Author: David Bandurski

Now Executive Director of the China Media Project, leading the project’s research and partnerships, David originally joined the project in Hong Kong in 2004. He is the author of Dragons in Diamond Village (Penguin), a book of reportage about urbanization and social activism in China, and co-editor of Investigative Journalism in China (HKU Press).

Information Office cadre calls cover-up of negative news “naive”

In the latest example of the puzzles and paradoxes coming from China’s top leadership on the question of information openness, the vice-minister of China’s State Council Information Office — the office taking the lead in expanding censorship of the Chinese internet — told China Central Television late last week that local leaders were “naive” in trying to suppress negative news. [IMAGE: Screenshot of CCTV Website coverage of Wang Guoqing appearance].

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Appearing on a CCTV talk show on July 13, Wang Guoqing said some government offices were “relatively naive” in “covering up” negative news and preventing media reporting. Addressing the recent Shanxi Kiln Affair, the official said that if local officials had revealed the truth to begin with, “I think the public would have understood, and there wouldn’t have been the kind of irrational expressions on the Internet that we saw later.”
Covering up negative news, Wang said, had become a matter of custom for many local government offices.
However, as CMP revealed last week, the Information Office has moved to more tightly control speech on the Web in the run-up to the 17th Party Congress, expected to be held in September this year.
Web censors issued an order recently saying “[Websites must] intensify public opinion guidance and management on the Internet of the Shanxi Kiln Affair … regularly release positive and authoritative information, and regularly report information about related people receiving medical treatment and being safely relocated, leading to favorable online public opinion.”
A separate order said reports other than official ones “must not be given prominent positioning (不上头条), be placed in top news sections, allow Web postings (跟帖), or be given links to special sections [devoted to coverage of the story].” Websites, it said, must “severely monitor forums, blogs, instant information and other interactive forms, and immediately delete extreme language and harmful or bad information.”
The story of Wang Guoqing’s CCTV appearance, reported last Sunday by Beijing Youth Daily and The Beijing News, became a favorite topic of newspaper editorials yesterday. In an editorial posted on rednet.cn, Sun Lizhong (孙立忠) generally agreed with Wang’s calling the cover-up of negative news “naive”, but said a number of conditions had to be met before officials were politically disincentivized to keep bad news under wraps:
Much of what is called negative news actually has positive value, and has special importance for safeguarding justice and fairness, improving the system, etcetera. To report such matters is to display the functional strength of watchdog journalism (舆论监督). At the same time, a lot of so-called negative news that “touches on the vital interests of citizens, legal persons or other organizations”, “requiring the widespread knowledge or participation of society” is also the sort of government information the government is required to take the initiative in making public under the “National Ordinance on Release of Government Information” [recently passed and due to take effect in May 2008].
Effectively implementing the law on information release is of course necessary, but relying solely on this is not enough. We also have an urgent need to set up protections for watchdog journalism by setting down and perfecting a press law and other legal systems, allowing the media to thoroughly exercise watchdog journalism. We also need to strenthen the supervisory roles of the People’s Congress and Chinese People’s Political Consultative Congress. Once the “cover up of negative news” is discovered, the People’s Congress and CPPCC representatives who speak on behalf of the people should work fast to make inquiries, find out who is responsible, recall [officials] and [employ] other means to ensure those responsible are taken to account.
Only when those [systemic issues] that need to be perfected have been perfected will “covering up” of negative news truly become a “naive” action.

[Posted by David Bandurski, July 17, 2006,12:15pm]

Web user arrests in southern China underscore growing official fear of the Internet

In a further sign of the growing influence of the Internet in China, and growing fears about the technology among local party officials, authorities in the southern city of Xinyi (信宜) apprehended three men accused of circulating “rumors” on the Internet about a serial rapist. Columnist and CMP fellow Yan Lieshan criticized the action today in Southern Metropolis Daily [more from ESWN], saying Xinyi officials showed no apparent concern for their own negligence in failing to issue timely warnings to the public (police have admitted a series of rapes in Xinyi between March 19 and May 31 this year, with a suspect taken into custody on July 3), instead misdirecting their focus to allegedly exaggerated Web postings. [PHOTO: Screenshot of New Express coverage of arrest of rape suspect in Xinyi, July 7, 2007, via news.21cn.com].

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News of the arrest and pending case against the three Web users recalled the recent Haicang PX story in Xiamen, in which city officials said they were mulling local curbs on Internet use after new media played an instrumental role in organizing popular opposition to a proposed chemical plant in the city. An official from Xiamen’s commercial bureau recently told media that “after opposition to the PX project, the government [in Xiamen] felt that content on the Internet should be [more tightly] controlled.”
In his editorial, Yan Lieshan said China was “at a crossroads” and that greater acceptance and protection of public speech was needed in order to fight corruption and other evils. “If we want to change the state of affairs under which good cannot stamp out evil, the most effective and economical means is to give citizens a greater right to know, right to speak and right to monitor (知情权、发言权和监督权),” he said.
The key question in the Xinyi Web user arrests is whether netizens should be held personally accountable for the accuracy of their postings. In the Xinyi case, it seems, there was a basis for the postings, and it is Yan Lieshan’s contention that, in the absense of official information on the case, it might in fact have been the buzz created by the three Web users in question that “moved the killer to show some restraint” (使犯罪分子有所收敛).
Selected portions of Yan Lieshan’s editorial follow:
There’s no need for me to conceal the fact that my original intention was to complain of the wrongs against the three Web users [in Xinyi]. But that’s not all. I’ve already used this example to show that there is much greater danger in exposing local scandals. I could find a heap of examples just searching the Internet. I’m talking not just about informing and exposing of illegal activities, but of normal speech concerning local public affairs …
It goes without saying that there are many abnormal or backward things happening in the political life of our society these days – corruption and bribery, trifling with impunity with [one’s official] post. But it’s those who inform, who expose crimes that live in fear …
I’m completely with Professor Cai Dingjian on this point, that media are an instrumental factor in promoting social change, and that the government has a responsibility to respect the media and thereby the will of the people. What needs to be added is that the media he’s referring to includes, of course, the new media and the Internet (postings, blogs, streaming video, etc.), including all of those citizens (interactive writers) who provide the media with information, viewpoints and “buzz” (人气).
It could be said that China’s social transition is at a crossroads. If we want to change the state of affairs under which good cannot stamp out evil, the most effective and economical means is to give citizens a greater right to know, right to speak and right to monitor.

[Posted by David Bandurski, July 13, 2007, 4:39pm]

Guangzhou police discover six tons of unlicensed “pornographic” magazines in raid on local printing house

Authorities in Guangzhou announced a raid yesterday on a printing house where “stacks upon stacks”, reportedly more than six tons, of an unlicensed “pornographic” magazine were waiting for distribution. Guangzhou’s New Express reported police were alerted to the operation by a disgruntled employee who had been fired by the printing house. [BELOW: Screenshot of New Express coverage of police raid on Guangzhou printing house at QQ.com].

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The newspaper quoted the source, Ah Bing, as saying: “I don’t want to help them do those kinds of immoral things anymore. And I don’t want to allow the printing house to continue harming others.” He said the printing house had produced various pornographic publications on demand. “They would print anything,” he said. “All it took was money.”
The story highlights a persistent problem facing authorities in China, where the age of commercialized media has spawned an explosion in unlicensed “adult” publications despite strict laws and regulations on indecent content.
CMP reported back in December last year on the phenomenon of salacious so-called “law and order” tabloids, which were readily available — and plentiful — at newstands in Shanghai. Some of the publications were plainly unlicensed, while others used publishing licenses, or kanhao, for unrelated publications, suggesting the licenses had been “rented out” by the “managing units” (主管单位) that legally held them.
[Posted by David Bandurski, July 13, 2007, 12:05pm]

July 9 – July 15, 2007

July 13 — In a further sign of the growing influence of the Internet in China, and growing fears about the technology among local party officials, authorities in the southern city of Xinyi (信宜) apprehended three men accused of circulating “rumors” on the Internet about a serial rapist. Columnist and CMP fellow Yan Lieshan criticized the action today in Southern Metropolis Daily [more from ESWN], saying Xinyi officials showed no apparent concern for their own negligence in failing to issue timely warnings to the public (police have admitted a series of rapes in Xinyi between March 19 and May 31 this year, with a suspect taken into custody on July 3), instead misdirecting their focus to allegedly exaggerated Web postings.
July 13 — Authorities in Guangzhou announced a raid on a printing house where “stacks upon stacks”, reportedly more than six tons, of an unlicensed “pornographic” magazine were waiting for distribution. Guangzhou’s New Express reported police were alerted to the operation by a disgruntled employee who had been fired by the printing house. The newspaper quoted the source, Ah Bing, as saying: “I don’t want to help them do those kinds of immoral things anymore. And I don’t want to allow the printing house to continue harming others.” He said the printing house had produced various pornographic publications on demand. “They would print anything,” he said. “All it took was money.” The story highlighted a persistent problem facing authorities in China, where the age of commercialized media has spawned an explosion in unlicensed “adult” publications despite strict laws and regulations on indecent content.

Investigative reporting 调查性报导

Many professional journalists in China look to reporting of the Watergate scandal in the United States as the ultimate example of a professional press at work. Likewise, they see the “investigative report” as the “most comprehensive test of a journalist’s level of professionalism”, and the accomplishment of such a report as the “apex” of a life’s work in journalism.
The dawn of the investigative report as an object of desire for professional Chinese journalists came in the 1990s, as China Central Television launched its “News Probe” investigative news program and Southern Weekend devoted substantial resources to investigative reports and established the first “investigative” newspaper section.
At the same time, there appeared in China a group of “investigative reporters” who werrelatively well known by the public (Wang Keqin, Liu Chang, Lu Yuegang). Still, investigative reporters in China face substantial obstacles, including the party censorship apparatus, commercial pressures and threats to their personal safety.
According to many accounts, investigative reporting (generally carried out under the banner of “watchdog journalism“) has faced increased challenges under the leadership of President Hu Jintao. Some reporters say even internal references, sensitive news reports not published but circulated among party leaders, have been subjected to tighter controls.

Media independence 媒体的独立性

The current press structure in China is fundamentally fused with the organizational structure of the ruling Communist Party, and media are extensions of various bureaucratic branches of the party and/or government. Under such a state of affairs, one can imagine the level of sensitivity accorded the notion of “media independence”. The term therefore generally does not appear in publications or publicly circulated articles.
However, in the warming intellectual climate of the early to mid 1980s, scholars in China began raising the idea that the press should have “relative independence” (相对的独立性) or “formal independence” (形式上的独立). In May 1981, Sun Xupei, a key force behind the push for media reform and freedom of speech within the socialist system throughout the decade leading up to the Tiananmen Massacre, wrote in Investigations of Press Theory (新闻理论探讨): “When we talk about socialist freedom of speech, this means the media must certainly accept monitoring by the people, by the party and by the law. [We will] persist in the socialist project, [we will] persist in serving the masses. At the same time, [we must] allow the press relative independence, permitting [them] a freedom that cannot be violated both within the scope of the law and the [political] system.”
As China entered the 21st century, a number of journalists and scholars felt that media commercialization might push the country toward more independent media. In response, Qian Gang, former chief editor of Southern Weekend, warned that: “Journalism should be independent — it should not serve neither official power nor the interests of capital.” Zhan Jiang, a professor of journalism at China Youth University for Political Science, has also, employing the work of Jurgen Habermas, written of the “re-feudalization” of Chinese media — a dirty pact between official and business interests — as a result of the push to commercialize.

Credibility 公信力

In the late 1990s, media professionals in mainland China began to more frequently employ the term “credibility”, first introduced from Hong Kong and Taiwan. The term appeared early on as a slogan among commercial media. Southern Weekend, a commercial spin-off of the official Nanfang Daily in China’s southern Guangdong Province, for example, advertised itself as “China’s largest-circulation, heftiest, most credible and most influential comprehensive weekly, and the country’s most important newspaper (中国发行量最大、版数最多、公信力最强、影响最广的综合性周报,也是中国最重要的报纸).”
In the beginning, the term “credibility” was connected with the goal of objective reporting independent of outside (and government) influences. As media commercialization picked up pace, it became more closely connected with the question of the “professional integrity of the press” and “press corruption” (a side-effect of commercialization under state control). The term has frequently surfaced in debates surrounding cases of press corruption, in which “the quality of credibility” (公信力品质) has been pitted against the “profit motive” (利润最大化).

Idealism (of media professionals) (传媒人的)理想主义

On June 13, 2003, China Youth Daily reporter Lu Yuegang published a public letter online addressing a speech given on May 24 that year to top newspaper cadres by Zhao Yong (赵勇), secretary of the standing committee of the Chinese Communist Youth League, publisher of the newspaper. In his letter, Lu Yuegang said Zhao’s speech was “full of sermonizing, intimidation and ignorance.” Summarized, Zhao Yong’s three main points had been: 1) whoever doesn’t fall in line with the CCYL will be sent packing, 2) China Youth Daily is a publication of the CCYL, not an ‘abstract major newspaper’ [in other words, not a professional journalistic enterprise], and 3) the newspaper could not operate on the principle of “idealism”.
For more than a century the tradition of press professionals in China has held that “the responsibility of defending the nation lies with the people” (天下兴亡,匹夫有责). This sense of idealism and purpose could be seen in the Shiwubao (时务报) of the late Qing Dynasty (19th and early 20th centuries), in the Ta Kung Pao of the Republican Period. For more than a half century, the news industry in China was colored strongly with a sense of justice and social conscience. Economic reforms in the 1980s brought the reemergence of this sense of idealism among the generation of journalists who had experienced the Anti-Rightist Movement of the 1950s and the Cultural Revolution. China Youth Daily was home to a number of such journalists, including Lu Yuegang and Li Datong.
In the preface to Zan Aizong’s book The Fourth Estate [Introduction to Zan at Independent Chinese Pen Center], Lu Yuegang explains “idealism” in the following way: “All editors and reporters will face these sorts of questions – Why do we interview and write? What are our basic rights and interests? In our social environment, whose interests does public opinion serve? In what way can we carry out objective and impartial reporting? In what way can we get nearer social truths? In a normal social environment these questions don’t constitute questions, or merely become questions of technique. But for us [Chinese] they are question we cannot turn away from. Some people say I’m an ‘idealist’. An idealist’s action is characterized by ‘acting for something even if you know that thing is nearly impossible’, and in the process drawing the attention of the world. Strictly speaking, I’m not that kind of idealist. Rather, my standard for idealism is ‘keeping truth as one’s creed even if it means losing one’s head’, basically not hesitating to shed blood or lose one’s head for some belief or concept about which you are determined.”

Supervision by public opinion 舆论监督

“Supervision by public opinion”, sometimes also translated “watchdog journalism”, has featured strongly in discussions of the role of media and press freedom in China since the late 1980s. In some cases the term can be used, particularly by proponents of an independent and professional press, as a stand-in term for “press freedom”, which is itself used only very cautiously by Chinese media (usually only in pejorative references to “Western press freedom”). Seeing the term as a Chinese cognate of Western “watchdog journalism,” they envision news media operating as a fourth estate, casting light on social, political and economic problems in China.
But “supervision by public opinion” has also been used frequently by officials in China to talk about the role of news media – under state control – in uncovering issues of official corruption and abuse of power on a range of issues, particularly at lower levels of the bureaucracy. At the Thirteenth National Congress of the CPC in 1987, party leaders said in their official report that news and propaganda tools (宣传工具) [i.e., official news media] should “serve a watchdog role (发挥舆论监督作用), supporting the criticisms of the public and [targeting] errors and shortcomings [in government work], opposing bureaucratism, and struggling against various unhealthy tendencies (不正之风).”
In the official view, this “supervision by public opinion” must be subject to the overarching political demands of party leaders. Since 1989 the term has stood in tension with the cardinal control concept of “guidance of public opinion”.
On January 24, 1994, then President Jiang Zemin said in addressing a national forum on propaganda work that “supervision by public opinion should have an eye toward assisting with the forward work of the party and the government in resolving real issues, promoting unity among the people and safeguarding social stability.”

Southern Metropolis Daily: where did the media go wrong reporting the Brick Kiln story?

The Shanxi Brick Kiln Affair (黑砖窑事件) [background translated by ESWN here] has received a wave of coverage in China over the last few weeks. But the lead editorial (社论) in today’s Southern Metropolis Daily takes a hard look at reporting for the story and gives the media low marks for its own role. The editorial steps gingerly around the issue of censorship and what its role might have been in controlling the story — CMP wrote earlier this week about orders to tone down Internet coverage — but argues media were remiss in their duties, failing to carry out thorough on-the-scene reporting and provide verified details about the case. With public statements from top leaders, the paper said, coverage should have been blown wide open. And if local officials tried to keep a lid on the facts? Well, that was “itself a major news story that should be splashed across the front page”.
The editorial is a reminder of just how complex are the problems facing Chinese media. While restrictions imposed by China’s censorship regime — so far, we don’t know whether orders or bans were issued by the Central Propaganda Department on the story — in many cases tie the hands of journalists, commercialization incentivizes media to take the professional low road. One symptom of the latter in the recent Shanxi story was the use of unverified information circulating on the Internet, such as the assertion in one Web posting that the boss at the Hongdong kiln had thrown a worker in a mixer and crushed him to death. This uncorroborated detail was distributed widely in the media.
The editorial also criticizes media for focusing reports on official actions rather than the exploited workers, their families and deeper webs of corruption in Shanxi that have enabled many kilns (not just the Hongdong kiln) to exploit workers without consequence.
Internet-related orders CMP revealed this week demonstrate an attempt by leaders to “cool down” the Shanxi story as an online sensation, saying “[Websites must] intensify public opinion guidance and management on the Internet of the Shanxi Kiln Affair”, “regularly release positive and authoritative information” and “report information about related people receiving medical treatment and being safely relocated, leading to favorable online public opinion.” The Southern Metropolis Daily editorial suggests, however, that newspapers and other traditional media have suffered not from controls but from a lack of professional will.
A translation of the editorial follows:
——————-
“The verdict isn’t out on the Shanxi Kiln Affair: media need to go deeper”
Southern Metropolis Daily
July 6, 2007
Were it not for the voice of determination given by Shanxi Governor Yu Hongjun in Southern Weekend [in which he said investigation of the affair was not yet complete], the public could only assume this bit of nasty news that shamed the nation has been left open-ended. Early news estimates revealed that perhaps more than 1,000 underage workers were slaving away in the illegal kilns of Shanxi. The overwhelming majority of Shanxi kilns are operating unregistered, and their long-standing operation is made possible by a Web of officials offering them protection (保护伞).
The Shanxi Brick Kiln Affair shocked the whole nation. The disgusting nature of details [of the affair] was one reason. Another was the widespread nature [of abuses of this kind]. And yet, following a mass catharsis of public anger, the affair rapidly atrophied. In the story, at least as it unfolded in the media, the oppression of workers in Shanxi brick kilns was reduced to the [limited] exploitation of workers at the Wang Bin Bin brick kiln in Caosheng Village (曹生村), Guangsheng Township (广胜镇), Hongdong County (洪洞县), Shanxi Province. Contrast this with the more than 300 rural workers liberated in a blanket search of Shanxi. Still, we’ve been offered only one final verdict [in the media and by the government], and the specifics have been left out. As for the illegal kiln in Hongdong County, even as people were pleasantly surprised by the speed with which the case was handled by law enforcement, the story was dramatically muted into one or two crimes by three to five people: unlawful detention [of workers] and deliberate harming [of workers] . . .
The Chinese people, roused with a shared anger, saw this primarily as [an instance] of barbarism and inhumanity. But the scene in the courtroom has lately been meek . . . How is it this heartbreaking story has been transformed into a dark comedy?
No, said Yu Hongjun, that’s not how it is! The illegal kiln affair will not be left hanging (不了了之), he said. He pledged that every problem revealed via the Internet, by the media or by the public would be investigated and the truth found out, that there would be no amnesty for the guilty. This should not be an insincere pledge. His speech indicated that a large-scale investigation was moving forward. We lack any specific reports on the nature of these investigations, however, and the media seem to be sitting on their hands waiting for the next breeze session (通气会), to get their paws on the next official press release in which verdicts are rendered but no details offered. When exactly did the media give up its active role in defining the issues and become an echo wall for officially released information?
Two things in particular concerning the media’s handling of the Shanxi Kiln Affair are inexplicable. One is the shallowness of reporting. Much news in the case early on was slapped together from unverified popular rumors and Web chatter. Subsequent reports failed to go deeper into the heart of the story, generously yielding free space for the subsequent “authoritative” version [offered by officials]. Secondly, after the affair broke, the media quickly turned the focus of the news story, neglecting investigation of the enslaved workers and their families, and of the tyrannical boss and the power clique that protected him. The focus turned [instead] to officials and law-enforcement as they worked to clean up the situation. [See ESWN translation of Southern Weekend report here]
It also owes to the lack of factual reporting that we have such a hard time understanding why the media would behave in such a way. A few investigative reporters have said that local officials stood in the way of a deeper investigation. Is this the true reason [for the lack of factual reporting]? Is it the complete reason? It’s hard for us to say. Looking more carefully, we should realize that when our highest national leaders have issued a statement [on a story], when the attention of the whole nation is drawn [to a story], and when local leaders still inhibit investigation by journalists, this is itself a major news story that should be splashed across the front page. But we didn’t see that major story … What is wrong with the media? Is it weak and ineffectual? Is it lazy and jaded? Is it timid and cowering? Is it lacking in professionalism? …
It was by dint of being reported by the media that the Shanxi Kiln Affair become a public event. The media was for this reason an important force in this public event. News reports and editorials, the feelings and demands of the public, and the attitude and actions of the government — it was the interaction of these three that pushed this event further and deeper. The responsibility of the media was not only to report on official actions. Nor was it merely to transmit the will of the people. More important was [the need to] take an independent stance, to go in search of the truth with a spirit of skepticism, to break through the riddles, to reveal the dark corners [others] try to cover up. Only under such a situation [in which the media plays these roles] can reports on the actions of officials be believable. Only under the force of such a media can the actions of the government be legitimized in the eyes of the public. Only when the media plays such a role can there be real dialogue and understanding between the public and the government. Only by building close interaction between the government, the media and the public can public events become the kind of public events that bring together the various forces of society …
The affair at Wang Bin Bin Kiln … is already being tried in the courts. According to Yu Hongjun this should just be the beginning, and is far from the end of the Shanxi Kiln Affair. High-level officials have repeatedly expressed their determination that the case be investigated thoroughly. Perhaps the people can wait for a completed examination paper. Perhaps they might also find in that completed examination paper an answer to their anger, a righting of wrongs. But as for that examination paper, the media have not yet finished their homework.

[Posted by David Bandurski, July 6, 2007, 4:45pm]