Author: David Bandurski

Now Executive Director of the China Media Project, leading the project’s research and partnerships, David originally joined the project in Hong Kong in 2004. He is the author of Dragons in Diamond Village (Penguin), a book of reportage about urbanization and social activism in China, and co-editor of Investigative Journalism in China (HKU Press).

Key drafter of information release legislation suggests journalists will be excluded

Written by David Bandurski on . Posted in Headlines and Hashtags.

Since news over a year ago that China’s national ordinance on government information openness (政府信息公开条例) was in the works, CMP has focused attention on how such legislation might impact news media. In our view, the effectiveness of the ordinance, and the realization of the government’s commitment to transparency, depends in large part on the degree to which Chinese media are permitted to serve the public’s right to know (知情权) [CMP on yesterday’s release of the text of the openness legislation].
But today, as professor Zhou Hanhua (周汉华), who played a key role in the drafting of the ordinance, spoke with Chinese media, there were hints the effectiveness of the ordinance would be hampered by the same problem that has plagued openness legislation in China from the beginning — the role of journalism and the identity of the journalist.
Speaking with Beijing’s Morning Post, Zhou Hanhua, a professor of law with the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS), was asked how the new legislation would impact news reporting. Here is the exchange as it appeared at Sina.com:
Reporter: As a journalist, am I right to understand that once the ordinance goes into effect, as long as the content [I’m looking for] is to be released [under the provisions of the ordinance], government organs should not avoid my request for coverage (or “gathering of news”/采访)?

Zhou: I can only say that the media’s right to interview and the citizen’s right to know are different, and that media are not vested with special rights. The content stipulated in this ordinance focuses centrally on protecting the citizen’s right to know.
That is to say, if a government at whatever level understands information release as holding a single press conference then they are wrong. But in the ordinance as it was publicized, this point is not sufficiently clear, and that’s one regrettable aspect of the ordinance.
The ambiguity, which Zhou seems to find regrettable — the professor told CMP repeatedly in an interview last August that the ordinance would apply to “anyone” (任何人) — concerns the difference between “citizens” and “journalists”, between the citizen’s “right to know” and the journalist’s “right to gather news” (采访权). This lack of clarity, which speaks to the more fundamental issue of party press controls in China, has to recall for Chinese journalists the case of Liberation Daily reporter Ma Cheng, who tried suing Shanghai’s city planning authorities almost a year ago under Shanghai’s own information release statute after he was denied information, and whose career as a journalist was ended as a result [June 2006 coverage from CMP]. While many Chinese journalists and academics see news media as critical facilitators of the public’s right to know, media are still regarded in China as agents of the party’s will and as a means to control, or “guide”, public opinion.
Zhou’s response to the Morning Post reporter suggests the ordinance, when and if it takes effect in May 2008, will have little direct impact on the work of journalists in China. Even while the ordinance is historic in terms of the promises it makes to Chinese citizens, this gap in the legislation should also raise tough questions about its overall effectiveness.
[Posted by David Bandurski, April 25, 2007, 1:58pm]

China sends mixed message as it releases text of new government transparency legislation

Written by David Bandurski on . Posted in Headlines and Hashtags.

As top government leaders released the much-anticipated text today of national legislation offering Chinese citizens better access to information and promising a new era of government transparency, the country’s most elite coterie of party leaders sent a very different message: control of speech on the Internet must be strengthened. Confirmation came, meanwhile, that Liu Binjie (柳斌杰), a close protege of President Hu Jintao, has taken the place of Long Xinmin (龙新民) as head of China’s General Administration of Press and Publications, a move that should solidify the top leader’s grip on news media ahead of the 17th Party Congress this fall. [BELOW: Screenshot of news coverage this morning on Sina.com, with announcement of Web controls and the openness of information ordinance stacked together].

3.jpg

The news items, which appeared together at several major Web portals, re-iterated the deep ambivalence that has marked so-called “media reform” in China since the 1990s, in which the forces of change and control work have worked in seeming dissonance.
The much-awaited text of China’s national ordinance on release of government information (中华人民共和国政府信息公开条例), approved by Premier Wen Jiabao last January, confirmed previous hints as to what its provisions might be. The ordinance, which will not go into effect until May 2008, appears, on paper at least, to scrap the norm of one-sided release of information (at leaders’ discretion) in favor of applicant’s rights. It outlines procedures for citizen application for access to a range of government information. [SEE David Bandurski’s “China’s Gloomy Governance Reform”, Far Eastern Economic Review, March 2007, for a discussion of the legislation and its possible ramifications for Chinese news media]. CMP’s rough translation of the full text of the ordinance on government information release is appended at the end of this post.
Meanwhile, in a politburo session led by — who else? — President Hu Jintao, China’s innermost circle of party leaders sent a strong message out to the country’s online media: watch out for tightening controls.
While much of the beginning of the Xinhua News Agency announcement of the session focused on the “unhealthy” influence of the Internet on China’s youth, the message, couched as ever in breathless party jargon, was more overarching control of China’s Internet:
It is to the benefit of raising the thought and moral character and the scientific and cultural character of the whole people, to the benefit of expanding the radiating power and infectiousness of Socialist spiritual culture, and to the benefit of building a Socialist harmonious society that we strongly develop an Internet culture with Chinese characteristics, strengthening the building and management of online culture, and thoroughly utilizing the important role of the Internet and other information networks in the building of Chinese Socialist culture.
Confirmation also came today that Liu Binjie (柳斌杰) will replace Long Xinmin (龙新民) as head of China’s General Administration of Press and Publications (GAPP), the State Council office charged with overseeing newspapers and magazines as well as publishing in China. Liu, who has served as deputy head of GAPP since 2004, is a close ally of President Hu Jintao.
The text of China’s national ordinance on release of government information follows:
————————————–
People’s Republic of China Ordinance on Openness of Government Information (FULL TEXT)
Xinhua News Agency, April 24, 2007
State Council Decree 492
The People’s Republic of China Ordinance on Openness of Government Information was passed at the 165th executive meeting of the State Council on January 17, 2007. It is hereby publicized, and is to go into effect from May 1, 2008.
Premier Wen Jiabao (温家宝)
April 5, 2007
People’s Republic of China Ordinance on Openness of Government Information
Chapter I: General Provisions
Article 1: This ordinance is instituted in order to ensure that citizens, legal persons and other organizations may obtain government information in accordance with the law, to raise the transparency of government work, promote legal governance, and thoroughly bring into play the service function of government information in the productivity and lives of the masses and in economic and social events.

Article 2: The government information referenced in this ordinance is that which is either created or obtained in the exercise of [official] functions, information that is recorded and preserved in whatever form.Article 3: People’s Governments at all levels must strengthen their leadership and organization on government information openness.
The State Council Office is the principal office in charge (主管部门) of national work concerning openness of government information, responsible for promoting, leading, coordinating and supervising nationwide work on openness of government information.
The People’s Government office of the county level or above, or other principal offices designated by People’s Governments at the county level or above, are responsible for promoting, leading, coordinating and supervising nationwide work on openness of government information for that administrative region.
Article 4: People’s Governments and People’s Government offices of the county level or above should set up comprehensive (建立健) systems for carrying out the work of openness of government information for their State organs, and the designated organ (hereafter referred to at the openness of government information organ) is responsible for the daily work of openness of government information for this administrative area.
The specific responsibilities of the openness of government information organ are as follows:
1. To undertake all specific matters concerning openness of government information for State organs;
2. To protect and update all publicly available [“open”] government information for State organs;
3. To organize and work out openness of government information guides, openness of government information directories and openness of government information annual reports for State organs;
4. To examine all government information for matters of secrecy;
5. Other duties concerning openness of government information designated by State organs.
Article 5: State organs should keep to the principles of impartiality, fairness and convenience for citizens in openness of government information.
Article 6: State organs should release government information in a timely and accurate manner. In cases where State organs discover false or incomplete information influencing social stability or disturbing social order (扰乱社会管理秩序), they should release accurate government information within the scope of their duties.
Article 7: comprehensive systems for information release and its coordination. When information released by State organs concerns other State organs, communication and confirmation should be made with relevant State organs to ensure the accuracy and consistency of the information released by State organs.
If information released by State organs concerns national regulations, it must first be approved, and that which has not been approved may not be released.
Article 8: State organs must not endanger national security, public security, economic security and social stability in the release of government information.
Chapter II: Scope of [information] Release
Article 9: State organs should take the initiative (主动公开) in releasing government information that meets any one of the criteria listed below [IE: as a matter of course]:
1. Concerns the vital interests (切身利益) of citizens, legal persons or other organizations;
2. Requires the broad knowledge or participation of the public;
3. Concerns the organizational setup, duties, or administrative procedures of State organs;
4. Other information that must be released as a matter of course according to other laws, regulations or national regulations.
Article 10: People’s Governments and their offices at the county level and above should, according to Article 8 of this ordinance, determine the specific content of government information to be released on initiative within the scope of their duties, with emphasis on information of the following types:
1. Regulatory documents and regulations and rules of State organs;
2. National economic and social development plans, planning for special projects (专项规划), regional planning and related policies;
3. Statistical information on national economic and social development;
4. Reports on fiscal budgeting and final accounts [on revenue and expenditure];
5. Information on programs, basis and standards (项目、依据、标准) for fees and charges for administrative work;
6. Information on projects, records, standards and their implementation for centralized purchasing by the government;
7. Information on matters of administrative approvals, including basis [for approvals], conditions, numbers (数量), procedures, periods [or terms], and records of all materials provided for application according to administrative requirements and the circumstances of their handling;
8. Information related to the approval of major building projects and the circumstances of their implementation;
9. Information on policies and measures concerning poverty alleviation, education, healthcare, social pensions and employment, etc., and the circumstances of their implementation;
10. Information on advanced planning for dealing with emergencies and public events (突发公共事件), information on early warning and response.
11. Information on inspection and monitoring for environmental protection, public health, production safety, food and medicine safety and product quality.
Article 11: Priority information for release by designated city-level people’s governments and county-level people’s governments should also include the following:
1. Information concerning major projects for urban and rural building and management;
2. Information concerning the state of public welfare projects;
3. Information concerning the requisition or use of land, eviction and demolition of homes and compensation, the allocation of subsidies and the circumstances of their use;
4. Information on the management and use and circumstances of allocation for emergency rescues and disaster relief work, veteran benefits, social relief, charity contributions and other funds.
Article 12: People’s governments in villages and townships should, in accordance with Article 9 of this ordinance, determine that information to be released of their own accord within the scope of their obligations, with emphasis on the following types of government information:
1. Information concerning the state of exercise and implementation of national policies for rural work (农村工作);
2. Information on the state of the management and use of revenues and expenditures and special funds;
3. Information on overall land-use planning for villages and townships, and the state of examinations for the use of zhaijidi (宅基地).
4. Information concerning the requisition or use of land, eviction and demolition of homes and compensation, the allocation of subsidies and the circumstances of their use;
5. Information concerning the state of creditors rights and TK,
（五）乡（镇）的债权债务、筹资筹劳情况；
6. Information on allocations for emergency rescues and disaster relief work, veteran benefits, social relief, charity contributions and other funds.
7. Information concerning contracting, leasing or auctioning activities involving collective enterprises of townships or villages, or other economic bodies of townships or villages;
8. Information on the state of reproduction policies.
Article 13: Aside from those types of information belonging to release by initiative (主动公开) of State organs outlines in Articles 9, 10, 11, and 12, citizens, legal persons or other organizations can, according to their particular production, life, research and other needs, make an application for obtaining government information with offices of the State Council, people’s governments at various regional levels and local people’s government offices at the county level and above.
Article 14: State organs must create comprehensive systems for examination and protection of secrecy in government information for release, clearly setting out examination procedures and lines of responsibility.
Prior to release of government information, State organs must conduct examination in accordance with Law of the People’s Republic of China on Guarding State Secrets [http://www.265ks.com/englishlearning/a/a5/200608/250533.html] and other laws and regulations of the government information to be released.
In the event the administrative organ cannot determine whether the information in question can or cannot be made public, they should according to laws and rules and relevant national regulations, make a report for determination to the relevant principle office in charge or the office at the same administrative level in charge of matters of secrecy.
State organs cannot release government information touching on national secrets, commercial secrets and personal privacy. However, in cases where the consent of the rightful party is obtained, or the administrative organ determines that not releasing certain government information touching on commercial secrecy or personal privacy could do serious harm to the public interest, release may be made.
Chapter III: Methods and Procedures for Disclosure
Article 15: State organs should release that government information designated for release by initiative through means most convenient for public knowledge, such as government communiqués, government Websites, press conferences, radio and television.
Article 16: People’s governments at various levels should designate areas within national archives and public libraries where government information may be accessed, and prepare the appropriate facilities and equipment for enabling citizens, legal persons or other organizations to obtain government information conveniently.State organs may, according to their needs, establish public reading rooms, material request points, information message boards, electronic information screens and other areas or facilities for the release of government information.
State organs should provide to national archives and public libraries on a timely basis that information designated for release on initiative (主动公开的政府信息).
Article 17: Government information generated by state organs shall be released under the responsibility of that state organ; government information obtained from citizens, legal persons or other organizations shall be released under the responsibility of that state organ keeping the information on file. The purview of release of government information is determined in other laws and regulations (法律、法规对政府信息公开的权限另有规定的，从其规定).
Article 18: Government information falling under the scope of release by initiative should be released within 20 days of its date of origination or update. The purview of release of government information is determined in other laws and regulations (法律、法规对政府信息公开的权限另有规定的，从其规定).
Article 19: State organs should prepare and publicize guides for government information release (政府信息公开指南) and catalogs of government information on file, which are to be updated in a timely manner.
Guides on government information release should include types of government information, their systems for arrangement, methods for obtaining information, the names of government information release organizations, their office addresses, office hours, contact telephones, fax numbers and electronic mailing addresses etc.
Government information release catalogs should include indexes, names, content summaries, dates and other such content for government information.
Article 20: Citizens, legal persons or other organizations who apply with state organs to obtain government information according to the prescriptions of Article 13 [of this ordinance] should submit their requests in writing (this can include digital document forms); applicants who have difficulty making written requests may raise [these requests] orally, to be submitted in writing on their behalf through the state organ to which there are submitting their request.
Requests for government information should including the following:
1. The surname or full name of the applicant and their contact information;
2. A description of the government information sought in the application;
3. Expectations of the format in which the government information requested [is to be provided].
Article 21: State organs shall respond to requests for release of government information in the following ways for the following situations:
1. For [requests] falling within the scope of release (属于公开范围的), [state organs] should inform the applicant of the methods and channels through which they may obtain the government information.
2. For [requests] falling outside the scope of release, [state organs] should notify the applicant and clearly state the reasons;
3. In case where by law the information does not belong to the state organ [to which the request is made], or where the government information does not exist, the applicant should be notified, and in cases where the [proper] releasing state organ can be determined, [the state organ to which the request is made] should provide the applicant with the name of the [proper] state organ and contact information.
4. In cases where the content requested is unclear, [state organs] should notify the applicant and request they amend or supplement their application.
Article 22: In cases where the government information requested contains information that should not be released, but [the information] can be handled selectively, state organs should provide to the applicant any content that can be provided.
Article 23: In cases where the state organ feels the government information requested belongs to the category of commercial secrecy, personal privacy, or could be harmful to the legal rights of a third party if made public, they should seek the opinion of the third party in writing; if the third party does not agree to release, [the information] may not be released. However, if the state organ deems that not releasing the information could have a major impact on the public interest, [the information] should be released, and written notice describing the content and the reasons [for its release] should be made to the third party.
Article 24: When responses can be made on the spot for applications for release of government information, state organs should answer the request on the spot.
When responses cannot be made on the spot for applications for release of government information, state organs should answer the application within 15 working days of submission of the request; if there is a need to extend the period of response, permission should first be sought with the organ responsible for government information release work, notice should be made to the applicant, and extensions to the period of response may not exceed 15 working days.
In cases where the release of government information touches on the rights of a third party, the time required for the state organ to seek the opinion of the third party is not figured in to the period stated in the second paragraph of this article.
Article 25: Citizens, legal persons or other organizations make application to state organs to obtain government information pertaining to their own taxes, social security, healthcare, etc. [they] should present valid identification or other documents of proof.
If citizens, legal persons or other organizations can demonstrate that information provided by state organs concerning themselves is inaccurate, they have the right to request that the state organ make corrections. If the state organ [in question] is not entrusted to make corrections, it must refer the information to the state organ that is entrusted and inform the applicant.
Article 26: State organs should provide government information according to the format requested by the applicant; when unable to provide [information] in the format requested by the applicant, [information] may be provided by arranging for reading of relevant materials by the applicant, provision of copies or other appropriate means.

. . . IN PROGRESS
MORE SOURCES:
“China issues landmark decree to encourage gov’t transparency“, Xinhua News Agency (English), April 24, 2007
[On GAPP head Liu Binjie] “The Chinese media market is ‘absolutely open’“, Danwei.org, April 19, 2006
[Posted by David Bandurski, April 24, 2007, 5:33pm]

Extortion or official bribery? Zhejiang court rules journalist Meng Huaihu must be punished as a public servant

Written by David Bandurski on . Posted in Headlines and Hashtags.

In a case touching on the question of journalist identity in China and recalling the recent Lan Chengzhang story, a local Zhejiang court overturned a prior verdict in the “news extortion” case of Meng Huaihu (孟怀虎), former Zhejiang bureau chief for China Commercial Times, who was accused of extorting money from companies using the threat of negative news reports. The intermediate court in Hangzhou ruled yesterday that the right to watchdog journalism is a “public right” (公共权利) — that journalists doing monitoring, in other words, are performing a public duty — and that Meng is therefore guilty of the common executive offense of bribery, a far more serious crime than extortion. Meng’s jail term has been extended to 12 years from the previous seven-year sentence. [BELOW: Screenshot from QQ.com showing Meng Huaihu appearing before the court in Hangzhou].

5.jpg

While China does not work on a system of legal precedent, the Zhejiang court’s decision could be read as a blow to proponents of a more independent monitoring role for the press in China, for whom the term Chinese term for watchdog journalism, or “supervision by public opinion” (舆论监督), is a stand-in for the more taboo term “press freedom” (新闻自由).
Meng Huaihu had countered prosecutors back in February by arguing that China’s laws concerning media were imperfect on the question of whether he should be tried as an ordinary citizen or as a public servant, and he should not be asked as a result to bear such a heavy responsibility.
China Commercial Times is a Beijing-based business paper published by the All-China Federation of Industry and Commerce (ACFIC).
Meng was quietly removed from his position in 2005 after allegedly trying to force an advertising contract from China Petroleum and Chemical Company (Sinopec) by threatening to write a negative news report. China issued a ban on news coverage of the affair, and for months the only trace remaining of the China Commercial Times incident was a report from September 2005 in which ACFIC’s chairman called the incident “a painful lesson” and vowed the paper would clean up its act by “grasping the lessons of the Marxist View of Journalism, [former President Jiang Zemin’s] Three Represents and the Three Lessons [training program for media personnel, which emphasizes upholding the Party’s principles in news work].”
In May 2006, Meng Huaihu suddenly surfaced again in an official Xinhua news bulletin detailing acts of news extortion (新闻敲诈) allegedly carried out by journalists from the provincial bureaus of four Beijing-based newspapers, including China Commercial Times. The bulletin was a stern warning to newspapers in China to clean up their regional news bureaus [Coverage from CMP]. [Coverage from ESWN].[Coverage from South China Morning Post].
MORE SOURCES:
“Prosecutors in Zhejiang news extortion case argue former bureau chief’s actions amount to official bribery“, China Media Project, February 28, 2007
[Posted by David Bandurski, April 20, 2007, 5:20pm]

Southern Metropolis Daily addresses cultural and institutional issues behind the “Wall of Shame” story

Written by David Bandurski on . Posted in Headlines and Hashtags.

Given a targeted official ban against Web portals re-running editorials from Southern Metropolis Daily — a nasty move, but also a nod to the newspaper’s influence among readers — you might not have run across the newspaper’s reflections today on Gansu’s “Walls of Shame”, a story reported yesterday by the official Xinhua News Agency. CMP noted yesterday that the Gansu story begged tough institutional questions about how China’s policy of the “new Socialist countryside” is being implemented at the local level. [PDF of today’s editorial page at Southern Metropolis Daily, pdf_article843.pdf].
The Southern Metropolis Daily editorial does not shrink from the deeper import of the “wall of shame” story. It argues that the idea of a “new countryside” is not about new building projects, or even the making over of peasant homes, but rather about the need for a new conceptual approach to dealing with the welfare of China’s rural poor. The final paragraph directly references related institutional problems, and urges readers to think about them as they read the Gansu story.
Portions of the editorial follow:
Gansu’s Yongjing County has been designated as a national priority area for poverty relief (国家扶贫重点县), with a poverty rate of 10 percent, going as high as 70 percent in some villages and townships. But reporting in the area recently, Xinhua News Agency reporters found that “walls of shame” had been erected in nine places on both sides of the highway, totaling some two kilometers, and that these were there to obstruct the view of the dilapidated home and courtyards of the peasants. What is most significant is that for many of the peasants whose homes have been blocked off by the wall of shame, food and water [supplies] are basic needs, and because they have insufficient money to buy bricks to use in building aqueducts, they cannot get water into the villages. And according to the [Xinhua] report, one meter of this “wall of shame” costs around 100 yuan. According to a leader in one of the villages 40,000 yuan was spent for their 400 meter section of wall.
Perhaps for some Party and government offices, the outer beauty of the countryside and pretended splendor are more important than the real-life realities of these villagers. For some leaders, the broken-down homes stand to affect their achievements fighting poverty [in the eyes of their superiors], and so the idea of a wall to hide their many inadequacies was hatched and quickly carried out. They made no effort to seek the opinions of the villagers … and was they were after was the elevation of their local image, particularly that they would win points in the eyes of their superior leaders when they visited on inspection tours.
This kind of high-wall culture has long been a form of self-protection in traditional culture. It is a kind of precaution against the outside world, designed to provide ease of mind. As our society progresses (随着社会文明进步), many cities have begun to advocate the opening of walls and [the creation of more] green space, allowing the space outside and inside walls come together. Gansu’s Yongjing County has opened a new chapter in the history of wall culture, turning it to another end. They have taken monies intended for the people and applied it to build walls against them, disguising the realities of poverty …
The building of a new countryside is not about the “new building of the villages”. It should not be a new re-packaging of the cultural wall. Nor can we simply achieve it by rebuilding the homes of peasants. What the new countryside demands are new human concepts (人文理念). It is about paying attention to the lives and productivity of the peasants to raise the overall strength of the countryside. Some areas have allowed for the building of villas using rural loan programs, lending the countryside the appearance of modernity virtually overnight, but in the end the peasants are unable to repay these loans and become bankrupt and dispirited. The basic sense of the new countryside is allowing for a countryside capable of sustainable production and living …
As we question the political conscience of these local leaders, we must also ask ourselves about the related [leadership] systems. We must address the system to prevent this “aesthetics of pretense” (假象美学) and ensure various regions are not overrun with walls of shame. This is the key to rooting out vicious local governance that cheats and deceives the world.
[Posted by David Bandurski, April 19, 2007, 2:15pm]

China’s Ministry of Culture announces new licensing rules on cultural professions

Written by David Bandurski on . Posted in Headlines and Hashtags.

China’s top cultural officials announced at a meeting in Beijing yesterday that the country would institute a new licensing system this year for employment in the cultural sector. Reportedly in the works for five years, the system would mean those employed in close to 30 cultural areas, including the cinematic arts, dance and singing, would be required to undergo professional examination and apply for government-issued licenses.
The purpose of the new system, said officials, was to “raise the level of and character of the cultural industries and their practitioners to satisfy the [goal of] building an advanced Socialist culture.”
Details of the licensing system were not yet available, but Chinese Web users heaped criticism on the new procedures in postings following news coverage at major Web portals.
“I’m sure this is just finding a reason to take money!” fumed one Web user. “Regulations like this are clearly a step backwards, the kind of thing we’d expect to see during the planned economy era. That government offices can think up such policies to suit their own interests, it really makes one doubt their ability to lead!”
Wrote another:
This is a terrible regulation! If you talk about doctors, lawyers, engineers or teachers then requiring a professional license for employment is necessary. But requiring documentation for singing and dancing is too much and inhibits the development of the cultural spirit. True art is of the people, created by the people and belongs to the people.
Others expressed concern that the licensing process would make it impossible for talents like Yang Liping (杨丽萍), a popular singer and dancer from China’s Bai minority, to break through the barriers to success:
If this was how things worked [before], Yang Liping and others like her wouldn’t have had any way of getting out there.

MORE SOURCES:
“Propaganda head Liu Yunshan promotes commercialization of media to strengthen China’s ‘cultural soft power’”
[Posted by David Bandurski, April 19, 2007, 10:39am]

Rural poverty and the “new countryside”: Xinhua News Agency investigates Gansu’s “Wall of Shame”

Written by David Bandurski on . Posted in Headlines and Hashtags.

CMP’s gaze is often turned to commercial newspapers and Websites in China, which represent the best and the worst of what Chinese media have to offer. But while the contrast between party and commercial media (the “P” and the “C”, as we like to call them) can be useful [See CMP example here], there are always surprises in China’s chaotic media universe.
The surprise today is a decent investigative report from China’s official Xinhua News Agency detailing the building by local officials of a wall along a stretch of road in Gansu’s Yongjing (永靖) County to disguise rural poverty in the area. [BELOW: Screenshot of Gansu story covered at Sina.com].

6.jpg

The story begins:
Gansu Province’s Yongjing County is a national focus of poverty alleviation, with roughly 10 percent of the population living in poverty, 70 percent in several townships and villages. Recently, nine shiny and clean walls were erected along portions of the public roads in this county, and those new to the area might find this strange.
What are these walls for? According to the local government these are “civilized walls” for the greening and beautifying of the countryside, but local peasants, not mincing words, refer to them as “walls of shame”.
The Xinhua story goes on to describe the many inconveniences caused to local peasants, including the blocking of doors and windows, as a result of the wall’s construction. The wall adds to the miseries of residents, says the story, who already have no running water and insufficient supplies of grain and other essentials.
The story quotes local leaders as saying — and here’s the broader policy import — that the building of the wall is part of its effort in the “building of a new countryside” (新农村建设).
[Posted by David Bandurski, April 18, 2007, 1:35pm]

Debate over media professionalism continues in the wake of the “tea causes inflammation” case

Written by David Bandurski on . Posted in Headlines and Hashtags.

As the “tea causes inflammation” (茶水发炎) controversy and the tragedy of Yang Lijuan grab the eyeballs of consumers, Chinese media are turning to a question very close to home — what are their professional obligations?
In an article yesterday, China Youth Daily, a newspaper published by Chinese Communist Youth League, published the results of a brief survey in which readers were asked whether they felt media were looking after the public interest in carrying out an undercover investigation of hospital care, or whether it had failed to abide by journalistic ethics.
Of 3,309 respondents, the paper said, just under half supported the actions of the media. More than 25 percent said reporting in the case violated journalistic codes, was unprofessional, and did little to improve the “building of a harmonious relationship” between doctors and patients.
China Youth Daily quoted Zhan Jiang (展江), a former CMP fellow and professor of journalism at China Youth University for Political Sciences, as saying: “While the ‘tea causes inflammation’ affair exposes problems in China’s health sector, it also brings conflict over professional journalism ethics before the public.” This was a question, said Zhan, about ways (道义论) and whether they justify the means (目的论).
MORE SOURCES:
“Didn’t you know tea causes inflammation?“, Zhang Ping, Southern Metropolis Daily, April 17, 2007
“Looking at the ‘double edged sword’ of the media through the ‘tea causes inflammation’ case“, Guangming Daily, April 17, 2007
“The ‘tea causes inflammation’ case will become a healthcare anecdote“, Guangming Daily, April 17, 2007
“The ‘tea causes inflammation’ case raises controversy over media ethics“, Xinhua News Agency, April 16, 2007
[Posted by David Bandurski, April 17, 2007, 3:05pm]

Long live comrade Fang Yonggang! The battle begins over the heart of the 17th Party Congress

Written by David Bandurski on . Posted in Headlines and Hashtags.

Over the last two weeks, Fang Yonggang (方永刚) has become a household name in China. He is not a star athlete, not a leading man in the latest Chinese blockbuster. But this obscure naval academy professor is, according to the wave of “public opinion” now boosting him high above the pack, a man to be universally admired and emulated. He is also the latest pawn in play in the great political chessgame leading up to China’s 17th Party Congress in October. [BELOW: Screenshot of Fang Yonggang features page at Sohu.com].

7.jpg

Nothing at all in the east-is-red media blitz of the Fang Yonggang story suggests it is anything more than a silly throwback to the ideological campaigns of China’s past. Moral, social and political models are of course nothing new in China. Through the 1990s, fresh models and heros, particularly those of moral fortitude, appeared in China’s media every two or three months — a recycled pantheon of caricatured, wooden Lei Fengs.
And certainly, the Communist Party fight song piping up on China Central Television’s special Fang Yonggang page is enough to induce eye-rolling laughter …But not so fast, before you move on to those headliners about Wen Jiabao’s visit with Shinzo Abe, or foreign direct investment in China.
Fang Yonggang was catapulted into the Party’s official news after President Hu Jintao paid a high-profile visit on February 20 to the professor’s hospital bed, where he is still recovering from a life-threatening illness. Hu Jintao reportedly learned of Fang’s situation on January 24 through an internal reference document, and responded by issuing an official memorandum: “We must do everything in our power to save Comrade Fang Yonggang’s life. And we must earnestly draw together and disseminate his advanced achievements.”
What are those “advanced achievements” exactly?
Fang Yonggang has been a contributor to much of President Hu Jintao’s own ideological armory — idea’s like “harmonious society“, the “scientific view of development”, etcetera. So elevating Fang Yonggang — who has the emotive and strategic advantages of being both seriously ill and a member of China’s armed forces — is to elevate the ideological “core values” of the sitting president. It is not an infantile game of perceptions, but in fact goes to the heart of Hu Jintao’s legacy and power.
Which is why Hu’s emotional visit to Fang Yonggang’s bedside …
Entering a sickroom full of fresh flowers, Hu Jintao warmly went forward to the sickbed where Fang Yonggang lay and extended both hands. Fang Yonggang, who had just undergone treatment and was half lying down in bed, tried with all his strength to sit up. Hu Jintao sprang forward, clasping his hands, and said: “Lie down, quickly lie down.”
Sitting at Fang Yonggang’s side, Hu Jintao said affably: “Today is the third day of the new year. I wanted to come especially to see you, to ask after both you and your family in the New Spring!” Fang Yonggang said with emotion: “Thank you, Hu Jintao!” (People’s Daily)
… was followed on April 9 with an announcement by Li Changchun (李长春), the powerful politburo standing committee member in charge of ideology, that Fang Yonggang’s “advanced achievements” should be studied and emulated by everyone.
The import was clear: Hu Jintao’s ideology and policies are the way forward for China, and Party officials should respect this fact as China’s approaches the all-important 17th Party Congress, where the sitting president hopes to exercise a decisive influence over the political report coming out of that plenary session, thereby controlling the Party’s “prevailing consensus” for the next five years.
A debate has lately been brewing just slightly under the surface in China about how exactly the Party should define its direction ideologically coming out of the 17th Party Congress. Hu Jintao, clearly, is blowing his own horn, and there have been indications that he might attempt this October to have his own theories written into the party constitution, a move that would bolster his legacy and solidify his hold on power.
An article by scholar Dong Degang (董德刚) in the March issue of the official magazine Scientific Socialism (科学社会主义) suggested a number of cadres, “including high-level officials and old comrades”, were wary of attempts to modify the party’s constitution at each CCP plenary session, and urged a cautious approach to adding President Hu’s theories to the document.
Dong pointed out that the 15th Party Congress had written Deng Xiaoping Theory into the party constitution, and that the 16th Party Congress in 2002 had thrown Jiang Zemin’s “Three Represents” into the mix. He argued that making amendments every four or five years showed insuffient respect for the party constitution. According to a summary of Dong’s arguments from Hong Kong’s Sing Tao Daily, he said the entry of Jiang’s “Three Represents” into the party constitution had “a definite negative impact by creating a market for the theories of one set of plenary leaders” with the goal of “firming up an individual’s place in history”.
Dong’s comments may underscore exactly what is at stake in the elevation of Fang Yonggang to the status of ideological exemplar. Like former president Jiang Zemin, whose power clique has well-noted frictions with the present top leadership, Hu Jintao may make a bid for the inclusion of his own favored theories in the party constitution.
With the unwitting help of a naval academy professor on his sickbed at the Liberation Army Hospital, Hu Jintao might be able to “kill two eagles with a single arrow” (一箭双雕), as the Chinese say — to showcase his precious theories and get the best of his arch-rival.
9.jpg

MORE SOURCES:
“Naval academy professor wins president’s praise“, China Daily, April 5, 2007
Sohu.com feature page on Fang Yonggang
China Central Television Web coverage of Fang Yonggang
[Posted by David Bandurski, April 12, 2007, 2:29pm]

China’s Ministry of Health accuses media of foul play in undercover expose on hospital foibles in Hangzhou

Written by David Bandurski on . Posted in Headlines and Hashtags.

In the latest showdown over watchdog journalism and media ethics in China, a spokesperson for China’s health ministry yesterday criticized media for “violating professional ethics” and “misleading the public” in a story on medical fraud that ran last month in a number of newspapers and on major Web portals and caused a nationwide sensation. In order to investigate the March story, three reporters for the official Website of China News Service submitted green tea as urine samples at a series of Hangzhou hospitals and were delivered (and of course charged for) seemingly improbable diagnoses. [BELOW: Screenshot of coverage of the tea-for-pee story appearing today at Sina.com].

11.jpg

The article in question, “Journalists Pass Tea off as Urine and Submit it for Testing”, appeared on March 20 and announced itself as an expose of poor health practices in the face of growing knowledge of citizens’ rights. “As public understanding of health and awareness of the law is on the rise, the expectations placed on hospitals and caregivers by those suffering from illness are also rising steadily,” the article began. “But the limitations of modern medicine and the irresponsible practices of some health workers have made a tough and hot social topic out of tensions between healthcare and the ailing public.” The article continued:
Lately, many people have come forward with complaints about hospitals. A woman in Hangzhou named Chen paid 2,000 yuan [US$260] for a simple visit to the doctor, but was not even given a bill of particulars listing her prescriptions and diagnosis. One dental clinic charged 4,000 yuan for a ceramic tooth that in fact was a fake alloy. Medical personnel who are clearly general practitioners are billed as professors or experts from major Beijing hospitals.
Then came the tantalizing commercial promise: “Over the last two days, reporters from this site worked together with reporters from the ‘News 007’ program of Zhejiang TV’s Qianjiang Metro Channel to report undercover in these hospitals. The conclusions drawn from just this brief investigation are enough to make people shiver all over with fear.”
The report detailed how one reporter had prepared green tea in a glass jar and submitted it for laboratory analysis at Hangzhou’s Shaoshan Qianjiang Hospital. After asking about his general circumstances, a doctor named Cai asked the reporter to submit a urine sample. The reporter poured a bit of the green tea he had prepared into the urine sample cup and submitted at the laboratory. The results came back within five minutes, showing the reporter had an elevated white cell count and possibly suffered from a urinary tract infection. He was prescribed some medicine and asked to come back if things didn’t improve.
The Ministry of Health spokesperson, Mao Qun’an (毛群安), said yesterday that health experts had deemed the China News Service report unprofessional. It had “misled the public, and was not conducive to maintaining a normal healthcare system or building a harmonious relationship between patients and caregivers.”
Mao Qun’an said the health ministry had formed an investigative team to deal with this “incident” and that the team was conducting expert analysis at several major hospitals in Beijing. The team had, like the reporters, submitted tea in place of urine samples and found they returned similar results. But the experts were all in agreement that the laboratory equipment was designed to deal with legitimate samples, and would yield results automatically without necessarily determining there was a problem with the samples themselves.
What would media try next, Mao asked rhetorically. Beer? Soy sauce?
The spokesman emphasized that the ministry’s criticism did not mean they discouraged media supervision of the healthcare system. But the precondition of supervision, he said, should be a “respect for science”, and media should first “understand the nature of medical services”.
Undercover exposes have been a popular form of commercialized journalism in China since the mid 1990s, which saw the advent of such offerings as the 60 Minutes-styled “News Probe”, an investigative news program on China Central Television, and the rise of newspaper exposes focusing mostly on low-level corruption or consumer issues.
State funding for China News Service, China’s number-two official newswire, was progressively pulled beginning in the late 1990s, prompting the service to move — like many media peripheral to the Party’s main propaganda organs (CCTV, People’s Daily and Xinhua News Agency) — toward commercial self-sufficiency.
MORE SOURCES:
Coverage at QQ.com
[Posted by David Bandurski, April 11, 2007, 12:23pm]

Propaganda head Liu Yunshan promotes commercialization of media to strengthen China’s “cultural soft power”

Written by David Bandurski on . Posted in Headlines and Hashtags.

As news of a visit to Henan Province by Politburo member and top propaganda official Liu Yunshan was pegged to the top of one of Beijing’s leading Internet portals today, the message, buried deep in a pile of Party shibboleths about the “scientific view of development” and “advanced Socialist culture”, was the need to develop and commercialize culture as an industry in China, thereby increasing the country’s “cultural soft power”. The message was not new, but rather a reiteration of President Hu Jintao’s guiding policy toward the media in China and a reminder of where he stands: squarely on the side of commercialization under Party control [BELOW: Coverage of Liu Yunshan visit to Henan Province tops the newspage today at Sina.com].

21.jpg

The import of Liu’s three-day survey trip to Henan Province, beginning April 6, was essentially a reaffirmation of the Party’s zuoqiang zuoda, or “making media big and strong”, policy (把新闻传媒做强做大), which debuted in January 2002. The policy promoted the creation of powerful and profitable domestic media conglomerates in China — naturally, under Party control — that were readied for global competition.
The term “making big and strong” had been a legacy of other reforming industries in the 1990s. The media version, first conceived by the Central Propaganda Department, SARFT and GAPP, in August 2001, urged the strengthening of China’s media industry through the building of various media groups, such as newspaper groups, publishing groups, circulation groups and radio and television groups. It also called for bringing dispersed publications into united publishing groups, improving business management, increasing the move toward technology and new media, and adjustment of ownership structures, including possibly introduction of stock ownership, etcetera.
So why raise this issue again through the Liu Yunshan visit? In the news story appearing today, and possibly placed prominently on Sina.com under an official order from censorship authorities, Liu Yunshan was quoted as saying that in the “contemporary world the relationship between economic development and culture is closer than ever, and a nation’s cultural status and the role of culture are more and more obvious, now forming an integral part of overall national strength.” This statement fits perfectly with the notion of zuoqiang zuoda articulated over five years ago, of the link between media commercialization — under a regime of control — and China’s long-term strategic goals.
The very idea of the BIG/STRONG strategy for Chinese media was allied with the notion of message control, the idea that without media groups of proper commercial strength and vitality, China would find it impossible to influence global public opinion. As the official media periodical Chinese Journalist, published by Xinhua News Agency, noted in December 2002: “Faced with competition from international media groups, and faced with a fierce struggle for public opinion on a global scale, China needs to have media groups capable of exerting influence and being competitive in the global opinion struggle.”
The choice of Henan for Liu’s recapitulation of Hu Jintao’s official position on the media is interesting for at least two reasons. Henan has, first of all, been a steady source of unfavorable news in recent years, including continued revelations of its AIDS crisis, the detention of world-renowned Aids activist Gao Yaojie (高耀洁), and repeated safety accidents. Secondly, Henan Party Secretary Xu Guangchun (徐光春), who has served in the province’s top job since 2004, is also a former deputy head of the Central Propaganda Department, a man who understands the Party’s balancing act between commercialization and control.
The direct message for Henan Province in Liu Yunshan’s visit was that while the province has rich “cultural resources”, it needs to do more to push ahead commercial reforms in its own media industry.
[Posted by David Bandurski, April 10, 2007, 4:02pm]

ABOUT US

CONTACT US

FOLLOW US (X)

COOKIE & PRIVACY POLICY

LINGUA SINICA NEWSLETTER