Now Executive Director of the China Media Project, leading the project’s research and partnerships, David originally joined the project in Hong Kong in 2004. He is the author of Dragons in Diamond Village (Penguin), a book of reportage about urbanization and social activism in China, and co-editor of Investigative Journalism in China (HKU Press).
On page five of today’s official People’s Daily newspaper, a commentary by Guo Jiping (国纪平) – short for “important commentary on international affairs,” or you guan guoji de zhongyao pinglun (有关国际的重要评论) – offers a full-scale account of China’s year in 2020. It will surprise no one that this account is entirely positive, full of unambiguous superlatives about China’s achievements and how, most importantly, these can all be chalked up to the superb leadership of Xi Jinping and the Chinese Communist Party.
The commentary, “Facts
Speak Louder Than Rhetoric” (事实胜于雄辩),
is a sprawling page of rhetoric – about the “community of common destiny for mankind” (人类命运共同体),
about “Six
Stabilities” (六稳)
and the “Six Guarantees” (六保),
about the “miracle of China’s rapid economic growth,” and so on.
If there is any question about how the Chinese Communist Party will choose, officially, to remember 2020, all questions are answered in the soaring rhetoric of the Guo Jiping piece.
The summary sentence at the start:
At a major historical juncture, mankind faced a major
test. China showed its report card, and injected confidence and hope into the
world. How extraordinary!
And here is the basic assessment of the year:
China achieved major strategic results in the fight
against Covid-19, delivering a response that satisfied the people, turned the eyes
of the world, and is to be recorded in the annals of history. China has become
the only major economy in the world to achieve positive economic growth, and it
made major breakthroughs on the Three Major Struggles [of preventing and resolving major risks, achieving
poverty alleviation, and preventing pollution] as well as major progress on
science and innovation, on major breakthroughs in reform and opening, and on strong
guarantees for the peoples’ livelihood. These achievements did not come easily,
but came through hardship and obstacles, and they result from the resolute leadership
of the Chinese Communist Party with Comrade Xi Jinping as the core, and result
from the united struggle of the whole Party, the whole army, and people of all
ethnic groups throughout the country.
There are many voices in the world praising China one
after another. As the former foreign minister of and deputy chancellor of Germany
Joschka Fischer declared in the Spanish media that “2020 is a successful year
for China.”
There is no mention, of course, that while Fischer did write earlier this month that “2020 proved to be a highly successful year for China,” particularly noting failures of leadership elsewhere in the world, he also was very clear that “[serious] failures by Chinese authorities permitted that outbreak to grow into a pandemic that has now killed almost 1.5 million people and brought the global economy to a standstill.”
But the Party and its flagship newspaper know only too well that rhetoric can speak louder than the facts.
On December 2, Xinhua News Agency
issued a lengthy official news release with a ponderous headline that included
two Chinese Communist Party buzzwords meant to signal the power of General
Secretary Xi Jinping. But there was a problem.
The headline,
seen in the screen capture below, read in full: “Casting the Soul of the Army
Under the Banner of the Party: A General Narrative of the Entire Army Supporting
the Use of Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a
New Era and Xi Jinping Thought on a Strong Military to Shape the Soul [of the Army]
and Educate [Soldiers].”
Last night, the Xinhua article was given further prominence as it was summarized on the nightly official news cast, Xinwen Lianbo (新闻联播). This was a clear sign of official support for the article, which outlined Xi Jinping’s ideas about the importance of “realizing the Party’s goal of building a strong military in the new era.” The Xinwen Lianbo report included the full headline of the article onscreen.
The December 2 edition of Xinwen Lianbo covers the Xinhua article on “Xi Jinping Thought on a Strong Military.”
In all, the Xinhua release
mentioned the phrase “Xi Jinping Thought on a Strong Military” (习近平强军思想) eight times. Of these, five uses combined the phrase
with Xi’s banner term (旗帜语), the political
catchphrase meant to subsume all of his ideas and stand as the monument to his
legacy. Like the headline of the article itself, these five instances talked
about “Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New
Era and Xi Jinping Thought on a Strong Military” (习近平新时代中国特色社会主义思想和习近平强军思想).
By the laws of CCP discourse – remembering that in the formulation of language at the highest levels, nothing is taken lightly – this should be a serious error on the part of Xinhua, and then again on the part of CCTV.
As we
have previously written, Xi’s banner term, “Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism
with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era” (习近平新时代中国特色社会主义思想),
which first appeared in October 2017 at the 19th National Congress of the CCP, is
on a winding path toward formalization as the shortened and more potent “Xi
Jinping Thought” (习近平思想), putting Xi on par with
Mao Zedong. Despite some rather careless and premature references
in academic literature and mainstream news reports outside China to “Xi Jinping
Thought,” it is worth remembering that “Xi Jinping Thought” has in fact not yet
emerged, not formally, and this is a distinction that certainly has not escaped
Xi and his acolytes at senior levels, who are busy trying to achieve this
transformation.
“Xi Jinping Thought” is the
end game, and when we see the emergence of a host of subordinate permutations
of Xi thoughts in various policy areas, including “Xi Jinping Thought on a
Strong Military” and “Xi Jinping Thought on Diplomacy” (习近平外交思想), these are meant to help pave the way toward “Xi
Jinping Thought.” Think of it as a rhetorical game of crossing the river by
feeling the stones. In 2018, at least 10 such sub-forms of Xi thought appeared
in official sources.
But the point of Xi Jinping’s
banner term is to subsume all of Xi’s ideas. There is meant to be one
banner, the umbrella phrase under which all lesser banners fly. And any suggestion
of equivalence between the lesser thoughts and their parent phrase would serve
to diminish the gravity of “Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese
Characteristics for a New Era.” This is the serious problem in the Xinhua
article, the “and” drawing an equivalence between Xi’s banner term and “Xi
Jinping Thought on a Strong Military.”
The term “Xi Jinping Thought on a Strong Military” appears in military-related sources, such as the People’s Liberation Army Daily, but is generally marked as being subordinate to the overarching banner term. When Party media in China reported on the release last month of the “People’s Liberation of China Joint Operation Outline (中国人民解放军联合作战纲要), they stressed that “the ‘Outline’ is guided by Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism With Chinese Characteristics for the New Era, and thoroughly implements Xi Jinping Thought on a Strong Military.”
A November 27, 2020, news release from Xinhua clearly shows use of “Xi Jinping Thought on a Strong Military” given secondary emphasis following “Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism With Chinese Characteristics for the New Era.”
The proper juxtaposition of these two phrases should have been something more like: “ . . . with Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era as the guide, thoroughly implementing Xi Jinping Thought on a Strong Military” (以习近平新时代中国特色社会主义思想为指导, 深入贯彻习近平强军思想).
How did this low-level error happen at Xinhua? How was it perpetuated on the official nightly news program? This is difficult to know. But how these terms appear together in the future will be something to continue watching.
Anyone could be forgiven for entirely ignoring last week’s China New Media Conference (中国新媒体大会), held over two days in the city of Changsha. Attended by propaganda officials, journalists, internet company representatives and communications scholars from across China, the event dealt with the insipid theme, hardly enlivened by official news releases, of “media convergence.”
How could this conference possibly be relevant outside the drab echo chamber of elite Chinese politics and communication, much less outside China? Beyond the usual parade of official news in Chinese, only Hong Kong’s South China Morning Post paid the event any heed at all.
But hold on just a minute. This year’s conference, which opened with an address from Xu Lin (徐麟), director of the State Council Information Office and a deputy propaganda minister, was an illuminating and deeply important look at media policy in China – with implications domestically and internationally. It essentially outlined how the Chinese Communist Party intends to leverage transformations in global communication, both at home and abroad (though the latter is more implied), to sustain the regime and increase its influence internationally.
Screenshot of a report by Hunan province’s official rednet.cn website on the 2020 China New Media Conference.
The event followed the September release of Opinions on Accelerating
the Promotion of Deep and Integrated Media Development (关于加快推进媒体深度融合发展的意见), which was important
enough to make the space just to the right of the masthead in the September 27 edition of the CCP’s official People’s
Daily newspaper. The Opinion spelled out a range of
actions to be implemented at all levels and at all departments in China in
order to create “an omnimedia communication system with assurances provided by
innovative management” (创新管理为保障的全媒体传播体系). The meaning of this will become clearer as we proceed.
The front page of the September 27 edition of the CCP’s official People’s Daily newspaper, the report next to the masthead about accelerating the development of media convergence.
Broadly speaking, media convergence in any context is about the
integration of information and communications technologies, various forms of
media content, and computer networks – for which some
scholars now use the shorthand
“Three C’s” (communication, computing and content). This may sound
like a fringe concern, something to be hemmed and hawed over by communications
scholars at some afternoon panel, but in this context media convergence is
about so much more.
One of the key messages in Xu’s address to the conference was simple.
“[We] must resolutely prevent the weakening of the Party’s leadership in the
name of convergence,” he said, “and must resolutely prevent the risk of capital
controlling public opinion.” For the Chinese Communist Party, media convergence
is really about harnessing of the digital media revolution – which in any case
is happening – to serve and preserve the Party’s political dominance. The
stakes are large, and China’s leaders want to get this right, which is why it
has become, as Xu said, a “national strategy.”
Promotional brochure for the China New Media Conference, hosted in Changsha on November 19 and 20.
At its most fundamental, media convergence (媒体融合) in China is about resolving the dilemma
facing the so-called “mainstream” media of the Chinese Communist Party –
namely, that they no longer appeal to wider audiences in an era of digital
media proliferation. The challenge is to
ensure that the CCP’s dominant ideology, wrapped up in the affirmation and
consolidation of its own legitimacy, can permeate throughout social media and
commercial websites and accounts.
Xu Lin spoke in his address to the conference of the goal in the last five-year plan to “build up a new mainstream media” (新型主流媒体), and to build up “strong county-level media convergence centers (县级融媒体中心). The project, in other words, involves a deep-level and nationwide transformation and re-building of the CCP media system. It seizes the moment of digital transformation, a trend shared across the globe, to re-insert the Party at the center of media development – after what has since the 1990s essentially been an increasing process of Party media marginalization.
Battling in the Belly of Princess Iron Fan
Concern over the possible, perhaps impending (or so is
the fear), loss of dominance over public opinion is a constant theme for the CCP
leadership, still enshrined in the central propaganda notion, dating to the
brutal crackdown on pro-democracy protests in June 1989, that “guidance of
public opinion” (now synonymous with media control) is essential to preserving
regime stability. Throughout the Hu Jintao era, and the latter part of the
Jiang Zemin era that preceded it, the project of “guidance” was in tension
with the trend of media commercialization, the emergence of a vibrant
internet space, and the rise of a sometimes restive core of professionally-minded
journalists, and an increasingly curious and consumption-oriented population
with an appetite for information but also for entertainment.
In August 2013, in his first
major speech on ideology
after coming to power, Xi Jinping outlined the context of the Party’s struggle
against dissent. “As for propaganda and ideological positions, if we do not
occupy them, others will,” he warned his audience of propaganda apparatchiks.
He talked about “three zones” existing in the field of public opinion and
ideology. The first was the “red zone,” or hongse didai (红色地带), which consists primarily of “mainstream
media,” meaning her Party-controlled media, and “positive forces online.” This
zone, said Xi, “must be held, and absolutely cannot be lost.”
The second zone was the “black zone,” or heise didai
(黑色地带), which was principally
comprised of “negative language” online and in society, but which according to
Xi “also includes the speech manufactured by various hostile forces” – this
being a catchall term for the CCP’s internal and external enemies, though it is
often understood to refer to unspecified acts of infiltration by foreign
sources with hostile intent. “This is not the mainstream,” Xi said of the black
zone, “but its influence must not be underestimated.”
The third zone was
the “grey zone,” or huise didai (灰色地带),
“existing between the red zone and the black zone.” In dealing with these
various zones, Xi proposed differentiated strategies. For the red zone, the
focus should be on “consolidation and expansion, steadily enlarging its social
influence,” said Xi. But his characterization of the strategies for the grey
and black zones was most interesting, and perhaps chilling:
For the black zone,
we must courageously enter it, like [Sun Wukong] entering the belly of Princess
Iron Fan to do battle, steadily promoting its red transformation. As for the
grey zone, we must carry out large-scale work, accelerating its transformation
into the red zone, preventing its metamorphosis into a black zone. This work
must be firmly grasped, and with perseverance it will obtain results.
Xi is known to have a fondness for colorful language and historical and literary references, and his mention in this passage of “entering the belly of Princess Iron Fan to do battle” can be understood as a colorfully oblique reference to the larger project of co-optation, not just of alternative or potentially competing messages inside China, but of critical voices globally.
The reference comes
from the 16th century Chinese classic Journey to the West, in
which at one point the main protagonist, the Monkey King, or “Sun Wukong” (孙悟空), possessing a magical staff
that enables him to shrink down to the size of a needle, does battle with
Princess Iron Fan (铁扇公主), the
wife of the Bull Demon Kong, by morphing into a fly, entering her mouth and
flying down into her gut. Once inside Princess Iron Fan’s soft belly, the
Monkey King punches and kicks her into submission.
Sun Wukong and Princess Iron Fan do battle.
Xi Jinping’s colorful literary allusion, along with his identification of three public opinion zones, tells us a great deal about the CCP’s objective in harnessing the digital revolution. The point is to ensure that the Party’s political frames permeate the public opinion space domestically, consolidating the “red” hold over grey zones, and transforming, through a process of deep internal struggle, black zones into red strongholds. This can be accomplished only if the Party has a strong, and also pliable and innovative, grasp of “media convergence,” of the entire process of content creation, distribution and demand.
In his speech to the China New Media Conference, Xu Lin addresses six key aspects of the CCP’s “national strategy,” which I include below with commentary and context.
Accelerating the full construction of an omnimedia communication system (全媒传播体系)
Xu Lin outlines the creation of an comprehensive national system at four levels, from the center to the province, city and country, that integrates content production and distribution through “advanced [communication] technologies” (先进技术) – and is “resource intensive” (资源集约) with a “high-level of coordination” (协同高效). Xu characterizes the internet as the “principle battleground” (主战场) and recognizes that mobile-based and video content is a more and more dominant trend. Talking aabout the relative roles of Party media (those directly overseen by Party Committees) and commercial media (commercially operating spin-offs overseen by Party or government bodies, and for-profit online media), Xu says that while Party media will set the tone of “mainstream public opinion” (主流舆论), meaning Party-led messaging, “commercial platforms will principally serve as channels, their technological and other advantages aiding the transmission of mainstream public opinion.”
Adhering throughout to correct guidance of public opinion (始终坚守正确方向导向)
As I mentioned earlier, “correct guidance of public opinion” remains a
key term denoting the central prerogative of information control to achieve
regime stability. “The guidance and value orientation of public opinion is the
soul of news and public opinion work,” says Xu in this section. And he states
the overarching priority of media control in the midst of technological
transformation more clearly here than we have perhaps seen in some time. He
says: “The development of convergence may bring a change in the forms of the
media, but regardless of what kind of media, regardless of whether these are
mainstream [CCP] media or commercial platforms, regardless of whether they are
online or offline, regardless of whether they are small-screen or large-screen,
in terms of guidance there is only once standard. There is no land outside the
law, and there are no public opinion enclaves.” While convergence is a priority
in consolidating the Party’s control over the message, Xu is very clear here
that “we must resolutely prevent the weakening of the Party’s leadership in the
name of convergence, and must resolutely prevent the risk of capital
controlling public opinion.”
These two points are the real heart of information policy, and the most
important aspect of Xu’s remarks, reflecting what has been called “Xi Jinping
Thought on
the News”（习近平新闻思想）.
Beyond this fundamentals, the leadership understands that there is
demand for information that it is effective and appeals. Today’s propaganda
cannot be yesterday’s propaganda, and it must not seem so to increasingly savvy
Chinese audiences. Moreover, it must accommodate if not lead the global
standard in terms of technology, so that China reaps the economic and political
benefits. And so:
Focus on expanding the production capacity of high-quality content (着力扩大优质内容产能)
Xu says that in the current information environment, what we see is “the
proliferation of information, and feel that quality content is scarce.”
“Whether or not we can attract the masses, and whether or not we can lead
public opinion, and building consensus, is ultimately up to whether or not our
content is good.”
As George Orwell wrote, “Doublethink means the power of holding two
contradictory beliefs in one’s mind simultaneously, and accepting both of
them.” And here, in Xu’s third aspect, we can glimpse the doublethink at the
heart of the CCP’s conception of media development and control – that you can
have a vibrant media space, commercially viable and creatively responding to
audiences, even as you dominate and control it. In the simplest sense, the
media revolution that unfolded in China from the 1990s, even as Jiang Zemin
spoke of the “Three Closenesses” (三贴近),
essentially the idea that control and commercialization could proceed side by
side, exposed the flaws of this doublethink. One important result was the
emergence of a professional and often restive commercial media space that
fought to greater space and air to breathe – and had a deep imprint too on the
internet and early social media spaces in China as fields that complicated the
Party’s project of “guidance.”
Media policy under Xi Jinping
comes at a time when the CCP seems to have much greater hope that the
technological tide is in their favor, as the tools of creation and distribution
can also now be tools of restraint, repression and surveillance.
In this section too, Xu talks
about the need to create a flood of information the spreads “positive energy” (正能量), another specialized media
terminology under Xi Jinping that essentially is a makeover of an older term of
the Jiang and Hu eras, the need to “emphasize positive propaganda.” Imagine a
world of colorful, uplifting and entertaining media products, none of which
turn thoughts to the unfortunate aspects of life, society or politics.
Actively seizing the high ground of communication technology (积极抢占传播技术高地)
Media convergence, says Xu, is a “media transformation brought on by
technological innovation.” Technologies like 5G had driven transformation, and
to stay on top in terms of guiding public opinion and ensuring the dominance of
the Party as “mainstream,” the leadership must ensure that it is not just
leading technological trends, but also leading in terms of the means of
harnessing and controlling them.
In the past, perhaps, Chinese leaders were unprepared for various forms
of media transformation, including media commercialization –coming ahead of
China’s World Trade Organization membership in the late 1990s and greater
integration with the global economy – and the rapid rise of social media
platforms like Weibo. This time, they are determined to be prepared. “We must
strengthen forward-looking research and the application of relevant new
technologies in the field of news and communication,” Xu said, “and we
absolutely must not simply look on and take a
passive approach to dealing with them.”
Advancing and controlling the media transformation from a technical
perspective is of course not enough. The priorities outlined in the first two
aspects that Xu addresses will require the CCP also to remake the human
mechanisms of media development and control. It will no longer be sufficient,
for example, to have one leader on the traditional media side and another on
the new media side, what Xu calls a “two skins” approach. Patchwork approaches
and temporary fixes must give way instead to more comprehensive solutions on
the management side, which involves of course both content
production/distribution and the policing of “correct guidance.”
Xu’s final aspect is about the people who will staff and implement this
new vision of the Party-led media system.
Fully stimulating the vitality of talent teams (充分激发人才队伍活力)
“The core competitive strength of the media lies in its people, and talent, the unit, is critical to achieving convergence,” Xu says. He talks here about developing the proper human resource and training programs, and also “scientific systems of examination and assessment.”
China’s Story Converges
The “national strategy” of media convergence, Party-led digital transformation, or whatever else one wishes to call it, is an ambitious project with far-reaching implications not just for speech and information inside China, but for the global conversation on a range of issues touching on China’s ever-broadening interests — from security to 5G, from diplomacy to trade and investment, from health to human rights and democracy.
Xi Jinping has emphasized that China must expand its “discourse power” internationally by “telling China’s story well,” which essentially means shifting global narratives to suit the objectives of the CCP, with regime preservation topping the list. Just as it is key to the transformation of domestic media control, media convergence is at the heart of the re-envisioning of external propaganda and influence. In 2016, an article appearing in the People’s Daily and addressing the creation of “a new mainstream media” said that “innovative expression, and telling China’s story well, require promoting the integrated development of traditional media and emerging media, not losing any opportunity.”
In a study published last year, Chinese communication scholars Jia Wenshan (贾文山) and Zhao Limin (赵立敏) wrote for the China Social Sciences Daily (中国社会科学报) — in an article exploring the expansion of China’s “international discourse power” (国际话语权) against a dominant West — that “[how] the media tells Chinese stories well and enhances the dissemination capacity of China’s international discourse raises new expectations for media convergence.”
Understanding the international dimensions of the national strategy of what might also be called China’s “red convergence” will unfortunately require a great deal more attention to insipid events like last week’s China New Media Conference, and to equally insipid documents like the September Opinions on Accelerating the Promotion of Deep and Integrated Media Development. For Xi Jinping’s CCP, global cyberspace is a map of black, grey and red, and it is not at all an exaggeration to say that media convergence is a battle cry.
According to a report from local Hunan media, a top China Media Group executive attending the China New Media Conference, Liu Xiaolong (刘晓龙), said that “mainstream” CCP media must “persist in using offense as defense in transmitting China’s voice.” They must strive, he said, to increase the territory they occupy in the field of international communication, fighting with a “combined punch” (组合拳) in what he referred to, echoing Maoist language Xi Jinping has re-introduced to policy-making on communication, as a “public opinion struggle.”
This
month, China’s party-state media have been increasingly vocal in criticizing
the “Clean Network” initiative introduced by the Trump administration, a global digital alliance of now almost 50
countries and 170 telecoms firms that aims to deter use of Chinese technologies
Washington regards as insecure owing to their possible manipulation by the
Chinese Communist Party. Introducing the program back in April, Secretary of
State Mike Pompeo said it was essential “to protect America’s critical
telecommunications and technology infrastructure.”
China may now be feeling the pressure more keenly in the midst of an ongoing tech cold war with the US, the State Department reporting in a tweet late last week that 27 of 30 NATO allies, 31 of 37 OECD members, and 26 of 27 European Union member states have signed on to the initiative. Just two countries, Pakistan and Syria, have so far voiced support for China’s would-be competing proposal, the “Global Initiative on Data Security,” though Chinese government sources also claim to have secured pledges of support from Laos and Cambodia.
Last week, CMP noted that the People’s Daily, the CCP’s flagship newspaper, had become more vocal in attacking the “Clean Network” initiative. In a commentary by Lu Chuanying, secretary-general and researcher at China’s Cyberspace International Governance Research Center, the paper accused the United States of conducting “network surveillance” in the name of cybersecurity. The US, said Lu, referencing the cyberpunk film franchise, is “the only real ‘Matrix.’”
“The Matrix” sci-fi action franchise, which recently wrapped up filming in Berlin for a fourth film due for release in December 2021, now appears to be a favored metaphor used by Chinese authorities and state media to criticize the US in the midst of a global rift over cybersecurity.
Over the weekend, the People’s Daily ran another commentary, this time under the “Zhong Sheng” (钟声) byline, reserved for important official statements on international affairs, called “Carrying Out Network Surveillance, Endangering Global Data Security” (实施网络监控，威胁全球数据安全). The commentary again sought to hammer home the argument that the US is the predominant threat to global cybersecurity even as it employs the rhetoric of security and openness.
“The ‘Matrix’ is proficient at network manipulation,” the People’s Daily commentary began, substituting the film’s title (which translated “Hacker Empire” in Chinese) for the US. “If it is allowed to break free from moral constraints and engage in network technology hegemony, continuously dispatching ‘rumor-bots’ to wander the world like ghosts, disrupting the cyber order, this world will inevitably face severe challenges.”
The
commentary likens “certain US politicians” to “rumor-bots dispatched by the Matrix,
which seek to “tirelessly discredit China on the 5G issue, suppressing specific
Chinese companies, and trying to coerce other countries to choose sides in the
name of building a so-called ‘Clean Network.’” These “rumor-bots,” it argues,
cannot change the fact that “the US threatens global cybersecurity.”
For months, China and the US have been exchanging barbs over hacking and cybersecurity. In May, the US accused China of exploiting the pandemic, attempting to hack academic and private laboratories to steal COVID-19 vaccine research. This followed the release in March of a report from Qihoo, China’s largest cybersecurity firm, that accused the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) of hacking attacks against Chinese companies and government agencies. After the report’s release, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs demanded a “clear explanation,” and spokesman Zhao Lijian (赵立坚) – a diplomat prone to provocative and colorful statements – was the first to raise the “Hacker Empire” (“Matrix”) comparison. “The facts have shown that the United States is the world’s largest cyber attacker, a veritable ‘Matrix,’” said Zhao.
Zhao Lijian repeated his “Matrix” language at a press conference in mid-August, after a journalist from China’s state media network, China Media Group (CMG), lobbed him a question about Pompeo’s trip to Central Europe:
According to reports, during his visit to Slovenia, Secretary of State Pompeo signed a joint declaration on 5G network security with the Slovenian Foreign Minister. Pompeo tweeted that this reflects ‘our common commitment to protecting the privacy and personal freedom of citizens.’ Pompeo also talked about jointly building a ‘Clean Network” in the Czech Republic. What is China’s comment?
Referring to programs such as Prism and the Equation group, and suggesting that the US carried out “around-the-clock surveillance of mobile phones and online computers,” Zhao Lijian responded: “These are obviously the exploits of the ‘Matrix’ [Hacker Empire]. The US is already covered in scars over cyber theft, but its secretary of state has the gall to propose a so-called ‘Clean network,’ which is absurd and ridiculous.”
The “Zhong Sheng” commentary in the People’s Daily marks the continued formalization of the Matrix/Hacker Empire accusation against the US in the context of the ongoing tech war, and also offers the latest example of how language from China’s increasingly combative foreign ministry — the so-called “wolf-warrior diplomats” — has migrated into China’s so-called “mainstream” media (meaning Party-controlled media), including central-level media like the People’s Daily.
Located in Xi’an, Da Ci’en Temple (大慈恩寺) is one of Chinese oldest Buddhist sites, its history stretching back 1,360 years. The temple is home to the Great Wild Goose Pagoda, a five-story structure built in the 600s to house religious texts and artifacts brought to China from India by Xuanzang, a scholar and pilgrim who departed from the ancient Tang imperial capital of Chang’an (Xi’an) in 629 AD to make a colorful journey of Buddhist study that lasted almost 17 years and covered scores of kingdoms in Central Asia and India.
Having
distinguished himself in India for his scholarship, Xuanzang eventually
returned with great fanfare to the imperial capital. As abbot of Da Ci’en
Temple – declining Emperor Taizong’s offer of an official position – he devoted
the rest of his life to the translation
of core works of Buddhism from sanskrit, including the most essential
Mahayana scriptures. Xuanzang’s return to China marked a new era
for translation, a time of immense cultural exchange. Centuries later, the monk’s
legendary pilgrimage would inspire one of the great classical novels of Chinese
literature, Wu Cheng’en’s Journey
to the West.
What role does Da Ci’en Temple play in China today? It remains an active center of Buddhist study, and it is of course a major tourist attraction, granted UNESCO World Heritage status in 2014. In the midst of now worsening relations between China and India, Da Ci’en Temple also remains a symbol of friendship and cultural exchange between the two countries. When Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi made an official visit to China in May 2015, he paid a visit to the temple.
But Da Ci’en Temple can also be understood as a symbol today of just how deeply the politics and ideology of the Chinese Communist Party have permeated all aspects of Chinese life, including religion.
A red banner hanging over the master of Da Ci’en Temple on November 6 reads: “Da Ci’en Temple Studies and Implements the Spirit of the Fifth Plenum of the 19th Central Committee of the CCP.”
A summary of the study session posted to the official WeChat account of the Da Ci’en Temple on November 6 quoted the temple’s master (大和尚) as saying that “the Fifth Plenum was an important and comprehensive meeting with historical significance that will usher our country into a new stage of development, at a critical moment in the realization of the great rejuvenation of the Chinese people.”
The master
demanded, according to the post, that “everyone must mobilize all positive
factors, grasping the essence of the plenary session, unifying thought and
action around the spirit of General Secretary Xi Jinping’s important speech,
and continuing to use the spirit of the plenary session in carrying out work
and guiding practice.”
The next section of the report mentions the need to “further enhance” the “Four Consciousnesses,” “Four Confidences” and “Two Protections.” The “Four Consciousnesses” and “Four Confidences” are phrases critical to the consolidation of Xi Jinping’s personal power as leader of the CCP. The former refers to 1) the need to maintain political integrity, 2) think in big-picture terms, 3) uphold the leadership core (meaning Xi Jinping and his inner circle), and 4) keep in alignment with the CCP’s central leadership. The latter refers to: 1) confidence in the path of socialism with Chinese characteristics, 2) confidence in the theories of the CCP, 3) confidence in the system (meaning the system of governance of the CCP), and 4) confidence in China’s unique civilization.
Together with the “Two Confidences” – which point to the need to 1) protect the core status of General Secretary Xi Jinping, and 2) protect the central, unified leadership of the Central Committee of the CCP – these phrases form the so-called “442” formula now used to signal loyalty to Xi Jinping and his leadership of the CCP.
Revealingly, the 442 formula is linked in the post directly with the need to “make steady progress in promoting the Sinicization of Buddhism” (稳步推进佛教中国化进程).
Da Ci’en
Temple is a prime example in point of how Buddhism has undergone a process of Sinicization
since the end of the Han dynasty in the second century AD, and Xuanzang was of course
himself a central figure in this process. Unmistakably, however, this latest
phase of “Sinicization” is about the re-framing of Buddhism around the
political imperatives of the Chinese Communist Party.
It is the CCP’s hope that Buddhism continue to thrive as a key aspect of China’s resplendent traditional culture — so long as Xi Jinping is securely at its core.
[Featured Image: Da Ci’en Temple photographed in 2009. Photo by Kevin Poh available at Flickr.com under CC license.]
“Canberra only has itself to blame,” read an commentary yesterday from the China Daily, the newspaper published by the Information Office of China’s State Council, the administrative office in charge of its external propaganda. The commentary came amid news that China plans to suspend seven types of Australian exports, including wine and coal, a decision that has caused an uproar in Australia.
Observers outside China noted that the unilateral restrictions, coming amid dramatically worsening relations, underscore China’s willingness to leverage economic pressure to oppose countries that challenge its interests. But there is another curious dimension to this latest move – the striking lack of coverage of the restrictions in China’s own media.
As ABC Australia reported yesterday, news of the export suspensions was relayed not by China’s government directly, but by the tabloid Global Times, a commercial spin-off (known for its nationalistic saber-rattling) of the Chinese Communist Party’s flagship People’s Daily newspaper. While the Foreign Trade Department of China’s Ministry of Commerce reportedly summoned Chinese importers earlier in the week to notify them of the changes, no public announcement was made by the ministry.
China’s only official acknowledgement so far came yesterday in a press conference held by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Asked about the Australian restrictions by a reporter from Bloomberg, spokesperson Wang Wenbin responded:
As for the Australian exports to China that you asked about, we responded to similar questions on multiple occasions. The Chinese competent authorities’ measures on foreign imports are in line with Chinese laws and regulations and international customary practices. They protect the safety of consumers and the legitimate rights and interests of domestic industries, and are consistent with the free trade agreement between China and Australia.
But how has this major trade story – seeing as it concerns, as Wang said, “the safety of consumers and the legitimate rights and interests of domestic industries” – been reported inside China? This is where things become curious, and revealing.
Presumably, restrictions impacting billions of dollars of imports with a major trading partner would at the very least make business headlines. But a search of news archives since November 1 using the keyword “Australia,“ covering several hundred mainland Chinese newspapers, turns up just 10 news articles dealing with the unilateral restrictions.
One of just two Chinese-language articles from the Global Times, the only two articles appearing on the Australia-China trade issue in a search of hundreds of Chinese newspapers.
Of these 10 articles, 7 are directly from the English (5) and Chinese (2) editions of the Global Times. The remaining three articles, it turns out, are also from the Global Times, but are re-published at the website of Ningxia Daily, the official CCP flagship paper in Ningxia, at Shenzhen Special Zone Daily (深圳特区报), an official CCP daily in the Shenzhen SEZ, and Newspaper Digest (报刊文摘), a publication of Shanghai’s official Liberation Daily. Meanwhile, searches of keywords like “Australia” and “7 products” on Google turn up overseas results in Chinese about the restrictions, but nothing in major or minor publications inside China, including speciality business-related websites.
The most recent news report on the bilateral trade row, appearing today in the Global Times, is a play-by-play account of accounts in the Australian and other media outside mainland China – in the Australian Financial Review, in Hong Kong’s South China Morning Post, at ABC Australia.
How do we account for this strangely unilateral media conversation? Why is this major trade story, understandably sparking concern in Australia and beyond, the exclusive prerogative inside China of a single newspaper, the sole exception being English-language coverage in the official newspaper (China Daily) of the government department dedicated to external propaganda?
Despite Wang Wenbin’s suggestion that China’s aim in imposing these unilateral restrictions is to “protect the safety of consumers and the legitimate rights and interests of domestic industries,” the palpable silence in China’s own media, and the fact that the bulk of what little “coverage” is available is in English and directed at foreign readers, clearly suggests this is a naked act of retaliation. The lack of coverage would also seem to suggest that Chinese leaders do not wish to encourage public comment or controversy over the decision, or to air out the sensitive details behind the ongoing bilateral disagreement — involving as it does allegations of Chinese spying and overseas influence operations in Australia.
In a brief analysis yesterday of a number of key points emerging from yesterday’s release of the bulletin (公报), or communique, from the Fifth Plenum, we noted the phrase “ensuring the achievement by 2027 of the century-long goal of modernizing the army” (确保二〇二七年实现建军百年奋斗目标) – and suggested this might signal Xi Jinping’s determination to remain as the CCP’s general secretary not just through the Party’s centennial next year, but through the centennial of the formation of the People’s Liberation Army, which falls on August 1, 1927.
Coming at the tail end of a passage that includes mention of “Xi Jinping Thought on a Strong Military” (习近平强军思想), an important nod to Xi’s emerging legacy term “Xi Jinping Thought,” the phrase about 2027 prompted Beijing-based political commentator Wu Qiang (吴强) to remark in an interview with RTHK that Xi had effectively set aside once and for all the notion of China’s “peaceful rise,” or heping jueqi (和平崛起).
And there is other language in yesterday’s bulletin pointing clearly to national security as an elevated priority, having a much more prominent emphasis at the highest levels of the CCP leadership than we have seen at perhaps any previous point in the reform era. One important phrase to note is “comprehensively strengthening training in preparation for war” (全面加强练兵备战), which also comes in the passage about “Xi Jinping Strong Military Thought” and the 2027 goal for the PLA.
If we search
the full archives of the People’s Daily, we find that the term “preparing
for war” does not appear in headlines at all after 1962 – not until exactly two
years ago today, on September 30, 2018. Appearing on the front page that day,
the headline included the full phrase on war preparation: “Comprehensively
Strengthening Training in Preparation for War, Speeding Up the Improvement of
Winning Capacity” (全面加强练兵备战加快提升打赢能力).
The report dealt with Xi’s inspection
tour of the PLA’s 79th Group Army, and included images of the general
secretary in the cockpit of a Z-10 helicopter.
If the phrase “war preparation,” beizhan (备战), appears in the full text of the 14th Five-Year Plan, which will not emerge until after next year’s “two sessions,” this will mark the first time in 55 years that the phrase has figured so strongly in CCP planning. The Third Five-Year Plan (1966-1970), which came at a time of intense vulnerability for China, amidst the Sino-Soviet split and ahead of rapprochement with the United States, emphasized the need to “begin with preparation for fighting big and fighting early, actively preparing for war, and putting the construction of national defense in first position [of priority].”
Finally, we should note the emphasis on national security in
the paragraph immediately preceding mention of “Xi Jinping Strong Military
Thought” in the bulletin, and in particular the phrase about ensuring that “security
development runs through the entire process of national development in all
fields“ (把安全发展贯穿国家发展各领域和全过程).
The paragraph reads:
The plenary session proposed coordination of development and security, building a higher-level of secure China. [We must] adhere to the overall national security concept, implement the national security strategy, maintain and shape national security, coordinate traditional security and non-traditional security, and [ensure] that security development runs through the entire process of national development in all fields . . . .
For observers of Chinese politics who eagerly await word from secretive events like this week’s Fifth Plenum of the 19th Central Committee of the CCP, the first whiffs of news are generally an anti-climax. The signs emerging from such events are rarely concrete, and require tedious unpacking.
Little
surprise, then, that the “bulletin,” or gongbao (公报),
emerging this
evening from the Fifth Plenum is a vine-entangled wall of CCP rhetoric. If
our task is to read the tea leaves, what we have here is sludge. There are,
however, a few surprises to note in the bulletin, and these might offer some initial
insights.
Banners
Not Quite Flying
First, as we
have noted
repeatedly at CMP, one of the most important aspects of CCP discourse to
watch over recent months has been the emergence (since the 19th
National Congress in 2017) of Xi Jinping’s “banner term” (旗帜语) – “Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with
Chinese Characteristics for the New Era” (习近平新时代中国特色社会主义思想) –
and its gradual transformation
from a cumbersome and unpalatable phrase into a short and powerful statement of
Xi’s power and centrality, namely “Xi Jinping Thought” (习近平思想).
When it comes to the world of Party rhetoric, this is the General Secretary’s
end-game, putting his legacy on equal footing with Mao Zedong.
More recently, we have seen more robust talk about various forms of shortened Xi thoughts in concrete policy areas, perhaps signalling a testing of the waters at the top of the leadership. One of the most prominent cases was the opening in July by foreign minister Wang Yi of a new center for “Xi Jinping Thought on Diplomacy.” Abridged Xi thoughts like this get us a bit closer to the coveted “Xi Jinping Thought.”
What do we find in the bulletin released today? The longer
version of Xi’s banner term does appear, but just twice in the text. And in
both of these instances the lengthy phrase appears in the context of standardized
introductions of the banner terms of past CCP leaders (think of it as the fossil
record of CCP legacies):
It was unanimously agreed that over the past year, with
the Politburo of the Chinese Communist Party raising high the great banner of
socialism with Chinese characteristics, adhering to the guidance provided by
Marxism-Leninism, Mao Zedong Thought, Deng
Xiaoping Theory, the important thought of
the “Three Represents,” the scientific view of development, and Xi
Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for the New Era . . .
The shortened phrase “Xi Jinping Thought” does not appear at all in the bulletin. However, there is one stepping stone phrase in the arena of national security, the text emphasizing the need to “carry out Xi Jinping Thought on Military Strengthening” (习近平强军思想), which also mentions the need to “uphold the party’s absolute leadership over the people’s army.”
We cannot of course definitively read the internal environment
in the CCP from its discourse, but the absence of Xi’s coveted “thought” seems
to indicate that the work of consolidating his strength and preparing his legacy
is ongoing.
Looking to the Future
While we’re on the subject of Xi Jinping’s legacy, there is
the crucial question of succession. Xi Jinping removed
presidential term limits back in 2018. Will he have a third, or even a fourth
term, during which to further shore up his power and position? The bulletin
cannot give us a definitive answer. But if we look at how each of the four most
recent plenary bulletins involving new five-year plans have been introduced in
their titles, there is perhaps an interesting clue:
In 2005: Proposal by the Central Committee of the
Communist Party of China for the 11th Five-Year Plan for National
Economic and Social Development /《中共中央关于制定国民经济和社会发展第十一个五年规划的建议》
In 2010:Proposal by the Central Committee of the
Communist Party of China for the 12th Five-Year Plan for National
Economic and Social Development /《中共中央关于制定国民经济和社会发展第十二个五年规划的建议》
In 2015:Proposal by the Central Committee of the
Communist Party of China for the 13th Five-Year Plan for National
Economic and Social Development /《中共中央关于制定国民经济和社会发展第十三个五年规划的建议》
In 2020:Proposal by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China for the 14th Five-Year Plan for National Economic and Social Development and a Vision for 2035 / 《中共中央关于制定国民经济和社会发展第十四个五年规划和二〇三五年远景目标的建议》
The addition in this year’s plan of “and a vision for 2035”
is impossible to miss, and could suggest not just the extension of current
policymaking through to 2035, but the extension of the current leadership. This
could be an important statement of intent, that Xi Jinping plans to continue
influencing policy for more than a decade to come.
But we have another important statement as well. In the
section on modernizing national security and the military toward the end of the
bulletin, there is mention of “ensuring the achievement by 2027 of the century-long
goal of modernizing the army” (确保二〇二七年实现建军百年奋斗目标). It’s hard not to read this as a statement of
Xi Jinping’s personal determination to preside not just over the centennial of
the CCP in July next year, but also the centennial of the formation of the
People’s Liberation Army on August 1, 1927.
Celebrations for the centennial of the PLA would be happening several months before the 21st National Congress of the CCP, which should come in the fall of 2027. So we can, by this reasoning, have some expectation that Xi expects to serve at least one more term, through the end of 2027.
Rivalries Between the Lines
On the international environment facing China, and in particular
US-China tensions and the upcoming presidential election in the US, we can note
that there is no direct mention of US-China relations, which might have been
anticipated.
But the section dealing with China’s external
relations – coming after a long bit about the war on poverty and how the plenary
session “highly appraised the definitive achievements made in the decisive
victory in building a comprehensively well-off society” – mentions that the
session “deeply analyzed the profound and complex changes facing our country’s
development environment.” That is code, certainly, for the US-China trade war and a
range of other
issues China has faced as it has tried to expand its presence in the global
economy, achieve technological dominance, and push programs like the Belt and
Road Initiative.
In this same section, we have language about how “today’s
world is undergoing immense changes such as have not been seen in a century, a
new round of technological and industrial revolution is in deep development,
and the balance of international forces is undergoing profoundly readjustment.”
This seems to be an indirect reference to the US-China rivalry and changes to
the global order, as well as China’s intention to seize the opportunity
afforded by the international environment to achieve technological dominance.
We can also find the phrase “technological independence
and self-reliance” (科技自立自强),
which has been used sporadically by Chinese media (less by official state
media) in the midst of the US-China trade war, but has not yet been given this
level of prominence. An article posted this evening at the Shanghai-based website
Guancha.cn also notes the significance of the statement in the bulletin
about “taking scientific and technological independence and self-reliance as strategic
support for national development” (把科技自立自强作为国家发展的战略支撑).
The bulletin concludes with two oft-seen phrases in
Chinese diplomacy, “promoting the building of a new model of international
relations” (推动构建新型国际关系)
and a “community of common destiny for mankind” (人类命运共同体).
The Need for a New Comprehensive
Chinese discourse analysts and other sad souls who follow
the world of the CCP’s special phrasings,
or tifa (提法), will be familiar with the so-called “four
comprehensives,” a set of political goals laid out by Xi Jinping in 2014. For
the past six years, these have
been set out as follows:
Comprehensive building of a moderately well-off society / 全面建成小康社会 Comprehensive deepening of reform / 全面深化改革 Comprehensive promotion of governing the nation in accord with the law / 全面推进依法治国 Comprehensive strict governance of the Party / 全面从严治党
But of course 2020 was established long ago as the year during which China was to fully accomplish the building of a moderately well-off society, and its success in doing so, and “definitively,” is mentioned in the first one-fifth of the bulletin. Before you applaud, do remember that there was never any way that the CCP was NOT going to reach this goal, which is how goals work under the Party’s leadership.
So clearly the “four comprehensives” must change, right? Right. And this is exactly what we see. The formula now enshrined in the bulletin – as we witness the birth of a new set of phrases – is led by a new objective, ”promoting the comprehensive building of a modern socialist country” (推进全面建设社会主义现代化国家).
The Chinese Communist Party’s Fifth Plenum, which kicked off in Beijing on Monday, has focussed this week on an assessment of the most recent 13th Five-Year Plan (2016-2020) – with fulsome propaganda for the “historic progress” achieved by Xi Jinping – and discussion of the proposed 14th Five-Year Plan (2021-2025) for economic and social development.
Why should this meeting, and this new plan for national development, matter to the rest of the world?
There are any number of reasons to tune in when it comes to the economic and investment impact, as well as geopolitical ramifications. The crux of the new plan, more details hinging on the “bulletin,” or gongbao (公报), that will be released tomorrow (Thursday), will likely be a recognition that China faces a “considerably less benign” global trade landscape than in the past, necessitating greater self-reliance. China’s response to these challenges could have broader ramifications worldwide. There is also the issue of the environment. As Reuters has reported, planners are now under pressure to include “radical climate targets” in the 2021-2025 plan following Xi Jinping’s pledge to the United Nations to make China carbon neutral by 2060.
“Dual circulation” has been characterized in the Party-state media as being about quality development, as opposed to the high-speed growth that was the priority in previous years. This is why, for example, there has been much less focus on GDP numbers, which should take a backseat at the Fifth Plenum. Screenshot of recent reporting from the Global Times.
But as China’s medium and long-term goals come into focus
this week, it is equally important to look beyond the targets, benchmarks and
pronouncements and bear in mind that the CCP’s five-year plans are much more
than simple plans. They are, importantly, statist visions of how planning should
be done, and as such they are bold statements about the nature of political
power and its relationship to society.
China’s five-year plans have their origins in the piatiletka of
Stalin’s Soviet Union, first launched in 1929 as a program of rapid industrialization
that focused on heavy industry and the collectivization of agriculture. Stalin’s
first five-year plan, launched in response to perceived external threats, was by
some measures a success, resulting, as one
scholar later termed it, in a “creative surge” of economic activity that “covered
the immense country with building sites, factories and dams.” But it was also a
“state-guided social transformation” that tore society asunder, a “revolution
from above” that placed the Communist Party of the Soviet Union at the center
of all aspects of life – social, economic and political.
A Soviet propaganda poster from 1930 is titled: “The Five-Year Plan in Four Years” (Piatiletka v chetyri goda). The inscription at the bottom reads: “With the banner of Lenin we won in the battles for the October Revolution. With the banner of Lenin we achieved decisive success in the battle for socialist construction. With the same banner, we will win in the proletarian revolution all over the world.” Image courtesy of the University of Pennsylvania.
While the nature of economic planning has of course changed
since China’s first five-year plan, following
the Soviet example and with Soviet input, was kicked off in 1953, the central
role of the Communist Party has not changed. In this sense, the Fifth Plenum is
not about goals met and goals set, but more essentially about renewing the CCP’s
claims to the legitimacy of its power, its system and its methods.
International news breakdowns like this
one from Reuters may dwell on policy priorities like innovation and
domestic consumption, but in the Party-state media the centrality of power and
legitimacy are impossible to overlook. An article pinned to the top of People’s
Daily Online Monday, as the plenum began, bore the headline: “The ‘Five-Year
Plan’ Enacts the Unique Charm of ‘Chinese Governance.’” The article
focussed on the five-year plan not just as a “significant milestone in measuring
China’s pace” and progress, but as a core aspect of China’s unique system of
governance. Each planning period, it said, had marked a progressive path on which
the Chinese people first “stood up,” then grew rich, and then, finally, became
powerful. “In this process of hard work and plodding forward,” the article
said, “‘Chinese governance’ has become more and more mature, and the great
rejuvenation of the Chinese nation has become nearer and nearer.”
The catchphrase
“Chinese governance,” or zhongguo zhi zhi (中国之治), first
emerged in 2017, and gained greater prominence in the discourse of Party-state
media particularly around the Fourth
Plenum in November 2019. It is closely associated with the homophone “the
Chinese system,” also zhongguo zhi zhi (中国之制). Together, they express the basic
idea that China has developed its own, uniquely effective, system of governance.
This week, China’s five-year plan is being showcased in official propaganda as
a core aspect of the genius of this uniquely Chinese system (Stalinist origins
notwithstanding).
An article from the Central Commission for Discipline
Inspection (CCDI), reposted Monday at
China News Service and many
other sites, was called, “The Secret Code of Chinese Governance: The
Five-Year Plan” (中国之治的重要密码:
五年规划). The
article ran through a brief history of five-year plans, noting changes along
the way. In 2006, for example, the word “plan,” or jihua (计划),
redolent of the era of the planned economy, was dropped in favor of the less politically
loaded term guihua (规划),
or “program.” The article then argued for the uniqueness of the five-year plan
as an aspect of “Chinese governance”:
The formulation and
implementation of the five-year plan for national economic and social
development is an important way for the Party to govern the country and an
important ‘secret code’
for Chinese governance. Since the founding of the new China more than 70 years
ago, and especially since reform and opening, long-term strategies, medium-term
programs and annual deployments have been organically combined and
complementary methods having a crucial role in promoting the sustained, rapid
and healthy development of our country’s economy and society.
Party-state
media are also hammering home – lest anyone forget – the core and indispensable
role of the CCP in this system of Chinese governance. As the People’s Daily
related Tuesday: “General Secretary Xi Jinping has pointed out: ‘The leadership
of the Chinese Communist Party is the essential distinctive feature of
socialism with Chinese characteristics, and it is the greatest advantage of the
system of socialism with Chinese characteristics.”
In this
system, the Party’s power is the essential, irremovable heart, and the genius behind
its five-year programs. As the People’s Daily article elaborates in the next
passage, the capacity of the CCP relies on the genius of its “core” leader, Xi
Jinping. “Through five years of hard work, the most fundamental reason ‘Chinese
governance’ can open new horizons is the strong leadership of the CCP Central
Committee with Comrade Xi Jinping at the core, promoting the continuous
transformation of institutional advantages into governance efficiency.”
Here,
beyond the goals and benchmarks, we have a sequence of nesting dolls taking
us further into the heart of Chinese politics. Beyond the outer truth of the capacity
and efficiency of “Chinese governance,” the “Chinese system” and the five-year
planning approach, one finds the system of socialism with Chinese characteristics;
within the system of socialism with Chinese characteristics one uncovers the
indispensable leadership of the Chinese Communist Party; and at the core of the
CCP one finds the incomparable leadership of Xi Jinping himself.
The most important revelation here at the core of the
nesting dolls of CCP rhetoric is that the entirety of “Chinese governance” and
the “Chinese system” is invested in a single, powerful man. In this sense, the “system”
is not emulable in any real sense – even as we are told in the Party-state
press that its “institutional advantages” (制度优势) offer inspiration to the world.
This week
we can expect to be inundated with declarations of the efficiency and long-term
vision of the Chinese Party-state, of the superiority of “Chinese governance”
and the “Chinese system.” The self-congratulation began weeks ago, in fact. Earlier
this month, China Society News, the official publication of the
Ministry of Civil Affairs, ran an article by the ministry’s deputy head, Zhan
Chengfu (詹成付), that
argued – though there was no reasoning beyond acceptance – for the superiority
of the Chinese system as a means of democratically representing the interests
of the people.
Zhan began:
General
Secretary Xi Jinping has emphasized that the preparation and implementation of
the five-year plan for national economic and social development is an important
way for our Party to govern the country. Since the founding of New China, from
1953 to 2020, our country has implemented 13 five-year plans or programs, one after
another every five years, and these have borne witness to the ups and downs of
China’s modernization. With its magical power, the ‘Five-Year Plan’ has ushered
in more and more surprises to China and the world, bringing out the unique and tremendous
charm of the Chinese system and Chinese governance.
Zhan’s talk
of “magical power” perhaps gets closer to the reality of the CCP view of planning,
but he continues with a familiar argument about the “long-term” visions and “efficient” allocation of resources. Given these advantages,
Westerners can only cast their gaze on China with envy. “Foreign scholars have lamented,”
he writes, “that while China is drawing up plans for the next generation, Western
countries are planning only for the next election.”
To further support
this idea, Zhan offers a quote he attributes to former French prime minister Dominique
de Villepin: “Former French prime minister De Villepin once said: ‘China’s
concentration of strength and long-term determination to struggle is what
Western countries lack.’”
How is it, Zhan asks, that the CCP and the Chinese government can “move from one task to another, passing the baton along, following their blueprints through to the end”? There are two reasons, he concludes. And those reasons will probably not surprise. First, there is the “advanced nature of the Chinese Communist Party.” Next, there are the “significant advantages of the leadership system of the Chinese Communist Party.”
We are running in
ellipses of rhetoric, orbiting Xi Jinping and his CCP. As Xi has
regularly re-asserted, echoing Mao Zedong: “East, west, south, north and
center, Party, government, military, society and education – the Party rules
all.” And the Party rules nothing so sternly
as its own self-image. Bear that in mind this week as its plans emerge.
Today the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) celebrated the 40th
anniversary of the founding of the Shenzhen Special Administrative Region
(SAR), and Xi Jinping’s speech to mark the occasion now tops the
news at party-state media.
A quick look through the text of
Xi’s Shenzhen speech suggests little or nothing of fresh import. It is very
much worth noting, however, that Guangdong’s top provincial leader, Party Secretary Li Xi (李希), talked shortly after Xi’s speech
about the need for “raising high the great banner of Xi Jinping Thought on
Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for the New Era” (高举习近平新时代中国特色社会主义思想伟大旗帜).
Why is this significant?
This is in fact the first time since the onset of the Covid-19 epidemic
in January this year that a member of the Politburo, the elite 25 officials who
oversee the CCP, has aggrandized Xi (this is what the “raising high” in this
case accomplishes) in his presence with reference to his banner term. And even
before January, the use of this phrase was exceptionally rare.
At the 19th National Congress of the CCP in October 2017, the
phrase “great banner of Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese
Characteristics for a New Era” was introduced as a preliminary banner term – as
my colleague Qian Gang has
pointed out. The ultimate goal ever since, navigating the domestic and
international political seas, has been for the top leadership to contract this
long phrase into the five-character power-term “Xi Jinping Thought.” This is a
game we’ve seen play out in a number of arenas, including most
recently foreign diplomacy.
Not at all unlike the Cultural Revolution era phrase, “Raising high the
great banner of Mao Zedong Thought” (高举毛泽东思想伟大红旗), once the shortening of Xi’s banner term has been successfully achieved,
the phrase, “Raising high the great banner of Xi Jinping Thought” can be
introduced normally into media and official discourse.
After the 19th National Congress, we already saw the
emergence of “raising high the great banner of Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism
with Chinese Characteristics for the New Era.” Where “Xi Thought” (习思想) is concerned, we can now find three distinct formalized phrases in
the official People’s Daily newspaper:
“with Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for the New Era as the guide” (以习近平新时代中国特色社会主义思想为指导);
“deeply studying and implementing Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for the New Era” (深入学习贯彻习近平新时代中国特色社会主义思想);
“raising high the great banner of Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for the New Era” (高举习近平新时代中国特色社会主义思想伟大旗帜).
The first has been used most frequently. The Work
Regulations of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China,
released on October 13, state in Article 3 that, “The Central Committee holds
high the magnificent banner of Socialism with Chinese characteristics, takes
Marxism-Leninism, Mao Zedong Thought, Deng Xiaoping Theory, the important
“Three Represents” thought, the scientific development concept, and Xi
Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a new era . .
. . “
The second phrase has appeared less frequently, and the third even less so. Looking at the use of the three phrases in the People’s Daily from October 2017 to October 14, 2020, we find that the first has appeared in 6,121 articles, the second in 2,312, and the third in just 67.
Which members of the Politburo have used the “raising high” phrase in
reference to Xi’s banner term? They are, searching the People’s Daily: Wang
Chen (王晨), on November 9, 2017; Li Qiang (李强), on December 4, 2017; Chen Quanguo
(陈全国), on March 8, 2018; Zhao Leji (赵乐际), on October 30, 2018; Wang Yang (汪洋), on August 30, 2019; and Han Zheng (韩正), on January 11, 2020.
At various meetings after the 19th
National Congress of the CCP in 2017, the phrase appeared prominently on bright
red banners unfurled at the respective venues. Examples include the 18th
National Congress of the Chinese Communist Youth League, the 17th National
Congress of the All-China Federation of Trade Unions (ACFTU), and the 12th
National Congress of the All-China Women’s Federation.
A banner including the “raising high” phrase appears (top, far left) at the 17th National Congress of the All-China Federation of Trade Unions (ACFTU).
Xi Jinping was in attendance at all
three of the above-mentioned congresses, and of course he would have seen this “raising
high.” Zhao Leji delivered the
main address to the All-China Women’s Federation event, and that address including
his own mention of “raising high.” Wang Yang’s 2019
mention came as he addressed an awards ceremony for state-owned enterprise
bosses. Han Zheng’s January 2020 mention came as he spoke at a
ceremony for the National Science and Technology Awards.
The “raising high”
phrase appeared the most in the People’s Daily in 2018, following the 19th
National Congress, with 28 articles in total using the phrase, compared to 13
in 2017 (all within two months of the National Congress), and 19 in 2019. This
year, the phrase has appeared just 7 times. After all, it has been a year of
many distractions.
As Qian Gang argued
in his
report on Chinese discourse in 2019, the lengthy “raising high” phrase must
necessarily be shorted, according the CCP’s political logic, and the ultimate
full-phrase goal has to be: “Raising high the great banner of Xi Jinping
Thought.” Given the constant difficulties that have beset China ever since the
19th National Congress of the CCP, including domestic economic challenges,
the US-China trade war, global frictions over trade, technology and human
rights, the issue of Hong Kong, and so on, Xi Jinping’s ambition to seal his
legacy with the stele of “Xi Jinping Thought” has been difficult to achieve.
Now, more than nine months after Han
Zheng’s mention of the “raising high” phrase, we again have a member of the
Politburo using the phrases to express praise and loyalty toward the General
Secretary. During the live broadcast
of Li Xi’s address on China Central Television, the camera cut away from Li
just as he was uttering these words of high praise, a choice that could not
have been incidental.
Staring straight ahead, unblinking, against a plain red background, the General Secretary was smiling.
