Author: David Bandurski

Now Executive Director of the China Media Project, leading the project’s research and partnerships, David originally joined the project in Hong Kong in 2004. He is the author of Dragons in Diamond Village (Penguin), a book of reportage about urbanization and social activism in China, and co-editor of Investigative Journalism in China (HKU Press).

Report claims victory for information controls in China

Written by David Bandurski on . Posted in Headlines and Hashtags.

I wrote last week about a recent forum in Beijing where government officials and internet industry representatives roundly praised media controls in the wake of the June 1 cruise ship tragedy on the Yangtze River. Using President Xi Jinping’s favoured term for non-critical reporting and public opinion, one of the forum’s participants remarked that there had been more “positive energy” on the internet this time than in the wake of any previous tragedy.
At the moment, when it comes to media control, the tone of Chinese officialdom is markedly self-congratulatory — one indication of just how successful (by the Party’s own estimates) controls on information have been under Xi Jinping.
On June 24, the Public Opinion Monitoring Center, a project established several years back at People’s Daily Online, released its latest report on the mobile internet: “China Mobile Public Opinion Development Report 2014” (2014年中国移动舆论场舆情发展报告). And once again it seemed the cat had swallowed the canary.

sweeping away rumors
2014 coverage of Chinese government policy toward the internet showed a cleaner sweeping “rumours” away from a computer screen.
For more than a decade, Chinese leaders have worried themselves over changes to the process of agenda-setting resulting from the advancement of commercial media — and an attendant trend of rising journalistic professionalism — and the internet. Essentially, the Communist Party media traditionally envisioned as the vanguard of “public opinion guidance” were losing influence, their circulations plummeting. Meanwhile, commercial magazines and tabloid newspapers were gaining huge audiences of paying news consumers for their more relevant, and sometimes envelope-pushing, content.
By 2003, when Chinese media achieved huge breakthroughs on a number of stories, including SARS and Sun Zhigang, even Party pundits had to admit to the co-existence of two quite distinct fields of public opinion, 1) the “mainstream” field of official media, that aligned with the Party-state, and 2) the “popular” (民间) field of commercial media and the internet. Some warned that the rise of this distinct public opinion sphere was a danger to the political status quo.
In the simplest sense, the past decade of media policy and propaganda practice in China has been all about the Chinese Communist Party regaining control of public opinion, increasing its capacity to “guide” the agenda against the backdrop of social and technological change.
The recently released report on mobile public opinion suggests that — at least for now — the Party might be winning the battle for dominance over information and public opinion, thanks to tighter controls on commercial media and the internet.
As Yan Hongshuang (阎虹爽), at People’s Daily Online, summarises the report: “According to the analysis, since 2014 there has been strengthened integration of the mainstream public opinion sphere and the popular public opinion sphere, and both the degree of consensus in online public opinion and the level of approval of the government rose rapidly, so that [China’s] online public opinion ecology got on the right track.”
Yan also noted that “mainstream media internal to the system,” meaning state-run media as opposed to commercially operating tabloids and others, had become more active and now enjoyed greater influence than popular opinion leaders, meaning those intellectuals, lawyers, journalists and writers — like the so-called “Big Vs” on Weibo — who tend to voice more dissident opinions on social and political issues.
Translated portions of the People’s Daily Online release about the “China Mobile Public Opinion Development Report 2014” follow.

On the morning of June 24, 2015, a ceremony was held jointly in Beijing by the Journalism and Mass Communications Research Center of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences and the Social Sciences Academic Press for the release of the “China New Media Development Report No. 6 (2015).” At the same time, the “China Mobile Public Opinion Development Report 2014,” written by Liu Pengfei (刘鹏飞), Zhou Yaqiong (周亚琼) and Zhang Li (张力), was also released. This is yet another important report to emerge from the People’s Daily Online Public Opinion Monitoring Center, resulting from the long-term observation of the internet, social media and the development of mobile public opinion in recent years.
The report points out that by 2014 the mobile internet in our country had already become the hottest public opinion sphere on the globe, with the rise of WeChat, news clients, HTML5 and other trends, and microblogs and mobile internet sites continuing to occupy the main position in mobile public opinion — and with new and old media working together to serve an agenda-setting function on sudden-breaking incidents and hot-button issues, gradually forming “latent public opinion” (潜舆论) and a decentralised new pattern mobile public opinion.
The government and the media have all made new arrangements in terms of “thumb discourse power” (拇指话语权) [in other words, dealing with an environment where expression is mobile and at web users’ fingertips], and the new media “national team” (国家队) [meaning the presence of social media accounts and platforms operated by Party-state organs] has had clear results, and there is greater maturity in terms of end-point coverage by new media for [handling of] government affairs and in terms of service functions [in other words, providing of access to various government services through mobile]. Our country’s internet experience and the international influence of its internet enterprises has strengthened. The “cross-border” (跨界) nature of the internet has presented new opportunities and challenges for the innovation of social management. There have been major breakthroughs for internet management, which has meant great strides for “the governing of the internet by the law” (依法治网).
In 2014, we saw the strong rise of WeChat, news clients and HTML5. WeChat, which has 600 million users, 8 million public accounts, and generate 1.6 billion posts per day, has already become the largest domestic mobile social media platform. WeChat has started to become the principal field of public opinion. Numbers show that users of Weibo have falled by 7 percentage points, but Weibo’s role as a mobile front and a gathering point for public issues remains prominent, and it continues to play an agenda-setting role during various sudden-breaking incidents. Our country’s mobile internet has already become the hottest “in the hand public opinion sphere” (掌上舆论场) in the world.
. . . .
According to the analysis, since 2014 there was a further strengthening of integration between the mainstream public opinion sphere and the popular public opinion sphere, and the degree of consensus in online public opinion and the level of approval of the government both rose rapidly, so that the online public opinion ecology go on the right track.
In recent years, the online public opinion ecology has changed [in China], with mainstream media internal to the system (体制内主流媒体) — [NOTE: this means state-run media as opposed to commercially operating tabloids and others] — more and more active and of greater influence than the traditional popular “opinion leaders” (民间“意见领袖”).
. . . .
Summarising the situation of development of the mobile internet, and new [related] issues, we can draw out the following in regards to management of the mobile internet in 2014, and make relevant new suggestions:
Clarifying judicial interpretations for the handling of internet-related cases, establishing a new order for the “governing of the internet in accord with the law.”
The [so-called] “Ten WeChat Regulations” (微信十条) and the real-name web registration system have important significance for raising socially responsible [behavior] among web users, for protecting the information security of citizens, and for their enjoyment of information rights.
The release of new regulations for internet account names [in late February 2015, taking effect March 1, 2015] mean that internet users can no longer act in an “unruly” manner. In the future, an even more complete system of internet laws will be issued and implemented.
The real social impact of new internet technologies will become more and more obvious. Online finance, rider apps [like Uber] and “cross-boundary” innovations will have an impact on traditional industries, and [related] reform will continue to offer the way forward.
Fake e-commerce goods have been a constantly hot public opinion topic. In this regard, not only to platform operators have a responsibility to strengthen oversight of sales of fake goods, but the government must also prioritise platform management and involve itself in this process; at the same time, online patrolling systems must be built, using internet technology to supervise buying and selling through online sales platforms.
The building of intelligent, geo-located early-warning systems for non-specific groups in public places (公共场所日常非特定人群地理位置信息智能化预警系统), and the building of intelligent mobile applications for citizens’ personal safety, would benefit raising our capacity to respond to and handle public crises.
[We must continue our] long-term and active development of Online to Office (O2O) e-government, facilitating connection online and facilitating services offline. One aspect of this is prioritising online public opinion channeling, while another is resolving real issues offline. The internet [can be used to] adequately resolve the problem of difficult handling of matters offline, and this must become the main trend in development.

Experts praise control of Yangtze tragedy

Written by David Bandurski on . Posted in Headlines and Hashtags.

As I argue in an upcoming piece for ChinaFile, Chinese media coverage of the capsizing of the Oriental Star cruise ship earlier this month offered us the clearest indication yet of how rigid restrictions on information are in China under President Xi Jinping.
While it is generally true, as international media have said, that Chinese authorities followed a “familiar playbook” of media control on the story, restrictions were in fact more effective this time than we saw during disasters under Xi’s predecessor, Hu Jintao — most notably the 2008 Sichuan earthquake and the 2011 Wenzhou train collision.
But don’t take my word for it.

Forum on positie energy
Participants in a recent forum in Beijing discuss the “spread of positive energy” online in the wake of the June 1, 2015, sinking of the Oriental Star cruise ship on the Yangtze River.
Two weeks ago, on June 12, communications scholars, internet industry executives and so-called “netizen representatives” gathered at a forum on “the spontaneous spreading of positive energy by web users” to assess how public opinion played out in the midst of the Oriental Star tragedy. Their conclusion — everything went very well in terms of public opinion guidance, the CCP’s official term for media control and censorship.
“Positive energy” is a new and emerging term in Xi Jinping’s press control lexicon, referring to the need to minimise dissident or negative voices in society in order to ease China through a period of tough social, economic and political transition. [Read this piece for more on the emergence of the term “positive energy”].
According to The Beijing News, Li Weining, the deputy director of the Internet Information Research Center at the Communication University of china, told participants at the forum that “more online positive energy was spread in this case [of the Oriental Star tragedy] than in any previous period following a natural disaster.”
The following is a translation of the June 12 piece on the “positive energy” forum in The Beijing News.

Many internet bigshots (互联网大咖) and internet user representatives gathered together at a forum on the spontaneous spreading of positive energy (网民自发传播正能量主题研讨会), where they discussed how after the “Oriental Star” tragedy internet users took it upon themselves to spread positive energy (自发传播的正能量).
Li Weining (李未柠), deputy director of the Internet Information Research Center of the Communication University of China, said of online public opinion during the “Oriental Star” tragedy that more online positive energy was spread in this case than in any previous period following a natural disaster.
Chen Lina (陈丽娜), deputy general manager of Sina Weibo, said that after the capsizing of the “Oriental Star,” there were close to one billion related posts on Sina Weibo. “The vast majority of web users looked at it through their own expertise or their own personal experiences,” [she said]. “There was no [widespread sharing of] public slogans (公众的口号), and there was no sensationalizing.” Chen Lina said that one ordinary user made a post late at night about precipitation around the Three Gorges Dam which didn’t at first get much attention, but then the next day reached more than 100,000 shares. Of these, more than 90 percent were shares by ordinary people, with positive discussion of 80 percent, neutral 10 percent and negative 10 percent.
Chen Lina said that in the case of this sudden-breaking natural disaster, the Weibo posts with the most interaction came from ordinary users, something unprecedented. Chen Lina believes that the positive energy of web users relies to a great extent on the timely release of information by the government and positive channeling of public opinion by the media. Only on this basis, [Chen said], can web users respond in a positive way.
After the tragic sinking [of the Oriental Star], Tencent’s [QQ.com] pushed out the news of rescues by divers, including news about more than 200 people diving down to search, which received more than 100,000 comments from web users, of which 80 percent were complimentary. Concerning this, QQ.com’s deputy editor-in-chief, Li You (李游), said that internet users really cared about positive energy.
When Xinhua News Agency reported on the incident, it created a “Q&A” section. Unlike previous expert interviews in the past, this section consisted entirely of questions and answers from web users themselves. Zhou Hongjun (周红军), deputy editor-in-chief of Xinhua Online, said that after the incident occurred web users expressed some doubts about the methods and intensity of the rescue effort. Xinhua Online selected and refined the comments and messages by web users and collected and arranged those hot topics most of interest to web users, introducing platforms for interaction on the basis of a whole series of topics.
“Every Q&A was handled on the basis of grabbing the hot points, the focal points that really concerned internet users each day,” Zhou Hongjun said. “For example, the first installment was on the topic of what difficulties there were in the Oriental Star rescue mission and why the hull had not been cut open at the first opportunity. These questions represented the doubts harbored by many internet users.” Because we were using the language of the internet, said Zhou Hongjun, this effectively checked the spread of online rumors.
Xue Chenzi (薛陈子), the chief executive officer of Media Observer (传媒大观察), said that online rumors did not appear during the Oriental Star tragedy, and this was because in recent years authoritative [official government and Party] departments had struck out decisively against [rumors], and also because the mainstream [Party] media had openly and transparently reported [the story], channeling the development of public opinion.
Zhu Huaxin (祝华新), secretary of the People’s Daily Online Public Opinion Monitoring Center, said that recently internet users had been relatively reasonable, and the online public opinion climate had been clearer. Online public opinion, said Zhu Huaxin, offers a kind of feedback on the national mentality. “Since the 18th National Congress of the CCP and the hard collective work of the central leadership in fighting corruption and advancing reforms, the social psychology today is far more stable.”

Human rights in the People's Daily

Written by David Bandurski on . Posted in Headlines and Hashtags.

Released yesterday by the State Council, China’s white paper on its “hard-won tangible results on human rights” in 2014 is an exemplary work of dissimulation. Unseemly social and political facts loom behind nearly every piece of hard data the report presents to construct a composite portrait of cherished progress.
Among my favorites is the statistic, plucked out in coverage by China Central Television, that the government received “2.72 million tip-off and complaint letters.” I don’t doubt that one bit. The number, in fact, is almost certainly a drastic underreporting. But almost every case running through China’s petitioning system is an exercise in futility — or worse, an invitation to monitoring by China’s security police.
Yu Jianrong, a respected Chinese social scientist, has written extensively about the failings of China’s petition system, and about the often violent interception of petitioners. Or you could watch Zhao Liang’s gripping documentary, “Petition.”

CCTV tip off and complaint letters
Screenshot of coverage of China’s human rights white paper on CCTV, an endless chain of statistics without story or context.
Well then, how about China’s courts? Section 4 on the “Right to Impartial Trial” deals with that issue. It begins: “In 2014 China’s judicial bodies at all levels enhanced judicial justice and openness, adopted multiple judicial reform measures and ensured impartiality in the trial of cases, thereby safeguarding human rights in the field of justice at a higher level.”
One huge problem there. “Judicial justice” is a term only recently introduced by the Chinese Communist Party because in only the past year it has developed a powerful aversion to the term “judicial independence.”
Freedom of speech is “better protected,” the paper says. How do we know that? Just look at the numbers!

*46.5 billion copies of newspapers
*3.2 billion copies of periodicals
*8.4 billion copies of books, with 6.12 copies of books per person
*650 million netizens
*Internet penetration rate was 47.9 percent
*508 million smart phone users
*433 million online video users
*249 million microblog users

“The public can air opinions, and raise criticisms and suggestions freely through the news media, and discuss problems of this country and society,” the report says.
Of course there is no glimpse at all of the news censorship that has now become so crippling that investigative reporting in China has been virtually extinguished in the space of five years — or of film censorship that aborts the creative process at every imaginable stage. There is no discussion of the criminalization of speech on social media, of the kind now being used to persecute the lawyer Pu Zhiqiang.
“Cultural services keep growing,” the report glowingly claims. How do we know that? X number of stations. Y number of programs. Z number of “cultural volunteers.” Another statistical Paint-By Number.
I could pick away at the 21,000-character report all day. But I just want to note that it made the front page of today’s People’s Daily. You can see it at the very bottom of the page, just left of the image.

pd human rights paper

The full text of the human rights white paper is also published in today’s People’s Daily, occupying all of pages 9 and 10. Page 11 includes other related coverage of China’s “new achievements” on human rights as it continues “on the voyage toward realizing the Chinese dream of the great rejuvenation of the Chinese people.”
A translation of the front-page coverage follows:

White Paper “China’s Progress on the Cause of Human Rights, 2014,” Released
The Cause of Human Rights in China Makes New Gains
Xinhua News Agency, Beijing, June 8, Journalist Sun Tiexiang (孙铁翔) — The white paper “China’s Progress on the Cause of Human Rights, 2014,” released on June 8 by the Information Office of the State Council, provides full coverage of the various achievements China has made in the cause of human rights. The white paper says that, in 2014, China’s human rights benefitted even more definitely from the country’s development and progress, and the cause of human rights gained new achievements.
The full text of the white paper runs to 21,000 characters, introducing the achievements China has made on human rights through substantial data and facts on 9 different aspects, including: the right to development; personal rights; democratic rights; the right to fair trial; ethnic minority rights; the rights of women, children and the elderly; the rights of those with disabilities; environmental rights; and international dialogue and cooperation.
The white paper says that on the voyage toward realizing the Chinese dream of the great rejuvenation of the Chinese people, the Chinese Communist Party and the government of China doubly cherish these hard-won tangible results on human rights and the valuable experiences that have been gained, and they will work to develop various ventures for the benefit of human rights protection and realization, allowing all individuals to develop themselves and remain devoted to society, together enjoying opportunities in life, together enjoying the opportunity to realize their dreams, together enjoying the rights to equal participation and equal development.
(For the full text of the white paper and related coverage, see pages 9, 10 and 11)

pd 9

pd 10

pd 11

Pu Zhiqiang post deleted from Weibo

Written by David Bandurski on . Posted in Headlines and Hashtags.

The following post by user Silu Silu (斯律斯律), which comments on the case against “die-hard lawyer” and former CMP fellow Pu Zhiqiang (浦志强), was deleted from Weibo sometime before 1:31AM today, June 8, 2015. The post was live on Weibo for approximately one hour. [Explore more deleted posts by using the Weiboscope, created by the Journalism & Media Studies Centre.]
The post, which includes an image of Pu Zhiqiang, makes reference to the 28 social media posts that only recently, one year after his detention in May 2014, were used to formally charge Mr. Pu.

Just a few Weibo posts you made were dragged before the court. The arm of the law has twisted with the leg of politics. This garland may not be something you’ve placed willingly on your head, but history or fate have chosen you. There must be a reason. And we believe that the you that will be free once again will be an entirely new you.

pu

The original Chinese-language post follows:

你以几十条微博，被诉到法院，法律的胳膊已经扭不住政治的大腿，不过，这桂冠虽然不是你愿意戴的，但历史或者命运选择了你，必定有理由，我们也相信，重获自由的你，一定是一个全新的你。

Propaganda converges

Written by David Bandurski on . Posted in Headlines and Hashtags.

In a ceremony today attended by senior officials dealing with media and propaganda, China’s official Xinhua News Service launched the second edition of its news app for iPhone and Android. Cai Mingzhao (蔡名照), the Xinhua News Agency director who served previously as director of the State Council Information Office and editor-in-chief of the People’s Daily, told the gathering at Xinhua headquarters that the launch of the mobile app “provided the basis for Xinhua Online to become the main force in the national transmission of news and information through the internet.”
The app’s launch comes amid a renewed focus in China’s top leadership on innovation combined with a more robust mobile internet-based economy, under a formula Premier Li Keqiang recently called “Internet Plus.” Responding enthusiastically to Premier Li’s overtures on innovation back in March, an English-language article on the website of the state-run Global Times newspaper said Internet Plus “will bring about the fourth industrial revolution for manufacturing.”

xinhua new mobile_new mainstream new experience

The mobile internet, which we are told is set to revolutionize the Chinese economy, is already transforming the project of information control in China. Against the backdrop of rapid technological change, the Party continues to regard information control, or “guidance of public opinion,” as a crucial foundation of social and political stability.
There is no question that the mobile internet is now the key focus and priority in the overall project of information control. In that sense, Xinhua’s new — and, we are told, improved — app for news and information is a strategic project in the Party’s efforts to dominate and drive coverage of important news stories at home. This is what Cai Mingzhao means when he talks about the enhanced mobile version of Xinhua Online becoming “the main force.”
In a nation where the very word “mainstream” refers to the political culture and agenda of the Chinese Communist Party, the motto of the new Xinhua News Agency app, “New Mainstream, New Experience,” is perhaps the clearest articulation of its motivation and purpose — creating new platforms and tools by which to drive and control public opinion.
It remains to be seen how enthusiastically Chinese web users will take up the Xinhua News Agency mobile app over sexier competitors like, say, Today’s Headlines (今日头条). But if history is anything to judge by, Xinhua has a steep uphill climb if it hopes apps like this one will make its news and information more competitive outside China.
Since its launch on March 14, 2012, the English-language Android app for Xinhua News Agency has received just 21 recommendations and 46 reviews on Google Play. Compare that to the Associated Press mobile app, which in the week since its launch on May 27 has received 3,134 recommendations and more than 32,000 reviews.
The distinction of being the world’s loneliest news app may go to the French edition of the Xinhua News Agency app, which has garnered just two reviews and four recommendations over a period of more than two and a half years.
Perhaps CMP can give Xinhua a little bump. Those China watchers wishing to download the Xinhua News app can do so simply by scanning its QR code.
app xinhua

A partial translation of the launch ceremony at Xinhua News Agency headquarters this morning follows.

[Xinhua News Agency]
On June 8 at 10AM, the latest version of the “Xinhua News Agency” app for iPhone and Android will be formally released in the Multi-Function Room of Xinhua News Agency Headquarters. Xinhua Online will broadcast the event live, and we ask you to tune in! [2015-06-08 06:52]
[Moderator, Xinhua News Agency Deputy Director Shen Haixiong (慎海雄)]
Respected leaders, VIP guests, comrades and friends: Good morning! [2015-06-08 10:02]
[Shen Haixiong]
Today, we solemnly announce the release of the new version of the “Xinhua News Agency” mobile app for iPhone and Android. The presence of you all brings light to these proceedings! First of all, I would like to introduce to you the leaders and VIPs who are presiding today over this release. We have comrade Jiang Jianguo (蒋建国), deputy propaganda chief and director of the State Council Information Office; comrade Ming Lizhi (明立志), chief of the news section of the Central Propaganda Department; comrade Jiang Jun (姜军), News and Information Broadcast Office of the Cyberspace Administration of China; comrade Wang Yibiao (王一彪), secretary of the People’s Daily; comrade Fang Zhenghui (方正辉), deputy director of the China Foreign Languages Publishing Administration; comrade Yuan Zhengmin (袁正明), deputy director of China Central Television; comrade Wang Xiaohui (王晓晖), editor-in-chief of China News Service; comrade Jiang Haiqing (姜海清), deputy editor-in-chief of China National Radio; comrade Ding Shi (丁士), deputy editor-in-chief of the Economic Daily; comrade Yang Xiaowei (杨小伟), deputy general manager of China Telecom; comrade Jiang Zhengxin (姜正新), deputy general manager of China Unicom; comrade Zhang Xuan (张轩), general manager of China Mobile; and comrade Fan Cheng (樊澄), Party secretary of Air China. [2015-06-08 10:04]
[Shen Haixiong]
Leaders of Xinhua News Agency present at the event include: comrade Cai Mingzhao (蔡名照), director and Party secretary of Xinhua News Agency; comrade He Ping (何平), editor-in-chief of Xinhua News Agency; comrade Long Xinnan (龙新南), deputy director of Xinhua News Agency; comrade Li Xi (李熙), director of the Xinhua News Agency office of the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection; comrade Zhou Shuchun (周树春), deputy director of Xinhua News Agency; comrade Peng Shujie (彭树杰), deputy editor-in-chief of Xinhua News Agency; and comrade Liu Zhengrong (刘正荣), secretary of Xinhua News Agency. [2015-06-08 10:04]
[Shen Haixiong]
[More guests are introduced here.]
[2015-06-08 10:05]
. . . .
[Shen Haixiong]
So, where is this new version of the “Xinhua News Agency” mobile app? Everyone please watch this short video. [2015-06-08 10:06]
[Xinhua Online]
A video [advertisement] is played for the “Xinhua News Agency” mobile app Version 2.0. [2015-06-08 10:06]
[Shen Haixiong]
Next, let us put our hands together and welcome comrade Cai Mingzhao, the director of Xinhua News Agency. [2015-06-08 10:09]
[Cai Mingzhao, director and Party secretary of Xinhua News Agency]
Respected ministers, VIP guests, comrades and friends: Good morning! Allow me first to welcome everyone to Xinhua News Agency to share this important occasion. In this multi-functional meeting room, I’ve attend two events that had great significance for the development of Xinhua’s internet business. The first was on November 7, 1997, when we held a ceremony for the comprehensive shift of news and information at Xinhua News Agency to the internet. From that time on, Xinhua News Agency shared its news and information with web users through Xinhua Online, and that provided the basis for Xinhua Online to become the main force in the national transmission of news and information through the internet. [2015-06-08 10:11]
The second occasion is today, for the release of the new version of the “Xinhua News Agency” mobile app for iPhone and Android. From this day forward, important news from Xinhua News Agency will be delivered directly to web users through this client. This means that Xinhua News Agency has taken a crucial step toward the mobile internet. [2015-06-08 10:12]
In order to release the new app today, our comrades in Xinhua News Agency’s New Media Center (新媒体中心) have labored night and day for more than two months. The average age on this team is 33 years old, and the youngest member is just 23. They have grown up in stride with the process of media convergence. They are brimming with energy and vitality, and they have rich knowledge and experience. [2015-06-08 10:13]
Our comrades at the New Media Center told me that the new version has in total 118 improvements and innovations over the previous version. I think that, in fact, all of these 118 improvements and advancements are based on a more important innovation, and that is an innovation in ways of thinking and consciousness. It is thanks to the hard work and exploratory spirit of this young team that we have these results we can celebrate today. [2015-06-08 10:13]
This is an app characterized by its authoritativeness (权威性为特色). It organically combines the aspects of authoritativeness and newsworthiness (资讯性). As the most authoritative news dissemination platform in China’s mobile internet sphere, the “Xinhua News Agency” app releases more than 1,000 original pieces of news on a daily basis, on every important news event in China and overseas — current affairs, the economy, military affairs, sports, there is nothing left out. And it also includes interviews, analysis, commentaries and the rest of it, everything you possibly need. [2015-06-08 10:14]

What's up with the PLA?

Written by David Bandurski on . Posted in Headlines and Hashtags.

A bit of context can sometimes cast away the monsters and calm one’s pounding heart. Business Insider wrote yesterday that a “chilling memo” had been released by the People’s Liberation Army, informing everyone that, “at least on the internet, China is at war.”
Before you hide under your bed, here is the context.
First of all, there is no “memo.” The text in question was an editorial running yesterday on page six of the People’s Liberation Army Daily, a newspaper that serves as the official mouthpiece of China’s Central Military Commission but does not reflect decision-making at the innermost core of political power in China. Promoted to the front page, such an article might occasion deeper reflection (of the “hmm” sort), but would hardly be a sign of anything profoundly significant.

BI internet war

This is a drop in the bucket of hardline sentiments we have seen from official media in China in recent months (and now years, unfortunately) — over “judicial independence,” the “public opinion struggle,” “constitutionalism,” or the “Western hostile forces.” Think of them as recurring abdominal pains, a nagging dyspepsia that might (or might not) signal a more serious condition.
Nor is this sort of churlishness over the issue of internet sovereignty something new at the People’s Liberation Army Daily.
There was the piece last week, on May 13, bellyaching about how “certain Western militaries” had already “brought the online struggle into their national defense and military strategies.” The crowning line of that diatribe: “Only by steadily engaging, standing at the front and making strong counterattacks can our army preserve ‘online sovereignty’ and build an ‘online Great Wall’!”
5.20 pLa pg 6 editorial
The page-six editorial in yesterday’s edition of the People’s Liberation Army Daily (top left) that Business Insider described as “chilling.”
Two weeks before that, on May 2, a strongly-worded piece in the paper vowed to purge those who spread “online rumors” about the Chinese military — about, for example, “military umbrellas of protection for crime syndicates,” or “internal struggles among the PLA elite.” At one point, the piece said ominously: “Certain hostile forces are trying in vain to use the broadcast power of the internet, in projects of online ‘Cold War’ and ‘political modification,’ to drive a wedge between the Party and the military.”
Or we can go all the way back to December 22, 2014, when the People’s Liberation Army Daily ran an article headlined, “Hostile Forces Frantically Manufacture Online Rumors to Defame and Vilify the PLA.” “In the Internet age,” that article concluded, “national security means securing one’s ideological core (心防即国防).”
But it’s coverage today that provides the clearest context to yesterday’s jeremiad. The front page of today’s People’s Liberation Army Daily tells us that yesterday was the first full session, held in Beijing, of the “All-Military Internet Security and Informatization Expert Consultation Commission” (全军网络安全和信息化专家咨询委员会).
I can bet you’ve never heard of this group before, because until now virtually nothing whatsoever has been written about it, in Chinese or in English. Today’s report gives us the basic lay of the land:

The All-Military Internet Security and Informatization Expert Consultation Commission is an organ for strategic consultation and technical support for the Central Internet Security and Informatization Leading Group, and it plays an important intelligence and strategic role in the strengthening of internet security, in raising the scientific nature of informatization strategies and decision-making, and in promoting the acceleration of informatization in the military.

The Central Internet Security and Informatization Leading Group to which this passage refers is the new strategic information security body established by President Xi Jinping in February 2014, with the General Office run by Lu Wei (鲁炜), China’s new cyber czar (who also heads up the Cyberspace Administration).
Others may disagree with me, but I don’t believe the PLA’s new Expert Consultation Commission is anything to get excited about, much less up in arms about. Its formation most likely mirrors, on the military side, the priority assent of strategic internet and information technology control we have seen already within the Chinese Communist Party, in the form of Xi Jinping’s new Leading Group.

PLA conference on information security
PLA officers take part in the first full session of the “All-Military Internet Security and Informatization Expert Consultation Commission” on May 21, 2015.
Now, imagine. It’s May 20, 2015. China’s military is holding the first session of its brand new, high-level “commission” dealing with the internet and information technology. The whole point of the commission, its raison d’être, is to grapple with internet security as a core component of national security.
Is it surprising at all that the army’s flagship newspaper should run an editorial on precisely this issue to mark the opening of the inaugural meeting? Is it surprising to find that editorial whirring with the same combative tone that has defined most others before it?
There now. Let’s all calm down.
 

Control and innovate

Written by David Bandurski on . Posted in China Newspeak.

According to a well-traveled Chinese proverb, “If the people labor with one mind, even Mount Tai can be moved.” That may be an uplifting notion where mass mobilisation is concerned. But can it be applied to the highly individualistic enterprise of innovation? Yes, say China’s leadership elite. And they have a lot riding on the idea.
At the present moment, innovation is China’s Mount Tai.
Presenting his government work report to the National People’s Congress back in March — including his “Plan for Work in 2015” — Premier Li Keqiang laid great stress on innovation as the way forward. As China faces a “new normal” fraught with various “systemic, institutional, and structural problems” (which Li characterised as “tigers in the road”), the country has to become more inventive, he said.
“China’s economic growth model remains inefficient,” said Li. “Our capacity for innovation is insufficient.” He added: “As the force that has traditionally driven economic growth is weakening, it is imperative that we intensify structural reform, boost efforts to implement the strategy of pursuing innovation-driven development, and upgrade traditional engines while creating new ones for driving development.”
The keyword here (for Chinese discourse junkies) is not just “innovation,” or chuangxin (创新), but rather “innovation-driven development,” or chuangxin qudong fazhan (创新驱动发展). And if we map the term over the past year, we have an image of, well, Mount Tai:

Innovation-Driven in Chinese Media

The Mount Tai formed by “innovation-driven development” in China’s media allows us to visualise the deployment of “innovation” as political discourse. It’s no accident that the term crested the same month Li Keqiang presented his government work report. This is a familiar pattern we see in China around important leadership gatherings, where policies like the “innovation-driven development strategy” (or any number of other flavours of the month) are introduced or given higher profile.
Right now, “innovation” is reverberating through China’s media ecosphere. Entrepreneurship is being sold as a new national obsession (as property speculation was from the late 1990s). The start-up, it seems, is the new blast furnace, the blazing fire in which the masses are to melt down the old ways and forge a new “growth model.”
The vision of innovation outlined by the Chinese Communist Party is tied closely to information technology, and an important component is the “Internet Plus” (互联网+) plan Li Keqiang unveiled in his government report on March 5, which involves spurring economic growth through the integration of internet technologies with other businesses and manufacturing. As Premier Li said:

Emerging industries and new types of businesses are areas of intense competition. We will launch major projects to develop high-end equipment, information networks, integrated circuits, new energy, new materials, biomedicines, aero engines, and gas turbines, helping a number of emerging industries to become leading ones. We will develop the “Internet Plus” action plan to integrate the mobile Internet, cloud computing, big data, and the Internet of Things with modern manufacturing, to encourage the healthy development of e-commerce, industrial networks, and Internet banking, and to guide Internet-based companies to increase their presence in the international market.

A preponderance of official hype does not necessarily mean innovative things aren’t actually happening. They certainly are, and we can expect to see interesting experiments at the intersection of information technology and business in China. But the hype reminds us at the same time of the relatively centralised nature of power in China, where policies are dictated from the top with the expectation that they are fulfilled below — a fact that could restrain innovation as much as spur it.
With that in mind, it behooves us to look at the rest of the discourse being reinforced alongside this horizon-less idea of “innovation” and Internet Plus: the discourse of control and limitation.
As it turns out, we are offered a crystal clear reminder of the tense pairing of development (“innovation”) and political control in the form of a recent inspection tour of Shenzhen media by Lu Wei (鲁炜), China’s cyber czar (as head of both the Cyberspace Administration and the General Office of the Central Leading Group for Internet Security and Informatization overseen by President Xi Jinping himself).
Shenzhen is symbolic because it has been singled out as China’s chief hub of innovation, on which basis it recently edged neighboring Hong Kong out of the top spot on a list of most competitive cities in China. Hong Kong lost out on the list, compiled by the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, because it did not adequately support innovation.
One oft-cited illustration of Hong Kong’s failure on the innovation side concerns the eventual setup in Shenzhen of DJI, a company first established in Hong Kong that is now a world leader in the design and manufacture of Unmanned Aerial Systems, or drones, and has led Shenzhen in becoming a global centre for drone design. Interestingly, the image accompanying official media coverage of Lu Wei’s inspection tour of Shenzhen media last week shows him beaming as editors at Shenzhen News Online, the city’s top government-run news portal, unveil one of their new in-house drones, which presumably will be used to “innovate” news coverage.

lu wei in shenzhen
The head of China’s Cyberspace Administration, Lu Wei, the country’s top internet control official, visits Shenzhen News Online earlier this month.
During his tour, Lu Wei gives Shenzhen News Online “a high degree of recognition” for breaking new ground in recent years, and notes that Shenzhen will play a “leading role” in the Party’s Internet Plus strategy. But Lu emphasises that the site’s success also derives from its “firm grasp of guidance,” a reference to the propaganda policy that has held sway in China since June 4, 1989, the notion that all media must adhere to the Party line in news coverage in order to ensure social and political stability. Lu Wei also links innovation to the “spreading of positive energy,” now one of the core concepts in Xi Jinping’s treatment of media, arts and culture.
Most telling, however, is Lu’s reversion to one of the oldest terms in the Chinese Communist Party’s media control lexicon, the principle of “politicians running the newspapers,” or zhengzhijia banbao (政治家办报). This is a phrase first used by Mao Zedong in 1957, when he said: “The writing of articles, and especially of official editorials, must take into account the overarching interests of the Party, being closely united with [the necessity of] political circumstances; this is what is meant by politicians running the newspapers.”
The bottom line in media policy, in other words — for Lu Wei as for Xi Jinping — is that media must serve the interests of the CCP. This was true in 1957, when the print media of which newspapers were representative had primacy. And it is true in 2015, as the Party defines internet technology as its path to economic “innovation.”
Internet Plus is only half the equation. Party control is the balance.

Lu Wei Visits Shenzhen Newspaper Group and Voices Hope Shenzhen Will Play Leading Role in the ‘Internet Plus’ Strategy”
Yesterday afternoon, Lu Wei, deputy minister of the Central Propaganda Department and director of the Internet Security and Informatization Leadership Group of the CCP Central Committee, made an inspection tour of the Shenzhen Newspaper Group, where he gave a high degree of recognition to the development of Shenzhen Newspaper Group’s flagship website — Shenzhen News Online (深圳新闻网).
Shenzhen, he said, is a priority city for internet development, a place where technology, funds, talent and innovation consciousness were all concentrated — and it should play a leading role in the “Internet Plus” strategy, becoming a model for smart city (智慧城市) development.
The city’s deputy Party secretary, Dai Beifang (戴北方) took part in the inspection tour.

sz news

. . .
Lu Wei used the phrase, “Good team dynamics, multi-innovation in work, a firm grasp of guidance, strong development potential” (队伍状态好，工作创新多，导向把握牢，发展潜力大) to in his assessment of Shenzhen News Online. Coming to Shenzhen News Online, he said, he felt that this was a place full of dynamism and passion, a force of vitality and progress. “It is because of your innovation,” [he said,] “that there has been an increase in the spread of positive energy, and a rise in influence, ensuring that Shenzhen moves more fully toward the whole country, and to the world.”
Lu Wei said that Shenzhen News Online’s successes were inseparable from the Shenzhen Newspaper Group’s ideas about constantly promoting the integrated development of traditional media and internet media, and from the Shenzhen Newspaper Group’s persistence in upholding the [principles of] the politicians running the newspapers (政治家办报) and a firm grasp of correct guidance of public opinion. [He] hoped that Shenzhen Newspaper Group would continue to innovate, putting effort into multimedia across the industry, putting effort into [developing] penetrating power (穿透力) and influence, putting effort into [developing] new technologies and new methods, using language and forms loved by the masses to constantly innovate and advance the formats and content of news reports, fashioning Shenzhen News Online as a leading national website providing more online positive energy (网络正能量).

China's media under Mr. Positive

Written by David Bandurski on . Posted in China Newspeak.

In China’s highly centralised system of discourse deployment, we can think of the general secretary of the Chinese Communist Party as the country’s pronouncer-in-chief. Whatever consensus has massed within the CCP — through a process less centralised and far messier — emanates like heavenly light from the man at the top.
To parse this political discourse, we must observe the light as it gleams down — from Party congress and plenum reports, from the People’s Daily, China Central Television and other core Party media, and from the “important speeches” of the general secretary himself.
But we can also observe how the light, how political discourse, is reflected back from the lower echelons of power. We may see a fresh buzzword, slogan or phrase emerge at the apex. But has it trickled down? Has it become institutionalized to the extent that Party inferiors must pay it lip service?

day donaldson xi jinping
When it comes to political discourse in China, Xi Jinping is pronouncer-in-chief. Image by Day Donaldson, available at Flickr.com under Creative Commons license.
In a series of posts over the past seven months, we’ve followed “positive energy,” or zhengnengliang (正能量), as a favoured new phrase in the sphere of news, culture and propaganda in China.

1. “‘Positive Energy,’ A Pop Propaganda Term?” / November 12, 2014
2. “College Teachers Must Be More ‘Positive’” / November 15, 2014
3. “China’s ‘Positive’ Prescription for Dissent” / November 17, 2014
4. “Top Official Positive on ‘Positive’ Media” / March 16, 2015
5. “The Remarks of Xi Jinping: Hot, or Not?” / March 18, 2015

The term is now regularly in use among Party officials at all levels of the bureaucracy, suggesting it is a term of currency in China’s political discourse. When it comes to media policy, Xi Jinping is Mr. Positive.
We can look, for example, at a recent front-page story in Liaoning Daily, the official Party mouthpiece of Liaoning’s provincial leadership, to see how the term is deployed and with which other familiar faces from the realm of news and ideology. At one point in the piece, Liaoning’s top leader, Wang Min (王珉), who is on a media inspection tour, notes Hu Jintao’s concept of the “Three Closenesses,” which dates back to 2002-2003. But in the articles crowning paragraph, we have three terms packed altogether: “guidance of public opinion” (舆论导向), which has been central to media control since 1989; the “main theme” (主旋律), a reference to CCP orthodoxy; and “transmitting positive energy” (传播正能量).
Wang Min makes clear that the media must uphold these principles “for the sake of revitalizing development.” This fits with how “guidance of public opinion,” and media control in general, have been conceived in the past — as maintaining stability, which sets the stage for development. But there seems also to be a new urgency under Xi Jinping to the idea that the message must be controlled, and refracted through the prism of positivity, in order to ease China through this period of economic transition he has repeatedly referred to as the “new normal.”
It seems for the moment that “positive energy” is here to stay.
A translation of the Liaoning Daily piece on Wang Min’s media visit follows:

“Firmly Grasping the Correct Direction and Public Opinion Direction in Order to Promote the Theme of Revitalization and Development and Cohere Positive Energy”
April 29, 2015
Liaoning Daily
On April 28, Wang Min (王珉), provincial Party secretary and chairman of the standing committee of the provincial people’s congress, visited publishing and broadcasting units in the province to conduct a special investigation on how to adequately handle cultural propaganda and public opinion guidance under the new situation (新形势), in order to vigorously develop a positive and healthy climate for public opinion and ideology
During his tour, Wang Min first arrived at Liaoning Television, going deep into the control center for programming (深入电视节目播控中心), the HD news studio and the No. 1 Studio for on-the-spot observation. Television, he said, reaches the multitudes, with wide-reaching audiences and huge influence. Relying on the richness of our historical and cultural resources, and upholding the [concept of] “content as king,” [we must] work hard to create excellent programs and products that stand out for their special character and which [people] love to see and hear — and we must push the integration of old and new media, so that multiple screen platforms [or devices] work together. [We must] further accelerate technological upgrades, accommodating and leading deeper changes to the media ecology (媒体格局), and we must fully inspire and motivate people in order to raise the propagation force, credibility and influence of traditional media, at the same time serving the [positive] image of Liaoning.
Entering the office building of the Liaoning Newspaper and Media Group (辽宁报业传媒集团), Wang Min came to the newspaper history museum and editing platform, learning in depth about the history and development of Liaoning Daily as well as its editorial copy flow process (采编流程). To those comrades working on the front lines of news and editorial, Wang Min expressed his thanks, urging everyone to carry on the great traditions of the older generation of news workers, constantly raising their political consciousness (政治意识) [i.e., of the Party line], their consciousness of the overall situation (大局意识) and their sense of responsibility [to the Party]. [They must] mind the major events of the moment, reach down to the grassroots, and report more on the practical results of reform and innovation and on topics of immediate interest to people’s lives, ensuring that news and propaganda are ever closer to actuality, to
life and to the masses [NOTE: This is Hu Jintao’s “Three Closenesses” formula]. In terms of content, channels and platforms, [the media must] deeply promote the integration and development of the media, actively holding the “high ground” (制高点) in online public opinion [NOTE: The “high ground” here refers directly to control, or strategic dominance, as in a military situation].
. . .

Liaoning Daily 4.29 pg 1
The front page of the April 29, 2015, edition of the official Liaoning Daily runs a piece of propaganda policy above the fold.
Wang Min pointed out during his visit that this year is a critical year in the deepening of reforms, the opening year of promoting rule of the country in accord with the law (依法治国), and also an important year in implementing the first round of promoting the revitalised development of industrial bases. The situation is encouraging, but the tasks are immense, [he said]. The question of whether or not the broadcasting and publishing units on the ideological front lines could properly carry out the work of public opinion channeling (舆论引导) concerns the path and direction [of the Party and the nation], concerns human minds and spirits, concerns the center and the overall situation [politically], and it is the core and basis of all types of work. Various news units must deeply study and implement the spirit of the 18th National Congress of the CCP, the Third and Fourth Plenums and the series of important speeches made by General Secretary Xi Jinping, energetically publicising and promoting social core values. [They must], around the strategic deployments of the provincial Party leadership and government, firmly grasp the correct political direction and [correct] guidance of public opinion, even more energetically and effectively carrying forward the main theme (主旋律) and transmitting positive energy (传播正能量) for the sake of revitalizing development.

A righteous view of history

Written by David Bandurski on . Posted in Headlines and Hashtags.

We wrote recently about a rising tide of animosity in China’s state press against the “infiltration” of Western ideas in Chinese education and scholarship — and provided a full translation of a hard-line essay decrying the “westernization” of economics education.
The latest target, it seems, is historical scholarship.
In a high-minded article posted on Monday to the official website of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences — and published in its official journal, Chinese Social Sciences Today — Li Zhiting (李治亭) of the National Qing Dynasty History Compilation Committee (国家清史编纂委员会) attacked a handful of American sinologists, ridiculing their work in the field of “New Qing History” as “pseudo-academic.”

new qing history
American historians Pamela Crossley, Mark Elliot and James Millward are singled out for abuse in a recent essay from the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences.
The following is the concluding paragraph of the essay:

“New Qing History” is academically absurd, and politically does damage to the unity of China. It is necessary to stir all scholars with a sense of righteousness to fiercely oppose it. We entirely reject “New Qing History.” Moreover, we expose its mask of pseudo-academic scholarship, eliminating the deleterious effect it has had on scholarship in China!

The final exclamation point in the above paragraph is in fact exclamation point number 88, making for an average of just under ten exclamation points per online page. Most readers of the piece could not fail to note the clear political bias at work — not to mention the unwarranted (in academic discourse) aggression. The essay, in fact, is not about historical scholarship at all, but about China’s current ideological climate.
A translation of the first online page follows:

“Scholars Assess ‘New Qing History,’ an Instance of ‘New Imperial History’”
April 20, 2015
Editor’s Note: Scholarship is the refined expression of the spirit of an age. Scholarship can only radiate vitality and have far-reaching influence if it is rooted in the era in which it is situated and responds to the major issues of the day. The problem comes when academic researchers hold the wrong positions, and serve the wrong ends . . . then no matter what results they have, or how loud they are, they can only be noise and static (噪音杂音) — and they can only stand in the way of history rather than push it forward. As to which category “New Qing History” belongs to, this essay from the “Contention” column of Chinese Social Sciences Today can help us decide.
In recent years, a certain saying about Qing history has emerged among academic historians called “new Qing history.” This was not invented by Chinese historians but in fact comes from overseas — created together by several American historians!
The American scholars who support “new Qing history” view the history of China from an imperialist standpoint, with imperialist points of view and imperialist eyes, regarding “traditional” China as an “empire,” regarding the Qing dynasty as “Qing dynasty imperialism.” Their theory and discourse are shot through with imperialist arrogance. Differentiating their work from 20th century studies of imperialism, they call it “new imperial history” (新帝国主义史学). “New Qing history” is one example.

CASS piece
Screenshot of the April 20, 2015, CASS essay attacking the notion of “New Qing History.”
In order to show the true face of “the historical study of new imperialism,” we must break down the fabrications of “new Qing history.”
1. The Name “Qing History” Does Not Reflect Reality
The so-called “academic breakthrough” of “new Qing history” does not reflect the reality. At its base it is a false and counterfeit good! Absent any academic breakthrough, it has lost the basis for survival. The whole range of views they express are cliches and stereotypes, little more than dusted off versions in a scholarly tone of the Western imperialism and Japanese imperialism of the 19th century!
First, we must address the origins of “New Qing History.” In 1996, American scholar Evelyn Rawski (罗友枝) gave an address called Reenvisioning the Qing: The Significance of the Qing Period in Chinese History, in which she challenged Ping-to Ho [of Columbia University]. She accused Ho of the “sinicization” of Manchurian [studies], arguing instead that the Qing dynasty could not be confused with “China.” She said that a “Manchu-centered view” was needed through which to reassess Qing history. This was the beginning, after which we saw scholars like Pamela Crossley (柯娇燕), Mark Elliot (欧立德) and James Millward (米华健) coming out with their own works along Rawski’s line. The most representative is a collection edited by Millward and Elliot called New Qing Imperial History: The Making of Inner Asian Empire at Chengde.
So-called “New Qing History” . . . has become the trademark of these scholars. They publish articles in America and China, produce academic reports, take part in academic forums, accept interviews from journalists, all the time beating the drum of this so-called “New Qing History.”
As these American scholars spare no effort in selling this “New Qing History,” there are various scholars in China who assist them in pushing it, but the world of Qing research [in China] has paid it little attention, and even less can we say it’s caught on. The “cold shoulder” some scholars have given [the idea] is the true feeling [most share]. . . . When they promote this “New Qing History” to subvert China’s Qing history or even Chinese history, we must take this seriously, looking at the true face of “New Qing History”!
As one scholar has already questioned: Where exactly is “New Qing History” new? The innovation of scholarship is a necessary condition of its development, and it is also the life of scholarship. But what innovations has “New Qing History” made?

Gao Yu sentenced to 7 years in jail

Written by David Bandurski on . Posted in Headlines and Hashtags.

Veteran Chinese journalist Gao Yu (高瑜), 71, was sentenced today to seven years in jail by Beijing’s No. 3 Intermediate People’s Court. She is accused of “illegally providing state secrets beyond [China’s] borders,” a charge stemming, many believe, from the leak in 2013 of the so-called “Document No. 9,” in which the Chinese Communist Party restricted discussion of a range of issues it regards as sensitive, including constitutionalism, civil society and press freedom.
According to Gao Yu’s lawyers, prosecutors accused her of leaking an unspecified document to Hong Kong’s Mirror Monthly (明镜), which in 2013 did publish a document identified as “Document No. 9.”
The sentencing of Gao, who began working as a reporter for the official China News Service in 1979, comes almost six months after her closed-door trial in November 2014. Shortly after her disappearance on April 24, 2014 — along with her son — video of Gao making an apparent confession appeared on state-run television in China. Gao has since maintained her innocence, saying the confession was made under extreme duress.

[ABOVE: Journalist Gao Yu is accused of leaking state secrets during a newscast on China Central Television, and appears to confess on camera.]
In it’s “Explaining the News” (要问解说) column yesterday, RFI Chinese ran an interview with one of Gao Yu’s defense lawyers, Shang Baojun (尚宝军), in which he explained the case and Gao’s present condition in custody.
A translation of the RFI interview follows:

Explaining the News: On November 21 last year, the Gao Yu case in the No. 3 Intermediate Court was not heard in public, and Gao Yu denied the related accusations [against her]. After that, two postponements of sentencing were granted. As her lawyer, have you been able to see her recently?
Shang Baojun: I see Gao Yu just about once a month, so I’ll first touch on the issue of her health and well-being. Gao Yu is already 71 years old, and she has many of the ailments that come with old age, such as high blood pressure, heart disease and Ménière’s disease, and she often falls ill. [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ménière’s_disease]. In the time shortly after she was arrested in April, the interrogations were frequent and went on for extended periods of time. There were scores of interrogations over a period of less and two months, and she was basically subjected to about 10 hours of questioning every day, sometimes even for longer. The pressure was intense at that time. In the half year since the trial [in November 2014] she has managed only to maintain a state of equilibrium. The detention center provides her with blood pressure and heart disease medication, and her Ménière’s is basically under control. She says that her physical situation is quite worrying — after all, she is quite elderly.
Explaining the News: And what about Gao Yu’s case? One reason Gao Yu’s case has drawn attention is because after she was taken into criminal custody by police, Gao Yu appeared on May 8 on a news program on China Central Television, her face beaten black and blue, and admitted her errors and issue a confession. Although, Gao Yu later said that she had been pressure to save her son and made a confession of guilt against her will. She also denied any criminal wrongdoing. Has there been any change to her attitude?
Shang Baojun: No, there has been no change. Concerning her appearance on CCTV, Gao Yu had no idea about it at all. The so-called recording should be that made by investigators during her interrogation. No one told her at the time that this would be broadcast on China Central Television. When Gao Yu later learned about this, it was only because we informed her, and she was extremely shocked. She had been arrested together with her son, and the police investigators told her that she must cooperate, otherwise those closest to her would come to trouble or suffer unfortunate consequences. It was only after being threatened and intimidated that Gao Yu made the so-called confession.
Actually, her situation is quite simple, just one thing. They say that in June-July 2013, Gao Yu provided a document to He Pin (何频), the chief editor of Hong Kong’s Mirror Monthly (明镜). This is that issue. Very simple and very specific. At the time, Gao Yu admitted to these accusations because she had no choice. But she has since consistently denied them. The last time I saw her should have been sometime around mid-March. I imagine nothing has changed since that time.
Explaining the News: The crime she has been accused of is “illegally providing state secrets beyond [China’s] borders,” but can you really regard the Chinese Communist Party’s internal documents concerning ideology as “state secrets”?
Shang Baojun: This is something we’ve debated before. Investigative organs determined through the Beijing Municipal Office for the Protection of State Secrets (北京市保密局) that the document in question was a state document of a confidential nature (机密级). Of course, we don’t agree with this conclusion. And we’ve appealed for a new determination higher up from the PRC’s National Administration for the Protection of State Secrets, including on the question of whether [the document] can be construed as a “state secret” — and then further what, if any, level of “state secret.” China has three levels of secrecy: top secret (绝密级), confidential (机密级) and secret (秘密级). If any of these are leaked, there are subject to different sentences.
Regardless of what the determination is, we do not believe that a document from the Chinese Communist Party providing guidance on propaganda and ideology, or direction on the main theme (主旋律) can be construed as a “state secret.”

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