Formerly a top reporter for China’s official Xinhua News Agency and deputy editor of the influential journal Chronicles of History (Yanhuang Chunqiu), Yang Jisheng is one of China’s most experienced journalists. In his 2004 book, “Political Struggle in Reform China”, Yang released his personal reporting notes spanning more than a decade, including the content of three discussions he had with Zhao Ziyang while the ousted premier was under house arrest.
SPEAKER: Yang Jisheng (杨继绳 )
Lecture will be in Mandarin
DATE: Monday, Oct 8, 2007
TIME: 19:00-21:00
VENUE: T4, Meng Wah Complex, The University of Hong Kong (NOTE: This is a change from the previous venue: Foundation Chamber, Eliot Hall, The University of Hong Kong
For enquiries call: (852) 2219-4014

I would expect the reader’s response to the above headline to be something like: “Voting? In China? What is there to talk about?” Point taken. But even if we’re not seeing popular democratic elections, it’s worth noting that Chinese media have been talking about “election” (选举), or xuanju, in the selection of delegates to the 17th National Congress. And this topic is critical as we tackle the issue of political reform in China. So what are we looking for exactly?
The measure Chinese media are talking about is the ratio (the “differential rate” (差额) or cha’e) between delegates nominated by party standing committees at various levels to the total number of National Congress seats available. The term used in Chinese is “differential voting” (差额选举), or cha’e xuanju.

[The Beijing Times reports in November 2006 on the increase in the differential rate for the 17th National Congress.]

For appointment of delegates to the upcoming 17th National Congress, there was reportedly a five percentage point rise in the differential rate, 15 percent as opposed to 10 percent, from the 16th National Congress back in 2002. That means, basically, that for every 100 seats available for this year’s congress, an additional 15 nominees were chosen (by party committees at various levels) and eventually pared down by party members (any who chose to vote) at those levels.
On August 2 this year, a list of all 2,217 delegates to the 17th National Congress was made public through newspapers across the country [See image below], a historic first for China. Given what we know, the People’s Daily list represents the results after 15 percent of nominees were removed in the differential rate process (被”差”掉). They were pared down, in other words, from an initial pool of around 2,550 nominees.

[The list of delegates to the 17th National Congress is made public in the official People’s Daily on August 2, 2007.]

The issue of “differential election” is still a very sensitive one in China. When Guangdong’s Southern Weekend ran an article on August 9 detailing the process of delegate “election” for the upcoming party congress, Central Propaganda Department Vice-director Li Dongsheng (李东生) was reportedly furious. The paper was formally criticized, and Li said: “Is this really something you think you can look into?!”
How significant is the recent increase in the differential rate? At this point, it is more symbolic than anything else. Consider that with 30 provinces and autonomous regions in China, there are just over 300 differential candidates, or an average of around 11 per province. That means that in the vast majority of voting districts (county or city, etc.) there are no additional candidates. While party members are theoretically tasked with “electing” their delegates, there are in most cases no real decisions to be made.
But that doesn’t mean the differential rate is worthless as a measure of political change in China. It should be noted that the differential rate for the 13th National Congress, during which Zhao Ziyang gave his political report, was 20 percent.
As the 17th Congress opens, the following questions are worth asking:

*Is a primary election held for members of the Central Party Committee and the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection?
*If there is a primary election, will the number of candidates exceed the number of posts (是否实行差额预选)? What is the differential rate? Is the list of candidates made public?
*In the formal selection process will differential elections be held? What is the differential rate? Is the list of candidates made public? Will media have access to the names of those candidates not chosen for posts?
*How will the election results be publicized? With a list of names and votes cast? Or simply names?
*How will members of the Political Bureau and the Central Secretariat be selected? Will there be a primary election? If so, will it be open?
*Will differential elections be held for members of the Political Bureau and the Central Secretariat?
*Will any language about differential election appear in Hu Jintao’s political report, or in amendments to the party constitution?

(Qian Gang, October 3, 2007)
[Translated by David Bandurski]
Previous 17th Congress article: “How will Hu Jintao promote “inner-party democracy” at the 17th National Congress?”

Pundits generally agree that this month’s 17th National Congress is unlikely to bring major change on the political reform front. But many also predict there will be small steps forward, and that these are likely to come in the area of “inner-party democracy” (党内民主). I agree with this assessment, and I think we should pay close attention to how Hu Jintao deals with inner-party democracy.
We’ve already seen a sharp rise in use of the term “inner-party democracy” in official party media, most notably People’s Daily, since the 16th congress:

[GRAPH: Number of articles in China’s official People’s Daily using the term “inner-party democracy” from 1949-2006.]

“Inner-party democracy” appeared in 103 People’s Daily articles in 2006. While that might not seem like a lot, it marks a new historical high point for the term and shows it is getting greater priority.
So what is inner-party democracy?
As the term itself makes clear, this is not about “popular democracy” (人民民主). The idea, rather, is greater “democracy” – or more shared decision-making – among party members (who account for just 5 percent of China’s whole population). That’s not so appetizing, perhaps, for democracy proponents outside China. But some believe this is a new party approach to political reform, and that inner-party democracy can be used to pull along more broad-based political reforms.

[An October 2004 article in Economic Daily by current Politburo Standing Committee member Wu Guanzheng (吴官正) argues for the development of inner-party democracy.]

Some scholars argue that political reform in China should take its cues from the so-called “East Asian Model” – that is, more centralized, single-party control with an agenda focusing on economic growth. Yu Keping (俞可平), an influential party theorist close to Hu Jintao, has been clear on this point:

One-party leadership is the basic character of China’s political system. One-party leadership means the Communist Party of China is the only political party in China, sharing political power with no other party or political entity.

And yet, even in the context of one-party rule, there is room for progress toward more “democratic” decision-making.
At this point, it’s hard to see how firm Hu Jintao’s commitment is to inner-party democracy. In his June 25 speech he had the following to say: “We must continue — actively, safely, soundly and effectively – to promote the building of inner-party democracy” (要继续积极稳妥、扎实有效地推进党内民主建设) … “to perfect the system of inner-party democracy, [and] to raise consciousness about inner-party democracy”( 完善党内民主制度，使党内民主意识普遍增强).
This could be read as Hu Jintao’s endorsement of inner-party democracy. But it shows at the same time a great deal of wariness. The words “actively, safely, soundly and effectively” tug back on the reins and ensure reforms don’t pick up too much speed.
Hu Jintao talks in the same passage about “upholding democratic centralism” (坚持民主集中制). This makes his bottom line clear – there will be no change to the longstanding status quo of one-party rule.
If Hu Jintao hedges with these words in his political report to the 17th congress this will signal that while inner-party democracy will be a priority over the next five years we cannot expect any major steps.
As we assess Hu Jintao’s progress on inner-party democracy, we should look especially at the following questions:

*How will party elections be handled for the 17th National Congress?
*Will delegates to the congress play a role in shaping the party agenda?
*Will there be discussion about creating a permanent decision-making body for the 17th congress (常任制) so that delegates can participate in affairs beyond the meeting this month?

I’ll be turning to all three of these issue later this week.
(Qian Gang, October 1, 2007)
[Translated by David Bandurski]
Previous 17th Congress article: “Will there be echoes in Hu Jintao’s report of the 8th or 13th congresses?”

When Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao wrote in the official People’s Daily earlier this year that China “is now and has long been in the early stages of socialism,” the phrase hearkened back to the political reform era of the 1980s. For many Chinese, there were clear echoes of Zhao Ziyang’s report to the 13th National Congress in 1987.
That congress, along with the 8th congress in 1956, is seen as a landmark for political reform in China. And as we have lately heard echoes too of the 8th congress in a livelier discussion of “inner-party democracy” (党内民主), it’s fair to ask whether the upcoming 17th National Congress will mark any return to the spirit of the 8th or 13th congresses.

[The 8th National Congress is announced in the official People’s Daily in 1956.]

The 8th National Congress, held in Beijing from September 15 to 27, 1956, was a rare bright spot in China’s political history. Held amidst the democratic movements sweeping Communist countries in the West in the wake of the 20th National Congress of the Soviet Union (held February 1956, the first since Joseph Stalin’s death in 1953), the 8th congress had two distinguishing characteristics:

1. Opposition to personality cults (个人崇拜) – “Mao Zedong Thought” was not written into the Party Constitution at the time, the 7th congress having designated Mao Zedong Thought simply as a “guiding principle.” This corresponded to Nikita Khruschev‘s critique of Stalin’s cult of personality and overconcentration of power.
2. An emphasis on “inner-party democracy” (党内民主)

Despite the crackdown on democracy demonstrators in 1989 and the ousting of Premier Zhao Ziyang, the 13th National Congress of 1987 remains an important signpost for Chinese reform. Even after Zhao’s downfall, Deng Xiaoping is known to have said of his political report to the 13th congress: “Not a word can be changed” (一个字都不能动).

[The 13th National Congress is announced in the official People’s Daily in 1987.]

As we look for parallels between the 17th congress and the 8th congress there are two questions to bear in mind. First, will President Hu Jintao promote “inner-party democracy”? Second, will Hu emphasize the need to check the power of individuals within the party and prevent personality cults?
I’ll explore “inner-party democracy” in greater detail in a later article. But as for the second point, the more specific question is whether Hu Jintao will push, as Jiang Zemin did, for the inclusion of his own core concepts in the Party Constitution. In other words, will party leaders write “harmonious society” and “scientific view of development” into the Party Constitution as a tribute to Hu Jintao’s political prowess?
As we look for parallels between the upcoming congress and the 13th congress we need to focus on two key phrases. First, will Hu Jintao resurrect the idea of “socialism in its early stages”? This phrase was first used by Zhao Ziyang in the 1980s to counter leftist fears that reforms were progressing too quickly. But the strength of the left has steadily waned since the 1990s. Wen Jiabao’s article in People’s Daily earlier this year already signals that “early stages” will likely appear in Hu Jintao’s report.
Secondly, will Hu Jintao’s report emphasize “one core and two focal points” (一个中心，两个基本点), another legacy of the 13th National Congress? Judging from Hu’s inclusion of the phrase in his June 25 speech, the answer is yes.
Of course, these terms are now in an entirely new context.
During the 13th congress, reforms faced powerful opposition and the notion of the Maoist class struggle was still very much alive. “One core and two focal points” was key to placating the left. With the strength of the left in clear decline, Hu Jintao’s continued emphasis of the phrase would now be a strategic attempt to temper calls for reform from the right. It would mean preserving the “Four Basic Principles” and thereby holding back the perceived threat to party rule posed by “bourgeois liberalism.”
The same is true of “socialism with Chinese characteristics,” a phrase used in a prominent section head of the 13th congress report to placate the left and shore up support for market reforms. Use of the term in 2007 would serve instead to balance those forces on the right that have been talking more loudly about “democratic socialism” (民主社会主义).
But the most critical phrase of all in determining whether the 17th congress makes a return to the 13th is “separation of the party and the government” (党政分开). Jiang Zemin omitted the phrase from all three of his political reports. The term ultimately points to the course of change in China — will political reform, in other words, be about the party’s consolidation of power, or about greater separation of powers?
I’ll leave a more detailed discusion of “separation of the party and the government” for another article.
(Qian Gang, September 28, 2007)
[Translated by David Bandurski]
Previous 17th Congress article: “Can Hu Jintao edge ahead of Jiang Zemin on the question of political reform?”

In my last article on the 17th congress, I urged readers to keep their eyes on the “Four Basic Principles” as a key phrase whose continued prominence – or alternatively, fading away – might offer clues about political reform in China.
On the political reform front, another key question is whether Hu Jintao will continue to use “political civilization” (政治文明), a Jiang Zemin buzzword that (though weak and noncommittal) encompasses political reform, or zhengzhi tizhi gaige (政治体制改革). The fate of this Jiang phrase could clue us in to Hu Jintao’s reform plans. Will Hu – can Hu – step out from the shadow of Jiang Zemin on the issue of political reform?

[“Political Civilization for the Governing Party”, a 2004 volume of theoretical essays explaining Jiang Zemin’s notion of “political civilization.”]

Jiang introduced the phrase “political civilization” during his last term in office, and it was written, along with “Three Represents” (三个代表), into China’s constitution in 2004.
So far, Hu Jintao has proceeded with extreme caution and has not signaled any change to the status quo represented by Jiang’s “political civilization.” This is a marked contrast with his policy-making on the social and economic fronts, where he has loudly touted “scientific development” and the “harmonious society”.
Hu’s silence on political reform has inevitably prompted two schools of thought. The first supposes the president will uphold established principles, not seeking any departure from Jiang Zemin. The second surmises Hu is quietly preparing for a number of breakthroughs on the political reform front.
CMP’s database analysis based on the official People’s Daily and the WiseNews database of Chinese language newspapers shows clearly that use of Jiang Zemin’s “political civilization” has been on the decline:

Speaking at a graduation ceremony at China’s Central Party School on May 31, 2002, Jiang Zemin said: “Developing socialist democratic politics and building socialist political civilization are important goals for the modernization of socialism” (发展社会主义民主政治，建设社会主义政治文明，是社会主义现代化建设的重要目标). A few months later, this new phrase appeared in Jiang’s political report to the 16th National Congress.
In China’s official party media, Jiang Zemin’s “political civilization” was at the time dubbed “a new way of thinking and formulating on the question of socialism and political development”. Hu Jintao once praised the concept, and even made “political civilization” the topic of a Political Bureau study session.

[Jiang Zemin’s new term, “political civilization”, is touted on the front page of Economic Daily on October 1, 2003]

On March 14, 2004, the People’s Congress amended China’s constitution, adding “three represents” and “political civilization.” Chinese media, particularly the party newspapers, followed with a major propaganda campaign for these new terms.
Jiang Zemin made sure “political civilization” kept its distance from the 1980s reforms of Zhao Ziyang. Jiang wanted to make it clear this was not the kind of political reform Westerners were hoping to see. By most meaningful standards, Jiang Zemin’s notion of reform was empty.
Despite its enshrinement in China’s constitution, “political civilization” has faded noticeably from public view. Use of the term in the Chinese media began sliding in 2004 and fell sharply throughout 2005.
It appears that if Hu Jintao does intend to push a new round of political reforms (of some sort or another), he will not continue to use “political civilization.” If Hu does use the term, he will de-emphasize it. He will certainly not hold it high as a term of importance.
If Hu Jintao hopes to step out of Jiang Zemin’s shadow on the question of political reform he must break through the established orthodoxy of “political civilization.”
In this orthodoxy, “political civilization” is closely tied to the so-called “correct path of building political civilization” (政治文明建设的正确方向): “unity of [1] persisting in the Party’s leadership, [2] people’s mastering of the country and [3] managing state affairs according to law” (坚持党的领导、人民当家作主和依法治国的有机统一).
Available portions of Hu Jintao’s June 25 speech and related People’s Daily editorials make no mention of “political civilization.” There is, however, a reference to the “unity of persisting in the Party’s leadership”, etc., the phrase that implies Jiang Zemin’s so-called “correct path.”
This suggests we are likely to see Hu Jintao using new political reform terminology in order to tackle his reform goals. We will probably not see major breakthroughs from Jiang Zemin’s stance on political reform. But we might see modest steps. And these are likely to happen first in the area of “inner-party democracy” (党内民主).
(Qian Gang, September 25, 2007)
[Translated by David Bandurski]
Previous 17th Congress article: “Will Hu Jintao continue to use the ‘Four Basic Principles’?”

The so-called “Four Basic Principles” (四项基本原则) are a hangover from the Maoist era in China and a symbol of the power still wielded by leftists. At every juncture of reforms, political conservatives in China have attacked reforms as violations of the “Four Basic Principles.” Taking the capitalist road, they say, has weakened the party, abandoned the dictatorship of the proletariat (人民民主专政), and forsaken Marxism, Leninism and Mao Zedong Thought (马克思主义、列宁主义、毛泽东思想).
The Four Basic Principles, introduced by Deng Xiaoping in 1979, are:

1. Remaining on the socialist path
2. Upholding the dictatorship of the proletariat
3. Upholding the leadership of the CCP
4. Upholding Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought

One important question as the 17th National Congress approaches is whether Hu Jintao will continue to use the Four Basic Principles in his political report. It is a question that directly concerns political reform in China.
In the 1980s, Zhao Ziyang talked about “one core and two focal points” (一个中心，两个基本点). In this formula, economic development was the core; upholding the Four Basic Principles and supporting reform and opening were the focal points. The formula was approved by Deng Xiaoping, but in fact the two focal points stand in fundamental contradiction to one another.
Our database analysis at the China Media Project shows that “political reform” and the “Four Basic Principles” have been locked in a fierce tug of war. The following graph shows the terms as they have appeared in the official People’s Daily since the mid-1980s:

The emergence of “political reform” as a topic of discussion met with fierce resistance from the left, as the first red peak above indicates. Chinese media coined the term “contest between three and four” (三四之争) to denote the tension between these two forces – “third” for the Third Plenary Session of the 11th Central Committee of the CCP (during which political reform was a hot topic), and “four” for the “Four Basic Principles.”
Although both terms were introduced by Deng Xiaoping, they stand in irreconcilable contradiction.
In 1987, leftists and proponents of reform were locked in conflict. Even as use of the term “political reform” reached a never-before-seen high in People’s Daily, the “Four Basic Principles” soared. There was clearly frustration in the leftist camp following the 13th National Congress in October 1987.
Readers may ask: given that People’s Daily is controlled by top leaders, how can we say the appearance of these two opposing terms indicates conflict when both are rising simultaneously? The answer is that top leaders use terms on either side to placate forces within the party.
In 1988, as “political reform” persisted as a term of strength, use of the “Four Basic Principles” actually declined 86 percent, appearing just one-third as frequently as its rival.
The crackdown on democracy demonstrators on June 4, 1989, brought a resurgence of leftist forces. China’s new top leader, Jiang Zemin, bowed to these forces and launched a full-scale assault on “peaceful evolution” (和平演变), which he characterized as an attempt by bourgeois forces to subvert the power of the CCP. Jiang Zemin said that “lately the focus of the class struggle had been a struggle between the Four Basic Principles and bourgeois liberalization” (当前阶级斗争的焦点是四项基本原则和资产阶级自由化的斗争).
In the years that followed, use of the term “political reform” was clearly scaled down in the official media.
In the aftermath of Tiananmen, a wave of resurgent leftism engulfed Deng Xiaoping. Leftists spoke out against economic reforms and pushed for two cores rather than one (advocating “economic development and opposition to peaceful evolution as the cores”).
The elderly Deng Xiaoping scrabbled to pick up the pieces. With firm support from those in the party who stood for reform, Deng bested those who advocated a turn back to the planned economy era. Deng managed to shore up the country’s market reform goals. This is why, in the graph above, we see a steady decline in use of the “Four Basic Principles” through the 1990s, even as “political reform” is almost nonexistent as a term.
Since Hu Jintao came to power, 16th National Congress leaders have seemed to “keep a respectful distance” (敬而远之) from the Four Basic Principles. When CMP conducted a search of 15 formal decisions, opinions and notices issued by the 16th National Congress, we found that only four used the term “Four Basic Principles”:

1. CCP Statute on Disciplinary Action (中国共产党纪律处分条例), February 17, 2004
2. CCP Decision on Strengthening Party Governance (中共中央关于加强党的执政能力建设的决定), September 19, 2004
3. CCP Opinion on Strengthening the Work of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (中共中央关于加强人民政协工作的意见), February 8, 2006
4. CCP Decision on the Study of the ‘Collected Works of Jiang Zemin’ (中共中央关于学习《江泽民文选》的决定), August 13, 2006

In what we can see from official media coverage of Hu Jintao’s June 25 speech, there is no direct mention of the Four Basic Principles. There are, however, references to “one core, two focal points,” which of course invokes the Four Basic Principles. As with the portions of Hu’s speech available, language in the official People’s Daily describing the speech does not include mention of the Four Basic Principles.
Still, there have been a number of discussions of the Four Basic Principles elsewhere in the Chinese media:

“Concerning a Few Problems on the Road to Socialism with Chinese Characteristics”, Frontline (前线), September 7, 2007
“On Political Reform in China and its Unshakable Principles”, People.com.cn, May 29, 2007
“Firm and Unchanging as We Walk the Great Path Toward Socialism with Chinese Characteristics”, People’s Daily, August 15, 2007

Concerning the Four Basic Principles, there are two possibilities for Hu Jintao’s political report to the 17th National Congress.
The first possibility is that Hu’s report will use the Four Basic Principles in the same way as previous reports, from the 12th congress through to the 16th. If this happens we can guess that Hu Jintao will not break any new ground in the area of political reform.
The second possibility is that the Four Basic Principles will not appear directly in Hu’s report, and that “one core, two focal points” will appear in its stead. While this would not be a radical shift in meaning, it would make a very different impression and could be read as a sign that Hu Jintao will focus more attention on [political] reform.
(Qian Gang, September 24, 2007)
[Translated by David Bandurski]
[PARTY DOCUMENTS TO REFERENCE]
CCP Notice on the Earnest Study and Follow Through of the Spirit of the 16th National Congress (中共中央关于认真学习贯彻党的十六大精神的通知), November 17, 2002
CCP Notice on the Printing and Distribution of ‘Outline Plan for the Study of the Important Ideology of the ‘Three Represents’ (中共中央关于印发《“三个代表”重要思想学习纲要》的通知), June 8, 2003
CCP Notice Concerning the Studying and Carrying Out of the New Wave of the Important Ideology of the ‘Three Represents’ Throughout the Party (中共中央关于在全党兴起学习贯彻“三个代表”重要思想新高潮的通知), June 15, 2003
CCP Decision Concerning Key Issues in the Perfecting of the Socialist Market Economic System (中共中央关于完善社会主义市场经济体制若干问题的决定), October 14, 2003
CCP Statute on Internal Party Supervision (中国共产党党内监督条例[试行]), February 17, 2004
CCP Statute on Disciplinary Action (中国共产党纪律处分条例), February 17, 2004
CCP Decision on Strengthening Party Governance (中共中央关于加强党的执政能力建设的决定), September 19, 2004
CCP Statute for Protection of the Rights of Party Members (中国共产党党员权利保障条例), October 24, 2004
CCP Opinion Concerning the Carrying Out of Advanced Party Member Education with the Ideology of ‘Three Represents’ as the Core Content (中共中央关于在全党开展以实践“三个代表”重要思想为主要内容的保持共产党员先进性教育活动的意见), November 7, 2004
CCP Notice Concerning the Printing and Distribution of ‘Outline Plan for the Comprehensive Building of a System for Fighting and Preventing Corruption Balancing the Priorities of Education, Systems and Supervision (中共中央关于印发《建立健全教育、制度、监督并重的惩治和预防腐败体系实施纲要》的通知), January 3, 2005
CCP Opinion Concerning the Formation of the Eleventh Five-year Plan for the National Economy and Society (中共中央关于制定国民经济和社会发展第十一个五年规划的建议), October 11, 2005
CCP Opinion on Strengthening the Work of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (中共中央关于加强人民政协工作的意见), February 8, 2006
CCP Decision on Commendation for Advance Grassroots Organizations, Outstanding Party Members and Party Personnel (中共中央关于表彰全国先进基层党组织和优秀共产党员优秀党务工作者的决定), June 30, 2006
CCP Decision on the Study of the ‘Collected Works of Jiang Zemin’ (中共中央关于学习《江泽民文选》的决定), August 13, 2006
CCP Decision Concerning Major Questions in the Building of a Socialist Harmonious Society (中共中央关于构建社会主义和谐社会若干重大问题的决定), October 11, 2006

One question on everyone’s mind as we approach next month’s party congress is whether there will be any breakthroughs on political reform. There are few answers at this point about Hu Jintao’s specific agenda on political reform. But we can at least prepare ourselves to ask the right questions.
CMP analysis of “political reform” coverage in the official People’s Daily bears out what most would probably already assume about the recent history of political reform in China – the issue grew louder in the mid to late 1980s and shrank to a whisper after the crackdown on democracy demonstrators on June 4, 1989:

The term we’ve searched here is “political [system] reform” (政治体制改革), a term unambiguous in its meaning and essentially what Deng Xiaoping called “reforms to the governance system of the party and government” (党和国家领导制度的改革). The term does not mean simple reform of personnel systems (公务员制度改革) – things like examinations for government employees – or the building of a legal system (法制建设). So as we train our eyes on the 17th National Congress, “political reform” (政治体制改革), or zhengzhi tizhi gaige, is one critical term we should be on the lookout for.
We can begin by asking whether “political reform” will become a key topic (主议题) at the congress. One simple way to gauge this is by looking at whether or not the term makes it into one of the smaller section heads of Hu Jintao’s political report (政治报告).
The term appeared, for example, at the top of the fifth section of Zhao Ziyang’s political report to the 13th National Congress in 1987: “Concerning Political Reform.”

[Zhao Ziyang’s political report to the 13th National Congress in 1987 lays out the specific rules on election of party officials, such as the differential rate.]

In former President Jiang Zemin’s report to the 14th Congress in 1992, the second section, “Key Tasks for Reform and Building in the 1990s”, said “[we] must work hard to realize 10 key tasks” (必须努力实现十个方面关系全局的主要任务) – the sixth of these was: “vigorous promotion of political reform to make relatively major strides in the development of socialist democracy and rule of law” (积极推进政治体制改革，使社会主义民主和法制建设有一个较大的发展). The term graduated to one of the smaller section heads in Jiang’s report to the 15th Congress. Section six was called: “Political Reform and the Building of Democracy and Law” (政治体制改革和民主法制建设). Five years later, in Jiang’s third political report, the term moved up to the fifth section: “Political Building and Political Reform” (政治建设和政治体制改革). [Click here for a record in Chinese of past political reports].
It is not enough, of course, that the term appears in a political report. After all, there is a world of difference between Zhao Ziyang and Jiang Zemin on the question of political reform – as the graph above makes clear. There are minute jumps in use of the term “political reform” corresponding to the 15th and 16th congresses, but they are shallow and short-lived.
We can conjecture that in Hu Jintao’s report “political reform” will appear in a smaller section head just as it did for the 13th, 15th and 16th congresses. But the more important question is how exactly the term will be used. What terms will accompany it? What terms will keep it in check, like chaperones at each elbow? We have to look, in other words, at context.
As was the case with Jiang Zemin’s political reports, will Hu’s report pin down “political reform” with other phrases like “strengthening party governance” (加强党的领导), “stability before all else” (稳定压倒一切), or “opposing westernization and differentiation” (反对西化, 分化)?
How will Hu Jintao’s formulation of “political reform” differ from what we saw with other congresses since the 13th? And will the president introduce any real roadmaps or timelines, or take any real steps, toward political reform?
One key specific question is whether Hu Jintao’s political report will make a point of referring to the “Four Basic Principles”. That’s a question for another article.
(Qian Gang, September 21, 2007)
[Translated by David Bandurski]
Previous 17th Congress article: “What Will Hu Jintao Say in His Political Report?”
[BACKGROUND]
The idea political reform in China, or zhengzhi tizhi gaige (政治体制改革), emerged in the reflection, reassessment and settling of accounts that came with the end of the Cultural Revolution. In 1979 calls for political reform came both from within and outside the CCP. Inside the party, Mao Zedong’s feudal and fascist methods were criticized during the so-called “theory discussion sessions” (理论务虚会). Outside the party, the notion of the “fifth modernization”, democracy, emerged on a wall poster during the brief burst of outspokenness known as the “Democracy Wall” (a response to Deng Xiaoping’s Four Modernizations). A number of important reform journals (such as Chen Ziming’s The Spring of Peking) were posted on the “democracy wall” in Beijing’s Xidan District.
On August 18, 1980, Deng Xiaoping made a famous speech called “Reforms to the Governance System of the Party and the Government” (党和国家领导制度的改革) during a meeting of China’s Political Bureau (中共中央政治局扩大会议). Deng denounced over-concentration of power in China’s leadership as well as “patriarchal methods, life tenure in leading posts and privileges of various kinds” (家长制、终身制和形形色色的特权现象). He also attacked the evils of Stalinism.
As a number of important activists, including Chen Ziming (陈子明), Hu Ping (胡平) and Wang Juntao (王军涛), electioneered for People’s Congress posts in various districts in Beijing (a movement initiated by university students), these “candidates” intensified calls for political reform.
As the workers’ movement in Poland, led by Lech Walesa, challenged the leadership of the Communist Party there, however, Chinese leaders — notably Chen Yun (陈云) — said calls for democratic reforms in China needed to be stopped to prevent similar unrest at home. In 1980, Leftist official Hu Qiaomu (胡乔木) called on leaders to prevent dissemination of Deng Xiaoping’s speech on political reform (parts of the speech appeared in 1983, and again in 1987), which was seen as offering encouragement to reform proponents [More on Hu Qiaomu at “Letters from China“].

[Deng Xiaoping’s speech on political reform is published in the official People’s Daily in 1987.]

In 1983, a speech by Hu Yaobang raised political reforms as a key part of “comprehensive and systematic” reforms. But political reforms were never rolled out, and Hu Yaobang was subsequently purged in the Anti-Bourgeois Liberalization Campaign (反资产阶级自由化) of 1987.
On September 4, 1986, the official People’s Daily reported Deng Xiaoping’s meeting with the head of Japan’s Komei Party and their dialogue about how “not carrying out political reforms would impede productivity and development” (不搞政治体制改革，就会阻碍生产力的发展). For the year 1987, the term “political reform” appeared in 348 separate articles in People’s Daily, a historic high.
On July 1, 1987, Deng Xiaoping’s key speech on political reform delivered to party leaders in 1980 was printed in full in People’s Daily, and referred to as a “seminal political reform document” (政治体制改革的指导性文件). At Deng Xiaoping’s urging, political reform made it on the agenda, appearing prominently in Zhao Ziyang’s political report to the 13th National Congress.
The democracy movement of 1989, and the violent crackdown that followed, brought political reforms in China to a screeching halt.

There is naturally a lot of guesswork going on in the run up to the 17th Party Congress. But there is one thing we can say with certainty already — the most important document to come out of the 17th Party Congress will be Hu Jintao’s political report (政治报告).

[The front page of yesterday’s Southern Metropolis Daily reports the politburo’s announcement of pending changes to the Party Constitution, adding core Hu Jintao concepts.]

Reports to the Party Congress are always a vehicle for top leaders to set out their political principles. Promoted loudly by state-run media after Congresses, political reports are also a form of speech hegemony (话语霸权), dominating the political vocabulary. For this reason, they are libraries of important political keywords of the day, and a textual analysis of them can yield important clues about China’s direction.
So, what exactly will Hu Jintao’s political report say?
Hu’s speech back on June 25 this year was a kind of warm up for his political report, and in the glimpses we have of that speech through official party media we can see the president’s key terms gearing up.
While the full text of the June 25 speech was never made available, People’s Daily ran a series of eight editorials this summer laying out the spirit of the speech. Performing a textual analysis of the keywords in those eight editorials, we get the following totals (for the number of times particular keywords appear):
Socialism with Chinese Characteristics (中国特色社会主义) – 48
Scientific Development (科学发展) – 37
Firm and Unchanging/Unshakable (坚定不移) – 26
Relatively Comfortable Standard of Living (小康) –
Harmony (和谐) – 15
Liberation of Thought (解放思想) – 9
Early Stages (初级阶段) – 9
Deng Xiaoping Theory (邓小平理论) — 8
Three Represents (三个代表) – 8
Inner-Party Democracy (党内民主) – 4
One Core, Two Basic Points (一个中心　两个基本点) – 4
Political Reform (政治体制改革) – 1
The notion of the “Four Unshakables” (四个坚定不移) is Hu Jintao’s own addition to the pantheon of party terms. In the following portion of Hu’s June 25 speech, I have marked the “unshakables” with bolded numbers:

[1] Liberation of thought (解放思想) is the basic requirement and character of our party’s course and thinking, a talisman with which we can meet new situations and new problems on the road ahead. [We] must firmly and unshakably (坚定不移) support it [the principle of thought liberation]. [2] Economic reform and opening is a necessary condition for the liberation and advancement of the productivity of society, and of the constant renewal of systems and mechanisms invested with energy and vitality (改革开放，是解放和发展社会生产力、不断创新充满活力的体制机制的必然要求). [Economic reform and opening] is powerful force (强大动力) in the development of Socialism with Chinese characteristics (中国特色社会主义), and we must firmly and unshakably promote it (必须坚定不移地加以推进). [3] Scientific development (科学发展) and social harmony (社会和谐) are basic conditions for the advancement of Socialism with Chinese characteristics (是发展中国特色社会主义的基本要求), and they are intrinsically necessary to the achievement of rapid and healthy (又好又快) development of the economy and society (是实现经济社会又好又快发展的内在需要) – [we] must put them into effect firmly and unshakably (必须坚定不移地加以落实). [4] The comprehensive building of a relatively comfortable standard of living (全面建设小康社会) is a goal toward which our nation must struggle through to 2020, and which concerns the basic welfare of our people (是全国各族人民根本利益所在) – [we] must firmly and unshakably struggle for it (必须坚定不移地为之奋斗).

From this notion of “four unshakables” and the terms orbiting around it in Hu Jintao’s speech, we can see that his basic orientation is toward reform and development. Nothing here suggests a slowing down or reversal of reforms.
After 2004, leaders and intellectuals in China cranked up the volume of the debate over the direction of reforms, and those in the leftist camp crusaded against market reforms. Hu’s speech offers a counterpoint to this retrogressive trend in Chinese politics, and we should expect to see the same in his report to the 17th Congress.
But Hu’s reforms will definitely not be too ambitious or too rapid. This becomes clear from his emphasis in the June 25 speech on “Socialism with Chinese characteristics” (中国特色社会主义).
Why is this the case? First, we should understand that the idea of Socialism with Chinese characteristics arose in counterpoint to the idea of “democratic socialism” (民主社会主义). In 2006, a number of relatively open-minded scholars allied proposals for further research into the question of “democratic socialism” with calls for an acceleration of political reforms. In response, leftists held more than ten conferences to criticize these moves. The emphasis on “Chinese characteristics (中国特色) is essentially an emphasis on “China’s national characteristics” (中国国情), and it seeks to draw clear boundaries between China and Western systems of democracy or the social democracy of Europe.
However, the slogan “Socialism with Chinese characteristics” can also serve to prevent further inroads by the leftist camp. The emphasis on “Socialism with Chinese characteristics” essentially upholds the policy, a 1980s legacy of Deng Xiaoping, of not getting mired in controversy over the ideological underpinnings of China’s development — “not arguing over whether [China’s economy] is surnamed Socialism or surnamed Capitalism” (不争论姓社姓资). The preservation of “Socialism with Chinese characteristics” is, therefore, a nod in the direction of the left, a stopgap solution preventing an ideological clash. The hope is that economic reforms can proceed without controversy, with a clear line drawn between China’s present economic development and the legacy of Mao Zedong’s brand of socialism.
Hu Jintao’s use of such phrases as “liberation of thought” (解放思想) and “early stages” (初级阶段) is also a kind of “singing two different tunes with equal skill” (异曲同工), or yiqu tonggong, a political ventriloquism that allows Hu to push his agenda while placating his enemies. It should be noted that an important mark of the leadership of Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao is in fact a quiet slipping back toward the politics of Hu Yaobang and Zhao Ziyang (although not, mind you, a return).
In order to drum up support and strength to push ahead with inner-party reforms, Hu and Wen must pick up key concepts where the 11th and 13th congresses left off. “Liberation of thought” was a slogan used at the Third Plenary Session of the 11th Central Committee, held in December 1978, and during which Deng Xiaoping launched a series of reforms including the Four Modernizations.
The phrase “early stages” was a strategy employed by Zhao Ziyang in the 1980s, when leftists remained a powerful force. The idea that China was in “the early stages of socialism” could be used to counter attacks from the left, and at the same time cooled down demands for more urgent political reform. The phrase was enthusiastically supported by Deng Xiaoping, who remarked: “This is well designed” (这个设计好).
“Relatively comfortable standard of living” (小康), “scientific development” (科学发展) and “harmonious society” (和谐社会) will remain hot buzzwords in the 17th Congress report. The “moderately wealthy” society, or xiaokang shehui, is an important target for the Central Party leadership. The term xiaokang, first used by Deng Xiaoping in 1979 to describe China’s modernization, was elevated by Jiang Zemin in his report to the 16th Congress.
“Scientific development” and “harmonious society” are banners and slogans raised by Hu Jintao, Wen Jiabao and the current leadership group. One thing we should watch for at the 17th Congress is whether or not these terms are formally elevated as “innovative party theory” (党的创新理论) — or, per the recent statement from the politburo, “major strategic theory” (重大战略思想). Will they be written, as state media suggested earlier this week, into the Party Constitution? And which ones?

[Coverage on major Chinese Web portal QQ.com on September 18 reports that key Hu Jintao concepts will be written into the Party Constitution this year]

While the possibility of political reform in China is something we should watch for carefully, it is doubtful whether political reform, or “political system reform” (政治体制改革), will become an important part of the agenda at the 17th Congress. Looking at Hu Jintao’s June 25 speech, we can see that “political reform” has only a minute share of the buzz. Still, we should pay attention to whether or not a particular section of the report is reserved for political reform.
Two more terms will be key at the 17th Congress – “one core, two basic points” and “inner-party democracy”. Stay tuned for further discussion of these two concepts.
(Qian Gang, September 19, 2007)
[Translated by David Bandurski]
Previous 17th Congress article: “How do we make an assessment of Hu Jintao’s strength?”
[A BRIEF HISTORY OF PARTY CONGRESS REPORTS]
The Communist Party of China has held nine Congresses since it came to power in 1949. What were the core agendas of these Congresses?
At the 8th Congress in 1956, the theme was the “general direction for the transitional period” (过渡时期总路线). The basic idea was for the “party of revolution” to make the transformation into a constructive ruling party and accelerate economic development. Responding to socialist democratic movements in eastern Europe, the report sought to contain contagion’s spread by building a “sound political culture.” This included such measures as increasing inner-party democracy (党内民主), essentially about more shared decision-making within the party. The report to the 8th Congress was done by Liu Shaoqi (刘少奇). But less than two weeks after the closing of the Congress Mao Zedong declared that, “The report to the 8th Congress was a mistake” (“八大报告是错误的”). Mao later destroyed the spirit and direction of the 8th Congress report, launching a class struggle and dragging China into a series of calamities – the Anti-Rightist Movement, the Great Leap Forward, the Cultural Revolution.
The 9th and 10th Congresses were held amidst the turmoil of the Cultural Revolution. The principal theme for the 9th Congress was “persisting in the revolution” (继续革命), and the report offered theoretical support for the Cultural Revolution.
The 10th Congress was held after the death of Lin Biao, whom Mao had designated as his successor but who was later branded a traitor. The reigning buzzword of the congress was the “Three Basic Principles” (1. Mao Zedong Thought over revisionism; 2. unity over disunity; 3. straightforwardness over conspiracy). The congress essentially mustered a war against Lin Biao’s former supporters and continued the path of the Cultural Revolution.
Hua Guofeng was premier when the 11th Congress opened in 1977, right on the heels of the Cultural Revolution. The theme that year was “grasping the guiding principles, governing the nation” (抓纲治国). The former was about continuing China’s class struggle; the latter was about economic development. The “guiding principles,” or gang, were dropped in December 1979, and economic development (“governing the nation”) became the core policy, with an emphasis on “liberating thought” (解放思想). This was the beginning of the policy of opening and reform.
In Hu Yaobang’s report to the 12th Congress, the core concept was “reform” (改革), which appeared 18 times, but another buzzword, even hotter, was “spiritual civilization” (精神文明), appearing 36 times. The term “spiritual civilization” was again a nod to the leftist camp, an important counterbalancing concession to those who feared economic development would send China reeling toward materialism. The term’s strong presence in the report signaled the persisting influence of leftists within the party.
In Zhao Ziyang’s report to the 13th Congress the buzzword was “early stages” (初级阶段), which appeared 26 times (and which, again, we’ve seen resurface this year in Hu Jintao’s June 25, speech). Another hot buzzword was “political reform” (政治体制改革), which appeared 12 times.
Jiang Zemin issued three political reports in all, at the 14th, 15th and 16th congresses. The key terms in his reports were as follows:

14th Congress: “Socialism with Chinese Characteristics” (35 times)
15th Congress: “Deng Xiaoping Theory” (32 times)
16th Congress: “Three Represents’ (27 times)

Readers may recall that an essay by Yu Keping (俞可平), a key theorist in Hu Jintao’s circle, created waves back in late 2006. Yu’s essay, “Democracy is a Good Thing,” argued that democracy was indispensable if China wanted to build a strong and modern socialist society. Today, just weeks before the all-important 17th National Congress, Yu Keping spoke out once again in the pages of Beijing Daily, in an article praising Hu Jintao and linking the president’s notion of “liberation of thought” (解放思想) – a phrase first used at the 1978 congress, when Deng Xiaoping introduced the Four Modernizations – to such issues as “human rights” and “constitutionalism.”

[Screenshot of Yu Keping essay as it appeared on xinhuanet.com.cn today]

We have no way of knowing whether Yu’s article represents the reform hopes of China’s top leader (whether Yu, in other words, is airing out Hu’s ideas to gauge public and party response), or whether the theorist is out on his own limb. But the essay should, at any rate, be the subject of lively debate leading up to next month’s congress.
The following are (hasty) excerpts of Yu’s essay as it appeared on Xinhua News Agency’s website:

Since reform and opening, many new concepts like “constitutionalism” (法治), “human rights” (人权) and “people as the foundation” (以人为本) have entered the political and social spheres in our country and been a force pushing progress on democratic politics in China (中国民主政治).
Hu Jintao pointed out in his June 25 speech that “liberation of thought (解放思想) is the basic requirement and character of our party’s course and thinking, a talisman with which we can meet new situations and new problems on the road ahead.” We can say that liberation of thought and the renewal of ideology are a key impetus behind social and political progress. As Comrade Deng Xiaoping said, changes in ideas and concepts are the preconditions of reform work. He said: “If we do not break through rigidness of ideas, there is no hope for the Four Modernizations.” More than 20 years of reform in China have shown thoroughly that conceptual changes have an extremely close connection with social and political progress …
[Brief history of concept of “people as the foundation” in China since 1949]
Just as with “people as the foundation”, so too has the concept of human rights been spurned [in China] as bourgeois ideology and criticized politically. Criticism of the idea of human rights has brought, in the realm of experience, the neglect of citizens’ human rights, the most terrifying example being the ten-year trampling on human rights that was the Cultural Revolution. After the mid-1980s some theorists began talking about human rights and looking with greater interest at Marxism’s views on human rights as well as introducing Western ideas about human rights. But these efforts were seriously impeded by the forces of traditional theory, to the extent that some proponents of Marxist human rights theory were branded “bourgeois free intellectuals” (资产阶级自由化分子) … At the turn of the millennium, the concept of human rights began to enter the language of the party and government, and at the end of 2003 the Central Party formally wrote the phrase “protection of citizens’ human rights” into the national constitution, a move unanimously approved by people’s congress representatives in March 2004 …
China is a country with a more than 2,000-year history of autocratic rule, and one of the toughest lessons of the ten-year Cultural Revolution was the need to move from autocracy to constitutionalism. After opening and reform, the party and government began to emphasize a legal system (法制) and rule by law (依法治国) . . . After the 1980s, some theorists began promoting “rule of law” (法治/以法治国) … From the beginning the idea of rule of law was given a strong priority by party and government leaders. In the mid-1980’s some party leaders pointed out that as China’s only ruling party, the CCP must act within the framework of the law and that party organizations or and individual leaders did not have special rights allowing them to act above the law. In the 1990s, “rule of law” made its formal entry into party and government documents. The political report to the 15th National Congress was the first to clearly state the objective of “building a socialist country [operating under] rule of law” (建立社会主义法治国家). Before long, this objective was written into our country’s constitution, making the transition from a political goal of the CCP to a political goal of the nation.

For more on “liberation of thought” and Hu Jintao’s political report to the 17th Congress, stay tuned for the fourth article in Qian Gang’s “The Insight Track” series, which will appear Wednesday, September 19.
[Posted by David Bandurski, September 17, 2007, 4:20pm]