David Bandurski, Author at China Media Project

The Emperor's New Buzzword

Written by David Bandurski on 8 June 2020. Posted in China Newspeak.

As the immediacy of the Covid-19 crisis has faded in China, the focus in the media coverage has turned to “the return to work and return to production” (复工复产). In the party-state media, the aggrandizing attention paid to Xi Jinping as the “leader,” or lingxiu (领袖), which cooled noticeably in February and March, is also now heating up once again.

When we look at the frequency of the phrase “two protections” – referring to the protection of Xi Jinping as the CCP’s “core,” and protection of the authority of the Central Committee – counted on a per-article basis in the Party’s flagship People’s Daily newspaper from December 2019 through May 2020, here is the trend we can see:

Clearly, the “two protections” has returned almost to the January high, which came before Xi Jinping’s open acknowledgement of the severity of the epidemic on January 20. The “two protections” is a phrase that, like the designation “core” and other related terms, clearly marks the power and authority of Xi Jinping as general secretary — and its resurgence, more than doubling from April to May, is significant.

But there is another term, perhaps less known to readers, that also deserves attention, and that is the phrase, rather unwieldy in English, “Green waters and green mountains are gold mountains and silver mountains” (绿水青山就是金山银山). What does this mean? In fact, this phrase is a personal favorite of Xi’s. During his official visit to Kazakhstan on September 7, 2013, he gave a speech at Nazarbayev University and answered questions from students about environmental protection. He said: “We want green waters and green mountains, but we also want gold mountains and silver mountains. It is better to have green waters and green mountains than gold mountains and silver mountains – and green waters and the green mountains are gold mountains and silver mountains.”

This is Xi Jinping’s more colorful way of saying that while economic development is a priority, the environment cannot be sacrificed for the sake of growth. State media have suggested repeatedly in recent years that the phrase has been welcomed internationally, and that it has “contributed Chinese knowledge and a Chinese solution” to global environmental problems. In fact, the phrase is difficult to convey in other languages, and it seems to have gained little or no traction outside China.

But the phrase rings well enough in Chinese, and it has been tolling steadily in the party-state media of late. When we look at the development of this phrase since late last year in the People’s Daily, here is what we find:

Over the past month the phrase has been further developed, shortened into what is now being called the “two mountains theory,” or liangshanlun (两山论). The following is an image of coverage last week from Xinhua News Agency. The headline reads: “Xi Jinping’s ‘two mountains theory’ allows the world to understand ‘beautiful China.’”

Reading the now abundant explications of this phrase and its shortened version in the party-state media, we are clearly told that the “two mountains theory” is an original creation of Xi Jinping’s. Back in March, in the midst of the epidemic, Xi paid a visit to Anji County in Zhejiang province, where from 2002 to 2007 he served as governor and Party secretary. Media reports stressed the claim that Xi was returning to the place where the “two mountains theory” was first conceived.

Several online sources, including the Chinese-language Wikipedia, suggest that Xi Jinping first raised the “two mountains theory” on August 15, 2005, during an inspection tour as provincial secretary of Zhejiang’s Anji County, and that it is “the principal theory guiding the building of an ecological civilization in mainland China.”

Environmental protection is regarded as an important agenda for the CCP on which there is a rather high level of consensus within the Party. The recent upsurge in coverage of the “two mountains theory” appears to be part of a new round of propaganda surrounding the notion of Xi as the lingxiu (领袖), or “leader,” this time focussing on what has also been termed “Xi Jinping thought on ecological civilization” (习近平生态文明思想).

The Chinese phrase, “Green waters and the green mountains are gold mountains and silver mountains,” is rather vivid, and one might argue lends itself to wider circulation, at least in Chinese. But where did the phrase actually come from? And in what context was it first raised by Xi Jinping?

Searching in the People’s Daily for the separate phrases “green waters and green mountains” and “gold mountains and silver mountains,” we can unearth the following front page from the newspaper dating back to March 9, 2003.

The headline highlighted in red reads: “Variations on green waters-green mountains and gold mountains-silver mountains.” The subhead to the left of the main headline tells us that this is about environmental policies in Jiangsu province, Zhejiang’s northern neighbour, and the concept sounds eerily similar: “A record of the coordination of environmental protection and economic development in Jiangsu province.”

Here is my translation of the editor’s note that starts out the article:

On the question of environmental protection, many regions have had this general experience: The 1970s ‘only prioritized gold mountains and silver mountains, overlooking green waters and green mountains’; The 1980s were about ‘demanding gold mountains and silver mountains, and also wanting green waters and green mountains’; In the 1990s the sense was that ‘having green waters and green mountains meant having gold mountains and silver mountains [to exploit]’; and lately we have recognized that ‘only by having green waters and green mountains can we have gold mountains and silver mountains!’”

Looking back ever further, similar phrasing appears in 1995, way back in the Jiang Zemin era. In an article appearing in the People’s Daily on November 2, 1995, the CCP leadership in the Jiangsu county of Zhangjiagang (张家港) wrote: “[We] need gold mountains and silver mountains, and we also want green waters and green mountains” (既要金山银山, 又要绿水青山).

In 1996 and 1997, in fact, quite of number of instances in which variations of this idea (of needing but also wanting, and so on) appear in headlines in the People’s Daily. These come, among others, from the county-level city of Fuyang in Zhejiang province (July 31, 1996); from Jiangsu’s Party secretary Chen Huanyou (陈焕友), appearing November 18, 1996; and from Shaanxi primary school teacher Yu Yingkai (于应凯).

On June 8, 1998, an article from the city government of Zhongshan in Guangdong province stated that, “[We] want green waters and green mountains, not polluted gold and silver mountains.” In another article appearing on July 15, 1998, the district government of Taishan in the city of Tai’an in Shandong province offered: “Gold mountains and silver mountains cannot compare to green waters and green mountains.”

Zhejiang province is regarded in China as being at the forefront of environmental protection. In 1999, the People’s Daily reported that President Jiang Zemin had written words of dedication for the village of Tengtou in Fenghua, near the city of Ningbo. Those words read: “We would rather have green waters and green mountains, even without gold mountains and silver mountains” (August 24, 1999).

In the 1990s, as green waters and green mountains were bandied about in the People’s Daily, there was no sign of such language from Fujian province, where Xi Jinping was serving in various posts, eventually becoming governor in 1999. It was only later, in 2002, that Xi would be transferred to “green” Zhejiang, becoming Party secretary there in November that year.

Before and shortly after Xi’s arrival in Zhejiang, there were already several provincial Party secretaries talking about the “two mountains” in the pages of the People’s Daily. On June 10, 2002, then Hubei Party Secretary Yu Zhengsheng (俞正声), who served on the Politburo Standing Committee with Xi from 2012 to 2017, said: “Only if we have green waters and green mountains can we have gold mountains and silver mountains.”

On March 5, 2003, then Jiangxi Party Secretary Meng Jianzhu (孟建柱), who was secretary of the CCP’s Central Political and Legal Affairs Commission before retiring in 2017, said: “We want green waters and green mountains, but we want even more gold mountains and silver mountains.”

But even more than these near-hit utterances, coming so close in meaning to the current “two mountains theory” being so loudly propagated as Xi Jinping’s own creation, we should note a People’s Daily report on October 24, 2003, in which the then director of the Ministry of Environmental Protection (MEP), Xie Zhenhua (解振华), said: “Green waters and green mountains are gold mountains and silver mountains!” (绿水青山就是金山银山). Here we have concrete evidence in the press records of the Chinese Communist Party that the so-called “two mountains theory” had already been codified by October 2003, and in fact emerged in full form that year from the government ministry tasked with protecting China’s water, land and air from pollution. The department is now known as the Ministry of Ecology and Environment.

When did Xi Jinping first come into the picture? To answer this, we must fast-forward almost a year, to August 10, 2004. We find Xi, then Party secretary of Zhejiang, quoted in a People’s Daily article referencing the “Three Represents” and the “Scientific View of Development,” the banner terms respectively of Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao. The article deals with a campaign in Zhejiang to clean up polluted villages, and reads at one point:

Zhejiang provincial Party leaders excitedly told the reporter: “The ‘1,000 Model Villages, 10,000 Renovated Villages’ Project, as an ‘ecological project,’ is an effective means of promoting the building at an ecological province, and it protects the ‘green waters and green mountains’ while bringing ‘gold mountains and silver mountains.’”

There is also a direct quote from Xi, in which he says: “We take the carrying out of this program as real action toward the realization of the ‘Three Represents,’ and the implementation of the scientific view of the development.”

Finally, on April 24, 2006, the People’s Daily reported on a speech on the environment delivered by then Zhejiang Party Secretary Xi Jinping to a provincial government conference on the issue. This is the first time we see the so-called “two mountains theory” closely associated with Xi in any context.

In this article, Xi says that the “two mountains” stand in contradiction, yet are “dialectically integrated.” Green waters and green mountains can unceasingly provide a source of gold mountains and silver mountains, he says. Ecological advantages can be turned into economic advantages – and this, he suggests, is the highest aspiration. There must be harmony between man and nature, and harmony between the economy and society. These are what he calls the “two mountains.” The article reads: “We want gold mountains and silver mountains, but we also want green waters and green mountains; green waters and green mountains are gold mountains and silver mountains.”

Explaining this “two mountains” notion at the time, Xi spoke of three stages. In the first stage, green waters and green mountains are exploited for gold and silver mountains. In the second stage, economic development is the priority, but the environment (the green waters and mountains) are to be protected. In the third stage, there is finally a recognition that environmental health is the constant source of economic prosperity – of those mountains of gold and silver. The third stage, he says, is the pinnacle of development.

Once we’ve put all of the above materials together, we can clearly see the development of the idea behind this phrase, “Green waters and the green mountains are gold mountains and silver mountains.” Xi Jinping is fond of saying that “each generation builds in its work on the last” (一代人接着一代人干). In fact, this is true also of discourse. This phrase originally came to maturity within the context of the nationwide propagation of Hu Jintao’s “scientific view of development” well over a decade ago.

It was only after several senior provincial leaders and central government officials made quite prominent and unmistakable pronouncements on this very concept and phrasing that Xi Jinping jumped on the bandwagon.

If we talk about the “two mountains theory” as a cumulative idea, then we can say that Xi Jinping has made two contributions in particular. The first is to tidy up the language around the “two mountains” with his 2006 People’s Daily article, which sums up and clarifies the idea. The second is to offer the “two mountains” concept his backing as a senior leader, giving it a much higher national profile. Though Chinese party-state media would have us also believe that the concept has had great impact internationally, that the world has greeted the concept, as the China Daily reported, with “a high-level of attention and expectation,” there in fact little mention of the phrase at all outside Chinese.

But the more crucial point here is that Xi Jinping is not the originator of this concept, not by a long shot.

We can note that the phrase, “We want green waters and green mountains, and also gold mountains and silver mountains,” which Xi included in his speech at Nazarbayev University, appears verbatim in the Jiang Zemin era. The phrase, “We would rather have green waters and green mountains, even without gold mountains and silver mountains,” was raised in the village of Tengtou, near Ningbo, in 1999, at which time Xi had not yet arrived in Zhejiang. The phrase, “Green waters and the green mountains are gold mountains and silver mountains,” which has been loudly trumpeted as a Xi neologism in recent weeks, was uttered nearly 16 years ago by the director of the Ministry of Environmental Protection, Xie Zhenhua.

Is there any need to imagine, and involve the entire country in the fiction, that this phrase is a theoretical innovation of Xi Jinping himself?

Officials in the Chinese Communist Party have developed the habit through long practice of this sort of collective aggrandizement. In the face of rising tides of leadership admiration, and incipient personality cults, the threshold of praise gets pushed ever higher, until facts are no longer material.

CCP history records how, in 1922, Li Lisan (李立三) and Liu Shaoqi (刘少奇) led a major strike among miners in Jiangxi’s Anyuan Township. In 1961, a Chinese painter made an oil painting called, “Liu Shaoqi and the Miners of Anyuan” (刘少奇与安源矿工), and Li Lisan, who by that point had been disgraced within the Party, was omitted from the portrait. But the vicissitudes of politics under Mao Zedong meant the tiles were soon shuffled again. As the Cultural Revolution got underway, and as Liu Shaoqi was purged and subjected to harsh treatment, another painting of Anyuan was created. This time, Liu Shaoqi was changed out for Mao Zedong, and the painting naturally called, “Mao Zedong En Route to Anyuan” (毛主席去安源).

The 1967 painting “Mao Zedong En Route to Anyuan,” by painter Liu Chunhua. Available at Wikimedia Commons under CC license.

There are many other examples of this kind, of the facts being twisted, expunged, painted over and glossed over – all in order to make way for the CCP’s predominating sense at the moment of how things should be.

Clearly, when online sources and party-state media suggest that the “two mountains” theory was raised by Xi Jinping during an inspection tour of Zhejiang’s Anji County in 2005, and the suggestion is made on national television that Anji is “the place where ‘green waters and green mountains are gold mountains and silver mountains’” was invented, this does not accord at all with the facts.

The only thing that remains to be seen now is just how long this “fake news” will persist in China’s media.

Is China reveling in US woes?

Written by David Bandurski on 3 June 2020. Posted in Headlines and Hashtags.

A number of international media have reported in recent days that Chinese officials might be deriving some pleasure from the protests unfolding in the United States in the wake of the tragic killing of George Floyd. The Guardian newspaper noted Monday that both officials and state media appeared to “revel in scenes of US unrest, comparing protests there to Hong Kong’s pro-democracy movement.” The New York Times reported yesterday that “[as] protests over police violence engulf hundreds of cities in the United States, China is reveling in the moment.”

It is certainly true that Chinese officials are likely to view protests over police brutality toward black people in America as an opportunity to undermine the legitimacy of US statements on the pro-democracy movement in Hong Kong — and on human rights more broadly. Observe the cunning Twitter mastery shown by Hua Chunying of China’s foreign ministry on Saturday as she responded with a simple “I can’t breathe,” the rallying cry for police protests, in response to a tweet in which her US counterpart Morgan Ortagus said that “freedom loving people around the world must stand with the rule of law and hold to account the Chinese Communist Party, which has flagrantly broken its promises to the people of Hong Kong.”

Also cited in several accounts of Chinese schadenfreude over the US protests is Hu Xijin, the editor-in-chief of the Global Times. In one of a number of US-related tweets, Hu equates violence in Hong Kong with the destruction evident on the streets of New York, D.C. and Minneapolis, suggesting the latter must have been incited by Hong Kong “rioters,” who had “infiltrated American states.” Hu Xijin later tweeted with apparent glee: “Mr President, don’t go hide behind the secret service. Go to talk to the demonstrators seriously. Negotiate with them, just like you urged Beijing to talk to Hong Kong rioters.”

French journalist Pierre Haski observed, not incorrectly, for the New York Times: “Beijing could not have hoped for a better gift.” But in the prickly domain of international relations, gifts must be unwrapped carefully. As the comments from Hua Chunying and Hu Xijin make clear, Hong Kong is the issue underlying Chinese criticism surrounding the US protests. And this makes the attention focused on the US both a fortuitous occurrence and an extremely touchy subject for the Chinese Communist Party.

Yes, the US protests can to some extent be exploited as an opportunity by the Chinese leadership. But the leadership must be careful at the same time not to imply the legitimacy of Hong Kong’s pro-democracy movement. It must undermine the idea that the United States stands for the values it purports to stand for – freedom, democracy and human rights – while not quite explicitly advocating those same values.

So, looking beyond the social media barbs of foreign ministry officials and the ever acerbic and often tasteless remarks of Hu Xijin, what are Chinese media saying and reporting about everything happening in the US? In fact, the picture is complicated. Hu Xijin’s Global Times aside – and it should always be regarded as a bit on the side, an antagonistic voice on the periphery of the core – party-state media in China, both central and provincial, have not dealt very loudly with the US protests. This is noticeable especially in the case of newspapers across the country, which have not prominently reported the news, and have tended to avoid images of the protests, especially images depicting more violent acts. Meanwhile, social media platforms, including Weibo and WeChat, which cannot be regarded as state media, have been channels for the sharing of a greater variety of information – including rumour, speculation and commentary. Examples include an interesting on-the-scene report from Phoenix TV correspondent Wang Bingru (王冰汝王冰汝) in Bethesda, Maryland; video of looting at an Apple Store accompanied by foreign media reports citing Apple as warning looters that stolen phones will be tracked; and video of marches in New York City accompanied by the hashtag “#US state governor rejected Trump’s decision to send troops#.” Readers who are interested might consider exploring the Weibo hashtag “American riots” (#美国暴乱#) to get a taste of the information being shared.

But given the suggestion that state media have reveled in events in the US, perhaps it would be helpful to take a slightly more systematic look at how the news is being handled at these outlets. The major caveat I offer here is that there seems to be a marked difference in the information shared by the news apps and public accounts operated by party-state media and the print and online versions of the same media. This begs tougher-to-answer questions about the new ways information, including propaganda, is being processed and shared through digital platforms. The New York Times notes in its report yesterday, for example, that an image titled “Beneath human rights” (人权之下), depicting a cracked and broken Statue of Liberty standing over the White House, was “published by People’s Daily, the Chinese Communist Party’s flagship newspaper, and circulated widely on social media sites this week.”

It should be stressed that this image was apparently created (it is labelled as such) as being from “People’s Daily New Media,” and bears the Sina Weibo tag “People’s Daily.” While the association with the CCP’s flagship newspaper seems clear enough, however, it is not quite accurate, and crosses wires in terms of the media power dynamics at play, to suggest that the image was “published by” the People’s Daily.

As I will discuss in a moment, the graphic message borne by the manga-style image above is something we would expect not to find approximated in the pages of the actual, official People’s Daily, whose discourse is carefully scripted at the upper levels of power. The image is clearly angled toward social media audiences, not toward CCP officials (the primary People’s Daily readership), and designed to go viral. The whole phenomenon of viral propaganda in the digital era, and the differential use of formal propaganda organs versus “official” news apps and social media accounts, is a giant issue deserving much more research (calling all graduate students). To complicate matters further, we must consider the role of Russian and alt-right sources of information both on Chinese state media channels and social media platforms like WeChat, something I will deal with only briefly.

Let’s move on to the traditional, published People’s Daily. The newspaper yesterday included no coverage of the US protests or related commentary. The front page was dominated instead by coverage of Xi Jinping’s plans for a free trade port in Hainan, and with other official CCP business, and most of the rest of the paper was filled with page after page of statutes passed during the recent NPC.

As I said earlier, Hong Kong is the real underlying issue of the moment for Chinese leaders, even as they consider events in the US. And Hong Kong was dealt with in five separate articles on pages 3 and 4. The page 3 commentary was from “Zhong Sheng” (钟声), a pen name used in the paper since November 2008 for important pieces on international affairs on which the leadership wishes to register its view. This column deals with the actions of “certain American politicians” in threatening sanctions against Hong Kong as a result of the proposed national security legislation, and repeats the leadership’s position:

The national security legislation concerning Hong Kong is purely a matter of China’s internal affairs. China’s advancement of relevant legislation is reasonable and legal, and is in the interests of all Chinese people, including our compatriots in Hong Kong. Obviously, some politicians in the United States do not wish to see the long-term stable development of Hong Kong, and they dig about to fabricate various supposed crimes, and threaten sanctions against Hong Kong.

The commentary urges an end to what it calls the “sanctions addiction” of the United States, but never raises US protests. This omission makes sense when you consider the piece’s conclusion, which turns to the need for closer US-China cooperation: “At a time when the COVID-19 epidemic has brought unprecedented public health and economic development challenges to various countries, China-US cooperation to deal with global hardships is of even more prominent importance. The US side should choose to strengthen cooperation with China in areas such as fighting the epidemic.”

A cluster of four pieces on page 4 dealt with Hong Kong national security legislation and the US response, with talk of “the American side blackening ‘One Country, Two Systems’”, the ill-advised nature of the “so-called sanctions,” criticism of Trump’s Friday announcement on barring entry to the US for graduate level research by Chinese nationals with ties to the military.

And what about today? The pattern on the front page of the People’s Daily holds, with an exclusive focus on internal Party business, and there is no mention at all of the United States through the rest of the newspaper, not even in the context of Hong Kong.

When we review yesterday’s provincial-level CCP newspapers, we find the pattern holds again. The Beijing Daily, the official organ of the Beijing municipal CCP committee, makes no mention of news in the US, focusing instead on front-page coverage mirroring that of the People’s Daily, about the master plan for the new free trade port in Hainan. The focus in later pages is on promoting local economic growth, fighting poverty, and NPC statutes. There is even coverage of city policies to deal with waste.

Fujian Daily, the official party mouthpiece of the CCP committee of Fujian province, similarly makes no mention whatsoever of the United States today, the focus again on Xi Jinping’s remarks on the proposed free trade port in Hainan.

Turning to Zhejiang Daily, the official organ of the Zhejiang provincial CCP committee, the Hainan free trade port news and Xi Jinping’s pronouncements are again the top story. The rest is dry official news that I leave you to read at your leisure.

If we turn to city-level papers, the same mind-numbing pattern continues. For example, Changjiang Daily, the official CCP publication in Wuhan, is dominated by the Xi story about Hainan, by the NPC statutes, and by local official news.

What about the commercial spin-offs of these and other CCP newspapers, which tend to be heavier on news coverage over dry official business? Without getting too deeply into the woods here, I found that the vast majority of commercial newspapers also dealt sparingly with the US protests, to put it mildly. For many, they simply did not exist.

One notable exception was The Beijing News, a commercial paper launched in 2003 by Guangming Daily and Guangdong’s Nanfang Daily but brought directly under the Beijing city leadership as a central-level paper in 2011. The paper addressed the US situation yesterday in two articles, one a commentary (page 3) and the other a news report (page 12). The former, “US riots escalate,” was written by Chen Jimin (陈积敏), a young professor in the International Strategy Research Institute of the CCP’s Central Party School.

After a brief rundown of the situation in the US, including demonstrations accompanied by “violent incidents,” and the dispatching of the National Guard in a number of cities, the commentary focuses criticism on American hypocrisy, the clear goal being to undermine US credibility on its own core values:

This incident is without a doubt a tragedy. Moreover, people sigh to find that it has happened in broad daylight in an America that parades about ‘democracy, human rights, freedom and equality.'” However, a basic understanding of American history will reveal such surprise as naive.

The second piece, a full-page in the “World News” section, focusses on “riots” in the US, bearing the headline: “Over 4,100 protesters already arrested in US riots.” The report is mostly a recounting of known facts, drawing on coverage from CNN and the BBC. The report emphasizes remarks from Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Zhao Lijian, who said this week that “voices of justice from the African Union and African countries represent the general consensus of the international community and he hoped the United States would face them and bide them carefully.” China, said Zhao, is “willing to work with the African side to firmly oppose all forms of racial discrimination, as well as all hateful language inciting racial discrimination.”

China has of course recently had its own serious problems with African leaders over racist treatment of African nationals in Guangzhou, and also faces questions over its treatment of black Americans in the city.

But here we see, notwithstanding, two thematic threads that seem rather consistent in Chinese state media treatment of the US protests – 1) the US has no credibility to speaks on rights and freedoms; 2) China stands with the rest of the world in upholding shared values.

Other commercial newspapers hardly merit attention on the US protests. We note that Guangzhou’s Southern Weekly, typically one of China’s more interesting and professional publications, has no coverage at all of the US on its website today. Providing comic relief, perhaps, the Qianjiang Evening News, a commercial spin-off of the official Zhejiang Daily, would prefer today to devote the front page to explaining why lobster prices are so low. Nowhere does the paper mention the US or other global news.

When we move on to state media news websites, coverage becomes marginally more interesting. The website of China Central Television yesterday included two reports mentioning the US protests – and here is where the question of Russian and alt-right sourcing enters the picture.

The first article, visible in the image below, reported Russia’s RT rejecting supposed claims by former US national security adviser Susan Rice that Russia could be behind the George Floyd demonstrations. In fact, Rice said during a CNN interview with Wolf Blitzer on Sunday: “I would not be surprised to learn that they [the Russians] have fomented some of these extremists on both sides using social media. I wouldn’t be surprised to learn that they are funding it in some way, shape, or form.” Though Rice never explicitly blamed Russia, but rather focused on general disinformation campaigns exploiting divisions in the US, which are well-documented in other contexts, her comments were widely reported to have done so by conservative news sites and Russia media sites like RT and Sputnik News.

The CCTV.com piece clearly cites RT as its only source, and includes a screenshot of RT coverage with Chinese reading: “American politician ‘shifts the blame’ to Russia, and is ridiculed by Russian media.” The piece was re-run at other online outlets, including QQ.com and Hunan’s Rednet.cn, Jiangxi’s official Jxnews.com.cn, Shaanxi’s CNWest.com, the website of Guangzhou’s Yangcheng Evening News, Sohu.com, Sina.com and many others.

This is not an isolated case of use by official Chinese media of RT and other Russian information apparently emerging from right-wing websites in the West, or similar to content appearing through such channels. On Monday, a number of Chinese websites, including Sina.com, shared an RT story detailing an attack by protesters on a white man identified as a Dallas shopkeeper protecting his neighborhood with a machete. The story originated with Elijah Schaffer, a freelance producer for Blaze TV, the network founded in 2018 by American conservative commentator and conspiracy theorist Glenn Beck. Schaffer apparently edited a video clip of the attack to make it seem unprovoked, and later spread the rumor that the victim had died. Police in Dallas subsequently complicated Schaffer’s version of events, and it seems the man in question suffered only minor injuries, according to the Fort Worth Star-Telegram.

Chinese accounts, most attributed to the Global Times website, reported that “RT quoted an eyewitness as saying that the man who was attacked was trying to protect a local shop from being damaged by demonstrators.” This eyewitness was in fact Schaffer, as the RT article makes clear.

The Military News section of Sina.com shares a story from the Global Times sources from Russia’s RT.

Also this week, the official China News Service shared through its news app a story from the RT for which George Floyd’s aunt, Angela Harrelson, was interviewed by the Russian service. These and other instances on other stories suggest a pattern of use of Russian sources such as RT and Sputnik News across the official sites and accounts of party-state media in China, something warranting further investigation.

The next article related to the US protests at CCTV.com yesterday, “Protests against brutal police enforcement continue to spread in the United States,” is a fairly straightforward account of protests in the US, including the announcement of a curfew by Minnesota governor Tim Waltz and declarations of a “state of disaster” by other states, including Texas and Virginia. The report is based entirely on US reports from CNN and the Associated Press. The image accompanying this CCTV.com article shows protesting figures in a blurry night scene, but depicts none of the acts of violence we have seen in coverage inside the United States and elsewhere in the world – no scenes of street fires and burning flags, destroyed squad cars or burned out post office buildings.

Looking at the use of images of the US protests in state media, it seems that more violent images are largely avoided, suggesting perhaps that such images have been discouraged by propaganda authorities. The scope of this study is of course limited, but Hong Kong could again be a factor here, as authorities are mindful of the resonance images of violence clashes between protesters and police could have.

We can note that an article and video posted to CCTV.com later in the day yesterday persisted in the attack on US credibility over human rights issues, while avoiding more violent images of US protests. The source of the video and story in this case was CGTN America, and a recent special report called, “America: A Reality Check.” The Chinese-language version was headlined, “Six big truths exposing human rights chaos inside the US.” The attack was numbingly familiar: “The United States has always boasted of being a human rights defenders in the world, and has put together its annual country-specific human rights reports in which it grabs at facts and listens to hearsay. But is the human rights situation in the United States really as perfect as some politicians suggest?”

Once again, the basic tactics: 1) undermine US credibility on human rights and basic freedoms; 2) emphasize China’s international solidarity and ostensibly shared values.

These same themes played out on the Chinese-language website of the official Xinhua News Agency yesterday as it shared an image of protests in New Zealand. The focus was on the international outcry over the death of George Floyd, with the implicit suggestion of China’s shared outrage. The headline: “New Zealand protests against violent law enforcement by US police.” Consider the contrast to similar coverage by the New Zealand Herald, which emphasized solidarity with protesting Americans: “New Zealand protesters have today joined thousands of Americans demonstrating against the killing of Minneapolis man George Floyd.”

The understated treatment of the US protests in party-state newspapers and on principal websites continues today. People’s Daily Online features no coverage on the homepage today.

The Chinese-language site of the official Xinhua News Agency, meanwhile, includes a single report with the headline: “Protests against violent law enforcement by police continues in many places in the US, Floyd funeral arrangements finalized.” The report, which does not include statements from China’s foreign ministry or other commentary, begins:

Protests against violent law enforcement by police that have spread across the United States entered an eighth day on June 2, and peaceful demonstrations were held in cities in the south and west. At the same time, the memorial service and funeral of George Floyd, the African-American who was killed by police violent law enforcement, will be held later this week to next week.

In Houston, Texas, tens of thousands of people braved the scorching heat in the city center on the afternoon of June 2 to hold a commemorative parade for Floyd. Before the march, the demonstrators called a brief moment of silence.

Once again, the photos in the news article show peaceful protests, and avoid any display of violence. On Xinhua’s homepage, the story is number eleven, following reports on Xi Jinping’s statements on public health and anti-poverty measures, Carrie Lam’s remarks on national security legislation in Hong Kong, and so on.

Given the nature of coverage by party-state media, I leave it others to determine whether, in their view, China’s officials are openly “reveling” in the scenes emerging from the US. I would suggest cautiously that the picture is far more complicated. There are clear cases of exploitation, notable for example in the case of CGTN America’s segment on “America: A Reality Check” – which targets an overseas audience but can be reflected back to a domestic audience. There are commentaries like that in The Beijing News, attempting to underscore American hypocrisy, which in any case are featured regularly in Chinese state media, whatever is unfolding in the US. But there also seems to be a muting of coverage in official channels, very possibly because propaganda officials are keen to avoid associations with Hong Kong.

As I indicated at the outset, one of the most interesting contrasts can be found between party publications like the People’s Daily and their digital cousins, notably “People’s Daily New Media.” The latter specialize in digital viral propaganda, and generally they seem to be far more provocative – and perhaps effective? – in their manipulation of the themes I mentioned, including the undermining of American credibility on rights and freedoms.

One further example can be found in a post circulating this week from “People’s Daily New Media” called “American double standards are bankrupt!” The post, which made numerous other sites and apps, including China Daily, Netease, iFeng.com and Yangcheng Evening News, used the words of President Trump to undermine US credibility on Hong Kong.

“When the looting starts, the shooting starts.” Trump said this in response to the violent clashes stemming from the death of a black man caused by a white policy officer kneeling on his neck, and [the president] said the army would support the governor of Minnesota, even threatening to use force against the rioters.

“What people find incredible is that some American politicians actually called the violence in Hong Kong ‘beautiful’”, the post continued. “Now, can such words be turned around on American politicians?”

The post was accompanied, like the crumbling manga-style Statue of Liberty, with an image to help make it viral. It depicted an American flag turned on its side, with an image of a police officer, hands in his pockets, and kneeling protesters. The Chinese headline: “American Politicians: Spokesmen for Double Standards.”

At the NPC: Xi Jinping, Hong Kong and Jobs

Written by David Bandurski on 25 May 2020. Posted in Headlines and Hashtags.

The “two meetings” of the National People’s Congress (NPC) and the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) have been shortened in 2020, and correspondingly the government work report delivered by Premier Li Keqiang (李克强) has been cut down, from last year’s more than 20,000 characters to just 10,400 characters. Li’s address on Friday took just one hour to deliver, short by historical standards.

But as the room for verbiage was halved in this government report, what terms and priorities were emphasized?

No decline whatsoever in terms such as “core” signifying Xi Jinping’s power

In the 2020 report, like the 2019 report, we find the so-called “442 formula,” referring to the “Four Consciousnesses” (四个意识), the “Four Confidences” (四个自信) and the “Two Protections” (两个维护), appearing once. The phrase group, which is an important indicator of Xi Jinping’s central role in the CCP leadership, was briefly absent from the texts emerging in February and March from meetings of the Standing Committee of the CCP Politburo, the Communist Party’s highest decision-making body – possibly a sign that drum-beating over Xi’s status was being toned down somewhat in the midst of the coronavirus epidemic. But the “442 Formula” quickly returned, and seeing it in the work report is perhaps a further sign of the return to normal in terms of bullish treatment of Xi and his leadership.

In the 2019 government work report, Xi Jinping’s name appeared 13 times, and Xi’s banner term, “Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for the New Era” (习近平新时代中国特色社会主义思想), appeared four times. It is important to note that even as the text of the work report was chopped in half this year, we had just one less instance of Xi’s name, and one less instance of his banner term. If we look at the use of both in terms of use per 1,000 characters, the rise in volume in the 2020 report is clear.

Nevertheless, despite its very strong appearance in the work report, “Xi Thought” (习思想) has not yet been further elevated by the inclusion of the phrase “raising high” (高举). We do not yet have the phrase, in other words, “raising high the banner of Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for the New Era,” which would indicate a new climb in status for Xi as paramount leader.

At the tail end of the report, we can clearly see a point where the graduated phrase might easily fit. But the report reads instead: “. . . raising high the banner of Socialism with Chinese Characteristics, with Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for the New Era as the guide” (高举中国特色社会主义伟大旗帜，以习近平新时代中国特色社会主义思想为指导”).

The following table compares the occurrence of various key terms in the 2019 and 2020 government work reports, as well as the lengths of the reports and relevant sections:

Like the 2019 report, this year’s report does not use a number of the more boastful terms (自嗨语) that can readily be found in the state media to describe China’s strengths and its importance globally. Terms like “China Model” (中国模式), “China Plan” (中国方案), “Chinese knowledge” (中国智慧) and “Chinese template” (中国范本) are not present, nor is the term “great power responsibility” (大国担当), a foreign policy phrase that seems to have appeared more frequently in recent months to describe China’s actions globally in the midst of the Covid-19 crisis.

However, we can spot another phrase, related to the above, that has also played prominently of late in the official media – “political and institutional advantages” (政治和制度优势).

The phrase “national security” (国家安全) appears twice in both the 2019 and the 2020 work reports.

A greater emphasis on “employment”

In the 2019 work report, the now common phrase “Six Stabilities” (六稳) had not yet emerged. However, there was mention at two different points in the 2019 report of “stabilities” outside of this rhetorical formula. These are: stable employment (稳就业), stable finance (稳金融), stable foreign trade (稳外贸), stable foreign investment (稳外资), stable investment (稳投资) and stable expectations (稳预期). The terms “Six Stabilities” and “Six Guarantees” (六保) – 1) employment, 2) basic livelihoods, 3) the market structure, 4) grain and energy security, 5) industry supply chains, and 6) operations at the grassroots – have now become formalized in 2020 as part of the official discourse, and we see each of these appearing 3 times in the government work report this year. Aside from these mentions, there are 39 separate mentions of “employment” (就业) alone, 9 more than last year (again, in a report just half the length). This suggests that within consideration of the whole range of economic issues, maintaining employment is one area that particularly concerns the government.

The grimness of the employment situation and the extreme challenges facing enterprises as they struggle to survive can be glimpsed in other areas of the work report this year, such as the dropping of GDP targets, talk of raising the intensity of efforts to lower taxes and fees (加大减税降费力度), promoting the lowering of operating costs for enterprises (降低企业生产经营成本), and talk of “doing everything possible to stabilize and expand employment” (千方百计稳定和扩大就业).

Hong Kong, Taiwan and the US-China relationship

When we compare the People’s Daily front-pages in 2019 and 2020 announcing the government work report, we can see obvious similarities. But there is also an obvious point of difference that has to be noted, and this concerns the issue of Hong Kong, which is raised in a subhead: “Hearing the draft of the Civil Code and the draft decision of the National People’s Congress on the establishment and improvement of the legal system and enforcement mechanism of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region to safeguard national security.”

Judging from the text of this year’s government work report, within the context of what are relatively brief and simple remarks on the relationships with Hong Kong and Taiwan, and with the United States, there is a much more severe treatment of Hong Kong. No longer do we see, as in the 2019 report and previous reports, language about “offering full support to the SAR governments and chief executives of Hong Kong and Macau in accordance with law.”

The chart below compares the statements in the 2019 and 2020 government work reports on the question of Hong Kong, Macau and Taiwan.

To sum up, this year’s government work report maintains a tone toward the leader (领袖) of vowing loyalty and devotion, while it strikes a more realistic and practical tone on the relative economic difficulties facing the country. On Hong Kong, meanwhile, the tone of the work report suggests a clear change from last year’s “two meetings,” which came after the proposal by the Hong Kong government in February 2019 of the extradition bill, but before the onset of successive months of protests in June 2019. As these issues in the report are deliberated this week, we can expect to see these characteristics play out further.

NOTE: This article used the version of the text of the government work report as presented at the NPC, not subsequent versions appearing online, which may differ slightly.

[Featured image: Protesters gather in Hong Kong in July 2019 to oppose the proposed extradition bill. Image by Studio Incendo, available at Flickr.com under CC license.]

Reading the NPC Work Report

Written by David Bandurski on 22 May 2020. Posted in Headlines and Hashtags.

As the full import sinks in of China’s announcement last night that the National People’s Congress, opening today in Beijing, will “debate” the introduction of a new national security law in Hong Kong, perhaps it is a good moment to look at the full text of Li Keqiang’s government work report, which runs to just over 10,000 characters. Here is a quick review of some of the key buzzwords and priorities.

The work report itself deals only very briefly with the question of Hong Kong in the final section (in the fourth to last paragraph, in fact), following general language about the CCP’s leadership of the armed forces and the determined protection of “national sovereignty, security and development interests.” Hong Kong and Macau follow together, without any particular emphasis, before the issue of Taiwan is addressed. The paragraph in question reads: “We must fully and accurately implement the policies of high-degree autonomy under ‘One Country, Two Systems,’ ‘Hong Kong people ruling Hong Kong’ and ‘Macau people ruling Macau,” building and perfecting the legal systems and implementation mechanisms for maintaining national security in the special administration regions, realizing the constitutional responsibilities of the SARs. [We must] support Hong Kong and Macau in developing their economies, improving people’s lives, and better integrating with overall national development, ensuring the long-term prosperity and stability of Hong Kong and Macau.”

The work report is intended as a broad overview of goals and a summary of supposed achievements, so we should not be surprised that it glosses right over this major development. The details were more forthcoming, and the language far more astringent, in the speech this afternoon (on video here) from Wang Chen, vice-chairman of the NPC Standing Committee, specifically addressing the question of new legislation for Hong Kong. Wang said, to a chilling chorus of pre-scripted applause (his voice even rose in anticipation at precisely this point) that “strong measures must be taken to stop and to punish” what he characterized as actions “seriously challenging the bottom line of the principle of ‘One Country Two Systems’, and seriously damaging national sovereignty, security, and development interests.”

The image above is a screenshot of the no-joke expression on Xi Jinping’s face when official coverage of Wang Chen’s remarks cut to the General Secretary.

“Overall Stability”

The opening section of Li Keqiang’s work report outlines the “many difficulties and challenges” facing China’s development and the global economy over the past year, a reference principally to global trade tensions and “downward pressures on the domestic economy.” The epidemic, though it has occupied much of the past five months, is not mentioned here specifically, though of course it has been a major factor.

The overarching message is that there is “overall stability in the operation of the economy,” a phrase essentially meant to say that things are OK, even if there are plenty of reasons for them not to be.

There is a focus on domestic consumption, which has been a major issue in recent months – getting Chinese to open up their wallets even further. Li then runs in stepping stone fashion through a range of related issues, from rising urbanization to supply-side reform, essentially the elimination of excess capacity. It is in this relation, in fact, and not on the question of foreign policy, that we have our first mention of the “Belt and Road” in the report, a simple note that the initiative has “achieved new results.”

A Responsible Power

Several paragraphs down, after a brief feel-good mention of the 70^th anniversary of the PRC in 2019 that “unleashed the patriotic fervour of people’s across the nation,” the report turns to foreign policy, referring to “great power diplomacy with Chinese characteristics” (中国特色大国外交) – a phrase China has chosen to officially translate “major country diplomacy,” because China (again officially) “does not dominate” ( 不称霸).

We have the usual language in this section about China as a responsible power and a stabilizing force in the world, though it is seeking the “reform” of the global system. Xi Jinping’s signature “common destiny” foreign policy concept is of course also there: “[We have] actively taken part in the building and reform of the global governance system, promoting the building of a community of common destiny for mankind. [We have] achieved results in economic diplomacy and cultural exchange. China has made major contributions to the promotion of world peace and development.”

It is in this section, in the context of international events, that we have direct mention of the coronavirus epidemic, a strategic choice that encourages focus on this issue as a global one – sidestepping touchy questions of origin and initial missteps – on which China has been fast and decisive, and has made immense sacrifices for the sake of the world. The fight against Covid-19 is characterized as a “people’s war” (人民战争) in which Chinese of all backgrounds were crucial, from medical personnel and scientific researchers to “grassroots cadres,” “news workers” and package couriers.

A summary of China’s response, including quarantine and control measures and the “extension of the Spring Festival holiday,” ends with language about overseas infections, suggesting these are the latest threat: “In response to the spread of overseas epidemic situations, we built a foreign import defense system in a timely manner, and strengthened concern and care for our citizens abroad. We actively carried out international cooperation in an open, transparent, and responsible manner, making timely reports of epidemic information, actively sharing epidemic prevention technologies and practices, and rendering mutual help in fighting against the epidemic together.”

Development Goals

The next section of Li’s report outlines the priorities for the upcoming work of the government, including development goals for the coming year. This section starts out with mention of the “442 Formula,” referring to the “Four Consciousnesses” (四个意识), the “Four Confidences” (四个自信) and the “Two Protections” (两个维护). Taken together, the “442 Formula” signifies the power of Xi Jinping and the need to remain loyal to his leadership in word and deed. CMP noted in March that both the “442 Formula” and the banner term “Xi Jinping Thought of Socialism With Chinese Characteristics for a New Era” (习近平中国特色社会主义思想), both being phrases signifying Xi’s paramount position, had been missing from success texts emerging from meetings of the Standing Committee of the CCP Politburo, the Communist Party’s highest decision-making body. This suggested some reputational tensions for Xi in the midst of the coronavirus epidemic, but by mid-March the tables had turned again.

In the government work report, both the “442 Formula” and Xi’s banner term are present, starting out the discussion o0f 2020 development goals.

The “Four Consciousnesses,” first raised by Xi Jinping in 2016, are as follows:“political consciousness” (政治意识), “consciousness of the overall situation” (大局意识), “consciousness of the core” (核心意识) and “compliance consciousness” (看齐意识). Together, they essentially boil down to allegiance to Xi Jinping, who in 2016 was designed as the “core” of the CCP. The “Four Confidences” are 1) confidence in the path, 2) confidence in the theories [of the Party], 3) confidence in the system [of socialism with Chinese characteristics], and 4) confidence in [China’s unique] civilization. The “Two Protections” (两个维护) are about protecting the core status of General Secretary Xi Jinping, and protecting the authority and the unified collective leadership of the Party’s Central Committee.

The bottom line in all of these buzzwords? Xi Jinping is the Party, and the Party reigns supreme.

The next buzzword in this very buzzword-loaded section of the work report is the “Six Stabilities” (六稳), or “Six Steadies.” This phrase is all about managing expectations of the economy, and ensuring that economic uncertainty does not translate into social unrest. They are: stable employment (稳就业), stable finance (稳金融), stable foreign trade (稳外贸), stable foreign investment (稳外资), stable investment (稳投资) and stable expectations (稳预期).

On this last “stability,” the question of expectations and their potentially uncomfortable implications, it is worth noting that China has now officially dropped the use of GDP targets. This is something that was in the cards for quite some time, and an interesting discussion of the use of GDP in China can be found here. The government work report says on this matter, after declaring that “China’s development must be full of hope,” that: “Based on comprehensive research and a considered assessment of the situation, we have made appropriate adjustments to the expected targets set before the epidemic.”

The focus economically, as in all areas, is stability. And in the next paragraph of the work report, the link becomes clear between the decision on GDP targets, the “Six Stabilities” and a related buzzword, the “Six Guarantees,” referring to 1) employment, 2) basic livelihoods, 3) the market structure, 4) grain and energy security, 5) industry supply chains, and 6) operations at the grassroots:

It should be noted that we did not propose specific targets for the annual economic growth rate, mainly because the global epidemic situation and the economic and trade situation are highly uncertain, and China ’s development faces some unpredictable factors. In doing so, it is helpful to guide all parties to concentrate on the ‘Six Stabilities’ and the ‘Six Guarantees.’ The ‘Six Guarantees’ are the focus of this year’s ‘Six Stabilities’ work. By sticking to the bottom line of the ‘Six Guarantees,’ we can stabilize the economic fundamentals; to promote stability through these guarantees, and in stability seek progress, laying a solid foundation for the comprehensive construction of a well-off society.

Fighting Poverty

Despite the difficulties facing the Chinese economy, which were challenging enough even before this year’s Covid-19 epidemic, the work report is resolute in maintaining China’s anti-poverty goals. This uncompromising attitude is likely more about the propaganda necessities of 2020 than about real and practical determination. Before the outbreak in Wuhan in January, the die had already been cast in terms of the main propaganda themes for the year. The focus would be on the fight against poverty and the realization of a moderately well-off society (xiaokang shekui), 2020 having been set by Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao years ago as the year by which to reach this development goal. As the official Xinhua News Agency reported back on January 1, less with optimism than with the surety of CCP spin: “The absolute poverty that has plagued the Chinese nation for thousands of years is about to end in 2020, a miracle in global poverty reduction history.”

Things changed dramatically as the country was shut down in late January, but propaganda on anti-poverty and the realization of xiaokang continued alongside the noisy official narrative of a “people’s war” against the coronavirus. Now we see the themes coming back with a vengeance, assuming their rightful places in the 2020 propaganda plan. The government work report reads: “Poverty alleviation is a firm task that must be completed in order to build a well-off society, and we must adhere to the current poverty alleviation standards . . . “

This is a basic rundown of the top themes and priorities laid out in Li’s work report today. But as I suggested at the start, the most pressing issue, and the one most urgently requiring the attention of the international community, is the issue summarily dealt with only toward the end of the report – the question, now an apparent certainty, of national security legislation, and new related mechanisms, in Hong Kong.

I include the full text of Wang Chen’s address on Hong Kong today below.

全国人大副委员长王晨对香港国安法草案的说明(全文)

香港回归以来，国家坚定贯彻一国两制，港人治港、高度自治的方针，一国两制实践在香港取得了前所未有的成功。同时一国两制实践过程中也遇到了一些新情况、新问题，面临着新的风险和挑战。

当前一个突出问题，就是香港特别行政区国家安全风险日益凸显，特别是2019年香港发生修例风波以来，反中乱港势力公然鼓吹港独，自决、公投等主张，从事破坏国家统一、分裂国家的活动，公然侮辱污损国旗、国徽，煽动港人反中反共，围攻中央主导机构，歧视和排挤内地在港人员，蓄意破坏香港社会秩序，暴力对抗警方执法，毁损公共设施和财物，瘫痪政府管治和立法会运作。还要看到近年来一些外国和境外势力公然干预香港事务，通过立法、行政、非政府组织等多种方式进行插手和捣乱，与香港反中乱港势力勾连合流、沆瀣一气，为香港反中乱港势力撑腰打气，提供保护伞，利用香港从事危害我国国家安全的活动。这些行为和活动严重挑战一国两制原则底线，严重损害法治，严重危害国家主权安全和发展利益，必须采取有力措施，依法予以防范、惩治。

香港基本法第23条规定，香港特别行政区应自行立法，禁止任何叛国、分裂国家、煽动叛乱，颠覆中央人民政府及窃取国家机密的行为，禁止外国的政治性组织或团体在香港特别行政区进行政治活动，禁止香港特别行政区的政治性组织或团体与外国的政治性组织或团体建立联系。这一规定就是通常所说的23条立法，它既体现了国家对香港特别行政区的信任，也明确了香港特别行政区负有维护国家安全的宪制责任和立法义务。

然而，香港回归20多年来，由于反中乱港势力和外部敌对势力的极力阻挠干扰，23条立场一直没有完成，而且自2003年23条立法受挫以来，这一立法在香港已被一些别有用心的人严重污名化、妖魔化，香港特别行政区完成23条立法，实际上已经很困难。

总的看，香港基本法明确规定的23条立法有被长期搁置的风险，香港特别行政区现行法律的有关规定难以有效执行，维护国家安全的法律制度和执行机制都明显存在不健全、不适应、不符合的短板问题，致使香港特别行政区危害国家安全的各种活动越演越烈，保持香港长期繁荣稳定，维护国家安全，面临着不容忽视的风险。

党的十九届四中全会明确提出，建立健全特别行政区维护国家安全的法律制度和执行机制，支持特别行政区强化执法力量，绝不容忍任何挑战一国两制底线的行为，绝不容忍任何分裂国家的行为。

贯彻落实党中央决策部署，在香港目前形势下，必须从国家层面建立健全香港特别行政区维护国家安全的法律制度和执行机制，改变国家安全领域长期不设防状况，确保香港一国两制事业行稳致远。

根据宪法和香港基本法，结合多年来，国家在特别行政区制度构建和发展方面的实践，从国家层面建立健全香港特别行政区维护国家安全的法律制度和执行机制，有多种可用方式，包括全国人大及其常委会作出决定，制定法律、修改法律、解释法律，将有关全国性法律列入香港基本法附件三和中央人民政府发出指令等。

中央国家有关部门经认真研究并与有关方面沟通后，提出了采取决定加立法的方式，分两步予以推进。

第一步，全国人民代表大会根据宪法和香港基本法的有关规定，作出关于建立健全香港特别行政区维护国家安全的法律制度和执行机制的决定，就有关问题作出若干基本规定。同时授权全国人大常委会就建立健全香港特别行政区维护国家安全的法律制度和执行机制，制定相关法律。

第二步，全国人大常委会根据宪法，香港基本法和全国人大有关决定授权，结合香港特别行政区具体情况，制定相关法律，并决定将相关法律列入香港基本法附件三，由香港特别行政区在当地公布实施。

2020年5月18日，十三届全国人大常委会十八次会议，听取和审议了国务院关于香港特别行政区维护国家安全的报告，会议认为有必要从国家层面建立健全香港特别行政区，维护国家安全的法律制度和执行机制。同意国务院有关报告提出的建议，根据宪法和香港基本法的有关规定，全国人大常委会法制工作委员会拟定了全国人民代表大会关于建立健全香港特别行政区，维护国家安全的法律制度和执行机制的决定草案。经全国人大常委会会议审议后，决定，由全国人大常委会提请十三届全国人大三次会议审议。

二，总体要求和基本原则

新形势下，从国家层面建立健全香港特别行政区维护国家安全的法律制度和执行机制工作的总体要求是，坚持以习近平新时代中国特色社会主义思想为指导，全面贯彻党的十九大和十九届二中三中四中全会精神，深入贯彻总体国家安全观，坚持完善一国两制制度体系，把维护中央对特别行政区全面管制权和保障特别行政区高度自治权有机结合起来，加强维护国家安全制度建设和执法工作，坚定维护国家主权安全发展利益，维护香港长期繁荣稳定，确保一国两制方针不会变、不动摇，确保一国两制实践不变形，不走样。

贯彻上述总体要求，必须遵循和把握好以下基本原则。一是坚决维护国家安全，二是坚持完善一国两制制度体系，三是坚持依法治港，四是坚决反对外来干涉，五是切实保障香港居民合法权益。

三，决定草案的主要内容

决定草案分为导语和正文两部分，导语部分扼要说明作出这一决定的起因、目的和依据。全国人民代表大会的相关决定是根据宪法第31条和第62条第二项，第14项、第16项的规定，以及香港基本法的有关规定，充分考虑维护国家安全的现实需要和香港特别行政区的具体情况，就建立健全香港特别行政区维护国家安全的法律制度和执行机制作出了制度安排。

这一制度安排符合宪法规定和宪法原则，与香港基本法有关规定是一致的。决定草案正文部分共有七条，

第一条，阐明国家坚定不移并全面准确贯彻一国两制，港人治港，高度自治的方针，强调必须采取必要措施建立健全香港特别行政区维护国家安全的法律制度和执行机制，依法防范、治理和惩治危害国家安全的行为活动。

第二条，阐明国家坚决反对任何外部的境外势力，以任何方式干预香港特别行政区事务，采取必要措施予以反制。

第三条，明确规定维护国家主权统一和领土完整是香港特别行政区的宪制责任，强调香港特别行政区应当尽早完成香港基本法规定的维护国家安全立法，香港特别行政区行政、立法、司法机关应当根据有关法律规定，有效防范制止和惩治危害国家安全的行为。

第四条，香港特别行政区应当建立健全维护国家安全的机制和机构和执行机制。中央人民政府维护国家安全的有关机关，根据需要在香港特别行政区设立机构，依法履行维护国家安全相关制度。

第五条，明确规定行政长官应当就香港特别行政区履行维护国家安全职责，开展国家安全推广教育，依法禁止危害国家安全的行为等情况，定期向中央人民政府提交报告。

第六条，明确全国人大常委会相关立场的宪制含义，包括三层含义。

一是授权全国人大常委会就建立健全香港特别行政区维护国家安全的法律制度和执行机制，制定相关法律。全国人大常委会将据此行使授权立法职权。

二是明确全国人大常委会相关法律的任务，是切实防范、治理和惩治发生在香港特别行政区内的任何分裂国家，颠覆国家政权，组织实施恐怖活动等严重危害国家安全行为，以及外国境外势力干预香港特别行政区事务的活动。

三是明确全国人大常委会相关法律在香港特别行政区实施的方式，即全国人大常委会决定将相关法律列入香港基本法附件三，由香港特别行政区在当地公布实施。

第七条，明确本决定的执行时间即自公布之日起执行。

本决定作出后，全国人大常委会将会同有关方面及早制定香港特别行政区维护国家安全的相关法律，积极推动解决香港特别行政区在维护国家安全制度方面存在的突出问题，加强专门机构执行机构和执法力量建设，确保有关法律在香港特别行政区有效实施。

全国人民代表大会《关于建立健全香港特别行政区维护国家安全的法律制度和执行机制的决定（草案）》和以上说明，请审议。

Blood-soaked Dumplings

Written by David Bandurski on 4 May 2020. Posted in Headlines and Hashtags.

Writing on social media back in February, Chinese writer Yi Zhongtian likened the excessive emotion, positivity and adulation in reporting and commentary on the coronavirus epidemic in China to “eating blood-soaked dumplings” (吃人血馒头). This was a reference to Lu Xun’s 1919 short story “Medicine,” the writer’s indictment of senseless superstition, in which poor and illiterate parents attempt to cure their son’s tuberculosis by offering him a steamed bun soaked in the blood of an executed revolutionary.

Just as Lu Xun’s frequent references to “cannibalism” in works like “Medicine” and “A Madman’s Diary” denounced the devouring of individual consciousness by an oppressive feudal society, Yi Zhongtian calls on these insights to highlight the way individual convictions and criticism can be swallowed up in today’s China as people and institutions reflexively conform to power.

This aspect of Chinese politics is most notable in times of tragedy and, as Yi writes, often takes the form of fawning and groveling. “Kissing up is a local specialty [of the Chinese],” he writes. “Every time national adversity strikes, they leap up eagerly and play at writing, which takes two standard forms: first, turning funeral rites into occasions of joy; second, showering leaders with adulation.”

After the Sichuan Earthquake in 2008, as furious parents protested over the death of thousands of schoolchildren in collapsed schools, a senior Shandong official named Wang Zhaoshan (王兆山) wrote a poem published in the Qilu Evening News that included these selected lines:

1.3 billion people cry as a single host,
We are blessed even if we are ghosts . . .
I just hope they place a screen before my grave,
So we can watch the Olympics together and rave.

The poem infuriated many Chinese, who railed against it in internet comments. Wang, and the newspaper, had gone too far. But the culture of “eating blood-soaked dumplings” is an irrepressible tool of the party-state, and it constantly demands the complicity of officials, journalists – and of course also citizens.

The manipulation of human emotion as propaganda kitsch, which I wrote about back in February, is one aspect of this “cannibalism.” Female nurses have been particular victims this year, their individuality consumed by the demands of party-state propaganda. When nurses were shorn of their hair, ostensibly to help prevent infection as they rushed to the front lines of the epidemic, their completely understandable tears were abstracted and exploited as uplifting propaganda. In another story of sacrifice, a local Wuhan newspaper reported that a young nurse had returned to work to fight the epidemic just 10 days after having a miscarriage. One WeChat-based essay took objection to this, calling it “the same old propaganda trick [of] using the sacrifice of ordinary individuals to strengthen solidarity.”

Power-conforming faith requires indulging in emotion and suspending disbelief. When the China Business Gazette was pressed to apologize in February for quoting the newborn twins of one front-line nurse as asking their father where mommy was, its only real sin was stretching belief too far (though they claimed the miraculously verbal infants had been an editing error).

As the coronavirus epidemic has been taken up by the Chinese party-state as a powerful propaganda tool this year, both domestically and in its foreign policy, the lines in this culture of “eating blood-soaked dumplings” have been constantly tested by skeptical Chinese who resent the dehumanization such propaganda demands.

One of several instances of “kissing up” that prompted Yi Zhongtian’s remarks on eating “eating blood-soaked dumplings” in February was a saccharine poem called “Thank You, COVID-19” that appeared on WeChat, and for many Chinese was too much to stomach. A taste of its nauseating sweetness:

I want to thank you, COVID-19, because you allowed me to see a blessing – unbreakable unity of will.
I want to thank you, COVID-19, because you allowed me to see a blessing – courageous advancement.
I want to thank you, COVID-19, because you allowed me to see a blessing – [people] facing death with equanimity.

The poem was criticized so roundly that it received attention even in the state-run media. Shanghai’s Liberation Daily spoke sharply against the poem’s insensitivity, cautioning that creative works needed to have “a human feel” to find a place in people’s hearts. The official Xinhua News Agency felt obliged to report that the poem had “not only failed to elicit sympathies, but in fact had enraged masses of internet users.” Nevertheless, the same Xinhua report heaped praise on other “great works” clearly manipulating emotions to support Party-state themes, noting in particular this one and this one.

Such acts of misbegotten creativity have been broadly encouraged, not just through the emotive and exaggerated language of the party-state media, but also through the school system.

One former journalist in Beijing tells me his nephew in southwest China was tasked by teachers with compiling a “poetry collection” on the epidemic, writing a poem and also inviting friends and relatives to contribute. The purpose, he said, is to write poems urging solidarity, and praising China for its coronavirus response, following party-state themes of sacrifice and unity. The journalist’s personal compromise – as he agreed as a matter of avuncular duty to write his own poem for the child’s collection – was to avoid outright praise of the government, centering instead on the theme of “human community” (close enough to Xi Jinping’s foreign policy phrase, “community of common destiny”).

Chinese nerves over being obliged to “eat blood-soaked dumplings” were again tested last week, as the Beijing News and other Chinese media reported that the Middle School Student Guide (中学生导报), a nationally circulated publication for middle school students published by Lanzhou Daily, the official Party-run newspaper in the city of Lanzhou, had run a special issue called “College Entrance Exams: Predicting Hot Topics in Current Affairs” that included a particularly noxious coronavirus inspired poem. The news originated with a post on social media showing apparently authentic images of the newspaper.

The voice in the poem, which indirectly praises China’s handling of the coronavirus epidemic, is that of the virus itself. The virus bemoans its horrible fate in China in the face of robust measures to contain it, and it says it wishes to retreat to its place of origin: the United States:

I wish to leave,
I wish to return to America,
In returning to America I return home . . . .
I regret ever coming to China.
Here, I just can’t continue on.
China has too many mountains [to cross],
This Huoshen Mountain, and Leishen Mountain, and Zhong Nanshan [Note: first two are temporary field hospitals set up to fight Covid-19, the last a reference to Dr. Zhong Nanshan, whose name includes the character for mountain.]
China’s government is too fierce,
It says to close the city and the city is closed;
Play with China’s white-angel nurses and you toy with your life,
They charge to the front lines, eyes blazing
Where one falls, another steps into position.
They are too awesome!

The poem caused outrage across Chinese social media, and a commentary from The Beijing News called it “inhuman.” “In the end, a disaster is a disaster, and should not elicit songs of praise and embellishment,” it said. “Nor should distorted writings that describe disasters as good things appear in newspapers circulated to schools.”

The last point quickly became the next point of controversy, as the Middle School Student Guide came out with a statement on April 28 alleging that the poem appearing online had been “illegal conduct misusing our publishing license number,” and that the publication had not in fact published a special issue about college entrance exams. Was the online photo a fake? Apparently not. Without getting into the tangled details, it seems based on subsequent reporting by the Shanghai Observer and others that the publishing license number of the Middle School Student Guide might indeed have been misused in some way by a company advertising with, or perhaps partnering with, the publication.

It does seem that a printed educational paper or supplement with the offending poem was indeed circulated, resulting in the online image that stoked this latest storm over fawning statements in the midst of national, and now global, tragedy. The piece from The Beijing News criticizing the poem has since disappeared.

On April 29, the WeChat account “Fisheye Observer” looked more closely at the poem supposedly written by a school student, exploring its origins, and found that it in fact was a shortened version of a poem written and posted online back in March by Tian Hexin (田和欣), identified online as having been an editor and “leader” at the Henan provincial branch of Xinhua News Agency and the state-run Consumer Daily newspaper. “Fisheye Observer” was unable, however, to find news content written by Tian or any information about his supposed leadership work, leading the account to suspect that his work with state media was “possibly exaggerated.”

Exaggerations and inventions like that of Tian Hexin have proliferated over the past few months. They arise, particularly in the midst of crisis, from a political culture in which exaggeration of the right kind is broadly encouraged – and even, as in the case of state-run media and the education system, explicitly assigned.

As China’s coronavirus propaganda campaign goes global, it should not surprise us to see foreign ministry spokeswoman Hua Chunying (华春莹) post an emotional tweet about sharing “weal and woe” surrounding a completely discredited story about Italians blaring the Chinese national anthem from their balconies to express their gratitude toward China. It should not surprise us be sold stories about the glories of China’s Covid-19 response, seasoned with words like “arduous,” “swift,” “decisive” and “victory”; to be told that “China’s model” in tackling the crisis points the way to a global solution; or to read glowing reports of China’s “institutional strength,” and a constant flow of accounts of countries thanking China for its aid during the epidemic.

Sure, there may be many directed efforts by China to influence international opinion. China’s government has pushed assertively to offset and contain global criticism over its handling of the coronavirus epidemic – exploiting every arrival of coronavirus supplies as a propaganda opportunity, pressuring the European Union to tone down criticism of China in its report on government disinformation, attempting to solicit public praise from Germany for its response, and so on. China’s so-called “Wolf Warrior” diplomats have taken to Twitter with strident tones, upbraided foreign journalists, and even written to suggest that “some Westerners are beginning to lose confidence in liberal democracy.”

But we should also understand that officials like Hua Chunying are deeply invested in their own fictions, that much of their noisy self-congratulation arises from the conditioned positivity about which Yi Zhongtian writes. Their impulse is to face (and efface) tragedy by elevating emotion and brown-nosing national power. Far from being strategic or helpful, their actions and statements are likely to be deeply counterproductive. Nevertheless, they cannot help themselves, just as Wuhan’s new top official, Wang Zhonglin (王忠林), almost certainly cannot comprehend how his suggestion in March that the much-suffering people of his city should undergo “gratitude education” stirred up such a storm of controversy.

For many Chinese Communist Party officials and “Wolf Warrior” diplomats, the supposed greatness of the country’s response to the coronavirus epidemic is a matter not of strategy but of superstitious faith. And they cannot understand why the rest of us have failed to acquire a taste for their “blood-soaked dumplings.”

“Speaking Politics,” Rushing Into Disaster

Written by David Bandurski on 26 March 2020. Posted in China Newspeak.

Infectious diseases have no politics. In January 2020, through the course of the Wuhan people’s congress and the provincial people’s congress, no new coronavirus cases were reported in China. But the epidemic continued unabated – paying no heed to the political prerogatives of the Chinese Communist Party.

One of the medical facilities hardest hit by the coronavirus epidemic in Wuhan has been the Wuhan Central Hospital. On March 10, Caixin Media reported that the hospital, which has more than 4,000 employees, had at least 230 infections among its staff, the highest rate of infection among local hospitals. As of March 20, at least five of the hospital’s staff members had died of the coronavirus, including Li Wenliang (李文亮), Jiang Xueqing (江学庆), Mei Zhongming (梅仲明), Zhu Heping (朱和平) and Liu Li (刘励).

According to reports from Southern Weekly and China’s People magazine, on December 30, 2019, WeChat groups used by staff from various departments of Wuhan Central Hospital received the following information from the Wuhan City Health Commission: “We ask everyone please . . . . do not circulate at will to the outside notices and relevant information about a pneumonia of unclear origins . . . . otherwise the city health commission will subject them to severe investigation.”

On January 3, Wuhan Central Hospital called an emergency meeting of hospital department heads, emphasizing that they must “speak politics, speak discipline and speak science” (讲政治, 讲纪律, 讲科学), that they must not manufacture rumors or spread rumors, and that departments must closely monitor their own staff to ensure that strict discipline is maintained. Medical personnel were explicitly instructed not to disclose confidential information in public, and not to discuss the disease through the use of text, images or other means that might leave evidence.

Since January, a digital copy of notes from that January 3 meeting, made by the now-deceased Jiang Xueqing, has appeared online, its authenticity verified by Chinese media. Jiang’s note include entries like: “10 discipline regulations”; “discipline in maintaining secrecy”; “no talking or discussion [without authorization.” And there is another phrase in Jiang’s notes – “speak politics.”

Notes taken of an internal hospital meeting by Wuhan doctor Jiang Xueqing on January 3, 2020.

The unfortunate deaths of Li Wenliang, Jiang Xueqing and others owe in large part to “speaking politics.” In the early stages of the coronavirus outbreak, “speaking politics” meant the muzzling of medical professionals in Wuhan, and it meant that doctors and nurses were deprived of critical protections at a time of great urgency.

Behind the rapid rise of the novel coronavirus outbreak that would overwhelm Wuhan Central Hospital and other hospitals in the city is a decades-long lineage of “speaking politics” that goes to the heart of the political culture of the Chinese Communist Party. What, then, does it mean to “speak politics”?

“Speaking” + “Politics”

The simple verb “to speak” in this context has layered meanings. Aside from the basic sense of “talking” and “saying” it bears the sense of “paying attention” and “taking into account.” Perhaps a better translation might be “prioritizing.”

In the Analects, the teachings and thoughts of Confucius, there is the phrase “speaking credibility in relationships,” or jiǎng xìn xiū mù (讲信修睦), which essentially means paying attention to or prioritizing trust, and seeking harmony. In this context, “speaking” is both similar and different in meaning to the word “grab” or “grasp” (抓) as it appears in CCP discourse, which CMP has deal with previously. Both of these words are used frequently in documents from the CCP’s Central Committee, and hang ever on the lips of Party and government officials. But “speaking” in fact implies an active choice made on the psychological level (精神层面主动选择).

“Politics,” though a simple enough word, is far more complicated when we talk about “speaking politics.” The layers entail such meanings as “distinguishing between the enemy and ourselves” (分清敌我), or “rooting out the alien [or dissident]” (铲除异己). There is also a sense of “making use of style” (发扬风格) – another complicated phrase in an of itself – and sometimes of “stressing the equitable” (讲求公正) or “[abiding by] the rules of the game” (游戏规则).

“Politics” can have meanings that are abstract and distant, or close and concrete, and these meanings of course shift with the times.

Earlier on within the discourse of the Chinese Communist Party, “speaking politics” had the sense in most cases of propaganda or oratory – speaking (or teaching) political lessons, or propagating political and economic ideas. At the same time, it bore the sense of emphasizing or prioritizing politics, which of course mean the Party’s politics.

In 1942, Mao Zedong said in his Yan’an Talks on Arts and Literature: “There are two standards for criticism in arts and literature; one is the political standard, and the other is the artistic standard.” These speeches by Mao would become the fountainhead of the notion within the Chinese Communist Party that the arts and literature must “speak politics.”

In the first decade following its launch in 1946, three years before the establishment of the PRC, uses of “speaking politics” in the People’s Daily were largely didactic, having to do with political instruction. And there was a related sense of “speaking of principles” (讲道理), which essentially meant just behaving properly. On the front page of the May 14, 1948 edition of the People’s Daily, for example, there was an article with the headline: “Examining Left-Leaning Mistakes Within the Party: Striking Others is Wrong.” A special working team had held a meeting, said the report, to discuss whether it was permissible to hit others. One old man was quoted as saying: “I used to gamble all the time, and I suffered much punishment under the old government. . . . But the Eight Route Army [of the Chinese Communist Party] has come, and I don’t hit others, and I don’t cuss, and I speak politics. Who in our village will gamble now?”

By the 1950s, “speaking politics” had already come in the arena of economics and the military to stand in opposition to the notion of specializing in doing business or in certain technologies or abilities without the proper nucleus of political consciousness. This stemmed from Mao Zedong’s notion, found in texts such as his essay “Concerning Agricultural Questions,” that one should develop expertise only on the basis of a core of correct communist ideas. In the following passage, “white” signifies capitalist ideas and impulses, set against the red of communism:

Our cadres in all walks of life must strive to be proficient in technology and business, so that they can become well-versed in their areas, both red and professional. But the idea of first professionalizing and then becoming red [turning to communist politics] is like first being white and then turning red, and this idea is wrong. Because this kind of person in fact wishes to continue being white, and to say they will later turn red is just a ruse. Right now, there are certain cadres who are red but not truly red, their ideas those of the wealthy farmer class.

Other slogans that expressed this idea in the relationship between business and politics included: “political work is the lifeline of all economic work” (政治工作是一切经济工作的生命线) and “red and professional” (又红又专), the latter found in the passage above. In this oppositional relationship between “speaking politics” and “speaking business” (讲业务) there is an undercurrent of power struggle, and this power struggle was present in the arts, in the military and in the economy.

After the Lushan Conference was held in 1959, Lin Biao, who catered to Mao and emphasized the spiritual role of people, succeeded Peng Dehuai as Minister of Defense and was appointed vice chairman of the Central Military Commission (CMC). The next year, the official commentary on National Day in the People’s Liberation Army Daily, the mouthpiece of the CMC, said: “The power of the material atomic bomb is great, but the power of the spiritual atomic bomb is greater still. This spiritual atomic bomb is the political consciousness and courage of the people.”

The term “spiritual atomic bomb” took the notion of “politics” and elevated it to the plane of strategic weaponry.

On January 12, 1965, a news story about “speaking politics” in the economic realm was published in the People’s Daily, and this was also the first time that “speaking politics” emerged in a headline in the newspaper. The headline, somewhat shortened here, was: “Speaking Politics Must Come First in Buying and Selling.”

From the 1960s to the 1970s, the meaning of “speaking politics” can be equated with Mao Zedong Thought. During this period, which of course includes the Cultural Revolution, phrases like “giving prominence to politics” (突出政治) and “politics first” (政治第一) rise dramatically. After the end of the Cultural Revolution, these phrases came under sharp criticism, associated with Lin Biao and with the Gang of Four.

Deng Xiaoping’s priority was on business and the economy, and he famously said: “It does not matter whether a cat is black or white, but a cat that can catch mice is a good cat.” As Deng’s reform and opening policy defined a new direction for the country, Deng abandoned the Mao era slogan about “giving prominence to politics,” but he did not outright deny the important role of politics. In August 1986, Deng said during an inspection tour of the city of Tianjin: “If, alongside reform and modern science and technology, we speak politics, this will have the most power. At any time, we must speak politics.”

In the Jiang Era, “Speaking Politics” Becomes a Slogan

Consolidating power is a hard necessity for each leadership group. And after the criticizing of Lin Biao and the Gang of Four, it was no longer possible for Jiang to use Mao era slogans without incurring public resentment. In this context, the more direct phrase “speaking politics,” not over-burdened with Maoist associations, was chosen as a political slogan. The following graph show the slogans “speaking politics” (blue), “politics in command” (orange) and “giving prominence to politics” (yellow) in various eras.

On November 8, 1995, Jiang Zemin said during an inspection tour in Beijing: “When we conduct education for cadres, we must emphasize speaking study, speaking politics and speaking rightness. The entire country should act in this way, and the city of Beijing should serve a guiding role.” This speech initiated what at the time was referred to as the “three speaks education” (三讲教育). On November 25, two weeks later, “speaking politics” appeared in a headline in the People’s Daily:

This article in the People’s Daily offered an essential definition of the “three speaks, as follows:

Speaking politics includes political orientation (政治方向), political viewpoint (政治观点), political discipline (政治纪律), political discernment (政治鉴别力), political acumen (政治敏锐性) . . . . Leaders and cadres at all levels must remain sober and determined in their politics, maintaining unity in political and ideological terms with the Party of which Comrade Jiang Zemin is the core.

By this time, Deng Xiaoping was already old and frail, and in just over a year the old architect of the reform and opening policy would pass away. In order to consolidate his political power, Jiang Zemin defined and emphasized the notion of “speaking politics” as concession to his core leadership status, and obedience to his leadership.

Jiang Zemin emphasized again and again that news work (新闻工作), or journalism, must speak politics. In September 1996, Jiang made a visit to the People’s Daily, during which he said there was a need to “put the authority of leadership of news and public opinion in firmly in the hands of people who respect Marxism, respect the Party, and respect the people; news and public opinion units definitely must put adherence to the correct political orientation and adherence to correct guidance of public opinion in the primary position in all of their work.”

In the Xi Era, “Speaking Politics” is Renovated

In Xi Jinping’s so-called “New Era,” “speaking politics” has become more important than ever. In the seven years from 2013 to 2019, here is how the term “speaking politics” trended in the People’s Daily:

In January 2016, Xi Jinping said during the 6^th full session of the 18^th Central Discipline Inspection Commission: “We adhere to the [principle that] the Party must manage the Party, that the Party must be strictly governed. The investigation of the serious disciplinary and legal violations of Zhou Yongkang, Bo Xilai, Xu Caihou, Guo Boxiong, Ling Jihua, Su Rong and others have emphasized strict political discipline and the rules, creating an atmosphere of clear-cut politics and strict discipline.” From this point on, the phrase “speaking politics with a clear banner” would make frequent appearances in the Party-run media.

In October the same year, during the 6th Plenum of the 18^th Central Committee of the CCP, Xi Jinping’s status as “core” leader was established, and on February 14 of the following year, “speaking politics” appeared in a related headline in the People’s Daily: “[We] Must Speak Politics With a Clear Banner.”

The phrase “speaking politics appeared no less than 13 times in the commentary. “Speaking politics is a fundamental requirement of a Marxist political party, our calcium supplement,” the commentary said at one point, attributing the idea to Xi Jinping. “Speaking politics concerns the future and fate of the Party,” is said at another point. And: “Speaking politics is not the repetition of old tunes, nor is it the far-left politics in the ‘Cultural Revolution’; rather, it is directed and practical.”

In terms of consolidation of power, the “New Era” has been a robust period of new slogan manufacturing, all lending fresh layers of discourse to the notion of “speaking politics.” Prominent among these slogans have been the so-called “Four Consciousnesses”—“political consciousness” (政治意识), “consciousness of the overall situation” (大局意识), “consciousness of the core” (核心意识) and “compliance consciousness” (看齐意识)—and the “two protections” (protection of the core leadership status of Xi Jinping, and of the centralized leadership of the Chinese Communist Party).

In his comprehensive review of Chinese political discourse in 2019, Qian Gang looked at how local Party media and military media (军报) used the “four consciousnesses “ and the “two protections,” signaling their loyalty to Xi Jinping and the Party. For example, on November 22, 2019, the local Wulong News in Chongqing used the phrase “respecting the core, protecting the core, complying with the core, and following the core” (忠诚核心、维护核心、看齐核心、追随核心). Jiangxi province’s official Gan’nan Daily wrote on the same day of “protecting the core, supporting the core, and following the core both in our hearts and in our outward actions” (将维护核心、拥戴核心、追随核心内化于心、外化于行).

At the 4^th Plenum in October 2019, Politburo Member Ding Xuexiang wrote in the People’s Daily:

The ‘Two Protections’ have a clear meaning and demand, to protect the core status of General Secretary Xi Jinping, and the object is General Secretary Xi Jinping and no other person; to protect the centralized and unified authority of the Central Committee of the CCP, the object being the Party’s Central Committee and no other organization. The authority of the CCP Central Committee determines the authority of Party organizations at all levels, and the authority of Party organizations at all levels comes from the authority of the CCP Central Committee. The ‘Two Protections’ can neither be applied layer by layer nor extended at will.

This passage makes it very explicit what is meant by “speaking politics.” As Ding Xuexiang lays out the essentials, there can be no doubt whatsoever.

As the Epidemic Raged, What Did “Speaking Politics” Mean?

2020 was meant to be China’s year of victory in its war against poverty and the building of a “moderately well-off society.” Early on in the year, before the coronavirus epidemic was pushed into the spotlight, it was clear that this supposed victory was the centerpiece of the Party’s propaganda strategy.

In Wuhan, which would soon become the epicenter of the epidemic, the Changjiang Daily, the official newspaper of the municipal Party committee, was not to be outdone in its declaration of victory in the war on poverty. A front-page article in the paper declared that Wuhan would become “China’s Fifth City” after Beijing, Shanghai, Guangzhou and Shenzhen.

In early 2020, as the coronavirus outbreak spread, what took precedence in the politics of Wuhan and Hubei province? The priorities were the celebration of the annual Spring Festival, the holding of the city and provincial sessions of the people’s congress and political consultative conference, the touting of the Party’s victories in fighting poverty, and the “Two Protections.” All of these were ultimately about the “Four Consciousnesses,” and as such were about the core status of Xi Jinping and the leadership of the Central Committee.

On January 10, the Changjiang Daily, Wuhan’s official Party newspaper, published the speech given by the city’s top leader, Ma Guoqiang (马国强) to the local people’s congress. In his speech, Ma emphasized the need to “speak politics with a clear banner.” Nowhere in his speech did Ma mention the coronavirus outbreak, which at that point was still not being dealt with openly in China.

On February 15, not long after Ma Guoqiang’s replacement as Wuhan’s top leader, the Changjiang Daily ran a report about a study session led by the city’s new top leader, Wang Zhonglin, that again emphasized “speaking politics,” though by his point the response to the coronavirus epidemic was an open agenda, having redirected the focus of news and propaganda efforts since Xi Jinping’s first public comment on the epidemic on January 20. The Changjiang Daily piece read: “Under the provincial Party leadership of session leader Comrade Ying Yong, and under the guidance of session leader Comrade Wang Zhonglin of the city’s Party Committee, [the study session] spoke politics, attended to the general situation and abided by the rules.”

“Speaking politics” has had varying meanings at different times in China’s history. In the early days of 2020, as the virus silently spread, “speaking politics” meant “not talking haphazardly” (不准到处乱讲). Once the response effort had actually begun after January 20, “speaking politics” meant shutting down cities, closing off roads and building emergency field hospitals like Huoshenshan. At the most challenging point of the response effort, “speaking politics” meant carrying out stability preservation in restive residential districts – like the one in Wuhan that heckled Vice-Premier Sun Chunlan during her inspection tour on March 6. In the most recent stage of China’s response, “speaking politics” is about being tough on restricting international arrivals who might reintroduce the virus, and about getting economic activity going again.

“Speaking politics” has often meant rushing into disaster – and many, like Doctor Li Wenliang (李文亮) and Doctor Jiang Xueqing (江学庆), have paid with their lives for its expedient focus on the shifting interests of the CCP leadership. So long as China fails to face the painful lessons of “speaking politics” and its privilege over humanity and conscience, its flag will continue to fly high, drawing attention away from real threats and dangers.

Reclaiming Doctor Li

Written by David Bandurski on 19 March 2020. Posted in China Newspeak.

China’s anti-corruption agency has announced the results of its investigation into the summoning and formal reprimand by the Wuhan Public Security Bureau of Li Wenliang, the 34-year-old Wuhan doctor who tried to warn colleagues in December about the deadly coronavirus outbreak in his city. The investigation was a response to Dr. Li’s death from the coronavirus on February 7, which prompted a wave of public anger and turned Li into a symbol for many of personal and professional courage in the face of a callous and unaccountable system.

The message from China’s leadership today: Li Wenliang belongs to the Chinese Communist Party, and any attempt to portray him as a folk hero or oppositional figure is unacceptable.

Dated January 3, 2020, this letter of reprimand signed by Li Wenliang acknowledges to Wuhan police that his sharing of information through WeChat on December 30, 2019, about a SARS-like illness originating at the Huanan Wholesale Seafood Market in Wuhan was “illegal.”

The notice released today by China’s National Supervisory Commission consists almost entirely in a sequential recounting of events already generally known, including Li’s post to WeChat, his questioning by local police at the substation on Zhongnan Road (中南路派出所), and his subsequent contraction of the coronavirus and death.

The notice ends with a brief note about the conduct of police that urges further action at the discretion of local authorities: “Concerning the issuing of an improper letter of reprimand by the Zhongnan Road Substation [of the PSB] and irregular law enforcement procedures, the investigation team has already advised that Wuhan municipal supervisory authorities in Hubei province carry out supervision and correct this matter, urging public security organs to revoke the letter of reprimand and hold the relevant personnel accountable, promptly announcing the results to the public.”

While the release acknowledges here that the actions of local police were “irregular” and “improper,” it avoids addressing this core question further.

Perhaps more significant than the release of the investigation findings is a separate news release from the official Xinhua News Agency that includes a Q&A with the National Supervisory Commission on its findings. That release takes on a far more antagonistic tone, portraying the so-called “Li Wenliang incident” in early February as an attempt by “hostile forces” to undermine the Party’s leadership.

The Q&A release clearly seeks to emphasize Dr. Li’s status as both a member of the Chinese Communist Party and as one among many medical professionals who have sacrificed in the midst of a Party-led effort to control the epidemic. Responding to the question of what “social role” was played by Li Wenliang’s posting of information to colleagues through WeChat in late December, the National Supervisory Commission states:

Colleagues told [the team] that Li Wenliang was a cheerful person who enjoyed helping others, and a member of the Chinese Communist Party. [He was] a responsible and hardworking doctor. He also said while under treatment in the hospital that, “After I recover I want to return quickly to the front lines, continuing to see patients.” [He] demonstrated dedication as a medical professional. In sharing and releasing relevant information, Li Wenliang’s idea was to warn his classmates and colleagues to taken preventive measures, and after the information was forwarded, it aroused attention from society and objectively served to promote attention to the epidemic and strengthen prevention and control. On March 4, 2020, the National Health Commission and other departments decided to commend Dr. Li Wenliang as one of a number of advanced individuals (先进个人) in the national health and health system for the prevention and control of the coronavirus epidemic. This is a recognition and affirmation of Dr. Li Wenliang’s work.

After a general statement about the immense sacrifices made by healthcare professionals since the epidemic began, the report notes blandly: “Dr. Li Wenliang is one member of the medical team who fought heroically and made contributions and sacrifices in the epidemic control effort.”

The most important message comes at the end of the Xinhua release:

It should be recognized that certain hostile forces, in order to attack the Chinese Communist Party and the Chinese government, gave Dr. Li Wenliang the label of an anti-system “hero” and “awakener” (觉醒者). This is entirely against the facts. Li Wenliang is a Communist Party member, not a so-called “anti-institutional figure” (反体制人物), and those forces with ulterior motives who wish to fan the fires, deceive people and stir up emotions in society are doomed to fail.

“Hostile forces” is a phrase frequently invoked by the Chinese Communist Party to paint internal social forces, including unwanted criticism of the government, as a plot by often unspecified enemies.

In this case, the act of claiming Li Wenliang as the Party’s own is reminiscent of the leadership’s treatment of the centenary of the birth of pro-reform CCP leader Hu Yaobang (胡耀邦) in 2015, which avoided mention of Hu’s reform credentials. Internal propaganda instructions at the time emphasized the need to stay closely to the notion of “the Party’s Yaobang” (党的耀邦).

"Countermeasures" Against US Media

Written by David Bandurski on 18 March 2020. Posted in Headlines and Hashtags.

China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs today announced what it called “countermeasures” against actions by the Trump administration last month to designate five state-run Chinese media organizations in the United States as “foreign missions.” The measures announced by MOFA, which could seriously escalate tensions between the two countries, make clear that reporters in China for the New York Times, the Wall Street Journal and the Washington Post will no longer be permitted to work in China after March 22.

The measures also specify that “the China-based branches of Voice of America, the New York Times, the Wall Street Journal, the Washington Post and Time declare in written form information about their staff, finance, operation and real estate in China.” It is not clear exactly what such declarations would mean. Also unclear is the full import of language in the announcement specifying the the expelled reporters from the New York Times, the Wall Street Journal and the Washington Post will not be permitted to work as journalists for these media in Hong Kong and Macau.

So far there are few responses or other coverage in the Chinese media. The Global Times, however, posted a report including interviews with two Chinese experts at 2:06AM, suggesting the paper had prepared the report in advance of the MOFA announcement.

A partial translation of the Global Times piece follows.

_______________

“Friendship cannot stand always on one side.” Shen Yi, an assistant professor in the School of International Relations and Public Affairs at Fudan University, told the Global Times in an interview that the measures taken this time by Chinese side toward American media were entirely reciprocal in terms of the number of media affected and the concrete measures taken. This shows that in relations between nations, while it is important to maintain a friendly attitude, friendship must be built on a foundation of reciprocity, not on one-sided forbearance. “If the United States makes things such that it is impossible to play according to the normal rules of the game, then China will also in the future play according to the new rules of the game set by the United States.”

Shen Yi also said that compared to past Chinese responses, this response shows greater confidence on China’s part, and shows greater bluntness and directness. “This tells us that US-China relations have already entered a new phase: China will no longer accept compromise. If the United States is willing to move in the opposite direction, this would be good, but if the United States obstructs China, it will certainly fight back.”

Li Haidong (李海东), a professor at the Institute for International Relations at China Foreign Affairs University, said to the Global Times that China’s response does not seek to make new trouble, but rather hopes through these actions to warn the United States that its own actions are inappropriate, and to press the US to make amends. Only in this way can media dialogue between China and United States be smooth and normal. “This move is also a reminder to the United States that US-China exchanges cannot be made ideological, and cannot be viewed and handled with Cold War thinking.”

He said at the same time that this matter would not obstruct China’s opening to the world, including its opening toward the US. The space for US-China exchanges still exists, and in fact is extremely broad. The two sides should do everything in their power to create conditions, strengthen communication and promote cooperation.

[Featured image by Torrenegra available at Flickr.com under CC license.]

Whistling Against Deception

Written by David Bandurski on 11 March 2020. Posted in Headlines and Hashtags.

China’s headlines are full of triumph today. The country’s pending victory in the war against the coronavirus epidemic, they say, is a testament to the decisive leadership of Xi Jinping and the Chinese Communist Party, and to the strength and unity of the people. Xi’s presence in Wuhan yesterday, his first visit to the center of the epidemic, was reportedly met with euphoria. The piece at the top of the official People’s Daily, which chronicles Xi’s tour through a residential community, finishes emotively:

As he left the community, the voices echoed for a long time in the spring sun: “Greetings, General Secretary!” “Go China!” “Go Wuhan!”

A report featured at the top of the newspaper’s website elevates Xi with the word “leader,” or lingxiu (领袖), an appellation dredged up from the shadows of China’s Maoist past: “The Party and the people are as one, the leader’s heart touches the hearts of the people.”

People’s Daily Online today. The top headline: “In 1 Month 3 Visits to the Frontlines! The General Secretary is With the People in the War Against the ‘Epidemic.'”

But beneath this towering wave of propaganda and positivity, another war has unfolded—a guerrilla war for greater openness, honesty and reflection about the tragic events of the past two months.

As Xi Jinping toured through Wuhan yesterday, a bombshell feature story by reporter Gong Jingqi (龚菁琦) in the latest edition of China’s People (人物) magazine made the rounds on social media. The story was based on an interview with Ai Fen, the director of the emergency department at Wuhan Central Hospital, one of the hospitals most directly affected by the epidemic in the provincial capital.

In her account Ai talks about her decision on December 30 last year to share with another health professional an image of a diagnostic report for a patient showing that they had “SARS coronavirus.” It was this image, passed between doctors in Wuhan, that resulted in eight doctors, including the now-deceased Li Wenliang, enduring harsh reprimands from local police. At the time, Ai was herself called in by the Disciplinary Office of her hospital and accused of “manufacturing rumors.”

The cover of the most recent edition of People magazine, the main story on “The Doctors of Wuhan.”

Ai shares her sense of regret now that she did not choose to speak up loudly and repeatedly, most of all for the sake of her colleagues, several of whom have now died as a result of the virus.

The Gong Jingqi piece is one of the strongest to appear to date in the Chinese media, and it paints a damning picture of how the signs were wilfully ignored by officials at the start of the outbreak, when more might have been done. During her reprimand, Ai Fen is told by the hospital disciplinary official: “When we go out to take part in meetings we can’t even raise our heads. This or that director criticizes us and talks about how our hospital has that Ai Fen. As the head of the emergency unit at Wuhan Central Hospital you are a professional. How can you go and stir up a rumor like this without reason, without any organizational discipline?”

The story was called, “The One Who Handed Out the Whistles,” a reference to Ai Fen’s insistence in her interview that she is not a “whistleblower,” but that her sharing of the original diagnostic report had enabled others, including Li Wenliang, to blow the whistle.

But of course the publication of Gong’s piece was just the beginning of its own story. The article was shared feverishly on social media, and just as feverishly expunged by the authorities. For such a report to circulate on the day of Xi Jinping’s “front-line” visit to Wuhan was of course unacceptable.

A notice on WeChat announces that a post on the People magazine feature story has been removed.

The authorities pushed. And Chinese pushed back on social media, with a level of creative defiance that was all at once ingenious, mystifying, heartening and sad. For reference, here is the opening paragraph of the story, translated with the original Chinese.

It was at 5AM on March 1 that I received a text message from Ai Fen, the director of the emergency department of Wuhan Central Hospital, agreeing to an interview. About half an hour later, at 5:32AM on March 1, her colleague Jiang Xueqing, director of the Breast and Thyroid Center, passed away, having contracted Covid-19. Two days later came the death of Mei Zhongming, her hospital’s deputy director of ophthalmology. He and Li Wenliang had been in the same department.

接到武汉市中心医院急诊科主任艾芬同意采访的短信是3月1日凌晨5点，大约半小时后，3月1日凌晨5点32分，她的同事、甲状腺乳腺外科主任江学庆因感染新冠肺炎去世。两天后，该院眼科副主任梅仲明过世，他和李文亮是同一科室。

And here is one attempt a user made to share Gong Jingqi’s story as the original versions were being taken down one after the other. The top of the post reads: “That piece, ‘The One Who Handed Out the Whistles.’” But this is not in Chinese characters, readable by automated filters. Rather, it is in pinyin, a Chinese romanization system, with tonal marks over the words.

In this form, Gong’s article is of course still readable. A method like this may work for a period of time before censors grow wise and remove it, often when it is seen to attract a critical mass of attention.

And when this fails? What then? How do you share “that piece,” the one everyone is talking about, the one that makes a farce of state propaganda?

Another internet user answered this challenge by posting the entire article in Korean, a language not recognized or prioritized by online censors. The story could then be copied by readers and put through a translation engine.

Gong Jingqi’s feature story is shared in Korean to evade censorship.

If Korean fails, the article can also be shared paragraph by paragraph through a series of QR codes. Try scanning this and you should see the story’s lede.

Still another reader chose to share and preserve this important story by reading it aloud in its entirely and recording it, then posting it to the audio site Ximalaya. He prefaces the piece by saying simply: “In this way I’ll voice my views and record history.”

But the prize for creativity goes perhaps to a WeChat post that reached back into the history of communication to find new inspiration. The post explains to readers what a telegram is, and its history in China, in which unique four-digit numbers were assigned to Chinese characters (list here), which could then be decrypted. The post follows with a long list of four-digit numbers:

What does this say when you decode it? The first four sets of characters spell out the beginning of Gong Jingqi’s story as provided above. Here are the codes highlighted with their corresponding Chinese characters.

This is just a taste of the ingenious workarounds that appeared this morning, and which still continue. Taken together they mark a determination not to be silenced, not to allow the truth to be swept away on Xi Jinping’s tide of “positive energy.”

A very brief portion of the People feature story is translated below, followed by the Chinese original in its entirety.

______________

As of March 9, 2020, four medical staff at the Wuhan Central Hospital had died of Covid-19. Since the coronavirus outbreak, this hospital, located just a few kilometers away from the Huanan Seafood Market, has become one of the hospitals in Wuhan with the largest number of medical staff to become infected by the virus. According to media reports, more than 200 people from the hospital have been infected, including three deputy hospital directors and multiple directors of various departments. Many department directors are currently undergoing ECMO treatment [for acute lung failure].

The shadow of death hangs over this, the largest of Wuhan’s three primary hospitals. One doctor tells People that almost no one among the medical staff speaks. They only mourn quietly and discuss privately.

There was at the start an opportunity to avoid this tragedy. On December 30, 2019, Ai Fen received a diagnostic report from a patient with an unknown form of pneumonia, and she drew a red circle around the words “SARS coronavirus.” When she was asked about the case by a college classmate, she took a photograph of the report and sent it to the fellow doctor. That night, this report made its way among doctors in Wuhan, and among those to share the report were the 8 doctors later taken in for questioning by the police.

This created problems for Ai Fen. As the source of the communication, she was called in for a chat with the Disciplinary Office of the hospital and received a “harsh and unprecedented reprimand,” told that she was manufacturing rumors as a professional.

On the afternoon of March 2, Ai Fen was interviewed by People at the Wuhan Central Hospital wing on Nanjing Road. She sat on her own in the emergency room office, and the emergency room that had over the past day received more than 1,500 [coronavirus] patients had now become quiet, with just a single vagrant loitering in the waiting room.

A number of previous reports have said, referring to Ai Fen, that “another female doctor who was questioned has surfaced.” And some have called her a “whistleblower.” Ai Fen corrects these accounts, insisting that she is not a whistleblower — rather, she is the “one who handed out the whistles.” In her interview, Ai Fen used the word “regret” many times. She regrets that after she was reprimanded that first time she did not continue to blow the whistle, especially for those colleagues who have already passed on. “Had I known this day would come, I would have cared nothing for their criticism, but would have spoken up wherever I could, right?”

______________

[FULL CHINESE VERSION]

“发哨子”的武汉中心医院女医生：约谈打击非常大整个人都垮了

2020-03-10 10:54:49 热点

年12月30日，艾芬曾拿到过一份不明肺炎病人的病毒检测报告，她用红色圈出「SARS冠状病毒」字样，当大学同学问起时，她将这份报告拍下来传给了这位同是医生的同学。当晚，这份报告传遍了武汉的医生圈，转发这份报告的人就包括那8位被警方训诫的医生。

这给艾芬带来了麻烦，作为传播的源头，她被医院纪委约谈，遭受了「前所未有的、严厉的斥责」，称她是作为专业人士在造谣。

此前的一些报道，艾芬被称为「又一个被训诫的女医生浮出水面」，也有人将她称为「吹哨人」，艾芬纠正了这个说法，她说自己不是吹哨人，是那个「发哨子的人」。

这是《人物》3月刊封面《武汉医生》的第二篇报道。

文｜龚菁琦

编辑｜金石

摄影｜尹夕远

截止2020年3月9日，武汉市中心医院已有4位医护人员因感染新冠肺炎去世——疫情发生以来，这家离华南海鲜市场只几公里的医院成为了武汉市职工感染人数最多的医院之一，据媒体报道医院超过200人被感染，其中包括三个副院长和多名职能部门主任，多个科室主任目前正在用ECMO维持。

死亡的阴影笼罩着这家武汉市最大的三甲医院，有医生告诉《人物》，在医院的大群里，几乎没有人说话，只在私下默默悼念、讨论。

悲剧原本有机会避免。2019年12月30日，艾芬曾拿到过一份不明肺炎病人的病毒检测报告，她用红色圈出「SARS冠状病毒」字样，当大学同学问起时，她将这份报告拍下来传给了这位同是医生的同学。当晚，这份报告传遍了武汉的医生圈，转发这份报告的人就包括那8位被警方训诫的医生。

这给艾芬带来了麻烦，作为传播的源头，她被医院纪委约谈，遭受了「前所未有的、严厉的斥责」，称她是作为专业人士在造谣。

3月2日下午，艾芬在武汉市中心医院南京路院区接受了《人物》的专访。她一个人坐在急诊室办公室中，曾经一天接诊超过1500位患者的急诊科此时已恢复了安静，急诊大厅里只躺着一名流浪汉。

此前的一些报道，艾芬被称为「又一个被训诫的女医生浮出水面」，也有人将她称为「吹哨人」，艾芬纠正了这个说法，她说自己不是吹哨人，是那个「发哨子的人」。采访中，艾芬数次提起「后悔」这个词，她后悔当初被约谈后没有继续吹响哨声，特别是对于过世的同事，「早知道有今天，我管他批评不批评，『老子』到处说，是不是？」

关于武汉市中心医院和艾芬本人在过去的两个多月中到底经历了什么？以下，是艾芬的讲述——

“发哨子”的武汉中心医院女医生：约谈打击非常大整个人都垮了

艾芬

前所未有的训斥

去年12月16日，我们南京路院区急诊科接诊了一位病人。莫名其妙高烧，一直用药都不好，体温动都不动一下。22号就转到了呼吸科，做了纤维支气管镜取了肺泡灌洗液，送去外面做高通量测序，后来口头报出来是冠状病毒。当时，具体管床的同事在我耳边嚼了几遍：艾主任，那个人报的是冠状病毒。后来我们才知道那个病人是在华南海鲜做事的。

紧接着12月27日，南京路院区又来了一个病人，是我们科一位医生的侄儿，40多岁，没有任何基础疾病，肺部一塌糊涂，血氧饱和只有90%，在下面其他医院已经治疗了将近10天左右都没有任何好转，病人收到了呼吸科监护室住院。同样做了纤维支气管镜取了肺泡灌洗液送去检测。

12月30日那天中午，我在同济医院工作的同学发了一张微信对话截图给我，截图上写着：「最近不要去华南啊，那里蛮多人高烧……」他问我是不是真的，当时，我正在电脑上看一个很典型的肺部感染患者的CT，我就把CT录了一段11秒钟的视频传给他，告诉他这是上午来我们急诊的一个病人，也是华南海鲜市场的。

当天下午4点刚过，同事给我看了一份报告，上面写的是：SARS冠状病毒、绿脓假单胞菌、46种口腔/呼吸道定植菌。我仔细看了很多遍报告，下面的注释写着：SARS冠状病毒是一种单股正链RNA病毒。该病毒主要传播方式为近距离飞沫传播或接触患者呼吸道分泌物，可引起的一种具有明显传染性，可累及多个脏器系统的特殊肺炎，也称非典型肺炎。

当时，我吓出了一身冷汗，这是一个很可怕的东西。病人收在呼吸科，按道理应该呼吸科上报这个情况，但是为了保险和重视起见，我还是立刻打电话上报给了医院公共卫生科和院感科。当时我们医院呼吸科主任正好从我门口过，他是参加过非典的人，我把他抓住，说，我们有个病人收到你们科室，发现了这个东西。他当时一看就说，那就麻烦了。我就知道这个事情麻烦了。

给医院打完电话，我也给我同学传了这份报告，特意在「SARS冠状病毒、绿脓假单胞菌、46种口腔/呼吸道定植菌」这一排字上画了个红圈，目的是提醒他注意、重视。我也把报告发在了科室医生群里面，提醒大家注意防范。

当天晚上，这个东西就传遍了，各处传的截屏都是我画红圈的那个照片，包括后来知道李文亮传在群里的也是那份。我心里当时就想可能坏事儿了。10点20，医院发来了信息，是转市卫健委的通知，大意就是关于不明原因肺炎，不要随意对外发布，避免引起群众恐慌，如果因为信息泄露引发恐慌，要追责。

我当时心里就很害怕，立刻把这条信息转给了我同学。过了大概一个小时，医院又来了一份通知，再次强调群内的相关消息不能外传。一天后，1月1日晚上11点46分，医院监察科科长给我发了条消息，让我第二天早上过去一下。

那一晚都没有睡着，很担忧，翻来覆去地想，但又觉得凡事总有两面性，即便造成不良影响，但提醒武汉的医务人员注意防范也不一定是个坏事。第二天早上8点多一点，还没有等我交完班，催我过去的电话就打来了。

之后的约谈，我遭受了前所未有的、非常严厉的斥责。

当时，谈话的领导说，「我们出去开会都抬不起头，某某某主任批评我们医院那个艾芬，作为武汉市中心医院急诊科主任，你是专业人士，怎么能够没有原则没有组织纪律造谣生事？」这是原话。让我回去跟科室的200多号人一个个地口头传达到位，不能发微信、短信传达，只能当面聊或者打电话，不许说关于这个肺炎的任何事情，「连自己的老公都不能说」……

我整个人一下子就懵了，他不是批评你这个人工作不努力，而是好像整个武汉市发展的大好局面被我一个人破坏了。我当时有一种很绝望的感觉，我是一个平时认认真真、勤勤恳恳工作的人，我觉得自己做的事情都是按规矩来的，都是有道理的，我犯了什么错？我看到了这个报告，我也上报医院了，我和我的同学，同行之间对于某一个病人的情况进行交流，没有透露病人的任何私人信息，就相当于是医学生之间讨论一个病案，当你作为一个临床的医生，已经知道在病人身上发现了一种很重要的病毒，别的医生问起，你怎么可能不说呢？这是你当医生的本能，对不对？我做错什么了？我做了一个医生、一个人正常应该做的事情，换作是任何人我觉得都会这么做。

我当时的情绪也很激动，说，这个事是我做的，跟其余人都没有关系，你们干脆把我抓去坐牢吧。我说我现在这个状态不适合在这个岗位上继续工作了，想要休息一段时间。领导没有同意，说这个时候正是考验我的时候。

当天晚上回家，我记得蛮清楚，进门后就跟我老公讲，我要是出了什么事情，你就好好地把孩子带大。因为我的二宝还很小，才1岁多。他当时觉得莫名其妙，我没有跟他说自己被训话的事，1月20号，钟南山说了人传人之后，我才跟他说那天发生了什么。那期间，我只是提醒家人不要去人多的地方，出门要戴口罩。

外围科室

很多人担心我也是那8个人之一被叫去训诫。实际没有被公安局训诫，后来有好朋友问我，你是不是吹哨人？我说我不是吹哨人，我是那个发哨子的人。

但那次约谈对我的打击很大，非常大。回来后我感觉整个人心都垮了，真的是强打着精神，认真做事，后来所有的人再来问我，我就不能回答了。

我能做的就是先让急诊科重视防护。我们急诊科200多人，从1月1号开始，我就叫大家加强防护，所有的人必须戴口罩、戴帽子、用手快消。记得有一天交班有个男护士没戴口罩，我马上就当场骂他「以后不戴口罩就不要来上班了」。

1月9号，我下班时看见预检台一个病人对着大家咳，从那天后，我就要求他们必须给来看病的病人发口罩，一人发一个，这个时候不要节约钱，当时外面在说没有人传人，我又要在这里强调戴口罩加强防护，都是很矛盾的。

那段时间确实很压抑，非常痛苦。有医生提出来要把隔离衣穿外头，医院里开会说不让，说隔离衣穿外头会造成恐慌。我就让科室的人把隔离服穿白大褂里面，这是不符合规范的，很荒谬的。

我们眼睁睁地看着病人越来越多，传播区域的半径越来越大，先是华南海鲜市场附近可能跟它有关系，然后就传传传，半径越来越大。很多是家庭传染的，最先的7个人当中就有妈妈给儿子送饭得的病。有诊所的老板得病，也是来打针的病人传给他的，都是重得不得了。我就知道肯定有人传人。如果没有人传人，华南海鲜市场1月1日就关闭了，怎么病人会越来越多呢？

很多时候我都在想，如果他们当时不那样训斥我，心平气和地问一下这件事情的来龙去脉，再请别的呼吸科专家一起沟通一下，也许局面会好一些，我至少可以在医院内部多交流一下。如果是1月1号大家都这样引起警惕，就不会有那么多悲剧了。

1月3号下午，在南京路院区，泌尿外科的医生们聚集在一起回顾老主任的工作历程，参会的胡卫峰医生今年43岁，现在正在抢救；1月8号下午，南京路院区22楼，江学庆主任还组织了武汉市甲乳患者康复联欢会；1月11号早上，科室跟我汇报急诊科抢救室护士胡紫薇感染，她应该是中心医院第一个被感染的护士，我第一时间给医务科科长打电话汇报，然后医院紧急开了会，会上指示把「两下肺感染，病毒性肺炎？」的报告改成「两肺散在感染」；1月16号最后一次周会上，一位副院长还在说：「大家都要有一点医学常识，某些高年资的医生不要自己把自己搞得吓死人的。」另一位领导上台继续说：「没有人传人，可防可治可控。」一天后，1月17号，江学庆住院，10天后插管、上ECMO。

中心医院的代价这么大，就是跟我们的医务人员没有信息透明化有关。你看倒下的人，急诊科和呼吸科的倒是没有那么重的，因为我们有防护意识，并且一生病就赶紧休息治疗。重的都是外围科室，李文亮是眼科的，江学庆是甲乳科的。

江学庆真的非常好的一个人，医术很高，全院的两个中国医师奖之一。而且我们还是邻居，我们一个单元，我住四十几楼，他住三十几楼，关系都很好，但是平时因为工作太忙，就只能开会、搞医院活动时候见见面。他是个工作狂，要么就在手术室，要么就在看门诊。谁也不会特意跑去跟他说，江主任，你要注意，戴口罩。他也没有时间和精力打听这些事，他肯定就大意了：「有什么关系？就是个肺炎。」这个是他们科室的人告诉我的。

如果这些医生都能够得到及时的提醒，或许就不会有这一天。所以，作为当事人的我非常后悔，早知道有今天，我管他批评不批评我，「老子」到处说，是不是？

虽然和李文亮同在一个医院，一直到去世之前我都不认得他，因为医院4000多号人太多了，平时也忙。他去世前的那天晚上，ICU的主任跟我打电话借急诊科的心脏按压器，说李文亮要抢救，我一听这个消息大吃一惊，李文亮这个事整个过程我不了解，但是他的病情跟他受训斥之后心情不好有没有关系？这我要打个问号，因为受训的感觉我感同身受。

后来，事情发展到这一步，证明李文亮是对的时候，他的心情我非常能理解，可能跟我的心情一样，不是激动、高兴，而是后悔，后悔当初就应该继续大声疾呼，应该在所有的人问我们的时候，继续说。很多很多次我都在想，如果时间能够倒回来该多好。

“发哨子”的武汉中心医院女医生：约谈打击非常大整个人都垮了

活着就是好的

在1月23日封城前一天的晚上，有相关部门的朋友打电话问我武汉市急诊病人的真实情况。我说你代表私人，还是代表公家。他说我代表私人。我说代表个人就告诉你真话，1月21号，我们急诊科接诊1523个病人，是往常最多时的3倍，其中发烧的有655个人。

那段时间急诊科的状况，经历过的人一辈子都忘不了，甚至会颠覆你的所有人生观。

如果说这是打仗，急诊科就在最前线。但当时的情况是，后面的病区已经饱和了，基本上一个病人都不收，ICU也坚决不收，说里面有干净的病人，一进去就污染了。病人不断地往急诊科涌，后面的路又不通，就全部堆在急诊科。病人来看病，一排队随便就是几个小时，我们也完全没法下班，发热门诊和急诊也都不分了，大厅里堆满了病人，抢救室输液室里到处都是病人。

还有的病人家属来了，说要一张床，我的爸爸在汽车里面不行了，因为那时候地下车库已封，他车子也堵着开不进来。我没办法，带着人和设备跑去汽车里去，一看，人已经死了，你说是什么感受，很难受很难受。这个人就死在汽车里，连下车的机会都没有。

还有一位老人，老伴刚在金银潭医院去世了，她的儿子、女儿都被感染了，在打针，照顾她的是女婿，一来我看她病得非常重，联系呼吸科给收进去住院，她女婿一看就是个有文化有素质的人，过来跟我说谢谢医生等等的，我心里一紧，说快去，根本耽误不了了。结果送去就去世了。一句谢谢虽然几秒钟，但也耽误了几秒。这句谢谢压得我很沉重。

还有很多人把自己的家人送到监护室的时候，就是他们见的最后一面，你永远见不着了。

我记得大年三十的早来交班，我说我们来照个相，纪念一下这个大年三十，还发了个朋友圈。那天，大家都没有说什么祝福，这种时候，活着就是好的。

以前，你如果有一点失误，比如没有及时打针，病人都可能还去闹，现在没人了，没有人跟你吵，没有人跟你闹了，所有人都被这种突然来的打击击垮了，搞蒙了。

病人死了，很少看到家属有很伤心地哭的，因为太多了，太多了。有些家属也不会说医生求求你救救我的家人，而是跟医生说，唉，那就快点解脱吧，已经到了这个地步。因为这时候每个人怕的都是自己被感染。

一天发热门诊门口的排队，要排5个小时。正排着一个女的倒下了，看她穿着皮衣，背着包包，穿着高跟鞋，应该是很讲究的一个中年女性，可是没有人敢上前去扶她，就在地上躺了很久。只得我去喊护士、医生来去扶她。

1月30号我早上来上班，一个白发老人的儿子32岁死了，他就盯着看医生给他开死亡证明。根本没有眼泪，怎么哭？没办法哭。看他的打扮，可能就是一个外来的打工的，没有任何渠道去反映。没有确诊，他的儿子，就变成了一张死亡证明。

这也是我想要去呼吁一下的。在急诊科死亡的病人都是没有诊断、没办法确诊的病例，等这个疫情过去之后，我希望能给他们一个交代，给他们的家庭一些安抚，我们的病人很可怜的，很可怜。

「幸运」

做了这么多年医生，我一直觉得没有什么困难能够打倒我，这也和我的经历、个性有关。

9岁那年我爸爸就胃癌去世了，那个时候我就想着长大了当个医生去救别人的命。后来高考的时候，我的志愿填的全部都是医学专业，最后考取了同济医学院。1997年我大学毕业，就到了中心医院，之前在心血管内科工作，2010年到急诊科当主任的。

我觉得急诊科就像我的一个孩子一样，我把它搞成这么大，搞得大家团结起来，做成这个局面不容易，所以很珍惜，非常珍惜这个集体。

前几天，我的一个护士发朋友圈说，好怀念以前忙碌的大急诊，那种忙跟这种忙完全是两个概念。

在这次疫情之前，心梗、脑梗、消化道出血、外伤等等这些才是我们急诊的范畴。那种忙是有成就感的忙，目的明确，针对各种类型的病人都有很通畅的流程，很成熟，下一步干什么，怎么做，出了问题找哪一个。而这一次是这么多危重病人没办法去处理，没办法收住院，而且我们医务人员还在这种风险之中，这种忙真的很无奈，很痛心。

有一天早上8点，我们科一个年轻医生跟我发微信，也是蛮有性格的，说我今天不来上班了，不舒服。因为我们这里都有规矩的，你不舒服要提前跟我说好安排，你到8点钟跟我说，我到哪里去找人。他在微信中对我发脾气，说大量的高度疑似病例被你领导的急诊科放回社会，我们这是作孽！我理解他是因为作为医生的良知，但我也急了，我说你可以去告我，如果你是急诊科主任，你该怎么办？

后来，这个医生休息了几天后，还是照样来工作。他不是说怕死怕累，而是遇到这种情况，一下子面对这么多病人感到很崩溃。

作为医生来说，特别是后面很多来支援的医生，根本心理上受不了，碰到这种情况懵了，有的医生、护士就哭。一个是哭别人，再一个也是哭自己，因为每个人都不知道什么时候就轮到自己感染。

大概在1月中下旬，医院的领导也陆陆续续地都病倒了，包括我们的门办主任，三位副院长。医务科科长的女儿也病了，他也在家里休息。所以基本上那一段时间是没有人管你，你就在那儿战斗吧，就是那种感觉。

我身边的人也开始一个接一个地倒掉。1月18日，早上8点半，我们倒的第一个医生，他说主任我中招了，不烧，只做了CT，肺部一大坨磨玻璃。不一会儿，隔离病房负责的一个责任护士，告诉我说他也倒了。晚上，我们的护士长也倒了。我当时非常真实的第一感觉是——幸运，因为倒得早，可以早点下战场。

这三个人我都密切接触过，我就是抱着必倒的信念每天在工作，结果一直没倒。全院的人都觉得我是个奇迹。我自己分析了一下，可能是因为我本身有哮喘，在用一些吸入性的激素，可能会抑制这些病毒在肺内沉积。

我总觉得我们做急诊的人都算是有情怀的人——在中国的医院，急诊科的地位在所有科室当中应该是比较低的，因为大家觉得急诊，无非就是个通道，把病人收进去就行了。这次抗疫中，这种忽视也一直都存在。

早期的时候，物资不够，有时候分给急诊科的防护服质量非常差，看到我们的护士竟然穿着这种衣服上班，我很生气，在周会群里面发脾气。后来还是好多主任把他们自己科室藏的衣服都给我了。

还有吃饭问题。病人多的时候管理混乱，他们根本想不到急诊科还差东西吃，很多科室下班了都有吃的喝的，摆一大排，我们这里什么都没有，发热门诊的微信群里，有医生抱怨，「我们急诊科只有纸尿裤……」我们在最前线战斗，结果是这样，有时候心里真的很气。

我们这个集体真的是很好，大家都是只有生病了才下火线。这次，我们急诊科有40多个人感染了。我把所有生病的人建了一个群，本来叫「急诊生病群」，护士长说不吉利，改成「急诊加油群」。就是生病的人也没有很悲伤、很绝望、很抱怨的心态，都是蛮积极的，就是大家互相帮助，共度难关那种心态。

这些孩子们、年轻人都非常好，就是跟着我受委屈了。我也希望这次疫情过后，国家能加大对急诊科的投入，在很多国家的医疗体系中，急诊专业都是非常受重视的。

“发哨子”的武汉中心医院女医生：约谈打击非常大整个人都垮了

不能达到的幸福

2月17号，我收到了一条微信，是那个同济医院的同学发给我的，他跟我说「对不起」，我说：幸好你传出去了，及时提醒了一部分人。他如果不传出去的话，可能就没有李文亮他们这8个人，知道的人可能就会更少。

这次，我们有三个女医生全家感染。两个女医生的公公、婆婆加老公感染，一个女医生的爸爸、妈妈、姐姐、老公，加她自己5个人感染。大家都觉得这么早就发现这个病毒，结果却是这样，造成这么大的损失，代价太惨重了。

这种代价体现在方方面面。除了去世的人，患病的人也在承受。

我们「急诊加油群」里，大家经常会交流身体状况，有人问心率总在120次/分，要不要紧？那肯定要紧，一动就心慌，这对他们终身都会有影响的，以后年纪大了会不会心衰？这都不好说。以后别人可以去爬山，出去旅游，他们可能就不行，那都是有可能的。

还有武汉。你说我们武汉是个多热闹的地方，现在一路上都是安安静静的，很多东西买不到，还搞得全国都来支援。前几天广西的一个医疗队的护士在工作的时候突然昏迷了，抢救，后来人心跳有了，但还是在昏迷。她如果不来的话，在家里可以过得好好的，也不会出这种意外。所以，我觉得我们欠大家的人情，真的是。

经历过这次的疫情，对医院里很多人的打击都非常大。我下面好几个医务人员都有了辞职的想法，包括一些骨干。大家之前对于这个职业的那些观念、常识都难免有点动摇——就是你这么努力工作到底对不对？就像江学庆一样，他工作太认真，太对病人好，每一年的过年过节都在做手术。今天有人发一个江学庆女儿写的微信，说她爸爸的时间全部给了病人。

我自己也有过无数次的念头，是不是也回到家做个家庭主妇？疫情之后，我基本上没回家，和我老公住在外面，我妹妹在家帮我照顾孩子。我的二宝都不认得我了，他看视频对我没感觉，我很失落，我生这个二胎不容易，出生的时候他有10斤，妊娠糖尿病我也得了，原本我还一直喂奶的，这一次也断了奶——做这个决定的时候，我有点难过，我老公就跟我说，他说人的一生能够遇到一件这样的事情，并且你不光是参与者，你还要带一个团队去打这场仗，那也是一件很有意义的事情，等将来一切都恢复正常以后大家再去回忆，也是一个很宝贵的经历。

2月21号早上领导和我谈话，其实我想问几个问题，比如有没有觉得那天批评我批评错了？我希望能够给我一个道歉。但是我不敢问。没有人在任何场合跟我说表示抱歉这句话。但我依然觉得，这次的事情更加说明了每个人还是要坚持自己独立的思想，因为要有人站出来说真话，必须要有人，这个世界必须要有不同的声音，是吧？

作为武汉人，我们哪一个不热爱自己的城市？我们现在回想起来以前过得那种最普通的生活，是多么奢侈的幸福。我现在觉得把宝宝抱着，陪他出去玩一下滑梯或者跟老公出去看个电影，在以前再平常都不过，到现在来说都是一种幸福，都是不能达到的幸福。

(来源:今必看)

When Propaganda Bites Back

Written by David Bandurski on 8 March 2020. Posted in Headlines and Hashtags.

CMP reported yesterday on the firestorm that ensued online in China as news circulated that Wuhan’s top official, Wang Zhonglin (王忠林), said during an internal meeting that the city needed to “carry out gratitude education among the citizens of the whole city” so that they thank Xi Jinping and the Communist Party of China for the response to the coronavirus epidemic.

Internal directives from press control officials now suggest this has been a full-blown public opinion crisis for the Party, and that the wound was self-inflicted. Media have been ordered not to share the original article, publish commentaries, or otherwise address the issue at all. The report on Wang’s remarks by Wuhan’s official Changjiang Daily has been withdrawn, but remains available online from certain sources.

A March 7 WeChat post on Wang Zhonglin’s “gratitude education” remarks has now been removed.

Below is CMP’s translation of an announcement for an internal propaganda meeting held last night, with required attendance from key central Party media and local propaganda offices. The announcement clearly says that what it now calls the “’gratitude education’ incident” invited “raging public opinion,” and that it was comparable as a “public opinion incident” to the uproar that followed the death of Dr. Li Wenliang.

The coronavirus epidemic has been a serious test of the Chinese Communist Party’s capacity to “guide public opinion,” a phrase it uses to describe the work of controlling and redirecting information in order to maintain political stability and the Party’s legitimacy in the eyes of the public. Efforts by an often rigid and unresponsive Party-state media system to turn the tide of criticism away from the government have often backfired, encouraging anger and resentment with the leadership’s apparent interest in managing appearances over acknowledging and grappling with problems.

One of the most obvious cases in point came last Friday as footage emerged online and on social media of residents in Wuhan shouting from their high-rise apartments during an inspection visit by vice-premier Sun Chunlan: “Fake! Fake! Everything is fake!” It was possibly this embarrassing episode that prompted Wang Zhonglin, who was appointed in February to replace Ma Guoqiang (马国强) as Wuhan’s Party secretary in a leadership shake-up, to suggest the necessity of a campaign of “gratitude education.”

The internal announcement on the “’gratitude education’ incident” urges all media to “consider the feelings of the people of Wuhan” in news and propaganda reports. But the focus remains, unsurprisingly, on the end goal of “easing the emotions of the people”—as though public opinion itself is the primary challenge. The announcement stresses the importance, in this regard, of a special series called “Entering Communities, Listening to People’s Voices, Alleviating People’s Concerns” (进社区, 听民声, 解民忧).

We can find this phrase being deployed already in Wuhan, and it appears on the front page of today’s Changjiang Daily. The following image is from the lower right-hand corner, pointing readers to page 3.

Page 3 is a full page of more informational content about the coronavirus epidemic in the city, under the headline: “Where Do Non-Coronavirus Patients Seek Medical Care, and How.” The subhead seems almost pleading in light of the insistence in the internal announcement (below) that media focus on alleviating the concerns of the public: “Bearing Concern for Community Residents, We Asked 4 Hospitals.”

A series of articles follows on the left-hand side explaining the situation at various local hospitals. Vertically across the right-hand side are questions from readers that are answered by the newspaper. One reader asks, for example, what to do if his annual vehicle inspection for his driver’s license is due but not possible owing to suspension of such services. The response explains that drivers in this situation will not be fined by transport authorities for such violations during the quarantine period.

These are certainly interesting times to observe the mechanics of press control and “public opinion guidance” in China.

____________

March 7, 2020

21:15-21:50

Host: State Council Information Office

Principal Participating Units: People’s Daily, Xinhua News Agency, Guangming Daily, China Central Television, The Paper, Economic Daily, China Youth Daily, Guangdong Propaganda Department, Hubei Propaganda Department, Propaganda Department of Wuhan City, and others.

1. Notice on the situation concerning the “gratitude education” incident, providing an internal grasp

Today Changjiang Daily’s report on “gratitude education” invited raging public opinion (舆情汹通), the intensity of the public opinion response being similar to that following the death of a certain doctor. Through communications between provincial and city leaders, and after a request to central authorities it was agreed: Changjiang Daily, [the WeChat account] Wuhan China (武汉发布) and Wuhan Television will remove the article at its source, and no other media will be permitted to follow-up with reports or commentaries!

This matter is a classic case of public opinion created by our own work (自身工作), in particular an insufficiently strict hold at Changjiang Daily, and[we] must draw lessons from this, and reflect back seriously.

On this matter, Minister [Huang] Kunming (黄坤明) [of the Central Propaganda Department] especially made a phone call to stress: This matter fully shows that with Wuhan now having been shut down for more than 40 days, the lives of the ordinary people have been affected to such an extent that there is resentment and anger, and all reports must consider the feelings of the people of Wuhan. This matter also sounds a warning to all of our media, that they must definitely consider the particular situation facing Wuhan and the feelings of the people.

The immense reaction created by this incident again shows the significance and importance of our running the special series “Entering Communities, Listening to People’s Voices, Alleviating People’s Concerns,”easing the emotions of the people – not to teach the people gratitude, but to alleviate their concerns.

Here we warn particularly: all media, regardless of whether in internal reporting (内宣) or external propaganda (外宣), regardless of whether they are central or local media, regardless of whether they are online or offline, must heed the calls [of the CCP], must all be strategically aligned in their consciousness, forming a coordinated unit of struggle (战斗部队), and must not fight independently.

[Featured Image: Screenshot of video from Apple Daily on Wang Zhonglin touring Wuhan.]

Author: David Bandurski

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Is China reveling in US woes?

At the NPC: Xi Jinping, Hong Kong and Jobs

Reading the NPC Work Report

Blood-soaked Dumplings

“Speaking Politics,” Rushing Into Disaster

Reclaiming Doctor Li

"Countermeasures" Against US Media

Whistling Against Deception

When Propaganda Bites Back

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