March 2007 — He Xuefeng is chief editor of the editorial division at Southern Metropolis Daily, a leading Chinese commercial newspaper that has become well-known for its tough investigative reporting and its strong and varied editorial viewpoints. After graduating from Anhui University, He Xuefeng worked as an editor and reporter for Southern Weekend, a leading commercial newspaper in Guangdong province.
Chinese authorities recently lifted a prior ban on coverage of the so-called “nail house” in Chongqing, the story of a beleaguered homeowner fighting against forced removal for a development project, and coverage in the Chinese media is on the rise again today. But an editorial from China Youth Daily suggesting media have blown the story out of proportion has dragged the debate in a new direction. [BELOW: Screenshot of “nail house” coverage today at the Website of China’s official Xinhua News Agency].
The China Youth Daily editorial, written by Lu Gaofeng (陆高峰), suggests that some media have used (or abused) coverage of the “nail house” story in Chongqing to manufacture public sympathy for the “weak” in the bottom-line pursuit of bigger audiences. Lu argues that while officials must face public and media scrutiny “pure-heartedly”, the media need to hold up their end of the bargain, namely to “preserve impartiality and cool-headedness, not playing to the gallery, not misleading the public.” Lu says also that “rational analysis” has been insufficient in coverage of the “nail house” story.
Lu Gaofeng’s editorial should not, in CMP’s view, be read as an official appeal for media self-discipline, but rather as a call for greater professionalism. Unavoidably, though, the editorial raised the hackles of many netizens, who posted responses on major Chinese web portals. “I’d like to ask Lu Gaofeng,” said one Web user at QQ.com, “What is the responsibility of the media? I’ve paid close attention to these ‘nail house’ reports, and some reports are clearly mouthpieces of the government and the development company, and some reports are clearly on the side of the nail house owner. What’s so strange about that? We can’t always demand that media people don’t have their own viewpoints or leanings can we?”
Selected portions of Lu’s editorial follow:
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Media Overexcited in “Nail House” Coverage
By Lu Gaofeng (陆高峰)
China Youth Daily, March 29, 2007
. . . Chongqing Mayor Wang Hongju (王鸿举) said, “The ‘nail house’ incident has been frothed up like crazy on the Web, with Web hits surpassing 10 million.” Actually, that number is probably much higher.
While the interests of the masses are no small matter, and while the entanglement between a Chongqing resident facing eviction and a developer and the government may be symbolic as the Property Law has just passed, the media should face questions over its building up of this story about the “nail house”, the fight over removal and demolition and the pursuit of [legal] rights and benefits. Why is it that public opinion [on this story] should lean so decidedly to one side? Why can’t the public agree with the court’s judgement of “removal and demolition”, or the Chongqing mayor’s assertion that the resident is asking for unreasonable compensation? To a large degree it is because the media has used it ability to set the agenda and create public opinion to manufacture sympathy in its audience for the “weak” [i.e., the “underdog”].
The mass media possess the natural advantage of being able to enlarge events and public opinion. According to the views of a number of communication scholars in the West, mass media are structures of re-creation that “mimic their environment” (大众媒介是从事“拟态环境”再生产的机构). In many situations, the mimicked environments [of mass media] are not entirely accurate reflections of the objective environment, but are new “constructions” of media organizations and disseminators made according to their particular needs and interests. Some have compared this re-creative and agenda-setting function of the media to a spotlight or an amplifier — enlarging events and public opinion, drawing the attention and concern of the public, or even working as a distorting mirror — twisting or changing [things] according to the needs of the disseminator.
. . . What is regrettable is that in reports on the “nail house” we see only the extreme “focus” and “magnification” of this event by the media, their excessive “publicizing” of the issue of rights and benefits, to the point that some have even made this “removal row” into their own personal performances, seeking to win the eyeballs of the audience through a “feast” of sympathy. We seldom see rational analysis of this story from the media, or impartial reporting, or any attempt to quell [or soften] the swelling of noise [surrounding the story].
As we explore the question of good relations between media and officials, there are two points we cannot lose sight of. The first is that government offices should face media scrutiny (“supervision by public opinion”) with an attitude of public service, not using their power to keep others down, accepting criticism pure-heartedly. The second is the media’s own social responsibility, to preserve impartiality and cool-headedness, not playing to the gallery, not misleading the public.
MORE SOURCES:
“We will not be moved: one family against the developers“, The Guardian, March 24, 2007
“In China, Fight Over Development Creates a Star“, March 24, 2007
“Property rights law fight hits home in China“, Associated Press, March 28, 2007
“Nailing Down a Settlement“, TIME China Blog, March 28, 2007
[Posted by David Bandurski, March 29, 2007, 12:50pm]
According to a CMP source, China’s leading venue for the screening of independent documentary films has been “postponed” under an order from authorities in Kunming, the capital of China’s Yunnan province. The Yunnan Multi Culture Visual Fest, or YunFest, which has been held for three years running, was scheduled to go ahead from April 6-12 in Kunming, but an e-mail from the festival’s executive committee today said they had been notified of the postponement. [BELOW: Screenshot of e-mail from YunFest 2007 executive committee notifying festival participants of the event’s postponement/Sender’s e-mail and mobile blocked].
In the e-mail announcement, YunFest planners said they were reaching “relevant authorities” (有关部门) concerning the move. CMP has not yet been able to confirm the reasons for the postponement, but the edgy film festival, which generally features a range of independently-produced documentaries touching on sensitive social issues, might be facing more intense political pressure as China’s 17th Party Congress approaches.
The postponement announcement urged participants to hold off on travel plans and wait for further word. The text is translated below:
Dear respected selected contest participant for the 2007 YunFest:
The YunFest committee has received notice that: “The Yunnan Multi Culture Visual Fest 2007” event has been postponed.
We are urgently getting in touch with relevant authorities, and we hope that we may be able to go forward as planned.
Would everyone please for the time being not purchase airline or bus tickets and keep a close eye on the YunFest Website: www.yunfest.org . Once we have received a definite answer we will release information at the earliest possible moment.
YunFest’s executive committee apologizes for any inconvenience this has caused.
Thank you everyone for your attention and support!
YunFest Executive Committee
March 26, 2007
MORE SOURCES:
About YunFest
[Posted by David Bandurski, March 27, 2007, 6:23pm]
Cases like the beating death of reporter Lan Chengzhang earlier this year, and the controversy surrounding the Foxconn Case in August 2006, have underscored the growing problem of media ethics and press corruption in China. A crucial point often overlooked in coverage of this issue is the relationship between problems in the Chinese media and Party press controls [See “China’s Yellow Journalism“, FEER, June 2006]. One of the lynchpin questions in the debate over ethical journalism in China is whether the professional environment for journalism can be improved without a radical rethink of the media’s role in Chinese society (which is also a fundamental question about political reform). [BELOW: Screenshot of online “Youth Topics” section of today’s China Youth Daily, with article on journalistic professionalism].
An editorial in today’s China Youth Daily, a newspaper published by the China Communist Youth League, touches on the institutional roots of poor media professionalism in China. The editorial, written by Chen Jibing (陈季冰), deputy editor of the Oriental Morning Post, one of Shanghai’s leading commercial newspapers, argues that the failure to establish “effective professional norms” in many sectors in China, including media, results from lack of “the necessary social ‘communities’ (共同体)”.
The article — “Oriental Morning Post deputy editor Chen Jibing: Only with self-discipline and regulation can there be freedom of speech” — looks at first glance like your typical media self-confession about the need for reporters to better behave and bear in mind their own responsibility to Chinese society:
… If we look more deeply, isn’t the media’s weak self-discipline just as serious a defect [as tight government control]? The two [factors] seem interconnected — because media don’t adequately self-discipline, the government controls more strictly; and because the government controls more strictly the media lack self-discipline even more. The precondition of freedom is rule of law. In the same way, journalistic norms (新闻规范) are the precondition of freedom of speech. Without a set of journalistic norms, even if the government is hands off and doesn’t exercise control, we can’t possibly achieve true freedom of speech.
But the editorial moves directly into a discussion of government regulation in “Western countries”, arguing that Western societies more effectively regulate various sectors (including professional sports, for example) through a combination of weak government and strong civil society (“小（弱）政府、大（强）社会”的格局). The article implies that state-controlled industry associations like the All-China Journalists Association should give way to more independent professional communities. The argument follows:
The most basic reason why we cannot establish effective “norms” in many sectors is that we lack the necessary social “communities”. Academic freedom needs to be supported by an “academic community”, and journalistic norms need to be supported by a “media community”. Of course, these sorts of communities are different from the government in that they are not backed up by legal force (the power to restrain under the law). Nevertheless, anyone who challenges the authority of the community will automatically lose their credentials as a community member, and owing to the internal operation of mutual acknowledgement and censure within the community, the community works as a strong binding force.
To give an example, classic cases of this kind of community are European football associations (欧洲的足球协会) [SEE UEFA], in which membership is entirely voluntary but which strongly bind registered players. Why do European players not dare commit ethics violations (打假球)? Because they know that if they are found out, or even cast into doubt, their careers are jeopardized, and even if they make the rounds all over Europe there’s not a single club that would dare sign a contract with them. Moreover, if the football association drops a player’s credentials, television advertisers will no longer do business with him. So why is it that [in China] we have a football association colored with state power (浓厚的官方色彩的足协) and yet cannot accomplish as much [as UEFA]? It’s because despite the fact that the government can leverage the force of the law, it cannot compel fans to buy tickets and watch matches. Moreover, when any industry association is connected with the state, its leaders tend to absorb themselves with their superiors rather than the healthy operation of the market.
What I’m arguing is that journalistic norms are the precondition for freedom of speech, and the creation and protection of journalistic norms relies upon the emergence of a “media community”. I don’t mean that we should give the work of propaganda offices entirely over to a news media association. And I’m not saying the government should not control [the media] from here on out. What I’m saying is that because the functions and resources of the government and industry communities are different, they should have different spheres of management. In light of China’s national realities, propaganda authorities should be responsible for questions of guidance in the ideological realm of media. Media professional associations should be charged with ordering market competition, professional principles for journalists and other questions belonging to the “social” sphere. Once this pattern of assuming respective roles and working together emerges, “freedom” and “regulation” will complement one another.
MORE SOURCES:
Chen Jibing’s personal Weblog
“Unsteady Taiwanese steps, often in the wrong direction“, Ethical Corporation, March 8, 2007
“Foxconn sues reporters over iPod story“, MacNN, August 29, 2006
“Foxconn sues newspaper”, ESWN, August 26, 2006
“The FoxConn-First Financial Daily Case Goes National/Global“, ESWN, August 28, 2006
“Western Media Begins Foxconn Coverage“, ESWN, August 29, 2006
“Some differing views of Foxconn“, Danwei.org, August 30, 2006
“Taboo term ‘press freedom’ unshelved for domestic Chinese coverage of the Foxconn lawsuit“, CMP, August 30, 2006
“China media seen as corrupt, but experts blame communist controls for skewing system“, AP, January 31, 2007
“Killing Puts Focus on Corruption in Chinese News Media” (NOTE: report contains several factual inaccuracies, including date of Lan Chengzhang’s death), The New York Times, January 31, 2006
[Posted by David Bandurski, March 27, 2007, 2:30pm]
southern-metropolis-daily_march-19_2007.pdf
Much Chinese media coverage of the 2008 Beijing Olympics has focused on national pride and the importance of the games in building up China’s international image. But a recent editorial in Southern Metropolis Daily argues that China’s well-publicized appetite for Olympic gold has become a kind of Midas touch, spoiling the spirit of friendship and harmony that the Games have come to symbolize. [BELOW: March 19 editorial in Southern Metropolis Daily discusses the spirit of the Olympic Games/See also PDF above].
The writer of the Southern Metropolis Daily editorial, Jing Kaixuan (景凯旋), suggests that China needs to remove the taint of central planning from its approach to athletics and focus more on sports as a way of life, also seeking to improve public access to sports facilities and raise the overall fitness of people across the country.
Jing’s comments follow a wave of news about China’s 2008 Olympic hopes, and discussions of where China’s priorities should lie. Coverage has been driven in part over the last week by comments from a representative to the recent NPC meetings in Beijing, who was quoted by Chinese media as saying that “China will win the most medals at the Olympics, or at least the most gold medals.”
The editorial follows in full:
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“Gold medals do not equal the Olympic spirit”
By Jing Kaixuan (景凯旋)
Southern Metropolis Daily
March 19, 2007
I’m a definite sports fan. Any time there’s a decent match to watch, I’m ready to enjoy it. But over these last few years I’ve watched less and less [sports on] television, because the propagandizing by some media has already departed from the Olympic spirit, spoiling the enjoyment to be found in sports. So when I heard the presentations from writer Wang Meng (王蒙) and athlete Deng Yaping (邓亚萍) at the [recent] two meetings [sessions of the NPC and CPPCC] I felt they were clear-headed and rational people. Happening to coincide [in their sentiments], they suggested that the political significance of sports events should not be played up, and that the drumbeating [within China] about being the top medal winner at the [Beijing 2008] Olympic Games has already damaged China’s image.
In my view, sports events manifest the power and beauty of humanity, and their emphasis is on the spirit of the games, not the warring of nationalities. Of course, when national flags are raised and national anthems pipe up at contemporary international sports events, this can come with a bit of patriotic pride. But unlike other areas, sports matches are marked with high degree of common cultural understanding, and the five-circled [Olympic] flag represents the unity, friendship and harmony (和谐) of humankind. The Olympic spirit is about universality, not about national differences, and it should be free particularly of political overtones. During the Cold War, when the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan, Western nations, led by the United States, boycotted the Moscow Olympics, and yet some athletes competed in their own names, waving the Olympic flag as they participated in the opening ceremony. This did not signal their support for Soviet politics, but rather [their conviction] that sports and politics should not be interlocked. I believe it is athletes like this, and not politicians, who evince the true spirit of athletic games.
Sports competitions should not be politicized also because they represent the most basic idea of equality … If we ratchet up the political significance of sports, and use nationalism to patch up ideological gaps, then this translates into the aberrant idea that “victory is patriotism and defeat is treasonable.” You cannot suppose logic of this kind is a merely fanciful – this was exactly what Saddam Hussein’s son Uday did when the Iraqi soccer team lost international matches, bringing out the whip after [the athletes] returned home.
Very few countries in the contemporary world are like us, taking sports matches and lending to them a kind of grave nationalistic import, so that only the winning of gold medals has importance, and silver and bronze medals are considered defeat. We often see that when foreign athletes win second and third place medals, their faces express their joy, but Chinese athletes by contrast wear looks of discouragement. Under pressure to win gold medals, even if these athletes do feel joy at winning, they do not dare show it. Are the tears shed by these champions tears shed under pressure, or tears shed through personal struggle? This is not the most important thing. In [our] media propagandizing, of course all tears are tears of fervent nationalism.
Under such a climate, the Olympic spirit has already been twisted. [Chinese] coaches and athletes seldom show bearing and dignity. Win a competition and this is the glory of race. Lose a competition and we blame the machinations of the other side. Some people say this is the coaches or athletes making a stink out of personal character. But if they are acting this way just for themselves and not out of nationalistic spirit, then what will the result be? Everyone in the world is clear about this. Some [Chinese] sports officials talk just as overbearingly overseas as they do within China. For example, during an open badminton tournament in Germany recently, a Chinese athlete dropped out of a match due to illness. This caused dissatisfaction in the [tournament’s] executive committee [which wondered about the reason for the withdrawal]. It was a matter that could easily be explained [owing to the player’s illness], but a [Chinese] official blamed the German peoples’ lack of understanding of the game, saying that German’s were jealous of the achievements of the Chinese team. Who would believe such an assertion, saying Germans were jealous over badminton? This could only cause others to believe that you suffered from lack of character.
All of this owes to a “system of unified national struggle” (举国体制) and to “Olympic strategizing” (奥运战略). In today’s market economy, the sports world [in China] still suffers from hangovers from the planned economy, and this is unsuited to the tenets of reform. These last few years, a number of sports officials and media have turned athletic sports into a grand national objective, relying on the support of the whole nation, turning national resources to the manufacture of gold medals, rolling tax revenues into this [sports] industry. In the name of winning glory for the nation, it seems anything can be done. But no one has ever stepped forward to explain exactly how much tax money must be spent for China to win a single gold medal, and seldom do people ask, when corruption exists in every industry — are sports officials really that clean? In all these cases of [athletes] using stimulants and match rigging, do we honestly think it all comes down to the personal foibles of the referees, coaches and athletes? And where has all that money for the sports lottery been applied?
Regardless of how many gold medals China wins in the Olympic Games, this is ultimately less important [for average Chinese] than eating well (大不过以食为天的民生), less meaningful than the idea of a “harmonious world”, and less important than national fitness. In countries with truly strong sports cultures, the people regard athletics as a way of life. But we have invested pathetically little in the health and fitness of our national citizens, and modern athletic equipment is very rarely made available to ordinary people. People generally speaking do not have public areas where they can exercise, and our health and fitness indicators are lower than in other countries. We simply go off to the hospital when we’re sick, and this exacerbates already strong pressures on our healthcare system, contributing to social instability. The upshot of emphasizing gold medals and not focusing on people is that neither our hearts nor our bodies can be sound.
(The author is a professor at Nanjing University)
MORE SOURCES:
“Don’t raise up the China as top gold medal winner theory: Think about it carefully” (Chinese), Qianlong.com, March 16, 2007
“China’s gold medalist Deng calls for Olympics-driven soft power improvement“, Xinhua News Agency, March 12, 2007
[Posted by David Bandurski, March 21, 2007, 2:01pm]
southern-metropolis-daily_march-20_2007.pdf
Guangdong’s saucy Southern Metropolis Daily, the lone Chinese newspaper to break news in late February of AIDS activist Gao Yaojie’s (高耀洁) trip to the United States to receive the Vital Voices Global Women’s Leadership Award, threw up chalk again today with a “line-ball” cover-story on Gao Yaojie’s face-to-face meeting with Senator Hillary Clinton. [BELOW: Front page of today’s Southern Metropolis Daily, with prominent photo of Hillary Clinton and Gao Yaojie/PDF: Page A16 interview with Gao Yaojie about meeting with Clinton.]
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CMP noted on February 26 that a Southern Metropolis Daily editorial had mentioned Gao Yaojie’s trip to Beijing in preparation for her departure for the United States, and had offered praise for top officials who visited Gao in her Beijing hotel room. The editorial had not, however, mentioned a letter to Chinese President Hu Jintao from Hillary Clinton, a New York senator and 2008 presidential candidate, that some have argued was instrumental in securing Gao Yaojie’s release from house arrest in Hebei Province and enabling her U.S. trip. To have emphasized this point would have been dangerous for any newspaper, suggesting that pressure from a U.S. politician had influenced high-level decision making.
Nevertheless, the Southern Metropolis Daily interview with Gao Yaojie, which occupies the whole of page 16 today, does quote Gao as mentioning Clinton’s letter in the following exchange:
Reporter: Did you express your thanks to her?
Gao Yaojie: I said it right from the very beginning. I said, Thank you for your letter, without which I could not have come here. We talked for half an hour, and she led me out personally.
The bold coverage today on Hillary Clinton and Gao Yaojie shows Southern Metropolis Daily‘s strong professional spirit in making full use of incremental political space available for treatment of a sensitive domestic issue — an opportunity afforded in part by Gao Yaojie’s visit in Beijing with deputy health minister Wang Longde (王陇德) and Hao Yang (郝阳), deputy director of epidemic disease control at the Ministry of Health.
The Gao Yaojie interview was accompanied by a strong page 2 editorial called, “Gao Yaojie: the glory goes to those who speak the truth“.
MORE SOURCES:
“Gao Yaojie: the glory goes to those who speak the truth” (Chinese), Southern Metropolis Daily, March 20, 2007
“Group Honors Doctor Who Exposed China AIDS Scandal“, Washington Post, March 14, 2007
“AIDS Doctor Fears Return to China“, Radio Free Asia, March 15, 2007
[Posted by David Bandurski, March 20, 2007, 4:25pm]
CMP has commented frequently about the debate in China over the role of the media, particularly its identity vis-a-vis the Party and government. The debate can take a number of forms, as in the controversy surrounding the Lan Chengzhang case concerning the difference between “real” and “fake” reporters, or in the question of whether “watchdog journalism” is a “right” of the media or a “duty” of the media (insofar as it is a function of the state). In the simplest sense, the debate can be seen to arise from a longstanding conflict between the propaganda role of the press under Communist Party rule and strains of “liberal” public interest journalism going back to the Republican Era (1912-1949) and even as far back as the late Qing Dynasty and the establishment of the first independent newspapers in China. [BELOW: Screenshot of Yan Lieshan editorial feature at top of editorial section at Sina.com].
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Questioning of the role of the press can be said to have reached a contemporary apex in the late 1980s, as China reacted against the falsehood of the Cultural Revolution and explored the creation of a press law to protect the work of journalists, an effort that died with the massacre of demonstrators following democracy protests in Beijing in June 1989.
Since the 1990s, commercialization has been the primary impetus for change in China’s media landscape, but the public interest strain of journalism persists, seeking opportunities in an unpredictable political environment.
The latest salvo in this ongoing struggle, an editorial by veteran journalist and former CMP fellow Yan Lieshan (鄢烈山), takes advantage of the opportunity afforded by Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao‘s recent statements on March 16 — that China “must create conditions such as to allow the people to supervise and criticize the government” — to argue strongly for an independent monitoring role for the news media based on mutual respect between officials and journalists. This method, frequently used by Chinese media to address sensitive issues,is called jieti fahui (借题发挥), or, translated roughly, “using a current topic of conversation to put out one’s own ideas”.
The China Youth Daily editorial follows in full:
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[Link to editorial on Sina.com]
“Respecting the rights of the media does not mean making it your footservant”
China Youth Daily
March 20, 2007
Yan Lieshan (鄢烈山)
If we want to inch forward, if we want to improve, if we want to work in concert, then we need to have an attitude of tolerance and compromise, we need to have more respect and understanding, and less opposition —
Can officialdom (Party organs and other offices of power, and officials) form a positive interactive relationship with the media? It should be possible. The media and officialdom are not necessarily cat and mouse, in zero-sum opposition (of course, the exceptions are those corrupt officials trying to cover up their crimes). If both sides see impartiality, factuality and the popular will as the basis of their work, then the main goal is the prosperity of the people and the strength of the nation. If in some cases they are divided in their views, this is simply because their roles are different.
In the early days of Guangdong Party Secretary Zhang Dejiang’s (张德江) appointment to the province, many journalists within the Nanfang Daily Group had no idea where they would stand. They had doubts about whether the group could maintain its position at the front of the pack of national media. As the facts have borne out, these fears were unwarranted: the pep of the Nanfang Daily Group has never waned. And just recently we had news reports saying that at the close of the two meetings [of the NPC and CPPCC], Zhang Dejiang sighed with feeling and said, “Guangdong media workers are especially capable,” and stressed that a strong economy also necessitated a strong media. This can be seen as an example of good-faith interaction between the media and officialdom.
It goes without saying that democracy and rule of law are still being established in my country, and the economic sector and the direction of the market are still controlled by the hand of the government. That is to say, we are still a country in a period of transition. Under such social conditions it can be said that insofar as there are tensions between officials and the media, these owe largely to the “official” side. Therefore, if media and officialdom are to build up a favorable cooperative [“interactive”] relationship, the most important thing is mutual respect, which means particularly that officials need to set their own positions straight — in respecting the rights of the media, [officials] cannot use the media as their footservants or tools.
In this regard, Premier Wen Jiabao perspicaciously remarked on March 16 when responding to questions from reporters: “We must understand a principle of truth, and that is that all power vested in the government is endowed by the people … and we must create conditions such as to allow the people to supervise and criticize the government … Regardless of the past, in the present and the future there is no need for us to speak [of our official work] in glowing terms.” If officials have a general knowledge of democracy and rule of law, they won’t act with this ancient attitude that puts officialdom high above the people and deals arrogantly with the media, seeing the criticisms and probing of the media as a great profanity. They will not regard the exposures of investigative reporting as forces of “chaos” upsetting unity and order. They will not demand that the media produce paeans singing high the “accomplishments” [of the government]. The responsibility of the media is ultimately to seek out the facts of our society, to provide a platform and a channel through which the people may express their will. Supporting the media, allowing it the strength to stand in the world on its own legs — this is rooted in the will and public confidence of the people. We have no trouble imagining how the county secretary who conjured up the “Penshui SMS Case” … this kind of old-school official who is the “boss” of the people, treats media under his control [NOTE: underlined phrase just above is a wry play on the word “democracy”, 民主, in which the characters, 民 主, are separated to mean “boss of the people.”]
Hunan Party Secretary Zhang Chunxian (张春贤) said recently in an interview with Southern Weekend: “The Web, this form of new media, is a discussion platform, and by using this method one can rather broadly understand the sentiments of the people. The only thing for those who govern is to understand the will of the people and to gather their knowledge … So if now leaders are not familiar with [the Web], they should get up to speed. And if these postings contain also challenges, then officials should face those challenges head on.” Zhang Chunxian’s comments came, in his own words, “out of respect for and trust of Internet users.” That’s exactly right. Respect and trust are linked intimately. And I especially admire his [Zhang Chunxian’s] comment that leaders should accept challenges. Many leaders have for a long time become accustomed to issuing orders and demanding others step into line with them. They are certainly not accustomed to discussion on terms of equality. To make the transition from a ruling mentality to a service mentality (从管治型转变为服务型), our government needs to begin conversing with the media and the people on terms of equality. For example, Party and government organs definitely need to become accustomed to answering “cunning and strange” questions from journalists and participants at news conferences … For many officials, transitioning from sending orders down to the plebians from on high to conversation with them on terms of equality is a tough and formidable challenge.
Here we come from the topic of mutual respect to mutual understanding. While the role of the media is to serve as the voice of the people, the power of the media, insofar as it arises from public opinion, can exert political pressure on our leaders. But the media needs also to “understand” the “troubles” facing officials: first of all, by not setting their hopes to high, giving them time to change their viewpoints and ways of operating; secondly, by observing our “national state of affairs” (国情), respecting not only the characters of our officials (we all share the same human weaknesses of character), but also to a definite degree respecting their interests. “Without tolerance, there is no freedom” [Chinese philosopher and essayist Hu Shi, 1948/text here]. If we want to inch forward, if we want to improve, if we want to work in concert, then we need to have an attitude of tolerance and compromise, otherwise we’ll look on one another as enemies, and only violence will settle things, precisely the old way of thinking that does nothing for us.
My feelings on this subject arise from two meetings between current Guizhou Governor Lin Shusen (林树森) and reporters. Formerly, as Party secretary of Guangzhou, he [Lin] expressed dissatisfaction with journalists and angrily accused media of “playing up” (炒作) Guangzhou’s public security problems. What “hand-chopping gang“, “speed-racing gang”, “backpack gang”, he said. Did Guangzhou have such gangs? During the most recent two meetings, he met again with journalists from Guangdong. He said disapprovingly, “Some leaders, they have houses of over 200 square meters, and they still say they can’t afford homes — they tell lies unblinkingly.” “High real-estate prices are the result of media playing things up right and left”, he said. A number of people have already pointed out that his [Lin’s] points don’t stand up to scrutiny, but I can understand why he expressed his dissatisfaction.
Truthfully, being the top political player in Guangzhou isn’t easy. In fact, many problems exist just the same in other places, but as Lin Shusen said, “the key is that in other places they are not reported [by the media], so that Guangzhou looks bad [by comparison]” (Southern Weekend, March 12, 2007). I completely trust that these words are true. Bordering Hong Kong and Macao, Guangzhou’s affairs are reported in those quarters as soon as the wind blows and the grass stirs. You couldn’t cover things up if you tried. Perhaps with Guangzhou’s newspaper industry so developed, and competition so fierce, city leaders in Guangzhou face media scrutiny to a degree leaders in other provinces do not.
If officials and the media enjoyed greater mutual understanding and mutual tolerance, and less opposition, this would benefit China’s gradual progress toward democracy and rule of law.
MORE SOURCES:
“Southern Metropolis Daily calls for a domestic ‘partnership’ between government and media“, CMP, January 5, 2007
“Should watchdog journalism be protected as a ‘right’ or mandated as a ‘duty’?“, CMP, January 10, 2007
“Debate on press freedom in China continues as 12-ex-officials and scholars issue open letter“, CMP, February 15, 2006
[Posted by David Bandurski, March 20, 2007, 1:47pm]
In the 1990s, as China’s media moved steadily into the marketplace, the Propaganda Bureau issued its “key principle” of “placing the good of society before all else, and working diligently to bring about the unification of social and economic benefits.” The new principle emphasized the following:
1. Under the conditions of the market economy, cultural products [media, film, the arts] are commodities, but commodities of a special nature. Media professionals must seriously and earnestly consider the social implications of their own work.
2. Under the conditions of the market economy, economic benefit must be emphasized in the creation of cultural and non-material products, and trends must be prevented that do not work toward economic development or promote economic benefits; Neither must [media] products lose sight of the social good through the self-interested pursuit of “saleability” in the marketplace.
3. For those news media important to the Party and the nation, the nation shall continue to provide financial and policy support.
(See “The Marxist View of Journalism and the Guiding Principles of Party Journalism,” in News Line, May 2004)
At the 16th Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, held in 2002, Hu Jintao (胡锦涛) was appointed General Secretary. Li Changchun (李长春) became the Standing Committee member tasked with coordinating propaganda and ideology. In China, where ideological formulations are of supreme importance, the new leadership under Hu Jintao needed a concise formula to deliver their policy on media control.
The result was the “Three Closenesses,” a phrase meant to encompass both the CCP notion of the imperative of media control, and at the same time the need to commercialize the media and make media products broadly more attractive to ever more savvy audiences.
In January 2003, Li Changchun announced top leadership would take a “Three Closenesses” approach to the control of mass media: “Closeness to reality, closeness to the masses and closeness to real life” (贴近实际，贴近群众， 贴近生活). Li said the emphasis of propaganda work should be uniting the “spirit” of the Party with public opinion. This was an elaboration of Jiang Zemin’s notion of “guidance of public opinion,” or yulun daoxiang (舆论导向), the idea being that people should be both guided and given media they found more attractive, interesting and relevant (in other words, could actually consume). The concept of the “Three Closenesses” was also seen as a key component of the so-called “Marxist View of Journalism” (马克思主义新闻观), the CCP’s vision of the purpose and practice of the media.
Li Changchun also called for “enlarging and strengthening” (做强做大), the idea being that “cultural” organizations (media, arts, etcetera) should push actively to become full-fledged businesses, forming an industry made up of powerful Chinese conglomerates (“aircraft carriers” they were actually called) equipped to do battle with foreign media groups like News Corp (China’s WTO accession had come in December 2001).
“Two Newspapers and One Magazine”, a media term inseparable from China’s newspaper culture before reform and opening, refers to the three most influential publications in China during the Cultural Revolution: People’s Daily, People’s Liberation Daily and Hongqi Magazine (renamed Qiushi Magazine in 1988). These three publications were used to deliver the latest ideological messages from Chairman Mao Zedong (毛泽东). The editorials appearing in the publications (which were all identical!) were regarded as the loftiest guides for Communist Party behavior and the unification of public opinion.
On May 31, 1966, the leader of Central Cultural Revolution Division, Mao supporter Chen Boda (陈伯达) took control of People’s Daily and refashioned it as a tool for Cultural Revolution propaganda. On June 1, People’s Daily printed an editorial called “Destroy all Evils” (横扫一切牛鬼蛇神), which sought to rally the support of the whole nation in carrying out a Cultural Revolution and the moving against “rightist” elements (those opposed to the policies of Mao Zedong). Chen’s team later gained control of People’s Liberation Daily and Hongqi Magazine, completing the so-called “Two Newspapers, One Magazine” propaganda machine, which became the principal force guiding all mass media in China.
By the end of 1966, after the publication of tirade called “Complete the Revolution on the Frontlines of Journalism” (把新闻战线的革命进行到底), a great number of newspapers had been shut down and those remaining fashioned into tools for promoting the Party ideology.
Aside from issuing the latest policies and messages about official movements, the editorials and comments issued by the “Two Newspapers and One Magazine” reinforced the cult of Chairman Mao. They includes slogans like “Long live the People’s Republic!” and sayings from Mao’s red book. Other newspapers sheepishly followed these three, mimicking not only their content but also their size, fonts and layout.
After the death of Mao on Sept 9, 1976, the Gang of Four ran the Chairman’s “dying words” – “Stay the course” (按既定方针办事) — in the editorials of the “Two Newspapers and One Magazine”. This was an attempt by the gang to further legitimize their powers in Mao’s absence.
When the Gang of Four fell on October 25, 1976, it was once again the “Two Newspapers and One Magazine” that announced “A Great and Historic Victory” (伟大的历史性胜利) and defined the new direction of the Party and the nation.
People’s Daily remains the official newspaper of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party. It is still regarded as the principle mouthpiece of China’s top leaders.
People’s Liberation Daily, the official newspaper of the Central Military Commission, released its first issue on January 1, 1956.
Hongqi Magazine began publication as a central theoretical magazine during the Great Leap Forward in 1958. Its last issue was released on June 15, 1988. Less than one month later, the magazine was re-launched as Qiushi Magazine.
Additional Resources:
Hu Xingrong (胡兴荣), “The Era of Great Newspapers” (大报纸时代)
