Author: David Bandurski

Now Executive Director of the China Media Project, leading the project’s research and partnerships, David originally joined the project in Hong Kong in 2004. He is the author of Dragons in Diamond Village (Penguin), a book of reportage about urbanization and social activism in China, and co-editor of Investigative Journalism in China (HKU Press).

A history of "internet diplomacy"

In a news piece promoted to its homepage today, China’s official Xinhua News Agency praised the country’s top internet official, Lu Wei (鲁炜) — the director of the former State Internet Information Office, now called the Cyberspace Administration of China (CAC) — for his deft sale of Chinese internet policy while on a visit to the United States.
Recapping Lu Wei’s attendance of the 7th Internet Industry Forum in Washington D.C., and his part in a seminar at George Washington University, Xinhua said: “During the day, Lu Wei extended three invitations to the deputy secretary of state and to university students, and the charm of his ‘internet diplomacy’ was on full display.”
Used in this way, bespeaking China’s confidence in making its presence felt in global internet policymaking, this pair of words, “internet diplomacy,” or hulianwang waijiao (互联网外交), mark an important shift. Why? Because it is the very first time state media in China have used the phrase in a positive sense at all, moving beyond the rhetoric of foreign interference.
China, it seems, has entered its own era of “internet diplomacy.” It is ready to embrace the idea. But it wasn’t always so.
On March 14, 2011, the official China News Service reported on a second speech on “internet freedom” (互聯网自由) by then U.S. Secretary of State Hilary Clinton (following on her 2010 speech). In this follow-up speech, the news service noted, Clinton “included this concept [of internet freedom] in the foreign policy framework of the United States.” With slightly pejorative overtones, the report added: “The current situation shows that America’s internet diplomacy has already moved on from verbal utterance to a stage of concrete implementation.”

cyber foreign relations
The brief history of the phrase “internet diplomacy” mirrors the fraught history of US-China relations over the question of information freedom. Composite of photo of Barack Obama by Beth Rankin, photo of Xi Jinping by Michel Temer, and photo of Hilary Clinton by Keith Kissel, all available at Flickr.com under Creative Commons License.
An article posted to Sichuan province’s official news portal on June 19, 2011, spoke of the “web war” (网战) — in Chinese, a play the word “website” — waged by the United States. According to the article’s “web war” timeline, in 1995 “the Pentagon began organizing a group of ‘hackers’ to engage in an information war against America’s enemies.”
Referring to reports of “shadow” internet and mobile systems the U.S. might deploy to assist dissidents living under repressive regimes in circumventing censorship — including the so-called “internet in a suitcase” — the article said such systems were “just the tip of the iceberg of the internet diplomacy pursued by the Obama government.”
China, it seemed, was forever on the receiving end of “internet diplomacy” — a tool, a ploy, or even a conspiracy, of the West.
On January 5, 2012, Liu Zhongmin (刘中民), director of the Middle East Studies Institute at Shanghai Foreign Languages University, wrote a piece called, “The Successes and Failures of China’s Foreign Policy in the Middle East,” published in Shanghai’s Oriental Morning Post. Topmost among China’s successes, Liu listed its adherence to the doctrine of non-interference.
Among the many lessons dramatic changes in the Middle East held for China, however, Liu noted the role of the internet and the nettlesome issue of “social management.”

. . . “Internet politics” and “internet diplomacy” have become a serious challenge facing China. At present, the internet has already become the principal tool by which the United States seeks to export democracy and carry out political infiltration (政治渗透). Responding to “internet diplomacy” will become a normalised political and social issue facing China.

“Internet diplomacy” was a political bogeyman, of a piece with the CCP’s recurring nightmare that the “Arab Spring” might make its way east.
In March this year, even as the power of China’s new internet czar grew, “internet diplomacy” was still an exclusively American matter. Here is a portion of a report by China Youth Daily about First Lady Michelle Obama’s China visit:

The U.S. government is also promoting with full force its strategy of “internet diplomacy”, with the belief that America’s global foreign policy relies not just on the diplomatic corps, but on the “online diplomacy of the people,” in which American citizens are encouraged to interact with foreigners on the internet . . .

But today, December 4, 2014, we can finally say that “internet diplomacy” is China’s strategy, pursued with a gusto China’s own state media see as only befitting its status as a great nation.
Mirroring the praise of Lu Wei from Xinhua today was an article in the overseas edition of the official People’s Daily, the gist of which was that foreign media had voiced admiration for Lu Wei’s nuanced understanding of the internet.
The final section of the overseas People’s Daily article offered the views of never specified Chinese scholars, who gushed (apparently in unison): “It would be apt to dub this ‘the year of internet diplomacy.’ These actions show the pluck and confidence of a great nation!”
 

China should attack US over Ferguson

The following post from “Han Dai Fu 2013 (汉大赋2013), which criticizes what the user sees as China’s lack of resolve in attacking the United States over recent riots in Ferguson, was deleted from Weibo sometime before 12:52AM today, December 3, 2014. The post was live for just over an hour before being removed by censors. [Explore more deleted posts by using the Weiboscope, created by the Journalism & Media Studies Centre.]
Here is a translation of the post:

The American imperialists have been talking nonsense about Occupy Central in Hong Kong, which gives China the perfect opportunity to attack the American imperialists over the resistance of black people at Ferguson to oppression. But so far [the government] doesn’t have the courage or attitude, but just talks about this new type of great-power relationship. Has this new type of great-power relationship kept the American imperialists from meddling in China’s internal matters? Why don’t we give them a taste of their own medicine? Why don’t we make it hurt rather than going on in this passive sort of way?

The original Chinese-language post follows:

美帝对香港占中说三道四,给了中国一个绝佳的机会就弗格森事件黑人反抗压迫对美帝发起进攻。但今上没这个胆子和气魄,一心想构建什么新型大国关系。新型大国关系挡着美帝对中国内部事务横加干涉了吗?既然挡不住,何不以其人之道还治其人之身?一举扭转天天被动挨打的局面,让美帝噎得难受?

ferguson
Photo of protests in Ferguson by “World Can’t Wait” available under Creative Commons license at Flickr.com

Don't Ask Why

The following post from “Beijing Lawyer Cheng Yi (北京律师成义), in which he shares a photo of the still-influential former top Party leader Jiang Zemin on a recent visit to China’s National Museum, was deleted from Weibo sometime before 12:47AM today, December 3, 2014. The post was live for just over half an hour before being removed by censors. [Explore more deleted posts by using the Weiboscope, created by the Journalism & Media Studies Centre.]
Here is a translation of the post, which includes a shortened link to a news page at Sina.com.cn including an apparent news release from the National Museum posted on October 3 this year (about Jiang Zemin’s visit), and a video of the official nightly newscast on CCTV on October 1, 2014, China’s National Day:

What does this mean? Jiang Zemin visits the National Museum http://t.cn/Rz6GQm2

National Museum Jiang

The original Chinese-language post follows:

什么意思? 江泽民视察参观国家博物馆 http://t.cn/Rz6GQm2

Reading habits post deleted

The following post from Weibo user Hu Yanglin (胡杨麟), in which he shares his experiences reading books on Chinese politics published overseas, was deleted from Weibo sometime before 11:33AM today, November 27, 2014. The post was live for over an hour before being removed by censors. [Explore more deleted posts by using the Weiboscope, created by the Journalism & Media Studies Centre.]
Here is a translation of the post:

I’ve read a number of books on Chinese politics published overseas, and they all wantonly attack and criticize Chinese leaders past and present but make an exception for a certain current leader. This is something I worry about too. I’m guessing this post won’t be around too long. Start the clock.

The original Chinese-language post follows:

看过一些海外出版的关于中国政治的书,对往届现任的中国领导人肆意的攻击漫骂,但对一名现任领导人除外,这也是我所忧虑的,这个贴估计存在不了多久,计时。

The dogs of positivity

With last week’s inaugural World Internet Conference, held in the Zhejiang water town of Wuzhen, China tried to put itself on the map of global web development forums. The country’s internet chief, Lu Wei, said the summit, which he likened to a “Davos of the East,” would be an annual event drawing together leaders from foreign governments, key non-profits (like ICANN) and major internet companies.
But behind the obligatory feel-good panels, with titles like “Creating an Online Global Village Together,” lingered tougher questions about China’s goals and hopes in hosting the event.
What business did a country with the world’s most robust system of information controls have talking about more “democratic” internet governance systems?
We explicated some of China’s core intentions here last week, arguing that the World Internet Conference was really about “a more assertive foreign policy for cyberspace” wrapped up with the CCP’s priority of strategic information control.
But if China’s intentions were at all opaque, they became clear in the most illuminating of ways right in the midst of the conference. The CCP’s very exercise of control on social media came back to haunt the “Wuzhen Summit” on — where else? — social media. A new online meme defined the mood and meaning of the event in ways Xi Jinping’s propaganda chieftains could scarcely have envisioned.
The dogs of propaganda bit their own tails. Or, more appropriately perhaps, were caught licking their own back ends.
Meet Hua Qianfang (花千芳).
Hua Qianfang is the nom de plume of Ning Xueming (宁学明), a “grassroots online peasant writer” from Liaoning’s Qingyuan Manchu Autonomous County (清原满族自治县). He is a member of the local official writer’s association in Fushun, and he has been called — along with Zhou Xiaoping (周小平) — one of the “four principal online positive energy writers (中国网络正能量四大写手之一).

sima and co at arts forum
Zhou Xiaoping (left) and Hua Qianfang (right) appear on state television as they attend the CCP’s forum on arts and culture.
For more on Xi Jinping’s new propaganda phrase, “transmitting positive energy to society,” and its grassroots pundits — given plaudits at the recent CCP forum on arts and culture — readers can visit this earlier piece, and this one.
Recently, in the wake of Lu Wei’s crackdown on “Big Vs” on Weibo, Xi Jinping said he hopes that “Big Vs” (meaning his kind) do more to “spread positive energy.” Hua Qianfang and Zhou Xiaoping are the faces of this new “positive” approach to control.
Hua’s best-known work is, “Ours Is A Journey Through a Sea of Stars”(我们的征途是星辰大海), the title of which Hua quite unwittingly stole from Japanese writer Yoshiki Tanaka.
Plagiarism notwithstanding, on October 15, 2014, Hua attended Xi Jinping’s Forum on Arts and Culture, where the president mentioned him by name as an exemplary writer.
But it was on November 21, 2014, as Hua Qianfang took part in China’s inaugural World Internet Conference, that the fun really began.
Posting on Weibo about attending of the conference, Hua wrote that, “In its determination to lead the Information Age, China already has the heart of Sima Zhao.”
Who is Sima Zhao? Si Mazhao (司馬昭) was a war general during China’s Three Kingdoms period (AD 220–280) that followed the end of the Han dynasty.
Before I get into the sub layers, here is Hua’s delightful quote in Chinese:

「中国引领信息时代的决心,已经是司马昭之心了。」

And here is a screenshot of the Weibo post in question, which set off a firestorm of giggles and groans on social media that eclipsed all other news of China’s ostensibly landmark internet conference.

sima Weibo post

The problem with Hua Qianfang’s remark is that Sima Zhao is a historical figure associated with deception, with knavish intrigue that despite its supposed secrecy everyone knows is happening.
This is why the ancient adage goes: “Even those passing on the road know what secrets Sima Zhao harbours in his heart”(司馬昭之心,路人皆知也).
And this is what makes Hua’s statement so blindly astute. Yes, indeed, China’s global internet ambitions are a transparent deception.
Sima Zhao is not, as Hua seems to believe, a paragon of strength and determination. He is, instead, a scoundrel.
photo-4

So the “Sima Zhao heart,” or Sima Zhao zhi xin (司马昭之心), is a heart of deception.
Journalists, academics and internet users of all stripes quickly picked up on Hua Qianfang’s enlightening gaffe, and the hubbub over the idea of “Sima Zhao’s heart” as the ethos of the “Wuzhen Summit” quickly drowned out the official narrative.
There are lessons to be had here — yet again — about the pitfalls of propaganda in an age where citizens (or at the very least, netizens) are far more savvy and skeptical than the purveyors of propaganda can afford to be.
Encourage “positive” ignorance and fawning blindness among the “Big Vs” you trumpet as your champions, and they are bound to make you look foolish.
self-leading dog
The “Bring-Your-Own-Grainer,” or BYOG (自干五), is a new term in Chinese referring to a pro-government propagandist who willingly serves as an apologist, needing no payment in return. This image by writer Shi Feike shows the BYOG as a self-walking dog, holding its leash with its own tail.
Hua Qianfang’s foolishness is on shameless display in a recent interview with Portrait (人物) magazine. Hua readily admits to his sparse reading of historical and political matters, and says he gets “all of my knowledge from online posts.”

The profile and interview in the November 22 edition of Portrait is called, “Hua Qianfang: America has Taken Our Respect, Piety, Virtue and Righteousness and Translated It As Universal Values” (花千芳:美国把我们的忠孝仁义翻译做了普世价值). That headline derives — mischievously, I think — from Hua’s absurd suggestion that Westerners just took traditional Chinese values and ripped them off by calling them “universal values.”
A translation of the Hua Qianfang interview follows. We also recommend that readers interested in the whole “positive energy” propaganda craze and the Bring-Your-Own-Grain pro-government commentators turn to this piece by former CMP fellow Yang Hengjun, written as a tongue-in-cheek defense of Hua’s compatriot, “Sunshine Boy” Zhou Xiaoping.

P:That day when Xi Jinping entered the hall, and later when he mentioned a number of you by name and shook hands with you — how did you feel right then?
H:What I felt right then, let me tell you, was happiness (幸福).
P:What did you say to him?
H:Hello Great Uncle Xi! I said that twice. Once when he said our names, and again when he shook my hand.
P:Everyone knows you for your essay, “Ours Is A Journey Through a Sea of Stars.” (我们的征途是星辰大海). This saying is from a Japanese writer, did you realize that?
H:You mean Haruki Murakami?
P:No, not Haruki Murakami. A writer called Yoshiki Tanaka, from a fantasy novel called Legend of the Galactic Heroes.
H:I’ve heard of the book, but I haven’t read it. Let me tell you, I get all of my information off the internet. I mean I haven’t read many books. I mean history books, politics books, science books, popular science — I’ve basically not read them. I get all of my knowledge from online posts.
P:So you browse the chat threads and look at what other people are saying?
H:Yeah. I see what other people are saying and then write down the really good parts. I don’t write it down, of course, but copy and paste you know. There’s a problem in doing that, which is that if people say it right I write it right, but if people say it wrong I might write it wrong.
P:How do you separate different viewpoints? Do you have your own standard of judgement?
H:I don’t have a standard of judgement. If someone says something reasonable I listen. This is the simplest point of view. Black is black, and white is white. It’s that simple. I’ll tell you, if I want to who’s right and who’s bad, the simpler the viewpoint the better. The prettier something is the more likely it is to be false.
P:Could you explain that?
H:For example, the notions of respect, piety, virtue and righteousness (忠孝仁义). China’s traditional value system. I can’t necessarily achieve this, but I think the sense in saying this is that we should respect the nation and act with goodwill toward our friends. I think these are things we should do, as a basic belief in being people. In America they translate this as “universal values.”
P:Have you had posts deleted or been prevented from posting before?
H:Well, everything I write are positive energy articles (正能量的文章), all propagating patriotism and calling on people to love life. I don’t know why there’s any cause to remove them. Generally, when I make a Weibo post there are at least 5,000 views, but sometimes I’ll post something and check back an hour later and find there are just a few views. Once I wrote a piece called, “I Support the Party Commanding the Guns” (我赞同党指挥枪), and that one was removed. I’m not sure why. [EDITOR’S NOTE: Hua’s ignorance of his nation’s political culture is astonishing, even for a layman. One of the most sensitive taboos in China is discussion of privatisation of the armed forces. Even voicing support for the Party’s control of the military assumes there is a debate at all, and so would tend not to be welcome — particularly on social media where comment threads would quickly grow sensitive.]
P:What about there being no blocking or deletion, and everyone can converse freely. Do you think that’s a possibility?
H:I don’t think that’s possible, because in America it’s not even possible.
P:So you believe there’s such a thing as [pro-American] paid web commentators (五美分) .
H:I think there must be, but I don’t have evidence.
P:What about 50-centers (五毛), [or pro-government paid web commentators in China]?
H:There definitely isn’t such a thing. There’s no need. Anyway, they have propaganda workers, and they can post on their own and that’s enough. Why would there be any need to hire others? If they need to pay people [to make positive comments online], then what are those propaganda workers for?
P:How do you understand the words [of Xi Jinping], “Ultimately, writers will guide this age”?
H:There are some who are pretty successful right now, like the ones writing fantasy novels, or online novels. They’re already quite successful. So far, positive energy writings, patriotic writings, haven’t yet found their path [to success].
P:So people look at positive energy stuff, but even more people read stuff criticising the government?
H:It’s no big deal. We can each do our own thing. There’s no tension here.
P:Well then, shouldn’t you head to where there are more people [interested]? I’m mean, seeing as you just said you write whatever it is people want to read.
H:Too many people go looking for problems, and not enough people go this route (patriotism, ‘positive energy’). Our readers should be the bigger group.
P:How do you arrange your time these days?
H:During planting season I’m busy in the fields. Then when I rest I write essays. That’s it. When there’s work in the fields you have to heed the call.
P:Have you ever thought about not writing, but making a living writing books?
H:I’ve wanted to be a writer since I was 13. If the opportunity comes up of course that would be better. But still, I don’t really think I can give it up. I think growing crops is a lofty and honourable thing. Just think, a piece of land, and nothing’s there, and you grow corn and in this way provide for people’s survival. How mysterious is that!
P:Your family’s corn crop, once it’s ready . . .
H:We have 50 mu. Enough for you to eat. Enough for you to eat (laughs).

Envisioning the splinternet

At China’s first World Internet Conference in the Zhejiang canal town of Wuzhen — nicknamed “the Wuzhen Summit” — Chinese President Xi Jinping said in his welcoming remarks that China encouraged the creation of a “multifaceted, democratic and transparent governance system for the international internet” (多边、民主、透明的国际互联网治理体系”. [Homepage image created with “iPhone 6 Plus” by Luke Ma, available at Flickr.com under Creative Commons license.]
Xi Jinping was not, in fact, present at the conference. His written remarks were recited by vice-premier Ma Kai (马凯). But the president’s bold presence could be felt in China’s assertiveness at the summit, which leaders pledged to hold every year, fashioning it as the “Davos of the East” (东方达沃斯).

water city wuzhen
The water town of Wuzhen in China’s Zhejiang province, where the first World Internet Conference is being held. Photo by “setiadi” available at Flickr.com under Creative Commons license.
In much the same way that China has pursued a more assertive foreign policy under Xi, it is now staking its claim to the right to decide how the global territory of the internet should be governed.
This is about a more assertive foreign policy for cyberspace. And China’s vision is a carving knife.
The internet is global. That, at least, is the originating vision of the internet. But official China, which now recognises a global internet premised on free and fair access as an imminent threat, wants instead an international internet, a splinternet governed and limited by specific national interests. China’s interests, as defined by the ruling Chinese Communist Party, should be appropriately represented, seeing as the country now accounts for almost one-quarter of the world’s internet users.
When Xi Jinping talks about a more “democratic” governance system, what he means is that China wants its rightful say in this international order — a seat, if we may, on the hypothetical Internet Security Council.
Gone are the days when China’s so-called Great Firewall – its hardware for filtering internet traffic — was the physical manifestation of a chronic insularity. Back then, the world of ideas was bisected into the “internal,” or dui nei (对內), and the “external,” or dui wai (对外). The purpose of the Great Firewall was to hold back the tide of foreign influence.
This insular outlook was reflected in the institutionalisation of controls. The dui nei concerns, how to control the Chinese public by “guiding public opinion” (to call it simply “censorship” belittles the ambitions of Chinese authorities), were the province of the Central Propaganda Department.
But from the early days of internet control, when the web was an indistinct force and the lightning was on the horizon, the management of the internet was placed under the Information Office of the State Council, the government agency dealing expressly with foreign, or dui wai matters — the same office that publishes the English-language China Daily, the newspaper meant for foreign readers of China.
The internet was a foreign thing. And like all foreign things, it was something to emulate and fear.
The internet is no longer lightning on the horizon. A new generation of social media promise global information sharing in multiple formats in real time. A report in the New York Times about the family fortune of a senior Chinese Communist Party official is no longer a dui wai matter — it can (and will) be shared almost instantly on Chinese social networks. Internet control is not just the new heart of censorship and propaganda, it is a life-and-death matter for the Party.
The walls have come down. The time for half-measures is over. The only choice China’s ruling Party now has is to march forth and make its insularity global.

Corruption quip not welcome on Weibo

The following post by Duan Guifa (段贵发) making a quip about corruption and patriotism was deleted from Sina Weibo sometime before 2:02PM today, November 17, 2014. Duan Guifa currently has more than 102,000 followers on Sina Weibo. [See more deleted posts at the WeiboScope Search, by the University of Hong Kong’s Journalism and Media Studies Centre].
The post shares a still from a Chinese period film or television serial in which a man shuts his eyes in revery as he sits before a lavishly-set table. The man standing behind the seated man says (in dialogue pasted over the top), “How can you in good conscience love your country when you’ve taken 800 million?” To which the seated man responds: “Nonsense! I could take 800 million, so why wouldn’t I love this country?”

cashing in_patriotism

The post is an apparent reference to widespread corruption in China. The Associated Press recently reported that, according Beijing estimates, 16,000 to 18,000 corrupt officials and state enterprise employees have fled China since the mid-1990s, stealing assets worth more than 800 billion yuan.
The original Chinese-language post follows:

能捞8个亿,干嘛不爱国?(图转)


China's "positive" prescription for dissent

One week ago we wrote about the ascendance in China of the propaganda term “positive energy” (正能量) — generally referring to news coverage, online content and cultural products that are uplifting in character, not dwelling on the negative side of Chinese society and politics. A few days later, we translated a report in the official Liaoning Daily attacking what it said was an overwhelming current of negativity about China among university instructors in the country.
Xi Jinping seems to be launching a full frontal attack on negativity. Not just in journalism, on the internet, in arts and culture, and in academia, mind you, but in China’s foreign and trade relations as well. “Positive energy” is a one-size-fits-all prescription targeting both dissent at home and “negativity” towards China in every other context.

red pills
If only it came in pill form. “Positive energy” seems to be Xi Jinping’s prescription for a whole range of domestic and international issues. Image from “HealthGauge” available at Flickr.com.
At the CCP’s forum on arts and culture in September, President Xi Jinping praised blogger Zhou Xiaoping, known for his fawning praise of all things officially Chinese. “Zhou Xiaoping,” said President Xi, shaking the blogger’s hand, “from here on out you must carry forward positive energy on the internet.” This mirrored what Lu Wei, the Beijing propaganda minister who is now China’s internet czar, said back in January 2013 when he issued a broad call for more “positive energy” on the web — a code for tighter controls in order to quiet dissenting and “negative” voices, like the Big Vs on Weibo Lu went after so aggressively just months later.
When Xi met with former U.S. President Jimmy Carter in 2012, he said that what the US-China relationship needed was more “positive energy.” And he told APEC leaders this month that regional economic cooperation was paramount and “it is hoped that all parties contribute positive energy to APEC’s long-term development.”
The emphasis on “positive energy” is about more than just attitude. It is about expunging dissent and silencing those “negative” voices that dwell on China’s problems.
The recent article in the Liaoning Daily has left some in China fearing that a new round of ideological controls is underway against those who dare to speak up — something akin, though this is so far a vast overstatement, to the anti-rightist campaigns of the 1950s.
Zhang Ming, a professor at Renmin University of China and a former CMP fellow, wrote on Tencent Weibo this weekend: “For some time I’ve heard people talking about how there is a new anti-rightist movement underway. I didn’t buy this at first, but the Liaoning Daily open letter to teachers made me believe. How many on the right will be arrested this time around?”
On Saturday, the Guangming Daily, published by China’s Central Propaganda Department, went so far as to identify a “group” of voices on the internet that it said sought to “slander” China with outright lies laced with quotes (Oh, horror!) from Westerners. An excerpt of the article, on page ten, follows:

In recent times two online groups have been engaged in fierce debate.
One of these groups the “citizen-intellectual” group (公知), combining together the identities of the “citizen” and the “intellectual.” They seek out the dark side of society and magnify them infinitely, then start making irresponsible remarks online while throwing in language from Westerners (洋人) — speaking lies with their eyes wide open . . .
There is another group called the “BYOG 50s” (自干五), “the 50 centers who bring their own grain,” meaning that out of their own will [without government pay] they praise positive energy in society (社会正能量). They are web users who offer encouragement for the development of China.
Those who disparage the “BYOG 50s” say they’re even worse than the “50 Cent Party” (五毛党) who get paid by the government. Not even paid, they have to bring their own food.
Here, I would like to say some things to stand firmly with the “BYOG 50s,” because they, with a factual attitude, carry out rational, historical and objective rumor-denying, explanation and criticism of language that slanders China.
. . . They are tolerant of those who are able to provide materials and offer rational argument — fundamentally unlike those so-called “citizen-intellectuals” and “elites” who view society with coloured glasses and use sharp and mocking language to attack the government and society.

GM Daily
An article on page 10 of the November 15, 2014, edition of Guangming Daily attacks “citizen-intellectuals” online for their “slander” of China. Article on upper-right.
As the Guangming Daily lobbed its attack on “elites” and “intellectuals,” Caixin Online, one of China’s most critical news voices in a media environment increasingly a wasteland of “positive energy,” interviewed Zhan Jiang, a professor of international journalism and communication at Beijing Foreign Languages University and a former CMP fellow, about the contention in Liaoning Daily that university instructors are too negative about China’s social problems.
Tellingly, perhaps, for the disciples of “positive energy” who grind their teeth over how intellectuals tend to quote Western ideas, Zhan threw Jurgen Habermas and John Milton into his Caixin interview.
By mid-day today, the Caixin interview with Zhan Jiang had been removed from the internet in China, yielding only a 404 Error.
404 2

And that, folks, is what “positive energy” looks like.
Below is a partial translation of the Caixin piece written from an interview with Zhan Jiang, followed by a few social media posts from Zhang Ming of Renmin University of China.

Zhan Jiang believes that while Liaoning Daily has a right to conduct watchdog journalism on social issues. But the public has an even greater right to fully know the sampling and investigative methods in order to be assured of the conclusions rigor. . .
Zhan Jiang said: “University teachers in the social sciences, humanities and philosophy in particular require a critical mindset in order to do research. If we want to change our society, if we want this society to improve, then first we have to identify our deficiencies and inadequacies.”
Lu Xun is remembered and celebrated as “the backbone of the Chinese people” because of his tough-love attitude, criticising ugly phenomena in China and awakening an awareness of the struggle.
Zhan Jiang disagrees with the accusations in the open letter, that criticisms of the society and nation in Chinese classrooms would lead to erroneous value systems in students just stepping out into the world, making them lose faith in society. University students, he said, are already mature and full of ideas. They are not vulnerable to indoctrination as they were in the closed-off era before economic reform and opening. Information is shared rapidly today, and students can access numerous sources via the internet. They are capable of forming their own opinions about society in the process of receiving various information. The teacher’s opinion is just one point of view. Students are able to think and form opinions on their own. According to John Milton’s theory of a “marketplace of ideas,” differing ideas can form an opinion marketplace where knowledge can emerge from among competing views.
Zhan Jiang pointed out finally that as a media, Liaoning Daily had the credentials to investigate and criticize university teachers. But whether this is done as journalism or social science research, the method of investigation should be rigorous in order to arrive at accurate conclusions. And so he hopes the paper is able to be open about the subject of investigation, it’s sampling methods and its investigation process.

Zhang Ming, of Renmin University, a frequent critic of China’s educational system, kept most of his criticism of the Liaoning Daily “report” on China’s university classrooms to Tencent Weibo. A few of his posts are translated below:

Of those attacking me on Weibo, saying I spread poison through my lectures, none have actually attended my classes. They can’t even utter a word about how I supposedly spread poison. In the same way, instructors who have had their classes suspended for punishment haven’t been presented with any reasons [for their being disciplined]. There are no procedures, there is no public debate, nor are they given any opportunity to defend themselves. Meanwhile, those who don’t take teaching seriously, who don’t know their stuff, who talk total nonsense — they face no consequences. Our universities care only about political correctness.
————-
In fact . . . The greatest problem among university instructors is not criticism of the government but lack of seriousness and expertise in teaching.
————-
In the history of world journalism, has there ever been undercover reporting of university instructors teaching class? Filming and recording in secret? The goal of Liaoning Daily is not to instruct or advise instructors on how to teach, but rather to gather evidence of guilt and hold these instructors to account.
————-
Liaoning Daily has sent reporters undercover to collect materials for [political] smears. This isn’t normal reporting activity but cultural spying. This is essentially turning instructors into the enemy.

 

College teachers must be more "positive"

Now one of the hottest discussions on social media, the following article, printed in the November 13 edition of Liaoning Daily, the official Party newspaper of Liaoning province, is framed as an “open letter” to university teachers across China, and accuses them of being too “negative” about the country.
The Liaoning Daily claims that it dispatched reporters across the country for an “investigation” of Chinese classrooms, visiting “20 schools in five cities.” The paper found that many instructors in university settings were politically insensitive and overly critical, it said, of Chinese society and the “theoretical innovations” of the Chinese Communist Party. They were sometimes (tisk, tisk) over-complimentary of Western ideas such as “separation of powers,” or sanquan fenli (三权分立).

liaoning daily letter

Many commentators on social media have found the tone and ideas in the Liaoning Daily piece worrisome, and a dangerous encroachment on academic freedoms that have already been under serious threat in China.
This rebuttal to the Liaoning Daily piece by Renmin University professor and former CMP fellow Zhang Ming (张鸣) is well worth a read. Time permitting, we’ll summarise Zhang’s points in the coming days.
File this one away in Xi Jinping’s “positive energy” folder.

Teacher, Please Don’t Talk Like That About China: An Open Letter to Teachers of Philosophy and Social Science
Liaoning Daily
November 13, 2014
Beloved teachers, it is with hearts filled with reverence that we write this letter.
The position of university teacher is a position of honor, a very unique one. The university is a place where we are taught to be people, and it is at the university that our emotional backgrounds, our wats of thinking and even the principle values with which we view life are formed.
Comrade [Deng] Xiaoping once said that education faced in the direction of modernisation, faced the world and faced the future. University education is about seeking and examining the methods and paths by which China can modernise, about building a system of culture that it suited to the world’s most advanced trends. It is about bearing up the future of the Chinese people through the transfer of knowledge.
Because of the special nature of their profession, teachers are no longer ordinary, nor can they be ordinary. You are not those [gossipers] who pass judgment in the park. And you are certainly not those who like to stir up the water online by throwing bricks.
The content of two-hour lectures in the classroom can’t be likened to discussion about money over the bar table. Nor is it the same [errant] thing as a WeChat post. The university classroom is a place where questions are answered. You are people who are to transmit knowledge. What we want are people who teach.
When it comes to the question of raising problems, our pen slows, our hearts feel troubled.
This plan originated with a post made by a web user. In October this year, the Central Committee sent down its “Opinion Concerning the Further Strengthening and Reforming of Propaganda and Ideological Work at Universities Under the New Circumstances” (关于进一步加强和改进新形势下高校宣传思想工作的意见), which raised the issue of energetically raising the ideological and political character of teaching teams in higher education.
On October 21, the official WeChat account of Liaoning Daily started gathering submissions on the topic of, “How should China be in the university classroom?” More than 300 micro-stories (微故事) were received. A message from a university student named Kiko caught our attention. She said: “I don’t know when it started, when talking bad things about China and cursing our society became the rage. One teacher of ours who when he lectures can’t stop talking about ‘look at how it is overseas.’ When he uses case studies to teach, all of the negative examples are China.
If China is truly as dark as our teachers make it out to be, with what sort of attitude are we to face this society once we’ve graduated? Who will give us the confidence and strength to build this society of ours?”
What an important and realistic question!
For China to have become the classic case study for all things negative — is this an isolated instance, or something more widespread? We used new media to conduct a survey and found that 80 percent of university students said they had encountered teachers who were ‘fond of airing complaints’, and this “blackening” (描黑) of our country and society left students upset. This was especially noted in law, administrative management, economics and other areas of philosophy and the social sciences.
We felt we had to write this open letter so that our teachers could better consider questions like these: How should China be taught objectively and accurately in the classroom? How can students be taught all at once with expert knowledge and a bright attitude (光明的心态)? How, when answering major social issues, can we raise effective methods for solving these problems?
To research teachers’ problems, we decided to honestly serve as students for a time. Reporters from Liaoning Daily went off in all directions, entering more than 20 schools in five cities — Beijing, Shanghai, Guangzhou, Wuhan and Shenyang. Over a period of two weeks, they listened to nearly one hundred expert classes.
Everyone was moved by the profound expert knowledge, serious scholarly attitude and sense of responsibility shown by the teachers. At the same time, however, the phenomenon of “being scornful of China” (呲必中国) existed to a definite degree, and in some cases this was quite excessive — deserving the attention and concern of the education world.
Organizing the close to 130,000 words of class notes we compiled, these include essentially three issues with “China in our university classrooms” (大学课堂上的中国).
The first issue is a lack of theoretical recognition [of CCP history and ideology]. Some teachers use mocking means to teach ideological theory courses, mentioning so-called Marx-Engels notions of “privacy”; making inappropriate comparisons between Mao Zedong and ancient dynasties, deconstructing history and making wanton evaluations; dismissing the theoretical innovations of the Chinese Communist Party, at every turn boiling the concrete problems of experience down into theoretical failure.
The second issue is a lack of political recognition (政治认同). Some teachers are wont to share their superficial “impressions from overseas study,” praising Western “separation of powers” and believing that China should take the Western path. Openly, they question the major policy decisions of the CCP’s Central Committee, or even speak directly against them. They one-sidedly exaggerate problems of corruption, social inequality, social management and other areas. They view problems occurring in the midst of development as deficiencies in our political DNA (政治基因缺陷).
The third issue is a lack of identification on an emotional level (情感认同). Some teachers turn their personal disappointments into complaints in the classroom, allowing the students to become unwitting “tribunals”; they use the remark, “I won’t enter the Party,” to show up their own supposed “backbone”; they accept doggerel and dark online stories as the final word and frighten students about their “sinister society,” inducing students to “blacken themselves for protection.”
When we approached teachers for their thoughts about this the general response — whether they were advisors, professors, lecturers or teaching assistants — was a clear: this is unacceptable! But some teachers responded like this:
“As for how I teach in the classroom, can you really intrude on my academic freedom?”
“Would I still have a class if we avoided talking about real problems? If we can’t face up to complaints, won’t our society be too weak?”
“The Party and government should hear the complaints of the masses . . . Otherwise, how can social pressures be relieved?”
Sure, ordinary folk can beg such questions. But, dear teachers, because your profession demands something higher of you, and because of the solemnity and particularity of the university classroom, please do not speak this way about China!
China in the university classroom should clear antecedents. Historical development is continuous, and no period is an isolated scene. Contemporary China’s political forms, social organisations, habitual concepts, all have been influenced by thousands of years of cultural tradition — and so, of necessity, it is imprinted with definite “Chinese characteristics.”
In assessing China, we can’t look just at the surface, but must look even more at the lines of its history.


Posts on Xi's snubbing of NYT deleted

The following post by “vicissitudo” about President Xi Jinping’s brushing off at the APEC press conference on November 12 of a question about censorship encountered by The New York Times in China was deleted from Sina Weibo sometime before 11:12AM today, November 14, 2014. “Vicissitudo” currently has just under 2,000 followers on Sina Weibo. [See more deleted posts at the WeiboScope Search, by the University of Hong Kong’s Journalism and Media Studies Centre].

xi apec

During a press conference with US President Barack Obama on November 12, Xi Jinping was asked by New York Times reporter Mark Landler whether China would relax its restrictions on US journalists working in the country. He sidestepped the question, turning instead to a reporter for Chinese state media. But Xi eventually circled back to the question, suggesting foreign media were to blame for any problems they experienced in China.
“When a car fails on the road,” President Xi said, “perhaps we need to get out of the car and see where the problem is.”
The censored Weibo post from “vicissitude” simply reads:

Xi angrily throws down his earpiece and avoids answering a question from a New York Times reporter.

The original Chinese-language post follows:

习怒摔耳机拒绝回答纽约时报记者

The Weibo post also includes a jpg image of a Chinese-language news article on the press conference and Xi’s response from Sina Hong Kong.

xi article