Now Executive Director of the China Media Project, leading the project’s research and partnerships, David originally joined the project in Hong Kong in 2004. He is the author of Dragons in Diamond Village (Penguin), a book of reportage about urbanization and social activism in China, and co-editor of Investigative Journalism in China (HKU Press).
The following post by “Lawyer Chi Sufeng” (迟夙凤律师), was deleted from Sina Weibo sometime before 11:41am yesterday, December 1, 2015. The post saluted the United Nations Conference on Climate Change, underway in Paris through December 11, and added a simple image of the author’s surroundings, a smoggy city sky with blurred buildings. The Air Quality Index (AQI) reached a hazardous 580 in Beijing on Tuesday, according to the US Embassy in Beijing. The post was alive for around 50 minutes before being censored. [Explore more deleted posts by using the Weiboscope, created by the Journalism & Media Studies Centre.]
A translation of the post follows:
A hearty congratulations to the World Climate Conference. This is what’s around me right now.
In a recent piece for ChinaFile, I looked at how China’s leadership is building a new institutional layer through which to control the activities of news journalists — a national network of “news ethics committees,” or xinwen daode weiyuanhui (新闻道德委员会), at the city and provincial levels.
While these new mechanisms are routinely justified as responses to poor and worsening ethics in China’s media, closer observation of the underlying discourse suggests they are predominantly about the Party reasserting control over the news agenda.
The rollout of this national network continues this week with the formal creation of the Anhui News Ethics Committee, with we are told aims to “further strengthen self-regulation in the news industry and social oversight of news work, and promote the improvement of news teams.”
The Beijing News Ethics Committee holds its first meeting in September 2014.
The announcement of the committee’s creation, on November 30, said it responded to the “spirit” of the recent Fifth Plenum of the 18th CCP Central Committee, held back in October. The committee would, said local media coverage, “prioritise resolving paid-for news, fake news, sensationalism and other obvious problems.”
One of the news ethic’s committee’s first acts was to create a reporting hotline allowing the public to call attention to possible instances of misconduct. In case you’re wondering, that number is: 0551–62608957.
Introduced in late October, the Chinese Communist Party’s new disciplinary regulations — outlining a code of integrity and requisite penalties for its transgression — included language forbidding “improper discussion” of the policies of the central leadership.
Could this ideological tightening over the discussion of Party policies have a further chilling effect in China, centralising decision-making and blocking out constructive criticism? That is certainly the view of some. And since the augmented regulations emerged in October, one focus of concern has been that the restriction on “improper discussion” might hamper so-called “intra-party democracy” — the idea, essentially, that China’s single-party political system could develop its own internal mechanisms that are more deliberative and “democratic.”
Coverage at Xilu.com of the ban on “improper discussion” in new CCP disciplinary regulations associates the move with anti-corruption. Three fists crush the Chinese characters for “corruption.”
Some have argued in the past, against skepticism in the West, that such mechanisms “might also provide for an incremental and manageable experiment of Chinese-style democracy.” The countervailing argument — an obvious one to my mind — is that you cannot realistically have institutionalised checks and balances exercised by a single political party on itself, a problem Qian Gang addressed ahead of the 18th Party Congress three years ago.
At the very least, however, the rhetoric of intra-party democracy can be seen as the lowest possible benchmark for political reform in China. Which is why some find all the talk of putting an end to “improper discussion” so concerning.
Over the past month, state media have done their utmost to counteract the argument that the prohibition on “improper discussion” undermines intraparty democracy (such as it is). And the latest piece came last Friday on page 7 of the People’s Daily. The article is written by Han Hui (韩慧), a lecturer at Jinan University’s School of Political Science and Public Administration, and it argues that since the release of the Party’s discipline regulations, the notion of “improper discussion” has been, well, improperly understood.
My translation of Han’s piece follows. Enjoy.
Improper Discussion of Party Policies Does Not Advance Intra-Party Democracy: Clearly Recognising the Error and Harmfulness of “Improper Discussion”
Han Hui (韩慧) People’s Daily, November 27, 2015, page 7
Recently, the central Party leadership released the Chinese Communist Party Disciplinary Regulations, which explicitly mentioned “discussion of the fundamental policies of the Central Party authorities, causing damage to the centralism and unity of the Party” as a disciplinary violation. The vast majority of Party members and cadres have embraced and supported this, but there have been other voices as well. Some people have suggested this amounts to “stopping up opportunities to speak” (闭塞言路). Others say it “suppresses freedom of expression” (压制言论自由), or even that it “denies the favourable trend of criticism and self-criticism within the Party, damaging intra-party democracy (党内民主).” These viewpoints might well disorient those who do not understand the situation, but in fact they are biased and full of holes — in point of fact, they are wrong. We must get to the bottom of this and sort out the facts in order to understand clearly why these viewpoints are wrong theoretically, and how they are harmful in practice.
These viewpoints are wrong, first and foremost, because they neglect basic concepts and specific contexts. First of all, starting with the concept of wangyi (妄议), [or “improper discussion”], the word wang means “careless” (胡乱), “overstepping the bounds” (越轨), “fabricated” (虚妄) or “false” (不实), and from this we understand that wangyi refers to creating something out of nothing, distorting the facts, overstepping established rules — and it clearly indicates “malicious discussion” (恶议) or “spurious discussion” (假议), as opposed to “principled discussion” (良议) or “true discussion” (真议).
Next, looking [at the term] within the specific context of the disciplinary regulations, the condition for [cases of] “discussion of the fundamental policies of the Central Party authorities” is that these are done “through the Internet, broadcasts . . . . or other methods.” After comes the further condition that it “causes damage to the centralism and unity of the Party.” Put these two together and its very clear that there are necessary and sufficient conditions for disciplinary action, specifically under what circumstances improper discussion occurs and what impact this has to necessitate what sort of disciplinary action. It does not amount to further restrictions on normal suggestions made through legitimate channels and methods. If we are clear about concepts and context, these views based on partial and facile readings collapse under their own weight.
These viewpoints are erroneous also in the way they fail to recognise the error inherent in “improper discussion.”
First, they substitute improper discussion for critical viewpoints. Criticism and self-criticism (批评和自我批评) are favourable approaches that the Party has consistently advocated as a basic means of resolving internal tensions . . . so long as the criticism in question is constructive. Improper discussion, on the other hand, is destructive in nature, irresponsible, done with ulterior motives (别有用心的), or motives that are impure — criticism that is improperly directed (方向不正) and improper in its method (方法不当), not criticism (and of course self-criticism) that seeks the truth (追求真理) or seeks lessons in past mistakes (惩前毖后).
Second, they secretly substitute improper discussion for freedom of expression. Our Constitution guarantees that citizens have freedom of expression, freedom of the press and freedom of association, but abiding by the law is the precondition for the exercise of any freedom. Party disciplinary regulations are stricter than national laws, and Party members and leaders cannot indulge their own “freedom of expression.” There are normal channels and methods for offering criticism and suggestions concerning the policies of the central Party, and Party organisations cannot be treated as personal clubs in which one can arbitrarily air out one’s own personal feelings.
Third, they set improper discussion up as intra-party democracy. Our Party gives great priority to intra-party democracy, but intra-party democracy is not the democracy of individualism (个人主义) and liberalism (自由主义). The building of intra-party democracy cannot depart from the Party Constitution, and of course it cannot go against the Party Constitution. Those who engage in improper discussion (妄议者) often will not speak up face-to-face, but speak nonsense behind one’s back; they will not speak up at meetings, but speak nonsense after the meeting. This thing they are calling democracy is at best an expression of their own personal interests, 0r a venting of their own personal desires — it is not true democracy, and it goes against the principle of democratic centralism (民主集中制).
In practice, the harm created by improper discussion of the policies of the central Party cannot be overlooked. First of all, it damages the cohesion and fighting strength of the Party. The Party’s cohesion and fighting strength arise from common objectives, and from strict discipline. Under the new situation, as our Party shoulders a lofty historical mission, we must be even stricter about Party discipline. Improper discussion of the polices of the central Party results in lax discipline within the Party, shaking people’s hearts and ultimately creating small cliques and factions, seriously damaging the Party’s cohesion and fighting strength.
Second, [improper discussion] weakens the Party’s authority and its leadership position. Some people, as they implement the policies of the centre, do so at a discount, fashioning their own alternatives, so that what we have are “policies above and countermeasures below” (上有政策, 下有对策), and disconnects from top to bottom that thwart [policy] decrees. This damages the authority and governing ability of the central Party. In fact, all of these [trends] have a great deal to do with the improper discussion of the policies of the central Party.
In fact, our Party has always upheld intra-party democracy as a priority, and has stressed the importance of the favourable trends of criticism and self-criticism. Take as an example the drafting process for Chinese Communist Party Opinions on the Formulation of 13th Five-Year Plan for Economic and Social Development. The document’s drafting team widely sought opinions from various quarters, and on numerous occasions held conferences to discuss changes, and a draft soliciting opinions was circulated within the Party. As for criticism and self-criticism, comrade Xi Jinping has emphasised: “As for the weapon of criticism and self-criticism, we must use it boldly, use it often, use it sufficiently and well, so that it becomes habitual, a kind of consciousness, a kind of responsibility, and the more we use this weapon the more effective we become, and the more results we get.” It is clear to see that to place discipline against the improper criticism of the policies of the central Party in opposition to intra-party democracy and the promotion of criticism and self-criticism is entirely wrong.
In the aftermath of the terror attacks in Paris, Chinese took to social networks to voice their sympathy. Some, however, also criticised what they believed to be a “double standard” applied by the West for terror attacks occurring on Chinese soil.
On the sidelines of a G20 summit in Turkey, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi echoed this frustration, saying there must be no international “double standard” on the “common enemy” of terrorism. Reporting Wang Yi’s remarks, the English-language China Daily said: “Due to their deep-rooted bias and double standard, some Western countries and their media refuse to recognise the violence and attacks masterminded by extremists in China’s Xinjiang Uyghur autonomous region as acts of terrorism.”
In the following editorial, posted first in Chinese to Deutsche Welle, veteran Chinese journalist and former China Media Project fellow Chang Ping (长平) argues that in fact China applies its own double standard, and that its discriminatory ethnic polices and lack of transparency about them are the legitimate cause of international criticism.
________________ THE DOUBLE STANDARD CAN END
By Chang Ping
On the very day of the Paris attacks, the Ministry of Public Security announced through an official Weibo account that “police in Xinjiang had destroyed a group of terrorists following a 56-day hunt.” It showed images of police carrying out the raid. But just as internet users were heaping praise on China’s counter-terrorism efforts, orders came down for the removal of the images and related posts from the internet and social media networks.
The act of domestic censorship did not, however, prevent Chinese internet users — encouraged by official state media spin — from sharply criticising Western media for their double standards in their reporting on the Xinjiang terrorist attacks. Foreign Ministry spokesman Wang Yi, even said during a G20 summit meeting in Turkey that, “There can be no double standards . . . China is also a victim of terrorism, and attacking the ‘East Turkestan’ terrorist forces represented by the East Turkestan Islamic Movement should become an important part of international counterterrorism.”
When minister Wang Yi, the state-run media and many Chinese internet users talk about a “double standard” in the West, they are referring to the way Western media generally take a critical stance against the media control tactics of the Chinese Communist Party and the government’s policies toward ethnic minorities.
But in fact, it is precisely because Western media do hold China to the same standard as other countries that they are so critical in their coverage. China’s government is always yammering on about how China’s “national circumstances” are unique. What is this if not a desire that the West holds China to a separate standard?
The short-lived Weibo post about China’s anti-terrorist activities in Xinjiang stated that a terrorist attack occurred back in September at a mine in Aksu, [in central-western Xinjiang], in which some 40 people were killed. The government, hoping the public would trust in the effectiveness of its anti-terrorism measures, refused to release the facts on the ground and prevented media from reporting the story. When information was released, this was only through the official Xinhua News Agency.
Try to imagine a similar scenario unfolding in Paris after the recent attacks.
What if the French government’s first move had been to forestall all media reporting with a stern order against any and all coverage? What if it had, with no mention whatsoever of the death toll, allowed only a trickle of official coverage about how how leaders were giving the case top priority, how they had ordered a full investigation and so on?
How would Western media have responded?
It should be obvious to everyone that media Western media would have criticised the French government with at least the same intensity as the criticisms levelled against China in the case of Xinjiang. In all probability, the blowback from the attempted restrictions would precipitate an end to the current French administration.
In the wake of September 11, American media slid into a stupor of nationalism, but this trend quickly came under criticism from scholars and other commentators. Today, many years later, this period in the American press provides a negative case study that is still hotly discussed and researched. Similarly, even as the Charlie Hebdo attack earlier this year prompted a wave of solidarity among Western leaders over counter-terrorism efforts, there were still many articles that took a more critical and reflective tone.
Another criticism levelled by Western media against the Chinese government concerns its discriminatory policies toward ethnic minorities. In this area, too, it is simply inaccurate to say that Western media have a double standard.
In response to terrorist attacks, mainstream public opinion in the West tends to balance against the simple and unfair lumping of Muslims, Arabs, Syrians or other national, ethic or religious categories together with “terrorists.” And yet, China’s government is itself in the habit of conflating the “terrorist” with the “separatist,” and there is nothing in the Party-controlled media to discourage the popular misconception that lumps these ideas together with Uyghur or Xinjiang people.
Here is one Weibo post that was widely praised: “When the attacks occurred in Paris, all of China united to voice support [for France]. When Xinjiang was attacked the entire country united in its rejection of Xinjiang people.” Of course, many people in Xinjiang are in fact Han Chinese, Kazakh or from other ethnic groups — but even if pointed at Uyghurs alone, these words are a classic example of ethnic prejudice. Ignorant statements like this are evidence of the kind of brainwashing by the Chinese government that Western media point to.
There’s no question that terrorist attacks against civilians must be answered firmly. But this does not mean that the ethnic policies of China’s government immune from criticism.
We can easily imagine another hypothetical situation in which there is within France a designated ethnic minority region with ostensible autonomy, but in which minority people are not permitted even to hold top government offices, where they live under military and special police occupation, where their religious observances are restricted, where they can be harshly sentenced for wearing beards or veils, where they need special permits to travel anywhere, where they cannot be served in certain hotels, bars and Internet cafes. And how would Western media treat such a story? Naturally, they would heap criticism on the French government. The response would be every bit as harsh as what we see meted out to China today.
There are certainly right-wing extremists in Western societies, and in recent years they have arguably been more active and vocal. They have their own media platforms, and there you can witness their verbal attacks against foreigners and minorities. They can form their own organisations and plan public marches. They can even establish political parties and make bids for power. But in Western societies where public opinion is open, mainstream opinion and the dominant political forces generally oppose these virulent strains and remain alert to danger they represent. More often than not, these extremists, rather than the minority groups they target, become the focus of police actions.
China has called on Western media to apply a unified standard, and this demand should be supported. This demands first that the Chinese Communist Party hold itself to the same standards as political parties in the West, and that the Chinese government abides by universal human rights standards. Otherwise, how can we talk about a single standard?
As China marked its annual Journalists’ Day over the weekend, proclaiming the importance of “correct news ideals,” even jaded New Yorkers stopped in their tracks and took notice. How could they not? The message beamed over 7th Avenue on Times Square, dominating one of the world’s most visible jumbotrons. According to a Chinese-language press release posted by the marketing department at PR Newswire, “many New Yorkers stopped to watch and take photographs.”
Of course, this is all pure fantasy.
An image provided by PR Newswire shows a special greeting for China Journalists’ Day displayed over New York City’s Times Square on November 8, 2015.
The jumbotron message was no more than a propaganda fizzle at the centre of a media-saturated universe China’s leaders seem chronically incapable of understanding. Unable to read Chinese, most Times Square onlookers would not have known this had anything to do with China. The logos of state-run Chinese media, arrayed across the bottom of the screen, would have been equally obscure.
But the fantasy nevertheless reveals a great deal of truth about how the Chinese Communist Party continues to understand the role of journalists and the media today. Fifteen years after Journalists’ Day was created in 2000 as one of three professional holidays in China, the country’s leaders still refuse the media’s right to exist as a true profession, rather than as a proxy of Party-state power.
Here is how the release — framed as a congratulatory message from PR Newswire to China’s “news workers” but quite reflective of the Party’s “mainstream” view — describes China and its press.
As the world’s largest economy, China has one of the world’s most developed media industries, and in terms of the number of media and news workers it far surpasses the other countries of the world. In recent years, along with the rapid development of Chinese media and the Internet, a great number of quality and influential news reports have emerged domestically [in China], attracting the attention of global media. This has not only objectively and impartially revealed to the world China’s openness and vitality, but at the same time has promoted the advancement of Chinese brands around the world. These achievements have been made by dint of the efforts of all Chinese journalists of this generation.
The message here is that China’s media must serve a larger narrative of the country’s success under the leadership of the CCP. Moreover, it is the success of this narrative — in “attracting the attention of global media,” for example — that decides whether news coverage is “objective” or “impartial.” To be objective is to see the big picture of China’s success without being distracted by those niggling facts that might darken or discolour the portrait.
Ideology chief Liu Yunshan, formerly head of the Central Propaganda Department, shakes hands with representatives from major state-run media in Beijing on November 8, 2015.
For China’s leaders, a professional press is a submissive press. As former Xinhua News Agency chief Li Congjun (李从军) wrote two years ago: “We must effectively strengthen our sense of political responsibility . . . upholding fully the principle of the Party-nature [of media], adhering to the principle that the politicians run the newspapers, magazines, broadcast stations and websites.”
This was the point that Liu Yunshan (刘云山), a member of the CCP’s powerful politburo and chief of ideology, reiterated yesterday when he met with media representatives during a journalism awards ceremony held in Beijing to mark Journalists’ Day. Journalists, Liu said, must build support for the recently released 13th Five-Year Plan, and “properly tell the new story of China.”
Liu Yunshan stressed, as he did on numerous occasions as China’s propaganda chief (here, here and here), that journalists must “abide by professional ethics, and uphold social responsibility.” But the professional imperatives are, as ever, circumscribed by political imperatives, by the journalist’s duty to the Party and to its social, economic and political agendas.
He emphasised that [those on] the news frontline must deeply study, publicise and implement the spirit of the Party’s Fifth Plenum, concentrate on the “13th Five-Year Plan” . . . . stirring up positive energy (激发正能量), in order to provide public opinion support and a favourable public opinion environment for the full realisation of a moderately prosperous society.
Liu left the more rigid control language to his successor as propaganda chief, Liu Qibao (刘奇葆), who was also present to tell those gathered that they must “express their social responsibility through the positive channeling of public opinion.” This involved:
Enhancing their sense of [public opinion] channeling, upholding correct guidance of public opinion, and raising their ability to channel [public opinion], consolidating and expanding positive and healthy mainstream opinion.
Consider that one of the award-winning pieces of journalism from the event over which Liu Yunshan presided this weekend was this fawning series of reports from Xinhua News Agency, “Raising Even Higher the Great Banner of Reform and Opening Up,” which marked the 110th anniversary of Deng Xiaoping’s birth and further shored up the reform credentials of President Xi Jinping. Click into the multimedia piece and it begins with soaring music and images of Deng and Xi against a rich, chocolaty background that resolves at the top into the ceiling of the Great Hall of the People.
If this is the standard for professional journalism, where do journalists go from here? How much higher can they raise the banner?
In a string of cases in recent months, Chinese authorities have made the case for stronger press controls, citing poor ethics in the journalism profession. But it is the hypocrisy of pro-Party ethics in a highly commercialised media environment that is the root cause of poor — and by all accounts, worsening — ethics in Chinese media.
While the Party leadership upholds falsehood, in the form of “guidance” and propaganda, as the ultimate professional standard, media operate under a competing market imperative that says they must attract audiences and deliver them to advertisers. Between the mechanisms of power and profit, there are no truly mediating professional standards or organisations.
The message: we can all profit from falsehood.
Reporters, editors or publishers who envision themselves as professionals working in the public interest are out on their own. And if they try to form a professional community or act in concert over professional ideals, they run extreme political risks.
The only communities allowed for the media in China are about “discipline” rather than professionalism. Take, for example, the latest “convention” made by Chinese media, reported back in September by China.org.cn, one of the media featured in the Times Square ad. Directed by the China Alliance of Radio, Film and Television (CARFT) — formerly the combined but acronym-challenged General Administration of Press, Publications, Radio, Film and Television (GAPPRFT) — media organisations signed “a self-discipline pact promising to uphold journalistic ethics.”
Just last week, on the eve of Journalists’ Day, CARFT announced the creation of a new committee to enforce the guidelines laid out in the September “convention.” This news was reported by China.org.cn under the headline: “New committee to uphold media ethics.”
Article 1: In order to fulfil socialist core values, pursue professional ideals, strengthen the building of professional morals, [promote] compliance with the Constitution, laws and regulations, and advocate a healthy industry climate, mass organisations in news, publishing, radio, film and television jointly formulate and sign the following convention. Article 2: Those participating in the [professions of] news, publishing, radio, film and television shall carry out the following course of professional self-discipline: Clause 1: Preserving the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party and the national interest, not publishing or spreading any language that damages the image of the Party or the nation.
And there you have it. Clause 1 makes it clear from the outset, yet again, that professionalism equals political obedience.
Happy Journalists’ Day!
The following post from “Beijing Yangbo” (北京杨博) was deleted from Weibo sometime before 10:10 am today, October 23, 2015. The post shares an image of the front page of The Beijing News, a leading Chinese commercial newspaper. The main headline on the page reads: “Irresponsible Discussion of Major Policies May Lead to Expulsions.” The article refers to a newly updated set of regulations governing to conduct of Chinese Communist Party officials in China, adding the stipulation that officials must not engage in “irresponsible discussion” of policies. The revised rules have sparked further concern of tighter control on dissenting views under the leadership under President Xi Jinping.
The post from “Beijing Yangbo, live for about 50 minutes before being removed, likens the new restrictions on Party officials to the madness of the Cultural Revolution. [Explore more deleted posts by using the Weiboscope, created by the Journalism and Media Studies Centre.]
The post accompanying the image reads:
The wind of the Cultural Revolution is quietly rising; the voice of one man clearly rules.
When finally unveiled sometime later this year, China’s Cyber-security Law could mark the beginning of a new and aggressive phase of information control in the country — one in which the Cyberspace Administration of China (CAC) is empowered by law to conduct widespread suppression and surveillance of networks and users under a broad mandate to preserve “Internet sovereignty” as a core function of national security.
The new law would provide a legal framework for the overarching project of media and information control in the digital age, furthering a crucial shift toward centralisation of cyberspace controls under the CAC and the Chinese Communist Party’s Central Leading Group for Cyberspace Affairs, formally established in March 2014 with President Xi Jinping as chairman.
As the leading group and CAC were formed last year, state media suggested this was a prime example of President Xi’s push to “deepen reform and strengthen top-level design,” and indeed we can understand this as a fundamental re-engineering of press controls in China to accommodate the reality that there are now close to 700 million Chinese on the Internet, of which more than three quarters have mobile access.
In an important internal speech to propaganda ministers on August 19, 2013 — later called simply, the “August 19 speech” — Xi Jinping re-iterated a core press control principle in place since it was first introduced by Mao Zedong in 1957, that the “politicians [must] run the newspapers,” or zhengzhijia banbao (政治家办报).
We must uphold the Party’s control of the media, adhering to the [principle] that politicians run the newspapers, periodicals, broadcasters and news websites. The various broadcast channels at all levels must adhere to the leadership of the Party.
In the same speech, Xi Jinping said, in terms eerily redolent of the Cultural Revolution, that China was in the midst of a “public opinion struggle.” The country, he suggested, faced an imminent threat from competing “non-mainstream” (non-Party) ideologies.
Riffing on this talk of “struggle,” the Chinese-language Global Times, sister to the People’s Daily, issued its own clarion call:
Only if we recognise the seriousness of the public opinion struggle can we make it a true priority. The public opinion struggle is a fight for hearts of the people . . . .
As old-fashioned as this language may sound, Xi Jinping is clearly aware that the “struggle” for public opinion, so core to maintaining the Party’s political control, is shifting away from traditional media and almost equally outmoded “news websites.” In the age of the mobile Internet and the Internet of Things, the Chinese Communist Party must seek a fundamental innovation of controls.
The days of “politicians running the newspapers” are past. Politicians must now run cyberspace.
We should understand the Cyber-security Law as part of a series of legal and institutional changes designed to consolidate the Chinese Communist Party’s control of ideology and public opinion in a networked world.
These changes also mean, of course, that those propaganda ministers President Xi spurred to action with his “August 19” speech two years ago will be increasingly sidelined as the business of information control, and its attendant power, transitions to the Central Leading Group and its enforcement arm, the CAC. The Central Propaganda Department, in other words, may be gradually dissolved or marginalised under a new control infrastructure with immense authority over the social, cultural, political and economic fabric of Chinese cyberspace.
The central strategic role of cyberspace for the CCP demands that take a much more active role in the global governance of the Internet, which is why we have seen a sharp rise in interest since 2010 in the notion of “Internet sovereignty,” or “cyber-sovereignty.”
Occurrences of the term “Internet sovereignty” in the Chinese media since 2010. Source: WiseNews Database, for all mainland Chinese news sources.
In an article published on the Huffington Post in December 2014, the head of the Cyberspace Administration of China, Lu Wei (鲁炜), laid out the fundamentals of China’s position on global Internet governance. While the United States, said Lu, advocated a “multi-stakeholder” approach to Internet governance, meaning that “all Internet participants [are] on an equal footing making the rules,” China proposed instead a “multilateral” approach that meant “the state making the rules based on the idea of the sovereignty of the nation-state representing its citizens.”
(What, if anything, can we read into the fact that Lu Wei’s Huffington Post article has received just 49 Facebook likes and 69 Twitter shares over a period of nine months?)
By re-defining cyberspace in this manner, China’s leaders seek to legitimise domestic political controls on the Internet — and their possible global implications — on the grounds of national security and sovereignty. Or, as EastWest Institute fellow Franz-Stefan Gady put it, the push for Internet sovereignty is an attempt to “gain de jure international support for China’s de facto Internet censorship policies.”
China’s own theorists on the issue often push the point that robust international guarantees of cyber-security are essential if any nation is to be secure. Wrote Lu Wei: “No country can achieve absolute security without the overall security of international cyberspace.”
For more thoughts on the draft Cyber-security Law, its political reasoning, and its possible implications for Chinese citizens and others, I highly recommend this piece by Mo Zhixu.
Continuing our series of coverage and translations on the issue of “Internet sovereignty,” I also provide the following piece published in the Legal Daily on September 28, recapping China’s views on cyberspace and global Internet governance in light of Xi Jinping’s recent visit to the United States.
The article — which characterises China and the United States as “cyber powers,” another iteration of the state-based conception of Internet governance — talks about how China has in recent years participated “more actively and comprehensively in the global experience of cyberspace governance.” And it argues that the end result of China’s efforts will be “an entirely new pattern . . . . in terms of the international governance system for global cyberspace.”
Enjoy.
China Actively Pushes Building of New System of International Governance of Cyberspace Legal Daily, September 28, 2015
Deepening international cooperation, respecting Internet sovereignty, preserving cyber-security, and mutually building a peaceful, secure, open and cooperative online space, and building a multi-faceted, democratic and transparent international Internet governance system.
Aside from hosting the World Internet Conference to actively construct an international platform for dialogue, and other beneficial moves, China has also begun to directly participate in key decision-making on important issues in the international governance of cyberspace. As China participates more actively and comprehensively in the global experience of cyberspace governance, an entirely new pattern will arise in terms of the international governance system for global cyberspace.
China’s confidence in promoting changes to the global governance structure for cyberspace must ultimately rely on support from technology, standards, infrastructure, [network] access equipment, critical applications and core capacity.
On September 25, President Xi Jinping held a joint press conference in Washington with U.S. President Barack Obama. Xi Jinping pointed out that China and the United States, as two major cyber powers (网络大国), must strengthen dialogue and cooperation, and that friction and opposition are not viable choices.
China and the United States have reached an important agreement on working together to combat cyber crimes, agreeing to strengthen joint investigations and information sharing. The governments on both sides agreed not to engage in or knowingly support the online theft of intellectual property . . . .
This is not the first time China’s government has made its voice heard on the issue of international cooperation over cyberspace.
In a written address to the first World Internet Conference, held in November 2012, Xi Jinping pointed out that various nations, on the basis of mutual respect, must deepen international cooperation, respecting [the principle of] Internet sovereignty, protection cyber-security, and mutually working to build a peaceful, secure, open and cooperative online space, and a multi-faceted, democratic and transparent international Internet governance system.
Experts in China and the United States have given great attention to the relevant speeches by Xi Jinping [on this issue].
James Andrew Lewis, director of the Strategic Technologies Program at the Centre for Strategic and International Studies, wrote in a recent blog post that negotiations between China and the United States over cyber-security are “a welcome development.”
Yu Xiaoqiu (俞晓秋), a researcher at the China Center for Overseas Social and Philosophical Theories at the Central Compilation and Translation Bureau (CCTB), has said that while various countries in the world are divided on questions of cyber-security, there are mutual interests at stake and there is also real and potential space for cooperation: “If China and the United States maintain an attitude of mutual respect, pay attention to one another’s concerns, if they do not engage in confrontation over cyber-security or remain divided over management and control (管控分歧, [choosing rather] to advance cooperation, only then can overall relations between the two countries develop steadily and peacefully.” Developing Countries Are Still Kept on the Margins
The “2014 China Internet Cyber-security Report” issued by the National Computer Network Emergency Response Coordination Centre (CNCERT/CC) states that in 2014 the number of phishing websites threatening out country’s domestic websites totalled 99,409, affecting 6,844 IP addresses. . . . These numbers indicate that cyber-security is a problem the international community faces together, and we must strengthen international cooperation to deal with the issue.
“Internet governance and the security of global cyberspace have already become major agendas of a global nature, and of constant concern to the international community,” says Yu Xiaoqiu. “They are a pressing task staring the countries of the world directly in the face.”
Since the American [surveillance program] “Prism” was revealed, calls have grown louder in the international community for the establishment of relevant principles, for the strengthening of international cooperation on cyber-security, and the regulation of conduct in cyberspace.
Brazil and Germany have called on the United Nations to expand the scope of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights to include protections for [online] privacy. The two countries jointly submitted a draft resolution on “privacy in the digital age,” and this was passed during a session of the United Nations General Assembly on December 19, 2013.
India has expressed its willingness to share cyber-security technology with Brazil, in order to assist Brazil in dealing with surveillance conducted by the United States and its allies.
On these issues, at the first World Internet Conference, Zhao Zeliang (赵泽良), director of the Cybersecurity Coordination Bureau at the Cyberspace Administration of China, suggested four principles for international cooperation over cyber-security: [maintaining] an open Internet as the foundation (立足于开放互联); adhering to rule of law in Internet management (坚持依法治网); mutual trust and respect (相互尊重信任); strengthening dialogue and conversation (加强对话交流).
. . . .
In fact, the international governance of cyberspace can hearken back to the World Summit on the Information Society held in Tunis in 2003.
At this summit, the international community held its first intense discussion over the question of whether and how the Internet should be governed. The outcome of those discussions was the creation by the UN secretary-general of the Working Group on Internet Governance.
According to Shen Yi (沈逸), an associate professor at Fudan University who specialises in the research of international politics, cyber-security and Internet governance, a report submitted by the [UN’s] Working Group on Internet Governance in 2005 gave a succinct evaluation of the Internet governance situation at the time. It pointed out, for example, that there were no effective mechanisms in place to protect the security and stability of the Internet, and that there were no effective mechanisms in place to resolve multinational crimes and other issues.
“As the governance of the online space had progressed, the basic situation now in terms of the international governance system for the online space is an unbalance state of affairs in which the United States holds the dominant position,” says Shen Yi. He explains further that the developed nations of North America and Europe, with the United States as the chief representative, hold a core position in global Internet governance together with companies and organisations that are in their grasp — and the developing nations of Asia, Africa and Latin America are kept on the margins of global Internet governance.
In Shen Yi’s view, when we look at the current situation, the governance of global cyberspace has a clear character of asymmetric interdependence (不对称相互依赖特征), in which all countries and actors are significantly dependent on the Internet. By means of technological, institutional, strategic and policy advantages, developed nations hold clear status and enjoy [a position of] lower sensitivity and relative strength. The reliance of developing nations on the Internet, meanwhile, is a classic situation of high sensitivity and high weakness. The developing countries that are the chief providers of data [in terms of Internet usage], have not obtained a matching degree of benefit, and in cyberspace they face marginalisation. China Progressively Takes The Stage of Global Governance
According to Wang Yukai (汪玉凯), and expert at the China Internet Security Conference and deputy director of the Committee of Experts on E-Government at the Chinese Academy of Governance, the United States has an absolute advantage in terms of network information technology. In recent years, however, America’s absolute advantage in cyberspace has met with constant challenges. “Many nations hope to break through American controls, and at least in the area of rules formulation they don’t want the United States having the final say, including on Internet governance and international cooperation,” Wang Yukai says.
On the eve of Xi Jinping’s visit to the United States, both China and the United States made statements concerning “cyber-security.” On September 9, Meng Jianzhu (孟建柱), Xi Jinping’s special envoy, a Politburo member and secretary of the Central Politics and Law Committee, led officials from [China’s] policy, security, legal and network communications branches on a visit to the United States, where he met with Secretary of State John Kerry. Analysts said this was a sign that Sino-U.S. negotiations had already reached a practical stage.
On September 11, Foreign Ministry spokesman Hong Lei (洪磊) said: “The issue of cyber security shall become one area of cooperation rather than a source of friction between China and the US. Some people from the US should stop their unfounded accusations against the Chinese side and carry out dialogue and cooperation based on mutual respect and trust so as to jointly create a peaceful, secure, open and cooperative cyberspace.”
Undeniably, in recent years China has progressively taken the global stage in the area of cyberspace governance.
“Taking part in the transformation of the structure of global Internet governance, China must make its own voice heard in terms of the discourse and shaping of symbols (在话语和符号塑造方面),” says Shen Yi, [the Fudan University professor].
“Because since the revelation of the ‘Prism’ program, the United States’ pursuit of a strategy of cyber-hegemony (网络霸权) has come under criticism. We must seize the opportunity, starting from top-level design and advancing the construction of ‘a new order of global Internet space’ (全球网络空间新秩序).”
The following post by “Jiapin26″ (贾榀26), was deleted from Sina Weibo sometime before 18:00 on October 6, 2015. The post, which includes an image of Nobel Peace Prize laureate Liu Xiaobo, makes reference to the recent top news about Chinese Scientist Tu Youyou being a recipient of a Nobel Prize for medicine, following a literature prize last year for Chinese writer Mao Yan. The post contrasts the cold reception in China of news of Liu Xiaobo’s prize with the excitement that attended the honours given to Mo Yan and Tu Youyou. [Explore more deleted posts by using the Weiboscope, created by the Journalism & Media Studies Centre.]
The post from “Jiapin26” reads:
Last year when Mo Yan won the Nobel Prize for literature, the media and the people puffed a whole lot. This year, Tu Youyou has won a prize for medicine, and she too will be popular for a while. But do not forget, our Peace Prize laureate is still in jail!
The following post by “Teacher Li Jinping (黎津平老师), was deleted from Sina Weibo sometime before 11:25 AM today, October 5, 2015. The post plays on a supposed remark made by British Prime Minister David Cameron to the effect that the British government is supported by taxpayers. The post then suggests that in other countries — China being the obviously implied country — it works the other way around, and the government decides even how people eat. [Explore more deleted posts by using the Weiboscope, created by the Journalism & Media Studies Centre.]
Who keeps the other alive? British Prime Minister Cameron says that it is taxpayers who keep our government alive; but in certain countries it is our government that decides the most basic subsistence of the entire people.
Photo by John Blyberg available at Flickr.com under Creative Commons license.
In order to better understand how the Chinese Communist Party understands “Internet sovereignty” — or “cyber-sovereignty” — we can take a look at how its own strategists have discussed the notion.
Back in July, Ye Zheng (叶征), a member of the Strategic Advisory Committee of the People’s Liberation Army, published an article called, “Thoughts on Internet Sovereignty,” addressing three key points:
1. Internet sovereignty directly impacts national security and stability. 2. Internet sovereignty can easily be neglected and infringed upon. 3. China needs to constantly raise awareness about the protection of Internet sovereignty.
Ye Zheng’s article first appeared in China Information Security, a magazine published by the China Information Technology Security Evaluation Centre (ITSEC) — this being a body created in 1997, during the the infancy of the Internet in China, to “provide the nation with technical support in the area of information security.”
China Information Security was launched in January 2010, at the outset of a year that would prove a seminal one for Internet controls in China and the emerging notion of Internet sovereignty. It was the year of the above-mentioned white paper, and also the year of Google’s testy exit from China. China Information Security, a magazine dealing with the issue of network security and now “Internet sovereignty,” and with unspecified links to the PLA. China Information Security appears to be closely aligned with the Chinese military, and a large number of its contributing writers and editors are identified as members of the People’s Liberation Army. The magazine’s assistant publisher and editor of its Strategic Cyberspace Forum, for example, is Qin An (秦安), a PhD graduate of the PLA Information Engineering University (which does technical training for network security and has been linked to possible state-supporting hacking) and the author of the recent book Cyberspace Quantum Leap — the literal translation would be Breaking Through Internet Containment — which deals in depth with national security and the “Internet war.” (Qin’s first chapter deals primarily with the Wikileaks scandal and the threat posed to China by the “online war preparations” of the United States military. His second chapter is titled, “Without Internet Security There is No National Security.”)
One of the first points Ye Zheng makes in his recent China Information Security article is that “Internet sovereignty” represents China’s own refinement of the concept of national sovereignty, and that this is something of which China should be proud:
Lately, China has taken the lead in raising and supporting the use of the concept of “Internet sovereignty,” and this is not just an innovation in the notion of national sovereignty, but also a national mission, and it is gradually being accepted by more and more countries. Naturally, our field of vision should expand further on the question of how to understand and safeguard Internet sovereignty as the primary concern in the building of a strong cyber-nation . . .
Ye later refers to “Internet sovereignty” as “an innovative perspective on sovereignty” (创新性主权观). And we can also sense in this passage the interest (and reputed success) in advancing worldwide China’s unique conceptualisation of sovereignty in the digital age.
As China advances its own understanding of “Internet sovereignty,” this is contrasted with the disapproval of “certain Western nations,” most notably the United States, which has, says Ye Zheng, habitually “posited these [notions of Internet sovereignty] in opposition to “Internet freedom.” As a rhetorical device, Ye’s article employs the language of necessity to suggest that China’s own notion of sovereignty in cyberspace is now the only admissible one in light of very real changes internationally:
But lately the situation is changing, and “Internet sovereignty” is gradually being accepted internationally. Even Americans will admit in open forums that the question of sovereignty does pertain to the Internet, and will use this as a pretext for using force to safeguard the United States’ own cyber-security. This dramatic change illustrates that for “Internet sovereignty” to come into the view of society is not just a conceptual innovation, but even more is a necessity arising from objective developments.
The next rhetorical device is to appeal to the professedly ancient and unchangeable truths about sovereignty. “For thousands of years,” says Ye, “through the progress of human civilisation, we have sought to consolidate and improve our national systems, and the idea that national sovereignty could not be violated gradually a generally respected and unwavering code.” Sovereignty, Ye Zheng argues, is a “basic right” of the nation, “indivisible and inalienable.”
But the content of sovereignty, that does change, says Ye:
[From] the earliest stages in which it referred to territory, it extended to the seas, then to the skies, and thence to space. With the emergence of online space, this must be integrated into the general category. The division now is not whether or not the question of sovereignty applies to cyberspace, but rather how we define “Internet sovereignty,” and how to protect it.
As Ye turns to a discussion of the link between “Internet sovereignty” and national security and stability (国家安全稳定), the Chinese Communist Party’s own experience with domestic political unrest in 1989, which has defined its attitude toward media and information ever since, is conspicuous. His language emphasises threat and loss of control, and speaks of forces that must be restrained. As the world entered a new century, he says, the “information web infiltrated every corner of our lives like a maniacal giant.” The Internet, he says, is “a double-edged sword.”
[I]f a country loses its Internet sovereignty, the result is too dreadful to contemplate. It will result in the loss of control over the systems governing lifeline economic sectors such as national industry, transportation, finance and resources, and result in untold economic damage. It will result in the loss of control over the guidance of online public opinion, sparking serious unrest and upheaval in society, directly challenging state power. It will result in the loss of control over military information networks, leading to command failures in the case of war . . . resulting in a nation defeated and broken.
In discussing the need for greater consciousness of the need to “preserve Internet sovereignty,” Ye makes it clear that the two most seminal events in the development of the policy were the were in June 2010 of the government white paper, “The Internet in China,” and President Xi Jinping’s address in writing to the “Wuzhen Summit” in November 2014. He also mentions the case of Google in China — or exiting China, rather — as a textbook instance of refusing to budge on the fundamental issue of Internet sovereignty: “During the Google storm in 2010, when China’s government outright refused Google’s demands that it be allowed the freedom to step beyond the bounds of Chinese laws and regulations, this was a resolute defence of Internet sovereignty.”
In order to advance Internet sovereignty, says Ye, there must be greater effort to explain the idea both inside and outside China. Domestically:
[We must] promote discussion of cyber-security among the masses, making the masses understand that just as we must defend our national territory, our seas, our airspace and outer space, so must we defend the Internet sovereignty of our nation, preserving network order and national stability, and fighting a war in defence of the Internet sovereignty of the people as a whole in the information age.
And China must, says Ye, take its defence of Internet sovereignty on the road, ensuring it becomes the dominant lens through which to observe and understand the process of Internet governance worldwide:
Finally, [we] must continue with a clear banner to promote our vision of Internet sovereignty internationally. The emphasis on sovereignty is to be principally directed toward the outside, and by declaring Internet sovereignty overseas we may arrive at unity of context and be clearer about its meaning, so that the justice of Internet sovereignty is accepted by the world.
