubious one, though. Never officially published in mainland China, the allegations were easily dismissed by Xu Yongguang as “rumors”, and even an attempt at “news distortion” by disgruntled former employees. Xu eventually stepped down as the head of Project Hope; he remained, however, on its governing council, and proceeded towards another leading position in the non-profit sector, that of vice-secretary general of the China Charity Foundation.
Several official audits and investigations were launched at Project Hope, but their results were never made public. The fully story remains off limits to public scrutiny, and to this day it is hard to establish the facts in the forest of allegations and counter-allegations. According to one well-informed and non-partial observer, Liu Yang’s original assertions in Ming Pao and Southern Weekend were “substantially true”, but they may have resulted from “institutional mismanagement”, rather than personal corruption of the Project’s leadership.
Suppression of the second expose on the mainland made it impossible to refute or confirm the allegations convincingly. A cloud of doubt remains. But one thing at least is certain – Project Hope has not yet recovered its former standing in the eyes of the public.

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[ABOVE: Zhai Minglei sits in front of Eliot Hall, The University of Hong Kong.]

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CMP Lecture: "Redemption and Fact: The Chinese Journalist's Sense of History"

The Journalism and Media Studies Centre, The University of Hong Kong, invites you to Redemption and Fact: The Chinese Journalist’s Sense of History, a public seminar by Mr. Lu Yuegang, former assistant editor of the Freezing Point supplement of China Youth Daily.

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(Conducted in Putonghua)
Date: December 6, 2007
Time: 5:30pm to 7:00pm
Location: Foundation Chamber, Eliot Hall, The University of Hong Kong
About the Speaker:
When the Freezing Point supplement of China Youth Daily was shut down by propaganda authorities in January 2006, assistant editor Lu Yuegang was removed from his post and transferred to the newspaper’s research division. Lu is well known as an investigative reporter and writer of reportage in China. His book-length works include Da Guo Gua Min, Among the High Classes, and Among the Lower Classes.
Enquiries: Ms Rain Li (2219 4001/ [email protected])

The “Wall Street Bull-Riding Affair”: Lone Chinese blog entry spawns a national controversy

By David Bandurski – Take China’s commercialized media landscape, add stringent controls on real news and information, and you’ve got a bull market for all things inane and extraneous. So perhaps it’s no surprise that a seemingly inconsequential blog post about Chinese tourists riding New York City’s Wall Street Bull has been inflated into headline news in China over the last week.
The controversy – now being called the “Wall Street Bull-Riding Affair” (华尔街骑牛事件) – began on November 15 as Wang Fang (王芳), a host for Beijing TV, posted several photos of Chinese tourists riding the Wall Street Bull she had taken while in New York. The accompanying blog post, “A Group of Chinese Tourists Actually ‘Ride’ the Wall Street Bull”, said “foreigners on the scene sighed and moaned as Chinese tourists made a show of riding the bull.”

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[ABOVE: Screenshot of Xinhuanet.com coverage of Chinese tourists riding the Wall Street Bull.]

Wang’s post added: “Their behavior drew a crowd of tourists from various nations, and a cleaner came over to see what all the fuss was about. Talking with him I learned that in the two years he had worked there he had never seen anyone ride the bull.”
Wang Fang’s post spread like a wildfire through Chinese cyberspace, sparking discussion on many online forums. Early on, most of these postings attacked the Chinese bull-riders. Most everyone agreed this revealed the poor manners of many Chinese tourists and reflected badly on Chinese generally.
It wasn’t long before the story was hoisted into commercial newspapers across China, becoming a national incident. Even newspapers in Hong Kong and Taiwan picked up on the story, running it in one case with the headline, “Taking Photos Riding the Bronze Bull in Mockery: Mainland Tourists Show Their Ugly Side on Wall Street”.
Then came a moderating voice from Hong Kong’s Ming Pao: “What’s most disgusting is that [things like this] should always be elevated into a question of Chinese character.”
The next turn came as photos began appearing in Chinese chatrooms depicting foreign tourists of all stripes riding the Wall Street Bull. Web users then turned their anger on Wang Fang, whose blog had initiated the controversy. Riding the bull didn’t seem to be such a big deal after all. Had Wang exaggerated the response of onlookers?

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[ABOVE: A special topics page at QQ.com gathers together the pro’s and con’s of the “Wall Street Bull-Riding Affair”.]

In an interview with Southern Metropolis Daily on November 24, Wang Fang said she was taken aback by the response. In her view, her blog was simply an online diary containing her personal reflections and viewpoints. “Most people who read my blog are mothers, and my goal in writing the blog is reaching these mothers and helping them educate their own kids,” Wang said. “I personally believe this was uncivilized behavior [to ride the Wall Street Bull].”
Views on the “affair” posted by Web users on QQ.com over the weekend expressed both support and criticism of Wang Fang:

59.40.30.*: With such a level as this she can still be a host for Beijing TV? She should be fired.
209.188.58.*: Wang Fang is right. Chinese people should learn from this, and its only because of her love of the country that they will bear it in mind.
125.91.80.*: Oh, so Chinese and dogs shouldn’t be allowed to ride the Wall Street Bull [apparently a reference to restrictions under colonial rule in treaty ports such as Shanghai barring admittance to certain areas to dogs and Chinese.]
222.81.98.*: And what does is say about Wang Fang’s character, to generate such clap-trap?
125.127.94.*: So foreigners ride the Wall Street Bull too. Clearly this is about making something out of nothing and poking fun at the Chinese people.

[Summary of story in Southern Metropolis Daily]

November 26 — December 2, 2007

November 27 — Following up on a November 19 report in The Beijing News saying local officials had masked efforts to thwart investigative journalism with ostensible campaigns against “fake reporters”, China Mining News ran an opinion column in support. “While we cannot accept ‘fake reporters’ carrying out extortion in the name of journalism,” said the column, “we can accept even less the use of ‘campaigns against fake reporters’ as a means to prevent the exercise of watchdog journalism.”
November 28 — Pan Jiazheng, a senior engineer involved in the construction of the Three Gorges project criticized international media for what he called “distorted and exaggerated reporting” of the dam project. According to China Daily, Pan said: “Chinese people welcome sincere criticism and supervision, even if it is harsh. But please don’t demonize us.” Pan said, according to the paper, that ” reports by some sections of the international press had headlines characterizing the dam as a time bomb and depicting the water in the reservoirs as soy sauce.” [SEE item below on response in Southern Metropolis Daily].
November 29 — Veteran journalist Zhai Minglei, editor of the NGO journal Minjian, posted an urgent message on his blogpaper, Yi Bao (壹报) saying police had raided his home, confiscating his last remaining copies of Minjian and taking away Zhai’s hard drive [coverage by John Kennedy at Global Voices here].
December 1 — Responding to statements from official Pan Jiazheng (潘家铮), who criticized foreign media for “demonizing” the Three Gorges hydropower project, media critic Xiong Peiyun (熊培云) said in an editorial in Southern Metropolis Daily that it was unfair to say criticism had a demonizing effect when there were still real and serious questions remaining about the project. Picking up on Pan’s comment that media were spoiling the project of “raising friendship and dialogue”, Xiong said it was the task of journalists to seek the truth, not to improve state relations. Pan reportedly said of foreign reporters: “They say nothing of China’s achievements, but they make mischief of China’s problems, or we should say its ‘darker side’, everywhere gathering things to blow up or twist, using irony and sarcasm and making things out of nothing.”