The one-year anniversary of the shutdown of Freezing Point passed in silence last week. Meanwhile, the editorial page team at Southern Metropolis Daily, a commercial spin-off of Guangzhou’s official Nanfang Daily, were putting together the next few installments in their editorial series commemorating the 15th anniversary of Deng Xiaoping’s “southern tour”, which in 1992 accelerated China on the path of economic reform. Yesterday’s installment in that series was an editorial by retired Guangzhou historian Yuan Weishi, whose essay in Freezing Point last year criticizing Chinese history textbooks was fingered as the cause of the supplement’s misfortunes. Yuan’s latest editorial, no less gutsy, begs the question: if it had been this essay in Freezing Point last year, how would the propaganda department’s News Commentary Group have responded?
pdf_yuan-weishi-article.pdf
The Yuan Weishi editorial, which praises Deng Xiaoping for his vision in setting China on the path to reform and moving the country beyond ideological diviseness, takes an unambiguous crack at leftist elements within the Chinese leadership — the same pack who were behind the attack on Freezing Point last year and issued the recent publishing ban on eight books in China. The editorial is likely to draw sharp opposition from China’s left, and cool protests from more moderate leaders, who might feel Yuan’s arguments — which call for a return to the spirit of Deng’s reforms — are too simplistic for China’s present realities.
Southern Metropolis Daily‘s excellent editorial series comes at a time when authorities seem to be ratcheting up pressure on media ahead of the sensitive 17th Party Congress and the historically important fiftieth anniversary of the crackdown on “rightist” intellectuals in China.
A translation follows of roughly two-thirds of Yuan’s editorial, including his criticism of lingering leftist tendencies in China and his call for deeper political reform:
Southern Metropolis Daily, A2
January 29, 2007
BY Yuan Weishi (袁伟时)
Professor of History, Sun-Yatsen University [retired]

Fifteen years ago, Deng Xiaoping’s southern speeches [during his “southern tour”] set into motion major changes in China. In what direction would China head in the aftermath of the disintegration of the Soviet Union, under the impact of dramatic change in many countries in Eastern Europe, combined with the aftershocks of the 89 storm? Public sentiment was diverse and confused. Xiaoping, with his prestige and wisdom, brought clarity to the ideological chaos, helping leaders grab a historic opportunity …
This important moment in history passed down to us a valuable lesson: historic opportunities are transient; only by taking a broad view of history can we bear our torches into the darkness, only with the minds of strategists can prompt decisions be made, and demands for reform be translated into reality. As for Xiaoping’s specific opinions [of that time], our experience over the past 15 years has possibly already outgrown them. But his method of approaching problems, his vision and intelligence will ever inspire us.
Behind the Controversy Over Globalization and the Market Economy
Participating in the WTO, joining the tide of globalization, “handling affairs in accord with international conventions”, represents a healthy road toward fully building a market economic system and a prosperous nation and people. The resolution of no economic problem should mean retreating from this path. This is a precious lesson Xiaoping passed down to us.
For all the insistence on “not inviting controversy” the 20-plus years of economic reforms [in China] have in fact seen constant controversy. Sum up the issues on either sides and you have nothing more than: are globalization and the market economy monsters, or necessary paths to modernization?
Those who describe globalization and marketization as monsters are troubled primarily by two things. The first is that [China’s] national security could be jeopardized. The second is that China will through this process [of globalization and marketization] become colonized by capital. In accord with these [fears], they strive to make non-peaceful change the core task, or one of the core tasks, of the country. As China’s international influence grows daily in stride with the rapid economic growth that comes with the economic reform process, impartial observers have to admit these two anxieties [about national security and colonization by capital] are phantasms.
Where Do These Mirages Come From?
Firstly, there is the deeply rooted stigma of a philosophy of contention [in China]. [NOTE: This is a reference to Mao Zedong’s notion of progress being rooted in contention and opposition]. Their heads writhe with [the notion of] “victimization at the hands of imperialism” (帝国主义亡我之心不死), and they forget that interaction in the modern world is built on economic foundations. The basic motivating factor of Chinese and foreign corporations is the maximization of profit. The governments and political forces of various countries may in fact strive for involvement in the process of corporate profit-seeking, but this is only local in nature and does not change the fact that the basic character of international economic relations is corporate commercial behavior.
Secondly, there is the failure to break through the shackles of the Soviet model and Western leftist theory. The revolution and building of Soviet Russia is a rare case in human history of a solemn and stirring quest by idealists. But we should not shrink from observing that is was, in its finale, a cruel and drawn-out tragedy, whether in political, economic or cultural and ideological terms. It left those that came after with so many lessons to ponder. A number of those who oppose economic reforms [in China] look on this [Russian experience] without clear heads. Intentionally or unintentionally, they mistake their faulty brush strokes for golden principles that must be followed. In international relations, for example, they oppose “cosmopolitanism” in favor of a parochial brand of nationalism … In the economic arena, [they are in favor of] economic planning and oppose market economics, the government directly running enterprises and monopolizing the market. They rob academic work, thought and speech freedoms. They rashly criticize and rashly deal with people [these oppose] – and they regard these as the foundation of Socialism.
A number of New Leftists who have come back from stints of study overseas are the disciples of American leftists. The criticisms launched by their teachers against politicians in developed countries are marked with a resistance to cavalier political and economic power [the tone here is NOT critical of these Western thinkers in their own contexts]; they bear these theories back to China whole and intact, so they become crude and ridiculous imitations.
Deng Xiaoping’s observations and analysis are of such a stature and perspicuity that they could never hope to match them.
How do we look at the world? The opportunities China has let slip by are so numerous. We won’t speak of the more distant examples. After the Second World War, Japan and Germany rose from the ashes. In the 1960s we set into motion the “destruction of the Four Olds”, “clamored for revolution” [the Cultural Revolution] and “comprehensive civil war”; [meanwhile] the four Asian tigers focused on developing their economies, with achievements that turned the heads of the world. All of these opportunities we missed out on. With the sincerest of wishes, Deng Xiaoping said: “Right now, a number of neighboring countries and regions are developing faster than we are. If we do not develop, or do not develop fast enough, then no matter how the ordinary people [of China] compare themselves, there will be trouble”. [The question of] whether to “seize the opportunity and develop oneself” became once again a serious question facing the Chinese people.
Where is the road out? Answering this question requires using the proper intellectual tools. “This is a different age. No problem can be solved through rigidity of thought or inflexible methods. Inflexibility will bring opposition. Both sides in opposition must consider the interests of the other side. They cannot resort to one-sided wishes” (Chronological Life of Deng Xiaoping, p. 1313-1314). Economic globalization is an indisputable historical trend. “Closing the country to international concourse is not the way … Opening without resolve and determination is not the way”. We must “handle affairs in accord with international conventions”, build a market economic system and integrate China with the world. Looking at the depths of history, this [lesson of Deng Xiaoping’s] is a conclusion to the tragic lesson of Chinese ignorance of global trends ever since the 17th century, its opposition to globalization, its opposition to the market economy, its repeated brushing with and wasting of opportunities…
“Leftist tendencies are still rooted [in our society]. A number of theorists and politicians take up their big hats and intimidate others; they are not on the right, but on the left” … Things that are good and beneficial they do away with in one fell swoop”. (Collected Sayings of Deng Xiaoping, Volume 3, p. 367).
Fifteen years have gone by. Arguments made brazenly and openly against the market economy and integration with the world are rare. But misguided trends in thought are still with us. At the first sign of trouble, those who “take up their big hats and intimidate others” can be found everywhere. Corporate mergers, repairing of rail lines, which country’s technology will be used for a nuclear power station, etc, etc., all are inundated with politics – treachery, patriotism, the hats fly up into the air. Faced with the growing gap between rich and poor, the severity of the Three Rural Problems … what measures should we take to deal with these? The planned economy [the Leftists say], that old road we know so well.
We should affirm without hesitation: participating in the WTO, joining the tide of globalization, “handling affairs in accord with international conventions”, building a market economic system, is a healthy road to a prosperous nation looking after the interests of the people. In resolving any economic problem, we should not veer from this overall path. This is a precious legacy handed down to us from [Deng] Xiaoping.
Rule of Law Demands Strategic Vision, Courage and Resourcefulness
The greatest task Xiaoping left to later generations is the reform of the political system. As early as 1986 he said: “Now each time we take a step forward in our economic reforms, we feel deeply the necessity of reforms to the political system” (Collected Sayings of Deng Xiaoping, Volume 3, p. 176). Twenty years have passed, and this great task is staring us in the face. Official corruption, a market in partial chaos, a growing gap between rich and poor, a poor capacity for innovation – how we solve these four major questions will determine the complexion of China’s future. These problems cannot be solved simply be piling on the internal measures of the original system. Reform calls for studying the vision and courage of Deng Xiaoping in those years. The heart of reforms is pushing forward with a system of constitutional governance.
One major point of progress in this area over the last 15 years has been that the concepts of constitutional governance and constitutional law have been elevated to the mainstream. [The ideas of] “a nation of laws”, “a country that respects and protects human rights”, “protects the legal rights and interests of personal economic activity, private enterprise and other non-state economic entities”, and protects private property, etc, etc., have been written into the constitution. One after another, national leaders have spoken about the importance of constitutional governance and constitutional law. [President] Hu Jintao said: “Ruling the nation by law means first ruling the nation by the constitution, and governing according to the law means first governing according to the constitution”. [Premier] Wen Jiabao said: “Those who govern the nation must govern according to the law”. One must feel great admiration for the clarity and accuracy of such expressions.
The Roots of Constitutional Governance Are Now Developing in China
The core of constitutional governance is protecting the rights and freedom of citizens; rule of law is the basic path toward protecting the rights and interests of citizens. The knowledge of citizen rights and interests is awakening, and the avenues for safeguarding one’s own rights and interests are gradually opening. Cases of rights violations can be found everywhere. But the victims are no longer silent. They seek out lawyers. They seek out the media. They seek out the courts, the people’s congresses, Political Consultative Congress [representatives] and government offices. The criticisms, revelatory speech and petitions show us a game of strategies (博弈) between rule of law and unlawful governance.
A citizen society – civic organizations are indispensable domains in which citizens may voice their wishes. Fifteen years ago, they were still places where scholars could discuss the classics and talk about things that were taboo in their actual lives. Today they are developing uninhibited in many areas [of society].
Without systems in place to check violations of the constitution there can be no true constitutional governance. If constitutional law cannot be realized in the legal system, then violations of the constitution cannot be dealt with in a regularized fashion. Calls for a system to dissolve conflict and protect the rights and interests of the people are echoing and reechoing, and the emergence of such a system cannot again be pushed off.
It has already been 100 years since the Qing Dynasty declared in 1906 that it was “preparing to implement constitutionalism”. The establishment and improvement of a system of constitutional governance is, in any nation, a two-sided process of interaction between leaders and the people. To move ahead [with building a constitutional system] we need people who care about the fate of their nation and who will each do their part, working diligently. We also need historic vision and minds like that of Deng Xiaoping …

[Posted by David Bandurski, January 30, 2007, 2:30pm]

Top officials and representatives from major Chinese Web portals met yesterday in Beijing to assess progress in the government’s Internet clean-up campaign, launched in March 2006 and marked by such slogans as the “development of a civilized Internet” and the “building of harmonious culture”.
A number of top media officials were present at the meeting, including Cai Mingzhao (蔡名照), a deputy director at the State Council Information Office and Hu Qiheng (胡启恒), a key figure behind China’s proposed real-name registration system for the Web, as well as representatives from People.com, Xinhuanet, Sina.com, Sohu.com and other major Chinese Web portals.
According to a Xinhua News Agency report on the meeting, representatives reached consensus opinion that the Internet clean-up campaign had “achieved good results, but there were still a number of unharmonious elements on the Internet”.
A joint proposal issued last April by major Web portals operating in China called on Websites to operate with the goal of creating a “healthy and civilized online culture”. The campaign sought to target indecent, violent and fraudulent online content by calling for rigorous self-censorship, standardizing of content production, and strengthening professional ethics among Web employees.
The campaign was closely linked with Hu Jintao’s “Socialist View of Honor and Shame”, a project of moral rectification in Chinese society.
[Posted by David Bandurski, January 30, 2006, 11:26am]

January 25 — More than a week after top publishing officials in China announced a nationwide ban on eight books, drawing domestic and international criticism, Beijing Daily slipped an excerpt from one of those books, The Other Stories of History, by former People’s Daily journalist Yuan Ying (袁鹰), into a prominent place on its inner pages. The case underscored the complexity of China’s changing media environment, in which newspapers can push the envelope in surprising ways. While more daring coverage is most often seen in commercial newspapers (generally spin-offs of provincial and city-level party newspapers) Beijing Daily is an offical party newspaper controlled by top city leaders in Beijing.
January 25 — Two weeks after announcement by local leaders in Chenzhou, Hunan province, of a new “watchdog journalism prize” drew sharp criticism from newspapers across China, leaders in Chenzhou responded through a news report in the official People’s Daily. Chenzhou’s party secretary and top leader Ge Hongyuan (葛洪元) said that releasing news was a means and promoting the work [of the leadership] the end goal. Ge emphasized that the prize was not just for show. Ge’s wishes were paraphrased by People’s Daily: “[He] hoped that in the process of carrying out watchdog journalism, the information gathered by the media, the stories told, the problems discovered, could be organized and transmitted as quickly as possible to the party and government [in Chenzhou], to be gathered and considered.”

Two weeks ago, the announcement by local leaders of a new “watchdog journalism prize” in the city of Chenzhou, Hunan province, drew sharp criticism from newspapers across China. Today, leaders in Chenzhou sought to clarify their intentions through a news report in the official People’s Daily.
After the prize was included in Chenzhou’s “Opinion on Further Supporting the Work of News Media” on January 11, many commentators characterized it as an effort to impede media supervision by co-opting it. They called for better protections for journalism independent from official meddling, and noted that while the prize targeted provincial and national media, local media in Chenzhou had been left out.
“What is most regrettable,” said a January 15 editorial in Southern Metropolis Daily, “is that up to today there is still no definite legal relationship between the media and the monitoring of public power, and the right to conduct watchdog journalism has not been afforded adequate protection. When officials are happy, they can give out watchdog journalism prizes, when they are unhappy they can keep [news] from seeing the light of day”.
The latter portion of today’s news article in People’s Daily, in which the reporter paraphrases the words of a Chenzhou spokesperson, follows:
During the forum a spokesperson from the municipal party committee of Chenzhou said that in the last year Chenzhou had not only suffered its worst natural disasters in 500 years, but had also seen a series of corrupt actions by the former party secretary, Li Dalun (李大伦), that had a profound negative impact [on Chenzhou]. Prior to this the municipal propaganda department had issued its “Three Mustn’ts” in a document targeted at watchdog journalism, [saying] “outside media must not be provided with news sources; outside journalists must not be received; and outside media must not be joined or cooperated with”.
[Chenzhou] learned lessons from bitter experience. The party and government leaders of Chenzhou believe that to build a harmonious society requires taking further steps to emphasize and bring into play support for the news media and its monitoring role. Building a splendid and harmonious Chenzhou requires taking further steps to create an ideal environment for public opinion and the propagating of information. They [the Chenzhou leadership] said: it is inconceivable that Chenzhou, with a population of 4.6 million, will not give rise to problems. If we focus only on achievements and do not face real problems head on, if we listen only to praise and do not countenance criticism … then we cannot make forward progress in our work, and [social] conflict will grow worse and worse. Criticism shakes us from our complacency, [so] supervision is support. It was for these reasons that [the Chenzhou government] released its “Opinion”.
Facing the controversy brought on by the “watchdog journalism prize”, Chenzhou’s party secretary [top leader] Ge Hongyuan (葛洪元), said that releasing news was a means and promoting the work [of the leadership] the end goal. The “watchdog journalism prize” [he said] was not just for show … [He] hoped that in the process of carrying out watchdog journalism, the information gathered by the media, the stories told, the problems discovered, could be organized and transmitted as quickly as possible to the party and government [in Chenzhou], to be gathered and considered.
[Posted by David Bandurski, January 25, 2007, 5:49pm]

If there’s one message to be taken away from the January 23 edition of Beijing Daily, the mouthpiece of top city leaders in China’s capital, it’s that Party newspapers can be feisty too. More than a week after top publishing officials in China announced a nationwide ban on eight books, drawing domestic and international criticism, Beijing Daily slipped an excerpt from one of those books, The Other Stories of History, by former People’s Daily journalist Yuan Ying (袁鹰), into a prominent place on its inner pages. [IMAGE: Page 15 of Beijing Daily, January 23, with exerpt (at top) of Yuan Ying’s recently-banned book/byline marked in RED].

The particular essay chosen by Beijing Daily, in which Yuan Ying discusses his various pen names of the past, is not itself sensitive. But the “Yuan Ying” byline is clear, and clearly a shot across the bow of officials at the General Administration of Press and Publications (GAPP), particularly deputy director Wu Shulin (邬书林).
CMP has written repeatedly about the way commercial newspapers (generally spin-offs of provincial and city-level party newspapers) push the envelope on various issues, both in news coverage and editorials. This latest case at Beijing Daily, a newspaper strictly controlled by top city leaders in Beijing, is a reminder of the complexity of China’s media environment.
Yuan Ying’s latest collection of essays, The Other Stories of History: My Days at the Supplement Division of People’s Daily (风云侧记 — 我在人民日报副刊的岁月), looks back with a level head on three decades of turmoil facing intellectuals in China, from the Anti-Rightist Movement of 1957 to the Cultural Revolution. While the book deals with many tragic episodes top Chinese leaders faced head-on in the early 1980s, Wu Shulin recently accused the book of “revealing state secrets”.
More Sources:
“Book Ban Violates My Rights, Says Author”, SCMP, January 20, 2007
“Denial of the Past Will Impede China’s Future“, SCMP, January 19, 2007
[Posted by David Bandurski, January 25, 4:37pm]

China Economic Times, a newspaper published by the Development Research Center of the State Council, published a lengthy story yesterday on the Lan Chengzhang case by former CMP fellow Wang Keqin, one of China’s leading investigative reporters. Wang Keqin’s report is the most thorough to appear so far on the controversial case, in which Lan, who was working as a reporter for China Trade News, was attacked while reportedly working on a story about an illegal mine in Shanxi province. The case has drawn strong attention from the Chinese public, top officials and domestic and foreign media since the first report appeared in Southern Metropolis Daily on January 16. (Kudos to Hong Kong blogger Roland Soong for translating the entire Wang Keqin report).
More on Wang Keqin and his work is available through the CMP site, including a case study on one of Wang’s earlier reports on corruption in Beijing’s taxi industry.
[Posted by David Bandurski, January 25, 2007, 12:47pm]

City law-enforcement officials in Datong, Shanxi Province, announced at a press conference yesterday that they had made a breakthrough in the case of murdered reporter Lan Chengzhang, taking seven suspects into custody. Datong police launched a probe into the reporter’s murder under pressure from national and provincial officials, who reportedly ordered an investigation be carried out “swiftly”. [More coverage translated at ESWN]. [BELOW: Screen capture of news coverage on Lan Chengzhang investigation, Sina.com].

A report from China News Service, available through major Web portals, said that after the incident happened “central, provincial and city leaders gave the case top priority”.
“CCP General Secretary Hu Jintao (胡锦涛), CCP Politburo Standing Committee Member Li Changchun (李长春), CCP Politburo Committee Member … Public Security Bureau Chief Zhou Yongkang (周永康), and Public Security Bureau Vice Chief Bai Jingfu (白景富) issued in succession formal instructions calling for a swift determination of the situation [in the Lan Chengzhang case] and the release of a report at the earliest possible moment”, the China News Service report said, noting that provincial officials had issued similar orders.
China’s domestic media have continued to report heavily on the Lan Chengzhang case since news broke in Southern Metropolis Daily on January 16. The story has prompted some newspapers to call for better protections for journalists in China.
In a January 22 editorial, Kunming’s Spring City Times used the Lan Chengchang story and other recent media stories, including a sketchy new watchdog journalism prize in Hunan province and watchdog journalism-related language in an anti-corruption legislation in Zhengzhou, to discuss the need for “specific laws” protecting the press:
These three [abovementioned] events, taken together, reveal a “love-hate” dynamic in the relationship between the government and news media in China, like that between “lovers”.
In a democratic society, the right of the people to monitor the government is in large part realized through the news media. If this principle is carried out [in deed], the relationship between the media and government should be one of monitor and monitored. Naturally, to the extent the media is an industry, the government has a duty to regulate it. Here we glimpse the [seemingly] contradictory relationship in which [the media and government] are both united and oppositional.
No matter what country’s mainstream media, the emphasis is on the interests of the nation and the people, and this means that in most instances the goals of media and government are one and the same. Their relationship should be one of mutual reliance and counter-valence, maintaining a state of balance. If one side takes pains to upset this balance, this will cause significant damage to both sides — during last year’s Typhoon “Saomei” in Fujian Province, reported numbers of dead showed considerable variance among the people because news media were strictly controlled [by local Party officials] …
For the media, having an atmosphere suited to watchdog journalism is much more meaningful than watchdog journalism prizes of any kind. For Zhejiang Province to emphasize the media’s right to conduct watchdog journalism through local legislation is progress. But while in a modern democratic society the fact that the “news media carry out watchdog journalism in accordance with the law … on government employees as they perform their official duties” is common knowledge, we still lack specific laws for [protecting] the exercising [of watchdog journalism], and when the rubber meets the road it is hard to ensure journalists are free to report.
The realization of watchdog journalism depends on good-faith interaction between media and the government. Officials have no need for teeth-grinding hate of the press, nor must they love them wholeheartedly.
[Posted by David Bandurski, January 24, 2007, 4:36pm]

Chinese broadcast officials announced over the weekend that only television dramas cleaving to the Party’s “main theme” would air during prime time this year. The measure, announced under the banner of China’s self-proclaimed “Year of Quality Television Dramas”, masks a campaign to keep threatening content out of prime-time television during what Party leaders regard as an especially sensitive year, marking the 50-year anniversary of the Anti-Rightist Movement and the start of the crucial 17th Party Congress. [Below: Headline in Jinghua Times announces the new SARFT regulations].

The language “carry forward the main theme” (弘扬主旋律) is an unambiguous Communist Party buzzword, encapsulating the notions of Party control, the supremacy of Marxism, the central position of heroic Party figures, and other key concepts, in an analogy to orchestral music. In recent years, the idea of the “main theme” has persisted as a term of some importance in China, complemented under commercialization with the notion of “promoting pluralism”. In television programming, the marriage of the two concepts suggests a CCP-style political correctness enlivened with themes more relevant to viewers — love stories, emotional turmoil, etc.
During a January 20 meeting, top leaders from the State Administration of Radio Film and Television (SARFT) announced that “beginning next month and for a period lasting at least eight months” — stretching through the Party Congress in October — satellite television stations in China would “without exception” broadcast “main theme television dramas” (主旋律电视剧).[Coverage from Jinghua Times via Sina.com].
Characterizing the new regulations as an effort to emphasize quality over quantity, SARFT officials said a 2003 relaxation of restrictions on television production had brought a flood of low-quality content into the industry. “This is a special year for all television programming,” said SARFT Deputy Director Wang Weiping (王卫平), quoted in Jinghua Times today. “In order to create good conditions and a favorable environment, SARFT declares that: from February and lasting for a period of eight months, all satellite channels will without exception broadcast main theme television dramas”.
Wang said SARFT had established a four-tier inspection and approval system for television dramas, in which they would first be submitted to the provincial office of SARFT and from there go to provincial propaganda authorities, the national SARFT office and finally to the Central Propaganda Department.
The move drew scorn and sarcasm from Chinese Web users.
“What is main theme television?” one user asked on the popular Chinese Web portal Sina.com. “Is it singing the praises of officials and their achievements? Or is it about things relevant to people’s lives, getting rid of corruption, fighting dirty power?”
Another Web user pointedly suggested China should share its policies with the world: “Shouldn’t we have the United Nations issue a decision: We cannot let Chinese people enjoy this happy [policy] on their own — the whole world must broadcast China’s main theme television? That would make it really fantastic!”
Many users hearkened back to the Leftist propaganda classics of the Cultural Revolution, suggesting bitingly that there was no reason for new productions if these were available: “It’s good enough just to re-air the eight exemplary plays [of the Cultural Revolution]. That’ll be flavorful enough. Why film new television dramas? I agree [with this policy].” And: “I support the State Administration of Radio Film and Television! It’s enough if we just film a few exemplary films each year. That way we won’t need to spend so much money!”
In a country where the popularity of video file-sharing has taken off in recent months, another Web user gave a verbal shrug, suggesting everyone should scrap their televisions and go with online broadcasts: “I’d like to ask — do I have the right during prime time to not, not, not to watch TV? I’d like to ask — the ‘main theme’ television you are talking about, if it is ‘main’, why doesn’t it have the guts to compete on level ground with other TV programs, but instead has to make use of monopoly power? …You guys go ahead with your making of regulations and carrying them out — you have a monopoly after all! As for myself, my prime time comes a bit later. It’s not affected. Ha ha! … From now on, those who set up new homes shouldn’t bother buying televisions. If you have a computer, there no sense in having a TV”.
[Posted by David Bandurski, January 22, 2007, 4:21pm]

A decision by publishing censors in China to ban eight books has angered many Chinese and brought a wave of online criticism, demonstrating again the power of the Internet as a form of expression in China.
Controversy over the decision to ban the eight books [list from SCMP], announced last week by Wu Shulin (邬书林), deputy director of the General Administration of Press and Publications (GAPP), comes on the eve of the one-year anniversary of the party’s shutdown of the Freezing Point supplement of China Youth Daily newspaper. [Summary of book ban by Danwei.org].
As was the case in the Freezing Point episode last year, in which intellectuals, officials and industry colleagues came to the supplement’s defense via the Web, resulting in its eventual re-launch, a number of prominent figures have stepped forward to criticize this most recent high-profile censorship case. Zhang Yihe (章诒和), the well-known author of one of the banned works and a recipient of the 2004 Freedom to Write Award from the Independent Chinese PEN Center (ICPC), has pledged in an open statement to defend her work to the end: “When my last two books were killed, I responded that I ‘didn’t care’ … This time, I do care, I care very much! Mr. Wu, let me tell you: I’ll face this gravely illegal behavior of yours with my life. Zhu Yingtai [a story character] gave her life to protect her love. I am prepared to give my life to protect my work” [Full translation of statement from ESWN].
On a popular Chinese bulletin board site, Zhang’s statement was introduced by Beijing lawyer and former CMP fellow Pu Zhiqiang (浦志强), who has served as defense counsel for a number of high-profile press freedom cases in China. Pu Zhiqiang also criticized Wu Shulin in a blog entry.
But while the Freezing Point episode concerned actions taken by the Party against news media via the Central Propaganda Department, opposition to the book ban is now directed toward a government office under the State Council, China’s highest administrative authority. Critics, including Zhang Yihe, say the actions of GAPP go against the stated goals of Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao and the State Council. As Zhang Yihe wrote: “Mr. Wu, what camp to you belong to? Not long ago, Premier Wen Jiabao said publicly that he hoped and demanded that Chinese writers and artists could speak the truth … GAPP is a subordinate office of the national government, under the State Council. Is this [GAPP action] not going directly against the State Council?”
The book ban controversy is also backgrounded by another upcoming anniversary — the fiftieth anniversary of the Anti-Rightist Campaign, launched in July 1957. Reference to this historical event, in which tens of thousands were purged as “rightist” elements critical of the policies of Mao Zedong, is apropos because the language of the GAPP ban targets not just content deemed unacceptable, but the writers themselves. GAPP Deputy Director Wu Shulin used the words “this person” to refer to Zhang Yihe in particular. Which is why Zhang Yihe, the daughter of a prominent “rightist” purged in 1957, alludes to factionalism in her public statement: “I understand that in Mr. Wu’s eyes, Zhang Yihe is a rightist. OK, let’s say I am a rightist. I’d like to ask: Isn’t a rightist a citizen [with a constitutional right to free speech/Chapter II, Article 25] all the same?”.
On top of this, the book ban controversy underscores the sometimes puzzling lack of uniformity in policy decisions and their execution that marks a China in transition. While the GAPP ban was issued on January 11, the January 14 edition of the official People’s Daily included a brief item about one of the books on the list, Yuan Ying’s (袁鹰) memoir titled Other Stories of History: My Days at the Supplements Division of the People’s Daily (风云侧记:我在人民日报副刊的岁月). Reviews of other books on the list, including Zhang Yihe’s, have appeared in various newspapers since the GAPP ban.
Web postings on the GAPP book ban multiplied at a rapid rate over the weekend on China’s KDnet. While postings were progressively deleted by Web censors — leaving the message: “This user’s post has already been removed by managers” — thousands of Web users voiced their opinions on the government move and shared information about the writers whose work was targeted.
A user called “No Tolerance” wrote: “I support the efforts of Zhang Yihe and the others to defend their rights”. Another, “guangli203”, re-posted Zhang Yihe’s pledge to stand up to GAPP Deputy Director Wu Shulin: “What earth-shaking words,” they wrote. “I support them!”
A user called “Northern Sky” wrote: “I support Zhang’s efforts to take action against them [in the GAPP]. Take action against them? Where does one go to take action against them? The United Nations?”
Wrote user “Tao Tie”: “Even a book that simply describes the pasts of Beijing Opera stars gets banned. The General Administration of Press and Publications is even stricter than during the Republican Era [under the Kuomintang] — is this what is meant by [Hu Jintao’s] Harmonious Society?”
One user, “Gong Buo”, included in “Post #8” a list of works by Zhang Yihe, to which another user subsequently responded: “Please go quickly and fill your prescription [buy books] according to Post #8. Supplies are limited!”
More Links:
“History Books Get the Axe“, Danwei.org, January 19, 2007
[Posted by David Bandurski, January 22, 2007, 1:59pm]

January 17 – The beating death of China Trade News reporter Lan Chengzhang (兰成长) sparked a controversy in China over press safety and media corruption as local party officials in Datong, Shanxi Province (where the reporter was killed), insisted Lan was a “fake” reporter out to extort money from local coalmines, and representatives from China Trade News confirmed they hired Lan on a provisional basis. [Coverage from ESWN here and here].
January 17 — Thousands of Chinese web users responded as Guangzhou’s top law-enforcement official, Zhang Guifang (张桂芳), blasted the media as the primary source of a worsening sense of public safety in the city. By late afternoon, Web censors were working to contain the story, and thousands of postings suddenly vanished from one major Web portal.
January 22 – A decision by publishing censors in China to ban eight books angered many Chinese and brought a wave of online criticism, demonstrating again the power of the Internet as a form of expression in China. The controversy came on the eve of the one-year anniversary of the party’s shutdown of the Freezing Point supplement of China Youth Daily newspaper. As was the case in the Freezing Point episode in 2006, in which intellectuals, officials and industry colleagues came to the supplement’s defense via the Web, resulting in its eventual re-launch, a number of prominent figures stepped forward to criticize the book ban.
January 22 — Rui Chengang, a well-known anchor at China Central Television, drew international attention as he wrote a criticism on his personal Weblog about the presence of a Starbuck’s coffee in the Forbidden City. [More coverage from ESWN]. [Coverage from IHT]. [Coverage from Shanghai Daily].
January 22 — Chinese broadcast officials announced that only television dramas cleaving to the Party’s “main theme” would air during prime time this year. The measure, announced under the banner of China’s self-proclaimed “Year of Quality Television Dramas”, masked a campaign to keep threatening content out of prime-time television during what Party leaders regard as an especially sensitive year, marking the 50-year anniversary of the Anti-Rightist Movement and the start of the crucial 17th Party Congress. The language “carry forward the main theme” (弘扬主旋律) was an unambiguous Communist Party buzzword, encapsulating the notions of Party control, the supremacy of Marxism, the central position of heroic Party figures, and other key concepts, in an analogy to orchestral music. In recent years, the idea of the “main theme” has persisted as a term of some importance in China, complemented under commercialization with the notion of “promoting pluralism”. In television programming, the marriage of the two concepts suggests a CCP-style political correctness enlivened with themes more relevant to viewers — love stories, emotional turmoil, etc. Characterizing the new regulations as an effort to emphasize quality over quantity, SARFT officials said a 2003 relaxation of restrictions on television production had brought a flood of low-quality content into the industry.