Now Executive Director of the China Media Project, leading the project’s research and partnerships, David originally joined the project in Hong Kong in 2004. He is the author of Dragons in Diamond Village (Penguin), a book of reportage about urbanization and social activism in China, and co-editor of Investigative Journalism in China (HKU Press).
Remember Xi Jinping’s little red app? “Study Xi, Strong Nation” (学习强国) was introduced back in February this year, along with demands that a wide range of Chinese, from government employees to school teachers, devote sufficient time to the study of the theories and policies of the Chinese Communist Party. The app, which scores users on a point system and tracks their progress, represents the gamification of propaganda and political control.
The People’s Dailyreferred to it simply as “an authoritative and content-rich platform especially for theoretical study.” But the app is intrusive in ways that propaganda has rarely if ever been, essentially bringing the Party and its discipline into the pockets, handbags and homes of tens of millions of people. As we wrote in “The Dawn of the Little Red Phone,” the app can place extraordinary demands on personal time, putting users under significant pressure to maintain point-earning, or fall behind at their own peril — and spawning sideline chatter, of course, about how to beat the system.
Now Xi Jinping’s little red app is putting the control and licensing of news reporters at central Party media right in the palm of, well, the reporters’ own hands.
The Media Oversight Office (传媒监管局) of the Central Propaganda Department announced through a notice on August 23 that online training and testing of news personnel nationwide would now be handled through the “Study Xi, Strong Nation” mobile app, and that testing would take place during the first half of October for the issue of press cards (新闻记者证). The notice has ordered “news units” — meaning in this case central Party media outlets, including top Party-run newspapers, television and radio, as well as 14 central-level news websites authorized to issue press cards — to create and authorize study groups through the app before September 15 in order to prepare staff for study and eventual testing.
On August 22, as China marked the 115th birthday of Deng Xiaoping, the paramount leader who led China into the reform era, flowers were laid at the feet of a bronze statue of Deng in his hometown of Guang’an in Sichuan province. In some media, the birthday was an occasion to revisit Deng’s ideas and writings.
But a discussion soon bloomed across social media that the authorities found unacceptable, and a hasty wave of deletions across WeChat, Weibo and other platforms ensued.
At issue was a post made to “People’s Reading” (人民阅读) and “People’s Daily Press” (人民日报出版社), both official WeChat public accounts operated by the People’s Daily, the flagship newspaper of the Chinese Communist Party. That post, called “Deng Xiaoping Abolishes the Lifelong Tenure System for Leaders” (邓小平废除领导职务终身制), dealt with the now very sensitive issue of term limits for national leaders.
Sensitive why? Because while Deng Xiaoping, still greatly respected as a reformer, had made it a priority to ensure that national leaders did not serve indefinitely and run the risk of over-concentrating power in their hands and sapping vitality from the system, Xi Jinping oversaw the removal of constitutional term limits in March 2018, which some within China regard as a dangerous slide back into the painful past.
It was Deng who led China into the period of reform following the end of the Cultural Revolution, and a crucial aspect of the country’s transformation was a reassessment of the decades under Mao Zedong, during which Mao’s unbridled power had been a fundamental contributor to political, social and economic chaos. Limits on terms for national leaders ultimately came in the 1982 Constitution, which stipulated “no more than two consecutive terms” (连续任职不得超过两届) for key positions, including the national chairman (国家主席), often referred to misleadingly as the “president,” the deputy chairman, and the premier.
These constitutional changes followed the June 1981 “Resolution on Certain Questions in the History of our Party Since the Founding of the People’s Republic of China,” which included a rather frank (by the Party’s own standards) official assessment of the tragedies of the Anti-Rightist Movement and the Cultural Revolution. Noting that the failure to “institutionalize and legalize inner-Party democracy and democracy in the political and social life of the country,” had led to over-concentration of power and led to “the development of arbitrary individual rule and the personality cult in the Party,” the Resolution pledged to move the country in the direction of greater limitations on individual leadership:
The Party has decided to put an end to the virtually lifelong tenure of leading cadres, change the over-concentration of power and, on the basis of revolutionization, gradually reduce the average age of the leading cadres at all levels and raise their level of education and professional competence, and has initiated this process.
Reform of the political system was a key priority for China in the 1980s, and into the 1990s. The smooth handover of power to from Jiang Zemin to Hu Jintao in November 2002, and again to Xi Jinping in 2012, was regarded as a proof that the system of leadership succession and of collective leadership were being institutionalized, making real the limits on personal power that Deng Xiaoping had envisioned.
But in the less than seven years since Xi Jinping came to power, all of this progress seems to have unravelled. There is chatter enough in the halls to suggest that Xi’s dismantling of term limits in March 2018, through a constitutional amendment that was introduced without sufficient (or any) debate in the wake of the 19th National Congress of the CCP, has angered some with the Party, who are concerned that Xi now has too much power.
And of course, there have been plenty of signs that Xi has a tendency toward self-obsession and self-aggrandizement, that he envisions himself as a leader after the mold of Mao Zedong. For an illuminating, and amusing, look at this aspect of Xi’s personality, please revisit Qian Gang’s analysis of Xi Jinping’s signature.
The official Sichuan News Online reports on a flower-laying ceremony outside a monument to Deng Xiaoping in his hometown of Guang’an, Sichuan province.
The posts made to the “People’s Reading” and “People’s Daily Publishing House” WeChat accounts on August 22, were in fact passages from a book about Deng Xiaoping published by the People’s Daily Publishing House in March 2013. The book, authored by former journalist Xu Wei (余玮), is called Deng Xiaoping: Ordinary Man.
The first chapter of the book is called “Retiring and Beginning a Normal Life,” and it includes the section shared by the above-mentioned WeChat accounts. While WeChat and other social media posts sharing the chapter under the title “Deng Xiaoping Abolishing the Lifelong Tenure System for Leaders” have been removed from the internet, and related comments are being actively scrubbed, the chapter can still be found online at a site dedicated to the book.
This most recent takedown of Deng Xiaoping, severely restricting discussion online around ideas and policies that are otherwise well-known, and historical accounts that have been printed and distributed by one of the Chinese Communist Party’s own publishing houses, is a further sign of just how far Xi Jinping has gone in pushing China back into the past.
Today’s commentary appearing on the front page of the Chinese Communist Party’s official People’s Daily is one for the history books. This is true on the one hand because it offers one of the strongest and most indignant rebuttals so far on the protests that have rocked Hong Kong since June, and on the other because it is so reminiscent of commentaries we have seen at other important points of political drama in the history of the PRC. [Photo credit: Hong Kong Free Press].
The sentiments are not new. In fact, they are painfully familiar. The protests are cast as predominantly violent and irrational, undoing any legitimate claim to justice, and they have exposed the “cold-blooded hypocrisy” and the moral vacuum of the West and its cries for “freedom,” for “freedom of speech,” and so on. China will not be fooled. It sees clearly the “black hands” behind events in Hong Kong, these “overseas anti-China forces” that wish to foment “color revolution.”
Why painfully familiar? Because here we are plodding toward the tail end of 2019, and yet this sort of rhetoric is still the way China’s leadership chooses to frame complex events like those unfolding in Hong Kong. Drum beats and trumpet blasts and broad-brushing of Western forces, and no attempt at sober assessment of what is actually happening.
This is a Party-state that claims to have benevolent global ambitions, to offer a “China Solution” to issues facing the world – and yet it cannot speak a human language. It cannot admit any subtlety on complex issues. And today, more than 40 years after reform and opening began, it is farther now than it has been at any point in the reform period from having any credible media voice that can stand apart from narrow, nationalistic rhetoric and engage intelligently with the world.
This is a reminder, at the same time, of why Hong Kong voices, messy and inconvenient though they are, have been such a critical window on China. And what if that window closes?
The commentary ends by saying that 1.4 billion Chinese “are united as one barrier.” How do you talk with and engage a barrier?
Our translation of the commentary, attributed to a “commentator from this paper,” follows:
________________________________ What Do We See Through the Violence?
透过暴行我们看到了什么
Commentator from this paper (本报评论员)
August 15, 2019
On the nights of the 13th and the 14th, shockingly violent incidents happened at the Hong Kong International Airport: A portion of the violent radicals taking part in the illegal gathering restrained and abused Fu Guohao, a reporter for the website of the Global Times, and another mainland traveler right out in the open for all to see. We fiercely denounce such displays of violence! We resolutely support the Hong Kong police and judiciary authorities in decisively enforcing the law and bringing the criminals to justice!
In recent days, one instance of violence after another has allowed the world to see the true face of the “peaceful protests” in Hong Kong. Violent attacks, The trashing of the Legislative Council chamber, the surrounding of the Liaison Office, the use of poisonous chemicals and petrol bombs and other dangerous materials to attack police, deliberately smashing private property and destroying public facilities, deliberately defacing public transportation such as subways and airports, harassing and attacking tourists in the airport, even sick people, pregnant women and children . . . . The extreme violent behavior and methods of the protesters has been taken constantly to new levels, fiercely escalating, the level of destructiveness more and more dramatic. But these violent acts trampling on rule of law are glossed over as “peaceful protests.” And on the other side, the Hong Kong police in exercising the law and legitimately preserving order are smeared as a “repressive force.” When true and false are so confused, and black and white turned upside down, how can you not be angry?!
The Hong Kong opposition parties have long had “freedom of speech” and “freedom of expression” on their lips, but the bitter experience of the Global Times Online reporter has shown their true faces: this freedom is only extended to media that share their views, and media that put out different voices unfortunately cannot enjoy this freedom, but if a single word is unacceptable then they are met with violence. Since the storm against the extradition law began, [they have] unreasonably thwarted normal reporting, have “dug into” reporter’s materials online, have beaten journalists with different beliefs, and have even threatened their families . . . .
Extreme opposition parties on the one hand wantonly suppress media with different opinions, creating an atmosphere of “black terror” (黑色恐怖) in the media, and on the other hand advocate breaking the law to seek justice, saying that “only violence can solve the problem,” instigating and bewitching the youth of Hong Kong to take the path of law-breaking and crime, trying with their words to coerce the Hong Kong citizens into their political dispute, worsening tensions in society. In a nutshell, they want to use the name of “freedom of expression” to “oppose China and bring chaos to Hong Kong.”
Not long after the violence at the airport, certain Western politicians and media again came out to on stage. Turning a blind eye to this shocking violence, turning a deaf ear to the victims of physical abuse, they spoke out for the “brave protesters,” reminding us of what it means to be selective. Since the storm against the extradition law began, certain Western politicians and media have opened their eyes wide to the atrocities, applauded the crimes, all the time claiming that the actions of these radical demonstrators “inspired the world,” saying that “their courage should not be ignored.” The world has already seen enough of these performances of theirs and grown accustomed to it. The United States and Britain have experienced large-scale public protests before, and at many points in U.S. history the military and tanks have been deployed to suppress popular demonstrations and riots. In 2011, when there were riots in London, the British government took a strong position, the prime minister [David Cameron] called the riots “completely unacceptable” and said that there was “no legitimate reason” for the violence,” and that “illusory human rights cannot become a roadblock to identifying criminals and trying them.” [NOTE:Cameron spoke of the “twisting and misrepresenting of human rights in a way that has undermined personal responsibility,” but did not refer to “illusory human rights.”] Just listen to these two instances! Faced with the same violence, they show the world what double standards are, and what is cold-blooded hypocrisy.
“O freedom, what crimes are committed in your name!” With things having developed to this point, people should see clearly the true faces of Hong Kong’s extreme protesters and the black hands behind them. This so-called “anti-extradition” is just a name, an excuse, and what they really seek is to oppose China and bring chaos to Hong Kong, to bring about a “color revolution.” But their performances have become the best and most convincing lesson of the opposite. The Chinese people, including our brethren in Hong Kong, are better able to discriminate and remain immune against what these anti-China forces overseas (境外反华势力) are peddling. We warn those black hands hiding behind: The 1.4 billion Chinese are united as one barrier, and they can stop any flood that threatens to destroy our country and our people. Stop dreaming!
A short video circulated on Twitter yesterday showed what appeared to be a mass deployment of security personnel in Shenzhen. The video was prematurely identified as showing the People’s Liberation Army preparing for possible deployment to deal with protests in Hong Kong, which understandably prompted some alarm.
However, even the most cursory look at the video and the word “Police” emblazoned on every uniform, shield and vehicle should have made it clear that this was a mass exercise organized by Shenzhen’s Public Security Bureau, and had nothing to do with the PLA.
On Chinese social media platforms today, more information has emerged about what now clearly seems to have been a police training event, with no apparent link to events unfolding in Hong Kong. Numerous posts to “Shenzhen PSB” (深圳公安), the official Weibo account of the Shenzhen Public Security Bureau, identify the event, which was apparently ongoing today, as “Shenzhen Showing the Sword” (深圳亮剑), a “stability preservation” (维稳) event preparing for the 70th anniversary of the People’s Republic of China and designed to “strengthen tactics, inspire morale, build courage and train and prepare for fully safeguarding the country’s social and political security.”
OK, but seriously — wasn’t this intended as a warning to Hong Kong? Well, it’s difficult to say how Hong Kong might fit into calculations. Certainly, there has been speculation on Chinese social media too that this was the real intention of the exercise, to make a determined show of potential force and thereby terrorize those unruly protesters across the border. Again, this is all speculation.
The force was indeed formidable. According to numbers from the Shenzhen police, the exercises involved 12,000 police officers, 50 armored trucks, 200 automatic weapons, 1,200 armored motorcycles and 5 helicopters.
But if we take a closer look at the videos and photographs being shared from official accounts, and listen a bit more conscientiously to the shouted slogans and declared victories, the “Shenzhen Showing the Sword” event reveals a great deal more about the shaky underside of mainland security than it does about the situation in Hong Kong.
Who are these fictional rioters? Official posts make clear that 1,500 police faced off against around 2,000 mock demonstrators wearing yellow hardhats and brandishing clubs. But notice the white banner that the rioters are carrying. It reads: “Give back the money we earned with our blood and sweat!” And what are those rioters shouting? You can hear shouts of, “Give our money back!” as they rush to attack the waiting lines of police.
These rioters are migrant workers. Whatever the purpose of the exercise, the back story here is not about taming the democratic ambitions of residents in the semi-autonomous international financial center across the border, but about an outbreak of unrest stemming perhaps from a sudden factory closure or another such grievance among China’s vast population of rural migrant workers — the kind of incident that seems ever more probable in a period of deep economic uncertainty, when China is engaged in a protracted trade war with the world’s largest economy.
This wave of law enforcement propaganda, in other words, speaks as much to China’s fragility and vulnerability as it does to the Chinese Communist Party’s determination to hold on tight.
As one veteran Chinese journalist wrote on WeChat, sneering at the cruel prejudice and twisted authoritarian logic of the “stability preservation” exercise: “So if migrant workers demand they be given the ‘money earned with their blood and sweat,’ this means they are bandits? If they petition, this is illegal; if they gather, they are arrested; if they leap to their deaths [in protest] this is theatrics. Well, I suppose the only thing they can do is get fleeced.”
Chinese state media reported last month that foreign ministry spokeswoman Hu Chunying (华春莹), shown above, had said on July 26 concerning affairs in Hong Kong: “I advise those people who want to invite wolves into the house make a good reading of history. Throughout history, those who colluded with external forces to damage the country and cause suffering to the people — how many of them ended well?”
In just one short remark, Hua made use of two idioms — ”letting wolves into the house” (引狼入室) and “damaging the country and causing suffering to the people” (祸国殃民). The meaning of the first one, essentially to invite trouble, is clear enough, and dates back to the Yuan dynasty. The second, however, may be less familiar to younger Chinese, though for people of their grandparent’s generation, who grew up in the midst of the Cultural Revolution, it is only too familiar — even if has been a long time since they last heard it.
We decided to accept Hua’s challenge and look back into the history of this phrase, because in fact the way Ms. Hua was using it seemed a bit different from what we knew, and it wasn’t altogether clear she was in fact using it properly.
In the Republican Era, in fact, both the governing Kuomintang Party and opposition political parties used the phrase “damaging the country and causing suffering to the people” (祸国殃民) to launch attacks on one another. In 1917, the provisional government of Sun Yat-sen (孙中山) used the phrase to attack the Beiyang Government. And during the Anti-Japanese War, the phrase was used by the Nationalist government, by the Chinese Communist Party and by the Provisional Government of the Republic of China, the puppet state in Japanese-occupied territory.
Here is an article in China Monthly from 1940, for example. The headline reads: “Rooting Out the Chinese Communist Party that Damages the Country and Causes Suffering to the People” (根绝祸国殃民的共产党).
After victory in the Second Sino-Japanese War, Chen Gongbo (陈公博), the Chinese politician who had been head of the Japan-backed provisional government in Nanjing, was put on trial, and many reports in the media used this phrase to refer to Chen. He in fact had been one of the founders of the Chinese Communist Party and a delegate to its First Congress. He underwent numerous shifts in his lifetime, and for a time under the Japanese wielded immense power. He was finally executed in 1946 after being extradited from Japan by American occupation forces after Japan’s surrender.
It was that same year in fact that the People’s Daily was launched. If we look at the occurrence of the phrase “damaging the country and causing suffering to the people” in ten-year periods throughout the newspaper’s history, here is what the pattern looks like:
Notice the clear peak in use of the phrase from 1976 to 1986. What was happening during that 10-year period ito cause the phrase to rise so dramatically? I wonder if people my age remember.
During the first three 10-year periods shown above, use of “damaging the country and causing suffering to the people” was rather low, at about 11 or 12 articles per year. Generally, the phrase was used to attack the Kuomintang which had fled to Taiwan, and the governments of Western nations. During the same period we can also find “damaging the country and causing suffering to the people” in newspapers in Taiwan — used, as you might guess, to criticize the Chinese Communist Party.
Below is a copy of Taiwan’s United Daily News from October 9, 1952, which uses “damaging the country and causing suffering to the people” in the headline：
Between 1958 and 1962, Mao Zedong’s Great Leap Forward became an unmitigated disaster for China, resulting in the death of millions. Here is another page from the United Daily News, this time from October 1, 1963:
The report refers to Mao Zedong as a bandit “damaging the country and causing suffering to the people,” and includes eyewitness accounts provided by Chinese who left the mainland in 1949, and from others who fled through Hong Kong in 1962. The small headline for the article reads: “A Madman’s Experimental Gamble, Creating an Unprecedented Famine.”
Just a few years later, in 1966, the Cultural Revolution unfolded in China, unleashing a new wave of misery. Chiang Ching-kuo, the eldest son of Chiang Kai-shek, who at the time was Taiwan’s Minister of Defense “called on the enslaved youth of the mainland to turn their guns and eliminate Bandit Mao, who has damaged the country and caused suffering to the people.”
When Mao Zedong died in 1976, Taiwan’s newspapers again used the phrase. Mao was the great destroyer, the criminal who had “damaged the country and caused suffering to the people.”
In China, Mao Zedong’s death was the closing of a long period of tragedy. Not even a month after Mao had passed, the “Gang of Four,” which included Mao’s wife, Jiang Qing (江青), was arrested. Anger over the excesses of the left erupted, and a campaign of denunciation of the “Gang of Four” rolled across the country. On October 22, 1976, the People’s Daily published a poem by Xu Gang (徐刚) called “Forward, Mother Country” (祖国，在前进), which rang like a lofty slogan:
Strike down these conspirators who oppose the Party’s power;
Strike down these thieves who damage the country and cause suffering to the people！
It was during the movement against the “Gang of Four” that the phrase “damaging the country and causing suffering to the people” reached the peak we see in the graph I shared at the start. In the period from October 1976 to the end of 1977 alone, the phrase was used in 512 articles in the People’s Daily.
The trial against the “Gang of Four” lasted from late 1980 into early 1981, until all members were finally sentenced. Here is the front page from Taiwan’s China Times on January 26, 1981:
One headline on the reads: “Counting the Bloody History of the Cultural Revolution! A Decade That Damaged the Country and Caused Suffering to the People.”
It was at this point that both the Kuomintang and the Chinese Communist Party, on their respective sides of the Taiwan Straits, actually came together at the level of discourse, both using the same phrase to point to the immense tragedies that had unfolded during the Cultural Revolution, during which, all could agree, disastrous policies had “damaged the country and caused suffering to the people.” The common target of this outrage was the “Gang of Four,” but of course everyone knew that the real culprit was Mao Zedong.
When people of China’s older generation hear the phrase “damaging the country and causing suffering to the people,” this is the history that comes to mind. And this is of course why we see the frequency of the phrase rising dramatically in the 10 years following the Cultural Revolution.
The history of the phrase points to a very clear pattern of use, and it’s no surprise to find basic sources like Baidu Baike (百科) defining the derogatory phrase as being “most often applied to people or groups in power.” In this sense, Ms. Hua’s use of the phrase is actually unorthodox, though she is claiming to teach everyone a history lesson. One could say she is directing her fury at a “group” (集团), I suppose, but she is not directing it at those in power. We should remember, perhaps, that the Kuomintang, which was in power during the Second Sino-Japanese War, repeatedly criticized the Chinese Communist Party as having “damaged the country and caused suffering to the people.”
We should assume that a spokeswoman for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has quite a strong team of writers behind her, assisting her with matters of phrasing. And yet, in this case, we must ask ourselves whether her use of the phrase “damaging the country and causing suffering to the people” is actually sufficiently precise — or whether its use in this context might have been a bit excessive.
It was a July of frustration and conflict in Hong Kong. But the Hong Kong garrison of the People’s Liberation Army sought to finish out the month yesterday on a militaristic high note, releasing a propaganda video that moves disturbingly from in-the-streets exercises in protest containment — with snipers in position and loudspeaker cries, in Cantonese, of “All consequences are your responsibility!” — to full-on missile strikes at sea.
The video, which has now been posted to YouTube, is being shared through a number of WeChat public accounts in China today, including the account of the website of China Daily, the English-language newspaper published by the State Council Information Office.
The title of the video, invoking a Xi Jinping phrase that has been used with much greater intensity this summer in the run-up to the anniversary of the founding of the PRC, is “Do Not Forget Our Original Aspirations, Defend Hong Kong” (不忘初心、守护香江).
The phrase, “Do not forget our original aspirations,” or buwang chuxin (不忘初心), is a reference to the original goals of the Chinese Communist Party, emphasizing the importance of its ideological stance in favor of so-called “socialism with Chinese characteristics.” It can be seen also as a phrase pleading for the relevance and legitimacy of the CCP as it faces immense headwinds both at home and internationally. For more analysis of the phrase, we recommend Willy Wo-Lap Lam’s analysis posted yesterday at the Jamestown Foundation.
The initial section of the video, marked with the characters “stability preservation,” or weiwen (维稳), in the upper left-hand corner, a reference to China’s domestic policy of suppressing unrest with paramilitary forces, shows scenes of PLA soldiers securing what look like typical Hong Kong streets and alleys, followed by a gaggle of stand-in protesters in what appears to be an exercise fleeing before an intimidating phalanx of soldiers with shields.
Who are we?
The Hong Kong Garrison of the People’s Liberation Army is an important manifestation of national sovereignty; it is an important force in the protection of “one country, two systems”; it is an important foundation in protecting the prosperity and stability of Hong Kong!
What are we doing?
We are focussed on preparing for war, practicing the art of killing the enemy, our bows and swords always at the ready!
The Hong Kong Garrison is a stabilizing force for the prosperity and stability of Hong Kong, and we will resolutely implement the directives of the Central Party, the Central Military Commission and Chairman Xi, and resolutely support the government of the SAR and its chief executive, and the forces of patriotism in Hong Kong. We are determined, we have confidence, and we have the capacity to firmly defend our national sovereignty, security, and development interests. We are determined, we have confidence, and we have the capacity to protect the long-term stability and prosperity of Hong Kong.
China’s official media were busy this week pushing a hard line on Hong Kong, and stressing the point that demonstrators in the city are troublemakers. Here is a tweet posted today on the official Twitter account of China Daily, the newspaper published by the State Council Information Office. For more on Hong Kong, see our recent analysis.
Also this week, state media reported the death of former premier Li Peng, who has been known outside China as the “Butcher of Beijing” for his decisive role in the bloody crackdown on pro-democracy demonstrators in Tiananmen Square on June 4, 1989. Media reports about Li referred to June Fourth only as a “counter-revolutionary revolt,” and praised Li’s “important role” in putting an end to the movement. But one paper, Beijing Youth Daily, made a serious error in its layout of the Li story — another case of how press control in China can be taken to absurdities.
Our roundup of the week’s top stories is below, starting with the use the highly sexist term “complaining woman syndrome” in an official commentary on CCTV’s nightly news program attacking “some people” in the United States for being irrational and inhibiting China’s development.
_______________________ This Week in China’s Media July 20-26, 2019
➢ Official Nightly Newscast Xinwen Lianbo Accuses US of Having “Complaining Woman Syndrome”
➢ Party Media Address the Hong Kong Issue
➢ Beijing Youth Daily Makes Layout Error in Reporting Death of Li Peng
➢ People’s Daily Online Issues First “Internet Content Risk Management Certificates” [1] Official Nightly Newscast Xinwen Lianbo Accuses US of Having “Complaining Woman Syndrome”
In recent days, the official nightly newscast Xinwen Lianbo (新闻联播) has made liberal use of online neologisms to sharply criticize the United States for ongoing trade tensions that have thwarted China’s development. These terms include “makes people spit out their food” (令人喷饭), which means that something is so ridiculous it invites ridicule; “crazy fits of rage and jealousy” (羡慕嫉妒恨); and the clearly sexist “complaining woman syndrome” (怨妇心态).
During the news program on July 25, anchor Kang Hui (康辉) read out an international commentary called “Who Is Actually Bullying and Scaring Others All Over the World?” (究竟谁在全球到处欺侮恫吓他人?) in which he used the phrase “complaining woman syndrome” to criticize the United States for having “double standards.” The use of this term in an official commentary drew lively discussion online.
On July 26, another international commentary was called “America’s ‘Complaining Woman Syndrome’ is a Stumbling Block for Global Cooperation and Development” (美国的“怨妇心态”是全球合作发展的绊脚石). The commentary said that some people in the US had “crazy fits of rage and jealousy” over China’s economic power. These unspecified people, who the commentary also said had “complaining woman syndrome,” lost their composure when they saw others developing. In an apparent reference to Huawei, the commentary said that using national power to suppress a Chinese enterprise, and preventing other countries from using 5G networks from Chinese companies, “presented a prime example of despicable activity to the entire world.” KEY SOURCES:
CCTV News (via Sina.com): 美国的“怨妇心态”是全球合作发展的绊脚石
CCTV Weibo account (@央视新闻): 今天的#新闻联播#在“饭点儿”讲了件荒唐事，大家听了可别“喷饭”啊 [2] Party Media Address the Hong Kong Issue
On July 21, the People’s Daily ran a front-page commentary called “Opposing Violence and Treasuring Rule of Law and Order Together” (共同反对暴力 珍惜法治秩序), which addressed the issue of unrest in Hong Kong. The commentary said: “Hong Kong cannot grow chaotic again, this is the mainstream view in Hong Kong, and the common feeling of all who care about the Hong Kong people.” Former Hong Kong chief executive C.Y. Leung (梁振英) posted to facebook: “Like the vast majority of Hong Kong people, I hope that the clause in the Basic Law about the [intervention of the] People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA’s) Hong Kong garrison does not need to be invoked, and I hope Hong Kong police can effectively control the situation. But the precondition is that these destructive forces operating behind the scenes immediately stay their hand.”
A page-one commentary in the People’s Daily the next day took a strong line on the July 21 incident in which protestors — referred to in the commentary as “radical demonstrators” (激进示威者) and “extremists” (激进分子) — massed at the entrance of the Liaison Office of the Central Government in Hong Kong and pelted the building, including the national emblem of the People’s Republic of China, with black paint, eggs and other projectiles. The commentary was firm in its stance that, as the headline itself read, “The Authority of the Central Government Cannot Be Challenged.” It does affirm the “One Country, Two Systems” formula, but it makes clear that protesters have, in the leadership’s view, “impinged on the bottom-line” by directly attacking the authority of the central government. “We firmly support the Hong Kong SAR Government,” the commentary said, “in employing every legal means to ensure the security of offices of the Central Government in Hong Kong, to preserve rule of law in Hong Kong, and to punish these criminals.”
On July 24, Xiakedao (侠客岛), the WeChat public account operated by the overseas edition of the People’s Daily, said in a post that “certain foreign media” in Hong Kong had “instigated violence” (煽动暴力). It said that the New York Times, the BBC, Apple Daily and other media had all implied in news reports following a press briefing by PLA official on July 24 about the release of China’s national defense white paper that the PLA would become involved in the Hong Kong situation. KEY SOURCES: People’s Daily (人民日报): 共同反对暴力 珍惜法治秩序 Ta Kung Pao (大公报): 梁振英：国家主权完整必须捍卫
Xinhua News Agency (新华社): 中国政府发表《新时代的中国国防》白皮书
WeChat public account “Global Times” (微信公众号“环球时报”): 国防部发言人一句话回应香港记者提问
WeChat public account “Xiakedao” (侠客岛): 【解局】在香港，这些媒体如此煽动暴力 [3] Beijing Youth Daily Makes Layout Error in Reporting Death of Li Peng
Following the death of former Premier Li Peng (李鹏), the news was reported in media across China using standard Xinhua News Agency releases. The Beijing Youth Daily, a newspaper published by the Beijing chapter of the Chinese Communist Youth League, ran a front-page headline across the top of the page on July 24 that read, “Comrade Li Peng, 91, Passes Away” (李鹏同志逝世, 享年91岁). Below the headline, however, was an unrelated image, taking up about half of the page, of smiling people wearing red clothing and carrying fresh flowers, with a large caption that read, “Returning with Honor” (载誉归来). The photo, as the caption explained, was of Chinese competitors returning from the International Mathematical Olympiad, at which China and the United States were the top-ranked countries.
The pairing of the photograph with the announcement of Li Peng’s death was presumably a careless breach of media discipline on the part of the newspaper. By July 25, this edition of the Beijing Youth Daily was no longer available online.
Coverage of Li Peng’s death from official state media referred to the June 4th, 1989, crackdown on Tiananmen Square as a “counter-revolutionary revolt” (反革命暴乱), and said Li Peng had “played an important role” (发挥了重要作用) in quelling the incident. KEY SOURCES: People’s Daily (人民日报): 中共中央 全国人大常委会 国务院 全国政协讣告 李鹏同志逝世
Beijing Youth Daily (北京青年报): 7月24日电子报（无法阅览） [4] People’s Daily Online Issues First “Internet Content Risk Management Certificates”
From July 26-27, People’s Daily Online issued its first batch of “Internet Content Risk Management Certificates” (互联网内容风控师（初级）证书) to certify personnel for online content controls after relevant training sessions for government personnel, public opinion research experts from People’s Daily Online, industry experts and others. Topics covered at the trainings included policy briefings (政策解读), self-media chaos analysis (自媒体乱象), content risk prevention mechanisms (内容风险防控体系) and so on. 74 participants from various new media took part in the training. KEY SOURCES:
People’s Daily Online (人民网): 人民网发放首批互联网内容风控师证书
A neologism has been born on China’s internet. A shortened version of the phrase “intelligent governance,” or zhineng guanzhi (智能管治), the buzzword is zhizhi (智治), which we might call in English simply “AI governance” – and it encompasses many of the new approaches we have seen in China to social and political control using surveillance technology and big data. The innovator and originator of this neologism is none other than Chen Yixin (陈一新), director of the Central Political and Legal Affairs Commission of the Chinese Communist Party, which oversees law enforcement authorities nationwide.
Chen Yixin has been a prolific originator of Party slogans, not least the “New Era” language introduced by Xi Jinping. In 2018, he created the “Six Grabs,” a new set of buzzwords for the idea that authorities must be much more aggressive in six key areas to set the agenda on policing and other law enforcement matters. And on May 21 this year, Chen introduced the “Five Governances,” or wuzhi (五治), which included “politics” (政治), “rule by law” (法治), “moral governance” (德治), “self-governance” (自治) and “AI governance” (智治). “[We must] lead with strong politics, exercise protections through rule by law, govern morals, [encourage] self-governance and [employ] AI governance.”
The first four of these five governances were largely familiar hot-air concepts. “Rule by law” referred not to legal protections but the instrumentalizing of the law for Party control. “Self-governance” was not about autonomy but about enforcing political discipline, about everyone behaving and falling in line. But the fifth concept, “AI governance,” was a novel and important formulation encompassing the new powers of control being applied by the Party.
At a recent training session for local-level politics and law officials, Chen Yixin said:
We must place the process of AI governance development in an even more important position, elevating it as an important means of control – [we must] promote “AI governance” in city-level social control systems, operational mechanisms, and in the restructuring of intelligent work processes, accelerating the modernization of social governance [control] at the city level.
Chen Yixin expressed the conviction that by relying on current technology, the Party can effectively and efficiently identify risks and warning signs at the local level, applying timely responses for risk management. The work, he said, would focus on “priority districts and places” (重点区域部位), and on “critical industry sectors” (重点行业领域) – essentially a reference to the “gridded community management system” we wrote about at CMP back in December. This process would rely, said Chen, on such key infrastructure as the Sharp Eyes Project (雪亮工程), literally “Dazzling Snow,” which envisions comprehensive digital video surveillance linked to a national network.
A search for “X-ray specs” in Google images reveals the term as a popular meme in Chinese for exposure of the private.
Chen Yixin also referred to “AI governance” and big data as offering microscopes (显微镜), X-ray specs (透视镜) and telescopes (望远镜) for public security, which he said could “promote the scientificization of policies on stability at the city level.” The reference to “X-ray specs” should bring home metaphorically the extent to which the Party hopes it can make all aspects of life and business in China transparent to itself for the sake of control. A search of the Chinese term for “X-ray specs” in Google Images turns up results (at left) that can only suggest the complete nakedness of the citizen in the face of these applied technologies.
This is the new state of affairs and long-term objective in China’s push to achieve precision and efficiency in its not-so-new objective of “stability maintenance,” or weiwen (维稳), the broader policy imperative since the 1990s that encompasses policing, the surveillance of society and protest management.
These innovations, a reminder that that particular word is not always positive or progressive, have been actively developed by the Party since 2013. And now, thanks to Chen Yixin – an old comrade of Xi Jinping’s who served under him when he was secretary of Zhejiang province, and who will very likely join the politburo three years from now – we have the perfect phrase for them.
A page-one commentary in the Monday edition of the official People’s Daily newspaper, the flagship publication of the Chinese Communist Party, offered the closest we have yet had to an authoritative response from China’s top leadership on the protests in Hong Kong and related acts of violence that have unfolded in recent days.
The piece is attributed to “a commentator from this paper,” or benbao pinglunyuan (本报评论员), which marks it as executed by top staff at the paper but representing views at the most senior levels of the Party. It essentially takes a strong line on the July 21 incident in which protestors — referred to in the commentary as “radical demonstrators” (激进示威者) and “extremists” (激进分子) — massed at the entrance of the Liaison Office of the Central Government in Hong Kong and pelted the building, including the national emblem of the People’s Republic of China, with black paint, eggs and other projectiles.
The commentary is absolutely firm in its stance that, as the headline itself reads, “The Authority of the Central Government Cannot Be Challenged.” It does affirm the “One Country, Two Systems” formula, but it makes clear that protesters have, in the leadership’s view, “impinged on the bottom-line” by directly attacking the authority of the central government. “We firmly support the Hong Kong SAR Government,” the commentary says, “in employing every legal means to ensure the security of offices of the Central Government in Hong Kong, to preserve rule of law in Hong Kong, and to punish these criminals.”
Firm as the tone of the commentary may seem, it offers few surprises in fact. It recapitulates the logic that stability equals prosperity, and that chaos is the enemy of the people and their true interests. More specific to Hong Kong, the notion of “chaos” is applied as a threat to the rule of law, which the commentary tacitly characterizes as the territory’s core advantage. “If they are allowed to trample on the rule of law in Hong Kong,” the commentary says of the demonstrators, “Hong Kong’s advantages and Hong Kong’s competitiveness will be eroded.”
The People’s Daily commentary avoids outright venom. It does not suggest, for example, that “foreign hostile forces,” or Western governments, are behind the protests in Hong Kong. But the piece presents a rather keen contrast with much of the discourse about Hong Kong appearing this past week in more peripheral sources, and particularly on WeChat. In a moment we’ll offer our full translation of the People’s Daily commentary. First, though, we’d like to run through some of the other sentiments about Hong Kong being expressed inside China, which mark in many instances a worrying escalation of extreme views about the territory and its future.
Among the themes that have been quite dominant in posts about Hong Kong appearing in WeChat public accounts since July 1 are the following: 1) The protests have been infiltrated and to a large extent orchestrated by “Western countries,” and in particular by the United States; 2) Hong Kong’s political and social system is powerless to achieve order (implying the need for intervention from Beijing); 3) the failure of Hong Kong police to establish order owes in large part to insufficient powers and excessive court intervention; 4) protesters in Hong Kong are violent and irrational; 5) the fundamental failure of Hong Kong to recognize and accept its identity as a Chinese territory is an urgent threat to sovereignty, and a lingering legacy of colonialism and foreign contagion.
In order to conduct a brief survey of Hong Kong-related discourse on WeChat, we compiled a list of 200 WeChat articles appearing since July 1. Much of this content was what we might characterize as “junk news,” sensational viral content that resembles the sort of content we have come to expect from right-wing sources of in the West — content that actually proliferates in the Chinese social media space, suggesting, for example, that migrants are sowing chaos in Europe. Given its context in a highly controlled information environment in which the Party line is supreme, we might also consider a neologism like “junk propaganda” to refer to content that is thinly and selectively sourced in order to emphasize the sensational and appeal to emotions, but which at the same time serves to consolidate “mainstream” Party messaging.
We can note that while few mainstream official sources this month employ the phrase “hostile forces” (though the rhetoric could be on the upswing this week), a substantial number of posts in our WeChat set do, including headlines like:
指挥袭击香港警察的外国人身份曝光！
Identities of Foreigners Who Directed Attacks on Hong Kong Police Are Revealed!
指挥袭击香港警察的美国人身份曝光！
Identities of Americans Who Directed Attacks on Hong Kong Police Are Revealed!
香港修正案暴徒指挥袭击警察的外国人身份曝光,行径令人发指!
Identities of Foreigners Who Directed Attacks on Hong Kong Police in Hong Kong Amendment Riots Are Revealed; Their Deeds Make Ones Hairs Stand on End!
港独暴徒钳断香港警察手指，这是CIA惯用手段
Hong Kong Independence Thug Bites Off Finger of Hong Kong Police, This is a Tactic Used by the CIA
The last of these posts, attributed to the online site Global Horizon (环球视野), deals with a July 15 incident in which a protester in Sha Tin allegedly bit off the finger of a police officer. The post argues on the authority of “famous blogger Cui Zijian” that the cutting off of fingers is a commonly used CIA tactic to sow conflict and color revolution. The Cui Zijian (崔紫剑) referred to here is a frequent contributor to Chawang (察网), a site founded in March 2014 that dubs itself a “well-known domestic patriotism portal” (国内知名的爱国门户).
Here is a taste of the WeChat post as it shares the bizarre analysis it attributes to the authority of Cui Zijian:
In Ukraine and other places, the tactic generally involves shooting. Generally, they mix in with the crowds and fire bullets into both sides, or directly beat participants to death. Then they use powerful public opinion attacks to stir up public anger.
Showing restraint, Hong Kong police have not offered such an opportunity. Add to this the fact that guns are prohibited in Hong Kong, and carrying guns in is difficult. Therefore, shooting is substituted [as a tactic] with cutting off fingers.
This is psychological warfare, and their goal in attacking the police is to cloud the officers mentally, filling the police with terror, undermining their courage and their ability to function.
If the police lose control, or lose their spirit — what follows is the next Ukraine.
Right beside this post at Global Horizon is a purported expose about how non-governmental organizations are used by Western governments to infiltrate and destabilize other countries. The piece even cites the remarks and policies of Viktor Orbán, the right-wing prime minister of Hungary, who has celebrated his own notion of “illiberal democracy,” to support its case.
Another post by the WeChat public account Liangjian Fasheng (亮剑发声) deals with the recent incident in the Hong Kong border village of Yuen Long, in which a mob of men in white t-shirts viciously attacked protesters wearing black just hours after the vandalizing of the liaison office. There are serious questions about whether these white-clad thugs, which Hong Kong media are reporting have links with criminal gangs, were actually mobilized by the authorities to intimidate protesters. There are also now calls for an investigation, and for a peaceful demonstration in Yuen Long this coming Saturday to speak out against the violence. But in the post from Liangjian Fasheng, the attackers in white are portrayed as local villagers defending their beloved homeland from invasion by “toxic extremists” (毒顽固分子). “Poisonous Gang of Hong Kong Thugs Countered by Villagers as They Invade Yuen Long Village,” the headline reads (港毒暴徒团伙在入侵香港元朗时遭到村民自卫反击!).
On the night of July 21, a number of Hong Kong thugs, organized by background orchestrators, made the deranged move of surrounding the Hong Kong Central Liaison Office of the Central Government, and pelted the national emblem outside the office with black paint, sprayed insulting language on the exterior wall and sought to charge into the building.
This conduct was an open challenge to the authority of the Central Government and impinged on the bottom-line of “One Country Two Systems,” [an act] of serious nature with a pernicious influence.
The Hong Kong police took active related measures to prevent the further worsening of the situation, and this was extremely necessary.
. . . . In the chaos of last night’s attack on the Central Liaison Office, the Hong Kong police were at the end of their tolerance and struck back! After certain toxic extremists (毒顽固分子) refused to listen to police warnings, [the police] began using tear gas.
What no one could predict was that this clique of poisonous Hong Kong yellow corpses (港毒黄尸) was already prepared with gas masks, and even though the Hong Kong police used a great deal of tear gas at the scene, still a large number of thugs remained at the scene and refused to leave.
Under this situation, the police raised their force level, firing rubber bullets on the thugs.
. . . .
This past month, we have seen the Hong Kong police taking up the law and taking up guns in order to teach a bitter lesson to these thugs who don’t know their limits, letting them know what pain really means.
After being dispelled by the police, the thugs still refused to desist from their troublemaking.
According to plans and arrangements made many days before, they took up weapons (凶器) and pushed into Yuen Long, seeking to again escalate the situation, expressing loyalty to their British and American masters . . . .
But this time, again, they miscalculated!
When rule of law fails locally, the maintenance of social order and protection of the homeland must rely on salvation from a third party.
The situation in Yuen Long today seems to be one of disorder. This is a situation caused by a weak and powerless Hong Kong police force (owing to judicial power placed not in the hands of the Hong Kong police, but with courts that can be manipulated by foreigners, and which release thugs on bail). In order to maintain the concept of Hong Kong people ruling Hong Kong, the Central Government is not likely to intervene.
The clan-based villages often have strong feelings toward their home countries. The Yuen Long Tautou people themselves have a tradition of patriotism and love for their homeland. Perhaps they aren’t greatly literate, and they aren’t as eloquent as certain so-called cultured people, or those who have been brainwashed. But most of the Yuen Long villagers have a bottom line, and that is a rather deep love of their country.
The white-clad thugs of Yuen Long, who were clearly shown in video footage surrounding and attacking protesters, are cast as patriots out to defend China. This is messaging we certainly would not expect to see in official Chinese media reports, but it has become core to the discourse about Hong Kong on Chinese social media.
Despite the extreme nature of many of these Hong Kong-related posts, they remain available on WeChat. One important question, then, is the extent to which these posts serve Party-state agendas — for example by proliferating views about foreign conspiracy or protester-driven violence that appear to delegitimize civil society action in Hong Kong. As I suggested earlier, the term “junk propaganda” may apply, because while this discourse is not, strictly speaking, official (as are People’s Daily commentaries or Xinhua News Agency reporting), they can potentially serve to disrupt and noise-fill the public opinion space in ways that are at least expediently beneficial to the leadership.
It is perhaps worth noting that Hong Kong’s Umbrella Movement of 2014 happened before China’s WeChat platform had become a truly dominant force in the social media space, and we can now observe the role of WeChat in forming public opinion in mainland China around the question of Hong Kong — a question that merits further systematic study.
It is certainly further testament to the worrisome prevalence of extreme rhetoric on the need to take a stronger approach in Hong Kong that Global Times editor-in-chief Hu Xijin (胡锡进), whose paper has long been the standard-bearer of Chinese jingoism, wrote on Monday against the position that military intervention from Beijing was advisable.
Hu’s piece was called, “Hong Kong is in Chaos: Should Beijing Show a Strong Hand?” (香港乱了, 北京该不该强力出手). “Does everyone support the idea of Beijing showing force, for example by ordering the PLA troops stationed in Hong Kong to take to the streets and maintain order?” Hu asked at the start of his piece, before offering his own view through his preferred alter ego, “Old Hu”:
I don’t know what you think, but Old Hu is very much against [the idea]. Why?
Some people say if things go wrong just do One Country One System, but that would mean a revolution in Hong Kong society, and the price and risk it would entail would be greater than the trouble we’ve seen thus far in implementing One Country Two Systems.
If the PLA gained control of the situation in Hong Kong, and suppressed all of these thugs, what then?
Indeed. What then?
Before we turn now to our full translation of Monday’s commentary in the People’s Daily, we have one last recommended post for our readers, a chilling treatise that appeared on July 3 at Red Flag Online (红旗网), a well-known leftist website, after first appearing in late June at Red Song Society (红歌会网), a self-described Maoist site devoted to “red culture.” Tellingly, perhaps, the post, called “Smashing Hong Kong’s Color Revolution” (粉碎香港颜色革命), is still available inside China and shared quite widely on WeChat. While the author is not entirely clear, there are a number of passages that suggest the piece has its origins somewhere in the PLA. The first passage of the lengthy piece ends, for example, after summarizing the “chaos” in Hong Kong, with the line: “Therefore, this [unrest] must incur the tremendous anger of China’s entire mass of 1.4 billion people, including all members of the Chinese Communist Party, all the generals in China’s People’s Liberation Army, and all commanders of China’s public security!” A similar formulation can be found in the concluding passage.
At another point, the piece says, unambiguously advocating PLA action in Hong Kong in light of the failure of the SAR government to maintain control during the 2014 Occupy Central movement:
Therefore, leaping beyond the current judicial process in Hong Kong, and unifying the superstructure, must become an urgent task of the Hong Kong SAR government. The focus of this should include, but not be limited to: imposing martial law in Hong Kong; firing, arresting, expelling or refusing entry to foreign judges that refuse to cooperate with the Hong Kong SAR government; arresting and sentencing those who organize street riots; arresting or expelling the intelligence personnel of foreign forces intervening in Hong Kong affairs, etc.
That is chilling stuff. But it is just the beginning in a piece that holds nothing back. The final section offers 10 recommendations for action in Hong Kong, beginning with the takeover of the government and the establishment of a Hong Kong Work Committee of the Chinese Communist Party.
The post is an excruciating read for all concerned with the future of Hong Kong, but it is nonetheless essential for anyone who wishes to understand one of the most radical Chinese positions on the territory, points of which may be shared in various corners of Chinese society and the Party-state.
Read through the fiery passages of “Smashing Hong Kong’s Color Revolution” first, and the firm-fisted Monday commentary in the People’s Daily begins to sound almost conciliatory. And that my tell us something — though we need a great deal more research on the subject — about the possible utility of “junk propaganda.”
_______________
On July 21, a few radical demonstrators surrounded the Liaison Office of the Central Government in Hong Kong, destroying equipment, defacing the national emblem, and spouting out language that insulted the nation and the Chinese people. This sort of conduct tramples Hong Kong’s rule of law, is an open challenge to the authority of the Central Government, and touches the principle bottom line of “One Country Two Systems,” with pernicious effects, and this must not be tolerated.
For successive days, a series of violent incidents have caused disquiet in Chinese society. A number of extreme radicals have in the name of opposing amendments [on extradition], attacked the Legislative Council building, destroyed public facilities, beaten police, manufactured explosives, and these violent acts have seriously damaged social order in Hong Kong, and trampled on Hong Kong’s rule of law. This time the surrounding of the Central Liaison Office has already completely gone beyond the scope of peaceful protest, and the level of violence has been escalated. The Liaison Office is the representative office of the Central Government in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, and it exercises its responsibilities in Hong Kong according to the Constitution and Hong Kong’s Basic Law, and empowered by the Central Government, and this cannot be challenged. The violent conduct of these extremists (激进分子) seriously violates the Basic Law and Hong Kong’s local laws.
Since Hong Kong’s return, the Central Government has fully adhered to and implemented the “One Country Two Systems” [formula], the principle of “Hong Kong people ruling Hong Kong” (港人治港) and the policy of [offering] a high-level of autonomy, and it has acted strictly in accord with the Constitution and the Basic Law in handling matters — acting as a defender of “One Country Two Systems” and the Basic Law, as a supporter of progress on various issues in Hong Kong, and as a protector of the legitimate rights of our Hong Kong brethren. For the past 22 years, the government (国家) has offered staunch support for the development of Hong Kong. And Hong Kong’s development is thoroughly linked to the mainland.
[Tung Chee-Hwa once said:] “If Hong Kong is good, the nation is good. If the nation is good, Hong Kong is even better.” These words spoke of the inextricable link between Hong Kong and the nation (国家). Only by properly protecting the authority of the Central Government can we ensure that the implementation of “One Country Two Systems” in Hong Kong does not go awry, that it is not distorted — and only this way can be ensure Hong Kong’s long-term prosperity and stability (香港长期繁荣稳定) and the welfare of its residents.
We can no longer find justifications for acts of violence! In a civilized society under rule of law, the peaceful and rational expression of demands on the foundation of mutual respect is a basic demand. There is no excuse for violence, and the threshold of rule of law cannot be violated. Compromising with, defending, beautifying and tolerating violence can only result in the continued escalation of the violent behavior of extremists. If they are allowed to trample on the rule of law in Hong Kong, Hong Kong’s advantages and Hong Kong’s competitiveness will be eroded. Hong Kong residents must see clearly the harm and basic nature of the violence perpetrated by a minority of extremists, and must resolutely protect “One Country Two Systems,” resolutely defend law and order in Hong Kong, and preserve the beautiful home of 7 million people.
[As the saying goes:] “Nothing is more beneficial than stability, and nothing is more detrimental than chaos.” We firmly support the Hong Kong SAR Government in employing every legal means to ensure the security of offices of the Central Government in Hong Kong, to preserve rule of law in Hong Kong, and to punish these criminals. We also call on all of our Hong Kong brethren to work together to oppose violence, and preserve rule of law, and to treasure peace. We firmly believe that with the support of the Central Government and the people of Hong Kong, the Kong Kong SAR Government can reinstate normal social order; we firmly believe that the tried and tested “One Country Two Systems” formula can continue to show more vitality.
The Three Gorges Project, the gravity dam and hydroelectric power station on the Yangtze River that is currently the world’s largest power station, is back in the news in China. And state-run media are pushing to reassure the public that the dam is safe. So why is this becoming an issue now?
In recent days, posts on social media have suggested satellite imagery of the mega-structure now shows that it is warping, calling into question its structural integrity. Other posts have reported so far unsubstantiated claims that authorities have halted tours to the area.
The post to the right-hand side above reads: “Comparing images from 2007 to 2018, it can be confirmed that the Three Gorges Dam has experienced serious warping.” The lower post on the left-hand side reads: “Terrifying! Expert team from the Three Gorges Dam has confirmed that the dam has changed shape!”
This second social media post actually refers to efforts by the authorities to counter discussion about possible problems with the project. It shares an image of coverage yesterday from The Beijing News.
The apparent point of the article in The Beijing Newswas to urge calm, citing a team of experts who certify that the project is safe, and that “the warping of the dam’s shape owes to its elasticity” (坝体变形处于弹性状态). The report was based entirely on a public relations release from the state-run China Three Gorges Corporation(中国长江三峡集团有限公司), which explained that the project had undergone regular safety inspections since the formation of its safety inspection team in 1999. The release even included an image of the log books published annually to document the dam’s operation.
Clearly, not all have been comforted by the affirmation from experts that the dam warps because of its “elasticity.” And part of the problem may be mixed messaging as the government tries to contain speculation. According to other official statements circulating after the story began trending around July 1, the inaccuracy of satellite imagery from Google, which is blocked in China, is the source of the misunderstanding.
On July 2, an official speaking with the Shanghai-based news outlet The Paper said that the satellite imagery circulating online had been generated from Google, and was a product of Google algorithms rather than a reliable and accurate image of the Three Gorges project. According to a report on the website of The Observer (guancha.cn), the official said that “the topography of the Three Gorges region shown on Google Maps often shows inaccuracies, because ‘the coordinates have been processed.'”
Naturally, given the fact that the Three Gorges has for some stood as a point of pride and a symbol of China’s technological and engineering prowess, accusations are also surfacing that the whole focus on the Three Gorges Project over the past five days has been a conspiracy cooked up by “anti-China forces.”
“Once Again Certain People Cause Trouble Over the Three Gorges Dam,” reads the headline of the following post. It goes on to say that, “[We] must forcefully strike the faces of anti-China forces(反华分子), building a sturdy dam against public opinion in society.” In other words, the discussion itself is the problem that needs fixing.
Throughout its history — and we are now at the centennial, we might note, of the first mention of the project by Dr. Sun Yat-sen in 1919 — the Three Gorges Dam has been a source of controversy. And at no point since the project’s construction got underway in the 1980s has discussion of the possible implications in terms of environmental or human cost been truly possible. For a look at the history of that discussion, we can recommend our 2015 piece by author Xiao Shu, and of course also Dai Qing’s groundbreaking work Yangtze! Yangtze!, published in 1989.
It is interesting to see this latest surge in interest inside China in a project that deserves a great deal more discussion. But this will almost certainly be a short-lived discussion — a momentary breach of the dam.
(Featured image by Michael Gwyther-Jones available at Flickr.com under Creative Commons license.)
