Now Executive Director of the China Media Project, leading the project’s research and partnerships, David originally joined the project in Hong Kong in 2004. He is the author of Dragons in Diamond Village (Penguin), a book of reportage about urbanization and social activism in China, and co-editor of Investigative Journalism in China (HKU Press).
I haven’t used these websites [like Facebook] before, and I don’t know whether or not they’ve been shut down. But as to there being some websites that cannot be visited, I think this is situation probably exists. However, I want to say that our management [of the web] is all done according to the law, and all of the measures we take are to protect China’s national security and the rights Chinese consumers in accord with the law.
As everyone struggles to unpack the significance of the “Decision” on “governing in accord with the law” (依法治国) emerging from the recent 4th Plenum, the clues continue to confuse.
Take, for example, this commentary appearing in the “People’s Forum” section on page four of today’s People’s Daily.
A cursory reading would suggest the piece is what it seems to be — an anthem to “rule of law” (法治) that categorically rejects its evil twin, the autocratic “rule by man” (人治). In the People’s Daily Online version, a single sentence is bolded: “Nevertheless, some leading cadres are still obsessed with rule by man. In their eyes, legal process has too many limitations, and they think it’s better and more effective to deal with certain ‘defects’ by applying the flexible methods of rule by man.”
But if you think this is a simple struggle between the forces of light and dark, read more carefully.
The second paragraph of the piece praises the “Fengqiao experience” (枫桥经验), which as CMP director Qian Gang explained a year ago — when Xi Jinping surprised many by raising the specter — is a relic from one of the darkest chapters of contemporary Chinese “rule by man” under the Communist Party.
The fanning to life of this Mao-era term is a lamentable surprise, the latest reminder of those chilly winds that have lately been blowing so strongly from the left, particularly as we near the 120th anniversary on December 26 of Mao Zedong’s birth.
The “Fengqiao experience” derives from the socialist education movement of the early 1960s — ahead of the Cultural Revolution — known as the “Four Cleanups” because they targeted the four so-called “reactionary elements,” or silei fenzi (四类分子), referred to landlords, wealthy peasants, counterrevolutionaries and evildoers (坏分子).
According to official coverage in 2013 to mark the 50th anniversary of the “Fengqiao experience,” Mao Zedong approved the nationalization of this governance experiment in 1963.
While the socialist education movement meant violent purging of “reactionary elements” in many areas of China at the time, the approach in Fengqiao was different, as described in several articles in the official People’s Daily at the end of the 1970s.
A commentary published in the People’s Daily on September 5, 1978, talked about how “Fengqiao District in Zhejiang’s Zhuji County relied on the masses to carry out on-site rectification of reactionary elements, reforming the vast majority of them into self-supporting laborers for the law.” “Their successful experience,” the article said, “was praised by Mao Zedong, and was known as a red flag on the front lines of public security.”
The question, then, is how to reconcile this dusting off of the “Fengqiao experience” — this model, the People’s Daily tells us today, “full of vitality” — with the overtures we are now seeing about the need for leaders and citizens alike to abide by rule of law?
We’ll leave it there. Happy reading.
“‘Modernizing Governance’ With the Aid of Rule of Law” (以法治助力“治理现代化”)
Li Zheng (李拯) People’s Daily, p. 4
October 30, 2014
I often hear grassroots-level cadres talk about the “two dilemmas” of petitioning work. Faced with the extreme behavior of some groups of petitioners [seeking redress for various issues], if they satisfy their demands this might invite even more extreme behavior; and if they simply ignore them this will just gather up tensions and affect long-term stability. It’s not right if you handle the case, and its not right if you don’t handle it. This state of hesitation shows us one aspect of grassroots governance.
In fact, despite the difficulty of these “two dilemmas,” there is a way out. The “Fengqiao experience” (枫桥经验) remains a fresh approach today, full of possibility precisely because it pays attention to the use of rule of law methods to dissolve tensions, so that “the demands of the masses are resolved reasonably, unreasonable demands dealt with through targeted education, and illegal conduct handled properly in accord with the law” — and the two dilemmas are resolved within the framework of rule of law.
We can see that in resolving difficult grassroots tensions, “rule of law” provides us with a key. In this regards, the 4th Plenum clearly talks about “the promotion of rule of law in grassroots governance” (推进基层治理法治化), and it emphasizes that “leading cadres at various levels must take the lead in respecting the law and take the lead in handling matters in accord with the law.”
In fact, in actual practice, a number of leading cadres to not favor rule of law methods. Some local areas, as soon as they encounter negative news will change out a local leader to calm the situation down, without asking any questions about the merits and demerits of the case. But before long the official who was removed will be returned to a position at the same level — and how can such [a system of] accountability win the support of the people?
If the only hope is to calm a situation down, if there are no questions of legal accountability and one side is favored in a simplistic balance between the “strong” and the “weak,” this might bring short-term relief of public anger. But how can the authority of rule of law be established for the longer term?
It seems on the surface that expedient means that flout the law are effective, but they bring a disastrous erosion of the foundation of trust between the government and the people . . .
Faced with discord between human feeling and legal principles in the process of governance, with the competing of interests and concepts, and the testing of strength between doubt and trust, if rule of law becomes the measuring stick for the conduct of citizens as well as the administrative method applied by the government, then government credibility can grow in the fertile soil of rule of law and dramatically lower the cost of governance.
When the “Wenling nail house” (温岭最牛钉子户) incident caused such an uproar, the local government did not resort to violence or forced demolition, nor did they agree to demolition compensation surpassing [that stipulated by] the law. In the end, the “nail houser” and the government reached a compromise within the framework of rule of law. This “gentle handling of a demolition case” left in its wake a clear rule of law precedent: citizens defending their rights in accord with the law, the government applying policy in accord with the law, and opposition could be transformed into cooperation, good governance found amid tension. Nevertheless, some leading cadres are still obsessed with rule by man (人治). In their eyes, legal process has too many limitations, and they think it’s better and more effective to deal with certain “defects” by applying the flexible methods of rule by man. . . [NOTE: bolded as at People’s Daily Online]
“China’s history has developed to this point, and I’m afraid the methods of rule by man has already run its course,” one member of the Standing Committee of the CPPCC wisely said in 1978. . . Making this happen relies not just on declaration from the national level, but also requires the common efforts of each and every leading cadre in practicing rule of law.
President Xi Jinping has outlined his plans for “governing the nation in accord with the law.” What does he really mean?
Just to name a few options out there, Xinhua quickly released President Xi Jinping’s own “explanation” of the document yesterday — an explanation that itself will require more explication.
Xinhua has spoken to five “experts” about the significance of the “Decision.”
And finally, Xinhua has also posted a “25-sentence summary” of the “Decision” today that might help simplify matters.
Obviously, all of these official explainers should come with a huge caveat: They are designed to promote the Party’s agenda, not just transparently explain it.
Let us turn for the moment, however, to another interesting piece, this time by People’s Daily Online, addressing one of the most important questions lingering behind this ostensible move toward “rule of law”: the role of the Chinese Communist Party.
That’s right, the red elephant in the room.
In the piece, posted late yesterday to its current affairs channel, People’s Daily Online reviewed Xi Jinping’s remarks on one central and unmovable aspect of rule of the nation according to law, or yifa zhiguo (依法治国) — the “leadership position of the Chinese Communist Party.”
Notice the language from Xi Jinping about the need to assert CCP rule “with self-confidence and with great fanfare.” And note the explicit reference to attempts “by a few” to conflate “socialist rule of law” with “Western political and legal systems,” a trend that must, according to Yang Xiaojun (杨小军), a professor at the Chinese Academy of Governance, be “nipped in the bud.”
Enjoy.
“Interpretation: Why Does Xi Jinping Say We Must Self-Confidently Assert the Party’s Leadership Status?“ (解读：习近平为啥说要理直气壮地讲党的领导地位?)
People’s Daily Online, Current Affairs Channel
October 28, 2014, 8:59PM
Tonight, the CCP Central Committee Decision Concerning the Comprehensive Advancement of Major Questions on Governing the Nation According to the Law was formally released. Entrusted by the Politburo, Xi Jinping has provided some explanations about the drafting process of this decision.
Among these [explanations] is the question of the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party and its relationship to rule of the nation according to law (依法治国). He emphasizes that our country’s Constitution, as the basic law, expresses the Party’s successes in leading the people in carrying out revolution, [national] construction and reform, and it establishes the leadership role of the Chinese Communist Party as a product of history and the people’s choice. As to this point, [he says], [we] must assert it with self-confidence and with great fanfare.
“We say ‘with self-confidence’ because to say so is the truth,” said Central Party School professor Xin Ming (辛鸣) in an interview with People’s Daily Online. We must, [he said], have the fullest confidence in the leadership of the Party. History and experience have shown that the leadership status of the Party is correct, and it is endorsed by the people. The “Decision” raises five [issues that] must be “firmly supported” (坚持), and of these it places firm support for the leadership status of the Chinese Communist Party before all others, in order to give no quarter to those who seek to obscure or deny the truth.
Xi Jinping points out in his explanation of the “Decision”: “The crux of whether or not the major task of thoroughly promoting rule of the nation according to law can be handled adequately is a matter of the correctness of our political direction (方向), whether the political guarantee is strong.”
Professor Xin Ming points out that regardless of whether viewed from the standpoint of rule of law theory or our experience of rule of the nation according to law over the past 17 years, without the leadership of the Party there would be no way of achieving the objective of rule of the nation according to law, and therefore no way of achieving national strength and prosperity, the rejuvenation of the [Chinese] people, or the happiness of the people. In terms of the building of rule of law, we have referenced all the fruits of human civilization in order to ensure the rule of law path under socialism with Chinese characteristics is traveled more surely and healthily.
We say “great fanfare” because the Chinese Communist Party must make its attitude and position clear both domestically and internationally. Xi Jinping emphasized that we must speak clearly to the masses of cadres the basic nature of our country’s socialist rule of law, being clear about its roots and setting the record straight.
Chinese Academy of Governance professor Yang Xiaojun (杨小军) points out that because many legal concepts lately are “exotic” (舶来品), some people have equated “ruling the nation in accord with the law” (依法治国) with Western political and legal systems. This difference in understandings has created diverging paths. And so there is a need to strengthen internal propaganda and education, nipping this trend in the bud and ensuring that rule of the nation according to law can proceed smoothly.
The China Media Project is pleased that it made the list of “must read” China websites in this year’s Danwei Model Worker Awards.
The annual list has been published by Danwei.com, itself a well-regarded China site, since 2005.
None of those words would probably get caught up in China’s automated filters. But the Weibo post includes an image of a yellow umbrella, now a popular symbol of the movement in Hong Kong for universal suffrage.
China’s official Xinhua News Agency announced the recipients yesterday of the first WMS Global Awards for Excellence. Drawing a blank are you?
“WMS” stands for World Media Summit, an ostensible non-governmental association China started ahead of the Beijing Olympics in 2008 as an initiative to enhance its “soft power,” which then-President Hu Jintao had prioritized in his 2007 political report to the National Party Congress.
Although the WMS was, according to Chinese state media, “co-launched by Xinhua News Agency and other major media organizations around the world,” the event has always been solidly China’s prerogative, and these “major media organizations” have A) refused to acknowledge any clear institutionalized involvement in the WMS, and B) done no reporting at all about the summit itself, which only China has loudly touted.
The World Media Summit is hosted in Moscow in July 2012. Photo: Xinhua
After Xinhua reported in October last year that the host of the 2014 WMS would be the New York Times — whose chairman, Arthur Sulzberger, Jr., was in China that month as a member of the summit’s supposed governing body, the “presidium” — the Atlantic approached the Times to ask about the nature of its participation in the WMS.
The response from Eileen M. Murphy, the Times‘ vice president of corporate communications, revealed both how nebulous the WMS was organizationally, and the primary motivation of participating media organizations — namely, access to the China market.
In an email interview, New York Times Vice President of Corporate Communications Eileen M. Murphy said governance procedures for the WMS are “just beginning to be developed, but we think it’s in the interest of free press issues for us to be part of the process.
“We have no illusions about China’s motivations in creating the World Media Summit,” she said, “but we believe that it is important to engage with China on many levels and the WMS is one opportunity to do so.”
Murphy added that the Times was hosting the 2014 WMS “precisely because we believe strongly in promoting press freedom around the world and we feel there is no better way to do so than to invite members of the world’s media, including China’s media, to engage in a dialogue on our home turf.
The plans for the New York Times to host the WMS in the United States seem to have flopped. There has been no news whatsoever about the “third World Media Summit” or the WMS presidium since Xinhua first reported news of the plans agreed by the presidium in Hangzhou on October 10, 2013.
The global news awards that were decided — again, according to Xinhua — at the Hangzhou meeting of the presidium apparently have gone forward, however. (For a list of all recipients of the WMS awards, see this Xinhua report.)
But the dribble of global coverage the awards have received suggests the WMS is not gaining traction, nor is it getting any real public support of any kind from global media organizations. According to Xinhua, the recipients of this year’s inaugural awards were decided by a “panel of judges in China,” many sent by global media organizations.
Who exactly were they? According to Xinhua, because of course we have no other source, the judges included: Ted Anthony, director of Asia-Pacific News for AP; David Schlesinger, former editor-in-chief of Reuters News; and Jack Gao, former senior vice president of News Corporation.
The WMS Global Awards for Excellence seem to be plagued by the same problem that has harried the WMS all along — nobody cares. That is, nobody cares except to the extent that the process puts them in close proximity to powerful Chinese who can assist their business ambitions in China.
The following list is the sum total of all news reports so far about the WMS Global Awards for Excellence, followed by the source of the news content:
The bottom line: Only 10 articles in the entire world mention this year’s inaugural WMS Global Awards for Excellence, and according to our estimate 87% of the content in these 10 articles is from the official Xinhua News Agency, sponsor and creator of the WMS.
Only one report, from The Hindu, is original writing copy (not pulled directly from Xinhua), and that report attributes the news to “the release” from Xinhua.
I don’t at all doubt the merit of the recipients of this year’s prizes, or the rest of the 400-odd submissions from media around the world. And it doesn’t at all surprise me that, as Xinhua reports, Ted Anthony was “struck by the quality of the work submitted.”
There is also some merit to the rest of what Anthony says:
I do believe that journalism has the potential to make the world better and help us to look toward a better world.
The notion of an award like this helps bringing people of the world together to understand each others’ stories, and that is an opportunity for better relations and better communication among different cultures.
That, I suppose, is the right attitude, the principled one, to have when your media boss packs you off to Beijing to take part in the selection process and butter up your Chinese counterparts.
The problem comes when you step back and look at the larger backdrop of the World Media Summit. It is not, by any stretch of the imagination, a professional organization — or even primarily a professional gathering. It was created by the Chinese state, through its official news agency, with the express purpose of expanding China’s influence over global media.
Li Congjun, the president of Xinhua News Agency and “WMS executive chairman,” told his own news agency that “the creation of the awards has epoch-making significance.”
It encourages all people working in the media sector to keep developing their professional skills and pursue excellence, while inspiring media setups to work with the times in the spirit of innovation, and to actively carry out social responsibilities and the mission of public welfare.
We can’t forget — we shouldn’t forget, anyhow — that China’s leaders don’t at all view the role of media as being in the “public welfare.” Media serve the Party. And when President Xi Jinping drove the point home to propaganda leaders last year that they must “show their swords” and be bolder in controlling the press, it was WMS founder Li Congjun who wrote in the Party’s official People’s Daily that Xi was right, and that the Party needed to “firmly grab the initiative in public opinion.”
Li meant, of course, that the Party needed to actively defend its agenda through media controls at home, and to take the fight over global public opinion to foreign media. Consider that and it puts Li’s talk of the “spirit of innovation” in quite a different light — for it was precisely in the Party’s own spirit of innovation (of its agenda-setting machine) that the WMS was created in 2008.
Since rising to the post of General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party in November 2012, Xi Jinping has worked hard to set himself apart from his predecessors, defining his personal style as down-to-earth and no-nonsense.
The goal of this public relations makeover has been to convince the Chinese public that the fifth generation of China’s leaders is in touch with the issues facing common folk, that it is open and subject to scrutiny — rather than aloof, privileged and corrupt.
The sense of Xi Jinping as an attentive man of action was captured early on in a propaganda piece on December 31, 2012: “Xi Jinping Visits Poor Families in Hebei: Dinner Is Just 4 Dishes and One Soup, No Alcohol.”
Xi Jinping visits families in Hebei on December 29, 2012.
The Xi Jinping love fest continues today with a piece from the Shanghai Observer (上海观察), prominently placed on many websites — including the official site of the state news agency, Xinhua — that purports to offer inside access to the president’s busy workday. He is a man, the writer tells us, who never stops.
The Shanghai Observer is a new media platform launched on January 1, 2014, by the Shanghai United Media Group (上海报业集团), which was founded in October 2013 by the merger of the Liberation Daily Press Group (解放日报报业集团) and the Wenhui Xinmin United Press Group (文汇新民联合报业集团) — the former being the publisher of Shanghai’s official Party paper, the latter being a press group founded in 1998 as China’s commercial media revolution was gaining steam. The Shanghai United Media Group is run by Qiu Xin (裘新), a former senior editor with Shanghai’s official Liberation Daily (解放日报) who served as the city’s deputy chief of propaganda in 2011.
(If I may be permitted a moment of schadenfreude . . . The official Weibo account of this “new media” publication by a Shanghai media behemoth has fewer followers than the rather tepid Weibo account of this CMP editor.)
But the Shanghai Observer apparently has quite close access to China’s president.
Today’s article begins by referring to an article previously circulated by the “Study Group” (学习小组), a mysterious content source that became a hot topic this year after it circulated a number of portraits of Xi Jinping and his work-style that seemed far more personable that past profiles of national leaders — pieces like, “Xi Jinping Celebrates His Birthday During the Dragon Boat Festival” (習近平端午节过生日).
All of the material released by the “Study Group” dealt with Xi Jinping, and all of it generally kicked up a wave of excited attention on the internet. An article in the overseas edition of the People’s Daily in June this year revealed that the “Study Group” was in fact “a column” run by the People’s Daily overseas edition. The “column” seems to be primarily devoted to keeping up the polish on Xi Jinping’s shimmering public image.
Anyhow, the “Study Group” article talked about how Xi Jinping once added his comments by early morning to a policy document he did not receive until around midnight the night before. The point: Xi Jinping is a hard worker; he gets things done. Chinese President Xi Jinping delivers his New Year’s message to the nation on the eve of January 1, 2014, through China Central Television, China Radio International and China National Radio. Photo by Lan Hongguang (兰红光), Xinhua News Agency.
The following is our translation of the Xi Jinping profile from the Shanghai Observer:
The topic of Xi Jinping and time has come up often in [articles by] the Study Group (小组).
Early this year, Xi Jinping issued the classic sigh, “Where has the time gone?” The answer he gave to his own question was that it had all been spent on work. On an overseas trip, Xi Jinping once said he often felt conflicted about overseas travel, because there were so many things that needed doing back home. There was once a case, according to the Study Group, where [Xi Jinping] issued written comments first thing in the morning on a [policy] document received at midnight the night before.
The article we share today comes from the Shanghai Observer (上海观察), and it was written by Guan Jintai (官锦台). As a writer who has observed Xi Jinping at close quarters, Guan has discovered that Xi Jinping’s daily work “proceeds at high speed and with great energy” (高速运转且极费精力). The ordinary day in the life of Xi Jinping recorded by the writer certainly seems to be extremely busy.
I’m sure many people would like to know how work is arranged for Xi Jinping every day. On Friday, October 24, many Chinese people were savoring the communique emerging from the Fourth Plenum [of the 18th Central Committee of the CCP], Xi Jinping was already beginning a new busy day.
As someone who specializes in international news, I had the good fortune of observing Xi Jinping at close range as he handled the days foreign affairs. From this I gained an understanding of the daily work life of this, China’s most senior leader. I discovered that Xi Jinping that what Xi Jinping must accomplish each day is a series of tasks “proceeding at high speed and with great energy.” It’s not the least bit an exaggeration to say that he is “at work both day and night” (夙夜在公). Of course, like the average Chinese person, Xi Jinping’s busy day is not without humor and joy.
There was no way for me to know exactly what time Xi Jinping got up from bed that morning, but I could be sure that he, like all those working at the crack of dawn, he had eaten his breakfast before first light, and after he had read his “Daily Briefing” (每日简报) had proceeded to the Great Hall of the People. There he had to meet with international representatives present for the memorandum signing for the launch of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank.
According to my observations, regardless of the particular task at hand, Xi Jinping is always able to proceed according to the larger background of domestic and international affairs. He speaks in a bold and down-to-earth manner. For example, at this memorandum signing he said, “If you want to prosper, you must first build a road” (要想富，先修路). And he said, “Those who unite in purpose can move mountains” (人心齐，泰山移). Everyone present nodded in praise.
His domestic and international views were expressed in the following way:
“China is right now in the midst of a thorough deepening of reforms, and it is pushing ever closer to its goals of the ‘Two Centennials’ (两个一百年) [of the CCP in 2021, and of the “New China” in 2049]. China’s economy will continue to grow in a healthy manner, and China’s development cannot do without Asia or without the world. We will firmly and steadfastly pursue a win-win strategy of opening up. I have talked about building a Silk Road economic belt, a 21st-century Silk Road of the seas, and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank with the goal of deepening economic cooperation among the nations of Asia — in order to achieve common development. We will do our utmost to ensure that China’s own development benefits the nations of Asia and the world.”
That day, Xi Jinping also conducted “foreign affairs by telephone.” On the other end of the line was Indonesian President Joko Widodo. Xi Jinping congratulated Widodo on his becoming the new Indonesian president, and he invited him to attend the informal meeting of leaders at the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) in Beijing next month.
Xi Jinping’s work rhythm is “fast,” to use the words of CCP Central Committee Politburo member and General Office director Li Zhanshu (栗战书). Li Zhanshu recently wrote in an article in Secretary Work (秘书工作), [a magazine published by the Research Office of Secretariat of the CCP Central Committee], that “General Secretary Xi Jinping demands that we ‘work so there is no backlog, and nothing left overnight’ (案无积卷、事不过夜). The general secretary works like this himself. His work style is very rigorous, and his rhythm is very fast. [Policy] documents requiring instructions from the general secretary always come back with written instructions by morning the next day, regardless of how late they get to him, even if its at midnight.”
This sort of work attitude and style was expressed most incisively in the afternoon as Xi Jinping met with visiting Tanzanian President Jakaya Mrisho Kikwete. When the welcome ceremony outside the East Gate of the Great Hall of the People was concluded, Xi Jinping proceeded with rapid steps to the conference room, so that those of us behind had to jog along to keep up. As soon as the Tanzanian delegates were seated, Xi Jinping said there were many things they needed to talk about today, and to save time they should use simultaneous interpretation.
The facts show that simultaneous interpretation substantially increases the efficiency of meetings, and the meeting ended by 6:15 in the afternoon. Leaders from both countries then went straight to the signing ceremony for the cooperative agreement, held in the Hebei Hall (河北厅). Even though there was just a short walk between the two halls, I saw for myself how Xi Jinping and President Kikwete were engaged in intense conversation.
These two tense meetings in the morning and afternoon would be enough to exhaust anyone, so it was time for a much needed rebalancing. And this is how Xi Jinping accomplished it. When the heads of the two countries came to the table where they were to sign, Xi Jinping noticed that President Kikwete seemed to want to sit down, so he quipped cheerfully, we have to stand and serve as a backdrop for them. Hearing this, the translator instantly interpreted the remark as Kikwete listened attentively, and then the whole atmosphere of the scene relaxed a great deal.
I noted that during the signing ceremony one of Tanzania’s ministers forgot to shake hands with Xi Jinping after the copies were exchanged, and at the express urging of Kikwete, there was a quick “makeup shake” (“补握”). At that moment, Xi Jinping, perhaps thinking himself that this touch was rather interesting, started to laugh.
Whatever you do, don’t imagine that Xi Jinping’s day was then over. Because after that he still needed to host a banquet for President Kikwete. The lights were brilliant on the third floor of the Great Hall of the People, and at this time the lights went on over Chang’an Avenue as well, a parade of lights. As most people were having family dinners or watching television, he was still busying himself with affairs of state.
I thought of the time last year when Xi Jinping was visiting Russia. When he was meeting with Chinese Embassy staff in Moscow and representatives of Chinese-invested businesses there, he said: “They say misery can be accompanied by happiness; but for me, I find joy in exhaustion.”
And based on my observations over that one day, Xi Jinping not only “finds joy in exhaustion” when he is on foreign tours, but at home too he “finds joy in exhaustion.”
China released a communique late yesterday from the Fourth Plenum of the 18th Central Committee of the CCP. The document, which offers a preview of the full “Decision” to come in the next couple of days, deals with the “comprehensive advancement of rule of the nation by law (依法治国), with the overall goal of building a socialist system of rule by law with Chinese characteristics, and the building of a socialist country ruled by law.”
What does that mean? It’s difficult to say — and it’s certainly premature to speculate before the full decision is released.
However, it is worth noting that the communique does include a pair of political phrases CMP director Qian Gang (钱钢) analyzed at some length back in September: “ruling the nation in accord with the constitution” (依宪治国) and “governing in accord with the constitution” (依宪执政). For more, readers can see “The Missing Speech” and “Xi’s Missing Terms Emerge Again.”
Here is what Qian Gang wrote about the terms in the first of these pieces:
These were Xi Jinping’s most jarring slogans after taking the Party’s top post in 2012, and they were closely tied to the subsequent championing of “constitutionalism” that we saw among intellectuals in China. The rise and fall of these terms reflects internal political sensitivities. In January 2013 — the month that the Southern Weekly incident erupted in Guangzhou around the censoring of the New Year’s message on constitutionalism — the terms did not appear in the People’s Daily. Then, after appearing once each in February and March that year, the terms disappeared from the paper altogether from April to July. In August, there was one appearance of either term, just as the propaganda tide against constitutionalism reached its height. In October 2013, there was one appearance. In November, two appearances. In February, 2014, there was one final appearance — and since then we’ve not seen the terms at all.
These Xi Jinping phrases seem to be the subject of some degree of internal Party wrangling, and it remains unclear how central they were originally conceived as being to Xi Jinping’s own goals and legacy building. As Qian Gang wrote, the phrase uniting the two terms “was very possibly conceived originally as a Xi Jinping banner term, like Jiang Zemin’s “Three Represents” (三个代表) and Hu Jintao’s “Scientific View of Development” (科学发展观).”
One thing we can say about yesterday’s communique is that it seems to bring these terms back into prominence, and they’re virtually assured a visible position in the full “Decision.”
Still, optimists be cautioned. Despite all the talk of “rule by law” in the communique, the Party’s position of dominance remains absolutely clear in the language, and it remains to be seen how Xi Jinping and other Party elites view the notions of “ruling the nation in accord with the constitution” and “governing in accord with the constitution” over and against the supremacy of the Party’s position.
If the hot-and-cold history of the terms themselves is something to go by, that question is a point on which there is a lot of division.
But there is another term in the communique that deserves attention as well. And it is arguably a point in favor of those who lean toward a more pessimistic reading. In graph nine of the communique, the term “governing the nation with virtue” (以德治国) is added to the list of governance principles:
To realize these goals [of ruling in accord with the law], [we] must uphold the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party, uphold the principle position of the people, uphold equality of all people before the law, uphold the combination of ruling the nation in accord with the law and ruling the nation with virtue (以德治国), upholding the [principle of] proceeding on the basis of China’s realities.
What does it mean to “rule the nation with virtue”?
For a precedent for the use of this term we have to go all the way back to Jiang Zemin. Jiang used the term in an almost identical manner when articulating the Party’s governing principles in June 2000. “[We must] uphold the combination of governing the nation in accord with the law and governing the nation with virtue,” he said (坚持依法治国与以德治国相结合).
But after 2000, the term fell entirely out of favor. So we are witnessing the return of a ghost after a 14-year absence. And who can say what that means?
At a state-sponsored forum on arts and culture held earlier this month, President Xi Jinping said works of art and literature “should be like sunshine, blue sky and the spring breeze, inspiring minds, warming hearts and cultivating taste.”
What kind of taste exactly? Well, first of all, tastes and values should be uniquely Chinese. And they should also be full of “positive energy,” or zhengnengliang (正能量) — a term used widely in China’s state media since 2012 to refer to positive and uplifting content and attitudes (as opposed to critical and negative ones).
In the wave of Chinese media coverage attending the arts and culture forum, one representative in particular was singled out as the flag-bearer of “positive energy,” just the kind of voice that China needs to stake out its cultural place in the world. According to news reports, President Xi shook the hand of internet writer Zhou Xiaoping (周小平), a commentator known for his patriotic essays, and said: “Zhou Xiaoping, from here on out you must carry forward positive energy on the internet.”
One of Zhou Xiaoping’s best known writings is called A Sunshine Boy for the Mother Country (我待祖国如暖男), Zhou’s manifesto of sorts on how he sees his values and purpose. The term “sunshine boy,” or nuannan (暖男), is a new internet slang referring to a young man who, like the sunshine, instills people with feelings of warmth.
For cultural nationalists, Zhou Xiaoping certainly fits the bill.
An interview with internet writer Zhou Xiaoping appears on page 6 of today’s People’s Daily.
The following is our translation of an interview with Zhou Xiaoping published today on page 6 of the People’s Daily.
We leave it to readers to decide whether Zhou Xiaoping makes inspired points, or whether this familiar brand of cultural nationalism will, as the historian Yuan Weishi wrote a number of years back, “produce ideological trash.”
“Exclusive Interview With Post-80s Internet Writer Zhou Xiaoping: We Must Uphold Our Own Cultural Values” (专访80后网络作家周小平: 必须坚持我们自己的文化价值观)
October 24, 2014
Post-80s internet writer Zhou Xiaoping (周小平) has been a hot property lately. At the Work Forum on Arts and Culture held on October 15, he received the affirmation of General Secretary Xi Jinping as a representative at the meeting. The general secretary said he hoped [Zhou] would “create even more works with positive energy” (正能量). From Please Don’t Let Down This Age (请不要辜负这个时代) to A Sunshine Boy for the Mother Country (我待祖国如暖男), Zhou Xiaoping has voiced his own thoughts on himself, on this age and on China, and he has drawn widespread attention on the internet. Our reporter interviewed Zhou Xiaoping on related questions. “My sense of responsibility is pretty heavy, but I don’t feel pressure, because I’m confident I can do it well.” Reporter: Not long ago, you took part in the Work Forum on Arts and Culture led by General Secretary Xi Jinping. Seeing as it was your first time taking part in such a meeting, how did you feel? Zhou Xiaoping: The deepest personal feeling I had was first of all that General Secretary Xi Jinping had read a great many cultural works. Not only had he read these book, but he could talk about the content in detail — and he had even been to many of the places in these works.
His understanding about arts and culture is very profound, and that really surprised me. Because to my mind, leaders are too busy and they shouldn’t have the time to pay attention to these things. But General Secretary Xi is different. He in fact pays a great deal of attention, and he had a lot of stories to tell.
What General Xi Jinping really thirsts for is to express his innermost thoughts about the the revival of Chinese culture. This really shows between the lines — how he wants China’s cultural market to prosper, and it also shows how he wants to see Chinese culture have more confidence. Reporter: When General Secretary Xi urged you to creative even more works with positive energy, what were your feelings right then? Zhou Xiaoping: Actually, I had a lot of feelings going on. I’m a pretty ordinary guy, born in a far-flung place in Sichuan. That day I checked on a map and realized that there’s 1,800 kilometers between my hometown and the Great Hall of the People. So a huge distance, and such disparity of status, and it gave me this hopeful feeling. I never for the life of me believed that something like this would happen to me. My sense of responsibility is pretty heavy, but I don’t feel pressure, because I’m confident I can do it well. I can take three years, or five, or ten, or even longer to use the richest way possible to express the things I want to express, to convey my ideas and concepts through even richer and more colorful works. “I fiercely recognize that only by returning to a sense of confidence in Chinese culture can we make our country and our lives better.” Reporter: The many writings you’ve posted online have drawn a lot of attention and also stirred up criticism. How do you view this controversy and criticism? Zhou Xiaoping: I read this piece that analyzed my frame of thought and said that it was inconceivable that Zhou Xiaoping’s way of thinking wouldn’t be attacked in today’s public opinion climate and cultural community. Because the first opposition voice to speak up is always the one that gets criticized. This is just normal. Today many people talk about democracy and have to talk about Greece, or talk about human rights and have to talk about the West, or talk about innovation and have to talk about America and Europe. They think Chinese culture is decadent. They have no confidence in Chinese culture. So at a time like that for someone to stand up and dare to have confidence in Chinese culture, that’s something that gets on the bad side of a lot of prejudiced people — so naturally they are attacked.
And what do my essays actually talk about? I fiercely recognize that only by returning to a sense of confidence in Chinese culture can we make our country and our lives better. In their hearts, web users hold a love for their country, and they feel conflicted about the dark mood that prevails on the internet. That’s when people like me use our own way to tell them: your country has a sunny side. And when we show that sunny side, we earn the respect of a lot of people. They don’t necessarily agree with everything I say, with every viewpoint, with every story, with all the numbers. But what they do agree with is my feelings toward the country and my pursuit of light. This is something no one can refute. “Shaming the country is not criticism, and scolding the country is not criticism; we accept criticism, but we do not accept insults and abuses.” Reporter: These ideas of yours can’t have come from nowhere. What is the relationship between your views and your life experiences? Zhou Xiaoping: When I was little I was influenced a great deal by Western culture. At that time, I pretty much idolized the United States, Japan and Europe, and I didn’t feel a sense of affirmation about my own country. In Please Don’t Let Down This Age, I wrote that when I was young I wrote a lot of really foolish essays criticizing the government and voicing my admiration for the United States and Japan. But something happened when I served in the army, and it had a major impact on my values and my view of the world.
I started my military service in 1998, and the American bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade happened in 1999. At that time I was stationed on the border in Tibet, rifle in hand, and we stopped training and entered Level Two combat readiness (二级战备). That day, all admiration I had for America and Japan vanished. My liking for Europe disappeared too. Why? What I thought about was if we really went to war, what would my mom and dad do about those American bombs? And what about my relatives and friends? At the time I thought: If they really want to murder my relatives and friends, then they first have to step over my dead body! So from that time I went from being a baby soldier who didn’t understand a thing to a fighter devoted to the protection of his own country. Your faith comes out and you become a man, and you think, I need to protect my own country — so your sense of patriotism emerges too. My time as a soldier had a very big impact on my view of life.
I think cultural values should be diverse. When it comes down to China, we should have our own cultural values. That’s why General Secretary Xi says, “‘Getting rid of Chinese-ness’ (去中国化) is pathetic.” Because you are Chinese. And so what you adhere to can only be Chinese cultural values, and Chinese cultural values by the way are not too shabby.
For much of the broad sweep of history we were in first, and right now we’re catching up and getting ready to pass. The creativity emerging from this civilization, from our Chinese spirit, the inclusiveness and strength of our Chinese cultural inheritance, is something that deserves our pride. In China, we must adhere to the cultural values of the Chinese people. This is the only way we can live proudly in the world.
I think the fostering of this sort of attitude and the building of cultural values is a long-term project. Perhaps thirty or fifty years later, young people will have a different view of today, and a different view of the world. But how their views are different is a matter of what we do today. If we lose our culture, if we have no cultural values of our own, if we are entirely destroyed behind a tide of Western ideologies, well then, what will all of our struggles since 1840 have been for? So we have to make Chinese people feel pride and not shame for their culture and their history. Reporter: And you think that is what love of one’s country means? Zhou Xiaoping: Yes. General Secretary Xi has said, that we stand today closer than we ever have been to the Chinese dream. This is true. You need to understand that right now where you stand on this piece of ground, are the bones of so many martyrs. So many who sacrificed themselves. Think how many scientists returned to repay their country. How many ordinary people all playing their part . . . How can we just accept a total Westernization? I think that’s something shameful.
I think that’s how I see cultural values. We must uphold our own cultural values. Some people are always substituting their own concepts. I say, patriotism is not ass-kissing. Carrying forward the Chinese spirit is not empty flattery. We have to make a clear division over these. Shaming the country is not criticism, and scolding the country is not criticism; we accept criticism, but we do not accept insults and abuses.
The reasons are simple. For example, your child does something wrong at home. You criticize him. And maybe you spank him a couple of times. This is for his own good. In your heart you love him. But if someone comes over and says your child is a bastard, that he’ll be locked up in jail when he grows up, you would definitely sucker punch them. What we’re opposed to are those things that shame China. Reporter: So what are your plans now that the forum [on arts and culture] is over? Zhou Xiaoping: I’ve been a soldier. I’ve been a public servant. I’ve been a television host. And now I’ve started up a new company. From here on my main occupation won’t be essay writing, but I hope to create more and richer cultural products to express my ideas and serve society. And I hope these works truly influence others.
Think media. Think innovation. Think content and presentation for the future. Then blurt out the first newspaper that pops into your head. . . OK, how many of you said the People’s Daily?
It’s no secret to the most cursory of media observers that the People’s Daily and other Party papers — we can call them “the dailies” as most all of them end in the characters ribao (日报), and most all are directly administered by Party committees at their respective administrative levels — more or less missed out on the commercial revolution that remapped China’s media landscape in the 1990s.
Yes, Party media have to varying degrees trailed along behind their commercial media peers, adding pages and selling some advertising. But they remain principally propaganda organs, charged with narrowly reflecting the actions and policy pronouncements of the Party leadership.
While commercial newspapers, which rely entirely on outside sources of revenue (circulation/advertising), have led the reorientation toward the reader since the 1990s, Party papers have had far less need or incentive to respond to the market. Generally, these “mother papers,” or mubao (母报), are supported either by government layouts, or by revenue passed up from their bulkier commercial “child papers,” or zibao (子报).
To understand how their differing orientations — though both of course are ultimately controlled under the mandate of “public opinion guidance” — translated into very divergent media “products,” we need only look at today’s front pages from the People’s Daily, controlled by the Central Committee of the CCP, and its commercial spin-off, the Beijing Times, controlled directly by the People’s Daily as a market-oriented publication.
On the left, the official People’s Daily: high-density text with few images, dry official news. On the right, the Beijing Times, more vivid layout and a freer hand with headlines.
In light of the very restricted role and reality of Chinese media today, it is often fascinating to look at the official discourse inside China about communications design and strategy. Unable to speak freely about the political restrictions and demands placed on media, ostensible communications experts must nevertheless pontificate about the basic principles of media and communications.
No one can talk openly about the elephant in the room — namely, how the overarching business of media control rigs and subverts the game of media strategy.
In an article posted earlier this week to People’s Daily Online, communications scholar Wang Zhi (王志) offers a copious analysis of the People’s Daily, “the leading light of Party newspapers,” and asks how it can maintain its advantage as the “China’s most authoritative and most influential newspaper.”
“As the era of new media arrives, opportunities remain for print media, but the challenges predominate,” the article begins. “The People’s Daily is no exception.”
No exception?
But of course the People’s Daily is an exception. The paper is the chief propaganda organ of the Chinese Communist Party. It is supported by state outlays. It’s 24 daily pages generally carry only four full pages of advertising (which frankly the newspaper could take or leave). Its pages are filled day after day with tinder-dry reports of official goings-on, without any consideration whatsoever of graphic interest or how the paper’s front page might play at newsstands.
What makes the People’s Daily so important is precisely the fact that it is the exception.
Wang Zhi, however, must press ahead with his disingenuous analysis of “the style of the People’s Daily.” He apparently finds nothing ironic about the fact that he is writing about a future in which newspaper layouts matter, at a time when even the commercial newspapers of yesteryear are dying under the onslaught of new media.
Enjoy.
An Elementary Analysis of Page Layout in the People’s Daily (浅析《人民日报》的版面风格)
By Wang Zhi (王志)
October 21, 2014 SUMMARY: The People’s Daily is the leading light of Party newspapers (党报); it is the mouthpiece of the government and of the people. At the same time, as China’s premier newspaper, it is China’s most authoritative and most influential newspaper. Even in the age in which “content is king” (内容为王), it has not lost its shine. But in the age of “image-reading” (读图时代), with the era of information upon us, page layout becomes ever more significant. The excellence of a newspaper is determined by the unison of its content and its page layout, and neither of these two factors can be neglected. The quality of a newspaper’s content, and the richness and vitality of its page layouts affects that survival and development of that newspaper. This article analyzes the style of the People’s Daily in terms of its page layouts, seeking new horizons for future editorial work at the People’s Daily and for its survival and development.
As the era of new media arrives, opportunities remain for print media, but the challenges predominate. The People’s Daily is no exception. How can we allow print media to better face their challenges, so that they might step back from death’s door? This is an issue explored constantly be traditional media — how to break through the obstacles raised by new media, how to maintain advantage, how to find constant innovation in order to preserve their invincible positions.
Newspaper content and page layout are equally important. Content determines style, and style reacts to content. If it divorces itself from either, a newspaper has now long-term development prospects. There is no doubt that the content of the newspaper page remains important, but if the page layout is a mess, [the newspaper] will not be long for this world. By the same token, if a newspaper is eye-catching in terms of its layout . . . but the quality of its content is inferior, this over-reliance on attractive layouts will eventually be rejected in the test of time. And so, to run a good newspaper, you must maintain the quality of its content while at the same time giving care to the layout of its pages.
Doing in-depth reports and using opinion pieces to channel public opinion — this is beyond the reach of new media; if you have your own consistent style in terms of layout, but within that consistency have some measure of change, this gives the reader a sense of freshness. Only this kind of newspaper will have a strong vitality. Page layouts for a People’s Daily supplement. Are you enthralled?
The People’s Daily is the official organ newspaper (机关报) of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, and in terms of both authority and influence it is number one in China. It bears a heavy responsibility to the Party, to the government, to the people and to history. It must speak as a representative of the Party and the government, earnestly doing propaganda work for the Party’s line, principles and policies; it must also speak in place of the masses, expressing the innermost voice of the people. It must uphold correct guidance of public opinion (正确的舆论引导人); it must also point out unhealthy tendencies, carrying forward the national spirit.
In the 1990s, media in our country began going the route of “state-sponsored institutions with enterprise-style management” (事业单位，企业化管理). The People’s Daily also took part in market competition. As the newspaper took responsibility for its own profit and loss, the market had a decisive impact on its survival and development — and its relatively strong market was determined by both its content and its page layout.
