Now Executive Director of the China Media Project, leading the project’s research and partnerships, David originally joined the project in Hong Kong in 2004. He is the author of Dragons in Diamond Village (Penguin), a book of reportage about urbanization and social activism in China, and co-editor of Investigative Journalism in China (HKU Press).
Your websites are in your home. How can I shut down shut down sites in your home? . . . China has always been warm and hospitable, but I have a choice about who comes to be a guest at my home. I can say that, I have no way of changing you, but I have a right to choose my friends. I hope all those who come to China are friends, true friends.
Lu Wei’s bluntness and “new swagger,” a personal style he has evinced ever since he became chief of the State Internet Information Office (SIIO) in April 2013, seem to reflect a new confidence in China’s attitude not just toward domestic internet controls, but toward global internet development and governance. Lu may in fact be the bold new face of an information control regime centered in the CCP’s Internet Security and Informatization Leading Group (中共中央网络安全和信息化领导小组), created in February this year by President Xi Jinping.
Lu Wei, China’s new top internet official, favors the more direct assertion of the CCP’s approach to information control over the dry Marxist discourse traditionally deployed by propaganda officials.
Perhaps more significant than his position as head of SIIO is his position as director of the General Office of the Internet Security and Informatization Leading Group, which according to Xinhua News Agency is “designed to lead and coordinate Internet security work” as well as “draft national strategies, development plans and major policies.”
As the overarching information objectives of the CCP leadership (control/development/security) center not on the traditional media system — which in recent years has been quite effectively muzzled in China — but rather on vast, dispersed and global internet-based new media, it is time to ask: is the Central Propaganda Department being marginalized in favor of a new, rebalanced system of information controls under Xi Jinping?
If this is the case, then Lu Wei is the chief disciple of this important shift.
Lu Wei (鲁炜) was born in January 1960 in Chaohu (巢湖), a prefectural-level city in Anhui province. After receiving his master’s degree in journalism from Guangxi University, Lu served for a time as a teacher, and later as the secretary in charge with propaganda work at a factory. He was later editor-in-chief of Guangxi Legal Daily (广西法制报), chief of the Guilin bureau of Xinhua News Agency (1993-1994), and chief of the Guangxi bureau of Xinhua (1997-2001). In May 2004, he was promoted deputy director of Xinhua News Agency, a position he held (with many concurrent roles) until March 2011.
Overseas Chinese-language media have reported widely that Lu Wei was the man largely responsible for the press image and relations of former Premier Wen Jiabao, and that Lu’s appointment as propaganda minister of the Beijing municipality in March 2011 was the outcome of negotiations between Wen Jiabao and then propaganda chief Li Changchun (李长春).
As Beijing’s municipal propaganda minister in January 2013, shortly before he became head of SIIO, Lu Wei openly revealed — in a report by The Beijing News that was echoed across Hong Kong media — that employees within the city’s propaganda system (体制内) numbered more than 60,000, and employees doing the same work outside the official hire system (体制外) totaled more than 2 million. All of these workers, said Lu, were responsible for “strengthening positive channeling (正面引导) of hot-button issues,” and they should actively make use of new media. They must, he said, “watch Weibo, open up their own Weibo accounts, make Weibo posts and research Weibo.” The ultimate goal of this work, said Lu Wei, was to spread “positive energy,” or zheng nengliang (正能量) on the internet.
In consonance with President Xi Jinping’s appeal for a more down-to-earth style, Lu Wei hammers his points home with aphoristic aplomb. Unpack Lu’s recent press conference remarks, spoken with no-nonsense logic, and you’re left with several core assertions, a bag of tricks:
* The “home,” or homeland, of China belongs to the Chinese Communist Party, which as the Confucian “father” is duty bound to protect his children (who of course have a vested interest in obeying the father). * The Chinese “home” observes core values that are different from those of other nation-homes. China respects these differences and demands respect in return. * China’s “true friends,” those who respect and abide by China’s domestic political values, are welcome as “guests” in the Chinese home. And that means they are free to conduct business.
There are a number of points to note here, not least the seeming abandonment of Communist Party ideology. The argument for information control is not — overtly, at least — about “guidance of public opinion,” “a civilized web” or “socialist core values.” Control is fundamentally about protecting the nation-home and its continued prosperity.
In Lu Wei’s aphoristic crushing machine, control is also freedom. In September 2013, shortly after the chilling arrest of Charles Xue, a Chinese-American investor and “Big V” on Weibo, Lu Wei said that “freedom means order” and that “freedom without order does not exist.”
Here again we have an elementary assertion of fact that subsumes other core assertions.
* “Order” is the foundation of “freedom” * By ensuring “order” on China’s internet, the CCP (via the SIIO and the Internet Security and Informatization Leading Group) is safeguarding the “freedom” of China’s connected masses. * Any online acts that threaten the “order” of the internet are an assault on the security and freedom of all Chinese
Last week’s your-home-my-home metaphor notwithstanding, Lu Wei understands that it is not enough to assert control over information and establish “order” at home. This is why China wants to exert greater influence over global internet developments.
Last week’s press conference was about China’s hosting of the World Internet Conference from November 19-21. The event, we are told, will be the “largest and most high-level internet conference China has ever hosted.”
Listing out what he said were the “four firsts“ of the World Internet Conference, Lu Wei said this was, first and foremost, the first time China had hosted an internet-related event on this scale. “As the largest developing nation, with the world’s largest online population, China has one-fifth of the world’s internet users,” said Lu. “It stands to reason that an open platform should be created for the world that is broadly representative.”
China, in other words, wants the influence over global internet-related decision making that its sheer size warrants — and it hopes the World Internet Conference can become the platform through which it wields that influence.
More than 1,000 politicians and business leaders would attend the conference, said Lu — a second “first” — and they would rub shoulders with representatives from Chinese internet giants like Alibaba, Tencent and Baidu. Like an Olympic-style coming-out party for China’s internet industry, the conference would mark the first time — a third “first” — China could offer a “panoramic view of its internet development concepts and achievements.”
Here too, Lu Wei emphasized China’s sheer size. After twenty years of development China now had 630 million internet users, 1.2 billion mobile phone users, and 500 million users of Weibo and WeChat. And China had four of the world’s top-ten internet companies. “China has already become a veritable internet great nation,” Lu said.
Lu Wei’s fourth “first” may seem less consequential: This is the first time a world internet conference will be held in a 1,000 year-old town. In honor of the host town, Wuzhen, Lu Wei has suggested the conference be nicknamed the “Wuzhen Summit.” But hosting a global internet conference in an ancient canal town suits rather well Xi Jinping’s “sage king” aura, combining present-day Party authoritarianism with an exceptionalist notion of Chinese cultural continuity.
In Wuzhen, said Lu, “the most state-of-the-art fruits of world civilisation and the oldest Chinese culture can merge and interact, and modern information culture and historical cultures and traditions can shine together.”
At the conference, said People’s Daily Online, China would be able to “fully explain the development concepts of the Chinese internet.” As control of the internet has been one of China’s most core development concepts since the beginning, Lu Wei will no doubt be eager to “fully explain” China’s approach to internet governance.
In a speech at the World Economic Forum’s 2014 Summer Davos in Tianjin back in September, Lu Wei explained China’s view on global internet governance with characteristic bluntness: “Freedom and order are twin sisters, and they must live together,” he said. “The same principle applies to security. So we must have a public order [internationally]. And this public order cannot impact any particular local order.”
Contradicting last week’s remarks to the foreign reporter about “your home,” Lu Wei’s language suggested the ruling Chinese Communist Party wants a global internet governance system that respects “local” internet controls.
To make his point about the super-design of the global internet clear, Lu Wei employed another down-to-earth analogy, this time a technological one. The internet is like a car, he said.
If it has no brakes, it doesn’t matter how fast the car is capable of traveling, once it gets on the highway you can imagine what the end result will be. And so, no matter how advanced, all cars must have brakes.
What does it mean to design a global internet “with brakes”? For Lu Wei it means prosperity for all — a “brighter future,” as he said last week.
To simplify the choice ostensibly facing the entire world as it discusses the future of the internet (at the “Wuzhen Summit”), Lu Wei marshaled another of his favorite analogies. Global internet chiefs and politicians must come together to ensure that “the internet becomes Ali Baba’s treasure cave for humankind, and not Pandora’s box.”
A controlled internet — with a built-in “brake system” — offers the promise of riches to all. The alternative is not freedom but pandemonium. That, anyhow, is the stark information worldview presented by China’s internet czar, a man whose Midas touch turns propaganda into proverb.
There is no doubt that the promise of China’s internet market looms large. And for those who wish to enter, the magic word is “control.”
But how can we be sure that Ali Baba’s cave of treasure isn’t in fact Pandora’s box?
I haven’t used these websites [like Facebook] before, and I don’t know whether or not they’ve been shut down. But as to there being some websites that cannot be visited, I think this is situation probably exists. However, I want to say that our management [of the web] is all done according to the law, and all of the measures we take are to protect China’s national security and the rights Chinese consumers in accord with the law.
As everyone struggles to unpack the significance of the “Decision” on “governing in accord with the law” (依法治国) emerging from the recent 4th Plenum, the clues continue to confuse.
Take, for example, this commentary appearing in the “People’s Forum” section on page four of today’s People’s Daily.
A cursory reading would suggest the piece is what it seems to be — an anthem to “rule of law” (法治) that categorically rejects its evil twin, the autocratic “rule by man” (人治). In the People’s Daily Online version, a single sentence is bolded: “Nevertheless, some leading cadres are still obsessed with rule by man. In their eyes, legal process has too many limitations, and they think it’s better and more effective to deal with certain ‘defects’ by applying the flexible methods of rule by man.”
But if you think this is a simple struggle between the forces of light and dark, read more carefully.
The second paragraph of the piece praises the “Fengqiao experience” (枫桥经验), which as CMP director Qian Gang explained a year ago — when Xi Jinping surprised many by raising the specter — is a relic from one of the darkest chapters of contemporary Chinese “rule by man” under the Communist Party.
The fanning to life of this Mao-era term is a lamentable surprise, the latest reminder of those chilly winds that have lately been blowing so strongly from the left, particularly as we near the 120th anniversary on December 26 of Mao Zedong’s birth.
The “Fengqiao experience” derives from the socialist education movement of the early 1960s — ahead of the Cultural Revolution — known as the “Four Cleanups” because they targeted the four so-called “reactionary elements,” or silei fenzi (四类分子), referred to landlords, wealthy peasants, counterrevolutionaries and evildoers (坏分子).
According to official coverage in 2013 to mark the 50th anniversary of the “Fengqiao experience,” Mao Zedong approved the nationalization of this governance experiment in 1963.
While the socialist education movement meant violent purging of “reactionary elements” in many areas of China at the time, the approach in Fengqiao was different, as described in several articles in the official People’s Daily at the end of the 1970s.
A commentary published in the People’s Daily on September 5, 1978, talked about how “Fengqiao District in Zhejiang’s Zhuji County relied on the masses to carry out on-site rectification of reactionary elements, reforming the vast majority of them into self-supporting laborers for the law.” “Their successful experience,” the article said, “was praised by Mao Zedong, and was known as a red flag on the front lines of public security.”
The question, then, is how to reconcile this dusting off of the “Fengqiao experience” — this model, the People’s Daily tells us today, “full of vitality” — with the overtures we are now seeing about the need for leaders and citizens alike to abide by rule of law?
We’ll leave it there. Happy reading.
“‘Modernizing Governance’ With the Aid of Rule of Law” (以法治助力“治理现代化”)
Li Zheng (李拯) People’s Daily, p. 4
October 30, 2014
I often hear grassroots-level cadres talk about the “two dilemmas” of petitioning work. Faced with the extreme behavior of some groups of petitioners [seeking redress for various issues], if they satisfy their demands this might invite even more extreme behavior; and if they simply ignore them this will just gather up tensions and affect long-term stability. It’s not right if you handle the case, and its not right if you don’t handle it. This state of hesitation shows us one aspect of grassroots governance.
In fact, despite the difficulty of these “two dilemmas,” there is a way out. The “Fengqiao experience” (枫桥经验) remains a fresh approach today, full of possibility precisely because it pays attention to the use of rule of law methods to dissolve tensions, so that “the demands of the masses are resolved reasonably, unreasonable demands dealt with through targeted education, and illegal conduct handled properly in accord with the law” — and the two dilemmas are resolved within the framework of rule of law.
We can see that in resolving difficult grassroots tensions, “rule of law” provides us with a key. In this regards, the 4th Plenum clearly talks about “the promotion of rule of law in grassroots governance” (推进基层治理法治化), and it emphasizes that “leading cadres at various levels must take the lead in respecting the law and take the lead in handling matters in accord with the law.”
In fact, in actual practice, a number of leading cadres to not favor rule of law methods. Some local areas, as soon as they encounter negative news will change out a local leader to calm the situation down, without asking any questions about the merits and demerits of the case. But before long the official who was removed will be returned to a position at the same level — and how can such [a system of] accountability win the support of the people?
If the only hope is to calm a situation down, if there are no questions of legal accountability and one side is favored in a simplistic balance between the “strong” and the “weak,” this might bring short-term relief of public anger. But how can the authority of rule of law be established for the longer term?
It seems on the surface that expedient means that flout the law are effective, but they bring a disastrous erosion of the foundation of trust between the government and the people . . .
Faced with discord between human feeling and legal principles in the process of governance, with the competing of interests and concepts, and the testing of strength between doubt and trust, if rule of law becomes the measuring stick for the conduct of citizens as well as the administrative method applied by the government, then government credibility can grow in the fertile soil of rule of law and dramatically lower the cost of governance.
When the “Wenling nail house” (温岭最牛钉子户) incident caused such an uproar, the local government did not resort to violence or forced demolition, nor did they agree to demolition compensation surpassing [that stipulated by] the law. In the end, the “nail houser” and the government reached a compromise within the framework of rule of law. This “gentle handling of a demolition case” left in its wake a clear rule of law precedent: citizens defending their rights in accord with the law, the government applying policy in accord with the law, and opposition could be transformed into cooperation, good governance found amid tension. Nevertheless, some leading cadres are still obsessed with rule by man (人治). In their eyes, legal process has too many limitations, and they think it’s better and more effective to deal with certain “defects” by applying the flexible methods of rule by man. . . [NOTE: bolded as at People’s Daily Online]
“China’s history has developed to this point, and I’m afraid the methods of rule by man has already run its course,” one member of the Standing Committee of the CPPCC wisely said in 1978. . . Making this happen relies not just on declaration from the national level, but also requires the common efforts of each and every leading cadre in practicing rule of law.
President Xi Jinping has outlined his plans for “governing the nation in accord with the law.” What does he really mean?
Just to name a few options out there, Xinhua quickly released President Xi Jinping’s own “explanation” of the document yesterday — an explanation that itself will require more explication.
Xinhua has spoken to five “experts” about the significance of the “Decision.”
And finally, Xinhua has also posted a “25-sentence summary” of the “Decision” today that might help simplify matters.
Obviously, all of these official explainers should come with a huge caveat: They are designed to promote the Party’s agenda, not just transparently explain it.
Let us turn for the moment, however, to another interesting piece, this time by People’s Daily Online, addressing one of the most important questions lingering behind this ostensible move toward “rule of law”: the role of the Chinese Communist Party.
That’s right, the red elephant in the room.
In the piece, posted late yesterday to its current affairs channel, People’s Daily Online reviewed Xi Jinping’s remarks on one central and unmovable aspect of rule of the nation according to law, or yifa zhiguo (依法治国) — the “leadership position of the Chinese Communist Party.”
Notice the language from Xi Jinping about the need to assert CCP rule “with self-confidence and with great fanfare.” And note the explicit reference to attempts “by a few” to conflate “socialist rule of law” with “Western political and legal systems,” a trend that must, according to Yang Xiaojun (杨小军), a professor at the Chinese Academy of Governance, be “nipped in the bud.”
Enjoy.
“Interpretation: Why Does Xi Jinping Say We Must Self-Confidently Assert the Party’s Leadership Status?“ (解读：习近平为啥说要理直气壮地讲党的领导地位?)
People’s Daily Online, Current Affairs Channel
October 28, 2014, 8:59PM
Tonight, the CCP Central Committee Decision Concerning the Comprehensive Advancement of Major Questions on Governing the Nation According to the Law was formally released. Entrusted by the Politburo, Xi Jinping has provided some explanations about the drafting process of this decision.
Among these [explanations] is the question of the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party and its relationship to rule of the nation according to law (依法治国). He emphasizes that our country’s Constitution, as the basic law, expresses the Party’s successes in leading the people in carrying out revolution, [national] construction and reform, and it establishes the leadership role of the Chinese Communist Party as a product of history and the people’s choice. As to this point, [he says], [we] must assert it with self-confidence and with great fanfare.
“We say ‘with self-confidence’ because to say so is the truth,” said Central Party School professor Xin Ming (辛鸣) in an interview with People’s Daily Online. We must, [he said], have the fullest confidence in the leadership of the Party. History and experience have shown that the leadership status of the Party is correct, and it is endorsed by the people. The “Decision” raises five [issues that] must be “firmly supported” (坚持), and of these it places firm support for the leadership status of the Chinese Communist Party before all others, in order to give no quarter to those who seek to obscure or deny the truth.
Xi Jinping points out in his explanation of the “Decision”: “The crux of whether or not the major task of thoroughly promoting rule of the nation according to law can be handled adequately is a matter of the correctness of our political direction (方向), whether the political guarantee is strong.”
Professor Xin Ming points out that regardless of whether viewed from the standpoint of rule of law theory or our experience of rule of the nation according to law over the past 17 years, without the leadership of the Party there would be no way of achieving the objective of rule of the nation according to law, and therefore no way of achieving national strength and prosperity, the rejuvenation of the [Chinese] people, or the happiness of the people. In terms of the building of rule of law, we have referenced all the fruits of human civilization in order to ensure the rule of law path under socialism with Chinese characteristics is traveled more surely and healthily.
We say “great fanfare” because the Chinese Communist Party must make its attitude and position clear both domestically and internationally. Xi Jinping emphasized that we must speak clearly to the masses of cadres the basic nature of our country’s socialist rule of law, being clear about its roots and setting the record straight.
Chinese Academy of Governance professor Yang Xiaojun (杨小军) points out that because many legal concepts lately are “exotic” (舶来品), some people have equated “ruling the nation in accord with the law” (依法治国) with Western political and legal systems. This difference in understandings has created diverging paths. And so there is a need to strengthen internal propaganda and education, nipping this trend in the bud and ensuring that rule of the nation according to law can proceed smoothly.
The China Media Project is pleased that it made the list of “must read” China websites in this year’s Danwei Model Worker Awards.
The annual list has been published by Danwei.com, itself a well-regarded China site, since 2005.
None of those words would probably get caught up in China’s automated filters. But the Weibo post includes an image of a yellow umbrella, now a popular symbol of the movement in Hong Kong for universal suffrage.
China’s official Xinhua News Agency announced the recipients yesterday of the first WMS Global Awards for Excellence. Drawing a blank are you?
“WMS” stands for World Media Summit, an ostensible non-governmental association China started ahead of the Beijing Olympics in 2008 as an initiative to enhance its “soft power,” which then-President Hu Jintao had prioritized in his 2007 political report to the National Party Congress.
Although the WMS was, according to Chinese state media, “co-launched by Xinhua News Agency and other major media organizations around the world,” the event has always been solidly China’s prerogative, and these “major media organizations” have A) refused to acknowledge any clear institutionalized involvement in the WMS, and B) done no reporting at all about the summit itself, which only China has loudly touted.
The World Media Summit is hosted in Moscow in July 2012. Photo: Xinhua
After Xinhua reported in October last year that the host of the 2014 WMS would be the New York Times — whose chairman, Arthur Sulzberger, Jr., was in China that month as a member of the summit’s supposed governing body, the “presidium” — the Atlantic approached the Times to ask about the nature of its participation in the WMS.
The response from Eileen M. Murphy, the Times‘ vice president of corporate communications, revealed both how nebulous the WMS was organizationally, and the primary motivation of participating media organizations — namely, access to the China market.
In an email interview, New York Times Vice President of Corporate Communications Eileen M. Murphy said governance procedures for the WMS are “just beginning to be developed, but we think it’s in the interest of free press issues for us to be part of the process.
“We have no illusions about China’s motivations in creating the World Media Summit,” she said, “but we believe that it is important to engage with China on many levels and the WMS is one opportunity to do so.”
Murphy added that the Times was hosting the 2014 WMS “precisely because we believe strongly in promoting press freedom around the world and we feel there is no better way to do so than to invite members of the world’s media, including China’s media, to engage in a dialogue on our home turf.
The plans for the New York Times to host the WMS in the United States seem to have flopped. There has been no news whatsoever about the “third World Media Summit” or the WMS presidium since Xinhua first reported news of the plans agreed by the presidium in Hangzhou on October 10, 2013.
The global news awards that were decided — again, according to Xinhua — at the Hangzhou meeting of the presidium apparently have gone forward, however. (For a list of all recipients of the WMS awards, see this Xinhua report.)
But the dribble of global coverage the awards have received suggests the WMS is not gaining traction, nor is it getting any real public support of any kind from global media organizations. According to Xinhua, the recipients of this year’s inaugural awards were decided by a “panel of judges in China,” many sent by global media organizations.
Who exactly were they? According to Xinhua, because of course we have no other source, the judges included: Ted Anthony, director of Asia-Pacific News for AP; David Schlesinger, former editor-in-chief of Reuters News; and Jack Gao, former senior vice president of News Corporation.
The WMS Global Awards for Excellence seem to be plagued by the same problem that has harried the WMS all along — nobody cares. That is, nobody cares except to the extent that the process puts them in close proximity to powerful Chinese who can assist their business ambitions in China.
The following list is the sum total of all news reports so far about the WMS Global Awards for Excellence, followed by the source of the news content:
The bottom line: Only 10 articles in the entire world mention this year’s inaugural WMS Global Awards for Excellence, and according to our estimate 87% of the content in these 10 articles is from the official Xinhua News Agency, sponsor and creator of the WMS.
Only one report, from The Hindu, is original writing copy (not pulled directly from Xinhua), and that report attributes the news to “the release” from Xinhua.
I don’t at all doubt the merit of the recipients of this year’s prizes, or the rest of the 400-odd submissions from media around the world. And it doesn’t at all surprise me that, as Xinhua reports, Ted Anthony was “struck by the quality of the work submitted.”
There is also some merit to the rest of what Anthony says:
I do believe that journalism has the potential to make the world better and help us to look toward a better world.
The notion of an award like this helps bringing people of the world together to understand each others’ stories, and that is an opportunity for better relations and better communication among different cultures.
That, I suppose, is the right attitude, the principled one, to have when your media boss packs you off to Beijing to take part in the selection process and butter up your Chinese counterparts.
The problem comes when you step back and look at the larger backdrop of the World Media Summit. It is not, by any stretch of the imagination, a professional organization — or even primarily a professional gathering. It was created by the Chinese state, through its official news agency, with the express purpose of expanding China’s influence over global media.
Li Congjun, the president of Xinhua News Agency and “WMS executive chairman,” told his own news agency that “the creation of the awards has epoch-making significance.”
It encourages all people working in the media sector to keep developing their professional skills and pursue excellence, while inspiring media setups to work with the times in the spirit of innovation, and to actively carry out social responsibilities and the mission of public welfare.
We can’t forget — we shouldn’t forget, anyhow — that China’s leaders don’t at all view the role of media as being in the “public welfare.” Media serve the Party. And when President Xi Jinping drove the point home to propaganda leaders last year that they must “show their swords” and be bolder in controlling the press, it was WMS founder Li Congjun who wrote in the Party’s official People’s Daily that Xi was right, and that the Party needed to “firmly grab the initiative in public opinion.”
Li meant, of course, that the Party needed to actively defend its agenda through media controls at home, and to take the fight over global public opinion to foreign media. Consider that and it puts Li’s talk of the “spirit of innovation” in quite a different light — for it was precisely in the Party’s own spirit of innovation (of its agenda-setting machine) that the WMS was created in 2008.
Since rising to the post of General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party in November 2012, Xi Jinping has worked hard to set himself apart from his predecessors, defining his personal style as down-to-earth and no-nonsense.
The goal of this public relations makeover has been to convince the Chinese public that the fifth generation of China’s leaders is in touch with the issues facing common folk, that it is open and subject to scrutiny — rather than aloof, privileged and corrupt.
The sense of Xi Jinping as an attentive man of action was captured early on in a propaganda piece on December 31, 2012: “Xi Jinping Visits Poor Families in Hebei: Dinner Is Just 4 Dishes and One Soup, No Alcohol.”
Xi Jinping visits families in Hebei on December 29, 2012.
The Xi Jinping love fest continues today with a piece from the Shanghai Observer (上海观察), prominently placed on many websites — including the official site of the state news agency, Xinhua — that purports to offer inside access to the president’s busy workday. He is a man, the writer tells us, who never stops.
The Shanghai Observer is a new media platform launched on January 1, 2014, by the Shanghai United Media Group (上海报业集团), which was founded in October 2013 by the merger of the Liberation Daily Press Group (解放日报报业集团) and the Wenhui Xinmin United Press Group (文汇新民联合报业集团) — the former being the publisher of Shanghai’s official Party paper, the latter being a press group founded in 1998 as China’s commercial media revolution was gaining steam. The Shanghai United Media Group is run by Qiu Xin (裘新), a former senior editor with Shanghai’s official Liberation Daily (解放日报) who served as the city’s deputy chief of propaganda in 2011.
(If I may be permitted a moment of schadenfreude . . . The official Weibo account of this “new media” publication by a Shanghai media behemoth has fewer followers than the rather tepid Weibo account of this CMP editor.)
But the Shanghai Observer apparently has quite close access to China’s president.
Today’s article begins by referring to an article previously circulated by the “Study Group” (学习小组), a mysterious content source that became a hot topic this year after it circulated a number of portraits of Xi Jinping and his work-style that seemed far more personable that past profiles of national leaders — pieces like, “Xi Jinping Celebrates His Birthday During the Dragon Boat Festival” (習近平端午节过生日).
All of the material released by the “Study Group” dealt with Xi Jinping, and all of it generally kicked up a wave of excited attention on the internet. An article in the overseas edition of the People’s Daily in June this year revealed that the “Study Group” was in fact “a column” run by the People’s Daily overseas edition. The “column” seems to be primarily devoted to keeping up the polish on Xi Jinping’s shimmering public image.
Anyhow, the “Study Group” article talked about how Xi Jinping once added his comments by early morning to a policy document he did not receive until around midnight the night before. The point: Xi Jinping is a hard worker; he gets things done. Chinese President Xi Jinping delivers his New Year’s message to the nation on the eve of January 1, 2014, through China Central Television, China Radio International and China National Radio. Photo by Lan Hongguang (兰红光), Xinhua News Agency.
The following is our translation of the Xi Jinping profile from the Shanghai Observer:
The topic of Xi Jinping and time has come up often in [articles by] the Study Group (小组).
Early this year, Xi Jinping issued the classic sigh, “Where has the time gone?” The answer he gave to his own question was that it had all been spent on work. On an overseas trip, Xi Jinping once said he often felt conflicted about overseas travel, because there were so many things that needed doing back home. There was once a case, according to the Study Group, where [Xi Jinping] issued written comments first thing in the morning on a [policy] document received at midnight the night before.
The article we share today comes from the Shanghai Observer (上海观察), and it was written by Guan Jintai (官锦台). As a writer who has observed Xi Jinping at close quarters, Guan has discovered that Xi Jinping’s daily work “proceeds at high speed and with great energy” (高速运转且极费精力). The ordinary day in the life of Xi Jinping recorded by the writer certainly seems to be extremely busy.
I’m sure many people would like to know how work is arranged for Xi Jinping every day. On Friday, October 24, many Chinese people were savoring the communique emerging from the Fourth Plenum [of the 18th Central Committee of the CCP], Xi Jinping was already beginning a new busy day.
As someone who specializes in international news, I had the good fortune of observing Xi Jinping at close range as he handled the days foreign affairs. From this I gained an understanding of the daily work life of this, China’s most senior leader. I discovered that Xi Jinping that what Xi Jinping must accomplish each day is a series of tasks “proceeding at high speed and with great energy.” It’s not the least bit an exaggeration to say that he is “at work both day and night” (夙夜在公). Of course, like the average Chinese person, Xi Jinping’s busy day is not without humor and joy.
There was no way for me to know exactly what time Xi Jinping got up from bed that morning, but I could be sure that he, like all those working at the crack of dawn, he had eaten his breakfast before first light, and after he had read his “Daily Briefing” (每日简报) had proceeded to the Great Hall of the People. There he had to meet with international representatives present for the memorandum signing for the launch of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank.
According to my observations, regardless of the particular task at hand, Xi Jinping is always able to proceed according to the larger background of domestic and international affairs. He speaks in a bold and down-to-earth manner. For example, at this memorandum signing he said, “If you want to prosper, you must first build a road” (要想富，先修路). And he said, “Those who unite in purpose can move mountains” (人心齐，泰山移). Everyone present nodded in praise.
His domestic and international views were expressed in the following way:
“China is right now in the midst of a thorough deepening of reforms, and it is pushing ever closer to its goals of the ‘Two Centennials’ (两个一百年) [of the CCP in 2021, and of the “New China” in 2049]. China’s economy will continue to grow in a healthy manner, and China’s development cannot do without Asia or without the world. We will firmly and steadfastly pursue a win-win strategy of opening up. I have talked about building a Silk Road economic belt, a 21st-century Silk Road of the seas, and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank with the goal of deepening economic cooperation among the nations of Asia — in order to achieve common development. We will do our utmost to ensure that China’s own development benefits the nations of Asia and the world.”
That day, Xi Jinping also conducted “foreign affairs by telephone.” On the other end of the line was Indonesian President Joko Widodo. Xi Jinping congratulated Widodo on his becoming the new Indonesian president, and he invited him to attend the informal meeting of leaders at the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) in Beijing next month.
Xi Jinping’s work rhythm is “fast,” to use the words of CCP Central Committee Politburo member and General Office director Li Zhanshu (栗战书). Li Zhanshu recently wrote in an article in Secretary Work (秘书工作), [a magazine published by the Research Office of Secretariat of the CCP Central Committee], that “General Secretary Xi Jinping demands that we ‘work so there is no backlog, and nothing left overnight’ (案无积卷、事不过夜). The general secretary works like this himself. His work style is very rigorous, and his rhythm is very fast. [Policy] documents requiring instructions from the general secretary always come back with written instructions by morning the next day, regardless of how late they get to him, even if its at midnight.”
This sort of work attitude and style was expressed most incisively in the afternoon as Xi Jinping met with visiting Tanzanian President Jakaya Mrisho Kikwete. When the welcome ceremony outside the East Gate of the Great Hall of the People was concluded, Xi Jinping proceeded with rapid steps to the conference room, so that those of us behind had to jog along to keep up. As soon as the Tanzanian delegates were seated, Xi Jinping said there were many things they needed to talk about today, and to save time they should use simultaneous interpretation.
The facts show that simultaneous interpretation substantially increases the efficiency of meetings, and the meeting ended by 6:15 in the afternoon. Leaders from both countries then went straight to the signing ceremony for the cooperative agreement, held in the Hebei Hall (河北厅). Even though there was just a short walk between the two halls, I saw for myself how Xi Jinping and President Kikwete were engaged in intense conversation.
These two tense meetings in the morning and afternoon would be enough to exhaust anyone, so it was time for a much needed rebalancing. And this is how Xi Jinping accomplished it. When the heads of the two countries came to the table where they were to sign, Xi Jinping noticed that President Kikwete seemed to want to sit down, so he quipped cheerfully, we have to stand and serve as a backdrop for them. Hearing this, the translator instantly interpreted the remark as Kikwete listened attentively, and then the whole atmosphere of the scene relaxed a great deal.
I noted that during the signing ceremony one of Tanzania’s ministers forgot to shake hands with Xi Jinping after the copies were exchanged, and at the express urging of Kikwete, there was a quick “makeup shake” (“补握”). At that moment, Xi Jinping, perhaps thinking himself that this touch was rather interesting, started to laugh.
Whatever you do, don’t imagine that Xi Jinping’s day was then over. Because after that he still needed to host a banquet for President Kikwete. The lights were brilliant on the third floor of the Great Hall of the People, and at this time the lights went on over Chang’an Avenue as well, a parade of lights. As most people were having family dinners or watching television, he was still busying himself with affairs of state.
I thought of the time last year when Xi Jinping was visiting Russia. When he was meeting with Chinese Embassy staff in Moscow and representatives of Chinese-invested businesses there, he said: “They say misery can be accompanied by happiness; but for me, I find joy in exhaustion.”
And based on my observations over that one day, Xi Jinping not only “finds joy in exhaustion” when he is on foreign tours, but at home too he “finds joy in exhaustion.”
China released a communique late yesterday from the Fourth Plenum of the 18th Central Committee of the CCP. The document, which offers a preview of the full “Decision” to come in the next couple of days, deals with the “comprehensive advancement of rule of the nation by law (依法治国), with the overall goal of building a socialist system of rule by law with Chinese characteristics, and the building of a socialist country ruled by law.”
What does that mean? It’s difficult to say — and it’s certainly premature to speculate before the full decision is released.
However, it is worth noting that the communique does include a pair of political phrases CMP director Qian Gang (钱钢) analyzed at some length back in September: “ruling the nation in accord with the constitution” (依宪治国) and “governing in accord with the constitution” (依宪执政). For more, readers can see “The Missing Speech” and “Xi’s Missing Terms Emerge Again.”
Here is what Qian Gang wrote about the terms in the first of these pieces:
These were Xi Jinping’s most jarring slogans after taking the Party’s top post in 2012, and they were closely tied to the subsequent championing of “constitutionalism” that we saw among intellectuals in China. The rise and fall of these terms reflects internal political sensitivities. In January 2013 — the month that the Southern Weekly incident erupted in Guangzhou around the censoring of the New Year’s message on constitutionalism — the terms did not appear in the People’s Daily. Then, after appearing once each in February and March that year, the terms disappeared from the paper altogether from April to July. In August, there was one appearance of either term, just as the propaganda tide against constitutionalism reached its height. In October 2013, there was one appearance. In November, two appearances. In February, 2014, there was one final appearance — and since then we’ve not seen the terms at all.
These Xi Jinping phrases seem to be the subject of some degree of internal Party wrangling, and it remains unclear how central they were originally conceived as being to Xi Jinping’s own goals and legacy building. As Qian Gang wrote, the phrase uniting the two terms “was very possibly conceived originally as a Xi Jinping banner term, like Jiang Zemin’s “Three Represents” (三个代表) and Hu Jintao’s “Scientific View of Development” (科学发展观).”
One thing we can say about yesterday’s communique is that it seems to bring these terms back into prominence, and they’re virtually assured a visible position in the full “Decision.”
Still, optimists be cautioned. Despite all the talk of “rule by law” in the communique, the Party’s position of dominance remains absolutely clear in the language, and it remains to be seen how Xi Jinping and other Party elites view the notions of “ruling the nation in accord with the constitution” and “governing in accord with the constitution” over and against the supremacy of the Party’s position.
If the hot-and-cold history of the terms themselves is something to go by, that question is a point on which there is a lot of division.
But there is another term in the communique that deserves attention as well. And it is arguably a point in favor of those who lean toward a more pessimistic reading. In graph nine of the communique, the term “governing the nation with virtue” (以德治国) is added to the list of governance principles:
To realize these goals [of ruling in accord with the law], [we] must uphold the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party, uphold the principle position of the people, uphold equality of all people before the law, uphold the combination of ruling the nation in accord with the law and ruling the nation with virtue (以德治国), upholding the [principle of] proceeding on the basis of China’s realities.
What does it mean to “rule the nation with virtue”?
For a precedent for the use of this term we have to go all the way back to Jiang Zemin. Jiang used the term in an almost identical manner when articulating the Party’s governing principles in June 2000. “[We must] uphold the combination of governing the nation in accord with the law and governing the nation with virtue,” he said (坚持依法治国与以德治国相结合).
But after 2000, the term fell entirely out of favor. So we are witnessing the return of a ghost after a 14-year absence. And who can say what that means?
At a state-sponsored forum on arts and culture held earlier this month, President Xi Jinping said works of art and literature “should be like sunshine, blue sky and the spring breeze, inspiring minds, warming hearts and cultivating taste.”
What kind of taste exactly? Well, first of all, tastes and values should be uniquely Chinese. And they should also be full of “positive energy,” or zhengnengliang (正能量) — a term used widely in China’s state media since 2012 to refer to positive and uplifting content and attitudes (as opposed to critical and negative ones).
In the wave of Chinese media coverage attending the arts and culture forum, one representative in particular was singled out as the flag-bearer of “positive energy,” just the kind of voice that China needs to stake out its cultural place in the world. According to news reports, President Xi shook the hand of internet writer Zhou Xiaoping (周小平), a commentator known for his patriotic essays, and said: “Zhou Xiaoping, from here on out you must carry forward positive energy on the internet.”
One of Zhou Xiaoping’s best known writings is called A Sunshine Boy for the Mother Country (我待祖国如暖男), Zhou’s manifesto of sorts on how he sees his values and purpose. The term “sunshine boy,” or nuannan (暖男), is a new internet slang referring to a young man who, like the sunshine, instills people with feelings of warmth.
For cultural nationalists, Zhou Xiaoping certainly fits the bill.
An interview with internet writer Zhou Xiaoping appears on page 6 of today’s People’s Daily.
The following is our translation of an interview with Zhou Xiaoping published today on page 6 of the People’s Daily.
We leave it to readers to decide whether Zhou Xiaoping makes inspired points, or whether this familiar brand of cultural nationalism will, as the historian Yuan Weishi wrote a number of years back, “produce ideological trash.”
“Exclusive Interview With Post-80s Internet Writer Zhou Xiaoping: We Must Uphold Our Own Cultural Values” (专访80后网络作家周小平: 必须坚持我们自己的文化价值观)
October 24, 2014
Post-80s internet writer Zhou Xiaoping (周小平) has been a hot property lately. At the Work Forum on Arts and Culture held on October 15, he received the affirmation of General Secretary Xi Jinping as a representative at the meeting. The general secretary said he hoped [Zhou] would “create even more works with positive energy” (正能量). From Please Don’t Let Down This Age (请不要辜负这个时代) to A Sunshine Boy for the Mother Country (我待祖国如暖男), Zhou Xiaoping has voiced his own thoughts on himself, on this age and on China, and he has drawn widespread attention on the internet. Our reporter interviewed Zhou Xiaoping on related questions. “My sense of responsibility is pretty heavy, but I don’t feel pressure, because I’m confident I can do it well.” Reporter: Not long ago, you took part in the Work Forum on Arts and Culture led by General Secretary Xi Jinping. Seeing as it was your first time taking part in such a meeting, how did you feel? Zhou Xiaoping: The deepest personal feeling I had was first of all that General Secretary Xi Jinping had read a great many cultural works. Not only had he read these book, but he could talk about the content in detail — and he had even been to many of the places in these works.
His understanding about arts and culture is very profound, and that really surprised me. Because to my mind, leaders are too busy and they shouldn’t have the time to pay attention to these things. But General Secretary Xi is different. He in fact pays a great deal of attention, and he had a lot of stories to tell.
What General Xi Jinping really thirsts for is to express his innermost thoughts about the the revival of Chinese culture. This really shows between the lines — how he wants China’s cultural market to prosper, and it also shows how he wants to see Chinese culture have more confidence. Reporter: When General Secretary Xi urged you to creative even more works with positive energy, what were your feelings right then? Zhou Xiaoping: Actually, I had a lot of feelings going on. I’m a pretty ordinary guy, born in a far-flung place in Sichuan. That day I checked on a map and realized that there’s 1,800 kilometers between my hometown and the Great Hall of the People. So a huge distance, and such disparity of status, and it gave me this hopeful feeling. I never for the life of me believed that something like this would happen to me. My sense of responsibility is pretty heavy, but I don’t feel pressure, because I’m confident I can do it well. I can take three years, or five, or ten, or even longer to use the richest way possible to express the things I want to express, to convey my ideas and concepts through even richer and more colorful works. “I fiercely recognize that only by returning to a sense of confidence in Chinese culture can we make our country and our lives better.” Reporter: The many writings you’ve posted online have drawn a lot of attention and also stirred up criticism. How do you view this controversy and criticism? Zhou Xiaoping: I read this piece that analyzed my frame of thought and said that it was inconceivable that Zhou Xiaoping’s way of thinking wouldn’t be attacked in today’s public opinion climate and cultural community. Because the first opposition voice to speak up is always the one that gets criticized. This is just normal. Today many people talk about democracy and have to talk about Greece, or talk about human rights and have to talk about the West, or talk about innovation and have to talk about America and Europe. They think Chinese culture is decadent. They have no confidence in Chinese culture. So at a time like that for someone to stand up and dare to have confidence in Chinese culture, that’s something that gets on the bad side of a lot of prejudiced people — so naturally they are attacked.
And what do my essays actually talk about? I fiercely recognize that only by returning to a sense of confidence in Chinese culture can we make our country and our lives better. In their hearts, web users hold a love for their country, and they feel conflicted about the dark mood that prevails on the internet. That’s when people like me use our own way to tell them: your country has a sunny side. And when we show that sunny side, we earn the respect of a lot of people. They don’t necessarily agree with everything I say, with every viewpoint, with every story, with all the numbers. But what they do agree with is my feelings toward the country and my pursuit of light. This is something no one can refute. “Shaming the country is not criticism, and scolding the country is not criticism; we accept criticism, but we do not accept insults and abuses.” Reporter: These ideas of yours can’t have come from nowhere. What is the relationship between your views and your life experiences? Zhou Xiaoping: When I was little I was influenced a great deal by Western culture. At that time, I pretty much idolized the United States, Japan and Europe, and I didn’t feel a sense of affirmation about my own country. In Please Don’t Let Down This Age, I wrote that when I was young I wrote a lot of really foolish essays criticizing the government and voicing my admiration for the United States and Japan. But something happened when I served in the army, and it had a major impact on my values and my view of the world.
I started my military service in 1998, and the American bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade happened in 1999. At that time I was stationed on the border in Tibet, rifle in hand, and we stopped training and entered Level Two combat readiness (二级战备). That day, all admiration I had for America and Japan vanished. My liking for Europe disappeared too. Why? What I thought about was if we really went to war, what would my mom and dad do about those American bombs? And what about my relatives and friends? At the time I thought: If they really want to murder my relatives and friends, then they first have to step over my dead body! So from that time I went from being a baby soldier who didn’t understand a thing to a fighter devoted to the protection of his own country. Your faith comes out and you become a man, and you think, I need to protect my own country — so your sense of patriotism emerges too. My time as a soldier had a very big impact on my view of life.
I think cultural values should be diverse. When it comes down to China, we should have our own cultural values. That’s why General Secretary Xi says, “‘Getting rid of Chinese-ness’ (去中国化) is pathetic.” Because you are Chinese. And so what you adhere to can only be Chinese cultural values, and Chinese cultural values by the way are not too shabby.
For much of the broad sweep of history we were in first, and right now we’re catching up and getting ready to pass. The creativity emerging from this civilization, from our Chinese spirit, the inclusiveness and strength of our Chinese cultural inheritance, is something that deserves our pride. In China, we must adhere to the cultural values of the Chinese people. This is the only way we can live proudly in the world.
I think the fostering of this sort of attitude and the building of cultural values is a long-term project. Perhaps thirty or fifty years later, young people will have a different view of today, and a different view of the world. But how their views are different is a matter of what we do today. If we lose our culture, if we have no cultural values of our own, if we are entirely destroyed behind a tide of Western ideologies, well then, what will all of our struggles since 1840 have been for? So we have to make Chinese people feel pride and not shame for their culture and their history. Reporter: And you think that is what love of one’s country means? Zhou Xiaoping: Yes. General Secretary Xi has said, that we stand today closer than we ever have been to the Chinese dream. This is true. You need to understand that right now where you stand on this piece of ground, are the bones of so many martyrs. So many who sacrificed themselves. Think how many scientists returned to repay their country. How many ordinary people all playing their part . . . How can we just accept a total Westernization? I think that’s something shameful.
I think that’s how I see cultural values. We must uphold our own cultural values. Some people are always substituting their own concepts. I say, patriotism is not ass-kissing. Carrying forward the Chinese spirit is not empty flattery. We have to make a clear division over these. Shaming the country is not criticism, and scolding the country is not criticism; we accept criticism, but we do not accept insults and abuses.
The reasons are simple. For example, your child does something wrong at home. You criticize him. And maybe you spank him a couple of times. This is for his own good. In your heart you love him. But if someone comes over and says your child is a bastard, that he’ll be locked up in jail when he grows up, you would definitely sucker punch them. What we’re opposed to are those things that shame China. Reporter: So what are your plans now that the forum [on arts and culture] is over? Zhou Xiaoping: I’ve been a soldier. I’ve been a public servant. I’ve been a television host. And now I’ve started up a new company. From here on my main occupation won’t be essay writing, but I hope to create more and richer cultural products to express my ideas and serve society. And I hope these works truly influence others.
