Author: David Bandurski

Now Executive Director of the China Media Project, leading the project’s research and partnerships, David originally joined the project in Hong Kong in 2004. He is the author of Dragons in Diamond Village (Penguin), a book of reportage about urbanization and social activism in China, and co-editor of Investigative Journalism in China (HKU Press).

Criminalization of speech

The following post by Su Xiaohe (苏小和), which comments on the case of civil rights lawyer and former CMP fellow Pu Zhiqiang (浦志强), was deleted sometime before 1:30pm yesterday, December 14, 2015. The post compares Pu’s case with the criminalization of speech during the Cultural Revolution. Pu has been charged with “inciting ethnic hatred” and “picking quarrels and provoking trouble” on the basis of seven Weibo posts. [Explore more deleted posts by using the Weiboscope, created by the Journalism & Media Studies Centre.]
A translation of the post follows:

If one can be convicted by several Weibo posts, then every Weibo user is guilty, and everyone should be imprisoned. During the Cultural Revolution, people were killed because they wrote complaints on the wall. This can count as the first instance of “guilt by Weibo.” So, let’s wait for the trial result and then we can conclude whether or not this country has made any progress in terms of civilisation since the Cultural Revolution.

The original post in Chinese:

如果因为发了几条微博就被定罪,那么每个微博使用者都有罪,每个人都应该被抓进去。文革时,有人因为在墙壁上随便写了几句牢骚之语,就被杀头。这算是最早期的“微博之罪”吧。所以,等待判决结果,然后就能下结论,这个国家从文革到现在,到底有没有一点点文明的改进。

What is This “Positive Energy”?

Who came up with the phrase “positive energy” I don’t know. But the phrase getting hot goes back to a Zhang Lixian film called Beijing Blues, in which his character says “positive energy” over and over again — and that’s how its popularity took off. Of course, anyone who knows the rudiments of physics knows that energy doesn’t give a hoot about positive or negative, that it’s all about where energy goes or is induced. But when people in the arts use such a term it has a kind of infectious simplicity about it, and it goes right to the heart.
However, this term having now become popular, we find that the Party and government, and those closely aligned with them, are especially fond of using this term too. they open their mouths or shut them, and it’s all about positive energy.
Originally, the notion of positive energy was directed in our minds toward light, sunshine, love and decency. So a play, or a novel, so long as it made one feel a sort of warmth, we could say it was full of positive energy. Now, however, as use of the term has become habitual, we find its meaning has changed its flavour.
So-called positive energy now denotes patriotism, love for the government, love for the Party. It even bears along with this the sense of opposing Japan, opposing America and opposing the West. Articles, or posts on Weibo, no matter what the content, even if they are nothing more than abusive name-calling, are considered positive energy as long as they have this flavour. Some people make the most outlandish claims online, saying that the United States has no forced demolition because it massacred all of the native Americans, that the French president’s dining budget runs to 96 million euros, that US President Barack Obama and his family spend four million dollars each time they dine together, or that Obama’s mobile costs 27 million dollars. But because all of these statements suit the demand that we love the Party, the government and the country, and that we oppose Japan, America and the West, they all pass the positive energy test.
Positive energy having evolved to this point, we are now in a state of confusion as to what exactly is positive and what is wicked. Even if it were true that the American and French presidents were unpardonably evil, that they were the chieftains of imperialism, we can’t just throw mud indiscriminately, can we? If the definition of political correctness makes allowances for wild rumourmongering, if the ends justify the means anda all is fair however foul, how do we think the people of the world will view this country of ours?
The authorities, perhaps, have seen the situation prevailing online and feel that their own image is too lamentable, that there is too much praise for South Korea, Japan, America and the West. They imagine articles leaning in a different direction, that can be written in such a way as to suit the online style and earn approving eyes, and that they might, if energetically promoted, bring some balance or even turn the tide of public opinion in their favour. For the authorities, this is a kind of Operation Rescue, and there is no time to consider its implications more carefully.
But this term, “positive energy,” has been utterly befouled. It has become a political correctness utterly devoid of principle. And as a direct consequence people not only hold the concept itself in low regard, but beyond this look down on the authorities themselves, who have seen fit to elevate [online propagandists] like Zhou Xiaoping (周小平) so solemnly. The inference people draw from this is that the authorities have a weak capacity, insofar as they are incapable of finding writers of better quality.
Actually, in most places in the world, when people talk about positive energy they mean pretty much the same thing — those things that warm our hearts like a ray of sunshine. In any country in the world, regardless of its political system, regardless of the complexion of its people, love is something invariable. Without love, there is no positive energy. To politicise positive energy, and to uphold as champions of positive energy a group of hacks who will say anything in the pursuit of political correctness — this might deceive fools who lack any basic common sense, but the losses ultimately outweigh the gains.
In the end, public opinion cannot be swayed by the lowliest of fools. They are credulous and fickle. And never in history have they won the day.

Pu Zhiqiang and the "Chinese Dream"

Chinese lawyer and former CMP fellow Pu Zhiqiang will face trial in Beijing today on charges of “inciting ethnic hatred” and “picking quarrels and provoking trouble” stemming from a series of posts he made to social media between July 2011 and May 2014.
The circumstances of Pu Zhiqiang’s case clearly indicate that this is a political witch-hunt meant to silence one of China’s most outspoken advocates for social and legal reform. We will all be watching the case closely.
The following is a comment on Pu’s case posted late last night by Taiwanese writer and former cultural minister Lung Ying-tai.

The sun will be up soon!
The lawyer Pu Zhiqiang is a courageous and principled citizen of China. Today at 9AM, he will be brought before the Beijing Second Intermediate People’s Court to face trial.
The judge should understand that all the Chinese people of the world will be waiting for this 9AM, waiting and watching: Under the greatness of the “Chinese Dream,” how will the machinery of the state handle Pu Zhiqiang and the 600 words that he wrote?
That’s right, Beijing, please show us what you do. We want to know just how civilised this “Chinese Dream” of yours is.
Lung Ying-tai (3:10AM)

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How Xi Jinping sees the Internet

Just over a year ago, leaders from tech firms around the globe converged on the ancient canal town of Wuzhen, in China’s Zhejiang province, for the 1st World Internet Conference (WIC). At the event, which Reuters dubbed China’s “online coming-out party,” Internet industry leaders from China rubbed shoulders with executives from Apple, Microsoft, Amazon and Samsung — to name just a few — as well as attendees on Internet governance, such as Fadi Chehade, president and chief executive of the non-profit Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN).
If China’s agenda in establishing the WIC “summit” was unclear to anyone at the start, it became unsettlingly clear after the Chinese hosts slipped a draft declaration under the hotel room doors of attendees on the eve of the conference’s final day, hoping to rush through a “consensus” on the need to establish “an international Internet governance system of multilateralism, democracy and transparency” that would “respect [the] Internet sovereignty of all countries.”

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[ABOVE: “Xi Jinping, Painted Portrait,” photo by Thierry Ehrmann available at Flickr.com under Creative Commons license.]
Internet sovereignty, or cybersovereignty, is now a central policy concept for the Chinese Communist Party in dealing with the Internet. And the concept will be the unquestioned theme from the get-go at this year’s World Internet Conference, to be held once again in Wuzhen from December 16–18: “An Interconnected World Shared and Governed By All: Building a Cyberspace Community of Shared Destiny.”
Last year’s event apparently had something of a slapped-together feel. That’s understandable, perhaps, when you consider it was China’s first official international summit on the Internet. But there have obviously been hiccups this year too. The first announcement for the event came in late September, and said the conference would be begin on October 28. This was eventually pushed back six weeks. (Could international guests not make it on such short notice?)
The WIC, it seems, is still a bewildering work in progress. Don’t believe me? Go to their English-language website and scroll across the content tabs.
Click on “Sponsors” and you get “Coming Soon.” Click on “EXPO” and you get “Coming Soon.’ Click on “Partners” and you get “Coming Soon.”
But of course, the 2nd World Internet Conference is just around the corner. So, how soon is soon?
What about the conference agenda? There’s a special tab for that on the WIC website too. Let’s have a look . . . Oh.
agenda_coming soon

Well, fortunately we have China’s trusted state media to tell us everything we want to know. And today, in anticipation of the upcoming World Internet Conference, the “Studying Xi on the Road” column is devoted to Xi Jinping’s utterances concerning the Internet.
Enjoy.

Studying Xi On The Road (学习路上): Xi Jinping’s “Web View”: Working to Build an Strong Internet Power, the Fruits Benefitting the People
People’s Daily Online / December 8, 2015
The Internet is one of the great inventions of the 20th century, turning the world into a “global village,” and profoundly changing people’s basic production and living conditions. As a term, the Internet has featured highly in the speeches of Xi Jinping, [with such utterances as] “letting the 1.3 billion people of China benefit from the fruits of Internet development,” “the Internet is not a ‘realm outside the law,’” and “without cybersecurity there is no national security.” These involve both practical considerations and strategic considerations.
The 2nd World Internet Conference (Wuzhen Summit) will be held in Wuzhen, in Zhejiang province, from December 16 to 18. In light of this, “Studying Xi On The Road” will look back with you at Xi Jinping’s “Web View.”
1. Building a Strong Internet Power (建设网络强国)

“Cybersecurity and informatisation concern national security and national development, and are a major strategic issue for the work and lives of the masses. [We] must, starting from major international and domestic trends, make overall arrangements, coordinate various aspects, and seek innovation and development, working hard to build our nation as a strong internet power.” — February 27, 2014, Xi Jinping addresses the first conference of the Central Leading Group for Cyberspace Affairs

“Strategic deployments for the building of [China as] an internet power must proceed in step with the struggle toward the ‘Two Centenary Goals’, with steady progress toward basic popularisation of Internet infrastructure, the strengthening of our capacity for basic innovation, the full development of the digital economy, and strong cybersecurity protections.” — February 27, 2014, Xi Jinping addresses the first conference of the Central Leading Group for Cyberspace Affairs
“China is now actively promoting Internet construction, so that the 1.3 billion people of China benefit from the fruits of Internet development.” — November 19, 2014, Xi Jinping’s message of congratulation to the 1st World Internet Conference

2. Safeguarding Cybersecurity

“Internet and information security are matters of national security and social stability, and they are a new comprehensive challenge that we face.” — November 15, 2013, Xi Jinping in “Explanations Concerning ‘Decision of the CCCPC on Some Major Issues Concerning Comprehensively Deepening Reforms’”

“Without cybersecurity there can be no national security; without informatisation there can be no modernisation.” — February 27, 2014, Xi Jinping addresses the first conference of the Central Leading Group for Cyberspace Affairs
“Cybersecurity and informatisation are two wings on a single body, two driving wheels, and they must work together, be deployed together, be advanced together, and be implemented together. To properly do the work of cybersecurity and informatisation, [we] must properly handle the relationship between security and development, ensuring they are coordinated and advance together, so that security guarantees development and development guarantees security, and we make efforts for the long-term and secure growth of the industry.” — February 27, 2014, Xi Jinping addresses the first conference of the Central Leading Group for Cyberspace Affairs
“In the world today, the Internet raises new challenges for national autonomy, security and development, and we must meet these seriously. Although the Internet is highly global in nature, the autonomy of no country must be encroached upon in the information sphere. Even as Internet technology continues to develop, the information autonomy of no country can be violated. In the information sphere, there are no double standards, and every country [has the right] to defend its own information security. It must not be the case that one country is secure while others are not, or that some countries are secure while some others are not. Nor can [a country] seek its own so-called absolute security while sacrificing the security of other nations.” — July 16, 2014, Xi Jinping speech to National Congress of Brazil
“As one of the great inventions of the 20th century, the Internet has made the world a ‘global village,’ profoundly changing people’s basic production and living conditions and promoting social development, and it is highly global in its character. However, this ‘new frontier’ (新疆域) is not ‘a realm outside the law,’ and it too must respect rule of law, it too must preserve national autonomy, security and development interests.” — September 22, 2015, Xi Jinping in an interview with the Wall Street Journal
3. Grasping Core Technologies

“To build an internet power, [we] must have our own technologies, technology of the highest quality; [we] must have full and comprehensive information services, and a rich and developed Internet culture; [we] must have a sound information infrastructure, creating a strong information economy.” — February 27, 2014, Xi Jinping addresses the first conference of the Central Leading Group for Cyberspace Affairs
“Information technologies and the level of [Internet] industry development determine the level of development of informatisation. [We] must strengthen independent innovation of core technologies and the building of basic infrastructure, raising our capacity in terms of information gathering, handling, dissemination, use and security, ensuring the people benefit.” — February 27, 2014, Xi Jinping addresses the first conference of the Central Leading Group for Cyberspace Affairs
“In many ways, scientific and technological strength determine changes in terms of where [a nation] stands politically and economically in the world, and it determines too the fate of the people of various nations.” — June 9, 2014, Xi Jinping speech to the Chinese Academy of Engineerring general assembly at the 17th Academic Conference of the Chinese Academy of Sciences
“Only with core technologies in our own hands can we truly grasp the initiative in competition and development, and only this way can we ensure national economic security, national defence and other forms of security from the roots.” — June 9, 2014, Xi Jinping speech to the Chinese Academy of Engineerring general assembly at the 17th Academic Conference of the Chinese Academy of Sciences

4. A Clear and Bright Online Space

“[We] must consolidate and strengthen [the Party’s] mainstream ideas and public opinion, carrying forward the main theme (弘扬主旋律), spreading positive energy (传播正能量), exciting among the whole society a great strength in moving forward. Most critical is raising quality and properly grasping the timing, degree and effectiveness [of information], increasing its attractiveness and infectiousness , so that the masses love to listen to and watch it, and [so that they] develop a sense of resonance, giving full play to positive propaganda in inspiring and motivating people.” — August 19, 2013, Xi Jinping to the National Propaganda Work Conference

“[We must] persist in the active use, scientific development and legal management [of the Internet]. With the guiding principle of ensuring security, we must increase the intensity of legal management of the Internet, and improve our leadership system for Internet management (互联网管理领导体制).” — November 15, 2013, Xi Jinping in “Explanations Concerning ‘Decision of the CCCPC on Some Major Issues Concerning Comprehensively Deepening Reforms’”
“Properly conducting public opinion work online is a long-term task, and [we] must innovate and improve our online propaganda, using the principles of Internet communication, carrying forward the main theme, exciting positive energy, and energetically fostering and fulfilling the socialist core values, ensuring a good grasp of the timing, degree and effectiveness of online public opinion channeling, so that the online space becomes clear and bright.” — February 27, 2014, Xi Jinping addresses the first conference of the Central Leading Group for Cyberspace Affairs

[NOTE: Two sections following, on “gathering Internet talent” and “increasing international cooperation,” are not translated.]

China's prodigal president

On Friday, during a summit with African leaders in Johannesburg, Chinese President Xi Jinping pledged 60 billion dollars of development funding for the continent over the next three years. News of this astonishing generosity — for so it was portrayed in China’s state media — made the rounds online the very same day that the president’s African tour was covered with notable Xi Jinping monomania in the official People’s Daily newspaper.
With China’s senior leadership, wound tightly around Xi Jinping, sending a clear message that “improper discussion” of central Party policies will not be tolerated, and with a pall of silence hanging over the domestic media, criticising the gift to Africa is probably ill-advised.

Xi in Africa
Chinese President Xi Jinping poses with leaders at the China-Africa Summit in Johannesburg on December 4, 2015.
But a piece circulating online and across social media today manages, with a wry artfulness that makes it a must-share, to tease out several thorny questions surrounding Xi Jinping’s “throwing around of money” while in Africa.
The piece is apparently the latest instalment of “Shiguang Talks Straight” (世光直言), an online column by a writer identified as Yu Shiguang (余世光) listed in some sources as being from the city of Ezhou in Hubei province. (There is an archive of the author’s other writings here at Tianya, assuming they are one and the same.)
Yu Shiguang’s humorous piece manages to touch, with pretended vacuousness, on an astonishing array of issues, from rule-of-law and representative government, to domestic poverty, corruption and, finally, media control.
Enjoy.

Shiguang Talks Straight (12): General Secretary Xi, what does it mean when you go overseas and throw money around?
Yu Shiguang / December 6, 2015

General Secretary Xi, being poor myself, I cannot for the life of me understand why it is you scatter money around every time you go on an overseas visit. Why is that?
Is it because a nation, in order to improve its international standing, must toss money around? If that’s the case, then I think it’s just as well if you don’t use money to buy international standing.
Are there leaders of other countries that go around tossing money this way when they’re overseas? I really don’t know.
When you toss money people’s way, what good does that do us here in China? I’m a lowly person, so please don’t blame me for being so crass.
Is it that our country just has too much money, and if we don’t toss money away other people won’t know Chinese people actually have money? That seems an unnecessary expense, like punching your own face to look fatter, considering there are so many poor people like me in China.
This money you’re throwing around, is that your own personal money, or is it the people’s money? I’m afraid we really should make clear whose money this is!
If it’s not your personal money, then I believe the matter of tossing money around should go through the National People’s Congress, even if this is just a formality. I mean, the National People’s Congress represents the people, so that way at least there’s some deference to the law.
If you don’t take this through the National People’s Congress, and if you don’t go through legal procedures, then you are personally tossing around the people’s money, and isn’t that corruption in disguise?
Ordinary people really can’t get their heads around this tossing money around thing. Ordinary Chinese are so poor. Could you please explain this to us?
General Secretary Xi, this throwing around of money, it’s really quite an unpleasant thing to witness. It really inspires envy among us ordinary people who don’t know our manners. It makes us itch to steal! How are we to understand such a thing? General Secretary Xi, could you maybe just listen to this one piece of advice: Next time you go overseas and toss money around, could you please make sure the media don’t blow their horns about it quite so indiscriminately?

 

The man who controls the headlines

In a study published earlier this year, CMP director Qian Gang found that Chinese leader Xi Jinping had a much higher profile in the People’s Daily, the flagship newspaper of the Chinese Communist Party, than any of his predecessors going back to Mao Zedong and Hua Guofeng. Isolating the first year and a half of the terms of leaders past, Qian Gang found that mentions of Xi Jinping in pages one through eight of the People’s Daily were more than double figures for Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao.
When isolating front-page coverage, Xi Jinping’s frequency in the flagship newspaper remained more than 20 percent greater than Jiang and Hu both. The graph to the left, “Leader Frequency on the Front Page of the People’s Daily,” shows Qian Gang’s results for each 18-month period of leadership, with top leaders listed left to right beginning with Mao Zedong and ending with Xi Jinping.

graph
There are a many other examples, outside the pages of the People’s Daily, showing how Xi Jinping has been elevated on all propaganda fronts. In the latest edition of Southern Weekly, once the standard bearer of a more freewheeling style of professional journalism in China, praise for the glorious leadership of Xi Jinping is marquee coverage. Read the Southern Weekly piece, which runs more than 10,000 words, and weep: Oh, how far the mighty have fallen into the pit of positivity!
SW December 3 2015
A 13,000-word paean to the reform leadership of President Xi Jinping is the cover story in Southern Weekly this week, with the headline: “Three Years of Reform Under Xi Jinping.”
The propaganda is also more interactive than ever before. But don’t take my word for it. Scan the QR code below and begin your first Xi Jinping knowledge quiz.
qr

How do you stack up against the 200+ thousand others who have so far run the gauntlet of ten questions like the following: “When he led the 15th collective study session of the Poliburo, Xi Jinping said we must learn to correctly use the ‘invisible hand’ and ‘visible hand’ in order to properly drive _______ ?”
If you have kept your eyes trained faithfully on the headlines, the answer should come naturally enough: The relationship between the government and the market. For thus spoke the toweringly wise (and yet, so cartoonishly approachable) President Xi.
If you selected option one: Congratulations. And if you didn’t: Congratulations. In any case, your first quiz question has brought you that much closer to China’s president.
xi quiz

But topping the many, many recent examples of Xi Jinping’s growing profile in China’s media is today’s edition of the People’s Daily, in which Xi Jinping’s name appears in all but one of the twelve headlines (and makes it into the subhead of the last).
pd

Xi Jinping . . .
Xi Jinping . . .
Xi Jinping . . .
Xi Jinping . . .
Xi Jinping . . .
Xi Jinping . . .
Xi Jinping . . .
Xi Jinping . . .
Xi Jinping . . .
Xi Jinping . . .
Xi Jinping . . .
The parade continues on page two of the newspaper, on which Xi’s name begins each and every headline — and the entire page is a photo gallery of the president meeting with various African leaders:

HEADLINE: “Xi Jinping Meets Individually With Various African Leaders During the African Summit in Johannesburg”
HEADLINE: “Xi Jinping Meets With President Nyusi of Mozambique”
HEADLINE: “Xi Jinping Meets With President Kenyatta of Kenya”

page 2 of PD

African Summit content from the front page then spills over to page 3 of the newspaper, occupying the bottom half. At the top of the page, there are three more headlined pieces, of which two are about — you guessed it — Xi Jinping.

HEADLINE: “Important Speech by General Secretary Xi to Central Party Conference on Poverty Relief and Development Draws Strong Response From Cadres and Masses in Impoverished Areas: Taking Hard Steps Toward a Moderately Well-Off Society”
HEADLINE: “Book Exhibition Themed on Xi Jinping’s The Governance of China and Other Works Opens in South Africa”

The third headline on the page is for a separate piece on poverty relief written by a professor from Singapore. Mercifully, it does not mention Xi Jinping.
From that point on, the flagship newspaper of the Chinese Communist Party gives us a rest from the parade of Xi Jinping headlines. Pages four and five move on to other Party business. We see for the first time on page four the mention in a headline of Premier Li Keqiang (李克强). Right next to that article is a headline mention of Zhang Dejiang (张德江), another member of the powerful Standing Committee of the Politburo.
It is too early, perhaps, to formally call Xi Jinping’s personality cult. But it is a perfect time to review Clause 6 of Chapter II of the Constitution of the Chinese Communist Party:

6) The Party forbids all forms of personality cult. It is necessary to ensure that the activities of the Party leaders are subject to oversight by the Party and the people, and at the same time to uphold the prestige of all the leaders who represent the interests of the Party and the people.

BRICS media link up in China

On Monday and Tuesday this week, as a noxious cloud of pollution sat across a broad swathe of northern China, the country’s immense environmental challenges made international headlines, even as China’s president attended climate talks in Paris. The irony, not at all lost on Chinese, was a sore point for propaganda officials. They scrambled against all odds to position the story, purging snide posts on social networks and pushing knottier questions, like why the government hadn’t issued a “red alert,” onto trusted state news sources, like the official Xinhua News Agency.
Meanwhile, at the headquarters of Xinhua News Agency, just two blocks west of Tiananmen Square, media representatives from the world’s five emerging national economies, known collectively as the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa), gathered to discuss — according to their Chinese hosts — how to strengthen the “international discourse power” of the member nations. They claimed — in any case, their hosts claimed — to “support the voices of the developing world.”

BRICS Presidium
On December 1, representatives to the “Presidium” of the first BRICS Media Summit link hands in Beijing. They are, from left to right: Karima Brown, group executive editor of South Africa’s Independent News and Media SA; Americo Dos Santos, chairman of the Brazil Communication Company; Cai Mingzhao, president of China’s official Xinhua News Agency; Narasimhan Ram, of India’s The Hindu Group; and Pavel Andreev, deputy editor-in-chief of the Rossiya Segodnya International Information Agency.
The elephant in the room, of course, was the West. Changing the strategically weak position of the BRICS countries in terms of information would mean, according to Xinhua, “changing the current situation in which Western media dominate the media industry.” More important was addressing the imbalance of agendas. Western industry dominance meant that the West had come to dominate the global conversation as well as the accepted facts that formed the basis of that conversation. “BRICS countries,” said an English-language report from China Central Television, “should have a bigger say on global issues such as climate change and cybersecurity.”

Many visiting media representatives believe that while the five BRICS nations have large populations and huge economies, with proportionally large contributions to the global economy, the BRICS nations have not yet attained an international communication capacity commensurate with their economic weight. The media of BRICS nations must strengthen their own capacity building, making their own voices heard in the global public opinion sphere. [SOURCE]

On the issue of climate change, let’s remember, these words were fired off by Chinese state media at precisely the time that the leaders of both China and India were in Paris for the COP21 climate change conference. Let’s also not forget that China has silenced its own powerful voices on environmental issues, including the much-lauded documentary “Under the Dome,” by journalist Chai Jing.
One of the key suggestions to emerge from the event, the first BRICS Media Summit (金砖国家媒体峰会), came from Dmitry Kiselev, director of the Rossiya Segodnya International Information Agency. He proposed that the BRICS nations “achieve an information ‘handshake,’” by which he meant strategic cooperation in the release of news and information that was — again, in the words of Xinhua — “timely and accurate, overcoming the interference caused by untrue reporting of BRICS countries by certain Western media.”
The first BRICS Media Summit in fact continues a discussion that began at BRICS Russia 2015 back in October, when representatives of major media groups from BRICS countries discussed the possibility of a “joint newswire” and a “joint broadcaster” to counteract the influence of Western media and create a “common information space.”
This is what Kiselev had in mind when he spoke this week of a strategic “handshake” — a strong, unbroken chain, if you will, of BRICS media.
And without further (editorialising) ado, I give you Kiselev’s own words, spoken at the opening of the summit, on the possibilities inherent in this “precious opportunity.” Or, hold on, perhaps these are Beijing’s words. There are no quotation marks, you see — and the voices are so very hard to distinguish.

Rossiya Segodnya International Information Agency Director General Dmitry Kiselev Calls for Creation of BRICS Nations Information Service and BRICS Nations Broadcaster
Xinhua Online, Beijing, December 1, 2015 — Bosses from 25 media agencies from 5 BRICS member states took part in the first BRICS Media Summit held in Beijing on December 1. Rossiya Segodnya International Information Agency Director General Dmitry Kiselev (基谢廖夫) delivered a speech at the opening ceremony.
Kiselev said he thanked his dear friends and was very happy. Like the rest of my Russian colleagues, [he said], I am delighted to have this opportunity to take part in the first BRICS Media Summit. Permit me first to thank Mr. Cai Mingzhao (蔡名照), [the head of China’s Xinhua News Agency], and his agency for their high level of work in organising [this event]. I thank you all for creating this very important platform for us. At the same time, I also thank Mr. Liu Qibao (刘奇葆), [the chief of China’s Central Propaganda Department], for his [recent] remarks. As he said, we must do our utmost as media to seize this precious opportunity, investing our strengths, and I hope our relationship of cooperation is a stable and reliable one.
Rossiya Segodnya held a media summit in Moscow back in October this year, and although it was not a media summit of BRICS member nations, it was a meeting among media leaders from BRICS nations. In the midst of those meetings, we discussed the building of a common information space (统一的信息空间) among Brazil, South Africa, India, China and Russia. For all of us, this is an extremely important issue, because I understand that we must do more to broadcast timely and effective information about our respective economic developments. I believe my colleagues here agree with my view, that the more important issue right now with respect to the transmission of information is how to guarantee reliable and accurate information sources. At present, the principle sources of information are the United States, Great Britain and other European nations. And their information sources are often not very accurate, and at the same time their information is transmitted to South Africa, to Brazil, to Russia — and the transmission of information that is not particularly accurate (不是特别准确的信息) tends to create problems. So we must create a common information space.
In Syria recently, a whole series events occurred, and related news coverage once again demonstrated that we our proposition and thinking here is extremely important. I hope that through our efforts we can communicate and transmit more accurate information. And I also hope very much that we can each make our own contributions [to this cause] through our respective efforts. To start off, I propose the following:
First, that we create an information network for BRICS nations (金砖国家的信息网). Through this information network we can publish or promulgate accurate information in a timely manner. At the same time we believe that such a proposal must receive the support of the various [BRICS] nations, and in fact it has already received the support of China and other BRICS members. The various member states have always done their utmost to ensure the accuracy and openness of information. And so, we hope very much that through our efforts we can achieve a tight and timely linking of hands in the area of information.
Second, and this was proposed by our news agency, we should create a broadcaster for BRICS nations. This is an issue we have already discussed, because everyone knows that every country has its own FM frequencies, and we should fully use these frequencies as information windows (信息的窗口). China, Russia, Brazil, India and South Africa all have their respective frequencies for information transmission. What’s more, we hope very much that this proposal from the Russian side receives your support and active response. On information cooperation (信息握手), we also hope to have your support and active response.

Sensitive Climate

The following post by “Lawyer Chi Sufeng” (迟夙凤律师), was deleted from Sina Weibo sometime before 11:41am yesterday, December 1, 2015. The post saluted the United Nations Conference on Climate Change, underway in Paris through December 11, and added a simple image of the author’s surroundings, a smoggy city sky with blurred buildings. The Air Quality Index (AQI) reached a hazardous 580 in Beijing on Tuesday, according to the US Embassy in Beijing. The post was alive for around 50 minutes before being censored. [Explore more deleted posts by using the Weiboscope, created by the Journalism & Media Studies Centre.]
A translation of the post follows:

A hearty congratulations to the World Climate Conference. This is what’s around me right now.

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The original post in Chinese:

热烈祝贺世界气候大会召开,现在我的周围。

Anhui "news ethics" committee formed

In a recent piece for ChinaFile, I looked at how China’s leadership is building a new institutional layer through which to control the activities of news journalists — a national network of “news ethics committees,” or xinwen daode weiyuanhui (新闻道德委员会), at the city and provincial levels.
While these new mechanisms are routinely justified as responses to poor and worsening ethics in China’s media, closer observation of the underlying discourse suggests they are predominantly about the Party reasserting control over the news agenda.
The rollout of this national network continues this week with the formal creation of the Anhui News Ethics Committee, with we are told aims to “further strengthen self-regulation in the news industry and social oversight of news work, and promote the improvement of news teams.”

Beijing News Ethics Committee
The Beijing News Ethics Committee holds its first meeting in September 2014.
The announcement of the committee’s creation, on November 30, said it responded to the “spirit” of the recent Fifth Plenum of the 18th CCP Central Committee, held back in October. The committee would, said local media coverage, “prioritise resolving paid-for news, fake news, sensationalism and other obvious problems.”
One of the news ethic’s committee’s first acts was to create a reporting hotline allowing the public to call attention to possible instances of misconduct. In case you’re wondering, that number is: 0551–62608957.

Improper readings of “improper discussion”

Introduced in late October, the Chinese Communist Party’s new disciplinary regulations — outlining a code of integrity and requisite penalties for its transgression — included language forbidding “improper discussion” of the policies of the central leadership.

Last week, CMP gave readers a historical rundown of the notion of “improper discussion” in the Party’s official People’s Daily newspaper, showing how the term had been used over the past 60 years. We showed that throughout the newspaper’s entire history, just 7 articles had addressed “improper discussion” as “an internal Party ban” (党内禁令) — and 6 of these appeared in the People’s Daily this year.

Could this ideological tightening over the discussion of Party policies have a further chilling effect in China, centralising decision-making and blocking out constructive criticism? That is certainly the view of some. And since the augmented regulations emerged in October, one focus of concern has been that the restriction on “improper discussion” might hamper so-called “intra-party democracy” — the idea, essentially, that China’s single-party political system could develop its own internal mechanisms that are more deliberative and “democratic.”

xilu anticorruption
Coverage at Xilu.com of the ban on “improper discussion” in new CCP disciplinary regulations associates the move with anti-corruption. Three fists crush the Chinese characters for “corruption.”

Some have argued in the past, against skepticism in the West, that such mechanisms “might also provide for an incremental and manageable experiment of Chinese-style democracy.” The countervailing argument — an obvious one to my mind — is that you cannot realistically have institutionalised checks and balances exercised by a single political party on itself, a problem Qian Gang addressed ahead of the 18th Party Congress three years ago.
At the very least, however, the rhetoric of intra-party democracy can be seen as the lowest possible benchmark for political reform in China. Which is why some find all the talk of putting an end to “improper discussion” so concerning.

Over the past month, state media have done their utmost to counteract the argument that the prohibition on “improper discussion” undermines intraparty democracy (such as it is). And the latest piece came last Friday on page 7 of the People’s Daily. The article is written by Han Hui (韩慧), a lecturer at Jinan University’s School of Political Science and Public Administration, and it argues that since the release of the Party’s discipline regulations, the notion of “improper discussion” has been, well, improperly understood.

My translation of Han’s piece follows. Enjoy.

Improper Discussion of Party Policies Does Not Advance Intra-Party Democracy: Clearly Recognising the Error and Harmfulness of “Improper Discussion”
Han Hui (韩慧)
People’s Daily, November 27, 2015, page 7
Recently, the central Party leadership released the Chinese Communist Party Disciplinary Regulations, which explicitly mentioned “discussion of the fundamental policies of the Central Party authorities, causing damage to the centralism and unity of the Party” as a disciplinary violation. The vast majority of Party members and cadres have embraced and supported this, but there have been other voices as well. Some people have suggested this amounts to “stopping up opportunities to speak” (闭塞言路). Others say it “suppresses freedom of expression” (压制言论自由), or even that it “denies the favourable trend of criticism and self-criticism within the Party, damaging intra-party democracy (党内民主).” These viewpoints might well disorient those who do not understand the situation, but in fact they are biased and full of holes — in point of fact, they are wrong. We must get to the bottom of this and sort out the facts in order to understand clearly why these viewpoints are wrong theoretically, and how they are harmful in practice.
These viewpoints are wrong, first and foremost, because they neglect basic concepts and specific contexts. First of all, starting with the concept of wangyi (妄议), [or “improper discussion”], the word wang means “careless” (胡乱), “overstepping the bounds” (越轨), “fabricated” (虚妄) or “false” (不实), and from this we understand that wangyi refers to creating something out of nothing, distorting the facts, overstepping established rules — and it clearly indicates “malicious discussion” (恶议) or “spurious discussion” (假议), as opposed to “principled discussion” (良议) or “true discussion” (真议).
Next, looking [at the term] within the specific context of the disciplinary regulations, the condition for [cases of] “discussion of the fundamental policies of the Central Party authorities” is that these are done “through the Internet, broadcasts . . . . or other methods.” After comes the further condition that it “causes damage to the centralism and unity of the Party.” Put these two together and its very clear that there are necessary and sufficient conditions for disciplinary action, specifically under what circumstances improper discussion occurs and what impact this has to necessitate what sort of disciplinary action. It does not amount to further restrictions on normal suggestions made through legitimate channels and methods. If we are clear about concepts and context, these views based on partial and facile readings collapse under their own weight.
These viewpoints are erroneous also in the way they fail to recognise the error inherent in “improper discussion.”
First, they substitute improper discussion for critical viewpoints. Criticism and self-criticism (批评和自我批评) are favourable approaches that the Party has consistently advocated as a basic means of resolving internal tensions . . . so long as the criticism in question is constructive. Improper discussion, on the other hand, is destructive in nature, irresponsible, done with ulterior motives (别有用心的), or motives that are impure — criticism that is improperly directed (方向不正) and improper in its method (方法不当), not criticism (and of course self-criticism) that seeks the truth (追求真理) or seeks lessons in past mistakes (惩前毖后).
Second, they secretly substitute improper discussion for freedom of expression. Our Constitution guarantees that citizens have freedom of expression, freedom of the press and freedom of association, but abiding by the law is the precondition for the exercise of any freedom. Party disciplinary regulations are stricter than national laws, and Party members and leaders cannot indulge their own “freedom of expression.” There are normal channels and methods for offering criticism and suggestions concerning the policies of the central Party, and Party organisations cannot be treated as personal clubs in which one can arbitrarily air out one’s own personal feelings.
Third, they set improper discussion up as intra-party democracy. Our Party gives great priority to intra-party democracy, but intra-party democracy is not the democracy of individualism (个人主义) and liberalism (自由主义). The building of intra-party democracy cannot depart from the Party Constitution, and of course it cannot go against the Party Constitution. Those who engage in improper discussion (妄议者) often will not speak up face-to-face, but speak nonsense behind one’s back; they will not speak up at meetings, but speak nonsense after the meeting. This thing they are calling democracy is at best an expression of their own personal interests, 0r a venting of their own personal desires — it is not true democracy, and it goes against the principle of democratic centralism (民主集中制).
In practice, the harm created by improper discussion of the policies of the central Party cannot be overlooked. First of all, it damages the cohesion and fighting strength of the Party. The Party’s cohesion and fighting strength arise from common objectives, and from strict discipline. Under the new situation, as our Party shoulders a lofty historical mission, we must be even stricter about Party discipline. Improper discussion of the polices of the central Party results in lax discipline within the Party, shaking people’s hearts and ultimately creating small cliques and factions, seriously damaging the Party’s cohesion and fighting strength.
Second, [improper discussion] weakens the Party’s authority and its leadership position. Some people, as they implement the policies of the centre, do so at a discount, fashioning their own alternatives, so that what we have are “policies above and countermeasures below” (上有政策, 下有对策), and disconnects from top to bottom that thwart [policy] decrees. This damages the authority and governing ability of the central Party. In fact, all of these [trends] have a great deal to do with the improper discussion of the policies of the central Party.
In fact, our Party has always upheld intra-party democracy as a priority, and has stressed the importance of the favourable trends of criticism and self-criticism. Take as an example the drafting process for Chinese Communist Party Opinions on the Formulation of 13th Five-Year Plan for Economic and Social Development. The document’s drafting team widely sought opinions from various quarters, and on numerous occasions held conferences to discuss changes, and a draft soliciting opinions was circulated within the Party. As for criticism and self-criticism, comrade Xi Jinping has emphasised: “As for the weapon of criticism and self-criticism, we must use it boldly, use it often, use it sufficiently and well, so that it becomes habitual, a kind of consciousness, a kind of responsibility, and the more we use this weapon the more effective we become, and the more results we get.” It is clear to see that to place discipline against the improper criticism of the policies of the central Party in opposition to intra-party democracy and the promotion of criticism and self-criticism is entirely wrong.