One question on everyone’s mind as we approach next month’s party congress is whether there will be any breakthroughs on political reform. There are few answers at this point about Hu Jintao’s specific agenda on political reform. But we can at least prepare ourselves to ask the right questions.
CMP analysis of “political reform” coverage in the official People’s Daily bears out what most would probably already assume about the recent history of political reform in China – the issue grew louder in the mid to late 1980s and shrank to a whisper after the crackdown on democracy demonstrators on June 4, 1989:

The term we’ve searched here is “political [system] reform” (政治体制改革), a term unambiguous in its meaning and essentially what Deng Xiaoping called “reforms to the governance system of the party and government” (党和国家领导制度的改革). The term does not mean simple reform of personnel systems (公务员制度改革) – things like examinations for government employees – or the building of a legal system (法制建设). So as we train our eyes on the 17th National Congress, “political reform” (政治体制改革), or zhengzhi tizhi gaige, is one critical term we should be on the lookout for.
We can begin by asking whether “political reform” will become a key topic (主议题) at the congress. One simple way to gauge this is by looking at whether or not the term makes it into one of the smaller section heads of Hu Jintao’s political report (政治报告).
The term appeared, for example, at the top of the fifth section of Zhao Ziyang’s political report to the 13th National Congress in 1987: “Concerning Political Reform.”

[Zhao Ziyang’s political report to the 13th National Congress in 1987 lays out the specific rules on election of party officials, such as the differential rate.]

In former President Jiang Zemin’s report to the 14th Congress in 1992, the second section, “Key Tasks for Reform and Building in the 1990s”, said “[we] must work hard to realize 10 key tasks” (必须努力实现十个方面关系全局的主要任务) – the sixth of these was: “vigorous promotion of political reform to make relatively major strides in the development of socialist democracy and rule of law” (积极推进政治体制改革，使社会主义民主和法制建设有一个较大的发展). The term graduated to one of the smaller section heads in Jiang’s report to the 15th Congress. Section six was called: “Political Reform and the Building of Democracy and Law” (政治体制改革和民主法制建设). Five years later, in Jiang’s third political report, the term moved up to the fifth section: “Political Building and Political Reform” (政治建设和政治体制改革). [Click here for a record in Chinese of past political reports].
It is not enough, of course, that the term appears in a political report. After all, there is a world of difference between Zhao Ziyang and Jiang Zemin on the question of political reform – as the graph above makes clear. There are minute jumps in use of the term “political reform” corresponding to the 15th and 16th congresses, but they are shallow and short-lived.
We can conjecture that in Hu Jintao’s report “political reform” will appear in a smaller section head just as it did for the 13th, 15th and 16th congresses. But the more important question is how exactly the term will be used. What terms will accompany it? What terms will keep it in check, like chaperones at each elbow? We have to look, in other words, at context.
As was the case with Jiang Zemin’s political reports, will Hu’s report pin down “political reform” with other phrases like “strengthening party governance” (加强党的领导), “stability before all else” (稳定压倒一切), or “opposing westernization and differentiation” (反对西化, 分化)?
How will Hu Jintao’s formulation of “political reform” differ from what we saw with other congresses since the 13th? And will the president introduce any real roadmaps or timelines, or take any real steps, toward political reform?
One key specific question is whether Hu Jintao’s political report will make a point of referring to the “Four Basic Principles”. That’s a question for another article.
(Qian Gang, September 21, 2007)
[Translated by David Bandurski]
Previous 17th Congress article: “What Will Hu Jintao Say in His Political Report?”
[BACKGROUND]
The idea political reform in China, or zhengzhi tizhi gaige (政治体制改革), emerged in the reflection, reassessment and settling of accounts that came with the end of the Cultural Revolution. In 1979 calls for political reform came both from within and outside the CCP. Inside the party, Mao Zedong’s feudal and fascist methods were criticized during the so-called “theory discussion sessions” (理论务虚会). Outside the party, the notion of the “fifth modernization”, democracy, emerged on a wall poster during the brief burst of outspokenness known as the “Democracy Wall” (a response to Deng Xiaoping’s Four Modernizations). A number of important reform journals (such as Chen Ziming’s The Spring of Peking) were posted on the “democracy wall” in Beijing’s Xidan District.
On August 18, 1980, Deng Xiaoping made a famous speech called “Reforms to the Governance System of the Party and the Government” (党和国家领导制度的改革) during a meeting of China’s Political Bureau (中共中央政治局扩大会议). Deng denounced over-concentration of power in China’s leadership as well as “patriarchal methods, life tenure in leading posts and privileges of various kinds” (家长制、终身制和形形色色的特权现象). He also attacked the evils of Stalinism.
As a number of important activists, including Chen Ziming (陈子明), Hu Ping (胡平) and Wang Juntao (王军涛), electioneered for People’s Congress posts in various districts in Beijing (a movement initiated by university students), these “candidates” intensified calls for political reform.
As the workers’ movement in Poland, led by Lech Walesa, challenged the leadership of the Communist Party there, however, Chinese leaders — notably Chen Yun (陈云) — said calls for democratic reforms in China needed to be stopped to prevent similar unrest at home. In 1980, Leftist official Hu Qiaomu (胡乔木) called on leaders to prevent dissemination of Deng Xiaoping’s speech on political reform (parts of the speech appeared in 1983, and again in 1987), which was seen as offering encouragement to reform proponents [More on Hu Qiaomu at “Letters from China“].

[Deng Xiaoping’s speech on political reform is published in the official People’s Daily in 1987.]

In 1983, a speech by Hu Yaobang raised political reforms as a key part of “comprehensive and systematic” reforms. But political reforms were never rolled out, and Hu Yaobang was subsequently purged in the Anti-Bourgeois Liberalization Campaign (反资产阶级自由化) of 1987.
On September 4, 1986, the official People’s Daily reported Deng Xiaoping’s meeting with the head of Japan’s Komei Party and their dialogue about how “not carrying out political reforms would impede productivity and development” (不搞政治体制改革，就会阻碍生产力的发展). For the year 1987, the term “political reform” appeared in 348 separate articles in People’s Daily, a historic high.
On July 1, 1987, Deng Xiaoping’s key speech on political reform delivered to party leaders in 1980 was printed in full in People’s Daily, and referred to as a “seminal political reform document” (政治体制改革的指导性文件). At Deng Xiaoping’s urging, political reform made it on the agenda, appearing prominently in Zhao Ziyang’s political report to the 13th National Congress.
The democracy movement of 1989, and the violent crackdown that followed, brought political reforms in China to a screeching halt.

There is naturally a lot of guesswork going on in the run up to the 17th Party Congress. But there is one thing we can say with certainty already — the most important document to come out of the 17th Party Congress will be Hu Jintao’s political report (政治报告).

[The front page of yesterday’s Southern Metropolis Daily reports the politburo’s announcement of pending changes to the Party Constitution, adding core Hu Jintao concepts.]

Reports to the Party Congress are always a vehicle for top leaders to set out their political principles. Promoted loudly by state-run media after Congresses, political reports are also a form of speech hegemony (话语霸权), dominating the political vocabulary. For this reason, they are libraries of important political keywords of the day, and a textual analysis of them can yield important clues about China’s direction.
So, what exactly will Hu Jintao’s political report say?
Hu’s speech back on June 25 this year was a kind of warm up for his political report, and in the glimpses we have of that speech through official party media we can see the president’s key terms gearing up.
While the full text of the June 25 speech was never made available, People’s Daily ran a series of eight editorials this summer laying out the spirit of the speech. Performing a textual analysis of the keywords in those eight editorials, we get the following totals (for the number of times particular keywords appear):
Socialism with Chinese Characteristics (中国特色社会主义) – 48
Scientific Development (科学发展) – 37
Firm and Unchanging/Unshakable (坚定不移) – 26
Relatively Comfortable Standard of Living (小康) –
Harmony (和谐) – 15
Liberation of Thought (解放思想) – 9
Early Stages (初级阶段) – 9
Deng Xiaoping Theory (邓小平理论) — 8
Three Represents (三个代表) – 8
Inner-Party Democracy (党内民主) – 4
One Core, Two Basic Points (一个中心　两个基本点) – 4
Political Reform (政治体制改革) – 1
The notion of the “Four Unshakables” (四个坚定不移) is Hu Jintao’s own addition to the pantheon of party terms. In the following portion of Hu’s June 25 speech, I have marked the “unshakables” with bolded numbers:

[1] Liberation of thought (解放思想) is the basic requirement and character of our party’s course and thinking, a talisman with which we can meet new situations and new problems on the road ahead. [We] must firmly and unshakably (坚定不移) support it [the principle of thought liberation]. [2] Economic reform and opening is a necessary condition for the liberation and advancement of the productivity of society, and of the constant renewal of systems and mechanisms invested with energy and vitality (改革开放，是解放和发展社会生产力、不断创新充满活力的体制机制的必然要求). [Economic reform and opening] is powerful force (强大动力) in the development of Socialism with Chinese characteristics (中国特色社会主义), and we must firmly and unshakably promote it (必须坚定不移地加以推进). [3] Scientific development (科学发展) and social harmony (社会和谐) are basic conditions for the advancement of Socialism with Chinese characteristics (是发展中国特色社会主义的基本要求), and they are intrinsically necessary to the achievement of rapid and healthy (又好又快) development of the economy and society (是实现经济社会又好又快发展的内在需要) – [we] must put them into effect firmly and unshakably (必须坚定不移地加以落实). [4] The comprehensive building of a relatively comfortable standard of living (全面建设小康社会) is a goal toward which our nation must struggle through to 2020, and which concerns the basic welfare of our people (是全国各族人民根本利益所在) – [we] must firmly and unshakably struggle for it (必须坚定不移地为之奋斗).

From this notion of “four unshakables” and the terms orbiting around it in Hu Jintao’s speech, we can see that his basic orientation is toward reform and development. Nothing here suggests a slowing down or reversal of reforms.
After 2004, leaders and intellectuals in China cranked up the volume of the debate over the direction of reforms, and those in the leftist camp crusaded against market reforms. Hu’s speech offers a counterpoint to this retrogressive trend in Chinese politics, and we should expect to see the same in his report to the 17th Congress.
But Hu’s reforms will definitely not be too ambitious or too rapid. This becomes clear from his emphasis in the June 25 speech on “Socialism with Chinese characteristics” (中国特色社会主义).
Why is this the case? First, we should understand that the idea of Socialism with Chinese characteristics arose in counterpoint to the idea of “democratic socialism” (民主社会主义). In 2006, a number of relatively open-minded scholars allied proposals for further research into the question of “democratic socialism” with calls for an acceleration of political reforms. In response, leftists held more than ten conferences to criticize these moves. The emphasis on “Chinese characteristics (中国特色) is essentially an emphasis on “China’s national characteristics” (中国国情), and it seeks to draw clear boundaries between China and Western systems of democracy or the social democracy of Europe.
However, the slogan “Socialism with Chinese characteristics” can also serve to prevent further inroads by the leftist camp. The emphasis on “Socialism with Chinese characteristics” essentially upholds the policy, a 1980s legacy of Deng Xiaoping, of not getting mired in controversy over the ideological underpinnings of China’s development — “not arguing over whether [China’s economy] is surnamed Socialism or surnamed Capitalism” (不争论姓社姓资). The preservation of “Socialism with Chinese characteristics” is, therefore, a nod in the direction of the left, a stopgap solution preventing an ideological clash. The hope is that economic reforms can proceed without controversy, with a clear line drawn between China’s present economic development and the legacy of Mao Zedong’s brand of socialism.
Hu Jintao’s use of such phrases as “liberation of thought” (解放思想) and “early stages” (初级阶段) is also a kind of “singing two different tunes with equal skill” (异曲同工), or yiqu tonggong, a political ventriloquism that allows Hu to push his agenda while placating his enemies. It should be noted that an important mark of the leadership of Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao is in fact a quiet slipping back toward the politics of Hu Yaobang and Zhao Ziyang (although not, mind you, a return).
In order to drum up support and strength to push ahead with inner-party reforms, Hu and Wen must pick up key concepts where the 11th and 13th congresses left off. “Liberation of thought” was a slogan used at the Third Plenary Session of the 11th Central Committee, held in December 1978, and during which Deng Xiaoping launched a series of reforms including the Four Modernizations.
The phrase “early stages” was a strategy employed by Zhao Ziyang in the 1980s, when leftists remained a powerful force. The idea that China was in “the early stages of socialism” could be used to counter attacks from the left, and at the same time cooled down demands for more urgent political reform. The phrase was enthusiastically supported by Deng Xiaoping, who remarked: “This is well designed” (这个设计好).
“Relatively comfortable standard of living” (小康), “scientific development” (科学发展) and “harmonious society” (和谐社会) will remain hot buzzwords in the 17th Congress report. The “moderately wealthy” society, or xiaokang shehui, is an important target for the Central Party leadership. The term xiaokang, first used by Deng Xiaoping in 1979 to describe China’s modernization, was elevated by Jiang Zemin in his report to the 16th Congress.
“Scientific development” and “harmonious society” are banners and slogans raised by Hu Jintao, Wen Jiabao and the current leadership group. One thing we should watch for at the 17th Congress is whether or not these terms are formally elevated as “innovative party theory” (党的创新理论) — or, per the recent statement from the politburo, “major strategic theory” (重大战略思想). Will they be written, as state media suggested earlier this week, into the Party Constitution? And which ones?

[Coverage on major Chinese Web portal QQ.com on September 18 reports that key Hu Jintao concepts will be written into the Party Constitution this year]

While the possibility of political reform in China is something we should watch for carefully, it is doubtful whether political reform, or “political system reform” (政治体制改革), will become an important part of the agenda at the 17th Congress. Looking at Hu Jintao’s June 25 speech, we can see that “political reform” has only a minute share of the buzz. Still, we should pay attention to whether or not a particular section of the report is reserved for political reform.
Two more terms will be key at the 17th Congress – “one core, two basic points” and “inner-party democracy”. Stay tuned for further discussion of these two concepts.
(Qian Gang, September 19, 2007)
[Translated by David Bandurski]
Previous 17th Congress article: “How do we make an assessment of Hu Jintao’s strength?”
[A BRIEF HISTORY OF PARTY CONGRESS REPORTS]
The Communist Party of China has held nine Congresses since it came to power in 1949. What were the core agendas of these Congresses?
At the 8th Congress in 1956, the theme was the “general direction for the transitional period” (过渡时期总路线). The basic idea was for the “party of revolution” to make the transformation into a constructive ruling party and accelerate economic development. Responding to socialist democratic movements in eastern Europe, the report sought to contain contagion’s spread by building a “sound political culture.” This included such measures as increasing inner-party democracy (党内民主), essentially about more shared decision-making within the party. The report to the 8th Congress was done by Liu Shaoqi (刘少奇). But less than two weeks after the closing of the Congress Mao Zedong declared that, “The report to the 8th Congress was a mistake” (“八大报告是错误的”). Mao later destroyed the spirit and direction of the 8th Congress report, launching a class struggle and dragging China into a series of calamities – the Anti-Rightist Movement, the Great Leap Forward, the Cultural Revolution.
The 9th and 10th Congresses were held amidst the turmoil of the Cultural Revolution. The principal theme for the 9th Congress was “persisting in the revolution” (继续革命), and the report offered theoretical support for the Cultural Revolution.
The 10th Congress was held after the death of Lin Biao, whom Mao had designated as his successor but who was later branded a traitor. The reigning buzzword of the congress was the “Three Basic Principles” (1. Mao Zedong Thought over revisionism; 2. unity over disunity; 3. straightforwardness over conspiracy). The congress essentially mustered a war against Lin Biao’s former supporters and continued the path of the Cultural Revolution.
Hua Guofeng was premier when the 11th Congress opened in 1977, right on the heels of the Cultural Revolution. The theme that year was “grasping the guiding principles, governing the nation” (抓纲治国). The former was about continuing China’s class struggle; the latter was about economic development. The “guiding principles,” or gang, were dropped in December 1979, and economic development (“governing the nation”) became the core policy, with an emphasis on “liberating thought” (解放思想). This was the beginning of the policy of opening and reform.
In Hu Yaobang’s report to the 12th Congress, the core concept was “reform” (改革), which appeared 18 times, but another buzzword, even hotter, was “spiritual civilization” (精神文明), appearing 36 times. The term “spiritual civilization” was again a nod to the leftist camp, an important counterbalancing concession to those who feared economic development would send China reeling toward materialism. The term’s strong presence in the report signaled the persisting influence of leftists within the party.
In Zhao Ziyang’s report to the 13th Congress the buzzword was “early stages” (初级阶段), which appeared 26 times (and which, again, we’ve seen resurface this year in Hu Jintao’s June 25, speech). Another hot buzzword was “political reform” (政治体制改革), which appeared 12 times.
Jiang Zemin issued three political reports in all, at the 14th, 15th and 16th congresses. The key terms in his reports were as follows:

14th Congress: “Socialism with Chinese Characteristics” (35 times)
15th Congress: “Deng Xiaoping Theory” (32 times)
16th Congress: “Three Represents’ (27 times)

Readers may recall that an essay by Yu Keping (俞可平), a key theorist in Hu Jintao’s circle, created waves back in late 2006. Yu’s essay, “Democracy is a Good Thing,” argued that democracy was indispensable if China wanted to build a strong and modern socialist society. Today, just weeks before the all-important 17th National Congress, Yu Keping spoke out once again in the pages of Beijing Daily, in an article praising Hu Jintao and linking the president’s notion of “liberation of thought” (解放思想) – a phrase first used at the 1978 congress, when Deng Xiaoping introduced the Four Modernizations – to such issues as “human rights” and “constitutionalism.”

[Screenshot of Yu Keping essay as it appeared on xinhuanet.com.cn today]

We have no way of knowing whether Yu’s article represents the reform hopes of China’s top leader (whether Yu, in other words, is airing out Hu’s ideas to gauge public and party response), or whether the theorist is out on his own limb. But the essay should, at any rate, be the subject of lively debate leading up to next month’s congress.
The following are (hasty) excerpts of Yu’s essay as it appeared on Xinhua News Agency’s website:

Since reform and opening, many new concepts like “constitutionalism” (法治), “human rights” (人权) and “people as the foundation” (以人为本) have entered the political and social spheres in our country and been a force pushing progress on democratic politics in China (中国民主政治).
Hu Jintao pointed out in his June 25 speech that “liberation of thought (解放思想) is the basic requirement and character of our party’s course and thinking, a talisman with which we can meet new situations and new problems on the road ahead.” We can say that liberation of thought and the renewal of ideology are a key impetus behind social and political progress. As Comrade Deng Xiaoping said, changes in ideas and concepts are the preconditions of reform work. He said: “If we do not break through rigidness of ideas, there is no hope for the Four Modernizations.” More than 20 years of reform in China have shown thoroughly that conceptual changes have an extremely close connection with social and political progress …
[Brief history of concept of “people as the foundation” in China since 1949]
Just as with “people as the foundation”, so too has the concept of human rights been spurned [in China] as bourgeois ideology and criticized politically. Criticism of the idea of human rights has brought, in the realm of experience, the neglect of citizens’ human rights, the most terrifying example being the ten-year trampling on human rights that was the Cultural Revolution. After the mid-1980s some theorists began talking about human rights and looking with greater interest at Marxism’s views on human rights as well as introducing Western ideas about human rights. But these efforts were seriously impeded by the forces of traditional theory, to the extent that some proponents of Marxist human rights theory were branded “bourgeois free intellectuals” (资产阶级自由化分子) … At the turn of the millennium, the concept of human rights began to enter the language of the party and government, and at the end of 2003 the Central Party formally wrote the phrase “protection of citizens’ human rights” into the national constitution, a move unanimously approved by people’s congress representatives in March 2004 …
China is a country with a more than 2,000-year history of autocratic rule, and one of the toughest lessons of the ten-year Cultural Revolution was the need to move from autocracy to constitutionalism. After opening and reform, the party and government began to emphasize a legal system (法制) and rule by law (依法治国) . . . After the 1980s, some theorists began promoting “rule of law” (法治/以法治国) … From the beginning the idea of rule of law was given a strong priority by party and government leaders. In the mid-1980’s some party leaders pointed out that as China’s only ruling party, the CCP must act within the framework of the law and that party organizations or and individual leaders did not have special rights allowing them to act above the law. In the 1990s, “rule of law” made its formal entry into party and government documents. The political report to the 15th National Congress was the first to clearly state the objective of “building a socialist country [operating under] rule of law” (建立社会主义法治国家). Before long, this objective was written into our country’s constitution, making the transition from a political goal of the CCP to a political goal of the nation.

For more on “liberation of thought” and Hu Jintao’s political report to the 17th Congress, stay tuned for the fourth article in Qian Gang’s “The Insight Track” series, which will appear Wednesday, September 19.
[Posted by David Bandurski, September 17, 2007, 4:20pm]

The last five years have marked the transition of power in China from Jiang Zemin to Hu Jintao. One obvious question for pundits now is whether or not Hu has stepped out of his predecessor’s shadow. Has Hu’s power grown or diminished? And what do we make of Jiang Zemin’s influence now? At CMP we answer questions like these by tracking the movement of important political keywords.
In China all top leaders have their own sets of slogans, including core keywords. These slogans define leaders, identify their agendas and bolster their legacies. For top Chinese leaders, the creation of buzzwords is an act of crucial political brand-building. Here are three of China’s biggest leadership brands:

Deng Xiaoping: Deng Xiaoping Theory
Jiang Zemin: The Three Represents
Hu Jintao: Harmonious Society

By analyzing core keywords and how they play out in the Chinese media over time we get a fairly reliable indication of the relative strength of political brands – and this can tell us how leaders and/or their legacies are fairing.
Searching core leadership keywords in the WiseNews Chinese language database, which includes more than 300 Chinese newspapers, we come up with the following results (for the number of articles using a particular keyword over time):

[Please CLICK on graph for a clearer image]

Deng Xiaoping Theory and the Three Represents are both relatively strong terms in the Chinese media. But right now Hu Jintao’s “Harmonious Society” has surpassed them both.
Another of Hu Jintao’s core keywords is “scientific view of development.” Under Hu’s leadership, the Central Party now operates with a slogan combining both buzzwords: “Developing in a scientific manner, building harmony together” (科学发展，共建和谐). Hu Jintao and his circle have branded this formulation as an “innovation of party theory” (党的创新理论).
During the 16th National Congress in 2002 Jiang Zemin’s core keyword, “Three Represents,” was written into the Party Constitution. A key question as we approach the 17th Congress is whether or not any of Hu’s signature phrases – “innovative party theory,” “scientific development view” or “harmonious society” – will make it into the Party Constitution.
In March this year, an article by scholar Dong Degang (董德刚) in the official journal Scientific Socialism (科学社会主义) offered a glimpse of the debate over political legacies and amendment of the Party Consitution. Dong’s article said a number of cadres, “including high-level officials and old comrades”, were wary of attempts to modify the party’s constitution at each CCP session, and urged a cautious approach to adding President Hu’s theories to the document. [Click HERE for CMP coverage]. [Click HERE for Chinese coverage]. “We need to be careful,” wrote Dong, “about building [theoretical] systems too quickly and too excessively” (要警惕过急、过高、过分追求体系化的倾向).
Dong’s views, so openly expressed, make it clear that while Hu Jintao has power over major issues in China, he is by no means a paramount leader who can accomplish his objectives with a wave of his wand. As China transitions further toward a post-totalitarian society (后极权社会), we can expect to see the power of its top leaders continue to weaken.
(Qian Gang, September 17, 2007)
[Translated by David Bandurski]

Whenever party congresses roll around, pundits focus on the background of key officials and their connections to power centers inside the CCP. Potential picks to enter the succession group are often dissected in terms of the “Youth League faction” and the “princelings” — what we call in Chinese the tuanpai (团派) and the taizidang (太子党).
On the surface, it seems to make sense to label Chinese leaders along these lines.
For example, a good number of provincial and ministerial-level leaders have had prior positions with the Communist Youth League at either the central or provincial level. These include: Li Keqiang (李克强), Liu Yandong (刘延东), Li Yuanchao (李源潮), Ling Jihuai (令计划), Zhang Baoshun (张宝顺), Liu Qibao (刘奇葆), Qian Yunlu (钱运录), Zhou Qiang (周强), Huang Huahua (黄华华), Qiang Wei (强卫), Yu Youjun (于幼军), and Meng Xuenong (孟学农).
Pundits have referred to the above-listed leaders as the “Youth League faction.”
Other leaders, from top CCP families — including Zeng Qinghong (曾庆红), Yu Zhengsheng (俞正声), Bo Xilai (薄熙来), Wang Qishan (王岐山), Xi Jinping (习近平), and Bai Keming (白克明) — have sometimes been lumped together as “princelings.”
Among the names I have listed, some are sure to enter the succession teams during either the 17th or the 18th Party Congresses. So it’s no surprise journalists and commentators are rushing to guess how these “princelings” or supposed “Youth League faction” members figure in the big picture.
But compartmentalizing China’s leaders can be misleading. Using this simple framework to look at politics in China will yield warped results.
The term “Youth League faction” was already in use by the 1980s. Hu Yaobang, who had served as first secretary of the Chinese Communist Youth League, elevated Hu Qili (胡启立), Xiang Nan (项南) and other youth league members to key positions, giving rise to the term. But a closer look at politics in China at that time suggests this “faction” did not really exist.
Take, for example, former politburo standing committee member Li Ruihuan (李瑞环). While Li once held an important position with the youth league, it would have been wrong to associate him with the so-called “Youth League group.” Then there is Wang Zhaoguo (王兆国), who served formerly as first secretary of the youth league. No one associates Wang with the “Youth League faction.”
Even though he grew up within the Communist Youth League, Shanghai Mayor Han Zheng (韩正) is generally regarded as a member of the “Shanghai faction.”
Is Liu Yandong youth league, or is she a “princeling.” She has a deep history with the youth league. But she is also the daughter of Liu Ruilong (刘瑞龙), a high-ranking People’s Liberation Army general.
Then there is Wang Yang (汪洋), party secretary of Chongqing. Wang is an up and coming young official associated with neither the “Youth League faction” nor the “princelings.”
Summing up, speculation concerning backgrounds and factions is a worthy exercise, but it is not by any means a reliable ruler with which to measure China’s complicated political scene.
(Qian Gang, September 14, 2007)
[Translated by David Bandurski]
[ABOUT THE COMMUNIST YOUTH LEAGUE]
The Chinese Communist Youth League (中国共产主义青年团) — in short, gong qing tuan (共青团) — is generally recognized as an organization separate from the CCP and playing a supporting role (后备力量) [Click HERE for more information on the organization in Chinese].
The organizational structure of the youth league mirrors that of the CCP in consisting of a central committee (中央委员会), central secretariat (中央书记处), central propaganda department (中央宣传部) and central organizing department (中央组织部). The league’s International Liaison Department (国际联络部) handles its international initiatives.
While the Communist Youth League is firmly controlled by the CCP, the organization has been fairly active in its own respect since the PRC’s founding. In the 1950s, the league’s newspaper, China Youth Daily, was home to a number of more free thinking journalists, including Liu Binyan (who was later branded a Rightist).
As economic reforms took root in the 1980s, the youth league mustered together yet another group of more open thinkers, and China Youth Daily became an important staging ground in the reform effort.
Following the violent crackdown on June 4, 1989,China Youth Daily was brought to heel. But the paper’s independent streak re-emerged in 1995 with the launch of the Freezing Point (冰点) supplement. The purge of top editors at Freezing Point in 2006 was an attempt by the Central Propaganda Department and top officials in the Communist Youth League to keep the supplement’s influence in check.
The Communist Youth League is also an important testing ground for officials. Former Chinese foreign minister Wu Xueqian (吴学谦) served earlier on as head of the league’s International Liaison Department. Liu Binjie (柳斌杰), current director of the General Administration of Press and Publications (GAPP), served formerly as head of the youth league’s central propaganda department. Liu Peng (刘鹏), current executive chairman of the Beijing Olympic Committee, served earlier on as head of the league’s secretariat.
[ADDITIONAL ENGLISH LINKS]
A Bolder Hu Tests Power at China Communist Congress, Reuters, September 5, 2007
Hatchet man to henchman, China’s Zeng bends to times, Reuters, September 5, 2007
CMP Tip Sheet
Here are some questions to ask:
1. Has there been any change in power for the Communist Youth League network (Liu Yandong, Li Yuanchao, etc.)?
2. Has there been any change in power for the so-called “princelings”? (Yu Zhengsheng, Bo Xilai, Wang Qishan, Xi Jinping, etc.)?
3. What is the current standing of the original Jiang Zemin system (Zeng Qinghong, Zhang Dejiang)?

There has been a great deal of speculation in media outside China lately that Li Keqiang (李克强), who is currently serving as party secretary in the northern province of Liaoning, will be pegged as Hu Jintao’s successor, or “crown prince” at the upcoming 17th National Congress. Without a doubt, Li Keqiang is one of the key figures to watch over the next few weeks. But as a note of caution, it would be careless to focus one’s attention entirely on Li. First, a bit of background. [Photo of Li Keqiang, from China.org.cn]

[Li Keqiang is featured on the front page of Henan’s Dahe Daily after taking a tour of the site of a mining disaster]

The so-called “crown prince”, or top leader, was simply referred to as the successor, or jiebanren, during the Mao Zedong era. After the Chinese Communist Party came to power in 1949, Mao Zedong was both chairman of the party and the country’s top leader. Ten years later, in 1959, Mao relinquished his title as chairman of the People Republic and was succeeded by Liu Shaoqi (刘少奇). Liu Shaoqi’s vice-chairmanship was generally understood to be his successor.
The onset of the Cultural Revolution in 1966 brought the ouster of Liu Shaoqi. Lin Biao (林彪) became Mao’s designated successor, an arrangement formalized with an amendment to the Party Constitution.
When Wang Hongwen became vice-chairman at the 10th National Congress in 1973, it seemed certain he would become the successor, but Mao instead entrusted matters on the front line to Deng Xiaoping . Deng Xiaoping was later ousted amidst opposition from the Gang of Four, so that Hua Guofeng emerged for a time as Mao’s anointed successor.
After the onset of economic reforms, championed by Deng Xiaoping who had outmaneuvered and ousted Hua Guofeng by 1981, Hu Yaobang (胡耀邦) and Zhao Ziyang (赵紫阳) served in succession as China’s top leaders. But Deng Xiaoping remained in control. Hu Yaobang and Zhao Ziyang were still mere “successors,” and jiebanren. Eventually, both Hu Yaobang and Zhao Ziyang were forced to resign (January 1987 and June 1989 respectively), and Jiang Zemin became Deng Xiaoping’s successor.
What lessons does this messy process have for next month’s congress?
People now believe Hu Jintao has selected Li Keqiang as his successor, that Li will be elevated to the inner circle, serving as a member of the politburo standing committee and as vice-chairman of the PRC. He will have the important task of handling appointments within the party, and will perhaps serve concurrently as head of the Central Party School.
With all the speculation flying in his favor, would we really be ill-advised to place our bets on Li Keqiang? Yes. For the simple reason that Hu Jintao is not Deng Xiaoping.
Deng Xiaoping was a formidable leader with a virtually unassailable position — a qiang ren, as we say in Chinese). Hu Jintao is, by contrast, is a chang ren, an “ordinary leader”. In China, the politics of the powerful, or qiang ren zhengzhi (强人政治), have already given way to the politics of ordinary players, chang ren zhengzhi (常人政治). Top leaders in China today do not have sufficient power to designate their own successors. In the next generation of top leaders, the force of the individual politician will further weaken, and in its place will come more collective leadership.
Given this changing political climate, we must look more broadly at whole “succession groups.”, rather than focus narrowly on possible “successors,”  We must look, for example, at the possible configuration of the entire inner circle for the 18th National Congress five years down the road. Li Keqiang will of course be one of these leaders, so it is important to watch him closely.
(Qian Gang, September 12, 2007)
[Translated by David Bandurski]
[ADDITIONAL ENGLISH LINKS]
Hong Kong’s Ming Pao reports on Li Keqiang and succession teams, September 19, 2007
Li Keqiang in Who’s Who in China’s Leadership, China.org.cn
Li Keqiang bio at ChinaVitae
The Next Hu?, Newsweek International, December 25, 2006
“Tiananmen, 15 Years On: Where Are Some of the Most Wanted Participants Today?“, Human Rights Watch, 2004
The Party Congress Peg, China Digital Times, July 20, 2007Li Keqiang elected Party chief of NE China’s Liaoning Province, People’s Daily Online, October 27, 2006
“Beijing prepares for battle“, Newsweek‘s The Bulletin, October 3, 2006
CMP Tip Sheet
Some things to take particular note of regarding Li Keqiang:
*The assessment made of Li Keqiang by his former Peking University classmate Wang Juntao , a political activist. [Link to Wang quote here].
*As an interesting detail, many within China’s media have a favorable impression of Li Keqiang. One veteran journalist at China Youth Daily recalls that Li was pretty familiar with journalists at the paper, and when the reporter in question attended a meeting in Henan Province, then-governor Li Keqiang went right up to him and greeted him warmly.

Beginning Wednesday, September 12, the China Media Project will run a series of articles by CMP director and former Southern Weekend managing editor Qian Gang. The series, “The Insight Track: 17th Party Congress”, will reflect on a range of issues key to coverage of the upcoming congress, from power cliques and key political personalities to valuable sources and analysis of party reports past. Stay tuned!

Sure, there are four months left on the calendar. But it’s probably not premature to declare 2007 the “Year of the Fakes” in China – not least in Chinese journalism. The year kicked off with the tragic beating death of “fake journalist” (假记者) Lan Chengzhang. Unflagging cases of “fake news” culminated in June with the infamous cardboard bun hoax. Most recently, a regional Chinese newspaper was awarded a top photojournalism prize for a feature page that never was. And behind all of this looms a control system geared toward public opinion “guidance” that is itself a most insidious form of state-sponsored fakery.
It’s only appropriate, then, that the editors at popular web portal QQ.com should apply their skills this week to a special section devoted to fake journalists, gathering together all major related news in the last two years.

As CMP noted with QQ’s recent Jinan flood page, the layout is innovative, incorporating a variety of news reports (about news extortion cases, the nature of press cards, etc.), photos and online forums.
The most recent story, run across the top of the feature page, is about the arrest of nine “fake reporters” in Shanxi Province on August 28, which followed a separate sting on August 4 bringing in 19 “fake reporters.”
Another major story featured on the page is the corruption case of Meng Huaihu (孟怀虎), former Zhejiang bureau chief for China Commercial Times. A sidebar shows an image of Meng’s extravagant home in Zhejiang.
Once again, though, it is the opportunity for reader participation that makes the page most interesting. Web users, for example, can participate in QQ’s online survey by ticking their preferred answers to questions like the following:

[Why do you think there is an inundation of fake reporters?]
*Because real reporters have special privileges
*Because mine owners and government offices have shortcomings and bend easily
*The root of the problem is the fact that the media are half official and half commercial
*Because management is too lax, and some journalists have poor morals

CMP would have ticked the third box, and gives kudos to QQ for opening, even if just a crack, the door to the root cause of bad journalism in China.
And of course web users could click the “participate in the discussion” link from any portion of the feature page, joining in on the comments forum. The limited sample of comments, or gentie, available (close to 300 by Tuesday morning) suggests a profession facing a crisis of public confidence. Here are just a few:

It’s already become impossible to apply ordinary logic to this society of ours. If a small-time thief steals a few thousand yuan from a corrupt official he’s beaten within and inch of his life, but you tell me, who is the real crook here? Basically, the whole society is rotten already, so what good is it talking about those little problems on the branches and leaves?
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There’s no such thing as true news here in China. There are many things the state controls and doesn’t let the people know about, so press cards are issued by the state. If they were given out to the public, the state is afraid people will say whatever they want. So if you watch the news in China, you’d better approach it as entertainment.
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How much of the news right now is real? Real journalists, fake journalists, they’re all tarred with the same brush!
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Say it, can you possibly ferret out how much money these newspaper groups make behind the scenes!!!!!! Journalists get money when they report good stuff, and its only when they don’t get payoffs that they report bad stuff … There aren’t many journalists with a good conscience!!!!!! It’s a problem with the system (是体制问题啊)!!!!!!
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The journalists working for this website [QQ] are pretty good! I feel like aside from stuff on the web that’s worth looking at, there’s really not much else.
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Right now journalists are the blackest of the black.
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We should recognize that most journalists are of good quality and good conscience, and it’s only the bad behavior of a few that’s damaged the image of everyone. It’s terrible!
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Why are officials afraid of journalists? Why are corporate bosses afraid of journalists? Because they’re afraid their crimes will be exposed!

[Posted by David Bandurski, September 4, 2007, 1:17pm]