Author: David Bandurski

Now Executive Director of the China Media Project, leading the project’s research and partnerships, David originally joined the project in Hong Kong in 2004. He is the author of Dragons in Diamond Village (Penguin), a book of reportage about urbanization and social activism in China, and co-editor of Investigative Journalism in China (HKU Press).

"Socialism with Chinese characteristics" tops buzz phrases in 17th congress report

And the results are in! “Socialism with Chinese characteristics” (中国特色社会主义) logged the most number of uses, appearing 52 times in Hu Jintao’s political report to the 17th National Congress. A distance second, “scientific development” (科学发展) racked up 38 appearances. Used a total of 34 times, “opening and reform” (改革开放) finished third, just edging out “harmony” (和谐) at 33.

sina-17th.JPG

[ABOVE: Screenshot of news coverage of 17th congress at Sina.com, October 17, 2007.]

Other words to watch include:

“Deng Xiaoping Theory” (邓小平理论) – 10 appearances
“Three Represents” (三个代表) – 9 appearances

“Socialism with Chinese characteristics” and “opening and reform” are familiar faces. The following graph plots occurrence of these phrases in this and previous party congress reports:

analysis-2-graph.JPG

The sharp rise in “Socialism with Chinese characteristics” and “opening and reform” reflects the party’s basic direction for the next five years. It is, first and foremost, a reaffirmation of the path of reform and opening in response to the left’s opposition and call for a turn back. Secondly, it is the striking of a middle path between the socialism of the Mao era on the one hand and clamors from the right for “democratic socialism” (民主社会主义) on the other.
With these two major preconditions in place, Hu Jintao formally ushers out his own banners, “scientific outlook on development” and “harmonious society.” Both of these phrases are about making moderate corrections to the GDP-focused economic reforms of the Deng Xiaoping and Jiang Zemin eras in order to address economic disparities.
Other key buzz phrases offer hints about Hu Jintao’s general path.
“Political reform” (政治体制改革), which appeared seven times in the 16th congress report, appears just five times this year. The term does not appear in the title of a report section head, which has not happened since before the 13th congress. This strongly suggests Hu Jintao plans to avoid the question of political reform altogether and is taking pains to cool public expectations. We’ll talk more about this later on.
As we mentioned yesterday, the position of the “Four Basic Principles” in Hu’s report is of special note. The phrase appeared seven times in Jiang Zemin’s 14th congress report, but dropped to just three times for the 16th congress report. In the five years since the 16th congress use of the phrase has continued to decline. That Hu uses the term four times in this year’s report is a surprising turn.

Hu Jintao's prominent use of the Four Basic Principles suggests intense pressure from party leftists

Late last month CMP co-director Qian Gang wrote about the “Four Basic Principles” as a key phrase to watch at the 17th National Congress:

Concerning the Four Basic Principles, there are two possibilities for Hu Jintao’s political report to the 17th National Congress.
The first possibility is that Hu’s report will use the Four Basic Principles in the same way as previous reports, from the 12th congress through to the 16th. If this happens we can guess that Hu Jintao will not break any new ground in the area of political reform.
The second possibility is that the Four Basic Principles will not appear directly in Hu’s report, and that “one core, two focal points” will appear in its stead. While this would not be a radical shift in meaning, it would make a very different impression and could be read as a sign that Hu Jintao will focus more attention on [political] reform.

Analyzing the text of Hu Jintao’s report on the opening day of the 17th National Congress yesterday as it was made available on the Xinhua News Agency website, CMP found that Hu not only made direct use of the “Four Basic Principles” but used the term four times, a conspicuous departure from his typical avoidance of the phrase.

china-daily-02.jpg

[ABOVE: Screenshot of China Daily Online coverage of the 17th National Congress, October 16, 2007]

In his first use, Hu Jintao reflected back on the history of economic reform and opening:

Throughout the history of economic opening and reform, our party has steadfastly linked the basic principles of Marxism with the promotion of China-style Marxism (马克思主义中国化), have linked our persevering in the Four Basic Principles with our persevering in reforms, have linked respect for the pioneering spirit of the people (人民首创精神) with strengthening and improving the party’s leadership, have linked our perseverance in the basic Socialist system with the development of the market economy …

The full passage in Chinese follows:

在改革开放的历史进程中,我们党把坚持马克思主义基本原理同推进马克思主义中国化结合起来,把坚持四项基本原则同坚持改革开放结合起来,把尊重人民首创精神同加强和改善党的领导结合起来,把坚持社会主义基本制度同发展市场经济结合起来,把推动经济基础变革同推动上层建筑改革结合起来,把发展社会生产力同提高全民族文明素质结合起来,把提高效率同促进社会公平结合起来,把坚持独立自主同参与经济全球化结合起来,把促进改革发展同保持社会稳定结合起来,把推进中国特色社会主义伟大事业同推进党的建设新的伟大工程结合起来,取得了我们这样一个十几亿人口的发展中大国摆脱贫困、加快实现现代化、巩固和发展社会主义的宝贵经验.

In another section, as he explained “Socialism with Chinese characteristics”, Hu again used the “Four Basic Principles”:

The road of Socialism with Chinese characteristics means, under the leadership of the Communist Party of China, adhering to the basic national situation (立足基本国情), with economic construction as the core, persevering in the Four Basic Principles, persevering in economic reforms, unleashing and developing the productive forces of society …

The full passage in Chinese follows:

中国特色社会主义道路,就是在中国共产党领导下,立足基本国情,以经济建设为中心,坚持四项基本原则,坚持改革开放,解放和发展社会生产力,巩固和完善社会主义制度,建设社会主义市场经济、社会主义民主政治、社会主义先进文化、社会主义和谐社会,建设富强民主文明和谐的社会主义现代化国家.

In yet another section, as he explained the relationship between the “Four Basic Principles” and his own “scientific outlook on development” (科学发展观), Hu Jintao invoked the phrase twice:

Implementing the scientific outlook on development requires that we thoroughly uphold the basic path of the ‘one core and two basic points’. The party’s basic path is the lifeline of the party and the nation and the political guarantee of the realization of scientific development … The Four Basic Principles are the foundation of the country, the political keystone of the survival and development of the party and the nation. Economic reform and opening is the path toward invigoration of the country, an important source of vitality in national development and progress. [We] must persevere in developing the great practice of Socialism with Chinese characteristics with economic development as the core and the Four Basic Principles and economic opening and reform as the basic points, and these must at no point be shaken.

The full passage in Chinese follows:

深入贯彻落实科学发展观,要求我们始终坚持“一个中心、两个基本点”的基本路线。党的基本路线是党和国家的生命线,是实现科学发展的政治保证。以经济建设为中心是兴国之要,是我们党、我们国家兴旺发达和长治久安的根本要求;四项基本原则是立国之本,是我们党、我们国家生存发展的政治基石;改革开放是强国之路,是我们党、我们国家发展进步的活力源泉。要坚持把以经济建设为中心同四项基本原则、改革开放这两个基本点统一于发展中国特色社会主义的伟大实践,任何时候都决不能动摇。

This direct and prominent usage of the “Four Basic Principles” is uncharacteristic of Hu. In his June 25 speech and the eight official People’s Daily editorials that followed, direct use of the phrase was avoided. Important Communist Party documents over the last five years have also made scant use of the phrase (SEE: “Will Hu Jintao continue to use the ‘Four Basic Principles’?“).
One possible reading of this outcome is that Hu Jintao gave the “Four Basic Principles” more prominent play when faced with strong pressure from leftists within the party on the eve of the congress.

When will party leaders start talking “constitutionalism”?

Political reform in China basically boils down to constitutional reform, or xianzheng gaige (宪政改革). This is an old issue, going back as far as the civil war in the 1940s, when the Communists demanded constitutional reform. The term has been on the rise in China’s media over the last 10 years or so. Both Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao talked about “ruling the country according to law” (依法治国). And when Hu Jintao held his first study session of the Political Bureau, the topic was reportedly the Chinese Constitution.
But the term “constitutionalism” remains sensitive, and there are no references to it in contemporary party documents or official speeches. Is that likely to change next week?
Not long ago, the News Commentary Group of China’s Central Propaganda Department (中宣部阅评) – the very same group that led the shutdown of the Freezing Point supplement last year – criticized media for discussing constitutional reforms in Eastern Europe. Not surprisingly, editors at some media, fearing criticism, avoid the term.
In a 2004 article in an official journal, writers Wang Yicheng (王一程) and Chen Hongtai (陈红太) advocated against using “constitutionalism” in China, which they called a “capitalist political term.” Others have argued that constitutionalism negates the leadership of the Communist Party, that it means importing a Western-style capitalist democratic system. Last year the head of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS), Chen Kuiyuan (陈奎元), vocally criticized what he called “capitalist constitutionalism”.
But China’s relationship to constitutionalism is more complex. Books on the subject now abound in Chinese, and constitutionalism has become a normative term for many Chinese media, particularly commercial media, as they discuss the general issue of political reform. Chinese leaders, even if they don’t speak publicly about “constitutionalism,” do talk about “ruling the nation according to law” (依法治国). The problem is that they haven’t yet let go of the notion that the nation should be ruled according to the party’s will (以党治国).
Hu Jintao has not led any real progress on political reform over the last five years. But the policy language used by Hu Jintao and Premier Wen Jiabao has not been unfavorable to political reform. Terms like “scientific view of development” and “harmonious society”, and the emphasis on “people as the dominant factor” (以民为本), all point in the general direction of political reform. It can be said, in fact, that China stands today at the threshold of political reform.
It is not so crucial that Hu Jintao use the term “constitutionalism.” So long as he does not stand openly on the side of the Maoist faction (毛派) in denouncing constitutionalism. So long as he continues to tolerate discussion of constitutionalism. So long as he leaves the road to constitutional reform open for the next generation of Chinese leaders.
Will the next generation of Communist Party leaders talk openly about “constitutionalism”? Will they make real and thorough efforts at political reform? From this point on this is something we should pay close attention to.
(Qian Gang, October 14, 2007)
[Translated by David Bandurski]
Previous 17th Congress article: “Two new Hu buzzwords to lookout for at the 17th Congress

Two new Hu buzzwords to lookout for at the 17th Congress

There has been some suggestion in recent months that Hu Jintao might introduce two fledgling buzzwords at next week’s 17th Congress. The first is “citizen participation,” or gongmin canyu (公民参与), short for the phrase “orderly political participation by citizens” (公民有序的政治参与). The second is “consultative democracy”, or xieshang minzhu (协商民主), sometimes called “deliberative democracy.”
These Hu terms actually mark cautious steps ahead, or points of pressure, on political reform. What do they mean?

citizen-participation-slogan.JPG

[“Expanding orderly citizen participation in political affairs”, reads a headline in the official Guangzhou Daily following Hu Jintao’s June 25 speech.]

In his June 25 speech, Hu Jintao said political reform “must move ahead in step with economic and social development, commensurate with the growing participation of the people of the nation in political affairs” (政治体制改革”必须随着经济社会发展不断推进,努力与我国人民政治参与的积极性不断提高相适应”).
In the political reform movement of the 1980s, political activist Wang Juntao and others talked about “checking and balancing [power] with diverse expression by intellectual elites” (多元表达,精英制衡) as a safe and reliable path of reform. “Expanding orderly political participation by citizens” has a similar meaning.
Pointing to growing disaffection in Chinese society and an increase in mass incidents, some have promoted citizen participation through such channels as public hearings, open meetings, leadership consultation days and online feedback as a means of dissipating resentment.
Check out these Chinese links for more on “citizen participation”:

Three Pressure Points in the Development of Democracy in China
Expert: Citizen Participation Will Make Progress After the 17th Congress

“Consultative democracy” (协商民主) is generally used in constrast to “electoral democracy” (选举民主). There has been lively debate about what exactly the term means, whether or not it should be opposed to “elective democracy”, whether it is a new democratic form, etc:

A New Form of Democracy“, China.com.cn, November 2006
Where is the Value in Consultative Democracy?“, China.com.cn, December 2006
Issues in Consultative Democracy“, China.com.cn, July 2007
More Discussion of Consultative Democracy“, Study Times, September 2007

But the term is basically a cautious and limited version of “electoral democracy.” It replaces the notion of “electoral democracy” in order to ensure the Communist Party maintains firm control of the political reform process.

deliberative-democracy-slogan.JPG

[The theory section of China’s official People’s Daily runs a page on consultative democracy as a “special form of Socialism with Chinese characteristics.]

“Citizen participation” and “consultative democracy” are political signposts. If both are used with greater frequency during and after the 17th Congress they will signal Hu Jintao’s cautious, conservative approach to political reform.
(Qian Gang, October 12, 2007)
[Translated by David Bandurski]
Previous 17th Congress article: “Will “separation of party and government” come up at the 17th Congress?

Will "separation of party and government" come up at the 17th Congress?

“Separation of the functions of party and government” (党政分开), or dang zheng fenkai, is a highly sensitive phrase in China. The phrase had a prominent role in political reforms as lined out in Zhao Ziyang’s report to the 13th Congress in 1987, but the 1989 crackdown on pro-democracy demonstrations pushed the term backstage. How Hu Jintao deals with the phrase when the 17th Congress opens next week could offer more clues to the president’s reform plans.
Will Hu hearken back to the 13th Congress, promoting the role of “party-government separation” in reform, or will he stand with the 14th Congress and eliminate all mention of the term?
As I mentioned in a previous article, Deng Xiaoping said of Zhao Ziyang’s political report to the 13th Congress: “Not a word must be changed.” In that report “party-government separation” appeared 13 times and was used in a small section head. The term hasn’t been seen since.
“Party-government separation” was conspicuously absent from Jiang Zemin’s report to the 14th Congress in 1992. Foreign journalists noticed the change. A reporter from Hong Kong asked: “Why isn’t the slogan ‘separating the functions of party and government’ being used anymore?” (People’s Daily, October 16, 1992, Page 4).
The answer came from Zhao Dongyuan (赵东宛), head of China’s Ministry of Personnel:

The goal in carrying out separation of the functions of the party and government was to improve the party’s governance and create a vital and efficient government mechanism. Since the 13th National Congress, party and government organs at various levels have, according to the principle of separating the functions of party and government, done a great deal of work to improve and strengthen party governance, and build and improve government mechanisms. In the area of administrative restructuring, the key problem now is lack of clear lines of separation between governments and enterprises (政企不分). If we want to change the function of government, the basic path of reform is separation of government and enterprise.

Zhao’s answer was, in a nutshell: our priorities have changed.
When Deng Xiaoping first raised “party-government separation” his point was to resolve over-concentration of power (权力过分集中). This trend was reversed for the 14th-16th congresses, where strengthening and concentrating party leadership became an important goal in itself.
This was clear from the 15th Congress report, where “political reform” was tethered to the Four Basic Principles: “With the Four Basic Principles as a precondition, [we will] continue to promote political reform, taking further steps to expand socialist democracy, improve socialist rule of law … From the standpoint of laws and systems, [we will] ensure the party maintains total control and coordinates various aspects in exercising core leadership” (People’s Daily, September 22, 1997).
Political reform did not just slow down in the Jiang Zemin era. It reversed. China moved back toward greater concentration of power. At provincial party congresses, many party secretaries (top provincial leaders) now serve as directors (省人大常委会主任). So while people’s congresses are nominally tasked with filling key posts, such as provincial governor, party secretaries now dominate the selection process, filling posts with their own favorites.
Li Keqiang (李克强), a potential Hu successor who has lately been the center of much speculation, is a good example of this trend. Li is currently party secretary of Liaoning Province but director also of Liaoning’s provincial party congress. As of 2002, at least 19 provinces had this sort of arrangement.
Chinese leaders and scholars go back and forth over the advantages and disadvantages of this centralized system. On the positive side, they say, it allows the party to exercise greater control over the people’s congresses, ensures the party’s message is legitimized as “national will,” and guarantees the party fills the leadership ranks with its own. In addition, powerful party secretaries can better supervise the people’s government, the court system and the procuratorate (一府两院). The upshot, argues the pro side, is increased social stability.
On the con side, officials recognize that greater concentration of power hinders deeper political reform and makes it tougher to check and limit the power of party officials. Further, it inhibits the ability of people’s congresses to effectively and independently monitor officials, and derails rule of law and an independent judiciary.
For more writing from the opposing position, check out the following Chinese links:

Looking at the Practice of Party Secretaries Directing Local People’s Congresses from the Standpoint of Party and Government Relations
Cautions on Party Secretary Direction of Local People’s Congresses
Directing of People’s Congresses by Secretaries Must be Reconsidered

Perhaps the most ardent voice of opposition to this form of concentration of power comes from Wang Guixiu (王贵秀), a professor at China’s Central Party School [SEE: “17th National Congress: What should you interview?“]. Wang argues that the goal of directorship of people’s congresses by party secretaries is control of the congressional election process — more backward even, he says, than party leaders serving simultaneously in government posts. This is a classic example of “rule of man”, or ren zhi (人治), says Wang (See Wang Guixiu, The Road to Political Reform in China, 中国政治体制改革之路. pg. 270).
It’s possible Hu Jintao will ignore the issue of “party-government separation” altogether, prefering not to stake out a position on the phrase. But Hu cannot ignore lingering questions about the basic direction of political reform in China — is the goal greater concentration of power or greater separation?
In his June 25 speech, Hu said “political reforms in our country must stick to the correct political direction.” What does he mean by “correct”? Does it mean that solidifying the leadership of the Communist Party must be at the heart of all so-called reforms?
Once again, we’ll just have to wait and see.
(Qian Gang, October 10, 2007)[Translated by David Bandurski]
Previous 17th Congress article: “The 17th National Congress: Who should you interview?
More on InsightTrack

September 24 — September 30, 2007

September 26 — As protests erupted into violence in Burma, Chinese media were restricted largely to Xinhua News Agency reports touting the official line of China’s Foreign Ministry. “China always sticks to a policy of non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries,” China Daily quoted a foreign ministry spokesperson as saying. [More coverage at BBC.com].
September 27 — The chairman of China’s Sun Media, Bruno Zheng Wu (吴征), told an audience in London that he was unhappy with the degree of media freedom allowed in China, the Daily Telegraph reported. Wu also encouraged China to adopt international 3G (third generation) mobile phone standards ahead of next year’s Olympic Games. Wu’s wife, Yang Lan, is a popular Chinese television host. Together, Wu and Yang have created one of China’s largest media businesses. [The Independent profile on Bruno WU and Yang Lan][Danwei.org responds to the Independent profile].
September 28 — Following a seminar hosted by China’s official People’s Daily, China agreed to step up cooperation on the media front with Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) member states through a so-called “China-Asean Media Cooperation Liaison Network,” Malaysia General News reported. Media organizations from ASEAN and China agreed at the seminar to allow further sharing of news items on condition that credit was given for content and images. Participating organizations also agreed to cooperate in their coverage of the 2008 Beijing Olympics.

September 17 — September 23, 2007

September 17 — Yu Keping, a key theorist in Hu Jintao’s circle, praised Hu in the pages of Beijing Daily, linking the president’s notion of “liberation of thought” – a phrase first used at the 1978 congress, when Deng Xiaoping introduced the Four Modernizations – to such issues as “human rights” and “constitutionalism.” Another Yu essay, “Democracy is a Good Thing”, created waves back in late 2006 by arguing that democracy was indispensable if China wanted to build a strong and modern socialist society. [More from CMP]
September 18 — Following its move to shut down “First Heartthrob”, a talent competition show on Chongqing TV, China’s State Administration of Radio Film and Television announced its was putting a stop to “Red Question Mark”, a program based on re-enactments of crimes committed by women. [More from Danwei.org]

Journalist Yang Jisheng reflects on China's reform in CMP lecture

By Xie Yuan — Speaking to a packed house at Hong Kong University on Monday, veteran journalist Yang Jisheng said China’s leadership would have to make a clean reckoning of the 1989 crackdown on pro-democracy demonstrators and pursue “democratic politics” before China could enter the “post-Deng Xiaoping era.”
But Yang stressed democratic change in China would be a gradual process.
“We have seen so many casualties from radical revolutions in our history, and we need to look for moderate, not radical political improvements,” said Yang.

yang-lecture-pic.jpg

Yang Jisheng’s talk, “China’s Reform: Reflections and Looking Forward”, was hosted by the China Media Project of the Journalism & Media Studies Centre, where Yang is currently a visiting fellow.
A retired senior reporter for China’s official Xinhua News Agency, Yang was one of just a few journalists to interview Zhao Ziyang while the ousted reformist premier was under house arrest.
Yang Jisheng is also the deputy editor of Chronicles of History (炎黄春秋), a journal that drew attention earlier this year for an essay by Marxist theorist Xie Tao calling for deeper political reforms.
The post-Deng era, said Yang, has been marked since the mid-1990s by a combination of authoritarian politics (权威政治) and market economics. As economic growth has surged and political reforms lagged, a number of problems have worsened. These include abuse of official power for business ends, a growing gap between rich and poor, and a host of other social problems such as the lack of affordable housing, education and medical care.
To solve these and other problems, future reforms in China would have to focus on separating power from the market economy, a task only democratic politics could achieve, said Yang.
“Democratic politics is the only way to have strict checks and balances on power,” he said.
Yang said democratic politics were also necessitated by changes in the nature of power in China. Leadership of charismatic men of the past, or qiangren zhengzhi (强人政治), has given way to leadership by ordinary persons, or changren zhengzhi (常人政治), he said.
Political leftists in China have advocated a return to Stalinist policies to resolve growing social problems, and Yang said he expected leftists to propose a slowdown of economic reforms at the upcoming 17th National Congress. But Yang said such a turn back was unlikely to garner support.
Yang is author of three books, including The Deng Xiaoping Era, Analysis of Chinese Social Strata and the recent Political Struggles in China’s Reform Era.
[Posted by Xie Yuan, October 9, 2007, 1:30pm]

17th National Congress: Who should you interview?

Top party leaders will of course be at the top of your interview wish list this month. But no one, least of all officials in the upper echelons, will agree to an interview ahead of this key political session. It’s possible Hu Jintao will choose to visit with some particular foreign news icon, as Deng Xiaoping did with Oriana Fallaci and Jiang Zemin with Mike Wallace.
But most foreign journalists will have to settle for Chinese academics, political experts and historians. Here are a few at the top of our list:
Wang Guixiu (王贵秀) – A professor at the Central Party School, Wang is the most important scholar of political reform in China. Wang has criticized China’s lagging political reform efforts. [Wang on separation of party and government].
[CLICK HERE FOR PHOTO]
Xie Tao (谢韜) – Xie is former vice-president of Renmin University of China and a leading Marxist theorist. At the beginning of this year, an important journal, Chronicles of History (炎黄春秋), published Xie’s essay, “Only Democratic Socialism Can Save China” (只有民主社会主义可以救中国). The essay sparked debate in China’s intellectual circles over political reform.
[CLICK HERE FOR PHOTO]
Gao Fang (高放) – A professor at Renmin University of China, Gao is China’s leading historian of the Communist movement. He was a major proponent of inner-party democracy (党内民主) during the political reform movement of the 1980s.
[CLICK HERE FOR PHOTO]
Dong Degang (董德刚) – Dong is vice-director of the philosophy research division (哲学教研部) of China’s Central Party School. Earlier Dong Degang (董德刚) – Dong is vice-director of the philosophy research division (哲学教研部) of China’s Central Party School. An article by scholar Dong Degang (董德刚) in the March issue of the official magazine Scientific Socialism (科学社会主义) suggested a number of cadres, “including high-level officials and old comrades”, were wary of attempts to modify the party’s constitution at each CCP plenary session, and urged a cautious approach to adding President Hu’s theory of “scientific development” (科学发展观) to the Party Constitution. [More coverage from CMP].
[CLICK HERE FOR PHOTO]
Wang Changjiang (王长江) – Director of the Party Building Division (党建部) of the Central Party School, Wang wrote an essay in May this year called, “Answering a Few Misgivings About Issues Concerning Democracy” (辨析关于民主问题的几个疑虑). The article, published in Beijing Daily, argued that democratization could happen even under a one-party system.
[CLICK HERE FOR PHOTO]
Zhou Tianyong (周天勇) – Vice-Director of the Research Office of the Central Party School, Zhou is also one of several authors of the Party School’s “Political Reform Research Report” (政治体制改革研究报告), which has been published in book form as Political Reform in China.
[CLICK HERE FOR PHOTO]
Yu Keping (俞可平) – A political scientist who currently serves as deputy director of China’s Central Compilation and Translation Bureau, Yu drew attention this year with an essay called, “Democracy is a Good Thing.” Many regard Yu Keping as a key thinker in the Hu-Wen administration.
[CLICK HERE FOR PHOTO]
Wu Jiaxiang (吴稼祥) – Now a freelance writer, Wu worked in the General Office of the CPC Central Committee in the 1980s and was regarded a key thinker behind then-Premier Zhao Ziyang. Wu was jailed following the crackdown on democracy demonstrators in June 1989. He later spent time as a fellow at Harvard University. Wu’s books include Wrestling for Power: The 16th CPC Congress (角力十六大) and Diary from Zhongnanhai: The Fall of Two Generational Heirs (中南海日记:中共两代王储的陨落).
[CLICK HERE FOR PHOTO]
Wu Guoguang (吴国光) – Now a member of the history faculty at Canada’s University of Victoria, Wu was closely involved in policy-making on political reform under Zhao Ziyang in the 1980s. He is the author of Zhao Ziyang and Political Reform (赵紫阳与政治改革).
[CLICK HERE FOR PHOTO]
Luo Shugang (雒树刚) – Formerly deputy director of China’s Central Propaganda Department and head of the official Xinhua News Agency, Luo is a key researcher in the area of political reform. In the 1980s he published two books on political reform: Political Reform Made Simple (政治体制改革通俗讲话) and Monitoring Within the Party (党内监督).
[CLICK HERE FOR PHOTO]
(Qian Gang, October 9, 2007)
[Translated by David Bandurski]
Previous 17th Congress article: “To what extent will delegates to the party congress have a say in party affairs?

To what extent will delegates to the party congress have a say in party affairs?

One interesting bit of news we should look for at the 17th Congress this year is the possibility the party congress might, for the first time in its history, put a system of proposals (提案制度) into practice. If this does happen, it will raise a key question – can Communist Party delegates (党代表) actually serve as representatives and have their say in debates over party matters?
Procedures for making proposals (提案) and motions (提议) are in place for the National People’s Congress (NPC) and Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) – known as the “two meetings” – but such an arrangement has never existed for national meetings of the Party.
The speeches by leaders reported in the media are generally “discussions” of the political report issued by the top leader, or about amendments to the Party Constitution — and these are notes of support rather than dissent. We do not see real discussion, debate or criticism on party matters. Delegates are there instead to offer up eulogies and make impassioned speeches of solidarity. It is essentially correct to call the national congress a rubberstamping body.
But over the last five years there have been signs of change. On September 19, 2004, the Central Party passed its “Decision on Strengthening the Party’s Governance Capability” (关于加强党的执政能力建设的决定). That document talked about “building a proposal system for the national party congress”. Such systems have already been put into place for some party congresses at the county and city levels. They have not yet been rolled out for provincial or municipal-level congresses, but a so-called “working opinions handling” (工作建议办理) system for delegates set up for the recent party congress in Zhejiang province comes very close.
After the Central Party announced the 17th Congress would be held on October 15 this year, the official People’s Daily Online ran a Weblog from a party member that posed three crucial questions:

1. Have you written your proposals yet?
2. Have you properly prepared yourself to face the media?
3. Have you set up your Weblog yet?

If a proposals system is put into effect for the 17th Congress, we’ll need to pay special attention to a number of questions. What proposals will the delegates make? Even if they don’t make formal proposals, what will they say at the congress?

* Can they talk about the corruption case against Chen Liangyu?
* Can they talk about the substantial number of corruption cases against provincial and ministerial-level officials this year?
* Can they talk about a system of permanent tenure (党代表常任制), in which delegates to the party congress participate in party affairs on a more regular basis?
* Can they talk about HIV-Aids, coal-mining disasters, food safety and other pressing issues?
* Can they talk about watchdog journalism and media reform?
* Can they talk about the party’s history, about the question of how to assess such figures as Hu Yaobang and Zhao Ziyang?
* Can all of these things be discussed openly? Semi-openly?

(Qian Gang, October 8, 2007)
[Translated by David Bandurski]
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