Political reform in China basically boils down to constitutional reform, or xianzheng gaige (宪政改革). This is an old issue, going back as far as the civil war in the 1940s, when the Communists demanded constitutional reform. The term has been on the rise in China’s media over the last 10 years or so. Both Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao talked about “ruling the country according to law” (依法治国). And when Hu Jintao held his first study session of the Political Bureau, the topic was reportedly the Chinese Constitution.
But the term “constitutionalism” remains sensitive, and there are no references to it in contemporary party documents or official speeches. Is that likely to change next week?
Not long ago, the News Commentary Group of China’s Central Propaganda Department (中宣部阅评) – the very same group that led the shutdown of the Freezing Point supplement last year – criticized media for discussing constitutional reforms in Eastern Europe. Not surprisingly, editors at some media, fearing criticism, avoid the term.
In a 2004 article in an official journal, writers Wang Yicheng (王一程) and Chen Hongtai (陈红太) advocated against using “constitutionalism” in China, which they called a “capitalist political term.” Others have argued that constitutionalism negates the leadership of the Communist Party, that it means importing a Western-style capitalist democratic system. Last year the head of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS), Chen Kuiyuan (陈奎元), vocally criticized what he called “capitalist constitutionalism”.
But China’s relationship to constitutionalism is more complex. Books on the subject now abound in Chinese, and constitutionalism has become a normative term for many Chinese media, particularly commercial media, as they discuss the general issue of political reform. Chinese leaders, even if they don’t speak publicly about “constitutionalism,” do talk about “ruling the nation according to law” (依法治国). The problem is that they haven’t yet let go of the notion that the nation should be ruled according to the party’s will (以党治国).
Hu Jintao has not led any real progress on political reform over the last five years. But the policy language used by Hu Jintao and Premier Wen Jiabao has not been unfavorable to political reform. Terms like “scientific view of development” and “harmonious society”, and the emphasis on “people as the dominant factor” (以民为本), all point in the general direction of political reform. It can be said, in fact, that China stands today at the threshold of political reform.
It is not so crucial that Hu Jintao use the term “constitutionalism.” So long as he does not stand openly on the side of the Maoist faction (毛派) in denouncing constitutionalism. So long as he continues to tolerate discussion of constitutionalism. So long as he leaves the road to constitutional reform open for the next generation of Chinese leaders.
Will the next generation of Communist Party leaders talk openly about “constitutionalism”? Will they make real and thorough efforts at political reform? From this point on this is something we should pay close attention to.
(Qian Gang, October 14, 2007)
[Translated by David Bandurski]
Previous 17th Congress article: “Two new Hu buzzwords to lookout for at the 17th Congress“

“Separation of the functions of party and government” (党政分开), or dang zheng fenkai, is a highly sensitive phrase in China. The phrase had a prominent role in political reforms as lined out in Zhao Ziyang’s report to the 13th Congress in 1987, but the 1989 crackdown on pro-democracy demonstrations pushed the term backstage. How Hu Jintao deals with the phrase when the 17th Congress opens next week could offer more clues to the president’s reform plans.
Will Hu hearken back to the 13th Congress, promoting the role of “party-government separation” in reform, or will he stand with the 14th Congress and eliminate all mention of the term?
As I mentioned in a previous article, Deng Xiaoping said of Zhao Ziyang’s political report to the 13th Congress: “Not a word must be changed.” In that report “party-government separation” appeared 13 times and was used in a small section head. The term hasn’t been seen since.
“Party-government separation” was conspicuously absent from Jiang Zemin’s report to the 14th Congress in 1992. Foreign journalists noticed the change. A reporter from Hong Kong asked: “Why isn’t the slogan ‘separating the functions of party and government’ being used anymore?” (People’s Daily, October 16, 1992, Page 4).
The answer came from Zhao Dongyuan (赵东宛), head of China’s Ministry of Personnel:

The goal in carrying out separation of the functions of the party and government was to improve the party’s governance and create a vital and efficient government mechanism. Since the 13th National Congress, party and government organs at various levels have, according to the principle of separating the functions of party and government, done a great deal of work to improve and strengthen party governance, and build and improve government mechanisms. In the area of administrative restructuring, the key problem now is lack of clear lines of separation between governments and enterprises (政企不分). If we want to change the function of government, the basic path of reform is separation of government and enterprise.

Zhao’s answer was, in a nutshell: our priorities have changed.
When Deng Xiaoping first raised “party-government separation” his point was to resolve over-concentration of power (权力过分集中). This trend was reversed for the 14th-16th congresses, where strengthening and concentrating party leadership became an important goal in itself.
This was clear from the 15th Congress report, where “political reform” was tethered to the Four Basic Principles: “With the Four Basic Principles as a precondition, [we will] continue to promote political reform, taking further steps to expand socialist democracy, improve socialist rule of law … From the standpoint of laws and systems, [we will] ensure the party maintains total control and coordinates various aspects in exercising core leadership” (People’s Daily, September 22, 1997).
Political reform did not just slow down in the Jiang Zemin era. It reversed. China moved back toward greater concentration of power. At provincial party congresses, many party secretaries (top provincial leaders) now serve as directors (省人大常委会主任). So while people’s congresses are nominally tasked with filling key posts, such as provincial governor, party secretaries now dominate the selection process, filling posts with their own favorites.
Li Keqiang (李克强), a potential Hu successor who has lately been the center of much speculation, is a good example of this trend. Li is currently party secretary of Liaoning Province but director also of Liaoning’s provincial party congress. As of 2002, at least 19 provinces had this sort of arrangement.
Chinese leaders and scholars go back and forth over the advantages and disadvantages of this centralized system. On the positive side, they say, it allows the party to exercise greater control over the people’s congresses, ensures the party’s message is legitimized as “national will,” and guarantees the party fills the leadership ranks with its own. In addition, powerful party secretaries can better supervise the people’s government, the court system and the procuratorate (一府两院). The upshot, argues the pro side, is increased social stability.
On the con side, officials recognize that greater concentration of power hinders deeper political reform and makes it tougher to check and limit the power of party officials. Further, it inhibits the ability of people’s congresses to effectively and independently monitor officials, and derails rule of law and an independent judiciary.
For more writing from the opposing position, check out the following Chinese links:

“Looking at the Practice of Party Secretaries Directing Local People’s Congresses from the Standpoint of Party and Government Relations”
“Cautions on Party Secretary Direction of Local People’s Congresses”
“Directing of People’s Congresses by Secretaries Must be Reconsidered“

Perhaps the most ardent voice of opposition to this form of concentration of power comes from Wang Guixiu (王贵秀), a professor at China’s Central Party School [SEE: “17th National Congress: What should you interview?“]. Wang argues that the goal of directorship of people’s congresses by party secretaries is control of the congressional election process — more backward even, he says, than party leaders serving simultaneously in government posts. This is a classic example of “rule of man”, or ren zhi (人治), says Wang (See Wang Guixiu, The Road to Political Reform in China, 中国政治体制改革之路. pg. 270).
It’s possible Hu Jintao will ignore the issue of “party-government separation” altogether, prefering not to stake out a position on the phrase. But Hu cannot ignore lingering questions about the basic direction of political reform in China — is the goal greater concentration of power or greater separation?
In his June 25 speech, Hu said “political reforms in our country must stick to the correct political direction.” What does he mean by “correct”? Does it mean that solidifying the leadership of the Communist Party must be at the heart of all so-called reforms?
Once again, we’ll just have to wait and see.
(Qian Gang, October 10, 2007)[Translated by David Bandurski]
Previous 17th Congress article: “The 17th National Congress: Who should you interview?”
More on InsightTrack

September 26 — As protests erupted into violence in Burma, Chinese media were restricted largely to Xinhua News Agency reports touting the official line of China’s Foreign Ministry. “China always sticks to a policy of non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries,” China Daily quoted a foreign ministry spokesperson as saying. [More coverage at BBC.com].
September 27 — The chairman of China’s Sun Media, Bruno Zheng Wu (吴征), told an audience in London that he was unhappy with the degree of media freedom allowed in China, the Daily Telegraph reported. Wu also encouraged China to adopt international 3G (third generation) mobile phone standards ahead of next year’s Olympic Games. Wu’s wife, Yang Lan, is a popular Chinese television host. Together, Wu and Yang have created one of China’s largest media businesses. [The Independent profile on Bruno WU and Yang Lan][Danwei.org responds to the Independent profile].
September 28 — Following a seminar hosted by China’s official People’s Daily, China agreed to step up cooperation on the media front with Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) member states through a so-called “China-Asean Media Cooperation Liaison Network,” Malaysia General News reported. Media organizations from ASEAN and China agreed at the seminar to allow further sharing of news items on condition that credit was given for content and images. Participating organizations also agreed to cooperate in their coverage of the 2008 Beijing Olympics.

September 17 — Yu Keping, a key theorist in Hu Jintao’s circle, praised Hu in the pages of Beijing Daily, linking the president’s notion of “liberation of thought” – a phrase first used at the 1978 congress, when Deng Xiaoping introduced the Four Modernizations – to such issues as “human rights” and “constitutionalism.” Another Yu essay, “Democracy is a Good Thing”, created waves back in late 2006 by arguing that democracy was indispensable if China wanted to build a strong and modern socialist society. [More from CMP]
September 18 — Following its move to shut down “First Heartthrob”, a talent competition show on Chongqing TV, China’s State Administration of Radio Film and Television announced its was putting a stop to “Red Question Mark”, a program based on re-enactments of crimes committed by women. [More from Danwei.org]

One interesting bit of news we should look for at the 17th Congress this year is the possibility the party congress might, for the first time in its history, put a system of proposals (提案制度) into practice. If this does happen, it will raise a key question – can Communist Party delegates (党代表) actually serve as representatives and have their say in debates over party matters?
Procedures for making proposals (提案) and motions (提议) are in place for the National People’s Congress (NPC) and Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) – known as the “two meetings” – but such an arrangement has never existed for national meetings of the Party.
The speeches by leaders reported in the media are generally “discussions” of the political report issued by the top leader, or about amendments to the Party Constitution — and these are notes of support rather than dissent. We do not see real discussion, debate or criticism on party matters. Delegates are there instead to offer up eulogies and make impassioned speeches of solidarity. It is essentially correct to call the national congress a rubberstamping body.
But over the last five years there have been signs of change. On September 19, 2004, the Central Party passed its “Decision on Strengthening the Party’s Governance Capability” (关于加强党的执政能力建设的决定). That document talked about “building a proposal system for the national party congress”. Such systems have already been put into place for some party congresses at the county and city levels. They have not yet been rolled out for provincial or municipal-level congresses, but a so-called “working opinions handling” (工作建议办理) system for delegates set up for the recent party congress in Zhejiang province comes very close.
After the Central Party announced the 17th Congress would be held on October 15 this year, the official People’s Daily Online ran a Weblog from a party member that posed three crucial questions:

1. Have you written your proposals yet?
2. Have you properly prepared yourself to face the media?
3. Have you set up your Weblog yet?

If a proposals system is put into effect for the 17th Congress, we’ll need to pay special attention to a number of questions. What proposals will the delegates make? Even if they don’t make formal proposals, what will they say at the congress?

* Can they talk about the corruption case against Chen Liangyu?
* Can they talk about the substantial number of corruption cases against provincial and ministerial-level officials this year?
* Can they talk about a system of permanent tenure (党代表常任制), in which delegates to the party congress participate in party affairs on a more regular basis?
* Can they talk about HIV-Aids, coal-mining disasters, food safety and other pressing issues?
* Can they talk about watchdog journalism and media reform?
* Can they talk about the party’s history, about the question of how to assess such figures as Hu Yaobang and Zhao Ziyang?
* Can all of these things be discussed openly? Semi-openly?

(Qian Gang, October 8, 2007)
[Translated by David Bandurski]
Previous 17th Congress article: “Will a “regular serving system” for delegates be discussed at the 17th National Congress?”

In my last article I talked about “differential voting” (差额选举) in the selection of delegates to the 17th National Congress. One of my basic points was that we can look at the increase in the “differential rate” (差额) – a higher ratio of candidates to positions available – as a measure of progress on political reform (in this case, “inner-party democracy”). But of course having more candidates than positions doesn’t mean delegates to this key meeting are more active participants in party decision making.
One important reason delegates to the National Congress have very little actual decision-making power is that their participation is a once-off deal. This month 2,217 party delegates will gather in Beijing. Once the meeting is finished, so are their responsibilities as delegates. They’re off the hook for the next five years, and the party’s Central Committee takes the reins.
But there has been some discussion in China since the 16th National Congress in 2002 about whether a “regular serving system” (常任制), or chang ren zhi, should be implemented for the party congress. This would mean delegates meet to discuss party policy and cast their votes. Such a system is already in place for the National People’s Congess (NPC) and the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC).
Jiang Zemin in fact raised the issue of a regular serving system in his 2002 political report. “[We must] expand our trials for a regular serving system for national party congress delegates at the county and city levels,” Jiang’s report said. “[We must] actively seek the forms and channels by which party congress delegates can play a representative role (发挥代表作用) between the closing of congresses.”
So what would a regular serving system mean? Basically that:

*Party delegates remain in their positions for the full five years between congresses
*The party congress (and not just the Central Committee) is the highest authority
*The Central Committee (党委会) makes annual reports to the congress that are deliberated by delegates
*Delegates to the party congress can make inspections of party affairs (视察党务工作), seek input from the population, and offer proposals during the annual congress just as their counterparts in the NPC and CPPCC are able to do.

This would mark a real step forward in the process of inner-party democracy, and some believe it is also the best way to tackle the difficult problem of democratization in China.
Trials have been made since the 16th National Congress in 2002. In some areas of China there have been standing party delegates at the township, county and other levels. According to mainland media reports more than 100 counties and cities have participated in trials. Examples can be found at the following links:

[“Thoughts and Experiences on a Regular Serving System for Party Delegates“, September 2004]
[A series of reports from 2003 to 2006 on regular serving systems]

Better known among reform efforts are the “Luotian Experiment” (罗田经验) in Hubei, and the “Huizhou Experiment” in Guangdong. Sichuan has been the most active among provinces in carrying out trials for a party delegate standing system.
Trials have not yet been made for provincial party congresses or for municipalities (Shanghai, Chongqing) or provincial capital cities. So if there is an announcement at the 17th congress that a regular serving system will go into effect for central party delegates that would be major news. This may not happen. But one distinct possibility is that local trials of regular serving systems are formally affirmed at the upcoming party congress and a goal set for future implementation at the central level.
(Qian Gang, October 5, 2007)
[Translated by David Bandurski]
Previous 17th Congress article: “How will voting be handled at the 17th National Congress?”