Author: David Bandurski

Now Executive Director of the China Media Project, leading the project’s research and partnerships, David originally joined the project in Hong Kong in 2004. He is the author of Dragons in Diamond Village (Penguin), a book of reportage about urbanization and social activism in China, and co-editor of Investigative Journalism in China (HKU Press).

Liu Wanyong bids journalism farewell

Written by David Bandurski on . Posted in Headlines and Hashtags.

Two stories in particular this week underscored the growing challenges to the conduct of professional journalism in China.  The first is a firestorm surrounding the reporting and release by Southern Metropolis Daily, a paper historically in China associated with more liberal (and perhaps professional) press conduct, of an audio recording that seemed aimed at discrediting the account of a Chinese student who alleges that she was raped last year by a prominent Chinese business executive. The newspaper shared the audio without, many said, providing proper context or looking more carefully into its origins. Media scholar Fang Kecheng wrote that Southern Metropolis Daily‘s actions more closely resembled those of a social media-based public account, or “self-media” (自媒体), than those of “institutional media.”
The second story is the news that Liu Wanyong (刘万永), a veteran investigative reporter with more than two decades’ experience, has left the media profession to pursue a new career with an asset management company. But Liu made clear that pressures on journalism were a major factor in his decision. “[Leaving China Youth Daily] isn’t just because of financial considerations,” he wrote on WeChat. “I had originally thought that I would spend my whole life as a journalist, but slowly it became impossible to write anything I wanted. This environment has already changed.”
With intense controls on China’s media now having been more or less consistently applied for more than six years under Xi Jinping, and dating back, some might argue, as far as 2010 or even 2008, a compelling argument can be made that the country is facing a generational crisis in journalism. Most of the critical pockets of professional resistance within traditional media outlets have closed, and editors and reporters with experience that might be shared with younger journalists have moved on.
Also, don’t miss our discussion here of the Belt and Road News Network.
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This Week in China’s Media
April 20 to May 3, 2019
➢ Implication of Chinese pharmaceutical boss in U.S. college admissions scandal prompts commentary on admissions corruption in China
➢ China initiates “sunshine comment” action movement to strengthen political guidance of online discussion
➢ Xi Jinping sends letter of congratulation to Council of the Belt and Road News Network: Do participants know what they’re getting into? 
➢ Southern Metropolis Daily faces firestorm of criticism after released of audio recording purported to be of JD.com CEO Liu Qiangdong
➢ Investigative report Liu Wanyong reveals the reasons for his departure from the media: The environment has already changed

[1] Implication of Chinese pharmaceutical boss in U.S. college admissions scandal prompts commentary on admissions corruption in China

According to reports in the Los Angeles Times, the Daily Mail, the Stanford Daily and other publications in the West, the president and co-founder of the publicly listed Chinese pharmaceutical giant Shandong Buchang, Zhao Tao (赵涛), has been implicated in the ongoing scandal over college admissions in the United States. According to news reports, Zhao Tao paid 6.5 million dollars to get his daughter “Molly” Zhao Yusi (赵雨思) admitted to Stanford University. Zhao Yusi, who was a sophomore at Stanford, allegedly admitted with false credentials for the sport of sailing, has reportedly been expelled by the university.

As news of Zhao’s implication in the scandal reached China, the Beijing Youth Daily newspaper noted that this scandal, perhaps the largest admissions scandal ever to hit higher education in the U.S., implicated not just fraudulent intermediaries but also the parents of students. The paper noted that while China has itself uncovered numerous cases in recent years of falsified college entrance examination scores and athletics records, these cases have not, in clear contrast to the U.S. case, focused attention on the role played by parents, and few if any parents involved have faced repercussions.

Commenting on the U.S. scandal, the Beijing News suggested that the wealthy in China should recognize that they have a greater responsibility as people of means to set a positive example through their conduct. The paper said that “the distorted outlook on life and on right and wrong brought on by wealth is not uncommonly found in China. For some of these wealthy people, the degradation of spirit is definitely connected to the larger social environment. But the wealthy differ from ordinary people in that they have a degree of influence that ordinary people do not have, and have an ‘advantage of resources’ that ordinary people cannot hope to match. In other words, they have the ability to avoid the tide of corruption, and even to take on greater responsibility in terms of changing the society and creating an even brighter and even fairer social environment.”

KEY SOURCES:
The Beijing News (新京报): 花巨资买进斯坦福，也是为富不“端”
Beijing Youth Daily (北京青年报): 严惩招生舞弊就是要“揪”出家长
Chengdu Commercial News (成都商报): 花650万美元送女儿进斯坦福？步长制药董事长卷入美高校招生舞弊风波

[2] China initiates “sunshine comment” action movement to strengthen political guidance of online discussion

On April 29, the Online Commentary Work Office of the Cyberspace Administration of China (中央网信办网络评论工作局) held what it called the “2019 Sunshine Comments Action Meeting” (阳光跟帖行动推进会) in Beijing. Addressing the internet censorship personnel present at the meeting, Yang Xiaowei (杨小伟), deputy director of the CAC, said that advancing “sunshine comments” — by which he meant comments left by internet users on various types of online content that were “positive” from the standpoint of maintaining social and political control — meant ensuring three basic points. First, cyberspace authorities should “strengthen ideological and political guidance, broadly achieving consensus” (meaning around the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party). Second, authorities should ensure that websites and other online platforms are actively involved in the process of pushing “sunshine comments,” “properly serving their role as guards” (当好把关人) and “properly safeguarding comment ecology”(维护好跟帖生态). Third, authorities must encourage “rational” online conduct by users, “ushering away online pollution through positive energy” (通过正能量驱散网络的雾霾).

At the meeting, Hua Qing (华清), head of the Online Commentary Work Office, revealed six basic activities planned for the “comment action” (跟帖行动) in 2019. These include: 1) fully discussing experiences and outcomes in recent years in terms of “sunshine comments” in order to properly mobilize action; 2) opening special areas concerning “sunshine comments” and proper conduct on such platforms as Guangming Online (光明网), China National Radio Online (央广网), Tencent (腾讯). This would include specific pointers and reminders about “sunshine commenting” directed toward users during the process of registration to make online comments (跟帖); 3) the production and promotion by platforms and companies like the above of special video messages about “sunshine comments” in order to reach users; 4) push participating platforms to produce special audio and video content around the 70th anniversary of the founding of the People’s Republic of China, highlighting positive voices among web users; 5) to use the China Federation of Internet Societies (CFIS) to advance propaganda events and push platforms to do propaganda reports, actively soliciting user involvement, thereby expanding the reach and influence of the “sunshine comment” action; 6) to hold a dialogue conference at year’s end to offer reward and encouragement to the organizations and individuals involved in the campaign.

In August 2015, a “sunshine comment” movement was initiated by the Cyberspace Administration of China jointly with the Chinese Communist Youth League Central Committee and the China Youth New Media League (中国青少年新媒体协会), an organization within the Chinese Communist Youth League. The current “sunshine comment” action is being led by the China Internet Development Foundation (中国互联网发展基金会) and the China Federation of Internet Societies (CFIS), in principal cooperation with 10 major media organizations, including Guangming Online, China National Radio Online and Tencent, and participation from 16 major internet platforms, including TikTok (抖音), Kuaishou (快手) and Miaopai (秒拍).

KEY SOURCES:
WeChat public account “China Cyberspace Administration” (网信中国): 2019年阳光跟帖行动推进会在京举行
Guangming Online (光明网): 阳光跟帖行动推进会在京举行
Baidu public account “Observer Online” (观察者网): 关于跟帖评论，这3点要求很重要！
China Youth Daily Online (中国青年网): TFBOYS任“阳光跟帖”行动大使：别让鼠标键盘跑过理智

[3] Xi Jinping sends letter of congratulation to Council of the Belt and Road News Network: Do participants know what they’re getting into? 

On April 23, the first council meeting of the Belt and Road News Network (一带一路新闻合作联盟) was held in Beijing at the People’s Daily, with the Party’s flagship newspaper designated as the organization’s directorate general (理事长单位). In a formal letter to the meeting, President Xi Jinping said he hoped that various participating news organizations from around the world could “tell the story of Belt and Road well, creating a favorable public opinion environment for the building of Belt and Road.”

At the opening ceremony for the event, the organization’s official website, www.brnn.com, was formally launched by People’s Daily Online, providing, according to official Chinese sources, a platform for “interaction and discussion, article upload and download, content sharing, copyright exchange and other services.” The website is currently available in Chinese, English, French, Russian, Arabic and Spanish.

Typical of such broad-brush initiatives advanced by Chinese agency but cobbling together supposed groups of decision-makers and partners — one prominent example in recent years being the World Media Summit and its “presidium” of international media bosses — the Belt and Road News Network seems sloppy and unserious when one takes the most cursory further look at its online presence.

For example, under the section “Database,” which one might expect to provide information of real value about BRI, a link on “BRI Countries” simply lists out all MOU signatories in no apparent order, which repeated explanations under each that are not even clickable, unlinked to further information, such as when the countries signed with China.

The section on BRI data includes just two articles, both posted on April 20, five days before the opening of the forum, that are propaganda pieces done by Xinhua.

State media are claiming that 40 media organizations from 25 countries participated in the first council meeting of the BRNN, and that 182 media organizations from 86 countries have so far joined the network. One must did around a bit, but a list of BRNN “council members” is given within the council’s first joint statement, as follows:

The council members include influential media organizations from Asia, Africa, Europe and Latin America. They are: People’s Daily (China), The Financial Express (Bangladesh), Belarus Today Publishing House (Belarus), Xinhua News Agency (China), China Media Group (China), Guangming Daily (China), Economic Daily (China), China Daily (China), China International Publishing Group (China), Science and Technology Daily (China), Workers’ Daily (China), China Youth Daily (China), China Women’s News (China), Farmers’ Daily (China), Legal Daily (China), China News Service (China), China Intercontinental Communication Center (China), Al-ahram Newspaper (Egypt), Ethiopian News Agency (Ethiopia), La Provence (France), The Jakarta Post (Indonesia), Kazinform International News Agency (Kazakhstan), Maekyung Media Group (Republic of Korea), Lao Press in Foreign Languages(Laos), Notimex (Mexico), Confederation of Mongolian Journalists (Mongolia), Democracy Today Newspaper (Myanmar), RNW Media (Netherlands), Thisday Newspaper (Nigeria), Jang Media Group and GEO Television Network (Pakistan), AgênciaLusa (Portugal), Russian News Agency TASS (Russia), Rossiyskaya Gazeta (Russia), Independent Media (South Africa), Agencia EFE (Spain), Alintibaha Daily Newspaper (Sudan), The Guardian Limited (Tanzania), Emirates News Agency (U.A.E), Associated Newspapers Ltd., DMGT (U.K) and Zambia Daily Mail (Zambia).

The council member listed from the Netherlands, RNW Media, is a non-profit organization whose mission is “to identify young people’s needs and to bring young people together in user-owned digital communities where they can safely engage on taboos and sensitive topics and generate strong stories for advocacy to unleash their potential for social change.” The group subscribes to the Partos Code of Conduct 2012, which it says makes “clear agreements regarding integrity, manners, good governance, quality, use of social media and independence.” The Global Times newspaper also ran an interview with the CEO of RNW Media, in which she spoke about the need for neutrality.

The Secretariat of the BRNN, however, is located within the headquarters of the People’s Daily, the flagship newspaper of the Chinese Communist Party, and all contacts are directed there. All Chinese media participants in the council, without exception, are operated by the Central Propaganda Department of the CCP.

The Spanish participant in the council is Agencia EFE, a Spanish international news agency.

KEY SOURCES:
People’s Daily Online (人民网): 习近平向“一带一路”新闻合作联盟首届理事会议致贺信
Xinhua Online (新华网): 黄坤明出席“一带一路”新闻合作联盟首届理事会议开幕式并致辞
People’s Daily (人民日报): “一带一路”新闻合作联盟章程

[4] Southern Metropolis Daily faces firestorm of criticism after released of audio recording purported to be of JD.com CEO Liu Qiangdong

On April 24, Guangzhou’s Southern Metropolis Daily newspaper faced a firestorm of criticism for releasing an audio recording the previous day purporting to be of “a woman demanding money from Liu Qiangdong” (女生向刘强东索要钱财). Liu, also known as Richard Liu, is the billionaire founder and CEO of JD.com. He faced accusations last year that he had raped a Chinese student in Minneapolis, but prosecutors in Minnesota decided last December not to press charges against him in the case. The audio in question, which seemed to have been intended to support counter accusations against Liu’s accuser, was apparently provided to the paper through an anonymous e-mail, and some critics said the newspaper had acted unprofessionally and against ethical standards in releasing it.

The release of the audio recording came just after a series of video clips emerged online through a Weibo account called “Mingzhou Shiji” (明州事记) showing surveillance camera footage of Liu Qiangdong and his accuser together on the night of the alleged incident.

Media scholar and former Southern Weekly journalist Fang Kecheng (方可成) wrote that the Southern Metropolis Daily had in this case ignored its professional obligations as an “institutional media” organization — conducting fact-checking, comparing the audio recording against statements from the accuser in the original case filings, etc. — and had behaved instead like a “self-media,” or zimeiti (自媒体).

KEY SOURCES:
WeChat public account “Jiu Wen Pinglun” (旧闻评论): 只谴责南都是不够的 | 据扯
WeChat public account “Fang Kecheng’s Journalism Lab” (方可成的新闻实验室): 刘强东案音视频：机构媒体的堕落与溃败

[5] Investigative reporter Liu Wanyong reveals the reasons for his departure from the media: The environment has already changed

On April 25, China Youth Daily journalist Liu Wanyong (刘万永) shared a message in his personal chat confirming he had already formally left the journalism profession, as he had indicated was his plan back in January this year. He wrote in his personal chat group: “It’s been a difficult journey. I’ve left, and even more now do I admire those who are still persisting.” On the same day, Japan’s Asahi Shinbun (朝日新闻) reported that Liu Wanyong was headed for a position at an asset management company, his wages expected to be 5 or 6 times what he earned at his newspaper. Liu clarified: “[Leaving China Youth Daily] isn’t just because of financial considerations. I had originally thought that I would spend my whole life as a journalist, but slowly it became impossible to write anything I wanted. This environment has already changed.”

Liu Wanyong graduated from Hebei University in 1996, going on to study at the China Journalism School at Renmin University (中国新闻学院) in 1998, and in the same year beginning work at China Youth Daily. He was later deputy editor of the special reports and in-depth reports department at the paper. He is a recipient of China’s Yangtze Taofen News Prize(长江韬奋奖), considered one of the country’s top journalism honors, as well as a China Journalism Award (中国新闻奖). In 2012, Liu was chosen as a delegate to the 18th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party. His investigative reports have included “The Business Dealings of a Retired High Official” (一个退休高官的生意经) and “A Public Security Official’s Daughter Attends College Under a False Name” (公安局政委女儿冒名顶替上大学). Liu made international headlines in 2006 after he was attacked by thugs at a courthouse in Liaoning province in apparent retaliation for the first of these two stories, published in May 2005 — which exposed the dirty dealings of the retired former mayor of the city of Fuxin city, Wang Yachen, who had essentially stolen a company and jailed its owner after first joining the company as an advisor.

KEY SOURCES:
WeChat public account “Media Jianghu” (传媒江湖): 刘万永透露离职原因：环境变了！现工资是中青报的五六倍
Dujia (独家): 调查记者刘万永宣布告别媒体：事非经过不知难！
WeChat public account “New Journalist” (新记者): 人物|刘万永：“不管是传统媒体或是自媒体，有人报道出来就是好事”

Burying "Mr. Democracy"

Written by David Bandurski on . Posted in Headlines and Hashtags.

Today, on the eve of the 100th anniversary of the May Fourth Movement, the political movement that arose out of student protests in Beijing in response to the Treaty of Versailles, “the youth” figure strongly in official propaganda. But as China’s leadership walks a tightrope, acknowledging this crucial anniversary while seeking to drain it of all hints of sanguine insurgence and youthful opposition (we are just weeks away from the anniversary of June Fourth), the story’s real protagonist is not China’s youth, but rather President Xi Jinping and the Party he leads.

The two most famous figures at the core of the “spirit” of the May Fourth Movement, Mr. Democracy and Mr. Science, are conspicuously absent.

“Chinese youth of the new era must continue to make full use of the spirit of May Fourth,” Xi Jinping told his audience at an official event last Tuesday to commemorate the anniversary. But what is that “spirit”? In Xi’s articulation, its essence is nationalism, a force that must be focused, moreover, through the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party. The youth, said Xi, must “[take] as their task the great rejuvenation of the Chinese people, not failing the hopes of the Party, the expectations of the people, and the great trust placed in them by all people of Chinese ethnicity.”

If we ask what values — aside from the narrow ideology of nationalism and fealty to the Party — should guide Chinese youth today, we are again told that the answer lies with Xi Jinping and the Party. An official commentary placed prominently at the top of the front page of today’s edition of the People’s Daily bundles the entire question of the May Fourth Movement into the political ideology of Xi Jinping and his recent articulation of his “Six Hopes” for the youth of China.

Hong Kong’s Ta Kung Pao lists the “Six Hopes” for China’s youth that President Xi Jinping spoke of during his speech to commemorate the anniversary of the 1919 May Fourth Movement.
“To continue making full use of the spirit of May Fourth, and to take on the great task of national rejuvenation, [youth] must have a profound understanding of the Six Hopes raised by General Secretary Xi Jinping,” the commentary said. The “Six Hopes” are as follows:

The formation of far-reaching ideals (树立远大理想) — which means having faith in Marxism, and a belief in socialism with Chinese characteristics.
Ardent love for the great motherland (热爱伟大祖国) — which means it is imperative to “listen to Party and walk with the Party” (听党话、跟党走).
Taking on the responsibility of the age (担当时代责任) — which means becoming “builders and successors” of the socialist system.
Daring to struggle on (勇于砥砺奋斗) — which means being “pioneers moving at the forefront of our times,” “pushing through the brambles to open up new possibilities.”
Reaching mastery of abilities (练就过硬本领) — which means diligently applying oneself to one’s studies and self-betterment.
Refining moral character (锤炼品德修为) — which means “putting socialist core values into practice” (社会主义核心价值观).

In Xi Jinping’s “Six Hopes” we see the “May Fourth spirit” trapped on the Möbius loop of Party ideology. All questions of value ultimately come down to the fundamental question of the Party’s legitimacy and dominance. And this question hinges on Xi Jinping as the “core” of the Party.
This is why you will not find, anywhere across China’s vast media landscape, any mention in recent days of “Mr. Democracy,” or de xiansheng (德先生), and “Mr. Science,” sai xiansheng (赛先生), two concepts that were absolutely core to the May Fourth Movement in 1919, and that inspired Chinese youth at other times through the interceding decades, not least in the spring of 1989. These nicknames, given to democracy and science as a sign of respect by none other than Chen Duxiu (陈独秀), one of the founders of the Chinese Communist Party, became the core of the so-called “May Fourth spirit.” In an essay published in January 1919 the journal New Youth (新青年), a publication Chen founded in 1915, he wrote that “these two gentlemen can save China from the political, moral, academic and intellectual darkness in which it finds itself.”

A page in the April 27, 1999, edition of the People’s Daily deals with ‘Mr. Democracy’ and ‘Mr. Science’ in a rare exception for the paper in its history.
I won’t go into detail about the Chen’s concepts of “Mr. Democracy” and “Mr. Science,” and their significance through the decades. Nor will I attempt to lay out what exactly Chen and others have meant or understood by “Mr. Democracy.” But it is worth remarking that this 100th anniversary of May Fourth comes as Xi Jinping has consolidated power to an extent not seen in the reform era, when even the notion of collective leadership within the Party is in question.
And as it happens, the Party’s official People’s Daily newspaper explored the question of “Mr. Democracy” 20 years ago, during the leadership of Jiang Zemin, to mark the 80th anniversary of the May Fourth Movement.
I should emphasize that the term “Mr. Democracy” has appeared in just four articles throughout the entire history of the People’s Daily, going back more than seven decades. Three of these articles, all under the title, “How to Revere ‘Mr. Democracy,” appear in 1999, just ahead of and after the 80th anniversary of the movement.
The first in the series, appearing on April 27, 1999, is written by Li Zhongjie (李忠杰), a well-known scholar of Party history who, quite literally, wrote the book on The Governing Principles of the Communist Party of China.
Here is one passage in which Li discusses the meaning of “Mr. Democracy”:

Next, in order to revere ‘Mr. Democracy,’ we must gain a new understanding and accurately grasp many principles concerning ‘Mr. Democracy,’ in this way better making use of the spirit of ‘Mr. Democracy.’
For example, the principle of the majority (多数原则). ‘Mr. Democracy’ is not a single individual, but rather a majority of people. The minority deferring to the majority is the basic principle of ‘Mr. Democracy.’ Without the principle of the majority there is no  ‘Mr. Democracy.’ Whether or not the principle of the majority prevails is one sign of whether the spirit of ‘Mr. Democracy’ exists. For example, within the Party committee, the secretary and the committee members all have only one vote. If a decision by vote is held, even if you are the secretary, the minority must defer to the majority. If someone comes and slaps the table and says, ‘What I say goes!’, this in fact is not ‘Mr. Democracy.’ If there is a person whose view differs, and they insist on thinking their opinion is correct and others must go along, this also is not ‘Mr. Democracy.’

In this “new era,” in which the Chinese Communist Party has moved in reverse on collective leadership and routinely fetes Xi Jinping as its unquestionable core — even removing presidential term limits and speaking of “one position as the highest authority” — these lines from Li Zhongjie on governance within the Party and reverence for “Mr. Democracy” sound almost progressive.

An op-ed in the Apple Daily by LEGCO member Kwok Ka-ki argues that China’s yearning for ‘Mr. Democracy’ will only grow stronger.
Here in Hong Kong still, such questions can be discussed more openly, of course. And so Kwok Ka-ki (郭家麒), a Legislative Council member from the Civic Party, wrote this week in the Apple Daily that today, 100 years after the May Fourth Movement, “China blindly develops its economy, and science and technology, mistakenly believing that this translates into national strength.”
Kwok suggested that China was only strong on the outside while brittle on the inside. “In a country without freedom and without democracy, there is no space for the people to make their will and demands heard,” he wrote. “Once people have satisfied their basic hunger for life, they will naturally grow envious of the freedom, democracy and culture of Western countries. The voices in China calling for democratic progress will only grow louder and louder. . . . I believe that someday the totalitarian [government] will fall, and Mr. Democracy will be found on Chinese soil.”
In response today, the Ta Kung Pao, a newspaper controlled by the Central Government’s Liaison Office, went on the attack, dismissing the “distorted reports” of the Apple Daily, which it said had wrongly suggested that President Xi Jinping had twisted the meaning of the May Fourth Movement by placing his emphasis on nationalism.
“This is a distortion of history, and a major insult to the spirit of the May Fourth Movement,” said the newspaper. “As we know, one of the slogans of the May Fourth Movement that year was a call for ‘Mr. Democracy’ and ‘Mr. Science,’ meaning for democracy and science. But why did the youth call for and demand ‘Mr. Democracy’ and ‘Mr. Science’? What was their goal? Was it not so that the nation could prosper and grow strong, for love of their country?”
The Ta Kung Pao returned the issue to the core logic of the Chinese Communist Party — that the youth must love their country, and this means love for the Party and its leader:

Xi Jinping’s speech was profound and comprehensive, and he spoke of everything from the history of May Fourth to the responsibility of youth today, pointing out that the core of the spirit of May Fourth is patriotism. The country today is ruled by the Chinese Communist Party, taking the path of socialism, and therefore for the youth of China today, loving the country, loving the Party and loving socialism are identical, and they are the only true patriotism.

 
 

Is China dispensing with "hurt feelings"?

Written by David Bandurski on . Posted in Headlines and Hashtags.

In his “On Balance” column today, South China Morning Post columnist Robert Delaney writes that, in the context of growing tensions with the United States, China is “moving from its standard emotional appeals and towards reason-based appeals to a global audience.” In particular, Delaney argues that in their external messaging Chinese leaders have moved away from the phrase “hurting the feelings of the Chinese people” as a standard response to perceived slights, reasoning that such language underscores China’s weakness.
“Beijing seems to have, at some point in recent years, concluded that characterizing its people as being so emotionally fragile doesn’t really help the country’s image,” Delaney writes.
As a long-time student of China’s official discourse, I couldn’t help raising an eyebrow at the suggestion that the Chinese Communist Party might be dispensing, just like that, with emotion — which is the heart and soul of propaganda — and opting instead for “reason-based appeals.” For all of its talk of doing so, China’s information control and messaging machine has never been very adept at calibrating its language for foreign audiences, and one major reason for this is that much of this jargon is really directed as domestic audiences, not least within the Party itself.
But picking apart Delaney’s thesis is simple enough, so I won’t beat around the bush.
Yes, China has certainly moderated some of its more boastful and triumphant language (much of it unspooling from the 19th National Congress of the CCP) in the midst of trade tensions with the U.S. It is not strategically smart for your state media to constantly boast about surpassing the West in this or that strategic technology when you’re trying to convince other countries that you are not a strategic threat. And a number of people inside China, including Luo Jianbo (罗建波), head of the China Foreign Policy Center at the Central Party School, warned last summer about the need to tone down the hype and bluster.
But the emotional fragility? It is still very much there. And it’s a fiction to imagine that somehow China has moved to a newly “reason-based” approach in dealing with foreign affairs and external propaganda. Things were of course very, very emotional last year as China voiced various forms of unhappiness with Sweden, culminating in the bizarre row over the fate of three Chinese tourists. Remember that case? Well, here is the overseas edition of the People’s Daily (which is all about external propaganda) responding to that case on September 17, 2018:

A number of Western countries including Sweden boast about their human rights, freedom and equality. And then, in their treatment of Chinese people, they routinely show another face, another standard. What of the human rights and freedom of the Chinese tourists throughout this whole matter? Where have the Swedish authorities shown their fairness? This incident has hurt the feelings of the Chinese people, and hurt the image of Sweden.
包括瑞典在内的一些西方国家向来以人权、自由和公平自我标榜。然而，在对待中国人、中国问题时，他们似乎常有另一副面孔，另一套标准。整件事里，中国游客的人权、自由在哪里？瑞典官方的公平公正在哪里？这件事伤害了中国人的感情，也伤害了瑞典自身形象。

In fact, the phrase “hurting the feelings of the Chinese people” is not routinely used to respond to international incidents, and colorful though it is, it actually appears rather infrequently in the Party’s flagship newspaper.
Looking back through the People’s Daily archives, the phrase generally appears at most around four times a year, though there was a very slight uptick in 2012. The phrase has yet to appear in the paper this year, but I would guess that it certainly will before the year is out. Almost everything is emotional for the Chinese Communist Party, after all.
When was the last time the phrase appeared in the newspaper? That was on December 21, 2018, when the U.S. Congress passed a bill on reciprocal travel to Tibet. The People’s Daily fumed that the act “violated the basic rules of international relations, crudely interfering in China’s internal affairs and hurting the feelings of the Chinese people.”
 
 
 

The black hole of copyright

Written by David Bandurski on . Posted in Headlines and Hashtags.

This week (as we catch up on two weeks of news in the Chinese media) we find the issue of professionalism in the media creeping onto the agenda with a spate of stories highlighting sensational approaches to important stories as well as flagrant abuse of copyright. First, there was finger pointing over the opportunistic sharing by prominent official social media accounts, including that of the Party’s People’s Daily, of video footage showing the suicide death of a 17 year-old. Next, we had questions from a veteran journalist over a sensational and over-simplifying account by a prominent news magazine of a series of corruption stories in Hubei province. And finally, we had a scandal over the sale by Visual China Group of black hole images from the European Southern Observatory that were designated a free-to-share images under Creative Commons — which spiraled into wider questions about copyright protection in China.
Beyond these stories, don’t miss our fourth this week, about the disciplining of a broadcast official in Suzhou for using a Twitter account to access news stories from “illegal overseas websites.” That story is a sign of just how serious China is getting about restriction of access to foreign media, including through restrictions on VPN use.
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This Week in China’s Media
April 6-19, 2019
➢ China Newsweekly accused of sensationalism and in reporting corruption stories
➢ Chinese state media display unprofessionalism in sharing video of 17 year-old jumping to his death from Shanghai bridge
➢ Black hole image sold by Visual China Group sparks wave of discussion about copyright abuse
➢ Suzhou broadcasting official disciplined for accessing external internet through Twitter
➢ China National Library announces archive of Sina Weibo posts
[1] China Newsweekly accused of sensationalism and in reporting corruption stories 
On April 4, the website of China Newsweekly, a leading Chinese news magazine, published an article called “Rare Sight! Top Officials from the Police, Procuratorate and Courts in This Province All Fall Together in Corruption Case” (罕见！公检法一把手尽数落马，这个省份现塌方式腐败). The article said that, “According to the latest official information, the former director of the court in the city of Wuhan in Hubei province, as well as the director of the procuratorate, the deputy secretary of the politics and law committee, and even the police chief of Huanggang [a prefectural-level city in Hubei], are all now under investigation!”
The suggestion from this prominent news magazine seemed to be that top provincial officials from the police and procuratorate in Hubei had been swept up in a rare anti-corruption action.


However, on April 6, veteran journalist Chu Chaoxin (褚朝新) posted to his personal WeChat account taking the China Newsweekly to task for its story. Chu noted that while the “this province” in the headline clearly referred to Hubei, in fact the “top officials” listed in the article had held city-level positions in the province. They included the former director of Wuhan’s intermediate people’s court, Wang Chen (王晨), the director of the Wuhan City People’s Procuratorate, Xun Guangjun (孙光骏), the former deputy secretary of the Wuhan politics and law committee, Zhou Bin (周滨), and the police chief of Huanggang, Wang Zhihuai (王治怀). These officials, Chu said, all came from very different jurisdictions and levels, and while Wuhan is Hubei’s provincial capital, these officials cannot be seen as reflective of politics at the provincial level. Huanggang, moreover,is merely a prefectural-level city, an even lesser concern. Why, then, Chu asked, had China Newsweekly muddied the story by reporting that “top officials from the police procuratorate and court all fall together” in “this province”?
The chatter surrounding the story and Chu’s response was a rare instance of discussion within China’s media concerning reporting on corruption and media professionalism.
KEY SOURCES:
China Newsweekly (中国新闻周刊): 罕见！公检法一把手尽数落马，这个省份现塌方式腐败
WeChat public account “Media Observer” (传媒大观察): 资深媒体人批评《中国新闻周刊》报道标题党不专业
WeChat public account “Chu Chaoxin” (褚朝新): 《中国新闻周刊》，时政新闻可不能这么写
[2] Chinese state media display unprofessionalism in sharing video of 17 year-old jumping to his death from Shanghai bridge
On April 17, surveillance cameras on Shanghai’s Hupu Bridge captured footage of a young man leaping off of the bridge after arguing with his mother and jumping out of the vehicle in which they had been riding. Immediately after the tragic incident, the mother could be seen in the footage crouching and weeping at the point where her son jumped. Chinese media, including many official WeChat accounts such as that of the People’s Daily, shared the video footage of the suicide as a sensational eye-catcher, without considering the broader social consequences.

Media researcher Wei Wuhui (魏武挥) wrote in response to the case that increases in suicidal behavior have been linked in studies to media coverage of suicide, and while media should play a role in reporting on suicide they must do so with great care and professionalism.Unfortunately, he said, domestic media in China have been backsliding on professionalism in reporting of these issues in recent years.
KEY SOURCES:
WeChat public account “Che Dan Ji” (扯氮集): 能让我尊重的新闻媒体 已经不多了
WeChat public account “People’s Daily” (人民日报):【荐读】17岁男孩母亲面前跳桥自杀！父母教育出了啥问题？
Baidu account “Sichuan Mobile Paper” (四川手机报): 痛心！因与母亲发生口角，17岁男生跳桥身亡，监控显示全程不到5秒
[3] Black hole image sold by Visual China Group sparks wave of discussion about copyright abuse
On April 10, the first images ever taken of a black hole were published on the internet by the Event Horizon Telescope imaging project. Soon after, internet users in China discovered that Visual China Group (视觉中国), the largest image distributor in China, was selling the black hole images online, and a wave of discussion over copyright abuse followed. As it became engulfed in online controversy, Visual China Group responded that its images had been obtained under non-exclusive editing license from its cooperation partner, AFP, which had sourced the images from the European Southern Observatory (ESO), involved in the Event Horizon Telescope imaging project. But ESO’s official website clearly stipulated that the images were under Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License, meaning that they were free to share with attribution.
Concerning the Visual China Group matter, ESO issued a statement saying that this sort of claim to copyright was illegal, and Visual China Group never reached out to ESO concerning use of the black hole images. Visual China Group eventually issued its own statement saying: “These problems reveal that we have weak links in management, and we apologize for this!,” VCG said. “At present, the company has taken measures to deal with the non-compliance pictures, and voluntarily close the website in accordance with relevant laws and regulations to carry out rectification, further strengthen corporate self-discipline, strengthen system construction, improve the quality of content review, and avoid similar situations.”
The scandal engulfing Visual China Group unfolded rapidly, progressing within 24 hours from exposure to damaging attempts at denial, to public apology and finally to the temporary shutdown of the website in order to conduct an internal review.
Party media were the last to follow suit on the Visual China Group story. On April 11, the official Weibo account of the Chinese Communist Youth League (@共青团中央) made a post in which it revealed that Visual China Group had placed its watermark on images of China’s national flag and national emblem. “So are the national flag and national emblem also copyrighted by this noble company?” the account asked. On April 14, the official account of People’s Daily Online (@人民网) called on Party-run media—known in Chinese as “mainstream media” (主流媒体)—to play a leading role in cleaning up copyright infringements in China and work toward a “People’s Visual Web” (人民图片网).
KEY SOURCES:
Baidu public account “China Economic Weekly” (百家号“中国经济周刊”: 视觉中国黑洞照片引发的商业图库整治风暴
Baidu public account “TMT App” (百家号“钛媒体APP”): 视觉中国被“从重罚款30万元”之后
Beijing Evening Post (北京晚报): 被指图库钓鱼 以诉代销 “黑洞事件”牵出视觉中国盈利链
Sina Weibo account “@ChinaYouthLeague” (新浪微博@共青团中央): 国旗、国徽的版权也是贵公司的？
[4] Suzhou broadcasting official disciplined for accessing external internet through Twitter
On April 4, the Suzhou Broadcasting System (SBS) issues a notice called “Concerning the Handling of Zhu Chengzhuo’s Discipline Violations” (关于朱诚卓违纪行为的处理决定), which said that Zhu Chengzhuo (朱诚卓), the deputy director of programming at the station’s multimedia desk, had registered the Twitter account “Alexzhuozhuchengzhuo” to browse and read “harmful information on illegal overseas websites” (境外非法网站的有害信息), and that he had been called in for questioning. The notice said that “the above-mentioned conduct by Zhu Chengzhuo is a serious violation of political discipline and political rules.”
KEY SOURCES:
Hongkong 01(香港01): 蘇州電視台高管使用Twitter瀏覽境外網站 遭警方傳喚並被撤職
[5]  China National Library announces archive of Sina Weibo posts
On April 19, the China National Library announced that it had initiated an “Internet Information Strategic Preservation Program” (互联网信息战略保存)involving the archiving of 200 billion public blog posts from Sina’s Weibo platform from the launch of the platform up to December 2018, which would be preserved at the China National Library. The archive reportedly will include also 50 billion images, 400 million videos and around 500 billion comments and likes. The archive would continue to archive content from the platform in the coming years.
News reports on the new archive said that “Internet information has become a new form of human civilization and social memory, objectively reflecting changes in politics, the economy and society.”
There was no clear indication of whether the archive would include deleted posts from the platform. The news also prompted some discussion of the rights of users to their own posts within the archive, with some commenters responding that all users signed an agreement when opening their Sina accounts giving all rights to the platform operator.
KEY SOURCES:
WeChat public account “China Youth Daily”(“中国青年报“)：2000亿条！微博全将被国图保存，网友：后人能懂我的梗吗？

Celebrating Cybersecurity

Written by David Bandurski on . Posted in Headlines and Hashtags.

The top news today at the People’s Daily is the announcement that China will host its second Belt and Road Forum for International Cooperation, or BRFIC, in Beijing from April 25 to April 27. That of course is less than a week away, and the big propaganda push today fits China general penchant for springing ostensibly major international events on the world before it — meaning both China and the rest of the world — has any opportunity to prepare. Think of the mystery, for example, that always surrounds the so-called World Internet Conference, otherwise known as the Wuzhen Summit.
Why does China do this? And what does it tell us?
I think the clearest message it sends is that China is ultimately interested only in the optics, in creating big events through which it can advance its own vision and agenda. It has no interest whatsoever in making these events about real international cooperation, in the sense that participants can come prepared to discuss real and perhaps competing agendas. The invitations are only ever to China’s great big stage.


For those interested in the upcoming event and its implications as understood from China’s official state perspective, today’s commentary from Guo Jiping (国纪平), the designated byline for important CCP commentaries on international issues, is a must-read.
One of my favorite lines in the piece is borrowed from a March 18, 2019, report in the New York Times by Jason Horowitz, “A Forgotten Italian Port Could Become a Chinese Gateway to Europe.” Horowitz wrote: “Now, courtesy of a rising China, Trieste appears ready to return to the center of a realigning world.” In today’s People’s Daily commentary, the indefinite “appears” of the Horowitz piece becomes a prophecy fulfilled. The commentary follows with: “Today, stories like that of Trieste are being replayed again and again along the ‘Belt and Road.'”
But turning away from the top news, today is also a major anniversary — or so we are told by the Chinese Communist Party. It was three years ago today that Xi Jinping opened the first Cyberspace Work Conference, an event bringing together key national and regional officials from the various branches of the powerful Cyberspace Administration of China (CAC), and gave his “important speech” on the governance of cyberspace, and the need to protect cybersecurity. That speech offered a broad and expansive vision of what that security means, and essentially mapped the Party’s overarching media control priorities — on the older post-1989 notion of the need to maintain “correct guidance of public opinion” (正确舆论导向) — on the massive new universe of cyberspace.
Visiting the People’s Daily on September 26, 1996, President Jiang Zemin (江泽民), who introduced the concept of “guidance of public opinion,” or yulun daoxiang (舆论导向), in the wake of the violent crackdown on student protests on June 4, 1989, elaborated the concept in terms of the benefit to the regime and to the people: “Correct guidance of public opinion benefits the Party and the people,” said Jiang. “Incorrect guidance of public opinion means calamity for the Party and the people.”

舆论导向正确，是党和人民之福；舆论导向错误，是党和人民之祸

In Xi Jinping’s era of cyberspace-driven media control — which is far more encompassing, to the point of involving every citizen in the act of “correct guidance” — Jiang Zemin’s so-called “theory of weal and woe” (福祸论) has been re-patterned after the language of another ostensible policy priority: environmental protection.
We can find the new formulation in a series of commentaries in the People’s Daily published to commemorate the anniversary of Xi Jinping’s inaugural speech on cybersecurity. A commentary yesterday, “Actively Leading Public Opinion for a Clean and Bright Online Space,” offers the following pairing, unmistakable to those who follow the official discourse of information control.

A clean and bright online space, with a favorable environment, is in keeping with the interests of the people; a foul atmosphere in the online space, with a foul environment, is not in keeping with the interests of the people.
网络空间天朗气清、生态良好，符合人民利益；网络空间乌烟瘴气、生态恶化，不符合人民利益。

Asked whether they want to live in a polluted environment, surrounding by hazardous materials that poison their children, any citizen would say No. But when it comes to information, of course, this is a false choice. The very real poisons to which your child might be exposed, for example, cannot be reported on or discussed on social media, because this goes against the mandate for “correct guidance” and another now-favorite buzzword, “positive energy.”
Another trend I’ve addressed previously, and that we can see again in this series commemorating the anniversary of the “4.19” speech, is greater openness about the project of information control. Censorship, justified as an environmental clean-up, is not such a dirty business itself as it once was, something the Party is ashamed to talk about. Many of the operational details of information control are naturally still secret, and the Party is not ready to have an open discussion about censorship. But it is far more prepared to announce to the public, with a sense of urgency and pride, everything it is doing to protect them from the perils of unwanted speech.
A translation of yesterday’s commentary follows.
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Actively Leading Public Opinion for a Clean and Bright Online Space:
Commentary 2 in Series on the Third Anniversary of the “4·19” Speech
April 18, 2019
Ye Xiao (叶筱)
In recent days, the Beijing office of the Cyberspace Administration of China has targeted websites that have posted illegal information and not done their full duty in carrying out censorship (审查义务), and which have continued to exhibit such serious problems as the dissemination of incorrectly guided [content], vulgar or pornographic [content], fake and untrue [content] and other harmful information. [The office] has called in people in positions of responsibility at these companies, has taken PC desktop apps and mobile apps off the market pending rectification. The CAC office in Tianjin has brought in the Visual China Group (视觉中国) for discussions, ordering it to stop illegal conduct on its site and demanding that it strengthen content reviews and management, and the training of staff, undergoing a complete rectification . . .
It can be said that a series of targeting cleansing campaigns on the internet are striking out, creating a fresh and clean online space for the masses of internet users.
In fact, these are just a microcosm of the governance [control] of the online space in recent years. On April 19, 2016, General Secretary Xi Jinping led the opening of the Cybersecurity Work Conference (网络安全和信息化工作座谈会) and emphasized that “[we] must build a favorable climate online, using the internet to play a role in channeling public opinion and reflecting the public will.” Over the past three years, our country has opened up a new phase in the development and control of the internet, from enhancing the governance of the online space to building a favorable online climate, from conscientiously defending cybersecurity to accelerating progress in introducing laws on the internet.
The online space is the spiritual homeland of the 100s of millions of masses. A clean and bright online space, with a favorable environment, is in keeping with the interests of the people; a foul atmosphere in the online space, with a foul environment, is not in keeping with the interests of the people.
We have seen repeated cases recently of the use of the internet to swindle, to spread pornographic materials, too carry out personal attacks, and to sell illegal products; or using the internet to promote the overthrow of the state regime, to stir up religious extremism, or to proclaim ideologies of ethnic separatism, to instigate violent acts of terrorism. Such language is not only not to the benefit of individuals, but also harms the progress of the work of the Party and the government, and it must be resolutely stopped, controlled and attacked, and firmly not be allowed to spread.
No one wishes to live in a space full of falsehood, deception, attack, derision, terror, pornography and violence. This means that in our cyberspace work we must actively direct public opinion, creating a clear and bright online space. . . .
Actively leading public opinion, and purifying the online climate, means strengthening the supervisory role (监管职责) of administrative departments of the government, and also means consolidating the responsibilities of internet business [in maintaining control]. Internet businesses are sensitive to the marketplace, sensitive to demand and innovation, and have a keen desire to innovate - but they must be correct in their value orientations, upholding their social responsibility. As General Secretary Xi Jinping has pointed out: “Those operating websites cannot simply pursue click rates, those opening online stores must be on the guard against cheap counterfeits, those operating social media platforms cannot become instruments of rumor spreading, and those doing search [business] cannot only set their results by how much people are willing to pay.” Upholding economic benefit and social benefit must go hand-in-hand, and only then can we ensure that the internet better enriches the country and the people.
Of course we must also see that the myriad changes and constantly emerging new circumstances of the internet age raise new challenges for the work of the cyberspace administration. We encourage mutual effort and participation from all sides in singing the main theme [of the CCP], and in transmitting positive energy (传递正能量). We are confident that we have the ability to protect and maintain a healthy and advanced online climate, and to create a clear and bright online space.

Maps of Global Influence

Written by David Bandurski on . Posted in Headlines and Hashtags.

In a recent story titled “China is Burning Books Again,” Foreign Policy addressed the growing problem of China’s censorship of printed materials bound for markets outside China, an important but perhaps underreported aspect of the Chinese Communist Party’s enforcement of its global narrative. The story quoted Jesse Covner, the American co-creator of a new crowd-funded roleplaying game, lamenting how authorities in Guangzhou had destroyed the entire print run of his game, The Sassoon Files. “I couldn’t believe what I heard,” Covner told FP. “I’d never heard of China’s government getting involved with printing issues for export to foreign markets.”

Even domestic companies can be guilty of “problem maps,” as Alibaba Group knows only to well from its shaming over this map that left off the island of Taiwan.
But by all accounts, stories like Covner’s are becoming commonplace, particularly as China occupies a bigger share of the global printing industry– over 10 percent — and as it recognizes its power to exercise such controls without repercussions. In the case of The Sassoon Files, the problem was apparently the mention of a historical figure, Victor Sassoon, a businessman with substantial interests in the foreign enclave of Shanghai in the 1920s and 1930s, despite the fact that there are no immediate sensitivities around the person of Sassoon.
But one of the most common areas of sensitivity has to do with political geography, and what the Chinese Communist Party regards as core issues of national sovereignty and territorial integrity.
I’m talking about maps.
Issues often arise with Chinese contract printers who take on overseas orders of books, posters and other printed merchandise that in some way suggest, even in the most indirect manner, that Taiwan, Tibet, disputed border regions with India and so on are not sovereign Chinese territory. Taiwan is left off of a map of China, or labeled Republic of China. If such “problem maps” are discovered in orders bound for export, their foreign destination is not regarded by Chinese authorities as an acceptable excuse. Quite to the contrary, they are seen as doing a great disservice to China’s efforts to defend its national sovereignty and territorial integrity — seeds of dangerous misinformation.
China’s sensitivity to these issues can result in pressure on international companies to censor or change material to reflect China’s official view. Last year, the Marriott hotel chain came under harsh criticism from China after it listed Taiwan as well as Tibet and Hong Kong, as separate countries in its online system.
Last year hotel chain Marriott was strongly criticized by Chinese authorities for listing Taiwan — along with Tibet and Hong Kong — as separate countries, all regions which Beijing claims under its authority. Also last year, the retailer Gap was pressured to apologize after it released a Gap-brand T-shirt that showed a map of China excluding the island of Taiwan. “Gap Inc. respects the sovereignty and territorial integrity of China,” the company said in a statement made to its Weibo account in China. “We’ve learned that a Gap brand T-shirt sold in some overseas markets failed to reflect the correct map of China. We sincerely apologize for this unintentional error.”
People’s Daily Online recently ran an article on “problem maps” among the top news on its homepage (to the right of thee image of firefighters in Sichuan).
Gap reassured Chinese authorities that the T-shirts had been recalled and destroyed.
Last month, customs officials in the port city of Qingdao discovered close to 29,000 poster maps bound for export that showed Taiwan as a separate country. They were confiscated and destroyed, and the case upheld as an important caution to printers and manufacturers working in China to be absolutely clear about their obligations to the nation.
The Qingdao case seems to have prompted renewed warnings in Party and state-run about the danger of “problem maps.” In late March, People’s Daily Online posted a piece at top of its list of news stories on the homepage called “In Tracking Down ‘Problem Maps,’ China Must Leave Nothing.” The piece indicates that “problem maps” have been identified as a priority issue in new regulations released several months back by the Ministry of Natural Resources and other government departments called “Notice on the Strengthening of Management Work on the Contract Printing and Import-Export of Maps By Businesses” (关于加强有关承印、进出口经营单位地图管理工作的通知). The People’s Daily Online article mentions the Qingdao case, but also alludes to recent confiscations in Shenzhen and Zhengzhou.
Our translation of the article follows:
____________________________
 
In Tracking Down “Problem Maps,” China Must Leave Nothing
Qin Ning (秦宁)
March 30, 2019 / People’s Daily Online
On March 21, customs authorities in Qingdao issued a notice saying that Huangdao Customs, a customs point under their jurisdiction, had tracked down and seized 28,000 “problem maps” (问题地图). According to media reports, this is the largest seizure of “problem maps” in Shandong province in recent years, and the company responsible for the products in the case is a certain company from the city of Hefei in Anhui province. The “problem maps” have already been incinerated at a designated location.
This group of products were contained in 803 boxes, containing 28,908 pieces. These maps contained such problems as designated Taiwan as a country, and incorrectly rendering the China-India border, and the case is shocking, whether in terms of the numbers involved or in terms of the nature [of the offense]. These maps were fortunately discovered in a timely manner, and swiftly destroyed. If this were not the case, these “problem maps” might circulate overseas and be used and hyped by those with ulterior motives (别有用心者), directly harming the national interests and the dignity of the Chinese people, seriously threatening the comprehensive security of the nation (严重威胁国家总体安全).
“Accurate national maps are symbols of national sovereignty and territorial integrity,” [said a division of the State Bureau of Surveying and Mapping in 2010]. It is no small matter if materials printed for overseas [clients] and imported or exported are found to contain “problem maps.” Starting from January 1, 2016, our nation made clear stipulations in its Regulations on Map Management  (地图管理条例) that map-related work must abide by the protection of national sovereignty, must preserve the security of geographic information, and must convenience the lives of the people. Content cannot be shown on maps that damages national unity, sovereignty and territorial integrity. No matter whether this means showing Taiwan as a separate country, or incorrectly showing the border between China and India, in both cases this violates the regulations, and this cannot be tolerated.
There have been a number of incidents of “problem maps” in recent years. Before the case of the “problem maps” requiring incineration in Qingdao, customs authorities in Shenzhen issued a notice saying that they had exposed a case of smuggling of “problem maps,” and “the maps in violation of China’s national sovereignty and territorial integrity” were said to number more than 300,000 in that case. In January this year, customs authorities in Zhengzhou issued a notice saying that around 20,000 “problem maps” disguised as “tourism notices” (旅游海报) had been [confiscated] bound for Germany. These are cases that have been reported  in the media. How many other cases are there? How many have gone undetected? And we must ask: why does this problem persist despite prohibitions against “problem maps”?
It is precisely because of the constant appearance of “problem maps” that a number of months ago the Ministry of Natural Resources, General Administration of Press and Publications, the General Administration of Customs and the National Office Against Pornography and Illegal Publication jointly issued its “Notice on the Strengthening of Management Work on the Contract Printing and Import-Export of Maps By Businesses” (关于加强有关承印、进出口经营单位地图管理工作的通知), which clearly stipulated: “Various business engaging in contract printing and import-export must strictly abide by the ‘Regulation on Map Management,’ the ‘Regulations on Publishing Management’ the ‘Regulations on Management of the Printing Industry’, the ‘Measures of the Customs of the People’s Republic of China for the Supervision and Administration of Processing Trade Goods’ and other laws and regulations, carrying out map-related business activities in a lawful manner.
There is no shortage of laws and regulations to prevent “problem maps,” nor is there a shortage of punitive measures that can be taken. But certain law-violating companies ignore these, and fundamentally fail to recognize that the contract printing of maps is a very strict and very serious matter, about which we cannot be careless, cannot be negligent and cannot show tolerance.
Taking on the [business of] printing “problem maps” is actually a lack of simple understanding of right and wrong, and a lack of knowledge of sovereignty [issues]. As a company that takes on the business of map printing, they must know that no company or individual is allowed to print, display, publish, sell, import or export maps that fail to abide by relevant national standards and regulations. Regardless of whether it is intentional or unintentional, the appearance of “problem maps” is an abandonment of legal justice, an abandonment of the righteousness of our people, and does harm to social righteousness.
Because of this, contracting for “problem maps,” particularly contracting for problem orders from overseas, must be subject to the necessary punishments under the law.
General Secretary Xi Jinping has emphasized that we must resolutely make national sovereignty and security the first priority, implementing a complete national sovereignty view. China cannot be diminished! Preserving national sovereignty, security and interests is the responsibility of all citizens, and relevant departments must,  taking the control of “problem maps” as an entry point, raise the sovereignty consciousness, territorial land and seas consciousness and sense of responsibility in protecting the homeland of all people in our nation. Aside from this, we must strengthen our efforts to hold those responsible for concocting “problem maps” to account under the law, creating mechanisms of lasting effectiveness — strengthening the regular oversight of imported and exported map materials even as the healthy and rapid development of map contract printing companies is ensured.

Was Singer Li Zhi Censored in Sichuan?

Written by David Bandurski on . Posted in Headlines and Hashtags.

This week we have a number of interesting stories in the Chinese media, including new budgetary outlays for the development of local “convergence” Party media — a sign that the Party is looking to rebuild the entire Party media structure from top to bottom — as well as similar news that the Central Propaganda Department is now seeking to employ 150 personnel to further develop the “Xi Study Strong Nation” app that has gotten attention in recent weeks for its gamification of Party ideology.
Also this week, there were suggestions from Sichuan province that the February cancellation of a concert tour there by singer Li Zhi (李志) was not in fact due to his physical condition, but rather to problems with the singer’s “improper conduct,” very likely a reference to his political views. Certainly, this is a sensitive year for the CCP, with many sensitive anniversaries on the horizon.
 

This Week in China’s Media
March 30 to April 5, 2019

➢ 3 Die in Sichuan Forest Fire, More than 10 Internet Users Detained for Defaming Firefighting Martyrs
➢ Central Party Adds 1.8 Billion Yuan in Public Financing to Support Building of Convergence Media at County Level
➢ Former Deputy Head of Hunan Broadcasting System is Removed from Both Party and Government Posts, Accused of Conspiracy with Boss
➢ “Study Xi Strong Nation” App Seeks 150 Staff Members for Its New Media Outfit
➢ Sichuan Province Issues Notice Cancelling Concert of “A Certain Famous Vocal Performer”

[1] 3 Die in Sichuan Forest Fire, More than 10 Internet Users Detained for Defaming Firefighting Martyrs

On March 30, 2019, a forest fire broke out in Muli County (木里县) in Sichuan’s Liangshan Prefecture (凉山州), rapidly spreading across the area. By April 4, the fire had claimed the lives of 30 people, including 27 firefighting personnel and 3 others.

At around 6PM on April 4, local police issued a public notice saying that it had identified 13 cases of insults directed at “martyrs” who had joined the firefighting effort. Internet users, said the notice, had broadcast their insults through friend circles (朋友圈) and group chats, and after being locked out of their services by online authorities, two of these had surrendered to local police, and 11 others had been arrested or summoned. Four have so far been subjected to administrative detention (行政拘留), and 7 face detention on criminal charges (刑事拘留).

Authorities in Panyu District, on the south side of the southern city of Guangzhou, also reported on April 4 that an internet user had “openly slandered and insulted” the martyrs of the Sichuan fire. That same day a web user identified only as “surnamed Zhao, age 38, from Guangdong” (男，38岁，广东人) was arrested on suspicion of “disorderly conduct” (涉嫌寻衅滋事罪).

KEY SOURCES: 

The Paper (澎湃新闻网): 少数网民侮辱凉山火灾牺牲英烈，各地公安通报拘留十余人

Sina Weibo account “@GuangzhouPublicSecurity (@广州公安): 网上恶意诋毁四川壮烈牺牲消防战士 一网民被广州番禺警方依法刑事拘留

[2] Central Party Adds 1.8 Billion Yuan in Public Financing to Support Building of Convergence Media at County Level

On April 2, the Central Party published its budget (中央财政预算), which included 14.7 billion yuan allocated nationwide for “local public cultural services development” (地方公共文化服务体系建设), and increase of 14 percent from the 2018 budget. The increase was accounted for largely by nw allocations for the support of “convergence media” (digital multimedia) development at the county level. These “convergence media” will be charged with playing a key propaganda role at the local level.

In recent years, local county-level and other local media in China have faced serious financial shortages, and some areas have been behind in payment of wages. The new budget outlays are apparently an effort to deal with such issues, and to remake and refinance propaganda at the local level.

KEY SOURCES: 

WeChat public account “Broadcast Leads” (广电头条): 中央增加18亿专项资金！各地如何扶持县级融媒体建设？

People’s Daily (人民日报): 扎实抓好县级融媒体中心建设（深入学习贯彻习近平新时代中国特色社会主义思想）

[3] Former Deputy Head of Hunan Broadcasting System is Removed from Both Party and Government Posts, Accused of Conspiracy with Boss

On April 4, discipline inspection authorities in Hunan province opened an investigation against Huang Wei (黄伟), the former deputy director of the Hunan Broadcasting System. Huang Wei is accused of violating the spirit of the CCP’s “Eight-Point Frugality Code” (中央八项规定) by accepting monetary gifts and “obtaining advantages and accepting gifts from others through his position” (在职工录用中为他人谋取利益并收受财物).

Discipline inspection authorities further accused Huang Wei of “losing faith in [Party] ideals and lacking the principle of Party nature,” working together with his superior to seek riches in violation of Party discipline.

KEY SOURCES: 

Central Discipline Inspection Commission website (中央纪委国家监委网站): 湖南广播电视台原党委委员、副台长黄伟严重违纪违法被“双开”

[4] “Study Xi Strong Nation” App Seeks 150 Staff Members for Its New Media Outfit

Recently the China Media Group (中央广播电视总台), also known as “Voice of China,” issued a public call for the hiring of 300 personnel, including 150 people who would be responsible for content operations for the “Study Xi Strong Nation” (学习强国) app, a new platform that seeks to push engagement with official Party ideology and the speeches and statements of Xi Jinping. The positions advertised include editors to produce digital audio and video content, as well as personnel to review content.

The WeChat public account “CCTV News” reported that this hiring for the “Study Xi Strong Nation” app was in response to demands from the Central Propaganda Department for the establishment of a dedicated personnel team for the app’s operation under the leadership of the propaganda department as an enterprise division of the China Media Group.

The “Study Xi Strong Nation” app is managed by the Central Propaganda Department and was formally launched on January 1, 2019. As of April the app had registered more than 100 million users, with 40–60 percent of users active on a daily basis.

KEY SOURCES: 

WeChat public account “CCTV News” (央视新闻): 中央广播电视总台招聘启事

The Paper (澎湃新闻网): 传媒湃｜“学习强国”将招聘150人组建新媒体队伍

[5] Sichuan Province Issues Notice Cancelling Concert of “A Certain Famous Vocal Performer”

On April 3, Sichuan province’s Office of Culture and Tourism (文化和旅游厅) held a news briefing (新闻通气会). According to a report from Chengdu-based Red Star News (红星新闻), in February this year the Sichuan Department of Culture and Tourism (四川省文化市场执法监督局) directed culture offices at the provincial and city levels to “urgently cease plans by a certain well-known vocal performer showing improper conduct (某行为不端知名声乐演员) to give 23 personal performances in Sichuan” and to refund 18,000 tickets already purchased.

According to previous promotional materials from Chinese singer Li Zhi (李志), he had been scheduled to perform in Sichuan from February 23 to April 20 this year, with 23 performances scheduled in all. But on February 22, the night before his first scheduled concert, Li Zhi posted an image to his personal Weibo account of a hospital band around his wrist, suggesting that he was seeking medical treatment, and announcing that the Sichuan tour had been cancelled as a result. Members of Li’s band later confirmed that the concert tour had been cancelled for reason’s relating to Li’s physical condition.

On April 4, other media confirmed that the “well-known vocal performer showing improper conduct” mentioned in the official release was indeed Li Zhi. In a subsequent interview with the Beijing Youth Daily, members of Li Zhi’s band claimed to be surprised by reports that Li Zhi was the “well-known vocal performer showing improper conduct” mentioned in the Sichuan release, and they said that the concert tour had indeed been cancelled at the time because Li was scheduled for minor surgery.

Later in the afternoon on April 4, the Sichuan Department of Culture and Tourism issued a statement saying that its actions in February were strictly in accordance with the Regulation on the Administration of Commercial Performances (营业性演出管理条例), and that more should be read into the situation. But the case continued to raise speculation that Li Zhi has faced pressure for his outspoken political views. A number of Li Zhi’s songs, including “The Square” (广场), which deals with June 4, 1989, have tackled sensitive issues, and Li’s Weibo account has been suspended in the past.

KEY SOURCES: 

Red Star News (红星新闻): 四川叫停某行为不端知名声乐演员23场次个人巡演

The Paper (澎湃新闻网): 官方回应“声乐演员因行为不端巡演被叫停”：不要对号入座

WeChat public account “8-Character Intersection” (8字路口): 关于逼哥我知道的不多

Law professor suspended for critical writings

Written by David Bandurski on . Posted in Headlines and Hashtags.

This week we have a wide range of stories to pick from in China’s media, dealing with everything from dramatic falls from official grace to odd official appointments that expose the opacity of official appointment to begin with.
To start with, we have the sentencing of former cyber czar Lu Wei, a key architect of the reengineering of the internet controls (and media regulation) around the Cyberspace Administration of China, to 14 years in jail, quite a hefty sentence. Unsurprisingly, official reports say Lu has decided not to appeal the decision — as though he has any real decision-making power in the case. The sentence brings to an end the saga of one of the most flamboyant officials to make his way through the propaganda system in recent decades.
In another sign of just how sensitive the political climate is in 2019, with its raft of historical anniversaries, we have news this week that law professor Xu Zhangrun was suspended from teaching and other duties at Tsinghua University after writing a series of critical articles over the past year warning against a return to Cultural Revolution-style thinking in China.
We have a local hospital chief in Hunan appointed suddenly as the head of the local TV station — a decision leaving internet users scratching their heads (and local officials defending their actions). And finally, we have the emergence of a brief discussion around the apparent designation by local governments of “families having lost an only child” as problems of social instability that need to be eliminated — a language scandal somewhat resembling the 2017 wave of anger over the “low-end population.”
 
THIS WEEK IN CHINA’S MEDIA
March 23-29, 2019
➢ Tsinghua suspends law professor for writings on present-day politics and the Cultural Revolution
➢ Propaganda officials emphasize strengthened controls at 2019 Media Oversight Work Conference
➢ Problem of “lost child families” mentioned in anti-crime campaign
➢ Hunan hospital chief promoted to post at head of TV station, and web users scratch their heads
➢ Former cyber chief Lu Wei sentenced to 14 years in jail
[1] Tsinghua suspends law professor for writings on present-day politics and the Cultural Revolution
Xu Zhangrun (许章润), a professor in the School of Law at Tsinghua University, posted a message to social media saying he had received the following disciplinary decision from the university: “On these problems [concerning your writings], investigative procedures are being carried out, and we await the results of the investigation; in the meantime, your classes are suspended, your research activities are suspended, your recruitment of students is suspended, and you are relieved of all duties:

对其问题启动调查程序，等待调查结果；在此期间，停课、停止科研活动、停止招生，免除一切职务。

Xu Zhangrun has posted numerous articles in recent years that have cautioned against the return of a Cultural Revolution mindset in China, including “The Fear and Expectation Facing Us” (我们当下的恐惧与期待), “Preserving ‘Reform and Opening'” (保卫“改革开放”), “Bow Your Head in Devotion, Heaven and Earth Have No Boundary” (低头致意，天地无边), and “Revisiting the Republic, This Grand Idea” (重申共和国这一伟大理念). In an article on March 28 suggesting that international media had exaggerated Xu’s case, the Global Times newspaper said: “Especially since last year, he has written a number of articles that are quite extreme politically, making him stick out instantly among dissidents domestically.”
Peking University law professor Zhang Qianfan (张千帆) responded to the storm surrounding Xu by saying that he felt the university leadership at Tsinghua were making this move, going after a “scholar of conscience” (良心学者), to protect themselves politically in a tense political climate.
KEY SOURCES:
FT Chinese (FT中文网): 哪有学者不表达？（郭于华）
AND: 清华应善待自己的优秀学者（张千帆）
Global Times (环球时报): 搞批评应守住三个原则，实现建设性
[2] Propaganda officials emphasize strengthened controls at 2019 Media Oversight Work Conference
On March 21, the 2019 Media Oversight Work Conference (传媒监管工作会议) was held in Beijing. The meeting was chaired by Li Hongkui (李宏葵) the deputy head of the Media Oversight Office (传媒监管局) of the Central Propaganda Department (中宣部), and focussed discussion on planning for “media oversight work” in 2019. The meeting suggested that “publishing resource deployment policies” (出版资源配置政策) in 2019 should “suppress volume, control scale and raise quality” (压数量、控规模、提质量), all rather oblique references to the need to cool down publishing activities during the year and ensure published materials are in line with political objectives.
In terms of news media oversight priorities for the year, the meeting emphasized the need to “strengthen the management of local offices of news units” and “tighten approvals and issuance of press cards” (严格新闻记者证审核发放), to “strengthen monitoring of illegal news and information” (加强新闻违法信息监测), and to “strengthen the monitoring and oversight of personnel and newspapers and magazines” (强化对报刊所办媒体及从业人员监督管理). Strengthening management of new media (新兴媒体) through “reform and innovation of oversight mechanisms” (改革创新监管机制) was also emphasized as a priority.
KEY SOURCES:
China News Publishing and Broadcast Web (中国新闻出版广电网): 2019年传媒监管工作会议召开 努力开创传媒监管工作新局面
[3] Problem of “lost child families” mentioned in anti-crime campaign
On March 26, images circulated online in China of a number of social welfare announcements from Xiangtan in Hunan province that dealt with “10 Priorities in Sweeping Away Black and Eliminating Evil.” This phrase, to “sweep away black and eliminate evil,” or saohei chu’e (扫黑除恶), is often used in the context of policing and social management to refer to negative social influences. But this particular list caught the attention of internet users because included on the list was the category “members of families that have lost an only child” (失独家庭人员). The text in full was: “Members of families who have lost an only child, serious cases of mental illness and other priority targets of oversight.”

Image from Baidu.com depicts the phenomenon of the “family with a lost only child,” a very serious social issue in China in the wake of the One Child Policy.
Soon after the images made the rounds on the internet, media reported that the prefectural-level city of Xinzhou in Shanxi province had also entered “families that have lost an only child” on their list of targets in “sweep away black” campaigns. They shared an article from September 19, 2018, called “Carried Out Black Sweeps to Eliminate Chaos, Protecting the Normal Operation of Healthcare” (开展扫黑除恶治乱，维护正常医疗秩序) that had been posted to the WeChat public account of the central blood bank in Xinzhou, which mentioned “families that have lost an only child” on the list of priority targets.
A commentary in The Beijing News suggested on March 28 that the “black sweep” lists issues by these local governments were highly inappropriate, and that they highlighted serious problems in the way some local governments deal as a matter of public policy with the psychological problems and the subsistence issues associated with the loss of children by Chinese families under the legacy of the One Child Policy. Many Chinese of around 50 years of age and older who have unexpectedly lost an only child face the prospect of having no one to look after them in old age, and many can suffer serious psychological trauma as a result of the loss.
Another commentary in China Youth Daily argued that while preserving social stability is naturally a key priority for local governments, they must at the same time ensure standards of social justice (社会正义) and act in a humanitarian spirit (人道主义).
KEY SOURCES:
The Paper (澎湃新闻网): 湘潭一社区将失独家庭列入扫黑对象？回应：内容不妥已撤下
The Beijing News (新京报): 失独家庭需要关怀而不是防备
WeChat public account “Beijing News Commentary” (新京报评论): 将“失独家庭”列入扫黑除恶对象，怎么想的？|新京报快评
China Youth Daily (中国青年报): 失独家庭成“扫黑对象”不是简单的失误
[4] Hunan hospital chief promoted to post at head of TV station, and web users scratch their heads
On March 20, “Wei Ba Ling” (微巴陵), the official WeChat public account of the local propaganda office in the city of Yueyang in Hunan province, made a post announcing new appointments and terminations in which it revealed that Yu Xinya (喻新亚), the director of the Yueyang People’s Hospital, had been relieved of the post and promoted as Party secretary and director of Yueyang’s county-level television broadcaster.
Web users seized on this bit of news to criticize the move and indirectly cast light on the appointments process in China. “Letting a cadre who had completely no media experience become director of a television station is without a doubt a thorough change in profession,” wrote one web user. “These two professions are both highly technical in nature, and the gap between them couldn’t be wider.”
Responding to these questions online, the Yueyang county propaganda chief, Li Yuezheng (李月争), said that the appointment had been carried out according to the spirit of discussions with superior cadres (“按照上级干部交流的精神执行”) and that it met with requirements and was considered a normal move.
KEY SOURCES:
People’s Daily Online (人民网): 湖南一医院院长调任电视台台长引争议 官方回应
WeChat public account “Wei Ba Ling” (微巴陵): 我县召开机构改革干部任前集体谈话会
[5] Former cyber chief Lu Wei sentenced to 14 years in jail
Lu Wei (鲁炜), the former head of the powerful Cyberspace Administration of China (CAC), an agency whose role he helped to shape after its formation in 2014 under the Central Cyberspace Affairs Commission (中央网络安全和信息化领导小组), was sentenced today to 14 years in jail for bribery. The sentence, which according to a brief official release from China News Agency, Lu Wei said in court that he would not appeal, marks an ignominious end to Lu’s long career as a propaganda official.

The real factors and events behind Lu’s fall from grace remain unclear, but today’s news release suggested Lu had engaged in corruption through roughly 15 years in senior positions of power, from 2002 to 2017.
The release said Lu had “used the convenience of his positions as a member of the Party Committee, and as secretary and deputy director at Xinhua News Agency, as a member of the Standing Committee of the Beijing Municipal Party Committee, as [Beijing’s] minister of propaganda, as Beijing deputy mayor, as director of the Cyberspace Administration of China and as director of the Office of the the Central Cyberspace Affairs Commission” to illegally exact around 32 million yuan in bribes.
The language of the release, though vague, suggests that Lu is accused essentially of monetizing his position of power within the propaganda system by offering related assistance to companies and individuals. It said that he had leveraged the above-mentioned positions to “offer help to relevant companies and individuals in such areas as internet regulation (网络管理), corporate business (企业经营), job promotion (职务晋升) and work reassignment.”
Photos from the courtroom were posted today through the official Weibo account of the Ningbo People’s Intermediate Court (宁波市中级人民法院).
KEY SOURCES:
Xinhua Daily Telegraph (新华每日电讯): 鲁炜受贿案一审宣判
WeChat public account “Political Knowledge” (政知道): 中宣部原副部长鲁炜获刑14年

Former Cyber Czar Sentenced to 14 Years

Written by David Bandurski on . Posted in Headlines and Hashtags.

Lu Wei (鲁炜), the former head of the powerful Cyberspace Administration of China (CAC), an agency whose role he helped to shape after its formation in 2014 under the Central Cyberspace Affairs Commission (中央网络安全和信息化领导小组), was sentenced today to 14 years in jail for bribery. The sentence, which according to a brief official release from China News Agency, Lu Wei said in court that he would not appeal, marks an ignominious end to Lu’s long career as a propaganda official.
The real factors and events behind Lu’s fall from grace remain unclear, but today’s news release suggested Lu had engaged in corruption through roughly 15 years in senior positions of power, from 2002 to 2017.


The release said Lu had “used the convenience of his positions as a member of the Party Committee, and as secretary and deputy director at Xinhua News Agency, as a member of the Standing Committee of the Beijing Municipal Party Committee, as [Beijing’s] minister of propaganda, as Beijing deputy mayor, as director of the Cyberspace Administration of China and as director of the Office of the the Central Cyberspace Affairs Commission” to illegally exact around 32 million yuan in bribes.
The language of the release, though vague, suggests that Lu is accused essentially of monetizing his position of power within the propaganda system by offering related assistance to companies and individuals. It said that he had leveraged the above-mentioned positions to “offer help to relevant companies and individuals in such areas as internet regulation (网络管理), corporate business (企业经营), job promotion (职务晋升) and work reassignment.”
Photos from the courtroom were posted today through the official Weibo account of the Ningbo People’s Intermediate Court (宁波市中级人民法院).
 

Converging on Control

Written by David Bandurski on . Posted in Headlines and Hashtags.

The most important media story for us over the past week was the publication in Seeking Truth of the full text of President Xi Jinping’s recent speech to a collective study session of the Politburo on “media convergence.” We’ll have more to say about this text in the coming days, but it should be seen as a crucial statement on how the Chinese Communist Party intends to leverage new developments in media and information technology to further consolidate control over society.
We offered a bit of analysis in late January of the language, as we could glimpse it from state media reports, coming out of the collective study session.
As the news came last week that Hu Haifeng, the son of former Chinese President Hu Jintao, has been promoted to the top Party post in the city of Xi’an, readers may be interested to note the ways the Chinese media played down his appearance at the National People’s Congress — as a member of the provincial delegation of Zhejiang, where he has been serving as the party secretary of the city of Lishui.
 
THIS WEEK IN CHINA’S MEDIA
March 9-15, 2019
➢ Food safety incident at school in Chengdu prompts arrest of parents, removal of principal, after trending on social media
➢ Sina rumor-busting account highlights old article on televised confessions newly making the rounds on the internet
➢ Full-text version of Xi Jinping speech on media convergence released
➢ Hu Haifeng, recently elevated to top post in Xi’an, takes part in the “two meetings,” but media go light on reporting
[1] Food safety incident at school in Chengdu prompts arrest of parents, removal of principal, after trending on social media
In the midst of China’s annual “two meetings” of the National People’s Congress (NPC) and Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC), the parent of a student in the primary school division of the Chengdu No. 7 Experimental Middle School posted a photo to social media raising concerns about the possible use of spoiled food in the school canteen. The photo suggested that the school was serving rotten and dangerous meat products and spoiled frozen food products, and vegetables such as potatoes and ginger that were also of questionable quality and safety. The parent alleged that substandard food was the cause of health problems suffered by some students, including diarrhea and bloody stools. Soon parents posted other photographs of food reportedly taken at the school’s canteen, which showed mold growing on slabs of meat.

Images posted online by school parents claiming to show rotten food in the school canteen.
On March 13, parents from the Chengdu No. 7 Experimental Middle School gathered outside the school gates in Chengdu to protest the lack of food safety. The protests moved on to local government offices, and video posted to social media showed protesters being met with police and sprayed with tear gas. The use of tear gas was confirmed by as post made by police from Chengdu’s Wenjiang District (温江区) to their official Weibo account: “In the process, a minimal amount of tear gas was used against certain persons who seriously inhibited the work of law enforcement,” the post said.
Soon after the protests, the Chengdu government announced that it had established a “joint investigative task force” (联合调查组) to look into the accusations against the school. Finally, at a press conference on March 17, a Chengdu police spokesman said that it had been discovered upon review of video cameras in the school’s kitchen that they had had reason to suspect that certain people had entered the canteen’s kitchen and fabricated images of food like those shared online. The spokesperson said that further investigation had revealed that three people, parents of students at the school, had forced their way into the school at around 10PM on March 12 and had ripped open packages of food and damaged it with the intention of making photographs and video to post online. Police said the three were now under investigation for “picking quarrels and provoking trouble” (寻衅滋事罪) — this being a charge frequently leveled at those engaged in acts of protest.
A social media account operated by the official Sichuan Daily shows image comparisons purporting to expose faked online images of substandard food at the Chengdu school.
Chengdu authorities also announced at the press conference that the school’s principal, Jiang Hong (江宏), had been dismissed for inadequate management and lack of responsibility.
KEY SOURCES:
WeChat public account “Sichuan Observer” (川报观察): 现场视频：抹姜黄粉照片如何出炉？看刚刚成都新闻发布会你关心的都回答没？
Peaceful Wenjiang, official Weibo account of police in Chengdu’s Wenjiang District (@平安温江): 警方通报
Weibo account @SichuanDaily (@四川日报): #成都七中实验学校事件调查结果#
China Business Journal (中国经营网): 成都七中实验学校食堂承包商背后利益链调查
[2] Sina rumor-busting account highlights old article on televised confessions newly making the rounds on the internet

On March 9, “Rumor Grabbing Chronicles” (捉谣记), an account on Sina Weibo devoted to the busting of rumors, made a post saying that in the midst of the “two meetings” an article called “CPPCC Delegate Zhu Zhengfu: Confessions of Criminal Suspects on Television Are Not True Confessions” (政协委员朱征夫：嫌犯电视里认罪不等于真有罪) that had made the rounds on social media was in fact an article from 2016 — and so was a classic case of “old news making the rounds again” (旧闻新传).
The old article on televised confessions was apparently of fresh interest to users of Chinese social media due to the recent televised “confession” of Supreme People’s Court judge Wang Linqing (王林清), who was accused by authorities of secreting documents in a high-profile company dispute after first being named as the whistleblower in the case. Many Chinese still suspect there is more to Wang’s case than the authorities are letting on.
KEY SOURCES:
“Rumor Grabbing Chronicles” (捉谣记): 网传朱征夫建议电视认罪要慎重 系2016年报道
The Beijing News (新京报): 全国政协委员朱征夫呼吁，减少甚至取消让犯罪嫌疑人上电视认罪的做法 朱征夫 嫌犯电视里认罪不等于真有罪
[3] Full-text version of Xi Jinping speech on media convergence released
The latest edition of the official Seeking Truth (求是) journal, published on March 16, includes an article called “Accelerating the Development of Media Convergence, Building a Full-Media Broadcasting Structure” (加快推动媒体融合发展 构建全媒体传播格局). The piece is attributed to Xi Jinping.
The Seeking Truth text is in fact a full-text version of a speech President Xi Jinping delivered on January 25 to the 12th Collective Study Session of the Politburo. In the speech, Xi Jinping says: “Our promotion of the development of media convergence is about building and strengthening mainstream public opinion, consolidating the common theoretical foundation for the united struggle of the entire Party and the people of the entire country.” His reference to “mainstream public opinion” is an unambiguous reference in Chinese to public opinion as it is manufactured and controlled under the leadership of the Party, particularly through Party and state-run media.
An article published on the website of Seeking Truth journal bears the byline “Author: Xi Jinping.” This is the full text of Xi’s speech on media convergence.

Xi Jinping also emphasizes: “The development of media convergence is not just a matter for news units, [but we] must transform the social, ideological and cultural public resources, social management big data and policy making authority in our grasp into comprehensive advantages in consolidating and strengthening mainstream public opinion.” This language is the latest and clearest indication that the Chinese Communist Party aims to leverage changes in the nature of information technology to achieve greater social and political control over the Chinese population.
KEY SOURCES:
Seeking Truth (求是): 加快推动媒体融合发展 构建全媒体传播格局
[4] Hu Haifeng, recently elevated to top post in Xi’an, takes part in the “two meetings,” but media go light on reporting
Hu Haifeng (胡海峰), son of Xi Jinping’s predecessor as president and general secretary, Hu Jintao (胡锦涛), attended this year’s session of the National People’s Congress as a member of the official delegation from Zhejiang province, where he has been serving as the Party Secretary of the city of Lishui since July last year. Though Hu is a natural source of interest and public speculation as son of a former top leader who was recently promoted to vice-ministerial rank as the new party secretary of the city of Xi’an, the Chinese news media treated him very cautiously, with coverage understated even in Zhejiang.
Zhejiang Daily (浙江日报), the official Party mouthpiece of Zhejiang, and its commercial spin-off, Qianjiang Evening Post (钱江晚报), published the same article on March 6 bearing the headline: “Zhejiang Delegation Deliberates Government Work Report, Wang Zhen gives Speech, Che Jun and Yuan Jiajun Attend” (浙江代表团审议政府工作报告 王晨讲话 车俊袁家军出席). Che Jun (车俊) is the party secretary of Zhejiang province, and Yuan Jiajun (袁家军) is the current governor and deputy secretary.
The Procuratorate Daily publishes a photo of Hu Haifeng, son of Hu Jintao, as a member of the Zhejiang delegation to the “two meetings.”

The Procuratorate Daily (检察日报), a newspaper published by the Supreme People’s Procuratorate, published a report on March 12 that included a picture of the Zhejiang delegation, Hu Haifeng included.
On March 14, Guangming Online, the site operated by the official Guangming Daily newspaper, reposted an article from the Zhejiang’s official provincial news app that reported on the Zhejiang delegation and identified Hu Haifeng as the “Lishui Party Secretary Hu Haifeng” in the context of a discussion of environmental policies.
KEY SOURCES:
Procuratorate Daily (检察日报): 浙江：推进开放型经济再上新台阶
Zhejiang Daily (浙江日报): 浙江代表团审议政府工作报告 王晨讲话 车俊袁家军出席
Guangming Daily (光明网): 书记市长面对面丨胡海峰：促进生态保护与经济发展的良性互动
 

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