Author: David Bandurski

Now Executive Director of the China Media Project, leading the project’s research and partnerships, David originally joined the project in Hong Kong in 2004. He is the author of Dragons in Diamond Village (Penguin), a book of reportage about urbanization and social activism in China, and co-editor of Investigative Journalism in China (HKU Press).

People’s Congress spokesperson addresses media-related portion of draft emergency law

As the controversy over the media clause of the draft emergency law continues, a page six article in today’s Southern Metropolis Daily offers a rather ambiguous clarification, if you will, of the People’s Congress position on the draft law and media-related portions. The statement, from People’s Congress information office spokesperson Kan Ke (阚珂), seems to be a direct response to the wave of attention harrying the media clause, which would set fines for “news media making bold to report on the handling of emergency situations in violation of regulations or issuing false reports”. One of the most interesting and debatable presumptions in this statement is that the government can all at once ensure “unity” (统一) and “accuracy” (准确). [PHOTO: Authorities at the site of a gas explosion in April this year, www.qjqjt.gov.cn police website].
The final paragraph is full of apparent contradictions, particularly for anyone approaching this issue from the standpoint of liberal press theory. But this seems to be an unsurprising affirmation of CONTROL as the heart of Chinese media policy. The government, in other words, intends to monopolize information, releasing so-called “accurate” information as suits it needs. If one reads this with the presumption the government always knows best in matters of public interest, the announcement is at least internally consistent. But this, of course, is exactly the issue at contention — we want to monitor you on behalf of the public, the media opposition are saying. Anyhow, here is the Southern Metropolis Daily story:

The Director of the Information Office of the National People’s Congress, Kan Ke, said China’s government has always placed a high priority on increasing transparency in the work of dealing with sudden emergencies. By building a relevant system [he said, the government] sought unity, timeliness and accuracy of information dealing with emergency management.
[Article here reiterates the text of the media clause, the nature of the proposed fines, etcetera] …
Kan Ke said that the draft had made stipulations in this area [meaning about news media] in order to further improve the system of information release for emergency situations and increase transparency.
Stipulations about management of reporting in the draft emergency law [Kan Ke said] are the product of years of work and experience and are consistent with current practice. The goal [he said] was to provide service to journalists and make their work more convenient, protecting journalists’ normal rights and interests in reporting (采访权益) while perfecting management and making media more timely, accurate, their stories reporting the true nature of the situation in order to better deal with emergencies, safeguard social stability and the public interest.

[Posted by David Bandurski, June 30, 2006, 1:07pm]

Chinese media continue their attack on the media clause of the draft emergency management law

As Chinese leaders continue to debate the draft emergency management law, media in south China, which have traditionally earned a reputation for relative outspokenness, are leading the push against the media-related clause. Here is an editorial appearing in yesterday’s New Express, a commercial newspaper in Guangzhou published by Yangcheng Evening News. The editorial intelligently discusses the media portion of the draft law against the stated goals of the law itself.
The editorial also addresses what has traditionally been an ideological blind-spot in Chinese coverage of natural disasters as well as accidents – their relationship to human error, or failures of leadership. Once again we have a direct reference to [Chinese] “watchdog journalism”, or yulun jiandu, as a necessary factor in monitoring the handling of emergencies:

One portion of the draft emergency law has drawn a great deal of attention. According to that portion “news media making bold to report on the handling of emergency situations in violation of regulations or issuing false reports” may be fined between 50 thousand yuan and 100 thousand yuan by the local government with the responsibility for “coordinated leadership” (统一领导) .
Looking at the draft law, it seems that not only the State Council but also provincial, city or county governments may take on the role of “coordinated leadership”, with the power to employ any number of “compulsory measures” – this would include monopolizing information, and during this monopoly news media must not “make bold” to depart from the will of the government.
In the case of draft laws, specific regulations and their possible ramifications must be considered thoroughly, so that the objective of the law itself is not compromised by the language. The [media] clause [of the draft] at the very least ensures the harm done by information interference and the propagation of rumors does not exceed the harm of the [emergency situation itself] …
However, in the first place, it does not consider that there is not way of verifying that the information in the hands of the government is the truest and most accurate under this imperative of news “monopoly”. If government information is incomplete or inaccurate, this could potentially lead to incorrect decision-making by governments (including both central and regional) and ultimately impact the handling of the emergency situation.
Secondly, [the clause] does not take into consideration the possibility that there are “man-made calamities” amidst “natural disasters”. If an emergency incident touches on interests of the local government (provincial, city, county), well then, in such a situation the so-called “report to superiors” we can expect from the local government will be a non-report or a false report. Interference of this kind is not without precedent, a good example being “collusion between coalmines and officials” (官煤勾结). In such situations this clause of the draft law would actually become a tool for corrupt local officials who want to cover up their dirty deeds – a highly effective legal sanction for [these governments] to set their own ground rules and avoid watchdog journalism (“supervision by public opinion”).
[Editor’s Note: We saw this sort of “interest” in operation with the recent Xining Coalmine Disaster in Shanxi Province. It took days for the story to appear in the provincial Party newspaper, Shanxi Daily. Why? We can speculate that scheduled leadership changeovers this year in this and other provinces made officials wary of bad press.]
Thirdly, [the draft law] has not clearly considered which theme of this [emergency law], the manifest or the latent one, has the most force [Editor’s Note: In other words, the stated goals of the law or the letter of the law, including the media clause]. Whose regulations should the news media respect? If media conduct watchdog journalism in violation of the “regulations” of some local government and reveal the truth, thereby ensuring the emergency incident goes only so far and doesn’t become more explosive – should they or should they not be punished with “fines”? It’s plain to see that if this clause were to indeed to become law, it could conceivably be used, abused and twisted during emergency events, working against the original spirit of the law itself.
As to the relationship between the principals and stipulations of law, the former governs the latter. If the stipulations of law violate that law’s very principles, they must either be changed or removed. If the stipulations of the draft law do harm to the very objective of the law, then reason suggests it will stand in self-contradiction. This demands urgent consideration. We must consider the ramifications of this law once it is formalized, and we must deal with these issues as the law is being made.

[Posted by David Bandurski, June 28, 2006, 12:53pm]

Media clause of draft emergency management law already under contention

CMP noted yesterday that the draft emergency management law – and the media clause that drew a wave of foreign media attention – was just that, a draft. Already today there are signs in the Chinese press that some leaders are unhappy with aspects of the proposed law, the media clause included. A news article on page four of today’s The Beijing News addresses several points under contention as members of the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress debated the draft. The last portion of that story reads:
A number of standing committee members believe article 57 of the draft law, concerning “news media making bold to report on the handling of emergency situations in violation of regulations or issuing false reports” is insufficiently precise and should stipulate which government bodies are making these “regulations” and the nature of those “regulations”.
This means some committee members are expressing concerns similar to those voiced yesterday by Zhang Ping in his editorial in Southern Metropolis Daily, which ESWN has translated in full. For example, are the local “regulations” in question designed to orchestrate a cover-up of the emergency situation? Again, we’ll have to see how this story plays out, but unfortunately a number of Western media have already turned this into the conventional “media crackdown” story.
[Posted by David Bandurski, June 27, 2006, 10:30am]

Chinese media respond to revised draft of emergency response law

The second draft of China’s proposed legislation on disaster coverage, released earlier this week, could be read as a small victory for critics of last year’s draft, which promised fines for media “making bold” to report on natural disasters, public health incidents or industrial accidents in violation of administrative bans [AFP coverage here]. In apparent concession to the swell of domestic criticism in June last year – seen mostly at the editorial pages of major commercial newspapers and on the Internet – the new draft drops the clause on media fines, which many viewed as a dangerous curb on watchdog journalism. [See CMP coverage here].
However, important questions remain about how the legislation would impact news media in practice. The new draft states, for example, that “units and individuals are prohibited from fabricating or spreading false information concerning emergencies and government efforts to respond to emergencies”, but gives no indication of who will decide what should be regarded as false information and on what basis.
Selected translations of Chinese editorials on the revised draft follow:
[Lead Editorial 社论]
Southern Metropolis Daily
June 25, 2007
Yesterday, the draft emergency response legislation was sent for deliberation to the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress. Raising eyebrows was the omission in this draft of a clause concerning news media that “made bold to release information against regulations” (违规擅自发布). At the same time, language in the first draft saying that people’s governments handling disaster events should “manage relevant reports from news media” was similarly removed.
We welcome the loosening toward watchdog journalism between the first and second drafts. The draft emergency response legislation submitted in June last year to the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress placed limitations on news reports: media making bold to report on the handling of disaster events and their development in violation of administrative bans, or reporting false information, could face fines of between 50,000 and 100,000 yuan from the local government charged with overseeing response efforts. The draft also ruled that the local people’s government in the area of the disaster would be responsible for releasing information in a uniform fashion, and that relevant news reports would be included in this uniform management. This stipulation drew broad interest from society, and media all over the country joined the debate. We said in our newspaper that this was a regrettable step back for our society …
The most vexing thing for local officials about the media’s role in disaster events is how they “disregard the overall interest” [of the state]. There is no doubt that unified action can potentially increase the efficiency [of response], but dispersed competition (分散的博弈) [for information] can come closer to the truth … To place limitations on this function of the media no doubt means sacrificing the society’s eventual grasp of the truth.
——————-
“The Fewer Restrictions on the Media the Better”
Chen Jieren (陈杰人)
China Youth Daily
June 26, 2007
. . . The draft to be deliberated this time by the People’s Congress eliminates the abovementioned unreasonable limitations on the media [in the first draft]. This demonstrates that the highest organs of power have made progress in placing importance on public opinion and the rights of citizens. It also shows a major stride forward in our country’s work toward establishing rule of law and a scientific attitude …
World experience has shown that in a well-ordered and harmonious society, the existence of the press is not premised on personal interests, but serves the common interests of the whole of society. The end product of restrictions on the media, particularly when they are superabundant and unreasonable, is harm to the public good.
—————-
“Let the Media Have a Direct Role in Dealing with Emergency Events”
Qin Guan (秦关)
The Beijing News
June 26, 2007
… Owing to the over-vagueness of the language “in violation of regulations” in article 57 [of the original draft legislation], people were universally concerned that it might become an excuse for placing curbs of the normal reporting of emergency events by the media, do harm to the ability of the media to perform a watchdog journalism function on the cover-up of such stories, and impede effective handling of crises.
… Put simply, crisis management is about information management. Especially in times of emergency, we need to mobilize the force of the whole society to participate in “information relief” …
The development of a civil society depends on the emergence of public space. In the market for information, no one media can possibly monopolize information or lead public opinion. Seen in this way, there’s nothing at all terrifying about “rumor” or “false information”. All it takes is transparency of information and all of this will be quickly rectified. Looking at it in another way, if media reports are directed according to some “regulation”, if some local government covers up a story, issues false reports and prevents the regular functioning of the media, the efficient flow of real information will very possibly be damaged.
[HOMEPAGE PHOTO: Scene of devastation in the Chinese city of Tangshan following a magnitude earthquake in 1976. Three decades later, the disaster remains a politically sensitive topic, and media are prevented from “reflecting back” on the role of official negligence in the devastation wrought by this natural event.]

Media clause of proposed emergency management law raises hackles at Southern Metropolis Daily

A scathing editorial in today’s Southern Metropolis Daily set the stage for a showdown over a clause in China’s proposed national emergency management law that would place heavy fines on media that “made bold” to report on natural disasters, public health incidents or industrial accidents in violation of administrative bans. Significantly, the editorial was written by Chang Ping (长平), the penname of Zhang Ping (张平), a former visiting scholar at Berkeley removed in a purge of top editors at Southern Weekend in 2001. In the interest of full disclosure, we should say that China Media Project co-director Qian Gang was also removed at that time [South China Morning Post report here].
pdf_southern-metro-daily-ed-opposing-draft.htm
The proposed national emergency law — which has the stated purpose of improving disaster responsiveness and ensuring administrative responsibility — was announced in an official Xinhua News Agency release yesterday and included a clause on reporting by news media. According to the clause “news media making bold to report on the handling of emergency situations in violation of regulations” or “issuing false reports” would be fined a minimum of 50,000 yuan (US$6,250) and a maximum of 100,000 yuan.
The reference to “regulations” apparently included not just national bans and orders but also statements issued by local or regional authorities. If the law were enacted with the clause this could mean, for example, that a national or city-level newspaper from Beijing dispatching reporters to the scene of a disaster in another region would be violating national law and incur heavy fines by reporting on the situation despite bans by local officials (who have an obvious interest in putting a lid on news coverage). This would indeed deal a heavy blow to cross-regional reporting, or yidi jiandu (异地监督), making it difficult for outside media to monitor local leaders. Cross-regional reporting has in the past been instrumental in breaking the silence on important national disaster stories as well as regional ones. The exposure of China’s HIV-Aids crisis, which devastated whole regions of the countryside in provinces like Henan, required persistent reporting by media from neighboring provinces. The first major report on the crisis, done by Henan reporter Zhang Jicheng in December 1999, eventually ran in a commercial newspaper in Sichuan province.
Zhang Ping makes the point more forcefully in today’s editorial:
In the instance of a coal-mining disaster, this might be characterized [under this law] as a small-scale incident that need only be handled by local authorities. According to this draft, the local government will implement unified leadership responsibilities, unified information and handling of the accident, and unified management of news media. What this essentially means is that the release of all information is in the hands of the local government. Based on documented cases of mining disaster cover-ups we know the local government takes the lead in orchestrating and leading the cover-up. Let’s say the media reports on the cover-up itself – is this not what you would call “making bold to report”? Yes, clearly. According to this draft resolution, the local governments and the instigators of the cover-up should take the lead in fining news media – is this not entirely nonsense?
So why can Southern Metropolis Daily speak out so vehemently against the media clause of the proposed legislation? This is also an important point. We should remember this is a draft law, which means at present that Chinese media have a modest amount of space to move on this important story. The editorial should be seen as an important work of advocacy, an attempt on the part of the journalism community (at least in southern China) to press for reconsideration of this potentially devastating clause.
The issue of its authorship aside, the editorial is also important because it comes from Southern Metropolis Daily, the newspaper disciplined in 2004 for its overly bold reporting on Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome, or SARS, in both 2003 and 2004 [SCMP coverage here].The 2003 debacle over the cover-up of SARS in China was thought by many to signal a new openness on the part of Chinese leaders concerning issues of public health, accidents and natural disasters. As the new leadership under President Hu Jintao removed the national health minister that spring, observers drew parallels with the disastrous nuclear accident at Chernobyl in the former Soviet Union, which accelerated the process of glasnost and perestroika (openness and restructuring) there [Council on Foreign Relations]. China’s leadership, however, has continually shown in its handling of such events that government control is the supreme condition of information release — “openness” means openness when leaders are ready.
As to the impact of the Zhang Ping editorial, we will have to wait and see how, and whether, other media follow suit on this issue. Meanwhile, here is a bit of additional material, the opening of Zhang Ping’s editorial in today’s Southern Metropolis Daily:

As we understand, the “Emergency Response Law” has been in development since May 2003, and was encouraged by poor communication of information and inadequate task coordination during the period of SARS. Two senior officials [at that time] were required to step down, thus making “openness of information” a term of much prominence among the public, which called for timely and transparent watchdog journalism [“supervision by public opinion”]. In subsequent disaster situations, such as coal-mining accidents, air traffic accidents and typhoon situations, mass media have functioned effectively to release information in a timely fashion, exposing acts of corruption [ie, cover-up] and preventing the spread of rumors. All people … affirm the importance of quick and accurate watchdog journalism in responding to disaster situations.
We believe, as a matter of course, that the spirit of watchdog journalism should be upheld in this law on emergency management. But in fact this draft in its present form does exactly the opposite and doubtless represents a step back. This is a puzzling turn of events.

English coverage of the proposed law, which is available on a number of government websites, is indicative of most coverage now available in Chinese by such newspapers as The Beijing News and Beijing Youth Daily [see PDF 2 above].
[Posted by David Bandurski and Brian Chan, June 26, 2006, 1:36pm]
[UPDATE: AFP released a version of this story at 2:40pm Hong Kong time. We would like to note, in case there is confusion, that The Beijing News is not technically “state media”, although Xinhua News Agency, the source of The Beijing News story, of course is. Note the oversimplification in the final paragraphs and the appeal to simplistic notions of press control in China. Nor does AFP mention that this is a “draft” law. In the friendly spirit of accuracy, we would point out that it is far more accurate to say “the Chinese government exercises persistent and rigorous controls over its news media as a matter of policy” than to say, as AFP does, that there is a “sustained media crackdown” in China.]

State Council Information Office says Western media coverage of China has taken a turn for the better

It should perhaps concern Western journalists that they are doing a slightly better job promoting China to the world, according to the principle information office of the Chinese government. Wang Guoqing (王国庆), deputy chief of China’s State Council Information Office, announced to participants in the 2006 meeting of the China International Public Relations Association (CIPRA) on June 22 that “negative” foreign news reports on China were slightly down last year, continuing an overall trend. According to his office’s internal analysis of 243 articles from such “mainstream” Western media as the Washington Post, 26 percent were “impartial”, 40 percent “balanced” and 34 percent “prejudiced”.
Coverage by China News Service of Wang’s speech, “Building a Harmonious World and Our Image to the Outside”, explained:
For the most part the impression given in this coverage about China was that its economy was growing fast with great potential, and was actively participating in international trade; in political terms, China is playing an important role in international affairs, but falls short in the areas of democracy and human rights; in social terms, China has a deep and rich traditional culture, but falls short in terms of public health and the environment. Characterizations of the government and government organizations were largely neutral or negative, and the image of enterprises was downplayed.
In the 1990s, said Wang, “negative” reports accounted for 70 percent of total news coverage in similar surveys:
As to the results of this newspaper analysis, one of the most gratifying things to find is that in the 1990s there was much negative coverage demonizing [China], as high as 60-70 percent, so in recent years mainstream Western media coverage of China has undergone some changes. But the changes still fall short of what one would wish, and demonization of China continues to characterize much mainstream Western coverage.

[Posted by David Bandurski, June 24, 1:15pm]

The Liu Zhihua Case: reading power and profit through the Chinese newspaper page

As details continue to emerge in the corruption case surrounding Beijing’s former vice-mayor, Liu Zhihua, with news that Beijing Capital Land chairman Liu Xiaoguang (刘晓光) has now been arrested on possibly related charges (as reported in Chinese media Monday, Hong Kong’s Wen Wei Po and Singtao News yesterday, and the South China Morning Post today), it’s a good time to re-visit early Chinese coverage of the case (the first Liu), which is one of the clearest examples of power and commercialization at play in Chinese journalism.
Chinese media were working under a ban on reportage – that is, they could use the official Xinhua News Agency release, but could not dispatch reporters, conduct interviews, etcetera. So what did coverage look like for newspaper readers on June 12?
Here is People’s Daily, the official mouthpiece of the central party committee. As a national Party newspaper, People’s Daily was not concerned with protecting Beijing city officials. But they did not want to call too much attention to story, which raises questions about misuse of funds for the 2008 Olympic Games. A very small article using the Xinhua release appears on page four, just above the weather report. Here, in fact, is where you typically find many of the really important stories in China:

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The headline for the story actually emphasizes not Liu Zhihua’s arrest but the meeting of party officials. The decision to remove Liu actually came out of that meeting.
Beijing Daily, the mouthpiece of Beijing’s municipal party committee, has a vested interest in protecting city leaders. Not surprisingly, the coverage is strictly downplayed. The story is buried at the bottom of page one. The leading stories are about a new policy statement on improving skilled labor, and creating signature sites in Beijing to attract tourism. The story directly above the Liu Zhihua item is a grandiloquent policy statement about the need to fight corruption.
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Next, we turn to Beijing Youth Daily, a newspaper published by the Beijing chapter of the Communist Youth League, a national organization for Communist Party recruitment. Because the paper falls under the auspices of Beijing city leadership, the coverage is similar to that of Beijing Daily. There are slight differences, but the biggest ones concern the overall commercial look of the paper and not the placing of the Liu Zhihua story. Commercial considerations carry the story to the front page, where it joins safer stories of “relevance” to the people, about a “Domino Olympics” and emergency exit plans for a Beijing subway station.
get_img63.jpg

The headline and use of the Xinhua release in the Beijing Youth Daily story are identical.
Now for Beijing Evening News, a commercial spin-off of Beijing Daily, the city-level mouthpiece we discussed earlier. The content is unchanged, but the positioning is more prominent. The subhead about the removal of Liu Zhihua might capture some attention at newsstands and drive the desired spike in circulation.
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But the top stories in Beijing Evening News are about a new Aids drug (with photo at center) and a drunk-driving case (across the top). Coverage of the World Cup runs along the right margin.
Moving again up the administrative ladder national party papers with a commercial interest in the Liu Zhihua story, the differences are more pronounced. The image below is the cover of Jinghua Times, a commercial spin-off of the official mouthpiece, People’s Daily, that started off the analysis. Jinghua Times has a definite commercial interest in the story about Liu Zhihua – it can “attract eyeballs”, as they say in today’s Chinese media industry. At the same time, it doesn’t need to step carefully around top Beijing city leaders. However, the ban on reportage is national (the central government is worried about fallout for the Olympic Games), so there is no additional news material. The answer is a massive headline under the banner that directly pronounces Liu Zhihua’s removal from office. Readers are then referred to the story on the inside pages, where they will find the Xinhua news release.
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Moving on to other cities in China the differences are also clear. The following is from the Oriental Morning Post, a commercial newspaper in Shanghai published by the official Wen Hui Bao. Like Jinghua Times, and out of the same commercial considerations, they run a huge headline about Liu’s removal on the front page. The article below the headline, however, is much longer than the Xinhua news release. How is this possible given the ban? The newspaper simply searched a Beijing government website for public information about Liu Zhihua. The information available, which no-one had apparently thought to remove, clearly spoke to Liu’s position within the city’s leadership at a time when other Beijing leaders were trying frantically to distance themselves.
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[Posted by David Bandurski and Brian Chan, June 21, 2006, 3:13pm]

A few Chinese media tease out the problems lurking behind Liu Zhihua’s “pleasure palace”

In China, where corruption cases are regarded as potentially dangerous sources of social instability, there is a tendency toward ritual demonization in much corruption-related news coverage. Government prosecutors release a dossier of sins and indiscretions and Chinese media feed on the ugly details. How much money was taken? How many mistresses did he have? [PHOTO: Liu Zhihua meets with workers in January 2006, The Beijing News].
When an official from Hebei was charged with corruption in 2001, the media even detailed an episode of road rage to show what a nasty fellow he was:
Li Zhen paid no mind to traffic signals, but roared straight through whether the light was red or green. More experienced traffic cops, who knew his car by sight, never dared stop him. A fresh recruit, not knowing better, once pulled Li over, but the official rolled his window down, spat directly in his face and peeled off down the road. (Legal Daily, June 14, 2003)
If you’ve been reading up on the most recent case, the firing of Beijing Vice-Mayor Liu Zhihua (刘志华) for his “decadent” lifestyle (we are told by media inside and outside China that he had a “pleasure palace” full of concubines), this kind of treatment will sound familiar.
[Coverage from The Guardian]
[Click here for China Daily’s take]
[Coverage from Reuters]
[Coverage from The Globe and Mail]
From the standpoint of the Chinese leadership, the wonderful thing about such coverage is that boat-rocking questions about endemic corruption are drowned out by the media circus. So how are Chinese media doing this time? Is anyone teasing out the deeper issues? Given the trickle of available information, and most likely a ban on reporting (under which media are ordered to use only official Xinhua News Agency coverage), one must turn once again to the editorials.
To start us off with the predictable, Lanzhou Chen Bao, a commercial spin-off of the official Gansu Daily, focused, like most everyone else, on the story’s moral aspects and thought it was a good time to revisit the “Eight Honors and Eight Disgraces”, President Hu Jintao’s new campaign of national moral cleansing:
This [action against Liu Zhihua] signals another success in our Party’s anti-corruption campaign, and a reminder of the urgent need for the Socialist Honor and Shame Ideology.
In light contrast, a June 13 commentary in Hebei’s Dahe Daily hinted at soft enforcement of discipline and argued for a bit more “common sense” on the part of inspection officials:
Common sense would suggest that when an official holding substantial power is dissolute in his lifestyle, he is guilty also of graft and corruption, exchanging his position for profit or sex. So it is odd that for so many years, discipline inspection authorities have apparently not exercised such common sense.
An editorial posted the same day on People.com and called “Thoughts on the Removal of Beijing Vice-Mayor Liu Jianhua” said:
At the very least, these kinds of problems should cause us to think very deeply. Whether control has been lost over the supervision of those like Liu Jianhua, whether the power of those like Liu Jianhua is indeed being monitored at all, whether the problem of these Liu Jianhua’s has been adequately addressed by the relevant government offices.
Following up at the relatively outspoken Southern Metropolis Daily, commentator and former CMP fellow Yan Lieshan said the people should have a right to monitor their leaders on the basis of “unverified information or whispers” (捕风捉影), the clear implication being that people, and not just inspection officials, should have a greater role in scrutinizing leaders. While the historical use of this term, bu feng zhuo ying, is negative, Yan intentionally adapted it, saying the concept could play a positive role in allowing people to participate in checking the power of their leaders:
On the basis of evidence disclosed so far [in the official Xinhua release] its impossible for people outside the government to say whether Liu Jianhua’s so-called “decadence” occurred before or after he served as vice-mayor …
Now, according to China’s constitution, people have the right to participate in the management of public affairs and the affairs of the country, and the right to monitor government officials in accordance with the law. The “sanction of the masses” is also a basic principle in the ruling Party’s selection of cadres. Well then, the people have a right to monitor their leaders at whatever level on the basis of ‘unverified information or whispers’ – the only condition being that they do so within the scope allowed by the law and not by putting up big Propaganda Posters and setting off fireworks …
A commentary by China Business Times, available online via this personal blog, explored the “real intention” and “professed position” of the People’s Congress in dealing with Liu Zhihua, and expressed its doubts succinctly:
Vice-mayor Liu was fired because of his decadent lifestyle … But I find it hard to entirely believe this official explanation.

[Posted by Brian Chan and David Bandurski, June 16, 2006, 6:20pm]

China accuses U.S. media of violating their own news values and playing up Chinese espionage cases

China’s manipulation and control of its media is of course well documented. But one topic of some interest in the Chinese media lately has been so-called “media manipulation” by the U.S. government. The pot, obviously, is calling the kettle black, but the occasion is provided by a case that does beg real questions for U.S. media: the out-of-court settlement between major U.S. media and nuclear scientist Wen Ho Lee on June 3. [Washington Post coverage here]. Coverage by Chinese media is particularly interesting because it drags in the issue of bilateral relations and the “China Threat” current in U.S. politics. And of course there are now new espionage cases pending against the Mak family in the United States. [China’s response via Xinhua in English].
Chinese media, including the central government’s People’s Daily, have criticized U.S. media for inadequate soul-searching in the aftermath of the Wen Ho Lee settlement. In the simplest sense, they have a point – not much has been written since the June 3 settlement about the media’s role in blowing Lee’s case out of proportion while it was still under investigation. It should be pointed out, though, that there was discussion after Lee’s release from detention in September 2000. The New York Times issued a page-two mea culpa that received a lot of press at the time, and media and j-schools have kept the topic alive [Click here for PBS News Hour on “sensational reporting” 2000 and here for a 2004 discussion of Wen Ho Lee and other stories at PressThink].
Anyhow, without in any way endorsing their views, we’ll let the Chinese media speak for themselves, beginning with People’s Daily, which is predictably snide about the West’s “so-called” news values and makes no pretensions, obviously, to the “impartiality” it ridicules:
A Lesson for American Media
People’s Daily, June 6, 2006

In recent days, nuclear weapons scientist Wen Ho Lee has once again become a news topic. On June 2, two U.S. government offices, the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Department of Energy, and five news media groups reached a settlement with Wen Ho Lee, agreeing to pay 1.64 million dollars in compensation for intruding on [Lee’s] right to privacy. This included payments totaling 750 thousand dollars from The New York Times, The Washington Post, The Los Angeles Times, ABC and the Associated Press. These payments, however, were not made willingly, and [these media] said that although they had agreed to pay compensation, this was to avoid the jailing of their reporters for protecting their sources. It seems that these mainstream American media do not wish to learn the necessary lessons from this event.

 

Seven years ago, the so-called “Wen Ho Lee Spy Case” was whipped into a frenzy by American media. Wen Ho Lee was accused of passing nuclear secrets to China while working at the Los Alamos National Labs, and for this he was detained for nine months. But the results of the investigation showed that Wen Ho Lee had merely mishandled computer data, and had not in fact been engaged in espionage. What is most surprising is that during the year the case was under investigation, the Department of Energy and the Federal Bureau of Investigation were too impatient to wait and exposed the case to the news media, a serious violation of Wen Ho Lee’s right to privacy and an attack on his reputation.

This case shows people once again the willingness of the U.S. government to manipulate the media. According to reason and the law, these government offices should not have, and had no right to, expose the case to the outside world. But what should not have happened did happen, and clearly these people [in the U.S. government] wished to use the media to whip up the “China Threat” for political ends. This case also lets us once again see clearly the sham of the so-called “independence”, “objectivity” and “impartiality” of the American media. Certainly, on internal questions, American media serve a definite role in checking and examining the power of government. But on international questions, they often toss away and disregard their own “principles”. As soon as the U.S. government points its lance to antagonize some country or leader, the American media rush to the story, add their own condemnation, characterizing this country as the “root of all evil” and its leaders as unpardonable monsters.


In recent years, American media have been singing in harmony with the “China Threat Theory” of the Pentagon. They sing about the “military threat”, the “economic threat”, the “scientific and technological threat”. Upbraiding China has already become a daily routine for many media and politicians – not hearing such vilifications, now that would be news. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld said recently at a speech to the Asian leaders in Singapore
[Link at Center for Strategic Studies] did not peddle the “China Threat” theory with his usual vehemence … When a reporter asked about this, Rumsfeld answered that had his views and policy on China had not changed. Actually, Rumsfeld’s not harping on the same string was entirely due to the fact that the “China Threat” theory he pitches does not garner interest in Southeast Asia …This is about twisting the facts through ideological prejudice, confusing black and white, and deviating from the professional methods news media should have. In the Wen Ho Lee case American media lost not only American dollars, but also the reputation that is so critical to news media. Does this not deserve a bit of soul-searching from the American media?
And this article comes from Jiangnan City Daily, a commercial newspaper in Jiangxi Province. It is written by Guo Shaobin, a scholar at the China Institutes for Contemporary International Relations. He says the Wen Ho Lee case shows “once again” the American media blowing up the “Chinese military threat”:
American Media Once Again Play Up “Chinese espionage” Cases
Jiangnan City Daily, June 12, 2006
In 2004, the American right’s Washington Times ran a story saying China’s 094 submarine was a threat. It is the relentless playing up of the issue by conservatives that has resulted in the release of “The Military Power of the People’s Republic of China” reports colored with the notion of a “Chinese military threat [Read the 2006 report here].
[Editor’s Note: The Department of Defense report says: “China’s leaders have yet to adequately explain the purposes or desired end-states of their military expansion. Estimates place Chinese defense expenditure at two to three times officially disclosed figures. The outside world has little knowledge of Chinese motivations and decision-making or of key capabilities supporting PLA modernization. This lack of transparency prompts others to ask, as Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld did in June 2005: Why this growing investment? Why these continuing large and expanding arms purchases? Why these continuing robust deployments? Absent greater transparency, international reactions to China’s military growth will understandably hedge against these unknowns”.]
Moreover, the details of the cases have not been [properly] scrutinized. Lately, much of the technology and equipment approved for export to China has been exported to foreign enterprises, so is still actually in American hands. As for so-called silencer technologies [NOTE: The article might be referring to “quiet electric-drive propulsion systems” for submarines, involved in the ongoing espionage case against engineer Chi Mak, a naturalized U.S. citizen], China entirely has the capacity to develop [such technologies] on its own … Ni Shixiong, a professor at Fudan University’s American Studies Center, says these spontaneously generated cases actually point to an inevitable conflict lurking in U.S.-China relations. Since 2001, Los Angeles, the city with the second-largest Chinese population in the western U.S., has become in America’s eyes a breeding ground for “Chinese spies”. First there was the investigation of first-generation overseas Chinese Xiong Delong (熊德龙) by U.S. authorities, which eventually forced him to go into exile. Soon after second-generation overseas Chinese Luo Wenzheng (罗文正) was sought by the Federal Bureau of Investigation for “economic” issues, which forced him to leave his country.
Many Chinese in America believe these are people hostile to Chinese deliberately pushing coverage of “Chinese spies” in order to create the sense of a “China Threat”, or people railroading overseas Chinese into becoming so-called “spies” so they can play up these cases in the media … From the Wen Lee Ho case to the Chen Wenying case, all have been whipped into a froth by the Federal Bureau of Investigation. While it looks like there is conclusive evidence, this is just “lightning without rain” and in the end there’s not just no case, there’s a low-key setting free of the accused. Behavior like this from the United States not only puts overseas Chinese under a great deal of pressure, but also impedes regular dialogue and cooperation between the U.S. and China.
[Posted by David Bandurski, June 15, 2006, 3:15pm]

Chinese media continue to cover Cultural Revolution in the wake of the fortieth anniversary

Western media were working with a very narrow news window when they covered the fortieth anniversary of China’s Cultural Revolution last month — the story bounced to the top for a few days before disappearing entirely. Many Western media remarked the “silence” of Chinese media on May 16, the actual day of the anniversary, which CMP showed to be an oversimplification. But in fact Chinese newspapers have continued to run features and profiles about the Cultural Revolution long after their counterparts in the West lost interest. [PHOTO: Mao Zedong greets writer Jin Jingmai in 1967. Jin is jailed less than a year later (see story below). Image from China.com].
Part of the impetus for continued Chinese coverage, arguably, was a press conference statement by China’s cultural minister, Sun Jiazheng, on May 25, in which he said the National Museum of China and the National Library of China had been gathering Cultural Revolution materials that might “assist in research of this period in history”. Some media pounced on this statement as an opportunity for more coverage in defiance of the official ban. But a certain degree of bolder coverage, of course, should naturally be expected as the immediate anniversary fades safely behind.
To give our readers an idea of the kinds of Cultural Revolution coverage we are seeing in the wake of the anniversary, here are excerpts of a June 6 story from Southern Metropolis Daily, the newspaper that urged revolution veterans in a May 26 editorial to tell the “truth about what the Cultural Revolution was”. This story is about a writer named Jin Jingmai (金敬迈) who rose to prominence in the early days of the Cultural Revolution but was later imprisoned for almost a decade. It appeared on page A44, in the “Guangzhou News” section of the paper:
By virtue of his book, “The Story of Ouyang Hai”, writer Jin Jingmai had become popular throughout the whole country. In 1967, he was appointed to take charge of the “Division of Cultural Revolution Literature”. Four months later he was packed off to jail. He returned to Guangzhou after being released from prison in 1976.
In April 1962, The Communist Party approved the Central Propaganda Department’s “Eight Rules for Literature”, which urged [the people to] “let a hundred flowers blooms” [NOTE: This is the “Hundred Flowers Campaign”]. During the Tenth Party Congress in 1962, Mao Zedong reminded the citizens not to forget the class struggle. “The Story of Ouyang Hai” nicely fulfilled this purpose …
“I developed the image of a brave soldier of Communism [in my book]. I wrote a lot about class struggle and the spirit of Communism. The book finally became material for Chairman Mao in the education of younger generations [of Chinese]”, [Jin Jingmai says]. …
“In 1966 and 1967, my situation was still secure because the Cultural Revolution had not yet engulfed me. Almost all the books of that period were regarded as ‘poisonous weeds’ while my own, ‘The Story of Ouyang Hai’, was still very popular and under no restrictions.” …
“Two members of our team were interrogated by the Central Government, asking who had ordered the gathering of unfavorable materials about [Mao Zedong mistress] Jiang Qing’s darker days in Shanghai in the 1930s [when she was an actress there]. I told them I had given the order and would take full responsibility. That was the reason for my downfall.” …
“On April 11, 1967, I was summoned to Beijing for a meeting with the Chief. In the meeting room of the Jingxi Hotel, Jiang Qing didn’t wait for me to sit down. She shouted, “‘Jin Jingmai, What is this?! You refuse to follow my comments in making your revisions? You assume the airs of a big writer!'”
“Jiang Qing kept saying, ‘I tried to protect you, not informing on your staff to the Red Guards, all because you served in the military. If I had told them, they would already have caught you and burned all your books!'”
[Posted by David Bandurski and Brian Chan, Juen 14, 2006, 11:41am]