By David Bandurski (班志远) — We’ve written extensively at CMP about the institutional causes of poor media professionalism in China — from the Lan Chengzhang case to the more recent “cardboard bun” hoax. Anticipating CMP fellow Lu Ye’s talk tonight on media corruption, we return again to the question of the deeper causes of poor ethics, questions that have larger implications for journalism and free speech in China.
Last month, in an article appearing at the online China Media Observation (CMO), scholars Ling Chen (凌陈) and Li Hongbin (李红兵) discussed the now-classic “cardboard bun” hoax, in which freelance TV reporter Zhai Beijia (訾北佳) was jailed for producing a fake news report about unscrupulous vendors filling steamed buns with a mixture of meat and cardboard.

[IMAGE: Screenshot of China Media Observation analysis of the “cardboard bun” hoax, September 21, 2007]

[HOMEPAGE: Screenshot of Henan Commercial Daily coverage of citizen TV reporters.]

The CMO article described Zhai, and others like him, as “news migrants,” or xinwen mingong (新闻民工), a term suggesting journalists not under official hire, or bianzhi (编制), are the victims of social and political injustice in much the same way that “rural” migrant workers are second-class citizens under China’s two-tiered household registration system (二元户籍制度).
A legacy of the planned economy era, China’s bianzhi system means the government specifies how many employees can be hired for a work unit (company) and under what conditions. As Chinese media have commercialized, their personnel needs have outpaced the limitations of the bianzhi system. Freelancers, or permanent employees not on official hire (编制外), fill the gap. Owing to the limitations of the bianzhi system, however, these employees are not entitled to the same benefits (steady salaries, healthcare coverage, etc.) as their workmates on official hire (编制内). At CCTV, the latter are called the “imperial guard” (皇军).
“The investigation that followed the “cardboard bun” hoax shows that “news migrants” are not only the disadvantaged group (弱势群体) within the news industry,” the authors of the CMO article wrote, “but also an at-risk group (高危群体).”
The article concludes: “The ‘cardboard bun’ hoax demands that journalists, particularly ‘news migrants,’ take a hard look at their own behavior. But it also sends up a warning about the need to improve the working environment for ‘news migrants.’ For the media, protecting the legal rights of ‘news migrants’ is just as important as ensuring the truth of the news.”
The authors understandably stop short of suggesting alternatives. After all, improving the “working environment” for this at-risk group would entail fundamental changes to the way media are handled by the state in China. It would mean revisiting the dangerous question of who controls the media and questioning their political role as organs, or “mouthpieces”, of the party.
If news media were completely self-reliant (hiring whomever they please with their own resources to suit their commercial needs) they might become news organizations in their own right. And that danger gives bianzhi the edge in China’s current political environment.
So long as news media are eating the emperor’s grain (吃皇粮), they will do the emperor’s bidding.
______________

Looking at China’s media environment through the “cardboard bun” hoax

The buzz over the recent “cardboard bun” hoax has now simmered down. But interest in the issue of “news migrants” and their situation has been heating up.
A temporary worker manufactured the fake news about “cardboard buns”. Why? And how was it possible?
A fake news segment was aired on Beijing TV. Why? And how was it possible?
And what can we say about the ensuing investigation and the administrative and legal procedures for dealing with the case?
The “cardboard bun” hoax continues to raises questions, and the reflection engendered by the hoax has overtaken the hoax itself.
In China’s media world there has always been a niche for this group of people [i.e.: temporary news employees, or “news migrants”] …
　　
They can be full of idealism, doing journalism with great gusto, and yet the news outfits that use them cast them aside because of official hiring limitations and cost considerations.
They sweat and even bleed to get the story out, and yet get very little from the media they work for.
They work tirelessly to safeguard the rights and benefits of others, but their own rights are lost in the shuffle.
They are the first on the scene, but in the news profession they always come in last.
They work hardest to get the job done, but they are paid the least, and with the least protection.
They are the downtrodden of China’s journalism profession.
They share a common identity – they are “news migrants” (新闻民工).
Lan Chengzhang (兰成长), the reporter for China Trade News killed earlier [this year] was cut of this cloth, and so was Zhai Beijia of the “cardboard bun” hoax.
Zhai Beijia was first a reporter for China Central Television, but because he was a temporary employee (临时人员), a worker outside the official hiring system (编外员工) , he was brooding and unhappy. When he went to Beijing Television, he became one of the main forces behind the “Transparency” program (透明度) on BTV-7, the lifestyle channel.
“Transparency” is a special service-oriented program airing once a week at Beijing TV. It relies on real investigation by reporters and on first-hand evidence to look at market and consumer behavior, telling viewers how to tell the difference between real and fake products. The programs often involve undercover reporting based on leads of a more explosive nature. Ratings for the program are quite high. “Transparency” is ranked number four among the station’s news and current affairs programs.
[List of topics of Zhai Beijia’s coverage at Beijing TV, including problems like fake kabobs and dangerous pastries]. But the 28 year-old Zhai was only a temporary worker, not a journalist under official hire. He was exactly what we often call a “news migrant.”
For “news migrants”, the ability to finish tasks and get more work is linked directly to their work environment and the opportunities afforded them … In order to make a good impression on the boss at the media they work for, they have to be resolute, making no bones about finishing jobs … They are in a Catch 22: faced with things they can’t do and aren’t able to do [for moral and legal reasons], and don’t wish to do [for fear of the consequences], they must do them nevertheless. Zhai Beijia is the very portrait of this impossible choice facing “news migrants.”
In early June 2007, “Transparency” received a phone call from a viewer saying there were steamed buns made using pieces of cardboard. Zhai Beijia was given the task of following up on the story. In order to fulfill this task, he spent days buying steamed buns and trying them out. But he couldn’t find any buns made with cardboard, so what then? If he gave it up and had nothing to give his superiors he would lose the job and have no money whatsoever to show for it (as payment depended on his coming through).
Under very real survival pressure, Zhai Beijia decided to fake the story. Using the name “Hu Yue” (胡月) and pretending to be a the boss of a construction site, he went to Number 13 Shizikou Village in Beijing’s Chaoyang District, where he told breakfast cook Wei Quanfeng (卫全峰), a migrant from Shaanxi Province, and 3 others that he needed a huge order of dumplings. Later, Zhai Beijia went back to Number 13 with undercover filming equipment, cardboard boxes and flour and ground meat he had bought himself. Saying he needed to feed his dog, Zhai asked Wei Quanfeng and the others to soak the cardboard and mix it in with the meat to make 20 “cardboard buns.” All the while Zhai Beijia secretly filmed the process.
In producing the final program, Zhai Beijia edited the footage and added fake voice-over. The result was a fake news item called “Buns Made Out of Cardboard.” … The segment aired on July 8, 2007, at 7pm on Beijing TV’s lifestyle channel (BTV-7).
[Article relates the particulars of the ensuing investigation. July 16, police carry out an inspection of steamed buns at 26 vendors in the city, etc.]
On July 18, Beijing TV stated on its “Beijing News” program that the cardboard bun story was a fake and that its creator had been detained by authorities. The station apologized to the public.
In China’s news industry there are three levels of gate keeping. So how did the cardboard bun story get through? An employee at “Transparency” said that since the show’s inception it had never come across fake programming. When Zhai Beijia material was in the production process, they asked more than once about its authenticity. Zhai was adamant, so they went ahead with the segment.
From this response we can see two points. First, everyone had let down their guard, believing there had never been fake news on the show. Second, faith in [the show’s] employees had replaced strict news controls.
[How the story became major national news after airing, with help from new media, etc.]
When we look at how this story got through, aside from the issue of Zhai Beijia’s own professional conduct, we see that the major cause is the drive for profit. The television station’s priority was getting an explosive story that could draw viewers, and with this end in sight they weakened oversight. The journalist’s priority was getting his 5,000-yuan fee for the piece, thereby closing the gap with his colleagues under official hire (正编记者).
“News migrants” exist throughout our country’s news industry. Some have official press cards but are not under official hire. Others do not have press cards and use interview certificates (采访证) or work certificates (工作证) to report stories. Given the sheer number of such journalists, it would be unrealistic to get rid of them. This would be an irrational and extreme response. The heavy-handed tactics of some well-known television stations in China [presumably, like CCTV] — getting rid of all temporary personnel in one go, getting rid of all employees outside of the official hire system, including early termination of internships for college students – are not worthy of emulation. Liu Binjie (柳斌杰), head of the General Administration of Press and Publications (GAPP), has said that fake reporters should be dealt with differently from those hired provisionally by media who are temporarily without news journalist identities (不具备新闻记者身份). As for the first, [said Liu], they must be firmly dealt with. As for the second, they should be issued the proper press credentials after completing testing and showing they can work successfully in the news media. We must, he said, continue to improve the entry system for journalism professionals through these special programs [of training and certification]. From this day forward, the credentials of all journalism personnel must be certified by administrative departments of the state [i.e., GAPP].
The investigation that followed the “cardboard bun” hoax shows that “news migrants” are not only the disadvantaged group (弱势群体) within the news industry but also an at-risk group (高危群体). After the hoax, both Zhai and Beijing TV paid a painful price.
On July 19, the All-China Journalist Association (ACJA) issued a firm notice saying the “cardboard bun” hoax would be dealt with severely.
On July 23, the Central Propaganda Department, State Administration of Radio, Film and Television (SARFT) and GAPP issued a notice demanding that local propaganda offices, local offices of SARFT and the ACJA and news media learn from the mistakes of Beijing TV and ensure the truth and accuracy of the news …
[Zi Beigui is detained. Three employees at “Transparency”, including a vice-director and a producer, are fired.]
[July 26: 20 Websites issue a joint declaration against fake news (“抵制假新闻，净化网络环境”)]
In court, lawyer Zhang Jie (张浩) served as Zhai Beijia’s counsel. In fact, Zhai Beijia’s criminal detention had already attracted the attention of many legal scholars, who felt that the Criminal Law had no stipulations relevant to Zhai’s activity. In an interview with Caijing magazine, [CMP Fellow] Zhan Jiang (展江), a professor at China Youth University of Political Science, raised this question. The lack of a press law in China, said Zhan, made it hard to reach a verdict in the case.
During the court hearing, the debate between prosecution and defense centered on whether Zhai Beigui’s behavior was indeed criminal (构不构成犯罪), and whether his behavior was direct intent (直接故意) or indirect intent (间接故意). In the end the court applied the charges as made in the indictment from the procuratorate. According to the indictment, Zhai Beigui’s fabrication and dissemination of a false version of the facts was a criminal offense because it had damaged the commercial reputations of related business owners and the nature of the case was serious …
Truth is the very life of journalism, and false news is its enemy. A small number of news people neglect the law and party news discipline. In pursuit of a selling point they build up negative news or manufacture news altogether, disregarding the important social role of information and their own professional obligations. A few news media are lax in their oversight, superficially pursuing ratings and circulation, and this creates an opportunity for fake news, with thoroughly negative implications …
Without a doubt, the “cardboard bun” hoax led to a tightening of nerves in the media over the issue of “news migrants.” But the truth is that “news migrants” account for more than half of all journalists under hire for many media in China. The vast majority of them are good, and the law-breakers and problem ones are the minority. Speaking to the heart of the matter, “news migrants” are the keystone, the supporting beam, of China’s media. This group must, on the one hand, be controlled. They must not be allowed to work unchecked. On the other hand, this group must be protected. We cannot intensify the challenges facing them just because of the damage caused by a few, worsening even further the environment in which they work. The question of how to check and protect them is not merely a matter of fairly, impartially and legally protecting their rights, but directly concerns the healthy development of the news industry.
The “cardboard bun” hoax demands that journalists, particularly “news migrants,” take a hard look at their own behavior. But it also sends up a warning about the need to improve the working environment for “news migrants.” For the media, protecting the legal rights of “news migrants” is just as important as ensuring the truth of the news.

SEE Also:
“QQ runs interactive feature page on the problem of “fake reporters” in China”
“CCTV’s freelancer purge corroborated/Henan newspaper explores growth in citizen journalism”

By Qian Gang (钱钢) — Before the 17th National Congress went into session I said we would have to see whether the phrase “political reform” (政治体制改革) appeared in a subhead in Hu Jintao’s political report. This, I said, would determine whether political reform would become a key agenda over the next five years. Based on appearances of the term in the 13th, 14th, 15th and 16th congress reports, I defined the presence of “political reform” in just one subhead as a minimum expectation of Hu’s political report.
But Hu Jintao’s report frustrated even our most modest hopes.
.

[ABOVE: Screenshot of People’s Daily online press center for the 17th National Congress, October 23, 2007.]

The 17th congress marks the first time in five major party meetings since the 13th National Congress in 1987 that we have not seen “political reform” in a subhead. In Zhao Ziyang’s report to the 13th congress, section five was called, “Concerning Political Reform” (关于政治体制改革).
In Jiang Zemin’s report to the 14th congress, section two, “Key Tasks for Reform and Building in the 1990s” (九十年代改革和建设的主要任务), listed 10 key objectives. The smaller subhead for task six read: “Actively Promoting Political Reform, Making Relatively Major Progress on Socialist Democracy and the Legal System” (积极推进政治体制改革，使社会主义民主和法制建设有一个较大的发展).
Section six of the 15th congress report, also by Jiang Zemin, was headed: “Political Reform and the Building of Democracy and the Legal System” (政治体制改革和民主法制建设). Section five of Jiang Zemin’s report to the 16th National Congress in 2002 carried the subhead: “Political Building and Political Reform (政治建设和政治体制改革).
In this year’s report to the 17th National Congress, Hu Jintao does not place “political reform” in a subhead. Instead, the section dealing with the issue of political reform is called, “Steadfastly Developing Socialist Democratic Politics” (坚定不移发展社会主义民主政治)。
The section has the following to say about political reform:

People’s democracy is the very life of socialism. The development of socialist democratic politics (社会主义民主政治) is a goal toward which our party struggles tenaciously. Since the beginning of the opening and reform policy, we have actively and prudently pushed ahead with political reform, bringing about a blossoming of socialist democratic politics. As an important component of comprehensive reforms in our country, political reforms must continually deepen so as to be compatible with economic and social development, and the people’s increasingly active participation in political affairs.
We must continue on the road to political development under socialism with Chinese characteristics, adhering to a unification of the Party’s leadership, the people as masters of the country and rule of law. We must adhere to and perfect the system of the National People’s Congress, the system of multi-party cooperation and political consultation under the leadership of Communist Party, and systems of regional ethnic autonomy and self-governance at the grassroots level, constantly seeking self-improvement and development of the socialist system.
In deepening political reforms we must hold to the correct political orientation, expanding socialist democracy, building a socialist country governed by rule of law and advancing socialist political civilization with the goal of ensuring that the people are the masters of the country, that the vitality of the party and country are lifted, and that the initiative of the people is stimulated.
人民民主是社会主义的生命。发展社会主义民主政治是我们党始终不渝的奋斗目标。改革开放以来，我们积极稳妥推进政治体制改革，我国社会主义民主政治展现出更加旺盛的生命力。政治体制改革作为我国全面改革的重要组成部分，必须随着经济社会发展而不断深化，与人民政治参与积极性不断提高相适应.
要坚持中国特色社会主义政治发展道路，坚持党的领导、人民当家作主、依法治国有机统一，坚持和完善人民代表大会制度、中国共产党领导的多党合作和政治协商制度、民族区域自治制度以及基层群众自治制度，不断推进社会主义政治制度自我完善和发展.
深化政治体制改革，必须坚持正确政治方向，以保证人民当家作主为根本，以增强党和国家活力、调动人民积极性为目标，扩大社会主义民主，建设社会主义法治国家，发展社会主义政治文明.

In the section of Hu’s report dealing with political reform, the term itself is not used. The phrase “democratic politics” stands in its stead. Not a big deal, right? This is a tiresome exercise in hair-splitting, right?
Wrong.
In China’s political lexicon, the term “political reform”, or zhengzhi tizhe gaige (政治体制改革), is relatively sensitive. By contrast, “democratic politics” is safe. Searching through a database of mainland newspaper coverage, CMP has found that “democratic politics” has enjoyed a high and steady degree of use over the last several years.
Before 1949 the term “democratic politics” was a weapon the Chinese Communist Party used in its ideological battle with the ruling Kuomintang Party. In the 1980s, Zhao Ziyang said the goal of economic reforms was to create a commodity economy (商品经济), and the goal of political reforms was to build democratic politics. From that point on “democratic politics” became the preferred term used to extol the party’s democratic achievements, such as the national congress and CPPCC systems.
The term “political reform” is unambiguously directed at the problem of abuse of power in China. In his report to the 13th National Congress in 1987, Zhao Ziyang said:

The undertaking and deepening of economic structure reforms raises the need for more pressing political reforms. The course of developing a socialist commodity economy should also be a course of building socialist democratic politics. Without undertaking political reforms, reforms to the economic system cannot ultimately succeed.
经济体制改革的展开和深入，对政治体制改革提出了愈益紧迫的要求。发展社会主义商品经济的过程，应该是建设社会主义民主政治的过程。不进行政治体制改革，经济体制改革不可能最终取得成功.

Political reforms stagnated during the Jiang Zemin era, but Jiang continued to speak of political reform as a priority. In each of his reports to the 14th, 15th and 16th national congresses, Jiang wrote the term “political reform” into a section head – even if the specific language of the section in question set limitations on reform.
Now, in Hu Jintao’s report, “political reform” is left out of the section heads altogether.
This move should be read as a cold response to growing calls for political reform among intellectuals and the public in China. Hu Jintao is sending a clear message that political reform will not be one of his key agendas. In the so-called “four-in-one” (四位一体) formula of economic construction (经济建设), social construction (社会建设), cultural construction (文化建设) and political construction (政治建设), the first two will be the core priorities.
In his report, Hu Jintao dwells on the minute details of reform and avoids systemic issues. He sidesteps what Deng Xiaoping said in 1980 was the system’s most egregious fault – over-concentration of power. Nor does he talk about separating the functions of party and government (党政分开).
Hu Jintao has carried on many terms of the Jiang Zemin era that signal persisting limitations on political reform – terms like “actively and cautiously” (积极稳妥), “upholding the leadership of the Communist Party” (坚持党的领导), and “keeping firmly to the correct political orientation” (坚持正确政治方向).
Hu’s stand on political reform in this year’s report underlines his apprehension. He is not endorsing and encouraging greater public participation in political affairs. Instead, he is sending a warning to those who support reforms.
When Hu Jintao talks about democratic politics he draws our attention to such issues as grassroots democracy, the building of the legal system and administrative reforms. He talks about the need for “supervision” (监督). But he offers no answer to the basic question of how, when over-concentration of power is a persisting problem, the opinions of the people can check and supervise organs of power.
There are some changes in Hu Jintao’s report. He has dropped a few stiff old phrases like “stability is of overriding importance” (稳定压倒一切) and “not copying models of political systems of the West” (绝不照搬西方政治制度)”.
But Hu Jintao has no major plans for political reform over the next five years, and his report makes this fact patently clear.
(Qian Gang, October 23, 2007)
[Translated by David Bandurski]

Journalism scholar Lu Ye discusses media corruption in China, including the phenomenon of “news extortion,” or the writing of negative news reports to force payoffs from businesses or officials. Corruption in China’s news media has become rife in recent years, culminating in early 2007 with the beating death of China Trade News reporter Lan Chengzhang as he was trying to extort money from an illegal coal mine.

Lu Ye is deputy director of the Center for Information and Communication Studies at Shanghai’s Fudan University and head of the university’s Media Ethics Center. Professor Lu is also an award-winning television news producer.
Date: October 26, 2007
Time: 5:30-7:00pm
Place: Foundation Chamber, Eliot Hall, The University of Hong Kong
Lecture will be in Mandarin. No interpreting will be provided.
(If you have any questions about this event, please call (852) 2219-4014.)

CMP guest contributor Xie Mingyuan (谢铭元) — Comparing Hu Jintao’s report to this year’s party congress to Jiang Zemin’s third and last political report back in 2002, a number of points stand out. First of all, while Hu’s report this year makes more frequent mention of “intraparty democracy” (党内民主) and “election” (选举), and the term “vote-deciding” (票决) appears for the first time in a political report, we should note that these are mentioned only in the context of past projects. They do not anticipate future progress.

[ABOVE: Screenshot of QQ.com special page on this year’s 17th National Congress]

On the question of a more active role for the National People’s Congress, as mandated in China’s constitution, the report shows no progress. Mentions of reform dwell largely on non-essential reforms, most of the goals involving improvements to the legal system. And the report suggests no breakthroughs on the question of electoral system reforms.
Third, the report offers nothing new in the area of intraparty democracy, although it clearly marks out the general principles. There is no mention whatsoever of “public nominations and public elections” (公推公选), or of “direct election” (直选), which suggests no change from the status quo of internal party appointments.
Fourth, while the report suggests no substantive progress on political reform, it does mention the need for “exploration” (探索) on expanding grassroots-level party democracy, an indication there will be no trending backward on reforms. Hu’s phrase in Chinese is as follows:

改革党内选举制度﹐改进候选人提名制度和选举方式。推广基层党组织领导班子成员由党员和群众公开推荐与上级党组织推荐相结合的办法﹐逐步扩大基层党组织领导班子直接选举范围﹐探索扩大党内基层民主多种实现形式。

Generally speaking, the report indicates that experiments in political reform (at the local level) will continue much as they have over the last five years, but nothing suggests new breakthroughs.
(Xie is a masters student at the Center for Contemporary China, National Tsing Hua University, Taiwan)

And the results are in! “Socialism with Chinese characteristics” (中国特色社会主义) logged the most number of uses, appearing 52 times in Hu Jintao’s political report to the 17th National Congress. A distance second, “scientific development” (科学发展) racked up 38 appearances. Used a total of 34 times, “opening and reform” (改革开放) finished third, just edging out “harmony” (和谐) at 33.

[ABOVE: Screenshot of news coverage of 17th congress at Sina.com, October 17, 2007.]

Other words to watch include:

“Deng Xiaoping Theory” (邓小平理论) – 10 appearances
“Three Represents” (三个代表) – 9 appearances

“Socialism with Chinese characteristics” and “opening and reform” are familiar faces. The following graph plots occurrence of these phrases in this and previous party congress reports:

The sharp rise in “Socialism with Chinese characteristics” and “opening and reform” reflects the party’s basic direction for the next five years. It is, first and foremost, a reaffirmation of the path of reform and opening in response to the left’s opposition and call for a turn back. Secondly, it is the striking of a middle path between the socialism of the Mao era on the one hand and clamors from the right for “democratic socialism” (民主社会主义) on the other.
With these two major preconditions in place, Hu Jintao formally ushers out his own banners, “scientific outlook on development” and “harmonious society.” Both of these phrases are about making moderate corrections to the GDP-focused economic reforms of the Deng Xiaoping and Jiang Zemin eras in order to address economic disparities.
Other key buzz phrases offer hints about Hu Jintao’s general path.
“Political reform” (政治体制改革), which appeared seven times in the 16th congress report, appears just five times this year. The term does not appear in the title of a report section head, which has not happened since before the 13th congress. This strongly suggests Hu Jintao plans to avoid the question of political reform altogether and is taking pains to cool public expectations. We’ll talk more about this later on.
As we mentioned yesterday, the position of the “Four Basic Principles” in Hu’s report is of special note. The phrase appeared seven times in Jiang Zemin’s 14th congress report, but dropped to just three times for the 16th congress report. In the five years since the 16th congress use of the phrase has continued to decline. That Hu uses the term four times in this year’s report is a surprising turn.

Late last month CMP co-director Qian Gang wrote about the “Four Basic Principles” as a key phrase to watch at the 17th National Congress:

Concerning the Four Basic Principles, there are two possibilities for Hu Jintao’s political report to the 17th National Congress.
The first possibility is that Hu’s report will use the Four Basic Principles in the same way as previous reports, from the 12th congress through to the 16th. If this happens we can guess that Hu Jintao will not break any new ground in the area of political reform.
The second possibility is that the Four Basic Principles will not appear directly in Hu’s report, and that “one core, two focal points” will appear in its stead. While this would not be a radical shift in meaning, it would make a very different impression and could be read as a sign that Hu Jintao will focus more attention on [political] reform.

Analyzing the text of Hu Jintao’s report on the opening day of the 17th National Congress yesterday as it was made available on the Xinhua News Agency website, CMP found that Hu not only made direct use of the “Four Basic Principles” but used the term four times, a conspicuous departure from his typical avoidance of the phrase.

[ABOVE: Screenshot of China Daily Online coverage of the 17th National Congress, October 16, 2007]

In his first use, Hu Jintao reflected back on the history of economic reform and opening:

Throughout the history of economic opening and reform, our party has steadfastly linked the basic principles of Marxism with the promotion of China-style Marxism (马克思主义中国化), have linked our persevering in the Four Basic Principles with our persevering in reforms, have linked respect for the pioneering spirit of the people (人民首创精神) with strengthening and improving the party’s leadership, have linked our perseverance in the basic Socialist system with the development of the market economy …

The full passage in Chinese follows:

在改革开放的历史进程中，我们党把坚持马克思主义基本原理同推进马克思主义中国化结合起来，把坚持四项基本原则同坚持改革开放结合起来，把尊重人民首创精神同加强和改善党的领导结合起来，把坚持社会主义基本制度同发展市场经济结合起来，把推动经济基础变革同推动上层建筑改革结合起来，把发展社会生产力同提高全民族文明素质结合起来，把提高效率同促进社会公平结合起来，把坚持独立自主同参与经济全球化结合起来，把促进改革发展同保持社会稳定结合起来，把推进中国特色社会主义伟大事业同推进党的建设新的伟大工程结合起来，取得了我们这样一个十几亿人口的发展中大国摆脱贫困、加快实现现代化、巩固和发展社会主义的宝贵经验.

In another section, as he explained “Socialism with Chinese characteristics”, Hu again used the “Four Basic Principles”:

The road of Socialism with Chinese characteristics means, under the leadership of the Communist Party of China, adhering to the basic national situation (立足基本国情), with economic construction as the core, persevering in the Four Basic Principles, persevering in economic reforms, unleashing and developing the productive forces of society …

The full passage in Chinese follows:

中国特色社会主义道路，就是在中国共产党领导下，立足基本国情，以经济建设为中心，坚持四项基本原则，坚持改革开放，解放和发展社会生产力，巩固和完善社会主义制度，建设社会主义市场经济、社会主义民主政治、社会主义先进文化、社会主义和谐社会，建设富强民主文明和谐的社会主义现代化国家.

In yet another section, as he explained the relationship between the “Four Basic Principles” and his own “scientific outlook on development” (科学发展观), Hu Jintao invoked the phrase twice:

Implementing the scientific outlook on development requires that we thoroughly uphold the basic path of the ‘one core and two basic points’. The party’s basic path is the lifeline of the party and the nation and the political guarantee of the realization of scientific development … The Four Basic Principles are the foundation of the country, the political keystone of the survival and development of the party and the nation. Economic reform and opening is the path toward invigoration of the country, an important source of vitality in national development and progress. [We] must persevere in developing the great practice of Socialism with Chinese characteristics with economic development as the core and the Four Basic Principles and economic opening and reform as the basic points, and these must at no point be shaken.

The full passage in Chinese follows:

深入贯彻落实科学发展观，要求我们始终坚持“一个中心、两个基本点”的基本路线。党的基本路线是党和国家的生命线，是实现科学发展的政治保证。以经济建设为中心是兴国之要，是我们党、我们国家兴旺发达和长治久安的根本要求；四项基本原则是立国之本，是我们党、我们国家生存发展的政治基石；改革开放是强国之路，是我们党、我们国家发展进步的活力源泉。要坚持把以经济建设为中心同四项基本原则、改革开放这两个基本点统一于发展中国特色社会主义的伟大实践，任何时候都决不能动摇。

This direct and prominent usage of the “Four Basic Principles” is uncharacteristic of Hu. In his June 25 speech and the eight official People’s Daily editorials that followed, direct use of the phrase was avoided. Important Communist Party documents over the last five years have also made scant use of the phrase (SEE: “Will Hu Jintao continue to use the ‘Four Basic Principles’?“).
One possible reading of this outcome is that Hu Jintao gave the “Four Basic Principles” more prominent play when faced with strong pressure from leftists within the party on the eve of the congress.

There has been some suggestion in recent months that Hu Jintao might introduce two fledgling buzzwords at next week’s 17th Congress. The first is “citizen participation,” or gongmin canyu (公民参与), short for the phrase “orderly political participation by citizens” (公民有序的政治参与). The second is “consultative democracy”, or xieshang minzhu (协商民主), sometimes called “deliberative democracy.”
These Hu terms actually mark cautious steps ahead, or points of pressure, on political reform. What do they mean?

[“Expanding orderly citizen participation in political affairs”, reads a headline in the official Guangzhou Daily following Hu Jintao’s June 25 speech.]

In his June 25 speech, Hu Jintao said political reform “must move ahead in step with economic and social development, commensurate with the growing participation of the people of the nation in political affairs” (政治体制改革”必须随着经济社会发展不断推进，努力与我国人民政治参与的积极性不断提高相适应”).
In the political reform movement of the 1980s, political activist Wang Juntao and others talked about “checking and balancing [power] with diverse expression by intellectual elites” (多元表达，精英制衡) as a safe and reliable path of reform. “Expanding orderly political participation by citizens” has a similar meaning.
Pointing to growing disaffection in Chinese society and an increase in mass incidents, some have promoted citizen participation through such channels as public hearings, open meetings, leadership consultation days and online feedback as a means of dissipating resentment.
Check out these Chinese links for more on “citizen participation”:

“Three Pressure Points in the Development of Democracy in China”
“Expert: Citizen Participation Will Make Progress After the 17th Congress”

“Consultative democracy” (协商民主) is generally used in constrast to “electoral democracy” (选举民主). There has been lively debate about what exactly the term means, whether or not it should be opposed to “elective democracy”, whether it is a new democratic form, etc:

“A New Form of Democracy“, China.com.cn, November 2006
“Where is the Value in Consultative Democracy?“, China.com.cn, December 2006
“Issues in Consultative Democracy“, China.com.cn, July 2007
“More Discussion of Consultative Democracy“, Study Times, September 2007

But the term is basically a cautious and limited version of “electoral democracy.” It replaces the notion of “electoral democracy” in order to ensure the Communist Party maintains firm control of the political reform process.

[The theory section of China’s official People’s Daily runs a page on consultative democracy as a “special form of Socialism with Chinese characteristics.]

“Citizen participation” and “consultative democracy” are political signposts. If both are used with greater frequency during and after the 17th Congress they will signal Hu Jintao’s cautious, conservative approach to political reform.
(Qian Gang, October 12, 2007)
[Translated by David Bandurski]
Previous 17th Congress article: “Will “separation of party and government” come up at the 17th Congress?”