Author: David Bandurski

Now Executive Director of the China Media Project, leading the project’s research and partnerships, David originally joined the project in Hong Kong in 2004. He is the author of Dragons in Diamond Village (Penguin), a book of reportage about urbanization and social activism in China, and co-editor of Investigative Journalism in China (HKU Press).

Mouthpiece 喉舌

Written by David Bandurski on . Posted in Dictionary.

The term “mouthpiece” has been used to describe Party media since the founding of the Chinese Communist Party. At Yan’an, the Liberation Daily described itself as “the Party’s mouthpiece, the mouthpiece of this great collective.” “We comrades who work at the newspaper are just one part of the Party organization,” the paper said, “but we must all, as one a body united, act according to the Party’s will. Each word and line, each character and sentence, must take the Party into consideration” (see “The Party and Party Papers”/”The Press Theory of the Liberation Daily”, Selections From Chinese Journalism History, Zhang Zhihua, editor, China People’s University Press, 1999, pg. 257). During a November 28, 1989, seminar on journalism, Jiang Zemin said, “Our country’s newspapers, broadcast and television are all the mouthpieces of the Party, the government and the people. This should be sufficient to explain the character of [Chinese] journalism and its important place in the work of the Party and the nation”. In an address following an inspection tour of China Central Television’s investigative program “News Probe” on October 7, 1998, State Council Premier Zhu Rongji offered the epigraph: “Supervisor of public opinion (舆论监督), mouthpiece of the masses, mirror of government, pioneer of reform.” This marked the first time “mouthpiece” had been used alone in this context, as “mouthpiece of the masses.” Zhu’s usage did not enter the canon of Party terms, however, and the official usage remains as “mouthpiece of the Party and the people.”

Eight Honors and Eight Disgraces 八荣八耻

Written by David Bandurski on . Posted in Dictionary.

The latest policy buzzword to hit China’s political scene in March 2006, “Eight Honors and Eight Disgraces” encapsulates Hu Jintao’s effort to carry out a campaign of moral rectification, improving the overall behavior of people at all levels of Chinese society. Mostly for political show, the policy is designed to mollify Leftist elements within the Party who have spoken out against the excesses brought on by China’s commercialization drive. The first reference to the term came on March 4 as Hu made a speech on “Socialist honor and grace” to the Chinese Political Consultative Conference. On March 6, China’s top propaganda official, politburo member Li Changchun, called on all levels of Chinese society to implement the “spirit” of Hu Jintao’s policy speech in order to “form the stable moral basis for a Socialist harmonious society”. Hu Jintao listed the “Eight Honors and Disgraces” as follows: “Loving the Mother Country is honorable, harming the Mother Country is disgraceful; Serving the People is honorable, neglecting the People is disgraceful; Upholding science is honorable, blindness and ignorance are disgraceful; Hard work is honorable, idleness disgraceful; Unity and cooperation are honorable, using others for profit is disgraceful; Honesty and keeping one’s word are honorable, seeing personal gain and forgetting justice is disgraceful; Respecting laws and regulations is honorable, disobeying laws and regulations is disgraceful; Suffering for the struggle is honorable, conceit and lasciviousness are disgraceful”.

The Marxist View of Journalism 马克思主义新闻观

Written by David Bandurski on . Posted in Dictionary.

In the two years prior to the outbreak of Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS), China’s media were busy complying with a 2001 Propaganda Bureau edict demanding they “offer programs for training [of media professionals] in the Marxist view of journalism.” Even after SARS, they continued to hold training sessions to educate professionals in the “three programs,” which included training in Jiang Zemin’s “Three Represents”, the “Marxist view of journalism” and “professional spirit and ethics.”
The Marxist aspect of the aforementioned trinity of training-courses comprised studies of the writings of Marx, Engels, Lenin, Mao Zedong, Deng Xiaoping and Jiang Zemin on the topic of the press, and selections highlighted the following key issues:
1. Supporting Party principles. “The Party publications are weapons of Party, and as such they must set forth the political creeds of the Party, and advance holding high the flag of the Party” (Marx/Engels). The Party’s papers are “publications of the Party,” they are “its gears and its screws.” (Lenin). In April 1942, Mao supervised the makeover of Yan’an’s Liberation Daily and defined Party “spirit”, or character, as the foremost of its four attributes. (Mao Zedong). On January 29, 1981, the Party said in its “Current Propaganda Regulations for Print and Broadcast Media”: “Professionals in publishing, news, radio and television must uphold the spirirt of the Communist Party.” “Party newspapers and periodicals must be sure to publicize the opinions of the Party without condition” (Deng Xiaoping). “Journalism must uphold Party principles” (Jiang Zemin).
2. Criticizing the “bourgeois concept of free speech.” Lenin once said that “absolute freedom” (绝对的自由) and “pure democracy” (纯粹的民主) do not exist. Lenin essentially believed the bourgeoisie concept of free press meant only the wealthy could publish newspapers, and amounted to a capitalist monopoly on the press. Therefore, Lenin advocated the overthrow of bourgeois press freedoms, saying that by doing so they could destroy a key ideological weapon of the enemy. Years later, Jiang Zemin said, “freedom of speech required rigorous class analysis”. Jiang believed hostile forces overseas and domestic proponents of press freedom were leveraging the concept as a means of “peaceful” resistance to Party rule. In order to safeguard the interests of the people, China must not only limit press freedom, but must, in accordance with the law, crack down on all designs to transform the socialist system through journalism.
3. Maintaining correct “guidance of public opinion”. This is the idea that media must walk the Party line, and is a vital component of prior censorship in China that requires editors and reporters to be obedient servants of the Party leadership. “We do not want intellectuals running newspapers, but rather politicians” (Mao Zedong). “Newspapers must become centers of stability and solidarity” (Deng Xiaoping). “[We must] grasp correct guidance of public opinion” (Jiang Zemin).

Paid-for News 有偿新闻

Written by David Bandurski on . Posted in Dictionary.

This is one among a litany of terms relating to ethical abuses in Chinese media. It has never been clearly defined, but can be generally understood as the practice of releasing information in the form of a news report in return for gains personally or for one’s media organization [definition at Modern Broadcasting website].
Some sources trace the phenomenon to an early column in Shanghai’s Wenhui Bao into which “news” was routinely sold. At that time reporters called such exchanges of news for cash “food coupon news” (饭票新闻).
An article on Sina.com identifies six forms of paid-for news, as follows:
1. Receiving money or other forms of benefit in exchange for news coverage;
2. Doing news coverage in exchange for advertising or circulation benefitss or sponsorship;
3. Forcing money or other forms of personal or institutional benefit by threatening negative news coverage (“news extortion”).
4. Media editors or bosses demanding their subordinates play a role in revenue creation, thus blurring the line between business and editorial;
5. Exchanging news with other media or journalists for payment or other benefit;
6. Public relations companies doing so-called “news reporting” on behalf of their clients and paying for space or airtime.
Forms of paid-for news, however, are constantly evolving. One article by People’s Daily described how some journalists work mention of so-called “clients” (those who have paid them for coverage) into stories in an indirect way, for example when addressing more general topics.

Emphasizing positive news 正面报导为主

Written by David Bandurski on . Posted in Dictionary.

“Emphasizing positive news” has been a guiding principle of China’s Central Propaganda Department (中宣部) since at least 1984. At a February 1995 conference of editors in chief of provincial-level newspapers, propaganda minister Ding Guangen said: “By supporting unity and stability, emphasizing positive news and speaking with one voice, we have achieved success in setting examples, leading and encouraging [the people] (People’s Daily, February 27, 1995). Ji Bingxuan, a deputy propaganda minister, said: “The relationship between positive and negative news must be well-managed. We must always support the guiding principle, which is to encourage unity and stability by emphasizing positive news. This principle must be followed with news reports … China is so vast and diverse, its development so unequal. While some areas are advanced, others lag far behind. Our country’s social development is fraught with contradiction, and problems appear often in many places. Suppose problems arise in each of our more than 2,800 counties. How those problems are viewed, and how they are reported – that is a question that must be treated correctly … The influence of propaganda is extensive. Failing to carefully analyze [content], or allowing negative reports to become too numerous or careless, results not only an incomplete picture of events but misleads the public, who begin to imagine problems are piling up. Such a slide in social morale negatively impacts social stability, the consequences of which may be incalculable” (See”新闻宣传要把好关把好度”, Press Frontline (新闻战线), March 2004.)

Fake News 虚假新闻

Written by David Bandurski on . Posted in Dictionary.

By some Chinese accounts, “fake news”, or xujia xinwen, has plagued news media in China since at least the Cultural Revolution, at which time media fabricated news to suit the political purposes of the Gang of Four. It is an extremely fuzzy term, and obviously, while it may be used by Chinese officialdom in campaigns against news regarded as unprofessional (or against party directives), could in its broadest sense (though not the official one) overlap with party propaganda itself.
When looking at fake news in mainland China, one of the toughest challenges is to separate genuine calls for professionalism from moves to control news unfavorable to the party. Over the last two decades, as economic reforms have moved ahead, the problem of fake news has certainly grown more serious. Many officials and academics point to the commercialization of media industry and intensified market competition as root causes – the need for a political reform and a more independent role for journalism as a “profession” is not addressed openly.
In June 2005, the Central Propaganda Department held a forum to discuss the issue. Reading between the lines, their definition of “fake news” predictably includes that which falls outside the purview of state news control, or “guidance of public opinion” (舆论导向). They mention the following tendencies in fake news: (1) more fake news is being outright fabricated, using flights of the imagination rather than real news materials; (2) more news is being exaggerated by media to generate public buzz; (3) there is more fake foreign news (including that generated by domestic journalists and that taken from foreign news sources); (4) non-journalists from different fields of the society are participating in the “creation of news”; (5) some well-known “mainstream” media also taking part in the creation and distribution of fake news; (6) the Internet is amplifying the influence and reach of fake news.
Writing in late 2005, one propaganda official for a local News Commentary Group (阅评组) in China addressed fake news and its causes: (1) journalists do not do work hard enough to verify the reliability of information in their stories; (2) journalists interpret stories in such a way as to exaggerate their importance (in other words, sensationalize them); (3) editors and reporters, knowing there are factual problems, modify problematic portions in such a way as to push the report through, circumventing controls; (4) some journalists lack the common sense necessary to distinguish true from false; (5) management practices are poor (by publication officials, top editors, etc) and there are no methods in place to ensure investigative reports conducted in areas outside the publication’s home turf are checked for accuracy. Beginning in 2001, The Journalist Monthly (新闻记者), a magazine on news media published by the Shanghai Academy for Social Sciences, began publishing an annual listed of “Top Ten Fake News”. Results from 2001 to 2005 are available on the publication’s website, or here through Xinhua News Agency.
[Posted by Brian Chan, May 11, 2006, 12:30pm]

The Four Unchangeables 党管媒体4不变

Written by David Bandurski on . Posted in Dictionary.

The “Four Unchangeables” is the buzzword for the central policy affirming the Communist Party’s control of the media under the rapid acceleration of commercialization and structural reforms. It can be seen as a policy cousin of Hu Jintao’s “Three Closenesses” (2002), which called for media to become more relevant to people’s lives (essentially, through commercialization) and “enlarging and strengthening”, which was about the creation of Chinese media groups fit to compete with international media groups like News Corp and Yahoo!. [See People’s Daily Online section on “multi-media groups”]. [More English-Chinese coverage of media conglomeration here]. The first articulation of the “Four Unchangeables” came on May 29, 2001, as Beijing All Media and Culture Group was officially launched in China’s capital. The opening ceremony was attended by media-minder big wigs like Propaganda Department vice-minister and SARFT head Xu Guangchun (徐光春), State Council Information Office head Li Bing (李冰), and top Beijing city officials. Representing Beijing’s Party committee and the city government, vice-secretary Long Xinmin (龙新民) said that under any conditions whatsoever, “the Party’s control of the media would not change (党管媒体不能变), the Party’s control of top media personnel would not change (党管干部不能变), the Party’s control over the ideological direction of media would not change (党管导向不能变), and the Party’s control over the asset structure of the media would not change (党管资产不能变)”. From this point on, most official reports about media consolidation, the formation of “news groups” etc., came hand-in-hand with mention of the “Four Unchangeables”.
In 2004, some mainland media reported a relaxing of restrictions on the operation of newspapers in China after Chongqing’s IT Home Publishing (电脑报社) and Zhong Ke Pu Media (重庆中科普传媒) teamed up with Hong Kong’s Tom Group. An official from the General Administration of Press and Publications, the media minders for publishing, stepped up to end the speculation and clarify exactly what the deal meant: “IT Home Publishing’s joint-venture (合资公司) is responsible only for the business side”, the official said. In other words, the Party would maintain tight controls over content – a clenched fist for politics and ideology, an open hand for business interests. In fact, the GAPP official said, IT Home was one of eight newspapers that had been designated by the Communist Party as an experiment in reform (by which they meant commercialization). The paper would be transformed from a “government-sponsored institution” (事业单位) to an “enterprise”. And this was not, as some media had reported, “the first news publishing joint-venture enterprise to be approved by GAPP since 1949”, officials said. The first such venture had in fact been the 2002 alliance between People’s Daily and Hong Kong’s Sing Tao News Corporation Limited (the publisher of Hong Kong’s Sing Tao Daily and The Standard. At the time, GAPP officials said total investment in this venture was 250 million yuan (US$31 million), with People’s Daily holding a 51 percent stake. [Company’s Website here, includes introduction touting the link-up as an illustration of China’s opening of its media to the “outside” following WTO entry. Its business scope is limited to retail distribution]
According to officials, the eight “newspapers” slated for commercial reforms included four newspaper groups and four newspapers. These were: Henan Daily Group, Xinhua Daily Group, Dazhong Daily Group (大众日报), Shenzhen Daily Group (深圳日报), IT Home (电脑报), China Securities News (中国证券报), Beijing Youth Daily (北京青年报) and Jin Wan Bao (今晚报). Then, as might be expected, came the “Four Unchangeables”. The GAPP official said: “These eight experiments in cooperation and restructuring have one thing in common, and that is that they are limited [in their cooperation] to the realm of business (经营领域). They are entrusted with business operations. They do not have the right to publish (出版权) or media proprietorship (媒体所有权). The right to publish and media proprietorship are exclusive rights of the newspaper’s sponsoring institution (主管单位).”
The GAPP official emphasized that the premise of restructuring [in the media] was to differentiate media and carry out reforms to the business side of newspaper groups. “But no matter how they are reformed”, he said, “the Party’s control of the media would not change, the Party’s control of top media personnel would not change, the Party’s control over the ideological direction of media would not change, and the Party’s control over the asset structure of the media would not change”.
[Posted by David Bandurski, May 22, 2006, 5:08pm]

Chinese leaders intensify propaganda orders and jargon of control in run-up to 17th Congress

Written by David Bandurski on . Posted in Headlines and Hashtags.

As a general rule the atmosphere for Chinese media grows more restrictive in the run-up to key political sessions. With China’s crucial 17th Party Congress just two months away (specific dates yet undetermined), propaganda authorities are readying themselves to keep a tight grip on public opinion. The tools at their disposal: abstract theoretical communiqués and concrete orders and bans.
In dense Communist Party jargon, propaganda department head Liu Yunshan (刘云山), also a politburo member, reminded party members in a speech last month (published in the latest issue of Building the Party magazine and excerpted on the Web yesterday) that:
As the 17th Party Congress approaches, publicity preparation in anticipation [of the session] also enters a new phase. We must, in accordance with the demands of the central party, push ahead with basic work on a number of fronts. The overarching idea is to: cleave to Deng Xiaoping Theory and the “Three Represents” as guiding ideologies, to further, see through and realize the scientific development view, being careful to maintain a high degree of uniformity with the central party under Comrade Hu Jintao as general secretary, making sound preparations for the 17th Party Congress our primary political duty …
The close of Liu Yunshan’s ponderous preamble — also thick with phrases like “singing the main theme”, “maintaining correct guidance [of public opinion]”, and “promoting social harmony” – contains the overarching point: the need to “create a desirable theoretical environment, public opinion environment, cultural environment and thought environment in society in order for the party’s 17th Congress to open victoriously” (为党的十七大胜利召开营造良好的理论氛围、舆论氛围、文化氛围和社会思想氛围).
The bottom line: intensified CONTROL.
Liu Yunshan’s words are the external face of the propaganda apparatus, the one you can find readily in state-run publications and on the Web. In terms familiar to the initiated, it says, essentially, that cadres all need to step in line with the top man, Hu Jintao, and keep a lid on things during a politically sensitive time in order to maintain a firm grip on power.
The view from the inside is more direct, and is all about the mechanics of control. Take this recent missive, which addresses one of China’s biggest news topics of the summer, the story of the use of child laborers at a brick kiln in Shanxi Province. The order was sent recently to major Web portals across China:
[Websites must] intensify public opinion guidance and management on the Internet of the Shanxi Kiln Affair. Recently, the mistreatment and detention of underage workers at the Shanxi kiln has continued to draw a high level of attention from Web users. [Websites must] regularly release positive and authoritative information, and regularly report information about related people receiving medical treatment and being safely relocated, leading to favorable online public opinion. Internet opinion must cool off rapidly, and language using every opportunity to attack the party and government, attack our country’s socialist system, attack our country’s human rights [situation], and stir the emotions of Web users must be discovered quickly and removed as it appears in Web postings, chatrooms, Weblogs and other interactive programs.
As was this one:
Concerning reports on the Shanxi Kiln Affair, websites must move quickly to tone it down, dealing strictly with related content. Already existing reports must be immediately deleted from the homepages of websites and from the main news pages. Aside from authoritative information from relevant government offices and from the investigation in Shanxi province as released by key central party news outfits [i.e., Xinhua News Agency, People’s Daily], other new reports that come out must not be given prominent positioning (不上头条), be placed in top news sections, allow Web postings (跟帖), or be given links to special sections [devoted to coverage of the story]. Severely monitor forums, blogs, instant information and other interactive forms, and immediately delete extreme language and harmful or bad information.
In recent months, offices charged with controlling the Web, such as the Information Office of the State Council, have been increasingly vigilant as propaganda authorities redirect their focus to reflect the growing influence of the Internet. But traditional media, including central party media, have also been warned to remain extra cautious during the next few months. The following order went out to central party media in the middle of June:
Directions on Reporting of 17th Party Congress
(1) From now onwards, creating a favorable environment for the 17th Party Congress is most important for us all. All reports must be encompassed by this demand as they are carried out. All units must conduct an examination of their own reports and programs, and those not appropriate must be readjusted immediately. [Media must work] with political consciousness [of the party line and party interests], awareness of the overall situation [of the strategy and interests of the central party/大局], and a sense of responsibility.
[Frontpage Photo: Cover of a back issue of Dangjian, or “Building the Party” magazine, published by the Central Propaganda Department]

Preface to "The Age of Warm Words", a volume of editorials from Southern Metropolis Daily [CHINESE]

Written by David Bandurski on . Posted in Research.

In his preface, He Xuefeng explores the origins and shape of China’s burgeoning interest in editorial writing, specifically the trend of current affairs editorial writing at major newspapers across the country. His preface begins: At the dawn of this new century, Southern Metropolis Daily’s inception and continued expansion of its commentary section was a sign of things to come. Newspapers all over the country then vied to create their own commentary sections, which precipitated all at once what has been called China’s third “wave of current affairs commentary.” The mushrooming of these editorial sections is doubtless a bright spot in the development of Chinese media. Moreover, the unflagging participation of Web users and the public [in this process] and new alliances between newspapers and public intellectuals demonstrates that Chinese society yearns for and is capable of expression, so that some have talked of the arrival of an “age of citizen writing” to describe this phenomenon.
So, what are the characteristics of this “age of citizen writing”? What is its relationship to the rise and popularity of the current affairs editorial? And what will its impact be on China’s future? [LINK HERE]

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