Author: David Bandurski

Now Executive Director of the China Media Project, leading the project’s research and partnerships, David originally joined the project in Hong Kong in 2004. He is the author of Dragons in Diamond Village (Penguin), a book of reportage about urbanization and social activism in China, and co-editor of Investigative Journalism in China (HKU Press).

A Leftist Magazine Rises Again

On August 24, a post on the WeChat public account “Progress Culture Online” (进步文化网) announced the launch this year of a “large-scale thought and humanities magazine” to be called Midstream Collections (中流丛刋). For those whose memory of press events in China goes back two decades, this is interesting news, because the name of this new online publication is a clear reference to Midstream (中流), a leftist magazine launched in 1988 by poet and novelist Wei Wei (魏巍), pictured above.

A novelist and poet from Henan province, Wei Wei joined the revolutionary Eighth Route Army during China’s civil war. He held firmly to his leftist political convictions even after the end of the Cultural Revolution. Midstream, a leading leftist voice in its day, was shut down in 2001 following sharp criticism of Jiang Zemin’s so-called “July 1 speech,” in which the leader urged that private entrepreneurs be allowed to join the Chinese Communist Party.

According to a 2011 report from the official China News Service, Midstream and Pursuit of Truth (真理的追求), both magazines strongly associated with old leftist figures within the CCP (many being veterans of the Yan’an days), had continuously published articles ahead of the CCP’s 80th anniversary in 2001 stressing the Party’s “proletarian character” and strongly opposing membership by capitalists.

Following Jiang’s “July 1” speech, Wei Wei led “a group of CCP members,” including the critic Lin Mohan (林默涵) and journalist and former press official Wu Lengxi (吴冷西), in writing a petition to the senior leadership called “On the Major Political Error of the “July 1 Speech” (“七一讲话”是极其重大的政治错误事件). The petition accused CCP leaders of “surrendering to capitalism” and of carrying out a “theoretical coup d’état” (理论政变), and it directly criticized the “Three Represents,” the banner term meant to encapsulate Jiang Zemin’s legacy.

The petition from Wei Wei was published in Midstream the same month as Jiang’s speech, and the shutdown of both Midstream and Pursuit of Truth followed shortly after. The petition was itself harshly criticized by state media and prominent scholars, including economist Hu Xingdou (胡星斗), who said the petition “irrationally attacked the Party’s general secretary.”

The announcement on “Progress Culture Online” made plain the new publication’s association with Wei Wei’s leftist legacy: “Wei Wei was an outstanding contemporary proletarian writer in our country. He launched the magazine Midstream in the 1980s, and before his death [in 2008] left behind the words, ‘Continue the revolution, and never surrender.’” Noting that this year marks the centennial of Wei Wei’s birth, the announcement added that “to launch this year, and to use the name of a publication launched by Wei Wei, has clear symbolic significance for Midstream Collections in the continuation of the spirit of Wei Wei.”

So far, there is no evidence that the newly launched Midstream Collections has support from influential figures within the CCP, but it has invited speculation on social media that leftist voices are now generally more accepted as China under Xi Jinping has reembraced Marx. The crucial question may be whether the magazine is able to publish openly offline. For now, Midstream Collections is being distributed only online to users who follow the public account of the publication’s editors. But “Progress Culture Online” reports that the print edition of the publication will be released “when conditions are right.” If that does happen, it would mean that a highly visible leftist publication is able to find an official government office to serve as its sponsoring institution, something necessary in China for any publication. And that would also mean official endorsement of the magazine’s content.

Li Keqiang in the Muck

Over the past week, as floods continued to devastate communities across southwestern China, the country’s top leaders descended from the capital to tour flood-stricken areas, visits meant to signal their resolve in dealing with the crisis.

Xi Jinping’s destination was Anhui, where he “delivered instructions to guide flood control efforts” and visited local residents, credited by party-state media for his “people first” approach. Meanwhile, Premier Li Keqiang, the head of the government and Xi’s number two on the Politburo Standing Committee (PSC), visited the city of Chongqing, where already this year the Yangtze River has topped its banks five times.

But beyond signalling the resolve of the leadership, these visits offered a glimpse of apparent divisions behind the scenes, and revealed how efforts to elevate Xi Jinping over his peers have led to a politics of the preposterous. The goal of the men driving the Chinese Communist Party’s propaganda efforts – right-hand ideas man Wang Huning (王沪宁), propaganda chief Huang Kunming (黄坤明) and China Media Group boss Shen Haixiong (慎海雄) –  may be to show Xi in the best light, and to ensure that he dominates centre stage. But the result of such determined efforts in the digital age can be to focus attention instead on the act of propaganda itself, highlighting its grotesqueness.

The problem begins with Xi Jinping’s bright white shirt and shiny, shiny shoes. Throughout his visit to Anhui, the “core” leader was depicted as immaculate. He gave pep talks to workers and soldiers. He visited museums and businesses. But he never, ever, got his feet or hands dirty. Readers can click here for a Google Image search of his Anhui visit.

An immaculate Xi addresses his immaculate comrades during the trip to Anhui.

And what of Li Keqiang? The iconic image of the premier’s trip to Chongqing (below), which was shared on Friday through the State Council’s own www.gov.cn (中国政府网), shows Li trudging through the muddy waters, engaged in an active discussion with local officials. A man of the muck. A man of the people.

Image of Li Keqiang visiting Chongqing. Shared via www.gov.cn.

In a second image, featured at the top of this article, Li stands in the clay-coloured slurry holding a shovel.

But it is not just the contrast that matters. On both Friday and Saturday, Premier Li was entirely excluded from China’s official nightly newscast, Xinwen Lianbo, save for a passing mention in the lower-third of his planned participation in the third Lancang-Mekong River Cooperation (LMC) leaders’ meeting taking place today. In the People’s Daily too on Saturday, Xi Jinping dominated the headlines, while Li received only a tiny mention on page three – again, of the LMC meeting.

The August 21 broadcast of Xinwen Lianbo should be archived and studied, against the absent news of Li Keqiang’s visit, as an outstanding example of the vagaries of official propaganda that makes its chief priority not any particular policy objective but rather the center-staging of a single leader, elevating his personal image and interests over all else.

The effect, one could argue, is to achieve exactly the opposite. It is to make Xi not a dynamic leader – as Li appears to be in the Chongqing images – but an almost comically static figure, as though he was photoshopped into his own tour.

Individual scenes from the first 25 minutes of the August 21 broadcast of Xinwen Lianbo.

The first 25 minutes of the August 21 broadcast deal entirely with Xi Jinping in Anhui, a tiresome succession of clips, including (lofty, distant) drone footage of the flooded region. The only action that is remotely human and relatable is that of the soldiers of the People’s Liberation Army, who are shown in scenes of mucky action after Xi had blandly directed them.

PLA soldiers work to clear flooded homes in Anhui.

In the digital age, the apparent restraints on the use of footage of Li Keqiang’s Chongqing tour present a real problem, but one of which the CCP’s top propaganda masters, including Wang Huning, seem unaware.

Here, for example, is a screen capture of the release on Xi Jinping’s trip to Anhui (left) as it appeared on the official WeChat account of www.gov.cn on Friday. Next to it (at right) is the release about Li Keqiang’s trip to Chongqing. Notice that while the Xi Jinping news has just 2,240 “likes,” the Li Keqiang story already has more than 11,000.

The contrasts were certainly noted by Chinese readers, whose chatter was picked up also by Chinese-language media internationally, including Deutsche Welle and RFA. The ultimate effect is arguably something for which the Chinese Communist Party has lately shown great sensitivity, the phenomenon of “high-level black,” or gaojihei (高级黑), in which CCP ideals, principles, policies and discourse are interpreted in such a way as to achieve a critical or embarrassing result.

Whatever tensions might lie behind the headlines are a matter of speculation. But this story of contrasts, the tale of two official visits and how they were portrayed and then amplified, can reveal the pitfalls of propaganda – in all eras, but certainly in the digital age.

Reading Between the Crowds

Earlier this week, I looked at how party-state media in China have been flagrantly one-sided in their reporting of the ongoing protests in Belarus, clearly standing with embattled President Alexander Lukashenko. Though a small-scale rally in support of the Belarusian leader over the weekend was dwarfed by large-scale demonstrations calling for his ouster, a headline in the official Xinhua News Agency on Monday read: “Large-scale rallies held in Belarusian capital to support the government.”

Given the widespread propagation of this cynically twisted version of events, combined with determined censorship of international coverage, one might suppose Chinese readers have little choice but to swallow the official spin. Outside perhaps a handful of stories from the likes of Caixin Media, which reported (behind its paywall) on Monday that opposition demonstrations “surpassed 100,000,” the pro-Lukashenko narrative has seemed to dominate.

But we cannot forget that despite layer upon layer of control, China’s information landscape remains complex, and acts of dissonance and creative resistance — from the oblique to the audacious — can be found for those who care to look. Today we have a delightful example in an article posted by the WeChat public account “Lao Yu Chui Niupi” (老鱼吹牛皮) that looks more critically at official news coverage of the demonstrations in Belarus.

The article does not directly criticize China Central Television for its clearly misleading suggestion this week that “huge street demonstrations are held in Minsk in support of the government.” It does, however, offer a knowing wink to the reader as it shows rather convincingly on the basis of photographic evidence that the pro-Lukashenko rally over the weekend was dwarfed by opposition demonstrations.

Turning to Shanghai’s Dragon Television, operated by the state-owned Shanghai Media Group, the post is more direct, noting that the network even mis-identified footage of opposition demonstrations in Minsk as showing pro-government demonstrators.

The “Lao Yu Chui Niupi” story remains on WeChat, but can also be found archived over at China Digital Times (just in case it disappears)

I include a translation of the article below.

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Is Dragon TV Trying to Fool Me About the Belarusian Language?

In recent days, Belarusian citizens have taken to the streets in protest because they are dissatisfied with the results of the recent election and suspect that Lukashenko falsified [the ballots]. Meanwhile, Lukashenko has been very busy these days, asking his old pal Putin for assistance, and then calling his own supporters out onto the streets.

In order to better understand the background, you can read my previous article, “Is Putin’s Close Buddy Finished?”

But an awkward picture has emerged as massive crowds have taken to the main square in Minsk, the capital of Belarus, to oppose Lukashenko, contrasting with sparse groups in support of the leader. The awkward picture looks essentially like this:

An image of a pro-Lukashenko rally, marked with arrows by the Chinese author, being dwarfed by opposition demonstrators who vastly outnumber them.

Some might wish to ask how I can tell from the image which are crowds opposing Lukashenko, and which are supporting him? Never fear, we will come back to this in time.

Even though the nation of Belarus is quite far from us [in China], our country’s media must of course report on such a major story when it unfolds. And so yesterday we had this news from a number of television stations.

First, from China Central Television:

A broadcast on CCTV 13 reports that “huge street demonstrations are held in Minsk in support of the government.”

Hmm. Many people no doubt saw this. In fact, there is some truth to what CCTV says here. In fact there were street demonstrations in support of Lukashenko, though the idea of using “street demonstrations” to voice support for leaders is a somewhat strange concept. [CMP NOTE: What the author neglects to note, likely as a means of not obviously crossing the line with content monitors, is that CCTV is in fact misleading viewers by mentioning only demonstrations in support of the government. It is not technically untrue that there were such demonstrations, but anti-government rallies and their overwhelming size are a more sensitive matter in China.]

Next we have this image from [Shanghai’s] Dragon Television (东方卫视):

A report by Shanghai’s Dragon TV reads: “Belarus: Around 70,000 people gather in the capital to support the government and preserve peace and stability.”

Now this is interesting. The scenes following on the channel include a few close-up shots of groups of demonstrators, but anyone who understands a bit of Belarusian could easily detect the problem.

Footage of demonstrations shown on Shanghai’s Dragon TV as pro-Lukashenko include a sign that reads: “A murderer cannot be president.” In the back, labelled by the author, is another sign that reads: “Step down!”

Are these [placards] not criticisms of Emperor Lukashenko? They refer to him as a “murderer.” And they call on him to step down. Mao Zedong once said that in this world, conscientiousness is to be feared. I have a good friend who went and checked [on these slogans] through translation software.

We can give thanks to the power of the internet:

Clearly then, this is a harsh criticism of him [Lukashenko].

SO, Dragon Television has taken footage of the opposition and made it out to be that of the crowd supporting Lukashenko. I would imagine that the editor here, an expert on international news, isn’t without knowledge of  foreign languages – so he is certainly pulling the wool over the eyes of those of us who don’t understand Belarusian.

In fact, there is an even easier way to make out which are the Belarusian demonstrators opposing Lukashenko, and which are the ones supporting Lukashenko. And that is to look at the flags they are waving.

For example, those supporting Lukashenko wave this sort of flag:

This is the national flag of Belarus, with its classic pattern and bands of red and green. The flag was originally designed in this way to show that the Belarusians are descendants of nomadic Scythians, who later migrated to the Eastern European plains. [NOTE: Readers can find out more about Belarusian flags here].

And so the footage shown on CCTV was also correct:

Screenshot shared by the author of coverage of Belarus on CCTV 13. The text in the crawler reads: “Large-scale demonstrations in support of the government held in Belarusian capital.”

The people in this image [from CCTV] are all hoisting the red-and-green flag, which is the current national flag of Belarus.

The opposition, however, are flying a flag with two white bands and one red, like this:

This is the flag of the short-lived Belarusian Democratic Republic of 1918 and the First World War. These colors derive from the historical Grand Duchy of Lithuania, mirroring the current national flag of Lithuania, which is also white and red – because Belarus was once part of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania.

After the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991, this flag was used for a short time by Belarus. The current national flag dates back to 1995, used only after Lukashenko became president. The opposition side uses this [white-red-white] flag to express its rejection of today’s leaders.

Therefore, from the images above, we can see that Dragon TV has things entirely turned around in its explanation of its footage. It just doesn’t match up [with the facts].

Oh, Dragon TV, you can support Lukashenko if you wish. But as a television station, when you make programs can you not at least show a bit of honesty? Don’t cheat those of us who can’t understand foreign languages. If you continue this way, people might mistakenly think that you are trying for underhanded criticism (高级黑).  

Facing the current situation,  Lukashenko has remained firm. He has said that the election is already a done deal, and [the opposition] cannot just refuse to accept it. There won’t be new elections “until you kill me,” he said.

The people of Belarus, it seems, are not to be cowed.

As the situation develops, he is now saying he would be prepared to entertain new elections and hand over power if there was a constitutional referendum.

In China, Only Positive News for Lukashenko

In recent months, as tensions have risen in Belarus in the run-up to the disputed re-election victory of Alexander Lukashenko, amid opposition arrests and detentions, China’s party-state media have consistently voiced support for the beleaguered Belarusian president.

Back in June, the official Xinhua News Agency said Lukashenko and Xi Jinping had discussed deepening economic cooperation in a late night phone call, and that Xi had praised his counterpart’s handling of COVID-19, expressing his belief “that under Lukashenko’s strong leadership, the Belarusian people will be able to defeat the epidemic as soon as possible.” On August 10, as widespread protests erupted in Belarus amid allegations that Lukashenko’s landslide re-election was a naked power grab, Xinhua noted simply that Xi Jinping had sent Lukashenko a congratulatory message and that the two sides were ready to “jointly push forward [the] China-Belarus comprehensive strategic partnership.”

News of Xi’s congratulatory message was carried on page one of the CCP’s official People’s Daily newspaper on August 11, and appeared on scores of news and government sites that day.

China’s official support for Lukashenko, and its characterization of protests against the leader as a source of unrest and chaos, becomes clear when you look at Xinhua’s reporting of events in Belarus yesterday, August 16, against international coverage.

As the BBC and other news outlets noted yesterday, a gathering in the Belarusian capital of Minsk to support Lukashenko, at which the leader addressed his supporters, was dwarfed by opposition protests, attended by an estimated 200,000 people who demanded Lukashenko’s resignation. In stark contrast to the anti-Lukashenko demonstrations, the gathering in support of the leader drew a “smaller crowd of several thousand,” according to the BBC. A Reuters reporter on the scene estimated the pro-Lukashenko crowed at “around 5,000 people,” while the Belarusian Interior Ministry, run by a Lukashenko appointee and ally, put the number at 65,000.

How have Chinese state media reported the story of the two rallies? Not surprisingly, readers are told only about one rally – that in support of Lukashenko. The headline today reads: “Large-scale rallies held in Belarusian capital to support the government.”

The following is a translation of the Xinhua story. The name of the quoted chairman of the “Belarusian National Social Union” is approximated, as reference to the pro-government organization could not be found outside the Chinese language.

Xinhua News Agency, Minsk, August 16 dispatch (reporters We Zhongjie and Li Jia) — Large-scale demonstrations were held on August 16th in the Belarusian capital of Minsk, supporting the government in preserving national tranquility and peace.

Around 70,000 people gathered in Independence Square that day in support of the government. Davydiko [sp?], chairman of the “Belarusian National Social Union” that organized the rally, said he supports a strong, prosperous, peaceful and independent Belarus.

Belarusian President Lukashenko said at the rally that the ballots in the [recent] election had not been rigged. The opposition should respect the opinions of the overwhelming majority, and must not encourage people to move toward violent confrontation, lest the country fall into chaos.

News of Lukashenko’s landslide victory in the August 10 election was reported without nuance or complicating facts in China’s party-state media. Here, for example, is a report from CCTV re-published by The Beijing News. It notes only Lukashenko’s victory, his sixth, and that he won 80.23% of the votes.

The Paper, a digital news site by the state-owned Shanghai United Media Group, ran a report on August 11, the day after the elections, whose sole source was the Belarusian Interior Ministry — the same government office claiming yesterday that the pro-Lukashenko rally had 65,000 supporters. The report said that authorities in Belarus had arrested more than 2,000 people in the midst of opposition events, and cited the Interior Ministry as saying it had taken “necessary measures to protect law and order and ensure public safety.” The report at The Paper repeated the election results, noting that Lukashenko had received 80.08% of the votes.

[Featured Image: Protests in Minsk on August 16, 2020, to oppose the August 10 election results. Image from Wikimedia Commons available under CC license.]

The Anniversary That Never Was

One of the privileges of being the “core” leader of the Chinese Communist Party is that history can be rewritten to place you right at the center. So it is this week with thinking on environmental policy in China.

People’s Daily Online today features two articles on the so-called “two mountains theory,” or liangshanlun (两山论), the three-character phrase meant to stand for what elsewhere has been called “Xi Jinping Thought on Ecological Civilization” (习近平生态文明思想), essentially the top leader’s claim to China’s record on sustainable development.

But this is not really about sustainable development – or not primarily. It is, like so much in the “new era,” about elevating the power and personality of Xi Jinping. And that requires mythmaking, and a very creative view of history.

The phrase “two mountains theory” emerged, as CMP wrote back in June, from a longer phrase, rather repetitive and roundabout in English, that is traced to Xi’s September 7, 2013, speech at Nazarbayev University in Kazakhstan: “We want green waters and green mountains, but we also want gold mountains and silver mountains. It is better to have green waters and green mountains than gold mountains and silver mountains – and green waters and the green mountains are gold mountains and silver mountains.” This is Xi’s way of saying, with his usual fondness for metaphor, that while economic development is a priority, the environment cannot be sacrificed for the sake of growth.

According to the newly-minted creation myth of the “two mountains theory,” Xi Jinping actually hatched this idea about sustainable development 15 years ago during a visit to a village in rural Zhejiang. The date was August 15, 2005, which means that tomorrow party-state media will be loudly proclaiming the 15th anniversary of the “two mountains theory,” giving Xi Jinping bragging rights over the ideological underpinnings of two decades official environmental policy in China (just as he has had bragging rights too this week over the revolutionary idea that people shouldn’t waste food).

One of the abovementioned articles at People’s Daily Online today – a propaganda piece that apparently took four reporters to write – credits Xi Jinping with the “two mountains theory,” which subsequently became the consensus, and then action, and then “had a profound and long-standing impact.” But as CMP has shown, the idea is not Xi’s, not by a long shot. A look through the media archives shows that very similar phrasing was used as early as 1995, well back into the Jiang Zemin era. And almost identical phrasing was used in the People’s Daily newspaper on October 24, 2003, uttered by then director of the Ministry of Environmental Protection (MEP), Xie Zhenhua (解振华).

The “two mountains theory” is not Xi’s theory at all. This much is clear from the Party’s own press history. But in the effort to consolidate the power of the “core,” legacies can ride roughshod over histories — and anniversaries be celebrated for moments that never were.

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UPDATE August 15: As we supposed, the “anniversary” of the “two mountains theory” is being loudly promoted today.

Here is the front page of the People’s Daily, dominated by the “two mountains.”

15年的绿色发展实践,生动诠释这一论断的深刻内涵。如今,绿水青山就是金山银山理念已经成为全党全社会的共识和行动,一幅新时代的绿色画卷正在美丽中国恢弘铺展!

And People’s Daily Online has topped the headlines with the anniversary too.

Xinhua News Agency? Naturally. Its top story, it says, is “written on the occasion of the 15th anniversary of the mention of the gold mountain, silver mountain concept” (写在绿水青山就是金山银山理念提出15周年之际).

And here is Zhejiang Daily, the CCP mouthpiece in Zhejiang province, where Xi is reputed to have invented the concept. The “anniversary” is the top piece right next to the masthead.

All provincial and city newspapers seem to be running the same exact piece on the front page today, helping to build the historical legacy in reverse.

Foreign Generals Nod to Xi's Ideas

Since late June, state-run media have promoted the publication of the English-language edition of the third volume of Xi Jinping: The Governance of China, the book series purporting to distill the ideas driving China’s top leader. Like the volumes preceding it, this book was published by the Central Propaganda Department of the Chinese Communist Party and the Information Office of the State Council (essentially a single office) in cooperation with the China International Publishing Group (CIPG), a CCP publishing arm that is now a sprawling global media company.

We won’t dredge through the content of the book here, which covers Xi Jinping’s reports, speeches, important pronouncements and so on between October 18, 2017, marking the closure of the 19th National Congress of the CCP, and January 13, 2020. We will only note that the book includes just two documents from 2020, both pre-dating the formal start of China’s national-level response to the COVID-19 epidemic on January 20, and the closure of Wuhan three days later. These were the January 8 speech Xi gave to a joint study session on “not forgetting to original intention, keeping to the mission” (essentially about CCP internal unity and governance, and the need to protect the “core” status of Xi himself), and the January 13 speech Xi gave to a top-level meeting on discipline inspection within the CCP (ostensibly about “checking and monitoring the exercise of power”).

We can imagine that if a fourth volume of Xi Jinping: The Governance of China can be expected between now and the 20th National Congress of the CCP in 2022, it will do a great deal of boasting about China’s response to COVID-19, playing up its global leadership. Volume three of Xi Jinping: The Governance of China – let’s just call it TGC 3 for short – was actually released in late March this year, but seems not to have been promoted too loudly at the time, likely because the pandemic response by that time dominated the agenda.

Moving on from its tinder-dry piling up of Xi’s past pronouncements, what is most interesting about TGC 3 is the way it is being used both as a vehicle to promote China’s policies internationally, and (perhaps more importantly) as a tool to signal internally the international acceptance of Xi’s ideas and policies.

Over the weekend, the China Foreign Languages Publishing Administration, this being just another name for the China International Publishing Group, released an article – shared also through the “Study Xi Strong Nation” app – highlighting a July 27 roundtable discussion held at the International College of Defense Studies, a college within the PLA-run National Defense University that seeks to “provide international advanced professional military training and to carry out defense-related exchanges.” The roundtable discussion was framed as an opportunity for foreign military leaders and senior Chinese officers to come together to “discuss their experiences” in studying TGC 3.

A general from Suriname addresses the July roundtable on Xi Jinping: The Governance of China (3).

We are told in the report that 50 “high-level military officers” from China and 29 foreign countries came together for the roundtable discussion, in order to “deepen their understanding and familiarity with Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for the New Era,” as well as reach “further consensus” on the promotion of the Belt and Road Initiative and the building of a “community of common destiny for mankind.”

Foreign attendees, we are told, included military officials from Iran, Suriname, Bangladesh, Sierra Leone, South Sudan, Togo and Fiji.  A full list of participants is not provided.

Interesting, though not surprising, is the fact that no substantive defense or other matters are mentioned, even in passing, in the report about the meeting. There is no talk, for example, of COVID-19, or of the Iran-China partnership. The result is an odd appropriation of foreign military figures with the apparent primary objective of signaling the importance of Xi Jinping terminologies and concepts, even in ways that have no clear or justifiable relevance to foreign countries or military leaders at all.

The most outstanding example occurs as a Bangladesh air force general is quoted as saying: “Only through a deep reading of this book can foreigners understand the relationship between the ‘Four Consciousnesses’ and the ‘Four Self-Confidences’ and the governing of the nation, and only then can they better understand China’s success and what stands behind that success, the Chinese Communist Party.”

As we outlined in the CMP report on political discourse in 2018, the “Four Consciousnesses” and “Four Confidences” are phrases critical to the consolidation of Xi Jinping’s personal power at the leader of the Chinese Communist Party. The former refers to the 1) need to maintain political integrity, 2) think in big-picture terms, 3) uphold the leadership core, and 4) keep in alignment with the CCP’s central leadership. The “core” is of course a reference to Xi Jinping, who was designated formally as the “core” leader in 2016. The “Four Confidences” refer to 1) confidence in the path of socialism with Chinese characteristics, 2) confidence in the theories of the CCP, 3) confidence in the system (meaning the system of governance of the CCP), and 4) confidence in China’s unique civilization.

The above-mentioned phrases are generally bound together with the so-called “Two Protections: 1) protecting the core status of General Secretary Xi Jinping, and 2) protecting the central, unified leadership of the Central Committee of the CCP. Together, these three phrases form what is called the “442” formula, now used to signal loyalty to Xi Jinping and his leadership of the CCP.

It is odd, to say the least, to hear this language of internal loyalty signaling from a Bangladeshi general.  

A military official from Bangladesh addresses the July roundtable on Xi Jinping: The Governance of China (3).

Predictably, many of the remarks quoted from foreign military officials follow familiar themes in Chinese foreign policy. China is committed to standing up internationally for developing nations, and doing its utmost to promote mutual development opportunities for all. This is linked to its commitment to fight poverty. And of course, China insists on the principal (if not necessarily the practice) of non-interference in its foreign policy.

A general from the Republic of Sierra Leone reportedly told those gathered: “China’s major diplomatic policy of building of a community of common destiny for mankind aims to share China’s experiences and resources with developing nations and the world. It opposes imposing its will on others, and opposes bullying of the weak.”

A military representative from Suriname reportedly said: “In the process of fighting poverty, the leaders of the Chinese Communist Party have created strong social synergies, and gathered forces from all corners of society, including private enterprises, to jointly fight poverty, forming a unique institutional system to fight poverty.”

Meanwhile, a general from South Sudan, where China has in recent years had deeper involvement (confronting the “inherent limitations of its traditional hands-off foreign policy posture”), focused on the need for continued security aid from China: “Xi Jinping’s work talks about using the ‘Belt and Road’ to promote the peaceful development of developing nations, and I have deep experience of this. I propose that China deepen its security aid to friendly nations, in order to ensure the security of the global community of common destiny for mankind.”

Also noteworthy is the fact that we are told that speeches delivered by Chinese military officers present at the roundtable including the topic of “Xi Jinping Thought on Diplomacy” (习近平外交思想). Here again we have reference to shortened permutation of Xi Jinping’s banner term, which can be seen as part of the evolution toward the ultimate positioning of a “Xi Jinping Thought,” putting Xi on virtually equal ideological footing with Mao Zedong.

Wang Yi and the "Ghost of McCarthyism"

Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi (王毅) has been getting what seems to be a clear uptick in attention in China’s party-state media ever since his launch late last month of a new “Research Center for Xi Jinping Thought on Diplomacy.” Both yesterday and today, media have widely reported Wang’s “exclusive interview” with the official Xinhua News Agency. A Chinese transcript of the interview appears prominently on page three of today’s People’s Daily.

Releasing a video of the interview yesterday, Xinhua emphasized Wang’s remarks about the US being unqualified to lead a coalition of “clean countries” on data protection and 5G technology, and his point that US “bullying” was challenging the global order. CGTN reported that Wang had drawn “a clear bottom line” for China’s relationship with the United States, set out the conditions for cooperation, and “clarified China’s position” on a number of key issues.

What many media seem to be emphasizing today as the central takeaway – though there are plenty of broadsides in the interview – is that China remains calm, cool-headed and ready to talk in the face of an “impulsive and restless” United States. Indeed, the headline on the interview transcript appearing in the People’s Daily today suggests China wishes to send the signal that its door is open. The headline reads: “There is a Need to Create a Clear Framework for China-US Relations.”

That said, the positions Wang Yi reiterates on core issues, from Huawei to Hong Kong, are unlikely to move the conversation. They boil down to a refusal to concede any ground, pinning the blame purely on the “arrogance” and “Cold War thinking” of “certain US politicians,” and a “conspiracy” to “resurrect the ghost of McCarthyism.” (The rather less colorful official English translation is simply “resurrect McCarthyism.”) One would be hard-pressed to detect anywhere in Wang’s remarks an attempt to really understand the anxieties about China that have seized not just “certain politicians” in the US, but governments and a broad range of constituencies, from academics and activists to business groups, in many places in the world.

Wang’s answer to concerns over Huawei and 5G, for example, boils down to a simple insistence that Chinese technology products are safe, and a reminder that it was the US that gave us surveillance programs like Prism and Echelon. On the question of rights and freedoms, he notes that “freedom, democracy and rule of law were long ago written into China’s Constitution, and have already become an important part of the socialist core values of socialism with Chinese characteristics.”

Today, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs released a full transcript of Wang’s remarks in English.

A few things to note about the transcript of Wang’s interview. First, it seems that he did not address the issue of Taiwan or the planned trip by US Health Secretary Alex M. Azar II.  Second, there is no mention of Xinjiang, and issue that has focussed concern internationally. Third, there is no reference in the interview to the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), or to the “ancient silk road,” though BRI has of course been central to China’s foreign policy in recent years. One can guess that the decision to omit mention of the BRI might have been prompted by the fact that it too has grown controversial, becoming a “global trail of trouble.”

Finally, we note that there is no mention in the interview of “Xi Jinping Thought on Diplomacy,” a phrase Wang Yi has emphasized recently as a shorthand for China’s new approach to foreign policy in the “new era.” The omission perhaps makes sense if we understand, as we have written about quite a bit, that “Xi Jinping Thought on Diplomacy” is largely a phrase for internal CCP consumption, more about consolidating Xi’s power as China’s “core” leader than attempting to focus or explain Chinese diplomacy to the rest of the world. Two phrases that are referenced in Wang’s interview are “community of common destiny for mankind,” mentioned twice, and “new type of international relations.”

THE TRANSCRIPT:

Xinhua: US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo asserted in his speech at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library that the policy of engagement with China pursued by successive US administrations since President Nixon’s has not produced its goal and has failed. Many people in the United States question his assertion, saying it was more of an “ideological rant” without any clear or feasible pathway forward. What is your comment?

Wang Yi: The assertion that US policy of engagement with China has failed is just a rehash of the Cold War mentality. It turns a blind eye to all that has been achieved in China-US relations over the past decades, shows ignorance of the historical process and lack of respect for the Chinese and American peoples. This is a political virus which is understandably questioned and rebuked by people in the United States and the international community.

Over four decades ago, leaders of China and the United States made the handshake across the vast Pacific Ocean. What made this possible was that both countries adhered to the principle of mutual respect and seeking common ground while putting aside ideological differences.

During President Nixon’s visit to China in 1972, Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai said that China and the US needed to be clear about our differences and find common ground, so as to reach a new starting point in bilateral ties. President Nixon responded that our two countries have great differences, and what brings us together is that we have common interests which transcend those differences. The Shanghai Communique issued by the two countries encapsulated their consensus to respect each other and seek common ground while setting aside differences.

What has happened since then demonstrates that this monumental choice made by the two sides is the right one. Over the past 40 years and more since the two countries entered into diplomatic ties, several generations of Chinese and Americans have worked together to advance China-US relations. As a result, bilateral ties have become one of the most deeply interwoven relationships in the world with broadest cooperation areas and most extensive common interests.

China and the US now account for over one-third of global economic output and over 50% of global growth. Bilateral trade volume has increased by over 250 times since the early days of diplomatic ties and takes up one-fifth of the global total. Two-way investment has jumped from almost zero to nearly US$240 billion, and annual two-way visits by the two peoples have reached five million. The two countries shoulder important responsibilities for almost all global issues concerning world peace and development. No one can deny these facts.

Forty years on, while China and the US are quite different in social system and many other aspects, such differences have not affected the peaceful coexistence and cooperation between the two countries, and they should not affect their bilateral ties in the future. It is neither necessary nor possible for the two sides to change each other. Instead, we should respect the choice independently made by the people of the other side.

China’s major achievements in the past decades show that the path of socialism with Chinese characteristics fits China and enjoys the most extensive and firm support of the Chinese people. It has also benefited the world and people of other countries, including the American people.

China will continue to pursue development and progress to meet the desire of its people and make new, even greater contributions to mankind. Anyone who attempts to derail this process can only end in failure.

Xinhua: Some people in the United States claim that the China-US relationship has long been unfair and not reciprocal, and that the US has rebuilt China but it has been taken advantage of. Do you think this is the case?

Wang Yi: China-US cooperation has never been a case of one party giving favor to the other, or one party taking advantage of the other. Both countries have benefited much from this cooperation, and no one is being taken advantage of or being ripped off.

Mutually beneficial cooperation over the years have turned China and the US into a community with shared interests. China has achieved rapid growth in part thanks to its opening-up to and cooperation with the rest of the world, including the US. China’s continued growth has also created sustained demand and an enormous market for the US and other countries.

Statistics show that China-US business ties support 2.6 million American jobs. Trade with China helps each American family save US$850 every year. Over 70,000 American businesses have made investment in China with a total sales volume of US$700 billion. Among them, 97% are making a profit. Even with the trade friction and COVID-19, the vast majority of American companies in China still want to stay and are doubling down on investment in China.

If China-US cooperation were unfair and not reciprocal, how could it have continued for several decades? How could China-US ties have come such a long way?

Globalization and free trade have delivered development dividends, but they have also created tensions for countries and affected their economic structures and distribution of interests. This should be dealt with through internal reform. Acting like a sick person who forces others to take medicine for his own illness or even resorting to decoupling will not work. It is the American companies and people that will get badly hurt.

In the globalized world today, the interests of countries are closely intertwined. The development of China and of the US is not a zero sum game, and we should not reject each other. What we should do is to draw on each other’s strength to achieve common development.

As COVID-19 takes its toll on the global economy, China and the US, the world’s two largest economies, should work for mutual benefit on an equal footing, stop attempts at decoupling and advance the relationship through cooperation, and live up to their responsibility for the world.

Xinhua: The United States has recently made a number of moves that undermine people-to-people and cultural exchanges with China. It has harassed Chinese students in the US, obstructed normal academic exchange, and imposed restrictions on Chinese media operating in the United States. Many people are concerned that this is a resurgence of McCarthyism. Do you think the two countries will fall into a new Cold War?

Wang Yi: China-US relations are facing the gravest challenge since the establishment of diplomatic ties, and their exchanges and cooperation in many areas are being seriously disrupted. The root cause is that some American politicians who are biased against and hostile to China are using their power to smear China with fabrications and impede normal ties with China under various pretexts. What they want is to revive McCarthyism in an attempt to undermine US relations with China, stoke hostility between the two peoples, and erode trust between the two countries. Ultimately, they want to drag China and the US into renewed conflict and confrontation and plunge the world into chaos and division again.

China will not allow these people to get their way. We reject any attempt to create a so-called “new Cold War”, because it contravenes the fundamental interests of the Chinese and American peoples and the global trend toward development and progress. The Cold War, which inflicted great sufferings to the world, should not be allowed to repeat itself. Peace and development is what all countries aspire to. Anyone who tries to start a new Cold War in the 21st century will be on the wrong side of history and will only be remembered as the one who has upended international cooperation.

Today’s China is not the former Soviet Union. We have no intention of becoming another United States. China does not export ideology, and never interferes in other countries’ internal affairs. As the world’s largest developing country and a permanent member of the UN Security Council, China will stay committed to peaceful development and to pursuing an opening-up strategy of mutual benefit. China will continue to promote global peace and development and uphold the international order.

Xinhua: We have noted that the current US administration shuns dialogue with China and keeps claiming that dialogue is futile. Pompeo even recently called for taking a “distrust and verify” approach toward China. What is your view on such moves?

Wang Yi: In international relations today, dialogue is the right way for settling issues and building trust. Favoring dialogue over confrontation is not only China’s position. It is also the consensus of the overwhelming majority of countries. China and the US are two major countries with different social systems, histories and cultures, and each has its own interests and concerns. This is natural. But what is important is that no one should unilaterally shut the door for dialogue at any time. Difference, misjudgment or confrontation should not be allowed to dominate their bilateral relations.

China is a major and responsible country. We are open and above board, and we are ready to enter into candid, effective consultation with the US side and make cool-headed and sensible response to the impulsive moves and anxiety of the US side. We are ready to restart the dialogue mechanisms with the US side at any level, in any area and at any time. All issues can be put on the table for discussion. We have proposed that the two countries draw up three lists respectively on cooperation, dialogue and issues that need proper management, and draw up a road-map for future interactions. Our message is quite clear: We urge the US to stop acting with arrogance and prejudice, but enter into constructive dialogue with us on an equal footing. We hope that it will work with us to ease current tensions and put the relations back onto the right track of no conflict, no confrontation, mutual respect and win-win cooperation. This serves the shared interests of the two peoples and meets the expectation of the international community.

Xinhua: Recently, Hong Kong has become a prominent issue in China-US relations. The US believes that by enacting the national security legislation, China has given up One Country, Two Systems. It has imposed a number of sanctions on Hong Kong. Do you expect the US to make more trouble on the Hong Kong issue?

Wang Yi: Hong Kong is part of China’s territory and Hong Kong affairs fall within China’s internal affairs. Non-interference in other countries’ internal affairs is a basic norm governing international relations, and no country will allow other countries to flagrantly sabotage its sovereignty or territorial integrity. At the recent session of the UN Human Rights Council, over 70 countries expressed support of China’s just stance and condemned the attempts to use the Hong Kong issue to interfere in China’s internal affairs. This speaks volumes for the common and just position of the international community.

National security legislation underpins the very survival of any country, and it is a common legal practice of all countries. The legislation on safeguarding national security in Hong Kong has plugged the long-standing legal loopholes in Hong Kong. It will ensure both the long-term implementation of the policy of One Country, Two Systems on the basis of rule of law and durable security and stability of Hong Kong. Several million residents of Hong Kong signed a petition in support of the legislation, which demonstrates their longing for peace and stability in Hong Kong and their strong support for the national security legislation.

China is committed to the policy of One Country, Two Systems. With the strong support from the mainland, an improved legal environment, and the united efforts of our Hong Kong compatriots, we can surely uphold and better implement the policy of One Country, Two Systems. The gross interference in Hong Kong affairs, be it in words or action, can only undermine the sound implementation of the policy of One Country, Two Systems. It will meet with the firm rejection from all the Chinese people, including the people of Hong Kong.

Xinhua: The US recently closed the Chinese Consulate-General in Houston, claiming that it was a hub of spying and intellectual property theft. China made a reciprocal response by closing the US Consulate-General in Chengdu. Are you concerned that this will lead to escalation in a China-US “diplomatic war”?

Wang Yi: The Chinese Consulate-General in Houston was the first Consulate-General opened by China in the US after the establishment of the diplomatic ties, and it was always an important symbol of China-US friendship. Over the past 40 plus years, the Chinese Consulate-General in Houston played a significant role in promoting friendship and cooperation between the Chinese and American peoples. Despite the difficulties encountered during the COVID-19 epidemic, it served as a crucial bridge for boosting cooperation against coronavirus between the US southern states and China. Closing such a consulate-general that bears both historical and current significance is closing a window for exchange and mutual understanding between the Chinese and Americans. This move has undermined the normal growth of China-US relations and the friendship between the two peoples. All the excuses for closure claimed by the US side are nothing but fabrications designed to slander China. None of them is backed by any evidence, and none of them can stand up to scrutiny.

Naturally, China would not swallow this arbitrary and unscrupulous US move. Our countermeasure is legitimate, justified and lawful, and it fully conforms to diplomatic norms. China has no intention to fight a “diplomatic war” with the US as it will only hurt the interests of the two peoples even more. Starting a “diplomatic war” does not prove the strength of the US. Quite the contrary, it only exposes the increasing lack of confidence of the US. If the US is bent on going down the wrong path, China is ready to make due response.

Xinhua: The US is going after Huawei in every possible way, and has declared to build a coalition of “clean countries” to counter China. Many see this as a reflection of US anxiety and fear. What is your take on this?

Wang Yi: Without any solid evidence, the US has launched a global campaign against a private Chinese company. This is a textbook example of bullying. Everyone can see easily and clearly that the US goal is to keep its monopoly in science and technology but deny other countries the legitimate right to development. It doesn’t even bother to disguise its bullying. This not only violates the international rules of fair trade, but also hurts the free global market environment.

I’d like to stress again that Huawei and many other Chinese companies, unilaterally sanctioned by the US, are innocent. Their technologies and products are safe to use, and they have never done any harm to any country. In stark contrast, the US is behind such scandals as PRISM and ECHELON. It conducts wire-tapping and mass surveillance around the globe, and these wrongful acts are already an open secret. The US is not qualified to build a coalition of “clean countries” because itself is dirty allover.

The new science and technology revolution, driven by information technology, is picking up speed. China will continue to work with all countries to maintain a fair, just, open and non-discriminatory business environment, promote international exchanges and cooperation in science and technology, and ensure that safe, reliable and quality information technology will boost global economic recovery and help improve people’s lives around the world. We hope that the US will give up its obsession with its narrow self-interest, and return to the right track of openness and cooperation.

Xinhua: Some US politicians are making fierce attacks on the Communist Party of China (CPC), attempting to pit it against the Chinese people. Forty-one years after China and the US established diplomatic relations, what do you think is the US motive in so doing?

Wang Yi: There have always been forces in the United States attempting to rebut the leadership role of the CPC and China’s path of socialism with Chinese characteristics. Their purpose is notably obvious, i.e., to contain and destabilize China.

Next year will mark the 100th anniversary of the CPC. Over the past century, the CPC has led the Chinese people to discard colonial rule and exploitation and realize national liberation and independence. It is the CPC that has led us in blazing the path of socialism with Chinese characteristics, turning the once impoverished country into the world’s second largest economy. It is under the CPC leadership that China’s per capita GDP has grown from less than US$200 forty years ago to over US$10,000 today, and over 800 million people have been lifted out of poverty. The great endeavor of the Chinese people under the CPC leadership has been recorded in the history of modernization as an outstanding, epoch-making chapter.

Practice is the sole criterion of truth, and the people are the judges of history. Does China’s system work for the country? The Chinese people know better than anyone else. The Harvard Kennedy School’s surveys in China which extended 13 years suggest that over 93% of the Chinese people are satisfied with the central government which is led by the CPC. Many international polls in recent years also show that at least 90% of the Chinese people trust their government. The relationship between the CPC and the Chinese people is as close as between “fish and water” and between “soil and seed”. Those who attempt to break this strong bond is making themselves enemies of the 1.4 billion Chinese people.

We have great confidence in our path of socialism with Chinese characteristics. In the meantime, we also respect the development paths chosen by other nations. We are not interested in rivalry of systems, or ideological confrontation with any country. Likewise, we hope that the US will respect China’s social system and the Chinese people’s choice, and give up its failed interventionism. As President Xi Jinping pointed out, we have the strong determination, resolve and national strength to overcome all challenges. We have the courage, ability and wisdom to prevail over all risks and tests. No country or individual can hold back the historic march toward the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation.

Xinhua: Pompeo is calling for a new alliance of democracies against China, and forcing other countries to choose between what he called “freedom” and “tyranny”. But we noticed that very few nations answered the call. Do you think that the US will get what it wants?

Wang Yi: Instigation for confrontation and division was not rare in history, but was all rebuked by the people. In the 21st century, it is inconceivable that some people intend to draw an iron curtain, stoke new division, advocate identity politics and bloc rivalry, and resort to other old tricks. This is a blatant contempt of human progress and wisdom as well as a regression of history. It goes against the trend of our times and the will of most nations. Naturally it has no support of the people, and few backing in the world.

China achieved freedom from imperialism and colonialism. Freedom, democracy and rule of law are codified in China’s Constitution. They are also part of the core socialist values. In addition, we also know that freedom has boundaries. Respect for science, reason, law and order as well as international rules are the basis of freedom. In fighting COVID-19, the Chinese people follow experts’ advice to wear masks. However, some US politicians attacked this, calling it an example of “tyranny” and “no freedom” in China. At the end of the day, they have been slapped in the face by the reality.

China has valued peace and cooperation since ancient times, believing that “division leads to rivalry, which leads to chaos, which leads to poverty.” China always opposes dangerous acts to divide the world along ideological lines. To this end, we advocate a new type of international relations featuring win-win cooperation. We pursue friendship and cooperation with all countries. And we endeavor to forge a global network of partnerships. President Xi Jinping calls for building a community with a shared future for mankind. This major initiative is aimed to rise above differences in system, abandon the zero-sum mentality, and find a common goal for all countries, nationalities and civilizations. China will work unrelentingly for this lofty vision for mankind.

Xinhua: Pompeo claims that China desires global hegemony. But everyone knows that it is the US that is willfully withdrawing from international treaties and organizations. Many worry that this will have a big impact on the future international order. What is your take?

Wang Yi: The real challenge to the current international order and system is that the United States, the strongest country in the world, places its own interests above everything else, and takes this as its code of conduct. It has gone extreme to pursue unilateralism and bullying, even at the cost of international responsibilities and multilateral rules. At the height of COVID-19, it went so far as to groundlessly attack and withdraw from the World Health Organization. The current US administration has pulled out of more international treaties than any one before it, making itself the most damaging force of the current international order.

China is always a firm defender of the international order and the international system. In the past seven decades and more since the founding of the People’s Republic, China never started a war, or occupied an inch of land of others. We have enshrined in the Constitution our commitment to peaceful development, and we are the first country in the world to make such a solemn pledge. We will continue to adhere to the path of peaceful development, and will never seek hegemony or expansionism. We will always be a staunch force for peace.

This year marks the 75th anniversary of the victory of the World Anti-Fascist War and the founding of the United Nations. Having learned hard lessons from the past, the world has ensured the longest period of stability and prosperity in modern times. We must not allow the international system to be undermined arbitrarily, or the world divided again. China was the first to put its signature on the UN Charter. China has joined almost all international treaties and agreements, and has been faithfully fulfilling its due international responsibilities and obligations. At a time when the future of the world is at stake, China will continue to champion and pursue multilateralism, safeguard the UN-centered international system, and promote multipolarity and greater democracy in international relations.

Xinhua: The US has significantly stepped up its intervention in the South China Sea. In his recent statement, Pompeo dismissed China’s sovereign rights and interests in the South China Sea. The US has conducted “dual carrier operations” there, and kept sending military vessels and aircraft on reconnaissance missions aimed at China. Some people think that the possibility for the US to provoke frictions and conflicts in the South China Sea is increasing. Can peace and stability still be maintained in the South China Sea?

Wang Yi: The US has recently taken a number of provocative actions in the South China Sea. First, the US has breached its longstanding commitment of not taking sides, and blatantly interfered in the territorial disputes. Second, the US keeps increasing and showing off its military presence in the South China Sea. In the first half of this year alone, the US sent military aircraft there more than 2,000 times. Third, the US is seeking to drive a wedge between China and ASEAN countries, and disrupt the consultation process of the Code of Conduct. The US purpose is to destabilize the South China Sea, and hijack regional countries onto its chariot to serve US domestic politics and geopolitical agenda. All regional countries should be vigilant, and prevent this region’s hard-won peace and development from being sabotaged by the US.

The South China Sea is the shared home for the countries in the region. It should not be a wrestling ground for international politics. Thanks to years of hard work, countries in the region have found effective ways to properly address their differences, and reached an unequivocal consensus that China and ASEAN countries should work together to safeguard peace and stability in the South China Sea. Facts have proved that settling disputes through dialogue is the right way that best serves the interests of regional countries, and countries in the region have a shared responsibility to keep the South China Sea peaceful and stable. Under the current situation, China proposes that we remove all disturbances to restart as soon as possible the Code of Conduct consultation, and agree as early as possible on a set of rules for maintaining long-term peace and stability in the region. In the meantime, China is prepared to strengthen maritime cooperation with other littoral countries, deepen mutual security confidence, and advance joint development, so as to make the South China Sea a sea of peace, friendship and cooperation.

Xinhua: The China-US relationship is at the most difficult time since the establishment of diplomatic ties. Are you optimistic or pessimistic about the relationship between now and the US election in November? What should be the priorities for the two countries at the moment?

Wang Yi: China’s US policy is always consistent and stable. In the meantime, we are also prepared for possible bumps and storms ahead. The US move to turn China into an adversary is a fundamental, strategic miscalculation. It means that the US is funneling its strategic resources in the wrong area. We are always ready to develop a China-US relationship featuring no conflict, no confrontation, mutual respect and win-win cooperation based on coordination, cooperation and stability. In the meantime, we will firmly defend our sovereignty, security and development interests, because this is a legitimate right inherent in China being an independent sovereign state. The US should honor the principle of sovereign equality enshrined in the UN Charter, learn how to get along with different systems and civilizations and adapt itself to peaceful coexistence, and accept the reality that the world is moving toward multipolarity.

Faced with the most complex situation since the establishment of diplomatic relations in 1979, we need to put in place a clear-cut framework for the relationship:

First, steer clear of red lines and avoid confrontation. For China-US relations to develop soundly, the most critical thing is mutual respect. China never intends to and will never interfere in US elections or other US internal affairs. Likewise, the US must abandon its fantasy of remodeling China to US needs. It must stop its meddling in China’s internal affairs, and stop its irrational cracking down on China’s legitimate rights and interests.

Second, keep the channels open for candid dialogue. Dialogue is the prerequisite for addressing problems. Without dialogue, problems will only pile up and even get out of control. China’s door to dialogue remains open. We are willing, in the spirit of equality and open-mindedness, to talk and interact with the US, and resume dialogue mechanisms at all levels and in all fields.

Third, reject decoupling and uphold cooperation. The interests of the two countries are deeply entwined. Forced decoupling will inflict a lasting impact on bilateral relations, and endanger the security of international industrial chains and interests of all countries. With COVID-19 still raging across the world, China is prepared to have mutually beneficial cooperation with the US on epidemic control and economic recovery, learn from each other and share experience on containing COVID-19, and join together with the US the global response and multilateral cooperation in fighting COVID-19.

Fourth, abandon the zero-sum mentality and stand up to shared responsibilities. COVID-19 again makes it clear that humanity is a community with a shared future. Our world still faces many global challenges. Traditional and non-traditional security challenges are intertwined. Almost all regional and international hotspot issues require a coordinated response from China, the US and other countries. China and the US must always bear in mind the well-being of mankind, live up to their responsibilities as two major countries, coordinate and cooperate as needed in the UN and other multilateral institutions, and work together for world peace and stability.

A Diplomatic Bow to Xi Jinping

China faces a growing list of setbacks internationally that might suggest its turn in diplomacy away from a more “cautious and passive” approach in favour of active assertiveness is backfiring. Nevertheless, China’s top diplomat, Wang Yi (王毅), declares in the latest edition of the official Seeking Truth journal that his country’s new model of diplomacy is not just an unqualified success but an historically significant contribution to international relations.

In the florid language of a true devotee, Wang credits Xi Jinping with “the vision and sagacity of a great strategist” in sussing out the complexities facing the world, and crafting “comprehensive” long-term solutions in a tidy package now to be called “Xi Jinping Thought on Diplomacy.”

But reading Wang’s language in Seeking Truth in order to better understand the substance of Xi Jinping Thought on Diplomacy would be to miss the point. Wang’s article, which we must assume is the full text, or very nearly the full text, of his speech last month to commemorate the opening of a new “Research Center on Xi Jinping Thought on Diplomacy,” is really not about China and its relations with the rest of the world so much as grandiose visions of Xi Jinping and his seemingly unassailable position at the “core” of power.

Here are the first two paragraphs of Wang’s article in translation, which provides a taste of the general tone. I follow with some comments on the rest of the article.

Looking back on history, [we can see that] great eras must give rise to great thoughts. Since the 18th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party [in 2012], socialism with Chinese characteristics has strode forward, head high, into a new era, and the Chinese people have, through long tribulation, welcoming a leap from standing up, to growing prosperous, to finally growing strong. Today’s China, is coming closer than it ever has come to realizing its dream of the great rejuvenation of the Chinese people, and it is moving closer than it ever has to the center of the world stage. At the same time, the world is in the midst of a major and unprecedented transformation, and is experiencing profound and complex change.

Facing uncertain international trends, General Secretary Xi Jinping has, with the vision and sagacity of a great strategist, accurately grasped the principles of the development of human society, fully determined the direction of international terrain and the historical position of our country, and he has raised a series of new concepts, new propositions and new initiatives to lead the trend of human progress. With a clear banner, he has answered the question of what kind of world China should advance and create, and what kind of international relations it should build. On what kind of diplomacy China needs, how to carry out diplomacy for the new era (新时代外交), and a series of other major theoretical and practical questions, the emergence and establishment of Xi Jinping Thought on Diplomacy with Chinese Characteristics for the New Era, or Xi Jinping Thought on Diplomacy, provides the fundamental guide for Chinese diplomacy entering the new era.

We should note that after the initial use of the longer 16-character phrase, seen in the opening passage above, the Seeking Truth article consistently uses the shorter phrase. This is significant because we have the prominent and repeated use in a major CCP journal of a term that clearly points to the emergence itself of “Xi Jinping Thought,” a shortened and more potent permutation of the leader’s banner term introduced at the 19th National Congress of the CCP in late 2017, “Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era.” This is something Qian Gang wrote about in greater detail last week.

The Seeking Truth article is organized into two major sections. The first makes five basic assertions about Xi Jinping Thought on Diplomacy, beginning with bolded summary sentences. The bolded statements follow with my observations:

Xi Jinping Thought on Diplomacy is an integral part of Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era. Wang Yi emphasizes here that the “core concepts” of Xi Jinping Thought on Diplomacy are “the promotion of a community of common destiny for mankind” (推动构建人类命运共同体), and “the promoting of the creation of a new model of major power relations” (推动构建新型国际关系). He calls the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party the “most fundamental character” and the “greatest political advantage” of this diplomatic “thought.”

Xi Jinping Thought on Diplomacy is the latest result of 21st century Marxism in the realm of diplomacy. The assertion by Wang follows the more vociferous promotion in recent weeks and months of the idea that Xi Jinping’s set of ideas under his banner term represent already, one-fifth the way into the new century, the totality of “21st Century Marxism.” This is once again about shoring up the power and status of Xi Jinping himself, and has little substance otherwise.

Xi Jinping Thought on Diplomacy is a continuation and an innovation of China’s outstanding traditional culture. Here we find generalized references to the glorious past, conforming with the CCP’s increased use under Xi Jinping of references to China’s “excellent traditional culture” as a source of legitimacy.” Specifically, in this context, this brings modern-day diplomacy into the broader historical perspective of China’s return to prominence. Wang Yi does not elaborate the “traditional” elements of diplomacy today, other than listing out references to the phrases “all under heaven are equal” (天下为公) and “great harmony” (世界大同), which are drawn from the Confucian Book of Rites (I’ll avoid deeper discussion of these for the moment), and to “the spirit of the ancient silk road” (古代丝绸之路精神) as there is a reference to Xi’s Belt and Road Initiative.

Xi Jinping Thought on Diplomacy is a continuation and development of new Chinese foreign relations theory. This section emphasizes the links between Xi’s “new era” diplomacy and Chinese diplomacy since 1949, referring to the “collective diplomatic ideas of several generations of leaders.” This is essentially about China’s emphasis since Mao Zedong on its status as a “champion of the developing world,” reiterating its opposition to colonialism, hegemonism and might-makes-right politics.

Xi Jinping Thought on Diplomacy abandons and surpasses traditional international relations theory. This is a huge can of worms, and deserves more attention and research. What does China mean here by “traditional international relations theory,” and which aspects does it reject? Wang Yi speaks only in the broadest terms. “In recent years,” he writes, “traditional international relations theory finds it more and more difficult to explain today’s world, and views such as advocating strength and zero-sum thinking are becoming increasingly incompatible with the direction of the times.” This amounts rather transparently to the building of straw men in order to form the basis of Xi’s supposed breakthroughs. Do China’s strategic thinkers really suppose this is the sum total of “traditional international relations theory”? Wang goes on to talk about “unifying the common and fundamental interests of the Chinese people and the people of the world,” about “long-term peace,” “common prosperity,” “openness and tolerance,” “mutual respect.”  Anyone reading this passage in a vacuum might suppose that China invented peace, security and mutual benefit. Here also we find the concept of a “community of common destiny for mankind” (人类命运共同体).

In section two of the article, Wang deals with the study and practice of Xi Jinping Thought on Diplomacy. The three bolded statements in this section are as follows, with my observations added:

Further strengthening research, to truly and deeply understand the sense and essence of Xi Jinping Thought on Diplomacy. This talk of research and understanding yields nothing in the way of concrete formulations of Xi Jinping Thought on Diplomacy. If anything, it should remind us of the obvious point that international relations theories in China are not the products of the discipline of international relations so much as about the consolidation and protection of power and legitimacy within the CCP. This is more about internal relations than international relations. Wang writes of the “core significance” and “rich content” of Xi Jinping’s thought within the theoretical lineage of the CCP, which is clearly outlined in ritualistic form: “We must link together the study of Xi Jinping Thought on Diplomacy with Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for the New Era, link [it] together with the study of Marxism-Leninism, Mao Zedong Thought, Deng Xiaoping Theory, the important thought of the ‘Three Represents,’ and the scientific view of development . . . “This procession of CCP spirits is like the invoking of the ancestors who provide the basis for Xi’s legitimacy. For Wang, this is another opportunity to flatter Xi Jinping and hitch himself to the wagon of his growing power.

Actively carrying out international exchange, allowing other countries and other people’s more deeply understand the scientific and advanced nature of Xi Jinping Though on Diplomacy. Wang Yi argues here that “Xi Jinping Thought on Diplomacy is a thought with world significance, with important and practical significance for various global challenges facing the world.” Despite clear setbacks for China’s international relations that are not at all addressed in the article, Wang insists that “international society is giving ever greater attention and ever greater priority to Xi Jinping Thought on Diplomacy.” Wang says China must continue to “go out” and to “invite others in” (think of carefully scripted official junkets with guests from around the world), strengthening dialogue and cooperation with 1) state governments, 2) political parties (this is an crucial aspect of Chinese diplomacy in recent years), 3) think tanks (China has announced the intention of building up its own “new think tanks”), 4) the media and 5) “other areas.” The focus is on expanding what China has elsewhere called its “international discourse power,” though this term is not used here. It has been replaced increasingly in recent years with the Xi Jinping phrase “telling China’s story well.” Wang writes: “We must learn and apply Xi Jinping Thought on Diplomacy, telling China’s story, China’s concepts and China’s plans well internationally, steadily raising China’s influence and appeal.”

Insist on applying what we have learned, steadily using Xi Jinping Thought on Diplomacy to guide the practice of great power diplomacy with Chinese characteristics. Here, in the last paragraph before he closes, it seems that Wang is ready to talk about practical applications. He effuses: “Thought is the guide for action, and theory provides direction to practice.” But watch what happens next. Just as Wang begins to speak of the need to unite thought and action, he finds himself back on the carousel of legitimacy signaling language: “Maintaining a high-level of unity in our politics and actions with the CCP with Comrade Xi Jinping as the core, [we must] resolutely implement the strategic deployments of General Secretary Xi Jinping on diplomacy.” The very next sentence begins: “[We] must arm our heads with the new theory of Xi Jinping Thought on Diplomacy, leading us to steadily strengthen great power diplomacy with Chinese characteristics. . . .”

If the previous points do not convince the reader that Wang Yi’s Seeking Truth article is chiefly not about diplomacy, but about signaling obedience to Xi Jinping and advancing his personal power, the article’s conclusion should do the job.  It repeats the language of the “core,” urging the need to “more closely unite around the central Party with Xi Jinping as the core,” and then mentions the so-called “442 formula,” a fixed formula of three separate phrases (“four consciousnesses,” “four confidences” and “two protections”) that since 2018 has symbolized the need for party-state officials to pay loyalty to Xi as the party-state leader. The “two protections” refer specifically to the need to 1) protect the core status of General Secretary Xi Jinping, and to 2) protect the central, unified leadership of the Central Committee of the CCP.

The bottom line: Even as Wang Yi discusses the central concept now unifying Chinese diplomacy in one of the CCP’s most important journals of theory, his discourse of diplomacy is in fact not about diplomacy at all. It is a discourse of obedience and power-signaling. And this is something we can certainly expect a great deal more of as we approach the 100th anniversary next year of the Chinese Communist Party.

[Featured Image: Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi. Image by the Austrian Foreign Ministry, available at Flickr.com under CC license.]

Diplomatic Moves Toward "Xi Thought"

On July 20, Chinese media reported the formal inauguration of a new research center located within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the “Center for Research of Xi Jinping Thought on Diplomacy” (习近平外交思想研究中心). The news made the rounds on the internet, and here is the notice as it appeared on the website of the official Xinhua News Agency.

But let’s consider a bit more carefully the language used to report this grand opening. China’s foreign affairs minister, Wang Yi (王毅), delivered a speech at the event in which he said, according to the version released by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs: “Xi Jinping Thought on Diplomacy with Chinese Characteristics for the New Era, or Xi Jinping Thought on Diplomacy, provides the fundamental guide for Chinese diplomacy entering the new era.”

To those not attuned to China’s political discourse, this may not sound significant – aside perhaps from illustrating the Chinese Communist Party’s penchant for verbosity. Why this hesitation between an unnecessarily wordy phrase and a much more concise version of the same idea? But we have, on either side of this very significant little word, “or” (), two markedly different phrases, which I’ll list out here for clarity’s sake:

Xi Jinping Thought on Diplomacy with Chinese Characteristics for the New Era

Xi Jinping Thought on Diplomacy

Is this some sort of word game? No. In fact, this is an example, playing out right before our eyes, of an important process of rhetorical evolution within the Chinese political discourse: the act of abbreviation (缩略), or the condensing of long and involved phrases and concepts into concise phrases with greater political potency.

As I’ve said again and again, words play a crucial role in signaling power and standing within the Chinese Communist Party. Since the 19th National Congress of the CCP was held in November 2017, during which the general secretary’s “banner term,” (旗帜语), “Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for the New Era,” was written into the Party’s charter, I have pointed out that Xi’s next rhetorical coup in terms of solidifying his power and legacy would be to successfully shorten this lengthy 16-character phrase into the concise five-character “Xi Jinping Thought.” This abbreviated banner term would put Xi on even rhetorical footing with his most powerful predecessors, Mao Zedong (“Mao Zedong Thought”) and “Deng Xiaoping” (“Deng Xiaoping Theory”). 

Despite the fact that “Xi Jinping Thought” has been reported as a fait accompli in the international press (as here and here), purely to avoid the unpalatable length of Xi’s power-phrase, the transformation is not yet complete. During the first half of 2020, we have not yet seen the abbreviated form of Xi Jinping’s banner term in use, and getting there is a delicate matter, about constantly testing the political waters internally.

This testing has happened in part through a number of abbreviations of Xi’s banner term evolving within Chinese political discourse and applied to specific policy areas. These abbreviations, far from being incidental, must be regarded as chess moves in the longer rhetorical game, in which the ultimate victory will be the final transformation of Xi Jinping’s 16-character banner term into a 5-character banner term.  

In March 2017, just a few months after Xi Jinping formally secured his status as China’s “core” leader at the Sixth Plenum of the 18th Central Committee in the fall of 2016, Ji Bingxuan (吉炳轩), vice-chairman of the standing committee of the National People’s Congress, repeatedly used the phrase “Xi Jinping Thought on Economics” (习近平经济思想). This was at least half a year before the direction of Xi’s new banner term was clear, but in retrospect was perhaps a foreshadowing. (Interestingly, the phrase has not been used in this abbreviated form since the introduction of Xi’s full banner term in late 2017, preference instead being given to “Xi Jinping Socialist Economic Thought With Chinese Characteristics”).

Also in March 2017, Zhejiang Daily, the official CCP mouthpiece of the Party committee in Zhejiang province, used the phrase “Xi Jinping Thought on Ecological Civilization” (习近平生态文明思想). In June 2017, Foreign Minister Wang Yi first used “Xi Jinping Thought on Diplomacy,” yet another act of foreshadowing. And in October 2017, the phrase “Xi Jinping Thought on Strengthening the Military” (习近平强军思想) first appeared in the Resolution released as the curtain closed on the 19th National Congress.

In my “China Discourse Report 2018,” covering the first full year after the formal introduction of Xi’s banner term, I looked at more than 20 different permutations of “Xi Thought” appearing in the Party-state press in 2018. These included:

“Xi Jinping Thought on Diplomacy” (习近平外交思想), “Xi Jinping Thought on Literature and Art” (习近平文艺思想), “Xi Jinping Thought on Strengthening the Military” (习近平强军思想), “Xi Jinping Thought on Education” (习近平教育思想), “Xi Jinping Thought on Ecological Civilization” (习近平生态文明思想), “Xi Jinping Thought on Party Construction” (习近平党建思想), “Xi Jinping Thought on Rule of Law” (习近平法治思想), “Xi Jinping Thought on Battling Poverty” (习近平脱贫攻坚思想), “Xi Jinping Thought on Rural Revitalization Strategy” (习近平乡村振兴战略思想), “Xi Jinping Thought on News and Public Opinion” (习近平新闻舆论思想), “Xi Jinping Thought on the Press” (习近平新闻思想), “Xi Jinping’s Important Thought on Taiwan” (习近平对台工作重要思想), “Xi Jinping Thought on Targeted Poverty Alleviation” (习近平精准扶贫思想), “Xi Jinping Thought on Education” (习近平体育思想), “Xi Jinping thought on Youth Work” (习近平青年工作思想), “Xi Jinping Though on Finance” (习近平金融思想), “Xi Jinping Thought on Ethnic Work” (习近平民族工作思想), “Xi Jinping Thought on Ethnic Unity” (习近平民族团结思想), “Xi Jinping Thought on Clean Politics” (习近平廉政思想), “Xi Jinping Thought on Belt and Road” (习近平一带一路思想), “Xi Jinping Thought on Marine Development” (习近平经略海洋思想), “Xi Jinping Thought on Military-Civilian Integration” (习近平军民融合思想).

But it was clear around the fourth quarter of 2018 that the enthusiasm had been too unbridled in the months following the 19th National Congress in late 2017, and the leadership made moves to clear away the noise and confusion by stemming the flood of the various forms of “Xi thought.” China’s political discourse had perhaps reached peak confusion in October 2018 as the People’s Daily released a color-coded flow chart purporting to explain the relationship between various branches of “Xi Thought,” meant to be a sort of instructional outline.

The streamlining that began in late 2018 focused on just four permutations of “Xi Thought.” These were: “Xi Jinping Thought on Strengthening the Military” (习近平强军思想), “Xi Jinping Thought on Diplomacy” (习近平外交思想), “Xi Jinping Thought on Ecological Civilization” (习近平生态文明思想) and “Xi Jinping Socialist Economic Thought With Chinese Characteristics” (习近平中国特色社会主义经济思想). These were the four major “thoughts” branching off from Xi’s banner term, and staking Xi’s claims to legacy in key areas of policy. The last of them was actually the disabbreviation of “Xi Jinping Economic Thought,” which as I said previously, had been used before the formal introduction of Xi’s banner term, at a time when its use was less delicate in the sense that it did not amount to a grandiose claim to a “Thought.”

The following graph plots the occurrence of each of the four “thoughts” for five six-month periods beginning with the first half of 2018:

Generally, none of these terms are used with great intensity in the People’s Daily – not the same level of intensity we would expect to see for phrases like “reform and opening” (with the 40th anniversary held at the end of 2018) or “Belt and Road” (touted loudly in China’s foreign policy). “Xi Jinping Thought on Strengthening the Military” peaks at the end of 2018, and “Xi Jinping Thought on Ecological Civilization” peaks in the first half of 2019, but by the first half of this year all of these terms are noticeably down.

“Xi Jinping Thought on Diplomacy,” which appeared in 44 separate articles in the People’s Daily in the second half of 2018, as “Xi Thought” permutations were generally on the rise, registered just 14 articles in the first half of 2020. If we look at the four major permutations of “Xi Thought” in the first half of 2020 in the People’s Daily, here is what we get:

Clearly, the emphasis in the CCP’s flagship newspaper when it comes to the legacy phrase “Xi Thought” is on defense and environmental policy.

When we broaden the search to look at all Chinese newspapers for the same period, based on the Qianfang database, we see a slightly altered picture. The Xi legacy term for environmental policy is the clear leader in terms of volume of coverage, while defense comes in a distant second, with less than half as many mentions.

It is clear from the graph immediately above that “Xi Jinping Thought on Diplomacy” and “Xi Jinping Socialist Economic Thought With Chinese Characteristics” have not received the same level of emphasis as the legacy terms dealing with defense and environmental policy. But why should this matter? Well, this is what brings us back to Wang Yi and his new “Center for Research of Xi Jinping Thought on Diplomacy.”

It matters because while these buzzwords are ultimately about Xi Jinping’s legacy and power as the Chinese Communist Party’s “core” leader, they also play a crucial role in signaling political achievements in key areas. The four thoughts represent four key areas of priority: the military (军队), foreign affairs (外交), environmental protection (环保) and the economy (经济). And to some extent, the way these terms perform in the media, and particularly in the party-state media, reflect perceived administrative achievements in these areas. When there are achievements to boast about in a particular arena of policy, these are reflected through association with Xi’s legacy, and the related “Xi Thought” rises correspondingly.

As the man responsible for progress in one of the four key sub-fields of the evolving “Xi Jinping Thought,” Wang Yi surely does not wish to be left behind. Seen from this perspective, the formation of the new research center at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs could be seen to show Wang Yi’s anxiousness about catching up.

This is only the second research center formed for a specific “Xi Thought.” The first center, established at the outset of 2018, was the “Research Center for Xi Jinping Thought on Strengthening the Military,” now housed within the People’s Liberation Army’s Academy of Military Science. There are as yet no centers for “Xi Jinping Thought” on the economy or the environment.

The simpler way to see this, perhaps, is that the “core” leader associates himself with success, and his banner term serves as a stamp of approval on the work of others. In the area of environmental policy, at least, the progress is relatively easy to identify, including a “stunning turnaround” over the past decade in how China has tackled pollution. Though there are still many questions about China’s commitment, the country has been recognized in many quarters as a global leader in clean energy and sustainable development. So this is one area where Xi Jinping can attach his name and legacy to progress being made. The economy is another story. While the party-state media are duty-bound to present China’s economic story in a positive light, things have been difficult in recent years, with unrelenting US-China trade tensions and most recently the economic hit from the COVID-19 pandemic. This is perhaps not the time, not yet, to loudly declare the victories of “Xi Thought on Economics.”

The rhetorical chess game is three-dimensional. Xi Jinping is ultimately looking to firm up his power and legacy through a crowning achievement in the political discourse – the shortening of his lengthy 16-character banner term, “Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for the New Era,” into the punchy, 5-character “Xi Jinping Thought” (习近平思想). But to do so, he must still proceed carefully. And all of the various spheres of policy-making potentially impact his ability to make progress in the long race toward the finish line of power and legacy.   

Where is that finish line exactly? This is difficult to say. But there are two very strong candidates for the timing of the full-fledged announcement of the arrival of “Xi Jinping Thought.” The first would be July 1, 2021, marking the 100th anniversary of the founding of the Chinese Communist Party. The second would be in the fall of 2022 as the curtain opens on the 20th National Congress of the CCP.

Either way, the spectators do not have long to wait.

[Featured Image: Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi, who recently inaugurated a new center for “Xi Jinping Thought on Diplomacy.” Image by the Austrian Foreign Ministry, available at Flickr.com under CC license.]

A Disaster is a Disaster

News about China internationally this week has centered on deepening US-China tensions. Houston, we have a problem. But in much of China, it is disastrous floods, and not the dangerously ebbing relationship with America, that have stayed at the top of the headlines. Torrential rains have hammered central and south China this month, causing what state media characterized already 10 days ago as the worst flooding in more than two decades.

A Google News search today for “China” turns up article after article on US-China relations and the row over the closure of the Chinese consulate in Houston, Texas.

As with the coronavirus epidemic that eventually commanded the news in January, upsetting long-laid plans for a 2020 focussing on happier and more triumphal themes, like victory over poverty and newfound economic wealth, the floods have challenged propaganda authorities with their torrent of bad tidings. How can the government make its rhetorical best of a bad situation, inviting the population to avoid gloomy thoughts and unwanted criticism?

In the case of the epidemic, China eventually did manage to turn the narrative around, focusing on such the heroism of the doctors and nurses on the frontlines, and the sacrifices of ordinary people for the country and for the Chinese Communist Party – all, of course, aided by a robust system of information control. By the end of February, Xi Jinping was claiming a glorious victory.  Along the way, however, many attempts to draw out and emphasize the positives – what in Xi Jinping-speak is called “spreading positive energy” – backfired horribly, drawing anger from Chinese who resented the exploitation of tragedy to distract from government missteps amid a loud chorus of thank you’s.

This week, as flooding continued to wreak havoc China’s south, “Poyang Notices” (鄱阳发布), an official WeChat account operated by the county leadership of Poyang (鄱阳), an area in Jiangxi province that is home to China’s largest freshwater lake, published a post urging people to think of the positives – and of course to be thankful. The post was reminiscent of the bright-side enthusiasm shown in kitsch coronavirus tributes earlier this year, perhaps epitomized by the nauseating poem, “Thank You, COVID-19.”

The original July 22 post by “Poyang Notices,” since deleted. In the image, local officials hoist red flags for the flood relief “Command Center,” for the provincial flood relief “Commando Unit,” and so on.

The post, titled “The Flood is Not Completely a Bad Thing,” began with this summary of the ongoing floods: “Major flooding has done great injury to the people of Poyang and amounts to a grave disaster, but it has also catalyzed many moving stories in the lake city, where there has been rebirth in the midst of disaster . . . . It can clearly be seen that the evils of the flooding are not completely bad.” It then offered the following verse (only partially translated) to encourage positivity:

So bad and so fierce has been this historic flood,
which has torn our homeland to pieces
and upset the rhythm of our lives.
We grit our teeth in hatred of the spirit of the flood,
But rational and tenacious, do not curse the world,
for it has stirred our high-spirited resistance.
Poyang Notices has truly witnessed
in the roiling currents, not just the teeth and claws of the evil waves,
but flashes of the brilliance of humanity.

Further down, the third passage of poem came to the inevitable moment of thanks, with an image that painfully (and quite insensitively for local people, one would think) invoked at once the real floods and the metaphorical surge of gratitude. “The heart’s voice of thanks drifts at every moment through the land of Poyang.”  

Like other sickening tributes to the emotional positives of tragedy in the midst of the COVID-19 epidemic, the “Poyang Notices” post quickly drew the wrong sort of attention. It was shared across social media platforms to the embarrassment of Poyang’s propaganda authorities. Before long, the post had been deleted, but not before social media users and the media had weighed in.

One voice of criticism was this one from The Beijing News, which urged “serious consideration” of the post’s twisted logic:

This article has now been deleted, but the logic behind it still deserves our serious consideration. Looking at the form of the article, I am willing to believe that the author feels what they set to writing, that many bright and moving points have emerged in the fight against the flood. But a number of lines, such as “Can you say it is completely a bad thing?” and “The evils of the flood disaster are not so bad,” twist the article away from its sound intent, and instead invite discomfort . . . .

Praising the anti-flood spirit and affirming the contributions of personnel fighting the flood is a separate matter from the treatment of the disaster itself. If the refinement of the anti-flood spirit is achieved by beautifying the disaster and forcing on it notions of ‘positive energy,’ then this is an insult to the anti-flood spirit. I am confident that those personnel on the front lines of the anti-flood effort are also none too happy to see this ‘inappropriate’ attitude of affirmation.

A disaster is a disaster. In the process of fighting the flood, the inspiration offered by the spirit of cooperation within social groups and the sparks of radiance in human nature, are a form of the precious spirit of human society, and also an effective way of facing disasters. But to say that this is the benefit of disaster, this is obviously very wrong.

Another post at Pincong, a Chinese online forum for discussion of political issues, was dumbfounded by the tone-deafness and insensitivity of the “Poyang Notices” post:

I don’t know what happened to the editor at “Poyang Notices.” “The evil of the flood disaster isn’t all evil, but also gave rise to good”? What are those who became victims of the flood supposed to think? My friend is in Anhui. The flood has inundated his home. The houses in the countryside will not be structurally sound after soaking up so much water, to say nothing of all of the furniture and electrical appliances. If you were to show him this article, how could he restrain himself from leaping up and cussing his brains out?

Writing on the question-and-answer platform Zhihu (archived here), another user sarcastically encouraged the author of the “Poyang Notices” post to continue seeking out good in the most unlikely places:

I’d really like to invite the little brother (or little sister) who wrote the “Poyang Notices” piece to visit a prison and circulate freely among the murderers and rapists there. I’m sure they would find that those on death row are not all evil, but can also give rise to good.

Once again, CCP propaganda authorities have fallen afoul of their own positivity. These are sensitive times, indeed — when negative news and positive energy alike harbor the potential for undermining the leadership’s standing.

[Featured Image: Flooding in a Chinese city in 2016. Image by Paul Gonzalez available at Flickr.com under CC license.]