Top party leaders will of course be at the top of your interview wish list this month. But no one, least of all officials in the upper echelons, will agree to an interview ahead of this key political session. It’s possible Hu Jintao will choose to visit with some particular foreign news icon, as Deng Xiaoping did with Oriana Fallaci and Jiang Zemin with Mike Wallace.
But most foreign journalists will have to settle for Chinese academics, political experts and historians. Here are a few at the top of our list:
Wang Guixiu (王贵秀) – A professor at the Central Party School, Wang is the most important scholar of political reform in China. Wang has criticized China’s lagging political reform efforts. [Wang on separation of party and government].
[CLICK HERE FOR PHOTO]
Xie Tao (谢韜) – Xie is former vice-president of Renmin University of China and a leading Marxist theorist. At the beginning of this year, an important journal, Chronicles of History (炎黄春秋), published Xie’s essay, “Only Democratic Socialism Can Save China” (只有民主社会主义可以救中国). The essay sparked debate in China’s intellectual circles over political reform.
[CLICK HERE FOR PHOTO]
Gao Fang (高放) – A professor at Renmin University of China, Gao is China’s leading historian of the Communist movement. He was a major proponent of inner-party democracy (党内民主) during the political reform movement of the 1980s.
[CLICK HERE FOR PHOTO]
Dong Degang (董德刚) – Dong is vice-director of the philosophy research division (哲学教研部) of China’s Central Party School. Earlier Dong Degang (董德刚) – Dong is vice-director of the philosophy research division (哲学教研部) of China’s Central Party School. An article by scholar Dong Degang (董德刚) in the March issue of the official magazine Scientific Socialism (科学社会主义) suggested a number of cadres, “including high-level officials and old comrades”, were wary of attempts to modify the party’s constitution at each CCP plenary session, and urged a cautious approach to adding President Hu’s theory of “scientific development” (科学发展观) to the Party Constitution. [More coverage from CMP].
[CLICK HERE FOR PHOTO]
Wang Changjiang (王长江) – Director of the Party Building Division (党建部) of the Central Party School, Wang wrote an essay in May this year called, “Answering a Few Misgivings About Issues Concerning Democracy” (辨析关于民主问题的几个疑虑). The article, published in Beijing Daily, argued that democratization could happen even under a one-party system.
[CLICK HERE FOR PHOTO]
Zhou Tianyong (周天勇) – Vice-Director of the Research Office of the Central Party School, Zhou is also one of several authors of the Party School’s “Political Reform Research Report” (政治体制改革研究报告), which has been published in book form as Political Reform in China.
[CLICK HERE FOR PHOTO]
Yu Keping (俞可平) – A political scientist who currently serves as deputy director of China’s Central Compilation and Translation Bureau, Yu drew attention this year with an essay called, “Democracy is a Good Thing.” Many regard Yu Keping as a key thinker in the Hu-Wen administration.
[CLICK HERE FOR PHOTO]
Wu Jiaxiang (吴稼祥) – Now a freelance writer, Wu worked in the General Office of the CPC Central Committee in the 1980s and was regarded a key thinker behind then-Premier Zhao Ziyang. Wu was jailed following the crackdown on democracy demonstrators in June 1989. He later spent time as a fellow at Harvard University. Wu’s books include Wrestling for Power: The 16th CPC Congress (角力十六大) and Diary from Zhongnanhai: The Fall of Two Generational Heirs (中南海日记：中共两代王储的陨落).
[CLICK HERE FOR PHOTO]
Wu Guoguang (吴国光) – Now a member of the history faculty at Canada’s University of Victoria, Wu was closely involved in policy-making on political reform under Zhao Ziyang in the 1980s. He is the author of Zhao Ziyang and Political Reform (赵紫阳与政治改革).
[CLICK HERE FOR PHOTO]
Luo Shugang (雒树刚) – Formerly deputy director of China’s Central Propaganda Department and head of the official Xinhua News Agency, Luo is a key researcher in the area of political reform. In the 1980s he published two books on political reform: Political Reform Made Simple (政治体制改革通俗讲话) and Monitoring Within the Party (党内监督).
[CLICK HERE FOR PHOTO]
(Qian Gang, October 9, 2007)
[Translated by David Bandurski]
Previous 17th Congress article: “To what extent will delegates to the party congress have a say in party affairs?”

Formerly a top reporter for China’s official Xinhua News Agency and deputy editor of the influential journal Chronicles of History (Yanhuang Chunqiu), Yang Jisheng is one of China’s most experienced journalists. In his 2004 book, “Political Struggle in Reform China”, Yang released his personal reporting notes spanning more than a decade, including the content of three discussions he had with Zhao Ziyang while the ousted premier was under house arrest.
SPEAKER: Yang Jisheng (杨继绳 )
Lecture will be in Mandarin
DATE: Monday, Oct 8, 2007
TIME: 19:00-21:00
VENUE: T4, Meng Wah Complex, The University of Hong Kong (NOTE: This is a change from the previous venue: Foundation Chamber, Eliot Hall, The University of Hong Kong
For enquiries call: (852) 2219-4014

I would expect the reader’s response to the above headline to be something like: “Voting? In China? What is there to talk about?” Point taken. But even if we’re not seeing popular democratic elections, it’s worth noting that Chinese media have been talking about “election” (选举), or xuanju, in the selection of delegates to the 17th National Congress. And this topic is critical as we tackle the issue of political reform in China. So what are we looking for exactly?
The measure Chinese media are talking about is the ratio (the “differential rate” (差额) or cha’e) between delegates nominated by party standing committees at various levels to the total number of National Congress seats available. The term used in Chinese is “differential voting” (差额选举), or cha’e xuanju.

[The Beijing Times reports in November 2006 on the increase in the differential rate for the 17th National Congress.]

For appointment of delegates to the upcoming 17th National Congress, there was reportedly a five percentage point rise in the differential rate, 15 percent as opposed to 10 percent, from the 16th National Congress back in 2002. That means, basically, that for every 100 seats available for this year’s congress, an additional 15 nominees were chosen (by party committees at various levels) and eventually pared down by party members (any who chose to vote) at those levels.
On August 2 this year, a list of all 2,217 delegates to the 17th National Congress was made public through newspapers across the country [See image below], a historic first for China. Given what we know, the People’s Daily list represents the results after 15 percent of nominees were removed in the differential rate process (被”差”掉). They were pared down, in other words, from an initial pool of around 2,550 nominees.

[The list of delegates to the 17th National Congress is made public in the official People’s Daily on August 2, 2007.]

The issue of “differential election” is still a very sensitive one in China. When Guangdong’s Southern Weekend ran an article on August 9 detailing the process of delegate “election” for the upcoming party congress, Central Propaganda Department Vice-director Li Dongsheng (李东生) was reportedly furious. The paper was formally criticized, and Li said: “Is this really something you think you can look into?!”
How significant is the recent increase in the differential rate? At this point, it is more symbolic than anything else. Consider that with 30 provinces and autonomous regions in China, there are just over 300 differential candidates, or an average of around 11 per province. That means that in the vast majority of voting districts (county or city, etc.) there are no additional candidates. While party members are theoretically tasked with “electing” their delegates, there are in most cases no real decisions to be made.
But that doesn’t mean the differential rate is worthless as a measure of political change in China. It should be noted that the differential rate for the 13th National Congress, during which Zhao Ziyang gave his political report, was 20 percent.
As the 17th Congress opens, the following questions are worth asking:

*Is a primary election held for members of the Central Party Committee and the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection?
*If there is a primary election, will the number of candidates exceed the number of posts (是否实行差额预选)? What is the differential rate? Is the list of candidates made public?
*In the formal selection process will differential elections be held? What is the differential rate? Is the list of candidates made public? Will media have access to the names of those candidates not chosen for posts?
*How will the election results be publicized? With a list of names and votes cast? Or simply names?
*How will members of the Political Bureau and the Central Secretariat be selected? Will there be a primary election? If so, will it be open?
*Will differential elections be held for members of the Political Bureau and the Central Secretariat?
*Will any language about differential election appear in Hu Jintao’s political report, or in amendments to the party constitution?

(Qian Gang, October 3, 2007)
[Translated by David Bandurski]
Previous 17th Congress article: “How will Hu Jintao promote “inner-party democracy” at the 17th National Congress?”

Pundits generally agree that this month’s 17th National Congress is unlikely to bring major change on the political reform front. But many also predict there will be small steps forward, and that these are likely to come in the area of “inner-party democracy” (党内民主). I agree with this assessment, and I think we should pay close attention to how Hu Jintao deals with inner-party democracy.
We’ve already seen a sharp rise in use of the term “inner-party democracy” in official party media, most notably People’s Daily, since the 16th congress:

[GRAPH: Number of articles in China’s official People’s Daily using the term “inner-party democracy” from 1949-2006.]

“Inner-party democracy” appeared in 103 People’s Daily articles in 2006. While that might not seem like a lot, it marks a new historical high point for the term and shows it is getting greater priority.
So what is inner-party democracy?
As the term itself makes clear, this is not about “popular democracy” (人民民主). The idea, rather, is greater “democracy” – or more shared decision-making – among party members (who account for just 5 percent of China’s whole population). That’s not so appetizing, perhaps, for democracy proponents outside China. But some believe this is a new party approach to political reform, and that inner-party democracy can be used to pull along more broad-based political reforms.

[An October 2004 article in Economic Daily by current Politburo Standing Committee member Wu Guanzheng (吴官正) argues for the development of inner-party democracy.]

Some scholars argue that political reform in China should take its cues from the so-called “East Asian Model” – that is, more centralized, single-party control with an agenda focusing on economic growth. Yu Keping (俞可平), an influential party theorist close to Hu Jintao, has been clear on this point:

One-party leadership is the basic character of China’s political system. One-party leadership means the Communist Party of China is the only political party in China, sharing political power with no other party or political entity.

And yet, even in the context of one-party rule, there is room for progress toward more “democratic” decision-making.
At this point, it’s hard to see how firm Hu Jintao’s commitment is to inner-party democracy. In his June 25 speech he had the following to say: “We must continue — actively, safely, soundly and effectively – to promote the building of inner-party democracy” (要继续积极稳妥、扎实有效地推进党内民主建设) … “to perfect the system of inner-party democracy, [and] to raise consciousness about inner-party democracy”( 完善党内民主制度，使党内民主意识普遍增强).
This could be read as Hu Jintao’s endorsement of inner-party democracy. But it shows at the same time a great deal of wariness. The words “actively, safely, soundly and effectively” tug back on the reins and ensure reforms don’t pick up too much speed.
Hu Jintao talks in the same passage about “upholding democratic centralism” (坚持民主集中制). This makes his bottom line clear – there will be no change to the longstanding status quo of one-party rule.
If Hu Jintao hedges with these words in his political report to the 17th congress this will signal that while inner-party democracy will be a priority over the next five years we cannot expect any major steps.
As we assess Hu Jintao’s progress on inner-party democracy, we should look especially at the following questions:

*How will party elections be handled for the 17th National Congress?
*Will delegates to the congress play a role in shaping the party agenda?
*Will there be discussion about creating a permanent decision-making body for the 17th congress (常任制) so that delegates can participate in affairs beyond the meeting this month?

I’ll be turning to all three of these issue later this week.
(Qian Gang, October 1, 2007)
[Translated by David Bandurski]
Previous 17th Congress article: “Will there be echoes in Hu Jintao’s report of the 8th or 13th congresses?”

When Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao wrote in the official People’s Daily earlier this year that China “is now and has long been in the early stages of socialism,” the phrase hearkened back to the political reform era of the 1980s. For many Chinese, there were clear echoes of Zhao Ziyang’s report to the 13th National Congress in 1987.
That congress, along with the 8th congress in 1956, is seen as a landmark for political reform in China. And as we have lately heard echoes too of the 8th congress in a livelier discussion of “inner-party democracy” (党内民主), it’s fair to ask whether the upcoming 17th National Congress will mark any return to the spirit of the 8th or 13th congresses.

[The 8th National Congress is announced in the official People’s Daily in 1956.]

The 8th National Congress, held in Beijing from September 15 to 27, 1956, was a rare bright spot in China’s political history. Held amidst the democratic movements sweeping Communist countries in the West in the wake of the 20th National Congress of the Soviet Union (held February 1956, the first since Joseph Stalin’s death in 1953), the 8th congress had two distinguishing characteristics:

1. Opposition to personality cults (个人崇拜) – “Mao Zedong Thought” was not written into the Party Constitution at the time, the 7th congress having designated Mao Zedong Thought simply as a “guiding principle.” This corresponded to Nikita Khruschev‘s critique of Stalin’s cult of personality and overconcentration of power.
2. An emphasis on “inner-party democracy” (党内民主)

Despite the crackdown on democracy demonstrators in 1989 and the ousting of Premier Zhao Ziyang, the 13th National Congress of 1987 remains an important signpost for Chinese reform. Even after Zhao’s downfall, Deng Xiaoping is known to have said of his political report to the 13th congress: “Not a word can be changed” (一个字都不能动).

[The 13th National Congress is announced in the official People’s Daily in 1987.]

As we look for parallels between the 17th congress and the 8th congress there are two questions to bear in mind. First, will President Hu Jintao promote “inner-party democracy”? Second, will Hu emphasize the need to check the power of individuals within the party and prevent personality cults?
I’ll explore “inner-party democracy” in greater detail in a later article. But as for the second point, the more specific question is whether Hu Jintao will push, as Jiang Zemin did, for the inclusion of his own core concepts in the Party Constitution. In other words, will party leaders write “harmonious society” and “scientific view of development” into the Party Constitution as a tribute to Hu Jintao’s political prowess?
As we look for parallels between the upcoming congress and the 13th congress we need to focus on two key phrases. First, will Hu Jintao resurrect the idea of “socialism in its early stages”? This phrase was first used by Zhao Ziyang in the 1980s to counter leftist fears that reforms were progressing too quickly. But the strength of the left has steadily waned since the 1990s. Wen Jiabao’s article in People’s Daily earlier this year already signals that “early stages” will likely appear in Hu Jintao’s report.
Secondly, will Hu Jintao’s report emphasize “one core and two focal points” (一个中心，两个基本点), another legacy of the 13th National Congress? Judging from Hu’s inclusion of the phrase in his June 25 speech, the answer is yes.
Of course, these terms are now in an entirely new context.
During the 13th congress, reforms faced powerful opposition and the notion of the Maoist class struggle was still very much alive. “One core and two focal points” was key to placating the left. With the strength of the left in clear decline, Hu Jintao’s continued emphasis of the phrase would now be a strategic attempt to temper calls for reform from the right. It would mean preserving the “Four Basic Principles” and thereby holding back the perceived threat to party rule posed by “bourgeois liberalism.”
The same is true of “socialism with Chinese characteristics,” a phrase used in a prominent section head of the 13th congress report to placate the left and shore up support for market reforms. Use of the term in 2007 would serve instead to balance those forces on the right that have been talking more loudly about “democratic socialism” (民主社会主义).
But the most critical phrase of all in determining whether the 17th congress makes a return to the 13th is “separation of the party and the government” (党政分开). Jiang Zemin omitted the phrase from all three of his political reports. The term ultimately points to the course of change in China — will political reform, in other words, be about the party’s consolidation of power, or about greater separation of powers?
I’ll leave a more detailed discusion of “separation of the party and the government” for another article.
(Qian Gang, September 28, 2007)
[Translated by David Bandurski]
Previous 17th Congress article: “Can Hu Jintao edge ahead of Jiang Zemin on the question of political reform?”

In my last article on the 17th congress, I urged readers to keep their eyes on the “Four Basic Principles” as a key phrase whose continued prominence – or alternatively, fading away – might offer clues about political reform in China.
On the political reform front, another key question is whether Hu Jintao will continue to use “political civilization” (政治文明), a Jiang Zemin buzzword that (though weak and noncommittal) encompasses political reform, or zhengzhi tizhi gaige (政治体制改革). The fate of this Jiang phrase could clue us in to Hu Jintao’s reform plans. Will Hu – can Hu – step out from the shadow of Jiang Zemin on the issue of political reform?

[“Political Civilization for the Governing Party”, a 2004 volume of theoretical essays explaining Jiang Zemin’s notion of “political civilization.”]

Jiang introduced the phrase “political civilization” during his last term in office, and it was written, along with “Three Represents” (三个代表), into China’s constitution in 2004.
So far, Hu Jintao has proceeded with extreme caution and has not signaled any change to the status quo represented by Jiang’s “political civilization.” This is a marked contrast with his policy-making on the social and economic fronts, where he has loudly touted “scientific development” and the “harmonious society”.
Hu’s silence on political reform has inevitably prompted two schools of thought. The first supposes the president will uphold established principles, not seeking any departure from Jiang Zemin. The second surmises Hu is quietly preparing for a number of breakthroughs on the political reform front.
CMP’s database analysis based on the official People’s Daily and the WiseNews database of Chinese language newspapers shows clearly that use of Jiang Zemin’s “political civilization” has been on the decline:

Speaking at a graduation ceremony at China’s Central Party School on May 31, 2002, Jiang Zemin said: “Developing socialist democratic politics and building socialist political civilization are important goals for the modernization of socialism” (发展社会主义民主政治，建设社会主义政治文明，是社会主义现代化建设的重要目标). A few months later, this new phrase appeared in Jiang’s political report to the 16th National Congress.
In China’s official party media, Jiang Zemin’s “political civilization” was at the time dubbed “a new way of thinking and formulating on the question of socialism and political development”. Hu Jintao once praised the concept, and even made “political civilization” the topic of a Political Bureau study session.

[Jiang Zemin’s new term, “political civilization”, is touted on the front page of Economic Daily on October 1, 2003]

On March 14, 2004, the People’s Congress amended China’s constitution, adding “three represents” and “political civilization.” Chinese media, particularly the party newspapers, followed with a major propaganda campaign for these new terms.
Jiang Zemin made sure “political civilization” kept its distance from the 1980s reforms of Zhao Ziyang. Jiang wanted to make it clear this was not the kind of political reform Westerners were hoping to see. By most meaningful standards, Jiang Zemin’s notion of reform was empty.
Despite its enshrinement in China’s constitution, “political civilization” has faded noticeably from public view. Use of the term in the Chinese media began sliding in 2004 and fell sharply throughout 2005.
It appears that if Hu Jintao does intend to push a new round of political reforms (of some sort or another), he will not continue to use “political civilization.” If Hu does use the term, he will de-emphasize it. He will certainly not hold it high as a term of importance.
If Hu Jintao hopes to step out of Jiang Zemin’s shadow on the question of political reform he must break through the established orthodoxy of “political civilization.”
In this orthodoxy, “political civilization” is closely tied to the so-called “correct path of building political civilization” (政治文明建设的正确方向): “unity of [1] persisting in the Party’s leadership, [2] people’s mastering of the country and [3] managing state affairs according to law” (坚持党的领导、人民当家作主和依法治国的有机统一).
Available portions of Hu Jintao’s June 25 speech and related People’s Daily editorials make no mention of “political civilization.” There is, however, a reference to the “unity of persisting in the Party’s leadership”, etc., the phrase that implies Jiang Zemin’s so-called “correct path.”
This suggests we are likely to see Hu Jintao using new political reform terminology in order to tackle his reform goals. We will probably not see major breakthroughs from Jiang Zemin’s stance on political reform. But we might see modest steps. And these are likely to happen first in the area of “inner-party democracy” (党内民主).
(Qian Gang, September 25, 2007)
[Translated by David Bandurski]
Previous 17th Congress article: “Will Hu Jintao continue to use the ‘Four Basic Principles’?”

The so-called “Four Basic Principles” (四项基本原则) are a hangover from the Maoist era in China and a symbol of the power still wielded by leftists. At every juncture of reforms, political conservatives in China have attacked reforms as violations of the “Four Basic Principles.” Taking the capitalist road, they say, has weakened the party, abandoned the dictatorship of the proletariat (人民民主专政), and forsaken Marxism, Leninism and Mao Zedong Thought (马克思主义、列宁主义、毛泽东思想).
The Four Basic Principles, introduced by Deng Xiaoping in 1979, are:

1. Remaining on the socialist path
2. Upholding the dictatorship of the proletariat
3. Upholding the leadership of the CCP
4. Upholding Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought

One important question as the 17th National Congress approaches is whether Hu Jintao will continue to use the Four Basic Principles in his political report. It is a question that directly concerns political reform in China.
In the 1980s, Zhao Ziyang talked about “one core and two focal points” (一个中心，两个基本点). In this formula, economic development was the core; upholding the Four Basic Principles and supporting reform and opening were the focal points. The formula was approved by Deng Xiaoping, but in fact the two focal points stand in fundamental contradiction to one another.
Our database analysis at the China Media Project shows that “political reform” and the “Four Basic Principles” have been locked in a fierce tug of war. The following graph shows the terms as they have appeared in the official People’s Daily since the mid-1980s:

The emergence of “political reform” as a topic of discussion met with fierce resistance from the left, as the first red peak above indicates. Chinese media coined the term “contest between three and four” (三四之争) to denote the tension between these two forces – “third” for the Third Plenary Session of the 11th Central Committee of the CCP (during which political reform was a hot topic), and “four” for the “Four Basic Principles.”
Although both terms were introduced by Deng Xiaoping, they stand in irreconcilable contradiction.
In 1987, leftists and proponents of reform were locked in conflict. Even as use of the term “political reform” reached a never-before-seen high in People’s Daily, the “Four Basic Principles” soared. There was clearly frustration in the leftist camp following the 13th National Congress in October 1987.
Readers may ask: given that People’s Daily is controlled by top leaders, how can we say the appearance of these two opposing terms indicates conflict when both are rising simultaneously? The answer is that top leaders use terms on either side to placate forces within the party.
In 1988, as “political reform” persisted as a term of strength, use of the “Four Basic Principles” actually declined 86 percent, appearing just one-third as frequently as its rival.
The crackdown on democracy demonstrators on June 4, 1989, brought a resurgence of leftist forces. China’s new top leader, Jiang Zemin, bowed to these forces and launched a full-scale assault on “peaceful evolution” (和平演变), which he characterized as an attempt by bourgeois forces to subvert the power of the CCP. Jiang Zemin said that “lately the focus of the class struggle had been a struggle between the Four Basic Principles and bourgeois liberalization” (当前阶级斗争的焦点是四项基本原则和资产阶级自由化的斗争).
In the years that followed, use of the term “political reform” was clearly scaled down in the official media.
In the aftermath of Tiananmen, a wave of resurgent leftism engulfed Deng Xiaoping. Leftists spoke out against economic reforms and pushed for two cores rather than one (advocating “economic development and opposition to peaceful evolution as the cores”).
The elderly Deng Xiaoping scrabbled to pick up the pieces. With firm support from those in the party who stood for reform, Deng bested those who advocated a turn back to the planned economy era. Deng managed to shore up the country’s market reform goals. This is why, in the graph above, we see a steady decline in use of the “Four Basic Principles” through the 1990s, even as “political reform” is almost nonexistent as a term.
Since Hu Jintao came to power, 16th National Congress leaders have seemed to “keep a respectful distance” (敬而远之) from the Four Basic Principles. When CMP conducted a search of 15 formal decisions, opinions and notices issued by the 16th National Congress, we found that only four used the term “Four Basic Principles”:

1. CCP Statute on Disciplinary Action (中国共产党纪律处分条例), February 17, 2004
2. CCP Decision on Strengthening Party Governance (中共中央关于加强党的执政能力建设的决定), September 19, 2004
3. CCP Opinion on Strengthening the Work of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (中共中央关于加强人民政协工作的意见), February 8, 2006
4. CCP Decision on the Study of the ‘Collected Works of Jiang Zemin’ (中共中央关于学习《江泽民文选》的决定), August 13, 2006

In what we can see from official media coverage of Hu Jintao’s June 25 speech, there is no direct mention of the Four Basic Principles. There are, however, references to “one core, two focal points,” which of course invokes the Four Basic Principles. As with the portions of Hu’s speech available, language in the official People’s Daily describing the speech does not include mention of the Four Basic Principles.
Still, there have been a number of discussions of the Four Basic Principles elsewhere in the Chinese media:

“Concerning a Few Problems on the Road to Socialism with Chinese Characteristics”, Frontline (前线), September 7, 2007
“On Political Reform in China and its Unshakable Principles”, People.com.cn, May 29, 2007
“Firm and Unchanging as We Walk the Great Path Toward Socialism with Chinese Characteristics”, People’s Daily, August 15, 2007

Concerning the Four Basic Principles, there are two possibilities for Hu Jintao’s political report to the 17th National Congress.
The first possibility is that Hu’s report will use the Four Basic Principles in the same way as previous reports, from the 12th congress through to the 16th. If this happens we can guess that Hu Jintao will not break any new ground in the area of political reform.
The second possibility is that the Four Basic Principles will not appear directly in Hu’s report, and that “one core, two focal points” will appear in its stead. While this would not be a radical shift in meaning, it would make a very different impression and could be read as a sign that Hu Jintao will focus more attention on [political] reform.
(Qian Gang, September 24, 2007)
[Translated by David Bandurski]
[PARTY DOCUMENTS TO REFERENCE]
CCP Notice on the Earnest Study and Follow Through of the Spirit of the 16th National Congress (中共中央关于认真学习贯彻党的十六大精神的通知), November 17, 2002
CCP Notice on the Printing and Distribution of ‘Outline Plan for the Study of the Important Ideology of the ‘Three Represents’ (中共中央关于印发《“三个代表”重要思想学习纲要》的通知), June 8, 2003
CCP Notice Concerning the Studying and Carrying Out of the New Wave of the Important Ideology of the ‘Three Represents’ Throughout the Party (中共中央关于在全党兴起学习贯彻“三个代表”重要思想新高潮的通知), June 15, 2003
CCP Decision Concerning Key Issues in the Perfecting of the Socialist Market Economic System (中共中央关于完善社会主义市场经济体制若干问题的决定), October 14, 2003
CCP Statute on Internal Party Supervision (中国共产党党内监督条例[试行]), February 17, 2004
CCP Statute on Disciplinary Action (中国共产党纪律处分条例), February 17, 2004
CCP Decision on Strengthening Party Governance (中共中央关于加强党的执政能力建设的决定), September 19, 2004
CCP Statute for Protection of the Rights of Party Members (中国共产党党员权利保障条例), October 24, 2004
CCP Opinion Concerning the Carrying Out of Advanced Party Member Education with the Ideology of ‘Three Represents’ as the Core Content (中共中央关于在全党开展以实践“三个代表”重要思想为主要内容的保持共产党员先进性教育活动的意见), November 7, 2004
CCP Notice Concerning the Printing and Distribution of ‘Outline Plan for the Comprehensive Building of a System for Fighting and Preventing Corruption Balancing the Priorities of Education, Systems and Supervision (中共中央关于印发《建立健全教育、制度、监督并重的惩治和预防腐败体系实施纲要》的通知), January 3, 2005
CCP Opinion Concerning the Formation of the Eleventh Five-year Plan for the National Economy and Society (中共中央关于制定国民经济和社会发展第十一个五年规划的建议), October 11, 2005
CCP Opinion on Strengthening the Work of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (中共中央关于加强人民政协工作的意见), February 8, 2006
CCP Decision on Commendation for Advance Grassroots Organizations, Outstanding Party Members and Party Personnel (中共中央关于表彰全国先进基层党组织和优秀共产党员优秀党务工作者的决定), June 30, 2006
CCP Decision on the Study of the ‘Collected Works of Jiang Zemin’ (中共中央关于学习《江泽民文选》的决定), August 13, 2006
CCP Decision Concerning Major Questions in the Building of a Socialist Harmonious Society (中共中央关于构建社会主义和谐社会若干重大问题的决定), October 11, 2006