Author: David Bandurski

Now Executive Director of the China Media Project, leading the project’s research and partnerships, David originally joined the project in Hong Kong in 2004. He is the author of Dragons in Diamond Village (Penguin), a book of reportage about urbanization and social activism in China, and co-editor of Investigative Journalism in China (HKU Press).

Supervision by public opinion 舆论监督

“Supervision by public opinion”, sometimes also translated “watchdog journalism”, has featured strongly in discussions of the role of media and press freedom in China since the late 1980s. In some cases the term can be used, particularly by proponents of an independent and professional press, as a stand-in term for “press freedom”, which is itself used only very cautiously by Chinese media (usually only in pejorative references to “Western press freedom”). Seeing the term as a Chinese cognate of Western “watchdog journalism,” they envision news media operating as a fourth estate, casting light on social, political and economic problems in China.
But “supervision by public opinion” has also been used frequently by officials in China to talk about the role of news media – under state control – in uncovering issues of official corruption and abuse of power on a range of issues, particularly at lower levels of the bureaucracy. At the Thirteenth National Congress of the CPC in 1987, party leaders said in their official report that news and propaganda tools (宣传工具) [i.e., official news media] should “serve a watchdog role (发挥舆论监督作用), supporting the criticisms of the public and [targeting] errors and shortcomings [in government work], opposing bureaucratism, and struggling against various unhealthy tendencies (不正之风).”
In the official view, this “supervision by public opinion” must be subject to the overarching political demands of party leaders. Since 1989 the term has stood in tension with the cardinal control concept of “guidance of public opinion”.
On January 24, 1994, then President Jiang Zemin said in addressing a national forum on propaganda work that “supervision by public opinion should have an eye toward assisting with the forward work of the party and the government in resolving real issues, promoting unity among the people and safeguarding social stability.”

Southern Metropolis Daily: where did the media go wrong reporting the Brick Kiln story?

The Shanxi Brick Kiln Affair (黑砖窑事件) [background translated by ESWN here] has received a wave of coverage in China over the last few weeks. But the lead editorial (社论) in today’s Southern Metropolis Daily takes a hard look at reporting for the story and gives the media low marks for its own role. The editorial steps gingerly around the issue of censorship and what its role might have been in controlling the story — CMP wrote earlier this week about orders to tone down Internet coverage — but argues media were remiss in their duties, failing to carry out thorough on-the-scene reporting and provide verified details about the case. With public statements from top leaders, the paper said, coverage should have been blown wide open. And if local officials tried to keep a lid on the facts? Well, that was “itself a major news story that should be splashed across the front page”.
The editorial is a reminder of just how complex are the problems facing Chinese media. While restrictions imposed by China’s censorship regime — so far, we don’t know whether orders or bans were issued by the Central Propaganda Department on the story — in many cases tie the hands of journalists, commercialization incentivizes media to take the professional low road. One symptom of the latter in the recent Shanxi story was the use of unverified information circulating on the Internet, such as the assertion in one Web posting that the boss at the Hongdong kiln had thrown a worker in a mixer and crushed him to death. This uncorroborated detail was distributed widely in the media.
The editorial also criticizes media for focusing reports on official actions rather than the exploited workers, their families and deeper webs of corruption in Shanxi that have enabled many kilns (not just the Hongdong kiln) to exploit workers without consequence.
Internet-related orders CMP revealed this week demonstrate an attempt by leaders to “cool down” the Shanxi story as an online sensation, saying “[Websites must] intensify public opinion guidance and management on the Internet of the Shanxi Kiln Affair”, “regularly release positive and authoritative information” and “report information about related people receiving medical treatment and being safely relocated, leading to favorable online public opinion.” The Southern Metropolis Daily editorial suggests, however, that newspapers and other traditional media have suffered not from controls but from a lack of professional will.
A translation of the editorial follows:
——————-
“The verdict isn’t out on the Shanxi Kiln Affair: media need to go deeper”
Southern Metropolis Daily
July 6, 2007
Were it not for the voice of determination given by Shanxi Governor Yu Hongjun in Southern Weekend [in which he said investigation of the affair was not yet complete], the public could only assume this bit of nasty news that shamed the nation has been left open-ended. Early news estimates revealed that perhaps more than 1,000 underage workers were slaving away in the illegal kilns of Shanxi. The overwhelming majority of Shanxi kilns are operating unregistered, and their long-standing operation is made possible by a Web of officials offering them protection (保护伞).
The Shanxi Brick Kiln Affair shocked the whole nation. The disgusting nature of details [of the affair] was one reason. Another was the widespread nature [of abuses of this kind]. And yet, following a mass catharsis of public anger, the affair rapidly atrophied. In the story, at least as it unfolded in the media, the oppression of workers in Shanxi brick kilns was reduced to the [limited] exploitation of workers at the Wang Bin Bin brick kiln in Caosheng Village (曹生村), Guangsheng Township (广胜镇), Hongdong County (洪洞县), Shanxi Province. Contrast this with the more than 300 rural workers liberated in a blanket search of Shanxi. Still, we’ve been offered only one final verdict [in the media and by the government], and the specifics have been left out. As for the illegal kiln in Hongdong County, even as people were pleasantly surprised by the speed with which the case was handled by law enforcement, the story was dramatically muted into one or two crimes by three to five people: unlawful detention [of workers] and deliberate harming [of workers] . . .
The Chinese people, roused with a shared anger, saw this primarily as [an instance] of barbarism and inhumanity. But the scene in the courtroom has lately been meek . . . How is it this heartbreaking story has been transformed into a dark comedy?
No, said Yu Hongjun, that’s not how it is! The illegal kiln affair will not be left hanging (不了了之), he said. He pledged that every problem revealed via the Internet, by the media or by the public would be investigated and the truth found out, that there would be no amnesty for the guilty. This should not be an insincere pledge. His speech indicated that a large-scale investigation was moving forward. We lack any specific reports on the nature of these investigations, however, and the media seem to be sitting on their hands waiting for the next breeze session (通气会), to get their paws on the next official press release in which verdicts are rendered but no details offered. When exactly did the media give up its active role in defining the issues and become an echo wall for officially released information?
Two things in particular concerning the media’s handling of the Shanxi Kiln Affair are inexplicable. One is the shallowness of reporting. Much news in the case early on was slapped together from unverified popular rumors and Web chatter. Subsequent reports failed to go deeper into the heart of the story, generously yielding free space for the subsequent “authoritative” version [offered by officials]. Secondly, after the affair broke, the media quickly turned the focus of the news story, neglecting investigation of the enslaved workers and their families, and of the tyrannical boss and the power clique that protected him. The focus turned [instead] to officials and law-enforcement as they worked to clean up the situation. [See ESWN translation of Southern Weekend report here]
It also owes to the lack of factual reporting that we have such a hard time understanding why the media would behave in such a way. A few investigative reporters have said that local officials stood in the way of a deeper investigation. Is this the true reason [for the lack of factual reporting]? Is it the complete reason? It’s hard for us to say. Looking more carefully, we should realize that when our highest national leaders have issued a statement [on a story], when the attention of the whole nation is drawn [to a story], and when local leaders still inhibit investigation by journalists, this is itself a major news story that should be splashed across the front page. But we didn’t see that major story … What is wrong with the media? Is it weak and ineffectual? Is it lazy and jaded? Is it timid and cowering? Is it lacking in professionalism? …
It was by dint of being reported by the media that the Shanxi Kiln Affair become a public event. The media was for this reason an important force in this public event. News reports and editorials, the feelings and demands of the public, and the attitude and actions of the government — it was the interaction of these three that pushed this event further and deeper. The responsibility of the media was not only to report on official actions. Nor was it merely to transmit the will of the people. More important was [the need to] take an independent stance, to go in search of the truth with a spirit of skepticism, to break through the riddles, to reveal the dark corners [others] try to cover up. Only under such a situation [in which the media plays these roles] can reports on the actions of officials be believable. Only under the force of such a media can the actions of the government be legitimized in the eyes of the public. Only when the media plays such a role can there be real dialogue and understanding between the public and the government. Only by building close interaction between the government, the media and the public can public events become the kind of public events that bring together the various forces of society …
The affair at Wang Bin Bin Kiln … is already being tried in the courts. According to Yu Hongjun this should just be the beginning, and is far from the end of the Shanxi Kiln Affair. High-level officials have repeatedly expressed their determination that the case be investigated thoroughly. Perhaps the people can wait for a completed examination paper. Perhaps they might also find in that completed examination paper an answer to their anger, a righting of wrongs. But as for that examination paper, the media have not yet finished their homework.

[Posted by David Bandurski, July 6, 2007, 4:45pm]

Mouthpiece 喉舌

The term “mouthpiece” has been used to describe Party media since the founding of the Chinese Communist Party. At Yan’an, the Liberation Daily described itself as “the Party’s mouthpiece, the mouthpiece of this great collective.” “We comrades who work at the newspaper are just one part of the Party organization,” the paper said, “but we must all, as one a body united, act according to the Party’s will. Each word and line, each character and sentence, must take the Party into consideration” (see “The Party and Party Papers”/”The Press Theory of the Liberation Daily”, Selections From Chinese Journalism History, Zhang Zhihua, editor, China People’s University Press, 1999, pg. 257). During a November 28, 1989, seminar on journalism, Jiang Zemin said, “Our country’s newspapers, broadcast and television are all the mouthpieces of the Party, the government and the people. This should be sufficient to explain the character of [Chinese] journalism and its important place in the work of the Party and the nation”. In an address following an inspection tour of China Central Television’s investigative program “News Probe” on October 7, 1998, State Council Premier Zhu Rongji offered the epigraph: “Supervisor of public opinion (舆论监督), mouthpiece of the masses, mirror of government, pioneer of reform.” This marked the first time “mouthpiece” had been used alone in this context, as “mouthpiece of the masses.” Zhu’s usage did not enter the canon of Party terms, however, and the official usage remains as “mouthpiece of the Party and the people.”

Eight Honors and Eight Disgraces 八荣八耻

The latest policy buzzword to hit China’s political scene in March 2006, “Eight Honors and Eight Disgraces” encapsulates Hu Jintao’s effort to carry out a campaign of moral rectification, improving the overall behavior of people at all levels of Chinese society. Mostly for political show, the policy is designed to mollify Leftist elements within the Party who have spoken out against the excesses brought on by China’s commercialization drive. The first reference to the term came on March 4 as Hu made a speech on “Socialist honor and grace” to the Chinese Political Consultative Conference. On March 6, China’s top propaganda official, politburo member Li Changchun, called on all levels of Chinese society to implement the “spirit” of Hu Jintao’s policy speech in order to “form the stable moral basis for a Socialist harmonious society”. Hu Jintao listed the “Eight Honors and Disgraces” as follows: “Loving the Mother Country is honorable, harming the Mother Country is disgraceful; Serving the People is honorable, neglecting the People is disgraceful; Upholding science is honorable, blindness and ignorance are disgraceful; Hard work is honorable, idleness disgraceful; Unity and cooperation are honorable, using others for profit is disgraceful; Honesty and keeping one’s word are honorable, seeing personal gain and forgetting justice is disgraceful; Respecting laws and regulations is honorable, disobeying laws and regulations is disgraceful; Suffering for the struggle is honorable, conceit and lasciviousness are disgraceful”.

The Marxist View of Journalism 马克思主义新闻观

In the two years prior to the outbreak of Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS), China’s media were busy complying with a 2001 Propaganda Bureau edict demanding they “offer programs for training [of media professionals] in the Marxist view of journalism.” Even after SARS, they continued to hold training sessions to educate professionals in the “three programs,” which included training in Jiang Zemin’s “Three Represents”, the “Marxist view of journalism” and “professional spirit and ethics.”
The Marxist aspect of the aforementioned trinity of training-courses comprised studies of the writings of Marx, Engels, Lenin, Mao Zedong, Deng Xiaoping and Jiang Zemin on the topic of the press, and selections highlighted the following key issues:
1. Supporting Party principles. “The Party publications are weapons of Party, and as such they must set forth the political creeds of the Party, and advance holding high the flag of the Party” (Marx/Engels). The Party’s papers are “publications of the Party,” they are “its gears and its screws.” (Lenin). In April 1942, Mao supervised the makeover of Yan’an’s Liberation Daily and defined Party “spirit”, or character, as the foremost of its four attributes. (Mao Zedong). On January 29, 1981, the Party said in its “Current Propaganda Regulations for Print and Broadcast Media”: “Professionals in publishing, news, radio and television must uphold the spirirt of the Communist Party.” “Party newspapers and periodicals must be sure to publicize the opinions of the Party without condition” (Deng Xiaoping). “Journalism must uphold Party principles” (Jiang Zemin).
2. Criticizing the “bourgeois concept of free speech.” Lenin once said that “absolute freedom” (绝对的自由) and “pure democracy” (纯粹的民主) do not exist. Lenin essentially believed the bourgeoisie concept of free press meant only the wealthy could publish newspapers, and amounted to a capitalist monopoly on the press. Therefore, Lenin advocated the overthrow of bourgeois press freedoms, saying that by doing so they could destroy a key ideological weapon of the enemy. Years later, Jiang Zemin said, “freedom of speech required rigorous class analysis”. Jiang believed hostile forces overseas and domestic proponents of press freedom were leveraging the concept as a means of “peaceful” resistance to Party rule. In order to safeguard the interests of the people, China must not only limit press freedom, but must, in accordance with the law, crack down on all designs to transform the socialist system through journalism.
3. Maintaining correct “guidance of public opinion”. This is the idea that media must walk the Party line, and is a vital component of prior censorship in China that requires editors and reporters to be obedient servants of the Party leadership. “We do not want intellectuals running newspapers, but rather politicians” (Mao Zedong). “Newspapers must become centers of stability and solidarity” (Deng Xiaoping). “[We must] grasp correct guidance of public opinion” (Jiang Zemin).

Paid-for News 有偿新闻

This is one among a litany of terms relating to ethical abuses in Chinese media. It has never been clearly defined, but can be generally understood as the practice of releasing information in the form of a news report in return for gains personally or for one’s media organization [definition at Modern Broadcasting website].
Some sources trace the phenomenon to an early column in Shanghai’s Wenhui Bao into which “news” was routinely sold. At that time reporters called such exchanges of news for cash “food coupon news” (饭票新闻).
An article on Sina.com identifies six forms of paid-for news, as follows:
1. Receiving money or other forms of benefit in exchange for news coverage;
2. Doing news coverage in exchange for advertising or circulation benefitss or sponsorship;
3. Forcing money or other forms of personal or institutional benefit by threatening negative news coverage (“news extortion”).
4. Media editors or bosses demanding their subordinates play a role in revenue creation, thus blurring the line between business and editorial;
5. Exchanging news with other media or journalists for payment or other benefit;
6. Public relations companies doing so-called “news reporting” on behalf of their clients and paying for space or airtime.
Forms of paid-for news, however, are constantly evolving. One article by People’s Daily described how some journalists work mention of so-called “clients” (those who have paid them for coverage) into stories in an indirect way, for example when addressing more general topics.

Emphasizing positive news 正面报导为主

“Emphasizing positive news” has been a guiding principle of China’s Central Propaganda Department (中宣部) since at least 1984. At a February 1995 conference of editors in chief of provincial-level newspapers, propaganda minister Ding Guangen said: “By supporting unity and stability, emphasizing positive news and speaking with one voice, we have achieved success in setting examples, leading and encouraging [the people] (People’s Daily, February 27, 1995). Ji Bingxuan, a deputy propaganda minister, said: “The relationship between positive and negative news must be well-managed. We must always support the guiding principle, which is to encourage unity and stability by emphasizing positive news. This principle must be followed with news reports … China is so vast and diverse, its development so unequal. While some areas are advanced, others lag far behind. Our country’s social development is fraught with contradiction, and problems appear often in many places. Suppose problems arise in each of our more than 2,800 counties. How those problems are viewed, and how they are reported – that is a question that must be treated correctly … The influence of propaganda is extensive. Failing to carefully analyze [content], or allowing negative reports to become too numerous or careless, results not only an incomplete picture of events but misleads the public, who begin to imagine problems are piling up. Such a slide in social morale negatively impacts social stability, the consequences of which may be incalculable” (See”新闻宣传要把好关把好度”, Press Frontline (新闻战线), March 2004.)

Fake News 虚假新闻

By some Chinese accounts, “fake news”, or xujia xinwen, has plagued news media in China since at least the Cultural Revolution, at which time media fabricated news to suit the political purposes of the Gang of Four. It is an extremely fuzzy term, and obviously, while it may be used by Chinese officialdom in campaigns against news regarded as unprofessional (or against party directives), could in its broadest sense (though not the official one) overlap with party propaganda itself.
When looking at fake news in mainland China, one of the toughest challenges is to separate genuine calls for professionalism from moves to control news unfavorable to the party. Over the last two decades, as economic reforms have moved ahead, the problem of fake news has certainly grown more serious. Many officials and academics point to the commercialization of media industry and intensified market competition as root causes – the need for a political reform and a more independent role for journalism as a “profession” is not addressed openly.
In June 2005, the Central Propaganda Department held a forum to discuss the issue. Reading between the lines, their definition of “fake news” predictably includes that which falls outside the purview of state news control, or “guidance of public opinion” (舆论导向). They mention the following tendencies in fake news: (1) more fake news is being outright fabricated, using flights of the imagination rather than real news materials; (2) more news is being exaggerated by media to generate public buzz; (3) there is more fake foreign news (including that generated by domestic journalists and that taken from foreign news sources); (4) non-journalists from different fields of the society are participating in the “creation of news”; (5) some well-known “mainstream” media also taking part in the creation and distribution of fake news; (6) the Internet is amplifying the influence and reach of fake news.
Writing in late 2005, one propaganda official for a local News Commentary Group (阅评组) in China addressed fake news and its causes: (1) journalists do not do work hard enough to verify the reliability of information in their stories; (2) journalists interpret stories in such a way as to exaggerate their importance (in other words, sensationalize them); (3) editors and reporters, knowing there are factual problems, modify problematic portions in such a way as to push the report through, circumventing controls; (4) some journalists lack the common sense necessary to distinguish true from false; (5) management practices are poor (by publication officials, top editors, etc) and there are no methods in place to ensure investigative reports conducted in areas outside the publication’s home turf are checked for accuracy. Beginning in 2001, The Journalist Monthly (新闻记者), a magazine on news media published by the Shanghai Academy for Social Sciences, began publishing an annual listed of “Top Ten Fake News”. Results from 2001 to 2005 are available on the publication’s website, or here through Xinhua News Agency.
[Posted by Brian Chan, May 11, 2006, 12:30pm]

The Four Unchangeables 党管媒体4不变

The “Four Unchangeables” is the buzzword for the central policy affirming the Communist Party’s control of the media under the rapid acceleration of commercialization and structural reforms. It can be seen as a policy cousin of Hu Jintao’s “Three Closenesses” (2002), which called for media to become more relevant to people’s lives (essentially, through commercialization) and “enlarging and strengthening”, which was about the creation of Chinese media groups fit to compete with international media groups like News Corp and Yahoo!. [See People’s Daily Online section on “multi-media groups”]. [More English-Chinese coverage of media conglomeration here]. The first articulation of the “Four Unchangeables” came on May 29, 2001, as Beijing All Media and Culture Group was officially launched in China’s capital. The opening ceremony was attended by media-minder big wigs like Propaganda Department vice-minister and SARFT head Xu Guangchun (徐光春), State Council Information Office head Li Bing (李冰), and top Beijing city officials. Representing Beijing’s Party committee and the city government, vice-secretary Long Xinmin (龙新民) said that under any conditions whatsoever, “the Party’s control of the media would not change (党管媒体不能变), the Party’s control of top media personnel would not change (党管干部不能变), the Party’s control over the ideological direction of media would not change (党管导向不能变), and the Party’s control over the asset structure of the media would not change (党管资产不能变)”. From this point on, most official reports about media consolidation, the formation of “news groups” etc., came hand-in-hand with mention of the “Four Unchangeables”.
In 2004, some mainland media reported a relaxing of restrictions on the operation of newspapers in China after Chongqing’s IT Home Publishing (电脑报社) and Zhong Ke Pu Media (重庆中科普传媒) teamed up with Hong Kong’s Tom Group. An official from the General Administration of Press and Publications, the media minders for publishing, stepped up to end the speculation and clarify exactly what the deal meant: “IT Home Publishing’s joint-venture (合资公司) is responsible only for the business side”, the official said. In other words, the Party would maintain tight controls over content – a clenched fist for politics and ideology, an open hand for business interests. In fact, the GAPP official said, IT Home was one of eight newspapers that had been designated by the Communist Party as an experiment in reform (by which they meant commercialization). The paper would be transformed from a “government-sponsored institution” (事业单位) to an “enterprise”. And this was not, as some media had reported, “the first news publishing joint-venture enterprise to be approved by GAPP since 1949”, officials said. The first such venture had in fact been the 2002 alliance between People’s Daily and Hong Kong’s Sing Tao News Corporation Limited (the publisher of Hong Kong’s Sing Tao Daily and The Standard. At the time, GAPP officials said total investment in this venture was 250 million yuan (US$31 million), with People’s Daily holding a 51 percent stake. [Company’s Website here, includes introduction touting the link-up as an illustration of China’s opening of its media to the “outside” following WTO entry. Its business scope is limited to retail distribution]
According to officials, the eight “newspapers” slated for commercial reforms included four newspaper groups and four newspapers. These were: Henan Daily Group, Xinhua Daily Group, Dazhong Daily Group (大众日报), Shenzhen Daily Group (深圳日报), IT Home (电脑报), China Securities News (中国证券报), Beijing Youth Daily (北京青年报) and Jin Wan Bao (今晚报). Then, as might be expected, came the “Four Unchangeables”. The GAPP official said: “These eight experiments in cooperation and restructuring have one thing in common, and that is that they are limited [in their cooperation] to the realm of business (经营领域). They are entrusted with business operations. They do not have the right to publish (出版权) or media proprietorship (媒体所有权). The right to publish and media proprietorship are exclusive rights of the newspaper’s sponsoring institution (主管单位).”
The GAPP official emphasized that the premise of restructuring [in the media] was to differentiate media and carry out reforms to the business side of newspaper groups. “But no matter how they are reformed”, he said, “the Party’s control of the media would not change, the Party’s control of top media personnel would not change, the Party’s control over the ideological direction of media would not change, and the Party’s control over the asset structure of the media would not change”.
[Posted by David Bandurski, May 22, 2006, 5:08pm]

Chinese leaders intensify propaganda orders and jargon of control in run-up to 17th Congress

As a general rule the atmosphere for Chinese media grows more restrictive in the run-up to key political sessions. With China’s crucial 17th Party Congress just two months away (specific dates yet undetermined), propaganda authorities are readying themselves to keep a tight grip on public opinion. The tools at their disposal: abstract theoretical communiqués and concrete orders and bans.
In dense Communist Party jargon, propaganda department head Liu Yunshan (刘云山), also a politburo member, reminded party members in a speech last month (published in the latest issue of Building the Party magazine and excerpted on the Web yesterday) that:
As the 17th Party Congress approaches, publicity preparation in anticipation [of the session] also enters a new phase. We must, in accordance with the demands of the central party, push ahead with basic work on a number of fronts. The overarching idea is to: cleave to Deng Xiaoping Theory and the “Three Represents” as guiding ideologies, to further, see through and realize the scientific development view, being careful to maintain a high degree of uniformity with the central party under Comrade Hu Jintao as general secretary, making sound preparations for the 17th Party Congress our primary political duty …
The close of Liu Yunshan’s ponderous preamble — also thick with phrases like “singing the main theme”, “maintaining correct guidance [of public opinion]”, and “promoting social harmony” – contains the overarching point: the need to “create a desirable theoretical environment, public opinion environment, cultural environment and thought environment in society in order for the party’s 17th Congress to open victoriously” (为党的十七大胜利召开营造良好的理论氛围、舆论氛围、文化氛围和社会思想氛围).
The bottom line: intensified CONTROL.
Liu Yunshan’s words are the external face of the propaganda apparatus, the one you can find readily in state-run publications and on the Web. In terms familiar to the initiated, it says, essentially, that cadres all need to step in line with the top man, Hu Jintao, and keep a lid on things during a politically sensitive time in order to maintain a firm grip on power.
The view from the inside is more direct, and is all about the mechanics of control. Take this recent missive, which addresses one of China’s biggest news topics of the summer, the story of the use of child laborers at a brick kiln in Shanxi Province. The order was sent recently to major Web portals across China:
[Websites must] intensify public opinion guidance and management on the Internet of the Shanxi Kiln Affair. Recently, the mistreatment and detention of underage workers at the Shanxi kiln has continued to draw a high level of attention from Web users. [Websites must] regularly release positive and authoritative information, and regularly report information about related people receiving medical treatment and being safely relocated, leading to favorable online public opinion. Internet opinion must cool off rapidly, and language using every opportunity to attack the party and government, attack our country’s socialist system, attack our country’s human rights [situation], and stir the emotions of Web users must be discovered quickly and removed as it appears in Web postings, chatrooms, Weblogs and other interactive programs.
As was this one:
Concerning reports on the Shanxi Kiln Affair, websites must move quickly to tone it down, dealing strictly with related content. Already existing reports must be immediately deleted from the homepages of websites and from the main news pages. Aside from authoritative information from relevant government offices and from the investigation in Shanxi province as released by key central party news outfits [i.e., Xinhua News Agency, People’s Daily], other new reports that come out must not be given prominent positioning (不上头条), be placed in top news sections, allow Web postings (跟帖), or be given links to special sections [devoted to coverage of the story]. Severely monitor forums, blogs, instant information and other interactive forms, and immediately delete extreme language and harmful or bad information.
In recent months, offices charged with controlling the Web, such as the Information Office of the State Council, have been increasingly vigilant as propaganda authorities redirect their focus to reflect the growing influence of the Internet. But traditional media, including central party media, have also been warned to remain extra cautious during the next few months. The following order went out to central party media in the middle of June:
Directions on Reporting of 17th Party Congress
(1) From now onwards, creating a favorable environment for the 17th Party Congress is most important for us all. All reports must be encompassed by this demand as they are carried out. All units must conduct an examination of their own reports and programs, and those not appropriate must be readjusted immediately. [Media must work] with political consciousness [of the party line and party interests], awareness of the overall situation [of the strategy and interests of the central party/大局], and a sense of responsibility.
[Frontpage Photo: Cover of a back issue of Dangjian, or “Building the Party” magazine, published by the Central Propaganda Department]