Author: David Bandurski

Now Executive Director of the China Media Project, leading the project’s research and partnerships, David originally joined the project in Hong Kong in 2004. He is the author of Dragons in Diamond Village (Penguin), a book of reportage about urbanization and social activism in China, and co-editor of Investigative Journalism in China (HKU Press).

September 24 — September 30, 2007

September 26 — As protests erupted into violence in Burma, Chinese media were restricted largely to Xinhua News Agency reports touting the official line of China’s Foreign Ministry. “China always sticks to a policy of non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries,” China Daily quoted a foreign ministry spokesperson as saying. [More coverage at BBC.com].
September 27 — The chairman of China’s Sun Media, Bruno Zheng Wu (吴征), told an audience in London that he was unhappy with the degree of media freedom allowed in China, the Daily Telegraph reported. Wu also encouraged China to adopt international 3G (third generation) mobile phone standards ahead of next year’s Olympic Games. Wu’s wife, Yang Lan, is a popular Chinese television host. Together, Wu and Yang have created one of China’s largest media businesses. [The Independent profile on Bruno WU and Yang Lan][Danwei.org responds to the Independent profile].
September 28 — Following a seminar hosted by China’s official People’s Daily, China agreed to step up cooperation on the media front with Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) member states through a so-called “China-Asean Media Cooperation Liaison Network,” Malaysia General News reported. Media organizations from ASEAN and China agreed at the seminar to allow further sharing of news items on condition that credit was given for content and images. Participating organizations also agreed to cooperate in their coverage of the 2008 Beijing Olympics.

September 17 — September 23, 2007

September 17 — Yu Keping, a key theorist in Hu Jintao’s circle, praised Hu in the pages of Beijing Daily, linking the president’s notion of “liberation of thought” – a phrase first used at the 1978 congress, when Deng Xiaoping introduced the Four Modernizations – to such issues as “human rights” and “constitutionalism.” Another Yu essay, “Democracy is a Good Thing”, created waves back in late 2006 by arguing that democracy was indispensable if China wanted to build a strong and modern socialist society. [More from CMP]
September 18 — Following its move to shut down “First Heartthrob”, a talent competition show on Chongqing TV, China’s State Administration of Radio Film and Television announced its was putting a stop to “Red Question Mark”, a program based on re-enactments of crimes committed by women. [More from Danwei.org]

Journalist Yang Jisheng reflects on China's reform in CMP lecture

By Xie Yuan — Speaking to a packed house at Hong Kong University on Monday, veteran journalist Yang Jisheng said China’s leadership would have to make a clean reckoning of the 1989 crackdown on pro-democracy demonstrators and pursue “democratic politics” before China could enter the “post-Deng Xiaoping era.”
But Yang stressed democratic change in China would be a gradual process.
“We have seen so many casualties from radical revolutions in our history, and we need to look for moderate, not radical political improvements,” said Yang.

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Yang Jisheng’s talk, “China’s Reform: Reflections and Looking Forward”, was hosted by the China Media Project of the Journalism & Media Studies Centre, where Yang is currently a visiting fellow.
A retired senior reporter for China’s official Xinhua News Agency, Yang was one of just a few journalists to interview Zhao Ziyang while the ousted reformist premier was under house arrest.
Yang Jisheng is also the deputy editor of Chronicles of History (炎黄春秋), a journal that drew attention earlier this year for an essay by Marxist theorist Xie Tao calling for deeper political reforms.
The post-Deng era, said Yang, has been marked since the mid-1990s by a combination of authoritarian politics (权威政治) and market economics. As economic growth has surged and political reforms lagged, a number of problems have worsened. These include abuse of official power for business ends, a growing gap between rich and poor, and a host of other social problems such as the lack of affordable housing, education and medical care.
To solve these and other problems, future reforms in China would have to focus on separating power from the market economy, a task only democratic politics could achieve, said Yang.
“Democratic politics is the only way to have strict checks and balances on power,” he said.
Yang said democratic politics were also necessitated by changes in the nature of power in China. Leadership of charismatic men of the past, or qiangren zhengzhi (强人政治), has given way to leadership by ordinary persons, or changren zhengzhi (常人政治), he said.
Political leftists in China have advocated a return to Stalinist policies to resolve growing social problems, and Yang said he expected leftists to propose a slowdown of economic reforms at the upcoming 17th National Congress. But Yang said such a turn back was unlikely to garner support.
Yang is author of three books, including The Deng Xiaoping Era, Analysis of Chinese Social Strata and the recent Political Struggles in China’s Reform Era.
[Posted by Xie Yuan, October 9, 2007, 1:30pm]

17th National Congress: Who should you interview?

Top party leaders will of course be at the top of your interview wish list this month. But no one, least of all officials in the upper echelons, will agree to an interview ahead of this key political session. It’s possible Hu Jintao will choose to visit with some particular foreign news icon, as Deng Xiaoping did with Oriana Fallaci and Jiang Zemin with Mike Wallace.
But most foreign journalists will have to settle for Chinese academics, political experts and historians. Here are a few at the top of our list:
Wang Guixiu (王贵秀) – A professor at the Central Party School, Wang is the most important scholar of political reform in China. Wang has criticized China’s lagging political reform efforts. [Wang on separation of party and government].
[CLICK HERE FOR PHOTO]
Xie Tao (谢韜) – Xie is former vice-president of Renmin University of China and a leading Marxist theorist. At the beginning of this year, an important journal, Chronicles of History (炎黄春秋), published Xie’s essay, “Only Democratic Socialism Can Save China” (只有民主社会主义可以救中国). The essay sparked debate in China’s intellectual circles over political reform.
[CLICK HERE FOR PHOTO]
Gao Fang (高放) – A professor at Renmin University of China, Gao is China’s leading historian of the Communist movement. He was a major proponent of inner-party democracy (党内民主) during the political reform movement of the 1980s.
[CLICK HERE FOR PHOTO]
Dong Degang (董德刚) – Dong is vice-director of the philosophy research division (哲学教研部) of China’s Central Party School. Earlier Dong Degang (董德刚) – Dong is vice-director of the philosophy research division (哲学教研部) of China’s Central Party School. An article by scholar Dong Degang (董德刚) in the March issue of the official magazine Scientific Socialism (科学社会主义) suggested a number of cadres, “including high-level officials and old comrades”, were wary of attempts to modify the party’s constitution at each CCP plenary session, and urged a cautious approach to adding President Hu’s theory of “scientific development” (科学发展观) to the Party Constitution. [More coverage from CMP].
[CLICK HERE FOR PHOTO]
Wang Changjiang (王长江) – Director of the Party Building Division (党建部) of the Central Party School, Wang wrote an essay in May this year called, “Answering a Few Misgivings About Issues Concerning Democracy” (辨析关于民主问题的几个疑虑). The article, published in Beijing Daily, argued that democratization could happen even under a one-party system.
[CLICK HERE FOR PHOTO]
Zhou Tianyong (周天勇) – Vice-Director of the Research Office of the Central Party School, Zhou is also one of several authors of the Party School’s “Political Reform Research Report” (政治体制改革研究报告), which has been published in book form as Political Reform in China.
[CLICK HERE FOR PHOTO]
Yu Keping (俞可平) – A political scientist who currently serves as deputy director of China’s Central Compilation and Translation Bureau, Yu drew attention this year with an essay called, “Democracy is a Good Thing.” Many regard Yu Keping as a key thinker in the Hu-Wen administration.
[CLICK HERE FOR PHOTO]
Wu Jiaxiang (吴稼祥) – Now a freelance writer, Wu worked in the General Office of the CPC Central Committee in the 1980s and was regarded a key thinker behind then-Premier Zhao Ziyang. Wu was jailed following the crackdown on democracy demonstrators in June 1989. He later spent time as a fellow at Harvard University. Wu’s books include Wrestling for Power: The 16th CPC Congress (角力十六大) and Diary from Zhongnanhai: The Fall of Two Generational Heirs (中南海日记:中共两代王储的陨落).
[CLICK HERE FOR PHOTO]
Wu Guoguang (吴国光) – Now a member of the history faculty at Canada’s University of Victoria, Wu was closely involved in policy-making on political reform under Zhao Ziyang in the 1980s. He is the author of Zhao Ziyang and Political Reform (赵紫阳与政治改革).
[CLICK HERE FOR PHOTO]
Luo Shugang (雒树刚) – Formerly deputy director of China’s Central Propaganda Department and head of the official Xinhua News Agency, Luo is a key researcher in the area of political reform. In the 1980s he published two books on political reform: Political Reform Made Simple (政治体制改革通俗讲话) and Monitoring Within the Party (党内监督).
[CLICK HERE FOR PHOTO]
(Qian Gang, October 9, 2007)
[Translated by David Bandurski]
Previous 17th Congress article: “To what extent will delegates to the party congress have a say in party affairs?

To what extent will delegates to the party congress have a say in party affairs?

One interesting bit of news we should look for at the 17th Congress this year is the possibility the party congress might, for the first time in its history, put a system of proposals (提案制度) into practice. If this does happen, it will raise a key question – can Communist Party delegates (党代表) actually serve as representatives and have their say in debates over party matters?
Procedures for making proposals (提案) and motions (提议) are in place for the National People’s Congress (NPC) and Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) – known as the “two meetings” – but such an arrangement has never existed for national meetings of the Party.
The speeches by leaders reported in the media are generally “discussions” of the political report issued by the top leader, or about amendments to the Party Constitution — and these are notes of support rather than dissent. We do not see real discussion, debate or criticism on party matters. Delegates are there instead to offer up eulogies and make impassioned speeches of solidarity. It is essentially correct to call the national congress a rubberstamping body.
But over the last five years there have been signs of change. On September 19, 2004, the Central Party passed its “Decision on Strengthening the Party’s Governance Capability” (关于加强党的执政能力建设的决定). That document talked about “building a proposal system for the national party congress”. Such systems have already been put into place for some party congresses at the county and city levels. They have not yet been rolled out for provincial or municipal-level congresses, but a so-called “working opinions handling” (工作建议办理) system for delegates set up for the recent party congress in Zhejiang province comes very close.
After the Central Party announced the 17th Congress would be held on October 15 this year, the official People’s Daily Online ran a Weblog from a party member that posed three crucial questions:

1. Have you written your proposals yet?
2. Have you properly prepared yourself to face the media?
3. Have you set up your Weblog yet?

If a proposals system is put into effect for the 17th Congress, we’ll need to pay special attention to a number of questions. What proposals will the delegates make? Even if they don’t make formal proposals, what will they say at the congress?

* Can they talk about the corruption case against Chen Liangyu?
* Can they talk about the substantial number of corruption cases against provincial and ministerial-level officials this year?
* Can they talk about a system of permanent tenure (党代表常任制), in which delegates to the party congress participate in party affairs on a more regular basis?
* Can they talk about HIV-Aids, coal-mining disasters, food safety and other pressing issues?
* Can they talk about watchdog journalism and media reform?
* Can they talk about the party’s history, about the question of how to assess such figures as Hu Yaobang and Zhao Ziyang?
* Can all of these things be discussed openly? Semi-openly?

(Qian Gang, October 8, 2007)
[Translated by David Bandurski]
Previous 17th Congress article: “Will a “regular serving system” for delegates be discussed at the 17th National Congress?

Will a “regular serving system” for delegates be discussed at the 17th National Congress?

In my last article I talked about “differential voting” (差额选举) in the selection of delegates to the 17th National Congress. One of my basic points was that we can look at the increase in the “differential rate” (差额) – a higher ratio of candidates to positions available – as a measure of progress on political reform (in this case, “inner-party democracy”). But of course having more candidates than positions doesn’t mean delegates to this key meeting are more active participants in party decision making.
One important reason delegates to the National Congress have very little actual decision-making power is that their participation is a once-off deal. This month 2,217 party delegates will gather in Beijing. Once the meeting is finished, so are their responsibilities as delegates. They’re off the hook for the next five years, and the party’s Central Committee takes the reins.
But there has been some discussion in China since the 16th National Congress in 2002 about whether a “regular serving system” (常任制), or chang ren zhi, should be implemented for the party congress. This would mean delegates meet to discuss party policy and cast their votes. Such a system is already in place for the National People’s Congess (NPC) and the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC).
Jiang Zemin in fact raised the issue of a regular serving system in his 2002 political report. “[We must] expand our trials for a regular serving system for national party congress delegates at the county and city levels,” Jiang’s report said. “[We must] actively seek the forms and channels by which party congress delegates can play a representative role (发挥代表作用) between the closing of congresses.”
So what would a regular serving system mean? Basically that:

*Party delegates remain in their positions for the full five years between congresses
*The party congress (and not just the Central Committee) is the highest authority
*The Central Committee (党委会) makes annual reports to the congress that are deliberated by delegates
*Delegates to the party congress can make inspections of party affairs (视察党务工作), seek input from the population, and offer proposals during the annual congress just as their counterparts in the NPC and CPPCC are able to do.

This would mark a real step forward in the process of inner-party democracy, and some believe it is also the best way to tackle the difficult problem of democratization in China.
Trials have been made since the 16th National Congress in 2002. In some areas of China there have been standing party delegates at the township, county and other levels. According to mainland media reports more than 100 counties and cities have participated in trials. Examples can be found at the following links:

[“Thoughts and Experiences on a Regular Serving System for Party Delegates“, September 2004]
[A series of reports from 2003 to 2006 on regular serving systems]

Better known among reform efforts are the “Luotian Experiment” (罗田经验) in Hubei, and the “Huizhou Experiment” in Guangdong. Sichuan has been the most active among provinces in carrying out trials for a party delegate standing system.
Trials have not yet been made for provincial party congresses or for municipalities (Shanghai, Chongqing) or provincial capital cities. So if there is an announcement at the 17th congress that a regular serving system will go into effect for central party delegates that would be major news. This may not happen. But one distinct possibility is that local trials of regular serving systems are formally affirmed at the upcoming party congress and a goal set for future implementation at the central level.
(Qian Gang, October 5, 2007)
[Translated by David Bandurski]
Previous 17th Congress article: “How will voting be handled at the 17th National Congress?

Yang Jisheng

October 2007 — Formerly a top reporter for China’s official Xinhua News Agency and deputy editor of the influential journal Chronicles of History (Yanhuang Chunqiu), Yang Jisheng is one of China’s most experienced journalists. In his 2004 book, “Political Struggle in Reform China”, Yang released his personal reporting notes spanning more than a decade, including the content of three discussions he had with Zhao Ziyang while the ousted premier was under house arrest.

CMP Lecture by Yang Jisheng, October 8: "China’s Reform: Looking Forward, Reflecting Back"

Formerly a top reporter for China’s official Xinhua News Agency and deputy editor of the influential journal Chronicles of History (Yanhuang Chunqiu), Yang Jisheng is one of China’s most experienced journalists. In his 2004 book, “Political Struggle in Reform China”, Yang released his personal reporting notes spanning more than a decade, including the content of three discussions he had with Zhao Ziyang while the ousted premier was under house arrest.
SPEAKER: Yang Jisheng (杨继绳 )
Lecture will be in Mandarin
DATE: Monday, Oct 8, 2007
TIME: 19:00-21:00
VENUE: T4, Meng Wah Complex, The University of Hong Kong (NOTE: This is a change from the previous venue: Foundation Chamber, Eliot Hall, The University of Hong Kong
For enquiries call: (852) 2219-4014

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How will voting be handled at the 17th National Congress?

I would expect the reader’s response to the above headline to be something like: “Voting? In China? What is there to talk about?” Point taken. But even if we’re not seeing popular democratic elections, it’s worth noting that Chinese media have been talking about “election” (选举), or xuanju, in the selection of delegates to the 17th National Congress. And this topic is critical as we tackle the issue of political reform in China. So what are we looking for exactly?
The measure Chinese media are talking about is the ratio (the “differential rate” (差额) or cha’e) between delegates nominated by party standing committees at various levels to the total number of National Congress seats available. The term used in Chinese is “differential voting” (差额选举), or cha’e xuanju.

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[The Beijing Times reports in November 2006 on the increase in the differential rate for the 17th National Congress.]

For appointment of delegates to the upcoming 17th National Congress, there was reportedly a five percentage point rise in the differential rate, 15 percent as opposed to 10 percent, from the 16th National Congress back in 2002. That means, basically, that for every 100 seats available for this year’s congress, an additional 15 nominees were chosen (by party committees at various levels) and eventually pared down by party members (any who chose to vote) at those levels.
On August 2 this year, a list of all 2,217 delegates to the 17th National Congress was made public through newspapers across the country [See image below], a historic first for China. Given what we know, the People’s Daily list represents the results after 15 percent of nominees were removed in the differential rate process (被”差”掉). They were pared down, in other words, from an initial pool of around 2,550 nominees.

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[The list of delegates to the 17th National Congress is made public in the official People’s Daily on August 2, 2007.]

The issue of “differential election” is still a very sensitive one in China. When Guangdong’s Southern Weekend ran an article on August 9 detailing the process of delegate “election” for the upcoming party congress, Central Propaganda Department Vice-director Li Dongsheng (李东生) was reportedly furious. The paper was formally criticized, and Li said: “Is this really something you think you can look into?!”
How significant is the recent increase in the differential rate? At this point, it is more symbolic than anything else. Consider that with 30 provinces and autonomous regions in China, there are just over 300 differential candidates, or an average of around 11 per province. That means that in the vast majority of voting districts (county or city, etc.) there are no additional candidates. While party members are theoretically tasked with “electing” their delegates, there are in most cases no real decisions to be made.
But that doesn’t mean the differential rate is worthless as a measure of political change in China. It should be noted that the differential rate for the 13th National Congress, during which Zhao Ziyang gave his political report, was 20 percent.
As the 17th Congress opens, the following questions are worth asking:

*Is a primary election held for members of the Central Party Committee and the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection?
*If there is a primary election, will the number of candidates exceed the number of posts (是否实行差额预选)? What is the differential rate? Is the list of candidates made public?
*In the formal selection process will differential elections be held? What is the differential rate? Is the list of candidates made public? Will media have access to the names of those candidates not chosen for posts?
*How will the election results be publicized? With a list of names and votes cast? Or simply names?
*How will members of the Political Bureau and the Central Secretariat be selected? Will there be a primary election? If so, will it be open?
*Will differential elections be held for members of the Political Bureau and the Central Secretariat?
*Will any language about differential election appear in Hu Jintao’s political report, or in amendments to the party constitution?

(Qian Gang, October 3, 2007)
[Translated by David Bandurski]
Previous 17th Congress article: “How will Hu Jintao promote “inner-party democracy” at the 17th National Congress?

How will Hu Jintao promote “inner-party democracy” at the 17th National Congress?

Pundits generally agree that this month’s 17th National Congress is unlikely to bring major change on the political reform front. But many also predict there will be small steps forward, and that these are likely to come in the area of “inner-party democracy” (党内民主). I agree with this assessment, and I think we should pay close attention to how Hu Jintao deals with inner-party democracy.
We’ve already seen a sharp rise in use of the term “inner-party democracy” in official party media, most notably People’s Daily, since the 16th congress:

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[GRAPH: Number of articles in China’s official People’s Daily using the term “inner-party democracy” from 1949-2006.]

“Inner-party democracy” appeared in 103 People’s Daily articles in 2006. While that might not seem like a lot, it marks a new historical high point for the term and shows it is getting greater priority.
So what is inner-party democracy?
As the term itself makes clear, this is not about “popular democracy” (人民民主). The idea, rather, is greater “democracy” – or more shared decision-making – among party members (who account for just 5 percent of China’s whole population). That’s not so appetizing, perhaps, for democracy proponents outside China. But some believe this is a new party approach to political reform, and that inner-party democracy can be used to pull along more broad-based political reforms.

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[An October 2004 article in Economic Daily by current Politburo Standing Committee member Wu Guanzheng (吴官正) argues for the development of inner-party democracy.]

Some scholars argue that political reform in China should take its cues from the so-called “East Asian Model” – that is, more centralized, single-party control with an agenda focusing on economic growth. Yu Keping (俞可平), an influential party theorist close to Hu Jintao, has been clear on this point:

One-party leadership is the basic character of China’s political system. One-party leadership means the Communist Party of China is the only political party in China, sharing political power with no other party or political entity.

And yet, even in the context of one-party rule, there is room for progress toward more “democratic” decision-making.
At this point, it’s hard to see how firm Hu Jintao’s commitment is to inner-party democracy. In his June 25 speech he had the following to say: “We must continue — actively, safely, soundly and effectively – to promote the building of inner-party democracy” (要继续积极稳妥、扎实有效地推进党内民主建设) … “to perfect the system of inner-party democracy, [and] to raise consciousness about inner-party democracy”( 完善党内民主制度,使党内民主意识普遍增强).
This could be read as Hu Jintao’s endorsement of inner-party democracy. But it shows at the same time a great deal of wariness. The words “actively, safely, soundly and effectively” tug back on the reins and ensure reforms don’t pick up too much speed.
Hu Jintao talks in the same passage about “upholding democratic centralism” (坚持民主集中制). This makes his bottom line clear – there will be no change to the longstanding status quo of one-party rule.
If Hu Jintao hedges with these words in his political report to the 17th congress this will signal that while inner-party democracy will be a priority over the next five years we cannot expect any major steps.
As we assess Hu Jintao’s progress on inner-party democracy, we should look especially at the following questions:

*How will party elections be handled for the 17th National Congress?
*Will delegates to the congress play a role in shaping the party agenda?
*Will there be discussion about creating a permanent decision-making body for the 17th congress (常任制) so that delegates can participate in affairs beyond the meeting this month?

I’ll be turning to all three of these issue later this week.
(Qian Gang, October 1, 2007)
[Translated by David Bandurski]
Previous 17th Congress article: “Will there be echoes in Hu Jintao’s report of the 8th or 13th congresses?