Author: David Bandurski

Now Executive Director of the China Media Project, leading the project’s research and partnerships, David originally joined the project in Hong Kong in 2004. He is the author of Dragons in Diamond Village (Penguin), a book of reportage about urbanization and social activism in China, and co-editor of Investigative Journalism in China (HKU Press).

Who warped China's media?

Written by David Bandurski on . Posted in Headlines and Hashtags.

In our ongoing series of posts on media corruption in China, we look at an official perspective on media corruption and its impact on the practice of watchdog journalism — what in China is called “supervision by public opinion,” or yulun jiandu (舆论监督).
Supervision by public opinion has featured strongly in discussions of the role of media and press freedom in China since the late 1980s. In some cases the term can be used, particularly by proponents of an independent and professional press, as a stand-in term for “press freedom,” which is itself used only very cautiously by Chinese media (usually only in pejorative references to “Western press freedom”). Seeing the term as a Chinese cognate of Western “watchdog journalism,” they envision news media operating as a fourth estate, casting light on social, political and economic problems in China.
But “supervision by public opinion” has also been used frequently by officials in China to talk about the role of news media – under state control – in uncovering issues of official corruption and abuse of power on a range of issues, particularly at lower levels of the bureaucracy. In this official view, this “supervision by public opinion” must be subject to the overarching political demands of party leaders. Since 1989 the term has stood in tension with the cardinal control concept of “guidance of public opinion.”
In response to the recent news extortion scandal at 21cbh.com, China Press and Publications Journal — a publication run by a central-level media group founded in April 2011 by the State Council — ran an editorial by He Yonghai (何勇海) that spoke out sharply against the corrupting influence of commercial interests in the media.
“Media professionals must be independent of commercial interests, avoiding the corrosive affect of commercial interests,” He wrote. “[O]nly then can they earn the trust of the public. Acts like those at 21cbh.com, of using the threat of negative reports to press companies into buying advertising, or taking money to ‘profit from silence,’ without a doubt turn supervision by public opinion into a tool for profit.”
He Yonghai also voices indignation about media “doing excessively positive reporting or covering up negative problems about enterprises they [are] ‘cooperating’ with.”
Typical of official arguments on the question of media corruption, He Yonghai’s editorial blatantly ignores the elephant in the room, the corrosive affect of political power. He talks in an offhand fashion about how media should earn the trust of the public, when in fact the notion that the media should work in the public interest at all can be a highly sensitive one in China.
The media, make no mistake, work for the interests of the Chinese Communist Party, a point Xi Jinping has made more emphatically than his predecessor, telling propaganda leaders they should “show their swords” and “struggle” for domination of the ideological sphere.
Press controls under the CCP have always emphasized that “politicians run the newspapers,” a term that goes back to Mao Zedong. Under this idea of the role of the press, it is the Party’s prerogative to dictate what is meant by such things as truth, fact or rationality. And year after year, propaganda leaders bang their fists about the need to “emphasize positive news” and “speak with one voice.”
Long before money could ever corrupt the relationship between the media and the public, power severed that relationship.
How can this editorial by He Yonghai speak with outrage about media “doing excessively positive reporting or covering up negative problems” when this is precisely what China’s press and propaganda apparatus, one of its most robust institutions, is tasked with accomplishing?
This is the kind of hypocrisy we should be alert for in official reflections on the 21cbh.com case and other incidents of media corruption.
Think of the way, in the heady days of state-sponsored “supervision by public opinion,” two lines would form outside the offices of China Central Television’s “News Probe,” an investigative news program. In the first line were those with urgent complaints petitioning the program to tell their story — peasants whose land was seized, patients who suffered malpractice. In the second line were local and regional government officials (or their representatives) hoping to convince the network not to run damaging segments.
In the latter case, these petitions to do exactly the kind of covering up He Yonghai professes to find so offensive, money and power greased the wheels. And these were not “black-hearted journalists” or fake reporters. This was China’s official national television network.
When this is the sort of press environment created by China’s political institutions, how can we be the least bit surprised when pay-for-play and pay-for-silence become institutionalized forms of media business?
We should be surprised if they don’t.
One of the most interesting veins in He Yonghai’s piece is his principled defense of the “shareholders’ right to know” about possible mismanagement at publicly-listed companies.
Says He:

The acts of 21cbh.com in carrying out “supervision by public opinion,” exacting “protection fees” from listed companies and then doing what they could to sweep negative news clean, or doing excessively positive reporting or covering up negative problems about enterprises they were “cooperating” with . . . all of this seriously damages the interests of the shareholders and their right to know (股民的知情权).

So citizens as such do not have a right to know news and information that might be in the public interest. But shareholders, they do have a right to know — about those companies, at any rate, where their capital is invested.
He Yonghai’s argument exemplifies the corrupt mindset he sets out to criticize and mobilize against. And that is another feather in the cap of Zhu Xuedong, who argued here at CMP last week that China, and its media, are in an “era of corruption.”
He Yonghai’s argument boils down to this. In China, who has a right to information? Well, the Chinese Communist Party, of course. And also those who are able to pay for it.
Perhaps next time, before we begin the debate about how money has corrupted China’s media, we should open our wallets, pull out a 100 yuan note and remember whose face is on it.

mao money

The Right to Supervision by Public Opinion Cannot Be Warped: It Must Be Independent of Commercial Interests
(舆论监督权绝不可异化 要独立于商业利益之外)
China Press and Publications Journal
September 18, 2014
He Yonghai (何勇海)
The news extortion scandal at 21cbh.com has been brewing for days now. The special task force dealing with the case has found that the website targeted listed companies and well-known enterprises under such themes as “listing,” “restructuring” or “business transitions” in order to press willing companies into expensive arrangements whereby they would be given exaggerated praise or have their problems covered up in order to carry out “positive reporting” (正面报道). For those companies unwilling to cooperate, the site would release negative reports seeking to corner them into buying advertising or signing cooperative agreements.
The website and individuals working there reaped huge rewards through such practices, earning several hundred million yuan since 2010. (China Youth Daily, September 11, 2014).
In the past, it was generally fake reporters or “black-hearted reporters” from various media that perpetrated news extortion. Whenever these people would hear about an enterprise or government office that they could “hijack,” they would spring into action, rushing off to carry out “supervision by public opinion.” They would use such threats as the writing of neican to corner these enterprises and earn money. At 21cbh.com people were involved at every level, from the chief editor to the management, editorial and advertising staff — amounting to a news extortion “bomb” that was ready to go off and send shock waves.
The acts of 21cbh.com in carrying out “supervision by public opinion,” exacting “protection fees” from listed companies and then doing what they could to sweep negative news clean, or doing excessively positive reporting or covering up negative problems about enterprises they were “cooperating” with . . . all of this seriously damages the interests of the shareholders and their right to know (股民的知情权). For example, if certain listed companies do not carry out their obligations and reveal information, or if they violate regulations, this might seriously impact the capital of the shareholders.
To accept “protection fees” under the guise of “advertising fees” also harms the interest of certain enterprises that operate in line with standards. Aside from those enterprises that might have real problems, there are those enterprises that are clean but remain concerned that financial media might, in exercising “reasonable doubt,” attack them maliciously with negative reports, damaging their reputations and shaking the confidence of shareholders even when the reports are shown to be false — and so these companies do everything they can to maintain their media contacts, even purchasing peace.
Aside from seriously interfering with the normal operation of the market economy, taking “protection fees” under the guise of “advertising fees” does massive damage to the media industry. Media professionals must be independent of commercial interests, avoiding the corrosive affect of commercial interests — only then can they earn the trust of the public. Acts like those at 21cbh.com, of using the threat of negative reports to press companies into buying advertising, or taking money to “profit from silence,” without a doubt turn supervision by public opinion into a tool for profit.
If we do not severely strike out against this sort of conduct, if we are lenient toward these villains, then the damage to the media’s reputation in society will be serious, poisoning the atmosphere for supervision by public opinion.
Right now, numerous suspects from 21cbh.com are in prison. The soul-searching in the media and in the capital markets cannot stop here. “If those who use the media have evil intentions, the damage done as a result is unthinkable. If things go on like this, not only will be fail to become the promoters of social progress, we will in fact become the destroyers of value.” These were the words spoken in the confession given by Liu Dong (刘冬), the president of 21cbh.com, and all journalists should be warned.
If we are to create a healthy and transparent environment for supervision by public opinion, and avoid supervision by public opinion becoming a tool that is sold at a profit, we must act without fail and without delay.


The Flag Has Not Fallen

Written by David Bandurski on . Posted in Headlines and Hashtags.

kuang biao

In late 2012, China’s outgoing president, Hu Jintao, warned that corruption was a clear and president threat to the Chinese Communist Party. “If we fail to handle this issue well,” he said, “it could prove fatal to the party, and even cause the collapse of the party and the fall of the state.”
Since coming to power, President Xi Jinping has tried to shore up the CCP’s legitimacy by launching an aggressive anti-corruption drive combined with a mass line campaign attempting to drum up support for the Party and tamp down dissent [More here].
In his bid to strengthen the ruling Party’s position and dominance, Xi Jinping has actively reigned in China’s media and sent a harsh message to dissidents and rights defenders through the persecution of the likes of Xu Zhiyong and Pu Zhiqiang.
In the above cartoon, posted by artist Kuang Biao (邝飚) to Sina Weibo, an ear-tagged pig representing, presumably, the Chinese Communist Party, sits in a pot in which he has built himself a gruesome throne made out of bones. He holds high a red flag emblazoned not with the crossed sickle and hammer, symbols of the Party’s alliance with the workers and the peasants, but with the gun and the cleaver — the brutal weapons the pig must use to maintain his rule.

Posts on Hong Kong student boycott deleted

Written by David Bandurski on . Posted in Headlines and Hashtags.

The following post by ChrisTac, a Sina Weibo user with just 360 followers, was deleted sometime before 5:50PM yesterday, September 22, 2014. [See more deleted posts at the WeiboScope Search, by the Journalism and Media Studies Centre]
The post shares an image of the start of university student boycotts in Hong Kong yesterday to protest China’s refusal to grant full universal suffrage to the territory as promised in a 1984 treaty with the United Kingdom. The student boycotts were inaugurated with a mass gathering of students on the University Mall at the Chinese University of Hong Kong.
The image collection on ChrisTac’s Weibo post is topped with a picture showing students holding a banner that reads, “Make a foundation of democracy, to ensure tomorrow is free from trouble.”
A translation of the post follows:

More than 13,000 at the Chinese University of Hong Kong

CUHK boycott

The original Chinese post follows:

香港中文大學 突破一萬三千人


China's corrupt media

Written by David Bandurski on . Posted in Headlines and Hashtags.

The recent investigation into alleged news extortion at 21cbh.com, a financial news website under the auspices of China’s 21st Century Business Herald newspaper, is just the latest smudge on the grubby surface of China’s media industry. We can add it to a long list of desecrations, including the shameless media mudfest over the televised confession of socialite Guo Meimei (郭美美) and sensational coverage of prison escapee Gao Yulun (高玉伦).
The 21cbh.com case stands as further proof positive that China’s media has entered an era of corruption. In the coming years, I’m afraid, we will continue to see cases and stories like these.
“Age of Corruption” was the cover of the April 2013 edition of China Weekly, the magazine where until recently I was editor-in-chief. Our coverage in that issue sketched an outline of the present age in which we have found ourselves. In our political, economic and cultural life, we are in an age of corruption. And there is no better phrase to capture the ethos of our present-day media industry.

age of corruption cover China Weekly
The April 2014 edition of China Weekly magazine, in fact a monthly, bears the headline, “Age of Corruption.”
Here are some other labels that fit our media: vulgar (粗俗), shallow (浅陋), manic (狂躁), cynical (犬儒), arrogant (蛮横), despicable (卑鄙), shameless (无耻).

It would be wrong to point to some past Eden of professional purity. There was no such place. But there was at least a time — counting from around the mid-1990s — when commercial media in China sought a higher professional character as they pursued greater independence in the marketplace. There was a professional esprit de corps that somehow brightened the darker aspects of media practice.
These days, the environment grows more and more unforgiving for those journalists and media that still strive for self-discipline, determined not to make the fall from grace.
On the one hand, cynical opportunism has become the dominant spirit of our industry. Success is measured by lucre and power, and their attraction to the exclusion of all else is irresistible to most. Meanwhile, institutional factors — both political and economic — work against those who persist in their ideals, raising the real costs of good professional journalism.
This perfect storm of moral and institutional corruption has scattered and dissipated those voices within the industry that once served to check the kinds of abuse we see so readily today.
You can still hear the vocabulary of professionalism at media gatherings. But a lot of the issues we held near and dear before — like balanced reporting or protecting your sources — have been usurped by talk of revenue streams, changing business models and “venture capital investment” (创业融资).
The surest way to elicit general groans is to start the conversation about professionalism. Just say the word “innovation,” however, and you’ll put a glow in every eye. What do we mean when we talk about “innovation”? Well, naturally we mean business. What else could we possibly mean?
There is still at least a superficial respect for the idea of pursuing the truth and serving the public interest, but these have been relegated to the margins. In China, we have an ancient literati tradition that emphasizes solicitude for the homeland. We also have the liberal tradition fostered by the newspaper professionals of the Republican Era. And we have, finally, the liberal and professional current that emerged at the outset of the commercial media era in the 1990s and never fully bloomed. But all of these legacies have been rapidly undone in recent years by political and economic pressures and by our darker human instincts.
Short-sighted opportunism — the dominant value in our society today — already reigns supreme in a media industry that once, not so long ago, stubbornly resisted such corrupting influences. The logical and real consequence of this is that the professional capacity of the media industry has not only failed to advance along with social change, but in fact has suffered continuous erosion.

Zhu Xuedong
The author, Zhu Xuedong.
In the past, you could find journalists striving for professional space even against immense institutional pressures, a process that often required yielding to the second-best choice (like Southern Weekly‘s old battle-cry, that while there might be truths that could not be told, they would not tell outright lies). Now, even this instinct is lost among media leaders and editorial staff.
With experienced professionals few and far between, expedience is now the name of the game. Online rumors are accepted as “news” without any effort to confirm, fact-check or actually conduct interviews. This is so frightfully common you can even find it at well-regarded media that consider themselves serious professional players.
Our content has become homogenous and superficial. I doubt you could find any time when reporting and writing in our media was so degenerate. These days, news stories slip carelessly into snap political judgements. Even profanity is used without care.
We all know the tendency our online media have to fish for readers with the sensationalizing of headlines. We now use the term “headline party,” or biaotidang (标题党), to refer to those who practice this special form of opportunism. But even our so-called serious media can be found hyping female sexuality on the front page or in prominent headlines. There’s almost nothing we won’t do, however undignified, to attract the all-important eyeball (吸引眼球).
When an official news release came out on the “confession” of Guo Meimei, we threw professional conduct and ethics aside entirely, becoming nothing more than an attack mob. Everyone used the information in the release and not a thing more. We didn’t even bother to attempt the most perfunctory of interviews.
Have we really abandoned the high road for the low road?
There are still media in China struggling to hold on to their professional standards. There are still journalists doing their best to take the high road, pursuing truth for the betterment of our society. But we cannot deny that the travelers on that road are an ever rarer sight. Nor can we deny that the other path grows more crowded by the day.
This article is a translated and edited version of a piece appearing on Tencent’s Dajia platform on September 17. Zhu Xuedong (朱学东) was the editor-in-chief of China Weekly magazine until his resignation earlier this year. He served formerly as deputy editor-in-chief at the Information Morning Post, executive editor-in-chief at Media magazine, and editor-in-chief at Window on the South. He is now working as a freelance writer.

China Daily post on Weibo deleted

Written by David Bandurski on . Posted in Headlines and Hashtags.

The following post by China Daily (中国日报), an English-language newspaper published by the Information Office of China’s State Council, was deleted sometime around 11AM today, September 17, 2014. [See more deleted posts at the WeiboScope Search, by the Journalism and Media Studies Centre]
The China Daily post on Weibo summarizes a report published on Monday by Hong Kong’s South China Morning Post (article in Chinese here) that said Oxford University, which has produced “a long list of political leaders in many different countries” now hoped to “produce its first Chinese president.”
The post from the Weibo account of the government’s own English-language external propaganda newspaper was presumably censored because the idea that the sons and daughters of CCP elites — sometimes called the “second-generation reds” — are studying at universities like Oxford (and might be expected to become senior leaders themselves) is a sensitive notion, underscoring the disproportionate opportunities available to Party leaders and their families.
A translation of the post follows:

[Oxford University seeks to train China’s future leaders] Andrew Hamilton, the vice-chancellor of England’s Oxford University says that many political leaders have studied at Oxford, and now Oxford hopes that a future Chinese General Secretary with emerge from Oxford. Currently, says Hamilton, around 900 students from China, Hong Kong and Macau are studying at Oxford. China, says Hamilton, is now a major priority for Oxford, and as move further into the 21st century China will only become more important for Oxford. http://t.cn/RhaVBZL

oxford post CD

The shortened link at the end of the China Daily post takes readers to the Chinese-language story at the South China Morning Post.
The original Chinese post follows:

【牛津大学望培养中国未来领导人】英国牛津大学校长贺慕敦表示，许多国家的政治领导人都出自牛津，如今牛津希望中国未来国家主席出身于此。牛津大学现有900多名来自内地、香港及澳门的学生，贺慕敦表示，中国如今是牛津关注的重点，而随着21世纪展开，中国对牛津将会愈发重要。http://t.cn/RhaVBZL

Defense denied access to case files, says Guo Feixiong

Written by David Bandurski on . Posted in Headlines and Hashtags.

Criminal proceedings are scheduled to begin in Guangzhou today against human rights activist and lawyer Yang Maodong (杨茂东), most often known by his nom de plume, Guo Feixiong (郭飞雄).
Yang, a long-time human rights campaigner who was previously jailed in 2007 for the unauthorized publication of a political expose (and released almost exactly three years ago), was arrested in August 2013 and later charged with “gathering a crowd to disrupt order in a public place.”

yang

At least some of Yang’s present charges stem from his alleged organization of protests in January 2013 outside the office’s of Guangzhou’s Southern Weekly newspaper.
Yesterday, ahead of today’s trial proceedings, Yang issued a statement circulated on Twitter, Facebook and Chinese social media, in which he accused the court of violating his right to legal defense by preventing access to key case materials.
Our full translation of Yang’s statement follows:

Statement from Prison by Mr. Guo Feixiong
In the process of hearing the case against me for so-called ‘disturbance of public order’ (聚众扰乱公共场所秩序), there have been numerous instances of violations of legal procedure. In particular, there have been violations of Article 38 of the Criminal Procedure Law, namely the preventing of my defense lawyers, Chen Guangwu (陈光武) and Zhang Xuezhong (张雪忠), from copying eight discs of digitized case materials (including video taken at the scene, photographs and other evidence). This already constitutes a serious violation of the legal right of defense of myself and my defense lawyers.
If the court continues tomorrow (September 12, 2014) to proceed according to its original designs, well then, the court and the trial will be improper and illegal, and therefore entirely null and void. Tomorrow, in the midst of this illegal and entirely void trial process, I will maintain silence throughout.
Here I wish only to voice my utmost resistance and condemnation to the tyrannical stability preservation system, which flagrantly violates the law and tramples on its spirit, and which regards the basic interests of the Chinese people — namely, the realization of constitutionalism and democracy — as an abyss that means the end of the world.
If those in power wish, in disguised fashion, to do away with the legal defense system, returning us to the kind of criminal justice system we had in the days before the end of the Cultural Revolution, when [the right to] legal defense did not exist and family members could not attend trial proceedings — well then, let them begin with the cases against me and against Sun Desheng (孙德胜)!
Guo Feixiong (郭飞雄), a.k.a. Yang Maodong (杨茂东)
September 11, 2014


Lu Wei: the internet must have brakes

Written by David Bandurski on . Posted in China Newspeak.

Speaking to a panel on “the future of the internet economy” at the World Economic Forum’s 2014 Summer Davos in Tianjin yesterday, Lu Wei (鲁炜), the director of China’s State Internet Information Office (SIIO), said there must be “mutual integration” of international rules for internet governance and the national laws of various countries.
“Freedom and order are twin sisters, and they must live together,” said Lu Wei, according to a report from the official Xinhua News Agency. “The same principle applies to security. So we must have a public order [internationally]. And this public order cannot impact any particular local order.”
Lu Wei, a former municipal propaganda minister for Beijing, has a reputation in China as a hard-liner bent on strengthening control over the internet, and particularly social media. Many Chinese journalists attribute China’s 2013 crackdown on “Big V” users on Sina Weibo to Lu.

lu wei

Suggesting that controls should be built into internet technology as it develops globally, Lu likened the internet to a car, for which brakes are an absolutely necessary feature.
“The internet is like a car,” said Lu Wei. “If it has no brakes, it doesn’t matter how fast the car is capable of traveling, once it gets on the highway you can imagine what the end result will be. And so, no matter how advanced, all cars must have brakes.”
A full translation of the Xinhua report of Lu Wei’s remarks follows:

The Speed of China’s Internet Development Has No Equal
During the dialogue, Lu Wei remarked that over the past 20 years, China’s internet has developed at a fierce pace. China now has close to four million websites, 600 million internet users and 1.3 billion mobile phone users, of which 500 million use mobile internet services. The number of internet users in China is greater that the total populations of many countries, and accounts for one-fifth of all internet users in the world. Internet enterprises in China have also developed rapidly, and of the 10 most competitive internet enterprises in the world, China is home to four. E-commerce in China has grown at double-digit pace, at nearly 30 percent, in fact — a level of growth that has no equal in the world. Looking at e-commerce in China, annual business transactions total more than 10,000 billion (10万亿), and this is expected to grow 20 percent in 2014. We have already seen a 20 percent increase in e-commerce growth during the first half of the year.
What is it that has driven the ferocious development of China’s internet? Lu Wei believes that, first of all, it has been China’s open policy approach. Without the policy of reform and opening, China’s internet would not have grown so rapidly. Secondly, Chinese internet enterprises have a strong sense of innovation. Without this level of innovation, these enterprises could not have performed so well. Thirdly, Chinese internet enterprises have worked with internet companies around the world and accommodated the global trends in internet development. Fourthly, China’s internet is managed in an orderly manner. It’s precisely because of this orderly management that China’s internet has developed in a scientific manner. Finally, China has gathered together a group of elite internet experts.
Internet Governance Must Be “Multilateral, Democratic and Transparent’
In addressing the issue of internet governance, Lu Wei used three words. The first was “multilateral” (多边), meaning the accommodation of various interests to a single goal. The second was “democratic” (民主), meaning that we discuss decisions together, and no single person, or no single country, or no single interest group can have the final say all on its own. The third was “transparency” (透明), meaning that internet governance must operate by transparent rules, and the whole world must be clear about these rules.
Across these three principles, said Lu Wei, we have a consensus [globally], and we can certainly reach the best methods that allow the internet to become Alibaba’s treasure box rather than Pandora’s box.
Combining International Public Order and Respect for National Laws
Lu Wei said that the establishment of rules was necessary, that if there were no rules governing e-commerce then problems such as piracy would result . . . Freedom and order are twin sisters, said Lu Wei, and they must live together. The same principle applied to security. So we must have a public order. And this public order cannot impact any particular local order. Therefore, there was a need for the mutual integration of the international public order [of the internet] and the laws of every nation. Only then will the internet be ordered as it should be.
The Basic Line of Thinking in China’s Approach to Internet Management is Respect for the Law
Lu Wei emphasized that the basic line of thinking in China for the management of the internet was respect for China’s laws. More concretely: 1) protection of China’s national interests; 2) protection of the interests of Chinese consumers. These are China’s legal bottom lines. What we cannot permit, [said Lu], is the taking advantage of China’s market, of profiting from Chinese money, but doing damage to China. This will absolutely not be permitted. It is unacceptable to harm China’s interests, to harm China’s security, or to harm the interests of China’s consumers. Assuming respect for this bottom line any internet company is welcome in China.
We Must Have a Clear Consciousness in the FAce of Rapid Technological Development
Discussing what sort of internet should be built, Lu Wei said that, first of all, the internet space should be peaceful (和平的), promoting the peaceful interaction among people, and it cannot provoke war in the world. Second, it must be secure. It cannot make people like goldfish in a fishbowl, their personal information revealed for all to see, or suffering slander at the hands of others. Third, it should be open, being interoperable at all access points in the world — because without openness the internet effectively does not exist. Fourth, [the internet should be] cooperative.
Lu Wei emphasized that we must remain clearly conscious about the rapid development of internet technologies. On the one hand, we cannot restrict the development of technologies simply because it is too fast; on the other hand, we cannot lose sight of security as technologies develop. The internet is like a car, [said Lu Wei]. If it has no brakes, it doesn’t matter how fast the car is capable of traveling, once it gets on the highway you can imagine what the end result will be. And so, no matter how advanced, all cars must have brakes.

Unhealthy criticism of a failing health system?

Written by David Bandurski on . Posted in Headlines and Hashtags.

The following post by “Bai Gu Lun Jin” (摆古论今), was deleted sometime around 8AM today, September 10, 2014. [See more deleted posts at the WeiboScope Search, by the Journalism and Media Studies Centre]
The post shares quotes from health professional and SARS hero Zhong Nanshan (钟南山) [official paean here], spoken in March 2014 during the annual full session of the National People’s Congress (NPC). The quotes, in fact, are all available publicly in coverage from of the NPC from the official Xinhua News Agency — making this an apparent case where social media censors are far more sensitive than their counterparts in traditional media.
During the March NPC, Zhong harshly criticized China’s medical profession, which he said relied on “selling prescriptions” that patients didn’t necessarily need. He urged reform of China’s healthcare system, and decried reform trends that put the health business before the well-being of patients.
A translation of the post follows:

“Doctors all around the world rely on their art to fill their bellies, but in China doctors rely on the sale of prescriptions.” “In half a day one doctor sees 50 patients. What time does he have to talk with those who are ill? You wait in line for three hours, and you see a doctor for three minutes. With such little interaction its easy for tensions to emerge.” “We can talk about the ethical shortcomings of our doctors, but it’s better to talk about the problems in our healthcare system. Healthcare reform must not be about economic ways of thinking, but about how to respect life.

The original Chinese post follows:

全世界医生都靠技术吃饭，中国医生靠卖药吃饭】一个医生半天要看50个人，有什么时间和病人交流？排队3小时、看病3分钟，没有沟通就容易产生矛盾。与其说是医生道德问题，不如说是医院体制问题。医改不应该用抓经济的思路，而要尊重生命。——钟南山 http://t.cn/8sv3BQO 支持他观点的请转发！

zhong nanshan

Pick a puppet, any puppet

Written by David Bandurski on . Posted in Headlines and Hashtags.

HK democracy

On September 31, the Standing Committee of China’s National People’s Congress issued strict procedures for the election in 2017 of Hong Kong’s next chief executive. The NPC proposal essentially gave China’s central government the right to decide who could and could not stand as a candidate for Hong Kong’s top office. Quoted in the New York Times, veteran Democratic Party politician Cheung Man-kwong, said: “By endorsing this framework, China has in truth and in substance reneged on her promise to give Hong Kong universal suffrage.” In the above cartoon, posted by Perverted Pepper to Twitter, President Xi Jinping, in a tank that has haphazardly been relabelled “democratic party,” approaches a man labelled “Occupy Central.” Xi offers a choice between two red puppets, both with menacing teeth. In the background, an anxious Taiwan looks on.

Xi's missing terms emerge again

Written by David Bandurski on . Posted in China Newspeak.

Just last week, in a post called “The Missing Speech,” I discussed the significant omission from a new compilation of speeches by Xi Jinping — A Primer of Important Speeches by General Secretary Xi Jinping — of a speech he made on December 4, 2012, to commemorate the 30th anniversary of China’s Constitution. I singled out the most important phrase Xi uttered during that speech: “Rule of the nation by law means, first and foremost, ruling the nation in accord with the constitution; the crux in governing by laws is to govern in accord with the constitution.”
The pair of terms in this phrase — “ruling the nation in accord with the constitution” (依宪治国) and “governing in accord with the constitution” (依宪执政) — received a great deal of attention inside and outside China at the time of Xi’s speech, and they were also for a time widely touted by Chinese media. Some felt that they bore the promise of greater reform. But before long they disappeared altogether. As of August 2014, the former term, “ruling the nation in accord with the constitution,” had been unused for six months, and the latter term, “governing in accord with the constitution,” had been unused for nine months.
I concluded my post by saying that the appearance (or continued disappearance) of Xi’s words during next month’s 4th Plenum of the 18th Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party would be an important test of how and whether the agenda has shifted.
As it happens, both terms have already re-emerged. On September 5, President Xi Jinping gave a speech to commemorate the 60th anniversary of the founding of the National People’s Congress (NPC). In the speech, Xi said: “The Constitution is the most basic law of our country. Rule of the nation by law means, first and foremost, ruling the nation in accord with the constitution; governing by laws is first and foremost, governing in accord with the constitution.”
For a more detailed look at the strange ups and downs of this important phrase, I refer readers to my earlier piece. But what can we infer from this strange pattern of use of this pair of slogans, what in Chinese we call tifa (提法), or “watchwords”?

spectrum

In my past analyses of political discourse in China, I’ve defined a four-color spectrum to categorise political speech: DEEP RED, LIGHT RED, LIGHT BLUE and DEEP BLUE.
Terms in the DEEP RED are mostly leftist slogans left behind by Mao Zedong. The Party’s dominant language is in the LIGHT RED, terms like “Socialism with Chinese Characteristics” (中国特色社会主义) or “not traveling the old road” (不走老路). LIGHT BLUE terms are more liberal ones that are not used by the Party but are not off limits. They might be seen, for example, in commercial newspapers like Southern Metropolis Daily, and much less frequently in the likes of the People’s Daily.
DEEP BLUE terms like “multiparty system” are off limits, hence the vertical red line in the graphic above. This means they are not generally used at all, at least in a positive sense. Since last year we can say we’ve seen a re-emergence of the DEEP RED in China, and along with this shift we’ve seen a number of terms typically in the LIGHT BLUE — such as “constitutionalism” and “civil society” — shift over into the DEEP RED, become taboo terms.
We can regard Xi Jinping’s above mentioned terms — “ruling the nation in accord with the constitution” (依宪治国) and “governing in accord with the constitution” (依宪执政) — as LIGHT RED terms. And at certain times, we might see these terms banished to the cold house, in which case they move further along the spectrum and become LIGHT BLUE terms (not used officially).
Political watchwords in China run hot and cold, and they can reflect political changes in the country. But the relationship between discourse and political shifts or circumstances is a complex one, and we have to avoid the temptation of oversimplifying.
Based on my observations of the ebb and flow of these constitutional terminologies employed by Xi Jinping, I believe they are closely tied to the internal struggle over constitutionalism in China.
In the summer of 2013, in the midst of a vehement campaign against constitutionalism, “ruling the nation in accord with the constitution” (依宪治国) and “governing in accord with the constitution” (依宪执政) disappeared entirely in the media. In the midst of the 3rd Plenum late last year, the terms came back again briefly. But through spring and summer this year, the anti-constitutionism drums beat strong again, and we saw a corresponding dip in use of these slogans.
Some people believe that the Chinese Communist Party has recognised this issue. Seeing that Xi had once again used these two terms, one scholar friend who specialises in constitutionalism shared his thoughts with me as follows:

These terms “ruling the nation in accord with the constitution” and “governing in accord with the constitution” that Xi is using refer to the preamble to the Constitution, which essentially says that the Chinese Communist Party is the leadership core of the project of socialism with Chinese characteristics. As the CCP understands it, this [sentence?] makes clear the ruling status of the Chinese Communist Party, and this is the basis of the Party’s rule. There is a huge gap between how the system understands this and how the public understands it. If you leave out these eight [Chinese] characters — “ruling the nation in accord with the constitution” and “governing in accord with the constitution” — you’ve lost the basis of Party rule. They’ve realised this. I think these terms missing from the Xi Jinping collection is just about how they mediate things internally.

I agree with what this friend says. Certainly, there is often a “huge gap between how the system understands [something] and how the public understands it.” There are a lot of Chinese who hope ardently for reform, and every time this or that slogan appears they read their own hopes into it, often missing the fact that inside the shiny new bottle it’s the same old wine.
But this does not mean that political watchwords leave us entirely without solutions. In fact, we can often observe what the numbers tell us about “how the system understands” something. In China, to understand how the DEEP RED and LIGHT RED constrain DEEP BLUE, and how the DEEP RED and LIGHT RED often contest one another, all we need is to observe the movement of the term “political reform” (政治体制改革).
Just consider. How is it possible that for such important terms as “ruling the nation in accord with the constitution” (依宪治国) and “governing in accord with the constitution” (依宪执政) — terms that deal with the Party’s core concepts — saying them and not saying them amount to the same thing?
Some people say, well, Xi Jinping has always talked about “ruling the nation by law” (依法治国), which is basically the same thing as “ruling the nation in accord with the constitution” and “governing in accord with the constitution,” right? But the difference in emphasis is, I believe, significant. Look again at what Xi Jinping said in December 2012:

Rule of the nation by law means, first and foremost, ruling the nation in accord with the constitution; the crux in governing by laws is to govern in accord with the constitution.

And what he said in this September 5 speech:

The Constitution is the most basic law of our country. Rule of the nation by law means, first and foremost, ruling the nation in accord with the constitution; governing by laws is first and foremost, governing in accord with the constitution.

I think with Xi Jinping’s talk of “first and foremost” and “the crux” in the above two passages we can see clear differences of emphasis between these and “ruling the nation by law.” I cannot possibly be an accident or an incidental choice for Xi Jinping to have used these particular phrases, these slogans, in these two speeches.
Many people, of course, don’t trust the slogans of the Chinese Communist Party. They’ll point out that the Party has always said one thing and done another. So even if they sign these two slogans about the constitution to the heavens, we can’t take this to mean they’re actually going to move in the direction of real constitutionalism. I’ll admit the reason in this too. However, I think it’s worth continuing to watch this deployment of watchwords.
This most recent speech of Xi Jinping’s deserves particular attention. It should be understood as an opening salvo to the upcoming 4th Plenum. It should be a signal of some sort that he has chosen at this moment to once again raise these two terms, “ruling the nation in accord with the constitution” and “governing in accord with the constitution.”
At the same time, it’s not enough to dwell on these terms. Looking at the full text of Xi’s September 5 speech, we can see LIGHT RED terms mixed together with clear DEEP RED language like “dictatorship” (专政). So it’s very hard to tell what positives can be inferred from these nuances of discourse.
One thing we can be quite sure of, however, is that there are people within the Party who are unsettled by Xi Jinping’s decision to use these terms.
With the re-introduction of the above mentioned terms in Xi Jinping’s September 5 speech, the questions I laid out in my last post are not eliminated. For from it. They are more pronounced than ever.
“Ruling the nation in accord with the constitution” and “governing in accord with the constitution” have a directional quality and even possibly are banner term material (representing Xi’s hoped-for legacy like the “Three Represents” for Jiang Zemin and “scientific development” for Hu Jintao). Xi Jinping used them at the beginning of his term in office, and now we see them emerging again.
But why would A Primer of Important Speeches by General Secretary Xi Jinping, the volume intended as “a scientific compass for the unifying of ideas and advancement of [Party] work in the new era,” leave out these slogans? It’s hard to imagine that such a collection, produced by the Central Propaganda Department, would be published at all without the blessing of Xi Jinping. If it did have his blessing, why again would these slogans be removed? And then, just as everyone throughout the Party is poring over their copies of this volume without Xi Jinping’s “ruling the nation in accord with the constitution,” the term crops up again?
Where does this leave the Primer as an authoritative volume?
My friend, the constitutional expert, is right. We have to watch “how they mediate things internally.”
Chinese politics today are an exceedingly complex system in which DEEP RED, LIGHT RED, LIGHT BLUE and DARK BLUE face off in a chess game in which the rules are equally unclear.
As I wrote in my last post, the 18th Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party will meet for its 4th Plenum next month. Party media have already reported that the meeting will “research the thorough promotion of rule of the nation by law.” I posed the question: would the Xi Jinping statements that “rule of the nation by law means, first and foremost, ruling the nation in accord with the constitution” or “the crux in governing by laws is to govern in accord with the constitution” appear at the 4th Plenum?
Now, one month ahead of the Plenum, Xi Jinping’s September 5 speech seems to have raised the probability that we will see these watchwords next month.
I urge observers of Chinese politics to watch these words closely. Though of course, things are never quite so simple. I noticed, for example, that while the full text of Xi Jinping’s September 5 speech as released by Xinhua News Agency does have both of these terms, Xinhua’s official news release on the meeting did not mention them at all. Nor did the news about the meeting on the front page of the People’s Daily make any mention of them.
Was that negligence too?

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