Now Executive Director of the China Media Project, leading the project’s research and partnerships, David originally joined the project in Hong Kong in 2004. He is the author of Dragons in Diamond Village (Penguin), a book of reportage about urbanization and social activism in China, and co-editor of Investigative Journalism in China (HKU Press).
Now one of the hottest discussions on social media, the following article, printed in the November 13 edition of Liaoning Daily, the official Party newspaper of Liaoning province, is framed as an “open letter” to university teachers across China, and accuses them of being too “negative” about the country.
The Liaoning Daily claims that it dispatched reporters across the country for an “investigation” of Chinese classrooms, visiting “20 schools in five cities.” The paper found that many instructors in university settings were politically insensitive and overly critical, it said, of Chinese society and the “theoretical innovations” of the Chinese Communist Party. They were sometimes (tisk, tisk) over-complimentary of Western ideas such as “separation of powers,” or sanquan fenli (三权分立).
“Teacher, Please Don’t Talk Like That About China: An Open Letter to Teachers of Philosophy and Social Science” Liaoning Daily
November 13, 2014
Beloved teachers, it is with hearts filled with reverence that we write this letter.
The position of university teacher is a position of honor, a very unique one. The university is a place where we are taught to be people, and it is at the university that our emotional backgrounds, our wats of thinking and even the principle values with which we view life are formed.
Comrade [Deng] Xiaoping once said that education faced in the direction of modernisation, faced the world and faced the future. University education is about seeking and examining the methods and paths by which China can modernise, about building a system of culture that it suited to the world’s most advanced trends. It is about bearing up the future of the Chinese people through the transfer of knowledge.
Because of the special nature of their profession, teachers are no longer ordinary, nor can they be ordinary. You are not those [gossipers] who pass judgment in the park. And you are certainly not those who like to stir up the water online by throwing bricks.
The content of two-hour lectures in the classroom can’t be likened to discussion about money over the bar table. Nor is it the same [errant] thing as a WeChat post. The university classroom is a place where questions are answered. You are people who are to transmit knowledge. What we want are people who teach.
When it comes to the question of raising problems, our pen slows, our hearts feel troubled.
This plan originated with a post made by a web user. In October this year, the Central Committee sent down its “Opinion Concerning the Further Strengthening and Reforming of Propaganda and Ideological Work at Universities Under the New Circumstances” (关于进一步加强和改进新形势下高校宣传思想工作的意见), which raised the issue of energetically raising the ideological and political character of teaching teams in higher education.
On October 21, the official WeChat account of Liaoning Daily started gathering submissions on the topic of, “How should China be in the university classroom?” More than 300 micro-stories (微故事) were received. A message from a university student named Kiko caught our attention. She said: “I don’t know when it started, when talking bad things about China and cursing our society became the rage. One teacher of ours who when he lectures can’t stop talking about ‘look at how it is overseas.’ When he uses case studies to teach, all of the negative examples are China.
If China is truly as dark as our teachers make it out to be, with what sort of attitude are we to face this society once we’ve graduated? Who will give us the confidence and strength to build this society of ours?”
What an important and realistic question!
For China to have become the classic case study for all things negative — is this an isolated instance, or something more widespread? We used new media to conduct a survey and found that 80 percent of university students said they had encountered teachers who were ‘fond of airing complaints’, and this “blackening” (描黑) of our country and society left students upset. This was especially noted in law, administrative management, economics and other areas of philosophy and the social sciences.
We felt we had to write this open letter so that our teachers could better consider questions like these: How should China be taught objectively and accurately in the classroom? How can students be taught all at once with expert knowledge and a bright attitude (光明的心态)? How, when answering major social issues, can we raise effective methods for solving these problems?
To research teachers’ problems, we decided to honestly serve as students for a time. Reporters from Liaoning Daily went off in all directions, entering more than 20 schools in five cities — Beijing, Shanghai, Guangzhou, Wuhan and Shenyang. Over a period of two weeks, they listened to nearly one hundred expert classes.
Everyone was moved by the profound expert knowledge, serious scholarly attitude and sense of responsibility shown by the teachers. At the same time, however, the phenomenon of “being scornful of China” (呲必中国) existed to a definite degree, and in some cases this was quite excessive — deserving the attention and concern of the education world.
Organizing the close to 130,000 words of class notes we compiled, these include essentially three issues with “China in our university classrooms” (大学课堂上的中国).
The first issue is a lack of theoretical recognition [of CCP history and ideology]. Some teachers use mocking means to teach ideological theory courses, mentioning so-called Marx-Engels notions of “privacy”; making inappropriate comparisons between Mao Zedong and ancient dynasties, deconstructing history and making wanton evaluations; dismissing the theoretical innovations of the Chinese Communist Party, at every turn boiling the concrete problems of experience down into theoretical failure.
The second issue is a lack of political recognition (政治认同). Some teachers are wont to share their superficial “impressions from overseas study,” praising Western “separation of powers” and believing that China should take the Western path. Openly, they question the major policy decisions of the CCP’s Central Committee, or even speak directly against them. They one-sidedly exaggerate problems of corruption, social inequality, social management and other areas. They view problems occurring in the midst of development as deficiencies in our political DNA (政治基因缺陷).
The third issue is a lack of identification on an emotional level (情感认同). Some teachers turn their personal disappointments into complaints in the classroom, allowing the students to become unwitting “tribunals”; they use the remark, “I won’t enter the Party,” to show up their own supposed “backbone”; they accept doggerel and dark online stories as the final word and frighten students about their “sinister society,” inducing students to “blacken themselves for protection.”
When we approached teachers for their thoughts about this the general response — whether they were advisors, professors, lecturers or teaching assistants — was a clear: this is unacceptable! But some teachers responded like this:
“As for how I teach in the classroom, can you really intrude on my academic freedom?”
“Would I still have a class if we avoided talking about real problems? If we can’t face up to complaints, won’t our society be too weak?”
“The Party and government should hear the complaints of the masses . . . Otherwise, how can social pressures be relieved?”
Sure, ordinary folk can beg such questions. But, dear teachers, because your profession demands something higher of you, and because of the solemnity and particularity of the university classroom, please do not speak this way about China!
China in the university classroom should clear antecedents. Historical development is continuous, and no period is an isolated scene. Contemporary China’s political forms, social organisations, habitual concepts, all have been influenced by thousands of years of cultural tradition — and so, of necessity, it is imprinted with definite “Chinese characteristics.”
In assessing China, we can’t look just at the surface, but must look even more at the lines of its history.
During a press conference with US President Barack Obama on November 12, Xi Jinping was asked by New York Times reporter Mark Landler whether China would relax its restrictions on US journalists working in the country. He sidestepped the question, turning instead to a reporter for Chinese state media. But Xi eventually circled back to the question, suggesting foreign media were to blame for any problems they experienced in China.
“When a car fails on the road,” President Xi said, “perhaps we need to get out of the car and see where the problem is.”
The censored Weibo post from “vicissitude” simply reads:
Xi angrily throws down his earpiece and avoids answering a question from a New York Times reporter.
The original Chinese-language post follows:
习怒摔耳机拒绝回答纽约时报记者
The Weibo post also includes a jpg image of a Chinese-language news article on the press conference and Xi’s response from Sina Hong Kong.
The Beijing News, one of China’s leading professional newspapers, published an interview today with Hu Deping (胡德平), the son of former senior leader Hu Yaobang (胡耀邦), whose death in 1989 prompted calls for a reassessment of his reform legacy that swelled into wider demonstrations. Hu Deping, a respected economist, is former deputy minister of the United Front Work Department of the Central Committee (中央统战部).
The interview in The Beijing News, which deals with the Bo Xilai scandal and the need for political reform in China to check the power of vested interests that might stand in the way of continued reform, appears in a section on page ten called “Dialogue China” (对话中国).
At left, former senior CCP leader Hu Yaobang. At right, his eldest son, Hu Deping, whose interview on political reform appears in today’s The Beijing News.
Our translation of the Hu Deping interview follows:
Hu Deping: Special Interest Groups Are the Biggest Obstacle to Reform
November 13, 2014 Politics Safeguards the Results of Economic Reform The Beijing News: One year on from the 3rd Plenum of the 18th Central Committee, which raised the issue of “comprehensive reform” (全面改革), could you talk about your ideas about reform? Hu Deping: There was a period of time [recently], especially when Bo Xilai was in the midst of his “Singing Red and Striking Black” (唱红打黑) in Chongqing, when I felt truly terrified. Wang Lijun said publicly: If only political problems could be changed into legal questions and then be investigated, then we would have an absolute say (发言权). I once wrote a letter to the Central Committee saying that these words were quite terrifying. After that, I made my opinion known publicly, arguing that judicial work [in our country] was going wrong. After the 18th National Congress, the Central Committee talked about comprehensive reform, about punishing corruption, and rule of law started heading in a good direction . . . and my sense of terror started to abate. This time, the Central Committee raising the issue of comprehensively promoting rule of the nation according to law (依法治国), this is major progress. The Beijing News: The 4th Plenum has just passed. What most made an impression on you about this meeting?
Hu Deping: What most made an impression was that the Party talked about using rule of law to promote the modernization of the country’s governance system and governing capacity. This suits the real circumstances in China, and it also adopts the fruits of the development of human civilization. For example, the emphasis on the authority of the constitution, on checking public power, and protecting individual rights, etcetera. The Beijing News: The 3rd Plenum was about “comprehensive reform,” the 4th Plenum about “ruling the nation in accord with the law” (依法治国). What is the logical relationship between these two? Hu Deping: In terms of “comprehensive reform,” in the year to now a lot of reforms are being promoted in the economic sector, for example land reforms and financial reforms. Protecting the gains of economic reform requires rule of law. So there is a very close relationship between these two plenums in terms of economic foundations and [political] superstructures. The 4th Plenum talk about “ruling the nation in accord with the law” is about reforms to the superstructure. It means that political reform (政治体制改革) has already begun. The Beijing News: Do you think the 4th Plenum idea about “comprehensively promoting rule of the country in accord with the law” (全面推进依法治国) is a part of political reforms? Hu Deping: Of course. Advocating rule of law, and implementing checks on power, including the emphasis this time on legislation, on examination of unconstitutional [conduct] (违宪审查), on the Chinese Communist Party leading the way in abiding by the law — all of these are reforms in the political realm. Only With the Cooperation of the Political System Can We Exit the Deep End The Beijing News: What aspect do you believe is most important in the process of comprehensively deepening reforms? Hu Deping: Political reform and judicial system reforms (司法体制改革) are already growing more and more important. Comprehensive reform requires the mutual interaction of various sectors, so that the reform of various sectors advances all together, in step. Otherwise, the system won’t work smoothly, and the workability of reform at various levels will suffer, and then various local authorities will impede the ideas of the central leadership. That won’t work. The Beijing News: Looking back from 1978 to now, what can we says are the characteristics of the reforms we are pursuing right now? Hu Deping: At the outset of reforms in 1978, political reform and economic reform were very matched. Aside from reforms in the economic realm, at the time we advocated the liberation of ideas (思想解放), breaking through obstacles in our thinking, and we promoted the reform of the leadership of the Party and of the government. But for a long period of time after that, we talked a great deal about economic reform, but we talked very little about political reform.
I think right now we’ve come back to the place where reforms in various realms are matched comprehensively. If political reforms can come along, then the process of reform will move even more quickly – it won’t be always stuck at an impasse (攻坚阶段), always wasting time stuck in the deep end, where ‘the troops are fatigued from an overlong deployment’ (师老兵疲). The Beijing News: Do you think that up to this point the Central Committee of the CCP has already completed the top-level design of reform? Hu Deping: Reform and opening has proceeded for more than thirty years now, and its now entered a period of impasse, the deep end period, and continuing the top-level design of reform exactly means ruling the nation according to the law. Various different interest groups in our society need to be protected by the law. If tensions emerge, legal methods should be used to mediate these tensions. For example, if the gap between rich and poor is substantial, then certain types of taxation can be considered, and limitations can be considered for various unregulated actions in the market.
But the one thing that cannot be protected is the illicit combination of money and power, special interest groups of privilege than run roughshod over the interests of the people. This portion of people is stands in tension with the country and with the Party.
Hu Deping: For some time in the recent past, particularly during Bo Xilai’s “Singing Red and Striking Black” (唱红打黑) campaign in Chongqing, I found things quite terrifying. Wang Lijun said publicly: If only political problems could be changed into legal questions and then be investigated, then we would have an absolute say (发言权).
What do you get when you combine a mainland tour by a Taiwanese pop icon with a roomful of propaganda officials who want to put their own stamp on policy? You get, possibly, a catchy new buzzword for state controls on the news, arts and culture. As we saw last month at the Chinese Communist Party’s forum on arts and culture, President Xi Jinping is all about “positive energy” in media and culture. He told artists gathered at the event that works of art and literature “should be like sunshine, blue sky and the spring breeze, inspiring minds, warming hearts and cultivating taste.” Cultural creation, said Xi, should brim with “positive energy,” or zhengnengliang (正能量), which refers to positive and uplifting content and attitudes as opposed to critical and negative ones.
At the Chinese Communist Party’s session on arts and culture earlier this fall, President Xi Jinping (right) praised blogger Zhou Xiaoping (left) for spreading “positive energy” through his writing.
In the context of news control, “positive energy” is akin to another term favored under Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao, “emphasising positive news.”
While the full phrase, “transmitting positive energy to society” (传播社会正能量), is a relative newcomer to China’s information/culture control lexicon, its rise is unmistakable.
The following is a search of the full “positive energy” phrase in the WiseNews database, accounting for hundreds of Chinese newspapers. (“Positive energy,” or zhengnengliang (正能量), cannot be searched separately because it can be used very differently in other contexts.)
The upward trend of the term since the final months of 2012 and the start of the Xi Jinping administration suggests it is an important — if not yet definitively core — concept in news and propaganda work.
When we look at how local propaganda leaders are deploying their control discourse of late, we can see that the phrase is a crucial one. When, for example, the propaganda chief of the city of Hanzhong, in Shaanxi province, addressed a forum on November 6 to commemorate China’s official Journalist’s Day, he set “positive energy” right beside China’s reigning cardinal control term, “public opinion guidance“:
At the forum, speeches were given by representatives from various media in Hanzhong, talking about the results achieved over the past year. Hanzhong Party Committee Member and Propaganda Minister Xie Jingshuai (谢京帅) pointed out that media must have a correct grasp of public opinion guidance (准确把握好舆论导向), and transmit positive energy to society (传播社会正能量).
. . . .
Concerning future media development, Xie Jingshuai said he hoped that media could correctly grasp public opinion guidance, respect the facts, have a keen eye for discovering beautiful things (拥有发现美的敏锐眼光), have the courage to bear [their responsibilities], that they report beauty, spread beauty and transmit positive energy to society (报道美、传播美，传递社会正能量).
The commercial Huashang Newscovers Hanzhong propaganda leader’s remarks on “positive energy.”
Where did this idea of “transmitting positive energy to society” originate?
The official use of the term seems to go back to September 2012, when just 8 articles in the universe of mainland Chinese newspapers mentioned the term.
A September 4, 2012, article in Beijing Business Today (北京商报), carried on many internet news portals in China, bore the headline, “State Administration of Radio Film & Television: We Encourage the Making of TV Dramas with Positive Energy.”
This report was about a discussion forum in Beijing called “There is a Spirit Called the Beijing Spirit” that dealt with a TV drama called Beijing Youth (北京青年). At that event, Wang Danyan (王丹彦), deputy section head of the Propaganda Management Division of SARFT (now merged with the General Administration of Press and Publications), “gave her thumbs up to Beijing Youth and TV dramas like it that transmit positive energy to society.”
Interestingly, the only coverage using the term “transmitting positive energy to society” in the three years prior to the SARFT remarks on Beijing Youth can be found in three articles in July 2011 reporting on concerts in China by Taiwanese superstar Lo Ta-yu (罗大佑):
You can easily see Lo Ta-yu’s desire to use the concerts to transmit positive energy to society, and this is why he is still called ‘the godfather of Chinese pop.’
In the decade prior to that coverage, there is nothing anywhere in mainland news coverage about “transmitting positive energy to society.”
Lo is a widely recognised cultural icon in Taiwan, mainland China and Hong Kong — though his simple and melodic songs have sometimes contained social and political commentary, and in the 1980s there were bans on some of his songs in Taiwan and the PRC. [There is an interesting piece here, with English translation, about a Lo tune called “Orphan of Asia.”]
More recently, Lo sparked some controversy during Taiwan’s “Sunflower Movement” protests earlier this year, when he called student protesters “victims of mass hysteria.”
Was Lo Ta-yu’s 2011 mainland concert tour the inspiration for the emerging propaganda notion of “transmitting positive energy to society”? It’s difficult to say for sure. But it is certainly possible. After all, as propaganda officials know only too well, culture moves in mysterious ways.
【Conquest】At the APEC banquet, Putin drew his coat over the shoulders of [the wife of Chinese President Xi Jinping] Peng Liyuan. When, right next to her, [US President] Obama saw this scene he exchanged pleasantries with Big Uncle Xi (习大大), at the same time casting a meaningful glance at Putin. At that moment, the three most powerful men in the world were all looking at one woman. Sometimes a few men can conquer the entire world, but they can never disrespect a beautiful woman. (This move of Putin’s was previously used on German Chancellor Angela Merkel).
As I wrote last week, the terms “ruling the nation in accord with the constitution” (依宪治国) and “governing in accord with the constitution” (依宪执政) — which had for a time disappeared from China’s official discourse — reemerged in the “Decision” released by the recent 4th Plenum of the 18th Central Committee of the CCP.
On Thursday, November 6, 2014, Guangzhou Daily, the official Party paper of the Guangzhou city leadership, published an interview with Mr. Hu Yunteng (胡云腾), a member of the Judicial Committee of the Supreme People’s Court who took part in the drafting process of the plenum “Decision.”
In the interview, run on page 6 of the newspaper, Mr. Hu reveals that “ruling the nation in accord with the constitution” and “governing in accord with the constitution” were “for a time taken out” of the “Decision.”
According to President Xi Jinping’s explanation of the plenum, the drafting process of the “Decision” went on for eight months. At the end of January 2014, the Central Committee of the CCP issued “Notice Soliciting Opinions Concerning the Question of the Party’s Comprehensive Promotion of Rule of Law” (关於对党的十八届四中全会研究全面推进依法治国问题徵求意见的通知). In mid-February, the drafting process for the “Decision” began in earnest. The drafting team (起草组) was divided into eight separate research groups (调研组) , which were dispatched to 14 cities and provinces for the purpose of research.
Hu Yunteng informs us:
Once the draft of the ‘Decision’ was complete, the opinions of 118 Central and regional departments were again sought, and the drafting group gave these opinions earnest consideration. Changes went back and forth for many of the opinions. For example, everyone paid a relatively substantial degree of attention to two phrases in the ‘Decision’: “Rule of the nation by law means, first and foremost, ruling the nation in accord with the constitution,” and, “The crux in governing by laws is to govern in accord with the constitution.” These two sentences were included in the original draft of the ‘Decision,’ and then some departments were of the view that much of the content already showed [these concepts], and so for a time these two phrases were taken out.
Mr. Hu does not reveal who he is referring to when he says “some departments.”
Judging from the time frame of the drafting process, we do know that the Central Propaganda Department was already putting together a collection of the president’s speeches called A Primer of Important Speeches by General Secretary Xi Jinping. That book, released in June this year, did not include Xi Jinping’s December 2012 speech on constitutionalism — the first time he had introduced the above-mentioned phrases under contention in the “Decision” drafting process.
Considering the timing, we can suppose that the initial removal of the constitution-related phrases from the draft “Decision” corresponded with the Central Propaganda Department’s eliding of Xi Jinping’s constitution anniversary speech in its published collection.
Here again is Hu Yunteng:
In the 8 months since the set up of the drafting team, we conducted in-depth research and investigation, canvassed widely for opinions, held topic-based debates and constantly discussed changes. During this process, there were three meetings of the Politburo Standing Committee and two of the Politburo for the express purpose of deliberation over the Decision.
When the tens of millions of copies of Xi Jinping collected speeches were distributed without his important remarks on the Constitution, this omission turned heads. On September 5, six weeks before the 4th Plenum was held, Xi Jinping finally mentioned his pair of constitution-related terms in a public speech. And yet, inexplicably, up to the opening of the Plenum, these terms had yet to make it back into the final draft of the “Decision.”
In his interview with the Guangzhou Daily, Hu Yunteng gives us a crucial detail: “In the discussion at the 4th Plenum, some leaders felt these two phrases should be included in the ‘Decision.’ And so, at mid-day on October 23, we members of the drafting team met to discuss whether or not to accept these opinions, and the final decision was to adopt them.”
We have no way of knowing for certain who those “some leaders” were. But October 23 was the very last day of the Plenum — so we can say that the terms “ruling the nation in accord with the constitution” (依宪治国) and “governing in accord with the constitution” (依宪执政) were pulled off the bench in the final seconds of the game.
The topsy turvy journey of these two terms — the “constitutional roller-coaster,” as I called it last week — shows us again what a confusing and non-transparent process Chinese politics is.
Hu Yunteng’s interview now makes two things clear. First of all, it explains why the two constitution-related terms were given short shrift in the “Decision.” They were, after all, last-minute add-ons. Second, it now makes sense that just as the “Decision” was released, Party media scrambled to explain in no uncertain terms that the CCP’s rule according to the Constitution is something quite different from Western constitutionalism.
What a truly fascinating business this struggle over language is. Even more unusual, in the context of China’s secretive attitude toward internal decision-making, was the headline for Hu Yunteng’s Guangzhou interview as it was picked up by the likes of People’s Daily Online and Xinhua Online:
“Drafter of Full Text of the ‘Decision’: ‘Rule in Accord With the Constitution’ initially Taken Out.”
A single APEC meeting, and not just Beijing but now six other cities and provinces must stop work and suspend classes, all the ensure a spurious air quality for a few days. This is the sky-high cost. It really puzzles me. If getting this kind of air quality means the ordinary people pay the price, then I don’t want it!
The recent 4th Plenum of the 18th Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party introduced a policy document with the long-winded title, Decision on Major Issues Concerning the Comprehensive Promotion of Rule of the Nation in Accord with the Law (关於全面推进依法治国若干问题的决定). One key takeaway of the “Decision” is the return of a pair of phrases that for some period of time had disappeared from official media coverage in China — “ruling the nation in accord with the constitution” (依宪治国) and “governing in accord with the constitution” (依宪执政).
For some background on these terms, readers can turn to two pieces I posted back in September, “The Missing Speech” and “Xi’s Missing Terms Emerge Again.”
Introduced boldly early in Xi Jinping’s term in office, the idea of “ruling the nation in accord with the constitution” has peaked, fallen and reemerged over the past two years. “Red Alert,” photo by Michel Filion available at Flickr.com under Creative Commons license.
On December 4, 2012, Xi Jinping made a speech in Beijing to commemorate the 30th anniversary of the promulgation and implementation of China’s constitution. This speech attracted a great deal of attention both inside and outside China. In the speech, Xi Jinping said: “Rule of the nation by law means, first and foremost, ruling the nation in accord with the constitution; the crux in governing by laws is to govern in accord with the constitution” (依法治国首先是依宪治国，依法执政关键是依宪执政).
For Xi Jinping to use the words “first and foremost” and “crux” in these remarks represented a marked departure from the language of his predecessors, Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao.
But in 2013, in the midst of the “Seven Don’t Speaks” (七不讲) policy and a wave of anti-constitutionalism rhetoric, this pair of Xi Jinping terms disappeared from official discourse altogether. They even became, we could say, sensitive terms.
As I wrote in “The Missing Speech,” when the Central Propaganda Department published a book last summer called A Primer of Important Speeches by General Secretary Xi Jinping, Xi Jinping’s December 2012 speech on constitutionalism was unaccountably left out of the collection.
Finally, on September 5, 2013, in a speech to commemorate the 60th anniversary of the establishment of the National People’s Congress, President Xi again used his two-part phrase: “Rule of the nation by law means, first and foremost, ruling the nation in accord with the constitution,” he said. “The crux in governing by laws is to govern in accord with the constitution.”
As Xi’s speech was reported in the official People’s Daily, the six-month disappearance of this political phrase was finally ended. However, the phrase went silent again immediately after the People’s Daily report, resurfacing only after the “communique” (公报) for the 4th Plenum was released in late October.
Searching for the pair of terms between December 2012 and October 2014 in three separate databases — the People’s Daily (PD coverage alone, full text); WiseNews (100+ mainland papers, full text and headline search); Baidu.com (covering all mainland news sites) — I arrived at the following results, which show a clear pattern across all three databases. The bottom two graphs are both for WiseNews, the headline search on the left and the full text search on the right.
In December 2012, soon after Xi Jinping came to power, the terms “ruling the nation in accord with the constitution” and “governing in accord with the constitution” appeared in six separate articles in the People’s Daily. In October 2014, the terms appeared in 16 articles in the People’s Daily, all but one of these after October 20, telling us they were closely related to the 4th Plenum.
The WiseNews database tells us that in December 2012 there were a total of 126 articles in mainland Chinese newspapers mentioning the two terms somewhere in the full text. After a period of 21 months with no use of the terms whatsoever, they appear in 514 articles in October this year.
This roller coaster ride of official discourse is not without its reasons. Some friends of mine who observe political events in China will say that the Chinese Communist Party doesn’t match its words with deeds and so there’s no sense in paying attention to the way it deploys language. But I believe we can, if we observe China’s political discourse carefully, glimpse the drift, collision and upheaval of the tectonic plates of Chinese politics.
The discourse of the Chinese Communist Party can be divided into five categories I label as follows: “cosmetic language” (脂粉语), “body hair language” (皮毛语), “banner language” (旗帜语), “gate of life language” (命门语) and “pointing language” (要穴语).
The first two types, including the “cosmetic language” the Party uses to sing its own praises (“representing the interests of the masses,” etcetera) and the “body hair language” of rigid but mostly meaningless formalism (like talk of “socialist core values”), can be disregarded in terms of their significance in reading political affairs in China.
By contrast, “banner language” — terms like the “Three Represents” (三个代表) of Jiang Zemin — do merit our attention as markers of the legacies and perhaps agendas of top leaders. (Note that Xi Jinping’s “banner term” is still not clear, and the “Chinese dream” doesn’t quite fit the bill.)
Examples of “gate of life language” would include fundamental principles that the Party cannot and will not dispense with. Take, for example, the “Four Basic Principles” (四项基本原则), of which the core principle is the leadership of the CCP.
Finally, there are terms like “political system reforms” (政治体制改革) or “ruling the nation in accord with the constitution” (依宪治国) which can be exceptionally sensitive directional pointers about where the Party intends to go, or how it intends to change. Behind the ebb and flow of this “pointing language” we can see the fierce tug-of-war of Chinese politics.
High and mighty advocacy of “constitutional rule” (依宪) certainly does not equal true love or acceptance of the Constitution or constitutionalism, but the erasure and denial of “constitutional rule” as reflected in the official discourse does offer conclusive proof that forces within the Chinese Communist Party are acting out their hatred of, and opposition to, this idea.
At the same time, both inside and outside the Chinese Communist Party, there are still forces in pursuit of constitutionalism and democracy. Of late, these forces are exceptionally weak — but they hang on still, holding still and making no sound.
When Xi Jinping first spoke of “ruling the nation in accord with the constitution”, the well-regarded journal Yanhuang Chunqiu (炎黄春秋), Southern Weekly and others grew somewhat bolder in their support. This was followed by a vicious wave of anti-constitutionalism that accounted for the dramatic disappearance of both of Xi Jinping’s terms, “ruling the nation in accord with the constitution” (依宪治国) and “governing in accord with the constitution” (依宪执政).
The anti-constitutionalism wave did not by any means root out support for the idea of constitutionalism, and as soon as the curtain closed on the 4th Plenum a number of media rushed to do special reports on “ruling the nation in accord with the constitution.” The following are several examples.
The Beijing Times runs a bold headline on its front page (upper left) reading “Ruling the nation in accord with the constitution; Governing in accord with the constitution.” A large headline at City Commercial News (upper right) reads: “Ruling the nation in accord with the constitution; Governing in accord with the constitution: Officials that Interfere with the Law Will Be Held Responsible.”
I observed recently that a number of websites, particularly official websites, also did obvious coverage of Xi Jinping’s pair of constitution-related terms. People’s Daily Online and Xinhua Online both did summaries of “important sentences” summing up the 4th Plenum “Decision,” and in both cases the term “ruling the nation in accord with the constitution” topped the list.
We must note, however, that the above newspapers and websites represent just one corner of China’s media. And these treatments we see fall somewhere on a spectrum between “directed action” (规定动作) – meaning they were demanded by certain Party interests – and “self action” (自选动作), meaning they were a matter of conscientious choice.
For the time being, we can say that “ruling the nation in accord with the constitution” and “governing in accord with the constitution” have crawled out from the valley of the past almost two years. However, they have yet to become widely accepted “hot words” (热词) within the broader discourse sphere. Their longer-term survival and development is far from certain.
Looking at coverage in the official People’s Daily last month, we can see that neither constitution-related term appeared in a headline in the newspaper. At the same time, 122 articles in the People’s Daily last month used the term “ruling the nation in accord with the law” (依法治国), and in 36 of these instances this term appeared in the headline.
Looking at the broader universe of print media coverage in the WiseNews database, we find that the constitution-related terms appeared in just 26 articles, while the latter term, “ruling the nation in accord with the law,” appeared 591 times. And Baidu shows a similar gap, with 694 online articles using the constitution-related terms and 110,000 using “ruling the nation in accord with the law.” It seems, therefore, that the real “hot term” during the 4th Plenum was “ruling the nation in accord with the law” – leaving the constitution out in the cold.
“Ruling the nation in accord with the law” was the main topic of the recent 4th Plenum. As the text of the “Decision” said:
Rule of the nation by law means, first and foremost, steadfastly ruling the nation in accord with the constitution; the crux in governing by laws is to steadfastly govern in accord with the constitution” (坚持依法治国首先要坚持依宪治国，坚持依法执政首先要坚持依宪执政) – the idea being that abiding by the constitution is the crux of “ruling the nation in accord with the law.
But the very idea of the centrality of the constitution makes many within the Party nervous. And just as the communique from the 4th Plenum was released, an article appeared online with the headline, “‘Governing in Accord with the Law’ Cannot be Confused with Western Constitutionalism” (依宪执政与西方「宪政」不容混淆). The article set the rather subdued tone for understanding the notion of “governing in accord with the law.” A search on Baidu shows that 106 websites ran this particular article, which was clearly propagated under direct instruction from propaganda authorities.
The byline of the article, Guo Ping (国平), is not in fact a person, but the official nom de plume of the Information Office of the State Council.
Your websites are in your home. How can I shut down shut down sites in your home? . . . China has always been warm and hospitable, but I have a choice about who comes to be a guest at my home. I can say that, I have no way of changing you, but I have a right to choose my friends. I hope all those who come to China are friends, true friends.
Lu Wei’s bluntness and “new swagger,” a personal style he has evinced ever since he became chief of the State Internet Information Office (SIIO) in April 2013, seem to reflect a new confidence in China’s attitude not just toward domestic internet controls, but toward global internet development and governance. Lu may in fact be the bold new face of an information control regime centered in the CCP’s Internet Security and Informatization Leading Group (中共中央网络安全和信息化领导小组), created in February this year by President Xi Jinping.
Lu Wei, China’s new top internet official, favors the more direct assertion of the CCP’s approach to information control over the dry Marxist discourse traditionally deployed by propaganda officials.
Perhaps more significant than his position as head of SIIO is his position as director of the General Office of the Internet Security and Informatization Leading Group, which according to Xinhua News Agency is “designed to lead and coordinate Internet security work” as well as “draft national strategies, development plans and major policies.”
As the overarching information objectives of the CCP leadership (control/development/security) center not on the traditional media system — which in recent years has been quite effectively muzzled in China — but rather on vast, dispersed and global internet-based new media, it is time to ask: is the Central Propaganda Department being marginalized in favor of a new, rebalanced system of information controls under Xi Jinping?
If this is the case, then Lu Wei is the chief disciple of this important shift.
Lu Wei (鲁炜) was born in January 1960 in Chaohu (巢湖), a prefectural-level city in Anhui province. After receiving his master’s degree in journalism from Guangxi University, Lu served for a time as a teacher, and later as the secretary in charge with propaganda work at a factory. He was later editor-in-chief of Guangxi Legal Daily (广西法制报), chief of the Guilin bureau of Xinhua News Agency (1993-1994), and chief of the Guangxi bureau of Xinhua (1997-2001). In May 2004, he was promoted deputy director of Xinhua News Agency, a position he held (with many concurrent roles) until March 2011.
Overseas Chinese-language media have reported widely that Lu Wei was the man largely responsible for the press image and relations of former Premier Wen Jiabao, and that Lu’s appointment as propaganda minister of the Beijing municipality in March 2011 was the outcome of negotiations between Wen Jiabao and then propaganda chief Li Changchun (李长春).
As Beijing’s municipal propaganda minister in January 2013, shortly before he became head of SIIO, Lu Wei openly revealed — in a report by The Beijing News that was echoed across Hong Kong media — that employees within the city’s propaganda system (体制内) numbered more than 60,000, and employees doing the same work outside the official hire system (体制外) totaled more than 2 million. All of these workers, said Lu, were responsible for “strengthening positive channeling (正面引导) of hot-button issues,” and they should actively make use of new media. They must, he said, “watch Weibo, open up their own Weibo accounts, make Weibo posts and research Weibo.” The ultimate goal of this work, said Lu Wei, was to spread “positive energy,” or zheng nengliang (正能量) on the internet.
In consonance with President Xi Jinping’s appeal for a more down-to-earth style, Lu Wei hammers his points home with aphoristic aplomb. Unpack Lu’s recent press conference remarks, spoken with no-nonsense logic, and you’re left with several core assertions, a bag of tricks:
* The “home,” or homeland, of China belongs to the Chinese Communist Party, which as the Confucian “father” is duty bound to protect his children (who of course have a vested interest in obeying the father). * The Chinese “home” observes core values that are different from those of other nation-homes. China respects these differences and demands respect in return. * China’s “true friends,” those who respect and abide by China’s domestic political values, are welcome as “guests” in the Chinese home. And that means they are free to conduct business.
There are a number of points to note here, not least the seeming abandonment of Communist Party ideology. The argument for information control is not — overtly, at least — about “guidance of public opinion,” “a civilized web” or “socialist core values.” Control is fundamentally about protecting the nation-home and its continued prosperity.
In Lu Wei’s aphoristic crushing machine, control is also freedom. In September 2013, shortly after the chilling arrest of Charles Xue, a Chinese-American investor and “Big V” on Weibo, Lu Wei said that “freedom means order” and that “freedom without order does not exist.”
Here again we have an elementary assertion of fact that subsumes other core assertions.
* “Order” is the foundation of “freedom” * By ensuring “order” on China’s internet, the CCP (via the SIIO and the Internet Security and Informatization Leading Group) is safeguarding the “freedom” of China’s connected masses. * Any online acts that threaten the “order” of the internet are an assault on the security and freedom of all Chinese
Last week’s your-home-my-home metaphor notwithstanding, Lu Wei understands that it is not enough to assert control over information and establish “order” at home. This is why China wants to exert greater influence over global internet developments.
Last week’s press conference was about China’s hosting of the World Internet Conference from November 19-21. The event, we are told, will be the “largest and most high-level internet conference China has ever hosted.”
Listing out what he said were the “four firsts“ of the World Internet Conference, Lu Wei said this was, first and foremost, the first time China had hosted an internet-related event on this scale. “As the largest developing nation, with the world’s largest online population, China has one-fifth of the world’s internet users,” said Lu. “It stands to reason that an open platform should be created for the world that is broadly representative.”
China, in other words, wants the influence over global internet-related decision making that its sheer size warrants — and it hopes the World Internet Conference can become the platform through which it wields that influence.
More than 1,000 politicians and business leaders would attend the conference, said Lu — a second “first” — and they would rub shoulders with representatives from Chinese internet giants like Alibaba, Tencent and Baidu. Like an Olympic-style coming-out party for China’s internet industry, the conference would mark the first time — a third “first” — China could offer a “panoramic view of its internet development concepts and achievements.”
Here too, Lu Wei emphasized China’s sheer size. After twenty years of development China now had 630 million internet users, 1.2 billion mobile phone users, and 500 million users of Weibo and WeChat. And China had four of the world’s top-ten internet companies. “China has already become a veritable internet great nation,” Lu said.
Lu Wei’s fourth “first” may seem less consequential: This is the first time a world internet conference will be held in a 1,000 year-old town. In honor of the host town, Wuzhen, Lu Wei has suggested the conference be nicknamed the “Wuzhen Summit.” But hosting a global internet conference in an ancient canal town suits rather well Xi Jinping’s “sage king” aura, combining present-day Party authoritarianism with an exceptionalist notion of Chinese cultural continuity.
In Wuzhen, said Lu, “the most state-of-the-art fruits of world civilisation and the oldest Chinese culture can merge and interact, and modern information culture and historical cultures and traditions can shine together.”
At the conference, said People’s Daily Online, China would be able to “fully explain the development concepts of the Chinese internet.” As control of the internet has been one of China’s most core development concepts since the beginning, Lu Wei will no doubt be eager to “fully explain” China’s approach to internet governance.
In a speech at the World Economic Forum’s 2014 Summer Davos in Tianjin back in September, Lu Wei explained China’s view on global internet governance with characteristic bluntness: “Freedom and order are twin sisters, and they must live together,” he said. “The same principle applies to security. So we must have a public order [internationally]. And this public order cannot impact any particular local order.”
Contradicting last week’s remarks to the foreign reporter about “your home,” Lu Wei’s language suggested the ruling Chinese Communist Party wants a global internet governance system that respects “local” internet controls.
To make his point about the super-design of the global internet clear, Lu Wei employed another down-to-earth analogy, this time a technological one. The internet is like a car, he said.
If it has no brakes, it doesn’t matter how fast the car is capable of traveling, once it gets on the highway you can imagine what the end result will be. And so, no matter how advanced, all cars must have brakes.
What does it mean to design a global internet “with brakes”? For Lu Wei it means prosperity for all — a “brighter future,” as he said last week.
To simplify the choice ostensibly facing the entire world as it discusses the future of the internet (at the “Wuzhen Summit”), Lu Wei marshaled another of his favorite analogies. Global internet chiefs and politicians must come together to ensure that “the internet becomes Ali Baba’s treasure cave for humankind, and not Pandora’s box.”
A controlled internet — with a built-in “brake system” — offers the promise of riches to all. The alternative is not freedom but pandemonium. That, anyhow, is the stark information worldview presented by China’s internet czar, a man whose Midas touch turns propaganda into proverb.
There is no doubt that the promise of China’s internet market looms large. And for those who wish to enter, the magic word is “control.”
But how can we be sure that Ali Baba’s cave of treasure isn’t in fact Pandora’s box?
