Author: David Bandurski

Now Executive Director of the China Media Project, leading the project’s research and partnerships, David originally joined the project in Hong Kong in 2004. He is the author of Dragons in Diamond Village (Penguin), a book of reportage about urbanization and social activism in China, and co-editor of Investigative Journalism in China (HKU Press).

Mapping Xi Jinping News Thought

Written by David Bandurski on . Posted in China Newspeak.

By this point most everyone has probably seen or read about the superbly abstruse “mind map” (image above) created by state media in China to isolate the strands of President Xi Jinping’s core ideological concept: “Xi Jinping Thought of Socialism With Chinese Characteristics for the New Era” (习近平新时代中国特色社会主义思想). If this is truly a map of Xi Jinping’s mind, one has to wonder: Is he clinical?
But I’m sorry to point out that despite the intensity of the map, there simply is not enough detail when it comes to media policy.
The node on the mind map dealing most directly with media is “19,” about building socialist ideology. This branch looks at issues like addressing “fundamental change in the nature of the public opinion ecology” and other such things, all related to the control of information in the “New Era.” Many of these aspects, however, fall under what has more recently been termed “Xi Jinping News Thought,” or Xi Jinping xinwen sixiang (习近平新闻思想) — a designation that makes Xi the first leader in the reform era to have a “name crowning,” or guanming (冠名), in relation to media policy.
Back in June this year, in fact, the Central Propaganda Department published a book called Teaching Materials in Xi Jinping News Thought (习近平新闻思想讲义).


Fortunately, Xi Jinping News Thought has also been summarized and explicated by state media in China. The following is our translation of a recent piece at China Youth Online (though versions ran earlier in the summer) that outlines the 7 “news” about Xi Jinping News Thought. We added our comments below the translation of each “new.”
Enjoy.
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7 “News” About Xi Jinping News Thought (习近平新闻思想的七个”新”)
October 11, 2018
China Youth Online
Xi Jinping News Thought (习近平新闻思想) is an important integral part of Xi Jinping Though on Socialism With Chinese Characteristics for a New Era. Since the 18th National Congress of the CCP, General Secretary Xi Jinping has given top priority to the Party’s news and public opinion work (新闻舆论工作), has provided new holistic thinking and strategic deployments regarding the new situation and new tasks facing the Party’s news and public opinion work, and has raised many new ideas and new viewpoints.

New positioning (新定位) —— a new positioning of the nature and status of the Party’s news and public opinion work.
“The Party’s news and public opinion work is an important task in the work of the Party, and a major matter in the management of state affairs and in the peace and stability of the country.”
“Properly doing the Party’s news and public opinion work is the banner and path, concerns the implementation of the Party’s theories, lines, principles and policies, concerns the smooth advancement of the work of the Party and the state, concerns the cohesion and force of the entire Party and the people of the whole nation, and concerns the prospects and destiny of the Party and the state.”
——February 19, 2016, Xi Jinping speech to the Party’s News and Public Opinion Work Conference
[NOTE: This positioning is not exactly “new.” In previous administrations there was an emphasis on the importance of “guidance of public opinion,” or control of the media to control the public agenda, as a key component of the Party’s exercise of power. The difference under Xi Jinping is more a matter of intensity, bringing the Party back to the center of media policy and practice. But there is also a greater push under Xi Jinping to redefine the Party’s role relative to society, to put the Party back at the center of not just news but also entertainment, manufacturing (or so is the hope) a new closeness between the Party and the people, addressing a gap noted also in Hu Jintao’s report to the 18th Party Congress in 2012.]
New formulation (新表述) ——making a new formulation of the responsibility and mission of the Party’s news and public opinion work
“Under the conditions of the new era, the responsibility and mission of the news and public opinion work of the Party is: raising high the banner [of the Party] (高举旗帜), leading the way toward [proper] guidance (引领导向), cleaving to the center (围绕中心), serving the overall situation (服务大局), uniting the people (团结人民), raising morale (鼓舞士气), defining social morals (成风化人), creating cohesion (凝心聚力), clearing away [political] errors (澄清谬误), separating true from false (明辨是非), connecting domestic and foreign (联接中外), linking with the world (沟通世界).
——February 19, 2016, Xi Jinping speech to the Party’s News and Public Opinion Work Conference
[NOTE: Again, not a lot of newness here. These are all very familiar terms within the Party’s media control lexicon, and the emphasis on proper guidance etc. is typical. The difference is intensity, and bringing the focus of media intensely and unambiguously around the Party and its leadership. See next entry.]
New judgement (新论断) ——making a new judgement of the guidelines and principles of the Party’s news and public opinion work
“If we are to take on this responsibility and mission, we must place political orientation (政治方向) in the first position, firmly adhering to the principle of Party spirit (党性原则), firmly adhering to the Marxist View of Journalism (马克思主义新闻观), firmly adhering to correct guidance of public opinion (正确舆论导向), firmly adhering to an emphasis on positive propaganda (正面宣传为主).”
“Most fundamental in ensuring that the Party’s news and public opinion work adheres to the principle of Party spirit is to adhere to the Party’s leadership of news and public opinion work. The media operated by the Party and the government are propaganda positions of the Party and the government, and they must be surnamed Party.”
——February 19, 2016, Xi Jinping speech to the Party’s News and Public Opinion Work Conference
[NOTE: This new judgement is actually a concerted return to a very old judgement of the role and function of the news media. In the past under the Chinese Communist Party, we have seen a strong emphasis on the “Party spirit” of the media after political disruptions. The concept rose noticeably in the 1950s around the Anti-Rightist Movement, and it crested again immediately following June 4, 1989, crackdown on pro-democracy demonstrations, becoming then a focus of discussion of the role of the media through to Deng Xiaoping’s “southern tour.” Generally speaking, the rise of “Party spirit” signals a loss, de-emphasis or outright denial of the agency of the press in monitoring power. The more “Party spirit” prevails, the fewer voices one can expect to hear.]
New arrangements (新擘画) —— making new arrangements for the innovation and development of the Party’s news and public opinion work
“Along with changes in the development of the [social/political/international] situation, the Party’s news and public opinion work must innovate its concepts (理念), content (内容), style (体裁), forms (形式), methods (方法), strategies (手段), [industry] formats (业态), systems (体制) and mechanisms (机制), enhancing the focus and effectiveness [of propaganda and public opinion control]. [We must] accommodate the trends in communication toward de-massification (分众化) and differentiation (差异化), accelerating the construction of a new pattern of public opinion channeling (舆论引导新格局).”
—— February 19, 2016, Xi Jinping speech to the Party’s News and Public Opinion Work Conference
“Adhering to correct guidance of public opinion (正确舆论导向), placing a high priority on the building and innovation of broadcast strategies, raising the communication power, influence and credibility of [the Party’s] news and public opinion.
——October 18, 2017, Xi Jinping’s report to the 19th National Congress of the CCP
[NOTE: This is all about advancing the way the Party does media, and on this front under Xi Jinping, the Party is attempting a great deal more “innovation,” aided by the overall shift in the nature of the media environment. Arguably, more tools are now available to the Party in enforcing its dominance in the communication realm than ever before. And the Party recognizes that it can’t have a simple one-size-fits-all approach. In a sense, this is about building in enough responsiveness that the attractiveness of core messages is enhanced — closely related to the next “new.”]
New deployments (新部署) —— making new deployments for online news and public opinion work.
“Right now, patterns of media (媒体格局), the public opinion ecology (舆论生态), audience targets (受众对象) and communication technologies (传播技术) are all undergoing deep change, particularly internet media which are prompting change such has never before been seen in the media sector. Where the readers are, where the audience is, the antennae of propaganda reports must extend, and the pressure points and footholds of news and propaganda work must be placed there.”
—— December 25, 2015, speech on inspection tour of the People’s Liberation Army Daily
“[We] must strengthen positive propaganda online, adhering to the correct political orientation with a clear banner, [adhering to correct] guidance of public opinion, [adhering to correct] value orientations, using Socialism With Chinese Characteristics for the New Era and the spirit of the Party’s 19th National Congress to unite and condense tens of millions of internet users, deeply carrying out education in the ideals and beliefs [of the Party], deepening propaganda and education in Socialism With Chinese Characteristics for the New Era and the Chinese Dream, actively fostering and putting into practice socialist core values (会主义核心价值观), promoting online propaganda concepts, content, forms, methods and strategies and other innovations, having a grasp of timing efficiency (把握好时度效), building a circle of trust online and offline (构建网上网下同心圆), better coalescing social consensus, firming up a mutual ideological foundation for the united of all people in the country.”
—— April 20-21, 2018, emphasized by Xi Jinping during the National Cybersecurity Work Conference
[NOTE: This signals the massive shift away from traditional media as a priority to mobile platforms and products as the focus of “public opinion work,” or media control. This is essentially about ensuring that the very old policy of “positive propaganda,” emphasized at points through the Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao eras, is intensified and effectively applied in a transformed media environment, dominated by WeChat and other platforms. Built into this idea is a notion of semi-responsiveness to audiences — call it audience-sensitive propaganda, if you will. The Party must know where the audiences (the differentiated masses) congregate, how they interact, and then must meet them in these environments through innovated products to deliver what are essentially old messages (about Party dominance of social and political life).]
New treatments (新阐述) —— providing a new treatment of the building of international communication capacity (国际传播能力建设).
“In conducting news and propaganda work under conditions of comprehensive opening to the outside, one important task is to lead people to have a more comprehensive and objective understanding of contemporary China, and view of the outside world.
—— August 19, 2013, emphasized by Xi Jinping at the National Propaganda Work Conference
“[We] must accelerate the building of international communication capacity, enhancing our international discourse power (国际话语权), concentratedly and properly telling the China story, at the same time improving strategic arrangements, applying strength to create flagship media for external propaganda that have strong international influence.”
—— February 19, 2016, emphasized by Xi Jinping at the Party’s News and Public Opinion Work Conference
[NOTE: This is all about the “going out” of Chinese media, and building channels through which the Party can influence audiences overseas, gaining and keeping control of the coverage and framing of issues important to the leadership. The recent restructuring of state media can be seen as an important part of this strategy. Again, not entirely new, in the sense that the building of influential media groups was emphasized even in the 1990s, and Hu Jintao talked about “soft power” and “going out.” But the emphasis under Xi Jinping is intensified, and there is a great deal more confidence, combined with structural change.]
New demands (新要求) —— raising new demands for the strengthening of news and public opinion work team construction
“In strengthening the work of propaganda and ideology departments, we must first of all strengthen our leading cadres and teams. Leaders and comrades at propaganda offices at various levels must strengthen their study and strengthen their experience, truly becoming experts in which others can place their trust.”
—— August 19, 2013, emphasized by Xi Jinping at the National Propaganda Work Conference
“[We] must deeply conduct education in the Marxist View of Journalism, leading the masses of news and public opinion workers to become disseminators advocating the Party’s policies, recorders of the conditions of the times, promoters of social progress, and guardians of fairness and justice.
The crux of media competition is the competition for talent, and the core of advantage in the media is the talent advantage. [We] must accelerate the training and creation of news and public opinion teams that are staunch in their politics (政治坚定), that excel in their business (业务精湛), that conduct themselves well (作风优良), that can be trusted by the Party and the people.”
—— February 19, 2016, emphasized by Xi Jinping at the Party’s News and Public Opinion Work Conference
 

People's Daily (Overseas) on Mallet Case

Written by David Bandurski on . Posted in Headlines and Hashtags.

Over the weekend we had another quasi-official Chinese voice commenting on the Victor Mallet visa case in Hong Kong, in the form of a page-four piece in the overseas edition of the People’s Daily. We say quasi-official because the overseas edition is more peripheral relative to such central Party media as Xinhua News Agency and the flagship People’s Daily newspaper, both of which might be considered more closely reflective of the leadership’s position.
China’s media approach to the story at present continues to be entrusting the response to the Hong Kong government, to pro-Beijing members of LEGCO, and to pro-Beijing newspapers like the Ta Kung Pao and the Wen Wei Po, both of which are controlled by the Liaison Office of the Central Government.
The following piece, published on Saturday, offers a brief “background” on the Mallet case, and then includes a series of comments from pro-Beijing Hong Kong politicians and media, mostly emphasizing issues of national sovereignty and national security.
_______________________________________________


 
Why Should Hong Kong Explain Not Issuing Visa For British Journalist (Voices)
People’s Daily Overseas Edition / October 13, 2018, page 04
Background: In recent days the Hong Kong Immigration Department denied a visa to FCC executive vice-president Victor Mallet, Asia News Editor for the British Financial Times newspaper, after which the Foreign & Commonwealth Office and the US Consulate in Hong Kong demanded that the Hong Kong SAR Government offer an explanation. A number of opposition party forces in Hong Kong were thereupon stirred into action, criticizing this matter as “harming press freedom” (伤害新闻自由). In Hong Kong, Mallet went against the opposition of the SAR Government in inviting a “Hong Kong independence” advocate to speak at the FCC.
“First, the immigration policies of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region are within the scope of our autonomy under the ‘One Country, Two Systems’ arrangement; Second, the Immigration Department makes a determination for each individual case under current laws and policies; Third, it is consistently our policy not to comment publicly on or explain, or make justify individual cases handled by the Immigration Department, and everyone should know that this general practice internationally. The Hong Kong SAR Government will not tolerate any promotion that advances the interests of “Hong Kong independence,” damaging national security or territorial integrity.”
— Hong Kong Chief Executive Carrie Lam (林郑月娥)
 
“For any region, it is absolutely impossible that there exist a situation in which any foreign must be issued a work visa without conditions. Moreover, in this recent situation we have a person showing utter contempt for China’s national sovereignty and security, willfully engaging in conduct that damages China’s sovereignty and security. This being the case, [he] must bear the consequences.”
——Hong Kong’s Ta Kung Pao (大公报)
 
“In fact, Britain and the United States often prevent foreign nationals from entering their countries without providing justification. There are myriad such cases, and those denied have included students, professionals, businesspeople and even politicians. What links all of these cases is the fact that Britain and the United States have not comment on each situation. And now they expect the Hong Kong SAR Government to break with convention and provide an explanation in the Mallet case. This clearly is a failure to hold oneself to the same standard one holds others.
——Hong Kong’s Wen Hui Pao (文汇报)
 
“Those working, traveling or studying in Hong Kong must abide by the laws of Hong Kong. Relevant laws clearly cannot be used to [defame]颠覆, to damage the foundation of national sovereignty and national security, and any person regardless of what channels they use to reach Hong Kong, must abide by relevant regulations. The reasons and motivations of opposition party representatives in demanding the government provide an explanation do not hold water. Denying a visa to these people who damage national security is a completely separate matter to the preservation of freedom of expression, and these must not be confused. The majority of Hong Kong citizens will support the methods of the government.
——Hong Kong Representative to the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference, Tu Haiming (屠海鸣)
 
“For certain opposition parties to discuss this incident as an attack on ‘freedom of expression’ and ‘press freedom’ completely lacks reason. The denial of a work visa to Mallet is a decision legally taken by relevant Hong Kong departments according to laws and procedures, and it should not be politicized. Every day there are hundreds or thousands of foreign reporters working freely in Hong Kong, and the press freedom of the Hong Kong news media has not at all been affected.
——LEGCO Member Leung Che-cheung (梁志祥)
 
“The Foreign Correspondents Club previously ignored the advice of the Central Government and the SAR Government, going their own way and insisting on inviting the convener of the ‘Hong Kong National Party’ to their lunch talk, providing a platform for promoting the idea of ‘Hong Kong independence’ in various circles and internationally. This was a show of extreme disrespect for China’s national sovereignty and security. If such an event were to happen overseas, how would foreign governments welcome these sorts of people?
——Chairman of Hong Kong Thinkers Wilson Or Chong-shing (柯创盛)
 

The Disciplinary Failure of Dignity

Written by David Bandurski on . Posted in Headlines and Hashtags.

In a report last week, The Paper, an online news site operated by the Shanghai United Media Group, revealed that Zhao Siyun (赵思运), a professor at the Communication University of Zhejiang serving as deputy director of the Academy of Literature, had been issued with a “severe internal-Party warning” (党内严重警告) for a speech he gave in September to incoming students.
According to a university document cited by The Paper, Professor Zhao was being disciplined because his welcome speech to students had “contained violations of political discipline” (政治纪律). As a result of the incident, Zhao’s prior words and conduct were also apparently subjected to greater scrutiny, and the notice alleged (in apparent reference to Zhao’s social media accounts or online speech) that between 2013 and 2015 he had “shared and posted erroneous remarks, creating a negative influence.”
What exactly did Zhao say?

A notice from the Party Committee of the Communication University of Zhejiang outlines the disciplinary procedures against Zhao Siyun.
His welcome speech to incoming students focusses broadly on principles of “self-discipline,” “respect,” “dignity” and “responsibility” — none of which would seem unwelcome concepts to instill in young minds. But Zhao’s address links these principles first and foremost to the individual — and independent — agency of the student and intellectual as “living creatures capable of independent thought,” each with their own “completely unique dignity and value.”
Zhao’s masterstroke of political mischief seems to have been his resurrection and definition of the concept of the “public intellectual,” or gonggong zhishifenzi (公共知识分子). This term has become a deeply sensitive one in China over the past decade, and has never in the reform era been more sensitive than it is now under Xi Jinping. Readers may remember that the notion of “civil society,” closely connected to the role of the public intellectual, was explicitly targeted in the so-called “Document 9” in 2013, which even months before Xi’s August speech on ideology that emphasized the supremacy of the “Party spirit” that proponents of civil society “want to squeeze the Party out of leadership of the masses at the local level.”
In his welcome speech, even Zhao notes the sensitivity of the term, saying: “In recent years, the idea of ‘the public intellectual’ has been stigmatized, and there is a need for us to get back to the roots of this concept.”
At the root of Zhao’s failure of “political discipline” is the notion (so threatening to the Party) that the intellectual, that the thinking mind, owes its allegiance primarily to independent conscience of the individual — that the intellectual finds self-respect and dignity in knowing her own mind in relation to society, and in applying her knowledge and conscience to the betterment of that society.
As a matter of immediate context, we should remember that the Party’s own discipline regulations, recently revised with an emphasis on Xi Jinping and the centrality of his leadership, put the Party itself as the heart of discipline. What the Party demands is loyalty. Dignity? The only ideas that will be dignified are those that serve the interests of the Party, and of Xi Jinping as the Party’s “core.”
We include a partial translation of Zhao Siyun’s welcome speech below.
Readers may note that there are various versions of the story of the death of translator Fu Lei and his wife, Zhu Meifu, at the outset of the Cultural Revolution. In his speech, Zhao returns to this image of the couple as symbols of love and partnership, but also of deep and unshakeable conscience, refusing “vulgar compromise.”
 

The Public Intellectual is a Scarce Resource
By Zhao Siyun (赵思运) / September 30, 2018
Beloved classmates, and respected teachers, good morning!
I’m really delighted that at the right time, in the right place, we have all the right people here! On behalf of the Academy of Literature (文学院), I offer the warmest congratulations and welcome to all of you who have come today!
Everyone has had a look around already, and all of us here are from the Academy of Literature! But what especially makes me happy today is to look out and see in your faces so thirsty for knowledge my own younger self. Allow me in the name of youth to take this opportunity to speak my heart.
Each year when new students arrive, parents will pull teachers, class heads or leaders aside and say: “We leave our children in your hands!” This is about trust, about great trust, and I thank everyone for the trust they have placed in the Academy of Literature. However, from another perspective, it’s as though you are household “valuables” that have been placed from your family hands into the school’s hands. What I want to say is that you do not belong to your parents, and you do not belong to the school. You are living creatures capable of independent thought (独立思考), and you each have your own completely unique dignity and value. Your parents watch you grow, and your teachers watch you grow. Your parents have been your left hand, and your teachers have been your right hand. Now, 18 years of age, you are entering the university campus, and beginning your own independent journey in life. From here on out, you will begin to find maturity. The first sign of maturity is “self-discipline” (自律). This is the first keyword I would like to discuss with everyone today.
Self-discipline is a form of cultural conditioning. This process of education comes through the details of daily life. We can carry out self-examination: When others pour water for me, do I support them with my own hand as a way of showing respect? When I offer drink or food or wine to others, do I do so with both hands? When I am the last to enter through the door, do I remember to close the door behind me? When I ask a question to my teacher, should I stand first? Look again at the classmates all around you. Haven’t we had classmates that already within five minutes have gone off to the toilet as though no one else is around them? Or classmates who just before class is about to finish will just head off for the toilet as though no one else is around? Let us remember: a person capable of self-examination, and who is full of self-restraint, has real spiritual strength!
Let me talk next about respect and dignity. We are all equal in life, and we have inviolable dignity. Therefore, people should uphold mutual respect between one another. During Teacher’s Day this year, a student I taught during my first year of teaching, Qin Xulin (秦绪林), sent me a poem that he wrote, and in this poem he talked about how one day he went to my office to seek my input on something, and he felt a sense of “equality” and “respect” between teacher and student. From his description of our exchange, I get a deep sense of how a teacher must maintain an attitude of equality and mutual respect.
King Edward [VIII] of England once went visiting among the poor in London, and he stood in the doorway of a dilapidated house and said to penniless old man inside: “May I come in?” This demonstrated his respect for those at the lower strata of society. We might even witness greatness in the person of a female prisoner. On January 21, 1793, as one female prisoner was led up to the guillotine at the Place de la Concorde in Paris, she inadvertently stepped on the foot of her executioner, and immediately she spouted out: “Pardon me, sir.” I was really moved by that story. And I would say that that female prisoner showed “greatness.”
We could look also at the famous translator [of Balzac into Chinese] Fu Lei (傅雷). On September 2, 1966, after two days and three nights of incessant humiliation at the hands of Red Guards, the translator Fu Lei was, “like the silent prophet, or the solitary lion, resentful and proud, never stooping to vulgar compromise or bowing his head” (in the words of his son, Fu Cong).  For the sake of dignity, on that night, he and his wife Zhu Meifu (朱梅馥) went hand-in-hand to death inside their house on Shanghai’s Jiangsu Road. Zhu Meifu prepared warm water so that Fu Lei could ingest his poison. In order to preserve Fu Lei’s dignity, Zhu Meifu propped him gently on the sofa, and then herself ripped up the bedsheets to make a noose with which to hand herself. She was 53 years old. In order to ensure that the sound of her kicking away the stool would not wake the neighbors, they first spread a quilt out on the floor. Then, quietly, they went . . . .
But very often we grow estranged from our sense of “respect” and “dignity.” Over the summer this year, I saw in my neighborhood a repairman working under the blazing sun. I said to him respectfully: “You’re working hard!” He didn’t respond. I said more loudly this time: “You’re working hard!” This time, he raised his head and gave me a look of acknowledgement, but still said nothing. After I had passed, I heard him behind me saying under his breath: “Does that guy think I’m someone he knows?” That’s right, self-respect and conducting oneself with dignity are valuable points of character. Respecting others begins with respect for oneself; it begins with the discovery of one’s own dignity. As teachers and students in the Academy of Literature, we must always seek out respect for life, must seek out the meaning of life, and we must protect our integrity and dignity.
The third issue I want to discuss with you is the way personal dignity and the vigor of our national character (国家民族的担当) are closely linked together. As university students in the New Era, you must take responsibility for the future of the country and our people. The famous scholar Ge Zhaoguang (葛兆光) said recently: “Our university system today is giving rise to a generation of people who tend toward their specializations but have no care for their society.” Peking University professor Qian Liqun (钱理群) hit the crux of the issues a few years ago when he said: “Chinese universities are raising a mass of pure egoists (精致的利己主义者).” On this note, I call on you — to carry on the great tradition of intellectuals: “In my ears are the sounds of wind, rain and reading; but my heart cares for the affairs of home, country and people.” I call on you — to rebuild the belief in “public values” (公共价值) among intellectuals.
In recent years, the idea of “the public intellectual” (公共知识分子) has been stigmatized, and there is a need for us to get back to the roots of this concept. The precise sense of the “public intellectual” is someone knowledgeable who has a background in scholarship and professionalism; someone who offers advice to society and who takes action in public affairs; an idealist who is vested with a critical spirit and a sense of nerve and justness. This right now is a spiritual resource that is scarce. Social responsibility is a sense of responsibility for the entire public, and it is required of each and every one of us, so that no one can find any reason to choose silence. There is a very good saying that goes like this: “To let everyone know the facts you know is to have justice; to share your understanding with everyone is to have responsibility; to tell everyone of the wickedness you have witnessed is to have conscience; to tell everyone the truth you understand is to have morals; to warn everyone of the lies you hear is to have fraternity . . . . ” Only those who have a deep and abiding love for their country and their people will criticize the darker aspects of their society. Only those who cherish the light will go and expose the vile corners of life. Because they know that this is their responsibility, that it is the bounden duty of the modern citizen! These days, we see every day how people online throw out curses about “bad people are getting old” (坏人变老了) — [NOTE: This is a popular online phrase about elderly people forcing courtesy on the young, such as making them give up train seats that are legitimately theirs] — but we should caution ourselves and wonder whether in years to come future generations might curse us in exactly the same way, saying that “bad people are getting old!” I also want to say that justice isn’t about just complaining and letting off steam. Primitive justice may be precious, but true justice is justice built on reason and law.
. . . .

Professor punished for praise of public intellectuals

Written by David Bandurski on . Posted in Headlines and Hashtags.

This week in China’s media, the authorities seemed not to know quite what to do about a speech by US Vice President Mike Pence sharply criticizing China and accusing it of election meddling. A full-text version of the speech in Chinese was not deleted from the official WeChat account of the US Embassy in China. But authorities still moved to curtail sharing of the post. Meanwhile, the same material on Weibo seemed to still be shareable up through this weekend.
We also had news this week that a professor from Communication University of Zhejiang was disciplined by university officials for apparently putting a positive spin on the notion of the “public intellectual,” or gonggong zhishifengzi (公共知识分子), which has been a highly sensitive notion for the Chinese Communist Party in the past decade — but particularly so under Xi Jinping. The professor’s public speech, delivered during a welcome ceremony for incoming students, was reportedly called, “Public Intellectuals Are a Scarce Resource.” Well, he’s not wrong about that.
 
THIS WEEK IN CHINA’S MEDIA
October 6-12, 2018
➢ China speech by US Vice-President Pence enters Chinese social media, handled cautiously on WeChat
➢ TV host Cui Yongyuan again accuses police of negligence, and alleges that Shanghai police accepted bribes in pursuit of Fan Bingbing case
➢ Professor accused of inappropriate speech on “public intellectuals” at welcome ceremony for incoming students
➢ Prime-time program on China Central Television introduces the special vocabulary of Xi Jinping
➢ Weibo experiments with “full-site blocking of blacklisted individual accounts” (一人拉黑，全站禁评)
[1] China speech by US Vice-President Pence enters Chinese social media, handled cautiously on WeChat
On October 6, 2018, the U.S. Embassy in China used its WeChat public account to share a Chinese-language version of the October 4 speech on China by Vice President Mike Pence. While the authorities were unhappy with the substance of Pence’s remarks, which dealt with the steps China is allegedly taking to undermine the Trump administration ahead of mid-term elections, they did not move to delete the U.S. Embassy post. However, sharing and saving of the post as well as copying of its link were all disabled on the WeChat platform.


By contrast, sharing and commentary on content about the Pence speech shared by “@USEmbassyinChina” (@美国驻华大使馆) on Weibo was still possible.
Key Chinese Sources:
WeChat public account “US Embassy in China” (美国驻华大使馆): 彭斯副总统讲话全文
Weibo “@USEmbassyinChina” (@美国驻华大使馆): 彭斯副总统讲话全文
[2] TV host Cui Yongyuan again accuses police of negligence, and alleges that Shanghai police accepted bribes in pursuit of Fan Bingbing case
On October 7 and 10, celebrity television host Cui Yongyuan (崔永元) made two Weibo posts — “One sigh and one roll of thunder” (一声长叹一声雷) and “Informing on the police” (举报公安) — in which he accused police in Shanghai of corruption, saying that, “Once, right in my face they drank wine that was 20,000 yuan a bottle, and smoked cigarettes that were 1,000 yuan apiece, and took away hundreds of thousands of yuan in a bag.” In the posts, he also alleged that Beijing police had done nothing in the face of Cui’s reports that he was receiving threats. By the weekend, Cui’s first post had received more than 12 million reads and 9,367 likes.
Facing public opinion pressure, Shanghai police issued a notice on October 10 saying that the accusations made in Cui’s post pointed to possible illegal conduct by their officers, a matter they viewed with seriousness. But they also said they had tried on numerous occasions to contact Cui about these accusations but had been unable to reach him — and they hoped Cui could cooperate with their investigation. Cui retorted that the suggested that he was unreachable was nonsense. And he again accused one officer, Peng Fen (彭奋), the former deputy head of the economic crimes division in Shanghai’s Changning District, of corruption.
Through its official WeChat account, the Legal Daily (法制日报) wrote commented on Cui’s “One sigh and one roll of thunder” post by saying that the case, now exposed, must be investigated thoroughly.
Key Chinese Sources:
Cui Yongyuan’s Weibo account (@小崔读书汇): 一声长叹一声雷
Cui Yongyuan’s Weibo account (@小崔读书汇): 举报公安
Official Weibo account of Shanghai PSB (@警民直通车-上海
警情通报)
WeChat public account “Legal Daily” (法制日报): 法制日报评《一声长叹一声雷》：有人捅破这层纸，就该深查下去!
21st Century Business Herald (21世纪经济报道): “快鹿系”集资诈骗案上海庭审： 投资人实际经济损失逾百亿
China Times (华夏时报): “快鹿系”集资诈骗案开审:集资规模超400亿未兑付逾百亿
[3] Professor accused of inappropriate speech on “public intellectuals” at welcome ceremony for incoming students
On October 12, The Paper learned from a source at the Communication University of Zhejiang that the deputy director of the university’s Academy of Literature, Zhao Siyun (赵思运), had been disciplined by the university with the issue of an “serious warning of internal Party discipline” (党内严重警告处分).
Professor Zhao Siyun, whose speech on “public intellectuals” reportedly angered university officials.
On September 30, the Communication University of Zhejiang had held its welcome ceremony for the 2018 entrance class, for which Professor Zhao Siyun had delivered a speech called “Public Intellectuals Are a Scarce Resource” (公共知识分子是一种稀缺资源). The speech treated the notion of the “public intellectual,” a term that now bears deep political stigma in China, as something positive. Not long after the speech, the university issued a formal document deciding that a “serious warning of internal Party discipline” would be issued in the matter.
The university document shows that Zhao Siyun has been accused of “the existence of problems in violation of political discipline” (存在违反政治纪律的问题). According to the document, on September 30, 2018, Zhao Siyun was serving in an interim role in charge of administrative matters at the school, and in his speech for the 2018 welcome ceremony he made “certain inappropriate remarks” (其中有个别不当用语). The university noted in the document, moreover, that Zhao had made certain “erroneous expressions” (发表错误言论) in the 2013-2015 period that had had “definite negative influence” (一定负面影响).
Key Chinese Sources:
QQ Daily Brief (天天快报): 浙传教授赵思运被校方处分，新生开学典礼致辞有个别不当用语
The Paper (澎湃新闻): 开学典礼致辞有不当用语 浙传一教授被处分
Bai Jia Hao “Shi Feike” (百家号”石扉客”): 观察 ｜ 终于有人站出来为公知正名了
[4] Prime-time program on China Central Television introduces the special vocabulary of Xi Jinping
The “Lecture Room” (百家讲坛) program on China Central Television, the country’s state broadcaster, is now running a special series of episodes called “Bringing the Language of ‘Ping’ Closer to the People: The Dictionary of General Secretary Xi Jinping (平”语”近人——习近平总书记用典). From October 8 through October 19, the program will run at 8PM each night.
The program, created jointly by the Central Propaganda Department and China Media Group, the state-run conglomerate created in March 2018 by combining CCTV and China National Radio, draws on the phrases and concepts in Xi Jinping’s speeches to promote his so-called “banner term” (旗帜语), “Xi Jinping Thought of Socialism With Chinese Characteristics for a New Era” (习近平新时代中国特色社会主义思想). The program series will have 12 episodes in all.

According to one report in Guangming Daily, the series has created a stir — and of course they mean that in a good way — among intellectuals in China: “The broad masses of intellectuals have brushed up [their knowledge of Xi Jinping’s] important speeches, again reading his classic writings, and felt deeply heartened by Xi Jinping Thought of Socialism With Chinese Characteristics for a New Era . . . ”
Between September 30 and October 4 this year, another propaganda program on the study of Xi Jinping’s ideas aired on Hunan Satellite TV, Hunan Education TV and People’s Daily Online. This program, “The Tide of Socialism” (社会主义有点潮), was created by the Hunan Provincial Propaganda Department (湖南省委宣传部) and the Hunan Broadcasting System (湖南广播电视台).
Key Chinese Sources:
CCTV Online (中央电视台网站): “百家讲坛”特别节目《平”语”近人》播出
Guangming Daily (光明日报): 人民情怀 理政智慧 文化自信 《平”语”近人——习近平总书记用典》引起知识界热烈反响
Xinhua Online (新华网): 《平”语”近人——习近平总书记用典》引发社会共鸣
People’s Daily Online (人民网): 推动习近平新时代中国特色社会主义思想“天天见”“天天新”“天天深”大型理论节目 《社会主义有点潮》第二季《新时代学习大会》今日开播
AND: 大型理论节目《新时代学习大会》开播

[5] Weibo experiments with “full-site blocking of blacklisted individual accounts” (一人拉黑，全站禁评)
On September 26, content managers at Weibo issued a notice about a trial system called “comment bans for blacklisting” (博主拉黑禁评), to be tested on September 27, in which account holders who had comments deleted and were blacklisted (拉黑) by other users (博主) would be prevented from all comment functions throughout the Weibo platform for 3 days. This effectively meant that if a user made a comment that resulted in blacklisting by another user with a moderating role on one portion of the Weibo platform (including on the moderator’s own Weibo posts), the user making the comment would be prevented from commenting anywhere else on the platform. The trial was to first be introduced for Weibo users with more than 100,000 fans, and the same services later offered to all verified users (认证用户) and Weibo members (微博会员) on the Weibo platform.
Some remarking on the new trial system argued that it disregarded one of the key steps in the blacklisting process — the mechanism of appeals (申诉机制). The system could mean, they said, that “Big V” users on Weibo, those with large followings, would be able to exercise censorship of others without any oversight or consequences, and ordinary users would pay the price.
Key Chinese Sources:
The Paper (澎湃新闻网): 新浪微博测试新功能：账号被博主删评并拉黑，将全站禁评3天
WeChat public account “Media Observer” (微信公众号”传媒大观察”): 微博推出的“博主拉黑禁止评论”，这些年真是为评论区操碎了心
Zhihua (知乎): 如何看待新浪微博在 9 月 27 日上线的「博主拉黑全站禁评」功能？

Discourse Climate Report: September 2018

Written by David Bandurski on . Posted in China Newspeak.

We are pleased to announce that CMP’s discourse analysis team has now released its monthly “discourse climate report” for September 2018, looking at how the core vocabularies of the Chinese Communist Party are moving in the official media, under the direction of Qian Gang. The report is available in Chinese below.
A few highlights. The report notes that the phrase pairing “one position as the highest authority, making the final decisions” (定于一尊, 一锤定音), which seemed to aggrandize Xi’s leadership position and was used in both July and August in the People’s Daily, was not used in September. You can read our July discussion of the history of these phrases here. The only use last month of the term “one position as the highest authority” in isolation came in a piece about the development of rule of law in China since the 18th National Congress of the CCP, and used the phrase in a negative context: “There does not exist in the world a model of rule of law that is in a position of supremacy, nor does there exist a path to rule of law that can be applied everywhere.”
The September report also takes a look at the history in the People’s Daily of the term “socialist transformation” (社会主义改造). The term became a topic of discussion outside official state media in September, thanks in large part to an online post claiming China was entering a “second era of socialist transformation.” For a summary of this story, our readers can turn to Qian Gang’s October 3 analysis.
Our September report concludes with a look back on the history of the phrase “supervision by public opinion” (舆论监督), which in the reform era has long encompassed the notion that the press should have a role in monitoring power.
The phrase was used more actively after 1992, following Deng Xiaoping’s “southern tour,” and by 1994 was being given a definite degree of priority by the top leadership. The period from 2003-2012 marked what now appears in retrospect to have been a rare decade for “supervision by public opinion,” in which the phrase signaled the rising power (and right) of the media to set the agenda through more critical, and even investigative, coverage — aided by changes in technology, and by the general development of (more or less) civil society (公民社会).
Since 2013, and the final ill-fated “New Century Forum on News Supervision By Public Opinion” (新世纪新闻舆论监督研讨会) — a conference on watchdog journalism organized for more than a decade by CMP fellow Zhan Jiang (展江) — the environment for “supervision by public opinion” has worsened considerably. The phrase “supervision by public opinion” has been usurped almost entirely by the phrase “channeling of public opinion” (引导舆论), a term for the active control by the authorities of news topics and discussion.
As a phrase of importance, it seems, “supervision by public opinion” is history.
 
——————————————
 
九月语象速递丨全凭爹爹做主
9月，17级台风“山竹”袭击广东-海南沿海；女性维权声浪中，滴滴事件一波未平，快递事件又掀波澜。在词云图中，16字长语热度不减。


根据香港大学新闻及传媒研究中心中国传媒研究计划（CMP）划分的六级语温梯度（沸、烫、热、暖、温、冷），9月关键词语温分布如下：
数据来源：人民日报图文数据库 *以上语温等级，均使用占比方法测定。参见《钱钢语象报告：党媒关键词温度测试》
九月，关键词语的语温变化几乎为一级升降，只有两词例外：“维稳”跳动两级，由温升热；“雄安”跳动两级，由冷升暖。
全面深化改革、两个一百年、依法治国、市场经济为本月“新烫”，上月为热词。其中，市场经济为八月新词。
结合前几个月看，八月一些热词降了温，九月又纷纷恢复为热词，如：五位一体、四个全面、红色基因、深度贫困。“善治”一词更是三个月以来连连升温，由冷升热。这些词语大多与十九大关联。
也有不少词语热度降低，如军民融合、四风、生态建设由热降暖；协商民主、大众创业、万众创新由暖降温；以德治国、政务公开、妄议、政治建军、邓小平理论、三个代表由温降冷。
 

13个关键词测温


本月邓小平理论、三个代表两词持续降温，由温入冷。从二月起一直凉凉的“和谐社会”由冷转温，半数相关报道与“三农”问题相关，如9月28日《人民日报》重刊习近平总书记在上海工作期间对推动“三农”发展的思考与实践，其中，他在2007年5月13日上海市委八届十二次全会讲话中提出，要把上海农民民生问题解决好，上海才能率先构建社会主义和谐社会。
“以人为本”和“市场经济”均在经历8月降温后升温，分别回归“暖”“温”序列。
16字长语在经历了8月的短暂降温后，再次回归沸点。
 

中央政要


他（684次）仍然遥遥领先，李克强持平为烫词（48次），较上月（76次）有大幅下降。九月，他出席中非合作论坛北京峰会、赴俄罗斯出席第四届东方经济论坛、对非洲4国进行国事访问、出席金砖国家领导人第十次会晤。李总理本月出席了第十二届夏季达沃斯论坛、公布《国务院关于修改部分行政法规的决定》，对10部行政法规的部分条款予以修改。
除了这两位，其他人出现频率如图所示。中央外事工作委员会办公室主任杨洁篪（55次）出现次数高于李克强（48次），位居第二，由暖升烫，这一变化与九月外事访问以及国际政要会议较多有关。中央书记处书记、中央办公厅主任丁薛祥（46次），中共中央政治局常委、全国政协主席汪洋（42次）同属烫级。
栗战书（30次）、韩正（24次）、孙春兰（23次）、胡春华（18次）、赵乐际（17次）、王岐山（16次）、黄坤明（15次），跟在后面，为热级。王晨出现14次，有所下降，成为暖，李希由冷升温（4次）。
九月，人民日报上没有见到中共中央政治局委员、重庆市委书记陈敏尔的身影。
 

地方政要


从地方官媒曝光量来看，和八月份一样，西藏党委书记吴英杰（105次）仍然占据榜首，广东省委书记李希（86次）第二，河北省委书记王东峰（83次）位居第三，由于开展“山竹”防治指挥工作，海南省委书记刘赐贵亮相次数大幅上升，为83次，与王东峰同居第三。随后是山东省委书记刘家义（63次）和广西党委书记鹿心社（63次）。
本月曝光量变动比较大的有广西党委书记鹿心社，和四川省委书记彭清华。前者从上月的21次，上升至本月的63次。后者从上月的34次，上升到本月59次。

外国元首


本月外国政要曝光排名有较大变化，上月位居第一的特朗普大幅下降，排名第四，只出现11次。排在他前面的依次是俄罗斯总统普京（30次）、南非总统拉马福萨（28次）、朝鲜劳动党委员长、国务委员会委员长金正恩（15次）。
本月，习近平赴俄罗斯出席第四届经济论坛，和“最知心的好朋友”普京进行了多次会面。出席中非合作论坛北京峰会、对南非进行国事访问，巩固中非团结合作关系。9月9日为朝鲜国庆70周年，习近平向金正恩致贺电，强调中朝两国是山水相连的友好邻邦，愿携手推动中朝关系长期健康稳定发展。
此前几个月，特朗普在《人民日报》上的出镜率基本第一，八、九两月的排位都相对靠后，提到他，《人民日报》表示“继续对伊朗和其领导人进行抨击”、“特朗普极端的“美国第一”路线甚至在直接受益的群体中都已播下了不信任的种子”、“特朗普政府对自中国进口产品加征关税，是不负责任的贸易保护主义，严重违反了世贸组织规则”。
九月，人民日报上没有见到加拿大总理特鲁多的身影。
 

本月聚焦

定于一尊？

“定于一尊”“一锤定音”组合曾出现于7、8两月的人民日报，分别为4次、3次，语温属“冷”；9月则在人民日报零出现。
9月7日新华社通稿《努力创造无愧于新时代的光辉业绩》报道对5月中央办公厅印发的《关于进一步激励广大干部新时代新担当新作为的意见》的反应。文章使用了“定于一尊 一锤定音”，全国仅19份报纸刊发。人民日报没有转载这篇通稿，而是刊登了该报记者采写的同题材报道《让想干事者有机会 让能干事者有舞台》，未使用“定于一尊，一锤定音”。延伸至全国报纸，九月在报纸上未出现“定于一尊 一锤定音”的省（市）有：北京、天津、上海、河北、吉林、黑龙江、江苏和安徽。
人民日报本月惟一一次使用“定于一尊”，是负面意义的，《绘就全面依法治国的斑斓画卷——党的十八大以来我国全面推进依法治国新成就综述》一文提到：“世界上不存在定于一尊的法治模式，也不存在放之四海而皆准的法治道路”。
有趣的是，上海新民晚报9月13日刊登《同娱盛夏“大家猜”》的文章，提到在上海工人文化宫的灯谜大家猜活动中，有一条谜面是戏剧中常用的语句“全凭爹爹做主”，打一成语。谜底是“定于一尊”（尊，令尊，父亲也）。
 

“金融监管”微信指数飙高

全球金融危机之后，我国金融监管经历了一系列的探索和模式演变。2008年推出4万亿的投资计划。在逆周期的经济刺激政策之下，国民经济在2012年之后开始企稳回升，但是由于原有的产业结构升级并未到位，4万亿的投资计划给国民经济带来的负面冲击如产能过剩、资产价格泡沫等问题日益显现。同时，国家经济发展面临的外部环境日益复杂，经济积累的系统性风险上升，每一次危机都意味着金融监管的失败和随之而来的重大变革。
9月，金融监管相关组织也是动作频频，通过“微信指数”，可看出相关活动及讨论的传播走势。


9月伊始，“金融监管”的搜索指数攀升，并于9月5日到达近90日曲线的最高点。归因于8月底银保监会、证监会的一系列举措：8月29日，中国银保监会召开银行保险监管工作电视电话会议，学习贯彻党中央、国务院关于下半年经济金融工作的安排部署，对近期重点工作任务提出要求；8月31日，银保监会依法对5家省联社违法违规问题进行行政处罚，同日，证监会正式印发《中国证监会监管科技总体建设方案》。
第二个峰值出现在9月8日。前一天，国务院金融稳定发展委员会召开第三次会议，分析当前经济金融形势。会议认为，当前各类金融风险得到稳妥有序防范化解，金融市场风险意识和市场约束逐步增强，要防范“黑天鹅”，保持股市、债市、汇市平稳健康发展。据统计，自今年7月新一届国务院金融委亮相至今以来，两个多月时间里已经召开三次会议及一次专题会议，并且都是国务院副总理、金融委主任刘鹤主持。
之后，搜索指数波动下降，16日到达一个低点。9月16日下午 纪念改革开放四十年暨50人论坛成立二十周年学术研讨会在北京举行，刘鹤出席论坛，吴敬琏、樊刚、吴晓灵等业界专家学者齐聚北京。论坛上，经济学界的智囊们既总结成功经验，又从不同角度澄清了当前束缚改革的一些阻力和变数。其中，防范系统性金融风险、完善金融监管，仍是讨论的主题之一。次日，搜索指数出现一个新的小高峰。
随后，受中秋假期的影响，22至24日的指数都处于低位，节后略有回升。
与搜索指数情况相反，人民日报和全国报刊中出现“金融监管”的文章篇数，在9月明显下滑（见下图）。

“第二次社会主义改造”

临近改革开放40周年纪念日，2018年9月，中国网络上出现多篇逆改革开放的文章或讲话。
9月11日，一个叫吴小平的人提出“中国私营经济已完成协助公有经济发展的任务，应逐渐离场”。
同一天，人力资源和社会保障部副部长邱小平在一个会议上讲话，号召私营企业职工“参与企业管理、共享企业发展成果”。
仅仅5天后，9月16日，一个党校教授发表下面的文章：


作者称：“共产党人从来不屑于隐瞒自己的观点和意图：消灭私有制”，“中国进入第二次社会主义改造时期已经成熟”。
这一系列逆改革言论，使网络哗然。“社会主义改造”，这个已经很少在媒体出现的词语，又变成了传播热词。
1949年中共建政，实行的是新民主主义制度。从1952年到1956年，对农业、手工业和资本主义工商业进行了社会主义改造，社会主义的基本制度由此确立。毛泽东大规模消灭了私有经济，并试图迅速、彻底实现“一大二公”，一系列灾难就此降临。
从1957年到2017年，“社会主义改造”一语在人民日报的传播频率如图。改革开放以后，“社会主义改造”在人民日报成为冷词。

9月27日，原中共中央统战部副部长胡德平（胡耀邦之子）发表讲话：《警惕打着共享的旗号搞新的公私合营》。讲话披露，1991年中共中央15号文件指出，对私营企业主，不要“像50年代那样对他们进行社会主义改造”。
《中国正处于第二次社会主义改造时期》一文的作者，名曹习华，是长沙市委党校副教授，网络显示，他曾到不同单位宣讲“19大精神”。

曹教授似乎没有注意到19大已淡化对50年代社会主义改造的肯定。但他对近年来“国进民退”的大气候十分敏感，这使他嗅到了“第二次社会主义改造”的味道。
 

四十年关键词之舆论监督

“舆论监督”是改革开放在新闻传播领域的旗舰性话语。1986年(不含)以前，这个词语在人民日报一共只出现过7次。
党媒语境下的舆论监督，经历了勃发（1988）、消沉（1989-1991）、震荡（1992-2002）、博弈（2003-2012）和淡出（2013-2018）。1980年以来，语温基本保持在“温”和“暖”区间，如下图所示。


“舆论监督”在1987年尚属“冷”词，全年共在20篇文章中出现。
1988年，“舆论监督”首次由冷跃升至暖。这是“舆论监督”元气旺盛的时期，人民日报全年有124篇文章使用此词。4月6日第2版右下，一篇题为《希望公布国家领导人员候选名单》的短文吸引笔者目光。作者认为，“扩大国家最高权力机构政务活动的开放程度，便于实行舆论监督和群众监督。”舆论监督之锋芒可谓空前绝后。

1989-1991年见证了“舆论监督”语温跌入谷底的过程。
1989年2月8日第1版刊登《天津不是害怕批评的地方》，报道天津市长李瑞环在春节前夕邀请中央及外地新闻单位驻津记者谈舆论监督和新闻改革。记者引用李的观点称：加强舆论监督，经常“微调”，可以避免“大修”。
仅过了10个月，李瑞环已跻身政治局常委。1989年11月25日，他在中宣部举办的新闻工作研讨班上发表讲话：《坚持正面宣传为主的方针》，认为“改进新闻工作需要研究和解决的问题很多，……关键的问题是新闻报道必须坚持以正面报道为主的方针”。这篇讲话分10个章节提出“看法和意见”，其中第六条为正确实行舆论监督。
这段论述把新闻舆论监督分成两类，一类是“搞资产阶级自由化的头面认为所鼓吹的”，另一类是“我们所说的”。对于如何“正确发挥新闻舆论的监督作用”，李讲的很实在：“新闻单位通过内部参考、内部简报向上反映问题，必须力求准确，不得掺假，以免提供错误信息”；“要充分发挥新闻的能动作用。要选择那些人民群众普遍关心而又有条件解决的问题作公开报道。”
人民日报在1990年3月3日头版刊登了这篇讲话，讲话也刊登在1990年3月的《新闻战线》杂志上，封面一图胜千言。
1992-2002年，舆论监督与舆论导向提法并重。受邓小平南巡带动，其在1992、1994年的语温皆有升级（冷至温，温至热）。
1994年，中央电视台新闻评论部创办《焦点访谈》，在略有松动的传媒生态中，竖起舆论监督的大旗。1998年10月7日，朱镕基到中央电视台视察，将“舆论监督，群众喉舌，政府镜鉴，改革尖兵”这四句话赠给《焦点访谈》栏目组。他说，“这四句话是我考虑了很久才想出来的，代表我的心声。”“在舆论监督面前没有特权，我本人也属于你们监督的对象。”

胡温主政的2003-2012年，在资讯科技和公民社会的加持下，舆论监督成为媒体与权力、市场的博弈场。
2001年，时任中国青年政治学院新闻与传播系主任展江教授发起并主办“新世纪新闻舆论监督研讨会”，每年征集优秀舆论监督作品，并请主创记者或编辑到会交流。研讨会从门户网站勃兴的Web 1.0时期，延续至微博、微信等社交媒体发挥舆论监督作用的Web 2.0时期，每一届都吸引学界和业界的顶级专家、高手参与，成为业内公认最有影响的年度会议。
2013年后，“新世纪新闻舆论监督研讨会”已难觅寄身之地。党报中，“引导舆论”取代“舆论监督”，“舆论”由主语位置成为被归置的对象。
 
 

Chinese Media Mum on Mallet Case

Written by David Bandurski on . Posted in Headlines and Hashtags.

We noted over the weekend that China had responded to the controversy over Hong Kong’s denial of a visa to Victor Mallet, Asia news editor of the Financial Times, as we might have expected — by 1) leaving commentary to peripheral state media (so far, only the Global Times) and 2) emphasizing the visa denial as a decision taken independently by Hong Kong.
So far, China is keeping to this playbook, and no fresh coverage is apparent today, despite continued coverage of the story internationally, and expressions of concern by organizations like the American Chamber of Commerce in Hong Kong.

October 7 coverage in the “World” section of People’s Daily Online reports the release of a statement on the Mallet case by the official of China’s foreign ministry in Hong Kong.
Even the voices speaking from the periphery, like that of the Global Times, seem to be getting little play within the online Chinese news space, suggesting the authorities have sought to minimize exposure. Aside from Sina.com, the Saturday commentary from the Global Times is absent from major media and portal sites. The statement from the Hong Kong office of China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, also posted Saturday, has been reported only by the “World” section of People’s Daily Online.
For more interesting voices from the official periphery, however, we point readers to coverage by Hong Kong’s Ta Kung Pao, a newspaper controlled by the Liaison Office of the Central Government in Hong Kong.
A piece in the Ta Kung Pao today works to paint a portrait of British hypocrisy over press freedom, quoting a journalist from Taiwan who says he was denied a Hong Kong entry visa by colonial authorities ahead of the handover. The journalist is quoted as saying: “During Hong Kong’s British period, Hong Kong government officials were all appointed by the British crown, so where was the democracy then?”
The Ta Kung Pao report concludes:

The Central Government has not tightened its policies toward Hong Kong. It’s just that certain people have purposely crossed the red line. The situation is as though a wall has been built there for 20 years, and today certain people want to remove it and say, ‘Why must there be a wall here?’ This is confusing black and white and goes against reason, and it is a refusal to accept the Constitution and the Basic Law.

A similar piece from the Ta Kung Pao yesterday sought to redirect the controversy by questioning visa denials issued in the past from the UK and the United States, including the 2016 refusal of entry to the US for BBC journalist Rana Rahimpour, who has dual British-Iranian nationality.


 

Global Times comments on Mallet case

Written by David Bandurski on . Posted in Headlines and Hashtags.

As the news broke last Friday about Hong Kong’s rejection of a visa for Victor Mallet, the Asia news editor of the Financial Times, a case that could have serious implications for freedom of speech and academic freedom in the special administrative region, we wrote that China was likely to respond first through more peripheral media like the Global Times.
Today we do have a response from the Global Times in the form of a commentary in both Chinese and English. The headline given to the English-language version of the commentary is: “Hong Kong has no less speech freedom without Mallet.” The Chinese-language edition is rendered somewhat differently, with a headline that might more properly translate: “Minus one British journalist, and Hong Kong will ‘mainlandize?’”
The commentary seeks to minimize the impact of the Mallet case, mocking the idea that it might have “a chilling effect on freedom of speech.” The basis of the argument is the idea that the visa refusal has nothing whatsoever to do with Mallet actual work as a journalist, and so cannot have any bearing on freedom of speech. Instead, the case — assuming it does relate to the FCC event in July — is a response to “political provocation that goes far beyond the scope of freedom of speech.”
This is a line we can expect to continue to see from the Chinese authorities, that freedom of speech is not absolute, that there are bottom lines, that the FCC crossed these bottom lines, committing an act fundamentally in violation of the Basic Law, etcetera.
The commentary goes on to dispute accusations that the Mallet case suggests Hong Kong has undergone a process of mainlandization:

Accusing Hong Kong of mainlandization, which is nonsensical, is a way of fighting for some Western forces and Hong Kong extremists. The Western media have hardly criticized the US order that requires Chinese news organizations to register as foreign agents. This will hinder their professional work in the country. But the Western media think a visa renewal rejection for a UK editor symbolizes Hong Kong being under more pressure from the mainland. Western media are indeed sophisticated in applying double standards.

According to the Global Times piece, Hong Kong people have “ample channels to voice their views,” and this will not be affected because of Mallet’s departure. “Hong Kong won’t have any less freedom of speech,” the article said. “By contrast, Mallet’s action damaged China’s national security and undermined freedom of expression.”
We also said Friday that China’s government was likely to comment on the refusal of Mallet’s visa as an exercise of Hong Kong autonomy, downplaying its role. In a statement yesterday, a spokesperson at China’s foreign ministry in Hong Kong said:  “The Central Government firmly supports the SAR (Hong Kong) Government in handling the related matters in accordance with law.”
 
 

Reporter Claims Self-Defense for National Security

Written by David Bandurski on . Posted in Headlines and Hashtags.

This week our top story for China’s media is the case of Kong Linlin (孔琳琳), the CCTV reporter who made a scene at the UK Conservative Party conference in Birmingham. Kong’s case is an interesting (and quite discouraging) look at the growing assertiveness of Chinese official voices, both media and diplomatic, in international contexts. We can surely expect similar displays of bullying and outrage in the future over issues China’s regards as being in its core national interest. In this case, the issue was Hong Kong.
The discussion internally in China of the Kong Linlin case was limited to social media platforms, and the overwhelming majority of responses seemed to be positive and in support of Kong’s temper tantrum as a matter of patriotism. We translate a portion of a rare WeChat post adding a bit of context to the case — talking about how such shows of “patriotism” are the real role of state media in China, which have little interest in professionalism as much of the rest of the world understands it.
One of the most disturbing aspects in China on the Kong case is the tacit support and legitimization of violence when it is seen as serving the fundamental interests of the Party and state. Facing questions of whether it was proper to strike others as she did in Birmingham, Kong responded on Weibo with a smiley face emoticon: “It’s not hitting when it’s legitimate self-defense (正当防卫).” Note that the Chinese here for “legitimate self-defense” suggests defense not just of Kong’s person but of the body, as it were, of the Chinese nation.
 
THIS WEEK IN CHINA’S MEDIA
September 29, 2018 to October 5, 2018
➢ CCTV reporter heckling panel at an event of the UK Conservative Party receives support from official state media
➢ Decision on discipline of actress Fan Bingbing for “shadow contracts” and tax avoidance made public, she is fined 800 million yuan
➢ Bloomberg releases a report on “spy chips” from China
➢ National Radio and Television Administration launches campaign to clean up advertisements, emphasizing “guidance”
➢ New regulations give broad police inspection powers over companies providing internet services
[1] CCTV reporter heckling panel at an event of the UK Conservative Party receives support from official state media
On September 30, as the Human Rights Council of the UK Conservative Party held a fringe event on the situation in Hong Kong during its annual Conservative Party Conference in Birmingham, panel members, included several prominent Hong Kong pro-democracy figures, were heckled by a reporter for the official China Central Television, Kong Linlin. As the hosts of the panel tried to get the woman to leave, she appeared to slap and event volunteer twice. The exchange was captured on video.
On October 1, the Chinese Embassy in UK issued a statement saying that “the Human Rights Council of the UK Conservative Party had used the annual party conference event to highlight anti-Chinese splittist forces (反华分裂势力), and the Chinese side expresses serious concern and fierce displeasure. We resolutely oppose the intrusion on Hong Kong affairs by any person or any organization.”
Addressing the embassy statement, the deputy chairman of the Human Rights Council of the UK Conservative Party, Benedict Rogers, said the absurdity of the Chinese Embassy statement was clear to anyone who viewed the video from the scene. More than 80 eyewitnesses at the event saw this Chinese journalist slap our volunteer twice, Rogers said. Rogers said that the journalist should immediately apologize, and the Chinese government should withdraw its statement.


A spokesperson for the China Media Group said on October 1: “Kong Linlin, the journalist for the European Center of China Central Television, has already been released. The China Media Group expresses its sympathy to Kong Linlin.”
For nuance on the Kong Linlin story inside China, it was necessary to look at the reflections appearing on the WeChat platform. One example we found was a post at “Shen Mutian” (沈目田), which was called: “Media Must Be Surnamed Party, And Journalists Must Be Surnamed Party.” This was a reference to President Xi’s speech on media policy in February 2016, when he stressed that all media work in the interests of the Chinese Communist Party. That speech came with visits to Kong’s outfit, China Central Television, and to the People’s Daily.
Here is a translation of a portion of the “Shen Mutian” post:

CCTV, which takes the lead in shouting the the media must be surnamed Party, has recently also “sought sunlight for the nation” (为国争光). A CCTV female reporter called Kong Linlin made a big fuss at the annual conference of the UK Conservative Party, engaging in a verbal war of words and even hitting people. Kong Linlin’s “patriotic” move received a lot of support from “patriotic” internet users. Afterward, some suggested that it was not right to hit people. Through her Weibo account, Kong Linlin explained by saying that legitimate self-defense (正当防卫) is not the same thing as hitting people, and the post came with a smile emoticon.
Concerning this question, former journalist Luqiu Luwei (闾丘露薇) said that this journalist based in London had exposed a core aspect of the Chinese media system: that the media serve the Chinese Communist Party, and that they must revere the Party. Daring to ‘show the sword’ was precisely the prerogative of these propaganda workers, and so seeing the high-level support officially and the energetic support back home is not at all a surprise. This is [for them] about responsibilities, and demanded by the media system. The definition of a journalist officially in China is very different from the professional definition provided in classrooms overseas. This is common knowledge.

Key Chinese Sources:
China News Service (中新网): 中国记者在英保守党年会被警方带走 中方要求道歉
CCTV Online (央视网): 央视发言人：央视记者孔琳琳已被无指控释放
WeChat public account “Shen Mutian” (沈目田): 央视女记者大闹英国保守党年会
WeChat public account “Shen Tuoshou” (沈舵手): 媒体姓党，记者也姓党
[2] Decision on discipline of actress Fan Bingbing for “shadow contracts” and tax avoidance made public, she is fined 800 million yuan
Actress Fan Bingbing (范冰冰), one of China’s most recognized celebrities, resurfaced as tax authorities in China announced that she had been fined for “shadow contracts” and tax evasion. In an apology shared widely across social media, Fan said she was sorry and would “engage in deep reflection” over the matter, that she felt “ashamed and guilty” (羞愧、内疚).


An October 3 announcement from tax authorities said that in the process of making the film “Unbreakable Spirit,” directed by Xiao Feng, in which she stars with American actor Bruce Willis, Fan Bingbing received “shadow contracts” that enabled her to evade more than 6 million yuan in personal income taxes, and more than 10 million yuan in small business taxes. In total, the authorities said, the actress would have to pay more than 800 million yuan in fines and back taxes. In language reminiscent of public confessions seen in recent years in China, she also thanked the Chinese government and the Chinese Communist Party for the opportunities afforded to her.
Online in China, views of the Fan case were varied. Some wondered at the fairness of Fan receiving only fines for tax evasion involving enormous sums when Li Xiaohang (李晓航) a former airline stewardess involved in cosmetics sales, received a prison sentence of 3 years for evading just over 1 million in taxes.
The WeChat public account “People’s Daily Commentary” said: “We will not offer special treatment because the violator of the law is a public figure. At the same time, we will not afford public figures punishments that exceed what is necessary.”
Key Chinese Sources:
Xinhua Online (新华网): 税务部门依法查处范冰冰“阴阳合同”等偷逃税问题
Weibo Account of Fan Bingbing (@范冰冰): 致歉信
CFI.net.cn (中财网): 为什么空姐代购逃税被判刑 范冰冰却只用交罚款？
WeChat public account “Xinhua News Agency” (微信公众号”新华社”): 范冰冰案教育警示文艺影视从业者遵纪守法
WeChat public account “People’s Daily Commentary” (微信公众号”人民日报评论”): 范冰冰“阴阳合同”案：法律面前没有例外
Guangming Daily (光明日报): 更须重警示守规矩立德行
[3] Bloomberg releases a report on “spy chips” from China

A report published on October 4 in Bloomberg Businessweek alleged that Chinese spies had hacked into the networks of nearly 30 U.S. companies, including Apple and Amazon, by using a “tiny microchip, not much larger than a grain of rice,” imbedded in server motherboards sourced from China. The report, which quickly sent ripples through tech and foreign policy communities in the U.S., seeming to substantiate calls for a harder line on China (one lawmaker calling it the “holy grail of hacking”), was denied by at least three of the major companies involved, Apple, Amazon and AMD. Super Micro, the supplier mentioned by Bloomberg as the source of infected motherboards, denied that its products contained such chips, which it said had never been found in its products.
Official state media in China remained silent about the case through October 5, but there was some discussion across tech sites and WeChat public accounts about which version of the story to believe. A post at the WeChat public account “Gui Xing Ren” (硅星人), did a full summary of the Bloomberg report and related coverage and then proceeded to look carefully at a number of “odd points” in the stories. The post bore the headline: “Bloomberg Exposed ‘Spy Chips’: I Can Buy One on Taobao for 1 Yuan” (彭博社曝光的“间谍芯片”，我在淘宝1块钱就能买一个).
Key Chinese Sources:
Huxiu (虎嗅网): 解码中国超微超级间谍芯片丑闻：我们知道些什么？谁在说真话？
AND: 一篇彭博报道引发的中美科技股血案
WeChat public account “Gui Xing Ren” (微信公众号”硅星人”): 彭博社曝光的“间谍芯片”，我在淘宝1块钱就能买一个 
[4] National Radio and Television Administration launches campaign to clean up advertisements, emphasizing “guidance”
A notice from the National Radio and Television Adminstration on September 30 announced that the agency would carry out a “cleanup campaign” (整治工作) from now through the end of 2018 to eliminate 9 types of television advertisements are false and misleading. According to the notice, called “National Radio and Television Administration Notice on Special Cleanup Work for Television Advertising” (国家广播电视总局关于开展广播电视广告专项整治工作的通知), this campaign is being carried out under the principle that advertisements, like all content, must “strictly grasp correct guidance of public opinion, energetically promote socialist core values, fully place social benefit in the first position,” “resolutely implement General Secretary Xi Jinping’s important statements on how advertisements must also adhere to guidance, endeavoring to sing the main theme [of the Party], promoting truth, goodness and beauty, transmitting positive energy and arousing positive spiritual forces.”
Key Chinese Sources:
WeChat public account “National Radio and Television Administration” (国家广播电视总局): 国家广播电视总局关于开展广播电视广告专项整治工作的通知
Tencent (腾讯网): 广电广告专项整治，这些领域是重点
[5] New regulations give broad police inspection powers over companies providing internet services
According to an October 4 report from the official Xinhua News Agency, the new “Regulations on Internet Security Supervision By Public Security Organs” (公安机关互联网安全监督检查规定), released by the Ministry of Public Security last month and due for implementation on November 1, 2018, will extend broad policing powers to local and central-level authorities in ensuring cybersecurity broadly defined. The regulations stipulate that public security organs may enter places of business where companies are engaged in the provision of internet services, inspecting computer rooms and offices, and requiring “responsible persons” of these companies or employees dealing with network security to explain information and procedures relevant to cybersecurity. The regulations specify that copies of these materials and information can be made available to police on request.
Official media in China explained the regulations as a means to provide greater security from such dangers as hacking, but the breadth of the regulations ensures that they can also be applied for the purposes of information control. In fact, police in China have long had the power to act in the way outlined in these new regulations, but these serve the purpose of formalizing this power.
The full text of the new regulations is available here.
Key Chinese Sources:
Xinhua Online (新华网): 公安部发布公安机关互联网安全监督检查规定
Public Security Bureau Website (公安部网站): 公安机关互联网安全监督检查规定（公安部令第151号）

How Will China Respond to the Victor Mallet Case?

Written by David Bandurski on . Posted in Headlines and Hashtags.

There is so far no official media response from China on the decision by Hong Kong authorities to deny a visa to Victor Mallet, the Asia news editor of the Financial Times. The story is most certainly a sensitive one, dealing as it does from China’s perspective with issues of national security and national sovereignty — and with the tinder-dry issue of separatism.
We can assume that China’s foreign ministry is closely monitoring international coverage, and can anticipate that at some point we will have a statement running through all of the sovereignty bullet points and claiming respect for Hong Kong’s decisions on this matter. At some point, too, we might expect a few attack pieces from more peripheral state media, like the Global Times.
Before these moves, however, it might be fruitful to review some of the previous official voices on the August event hosted by the Hong Kong Foreign Correspondents Club, which is likely at the heart of Mallet’s visa denial.
Interestingly, one of the attack pieces back in August from the Global Times was fairly dismissive of the impact of the decision by the Hong Kong Foreign Correspondents Club to host a talk with pro-independence activist Andy Chan. Here is what the paper said:

The actions of the FCC this time around is a classic case of foreign forces interfering in the affairs of Hong Kong and all of China. On the one hand, their actions should be censured and exposed. On the other hand, everyone is clear that this is a routine clash, and that once Hong Kong and Beijing have registered their attitudes there is no need for everyone to think too much (高看) of the vile actions of the FCC. This was a dirty stunt by certain people, and we can’t let it taint the agenda of Hong Kong and the whole country.

No need to worry then. This is conflict as usual in Hong Kong. A momentary heightening of tempers.
Except that it now clearly isn’t. The denial of Mallet’s Hong Kong visa is a clear escalation that will surely ripple through Hong Kong society and transform views globally about how credible the “one country, two systems” arrangement remains. And this is why it will be important to watch the way China characterizes the incident, and how it responds to the resulting international public opinion.
The provide just a bit more retroactive context, we translate below the August 15, 2018, report in the overseas edition of the People’s Daily, another of the more important (among few) semi-official voices emerging in response to the Andy Chan event. We say “semi-official” because the overseas edition of the People’s Daily is not exactly the same beast as the domestic edition of the People’s Daily. We don’t yet have responses from the core-most official media — the People’s Daily, Xinhua News Agency and CCTV — and until we do the article below will be one of the closest approximations we have to an “official” view of the matter, and the attitude of the leadership, outside of statements from the foreign ministry.
We have italicized certain portions in the translation we think are of particular significance.
_________________________________
HKSAR Government Says
Openly Spreading “Hong Kong Independence” Speech is Unacceptable
Ministry of Foreign Affairs Office in Hong Kong Issues Condemnation
People’s Daily (Overseas Edition)
August 15, 2018, page 4
By Lian Jintian (连锦添), Chen Ran (陈然)
The Government of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region issued a statement on August 14 expressing deep regret over the decision of the Hong Kong Foreign Correspondents Club to invite a speaker promoting “Hong Kong independence” to give a lunch talk. A spokesperson for the HKSAR Government said that anyone openly proclaiming or promoting “Hong Kong independence,” and any organization providing a platform for such speakers, was entirely inappropriate and unacceptable.


The HKSAR Government spokesperson emphasized that the Basic Law clearly stipulates that the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region is is inseparable part of the People’s Republic of China. Promoting “Hong Kong independence” is an open violation of the Basic Law, and even more directly harms national sovereignty, national security and territorial integrity. 
The statement reaffirmed that the government fully attaches importance to press freedom and freedom of speech, but these freedoms are not absolute (这些自由并非绝对), and must be exercised in accord with the law. In recent decades, the Hong Kong government has all along supported the work of the Foreign Correspondents Club, but this meeting providing a platform to a speaker promoting “Hong Kong independence” entirely treats with contempt Hong Kong’s statutory duty to uphold national sovereignty, and it cannot be accepted.
The Hong Kong office of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a statement on August 14 severely condemning the invitation by the Hong Kong Foreign Correspondents Club of a speaker promoting “Hong Kong independence.” The statement emphasized that China’s Constitution and the Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region have a bottom line and limitation, and “Hong Kong independence” is a violation of the Constitution and the law, and fundamentally does not belong to the category of freedom of expression (言论自由范畴). On the major question of opposing “Hong Kong independence,” the Central Government [of the People’s Republic of China], the SAR Government and the full people of China will not permit “Hong Kong independence” forces and the Hong Kong Foreign Correspondents Club to step on this red line, crossing the bottom line. The statement pointed out that we encourage the Hong Kong Foreign Correspondents Club to carry out introspection, to correct this wrong, to take actual actions to respect the laws of the People’s Republic of China and the SAR, with that respect including for the feelings of 7 million Hong Kong compatriots and 1.4 Chinese people. Any statements regarding the futile attempt to divide Hong Kong from China will be punished in accord with the law.
A joint statement by 32 pro-establishment lawmakers strongly condemned the Hong Kong Foreign Correspondents Club for inviting a speaker promoting “Hong Kong independence.” Related matters have also stirred the resentment of various quarters of Hong Kong society. Hong Kong National People’s Congress Delegate Ma Fung-kwok (马逢国) said that in providing a platform to a “Hong Kong independence” speaker, the Hong Kong Foreign Correspondents Club was complicit in harming national security, and the conduct was extremely inappropriate. On August 14, more than 10 groups gathered outside the Hong Kong Foreign Correspondents Club, opposing the group’s us of property of the Hong Kong government to aid the promotion of “Hong Kong independence.”
 

Missing Compliments

Written by David Bandurski on . Posted in China Newspeak.

Back in June this year, ahead of the July 1 anniversary of the founding of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), politburo member Ding Xuexiang (丁薛祥), director of the CCP’s General Office, delivered an instruction talk, or dangke (党课), to a group of offiicials. The substance of Ding’s talk was not made public at the time, but when it did surface several weeks ago it generated a lot of hubbub and discussion online.
Why the interest? Because Ding’s remarks, and how they have subsequently been treated in China’s political discourse environment, again provide clues to the political environment in China.
The point of keenest interest as news of Ding’s remarks made the rounds was the language he used to describe President Xi Jinping and his leadership. “Having read the works of General Secretary Xi Jinping, having listened to the general secretary’s instructions, coming to appreciate the general secretary’s feelings, I have a rather deep understanding of the general secretary’s longstanding devotion, his continued devotion, his selfless devotion,” Deng said.
He then introduced “three terms” (三个关键词) that to his mind summed up the essence of Xi. They were as follows:

“goes willingly into a sea of bitterness” (甘入苦海) — meaning Xi takes a courageous and good-humored attitude to adversity, bravely facing it.
“attends to public affairs day and night” (夙夜在公)
”dedicates himself to the cause of the Party” (以身许党).

Ding Xuexiang has a rather elevated status within the Chinese Communist Party, and the three terms he employed in praise of Xi Jinping naturally drew some interest in light of general questions about Xi’s strength and stature within the leadership.
But the pattern of propagation of these three terms online was also an area of interest. What does this pattern tell us?
First, we can see that the “three terms” were not propagated broadly across the usual platforms one would expect once news of Ding’s remarks emerged. If the terms were coming into broader “mainstream” use — as part, that is, of the Party’s official line — then we would expect to see the terms used and explained at People’s Daily Online, Xinhua Online and on official WeChat accounts and the like.
But reports on Ding’s speech were carried instead by commercial portals such as Sina, Netease, Sohu and Phoenix Online. And if we probe further, turning to a national database of newspapers for the entire period following Ding’s speech, from July through to the end of September, we find that not a single paper used Ding’s “three terms” of praise for Xi.
So the terms are absent not just from high-level, central Party media, but also from provincial and city-level Party newspapers.
Some websites have suggested that Ding’s speech was “an internal speech” (内部讲话). But this is in fact untrue. It was a public speech published in Secretariat Work (秘书工作), a journal run by the Secretariat of the General Office of the Central Committee. But when I conducted a targeted search within this website, I discovered something strange. The edition including the Deng Xuexiang lesson should have come out in July. It is now October, but the July edition has yet to appear on the journal’s website.

The period immediately after last year’s 19th National Congress brought a wave of personality worship (个人崇拜), and the three terms used in praise of Xi Jinping at the time were: “endorsed by the whole Party” (全党拥护), “love by the people” (人民爱戴) and “worthy of the title” (当之无愧). For a brief time, a number of local and regional media even used the highly honorific phrase “great leader” (伟大领袖). But these three phrases rapidly cooled off, possibly due to a personal directive from Xi Jinping to make it stop. Last month, just three local newspapers in China made use of these particular terms.
So how do we explain the pattern we are witnessing here with Ding’s remarks on Xi Jinping?
It could simply be that now is not the time to stroke Xi’s ego or elevate his greatness — any more, that is, than is already being done. In July, Xi Jinping faced numerous challenges. So the personality worship still continues in all sorts of ways, but it may lack fresh kinetic energy.
At the outset of the Cultural Revolution, Lin Biao (林彪) praised Mao Zedong for “defending and developing Marxism-Leninism with genius, with creativity and with totality” (天才地、创造性地、全面地继承、捍卫和发展了马克思列宁主义). This was a high compliment, and at that time “with genius, with creativity and with totality” (天才地、创造性地、全面地) became “the three adverbs” (三个副词) used in praise of Mao. But as Lin Biao and Mao had their falling out, Mao saw that the “three adverbs” were struck from official documents, and he indicated that he found the “Four Greatnesess” (四个伟大) used to praise him “disagreeable” (讨嫌).
For now, Ding Xuexiang’s three terms of praise have gotten the cold shoulder from official media at all levels. Being on the outside, it is difficult for us to know exactly why. Is this something compelled by the circumstances? Or is it that Xi faces headwinds within the Party?
Or is it, perhaps, just that Xi Jinping finds these three terms “disagreeable”?

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