Now Executive Director of the China Media Project, leading the project’s research and partnerships, David originally joined the project in Hong Kong in 2004. He is the author of Dragons in Diamond Village (Penguin), a book of reportage about urbanization and social activism in China, and co-editor of Investigative Journalism in China (HKU Press).
Since rising to the post of General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party in November 2012, Xi Jinping has worked hard to set himself apart from his predecessors, defining his personal style as down-to-earth and no-nonsense.
The goal of this public relations makeover has been to convince the Chinese public that the fifth generation of China’s leaders is in touch with the issues facing common folk, that it is open and subject to scrutiny — rather than aloof, privileged and corrupt.
The sense of Xi Jinping as an attentive man of action was captured early on in a propaganda piece on December 31, 2012: “Xi Jinping Visits Poor Families in Hebei: Dinner Is Just 4 Dishes and One Soup, No Alcohol.”
Xi Jinping visits families in Hebei on December 29, 2012.
The Xi Jinping love fest continues today with a piece from the Shanghai Observer (上海观察), prominently placed on many websites — including the official site of the state news agency, Xinhua — that purports to offer inside access to the president’s busy workday. He is a man, the writer tells us, who never stops.
The Shanghai Observer is a new media platform launched on January 1, 2014, by the Shanghai United Media Group (上海报业集团), which was founded in October 2013 by the merger of the Liberation Daily Press Group (解放日报报业集团) and the Wenhui Xinmin United Press Group (文汇新民联合报业集团) — the former being the publisher of Shanghai’s official Party paper, the latter being a press group founded in 1998 as China’s commercial media revolution was gaining steam. The Shanghai United Media Group is run by Qiu Xin (裘新), a former senior editor with Shanghai’s official Liberation Daily (解放日报) who served as the city’s deputy chief of propaganda in 2011.
(If I may be permitted a moment of schadenfreude . . . The official Weibo account of this “new media” publication by a Shanghai media behemoth has fewer followers than the rather tepid Weibo account of this CMP editor.)
But the Shanghai Observer apparently has quite close access to China’s president.
Today’s article begins by referring to an article previously circulated by the “Study Group” (学习小组), a mysterious content source that became a hot topic this year after it circulated a number of portraits of Xi Jinping and his work-style that seemed far more personable that past profiles of national leaders — pieces like, “Xi Jinping Celebrates His Birthday During the Dragon Boat Festival” (習近平端午节过生日).
All of the material released by the “Study Group” dealt with Xi Jinping, and all of it generally kicked up a wave of excited attention on the internet. An article in the overseas edition of the People’s Daily in June this year revealed that the “Study Group” was in fact “a column” run by the People’s Daily overseas edition. The “column” seems to be primarily devoted to keeping up the polish on Xi Jinping’s shimmering public image.
Anyhow, the “Study Group” article talked about how Xi Jinping once added his comments by early morning to a policy document he did not receive until around midnight the night before. The point: Xi Jinping is a hard worker; he gets things done.
Chinese President Xi Jinping delivers his New Year’s message to the nation on the eve of January 1, 2014, through China Central Television, China Radio International and China National Radio. Photo by Lan Hongguang (兰红光), Xinhua News Agency.
The following is our translation of the Xi Jinping profile from the Shanghai Observer:
The topic of Xi Jinping and time has come up often in [articles by] the Study Group (小组).
Early this year, Xi Jinping issued the classic sigh, “Where has the time gone?” The answer he gave to his own question was that it had all been spent on work. On an overseas trip, Xi Jinping once said he often felt conflicted about overseas travel, because there were so many things that needed doing back home. There was once a case, according to the Study Group, where [Xi Jinping] issued written comments first thing in the morning on a [policy] document received at midnight the night before.
The article we share today comes from the Shanghai Observer (上海观察), and it was written by Guan Jintai (官锦台). As a writer who has observed Xi Jinping at close quarters, Guan has discovered that Xi Jinping’s daily work “proceeds at high speed and with great energy” (高速运转且极费精力). The ordinary day in the life of Xi Jinping recorded by the writer certainly seems to be extremely busy.
I’m sure many people would like to know how work is arranged for Xi Jinping every day. On Friday, October 24, many Chinese people were savoring the communique emerging from the Fourth Plenum [of the 18th Central Committee of the CCP], Xi Jinping was already beginning a new busy day.
As someone who specializes in international news, I had the good fortune of observing Xi Jinping at close range as he handled the days foreign affairs. From this I gained an understanding of the daily work life of this, China’s most senior leader. I discovered that Xi Jinping that what Xi Jinping must accomplish each day is a series of tasks “proceeding at high speed and with great energy.” It’s not the least bit an exaggeration to say that he is “at work both day and night” (夙夜在公). Of course, like the average Chinese person, Xi Jinping’s busy day is not without humor and joy.
There was no way for me to know exactly what time Xi Jinping got up from bed that morning, but I could be sure that he, like all those working at the crack of dawn, he had eaten his breakfast before first light, and after he had read his “Daily Briefing” (每日简报) had proceeded to the Great Hall of the People. There he had to meet with international representatives present for the memorandum signing for the launch of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank.
According to my observations, regardless of the particular task at hand, Xi Jinping is always able to proceed according to the larger background of domestic and international affairs. He speaks in a bold and down-to-earth manner. For example, at this memorandum signing he said, “If you want to prosper, you must first build a road” (要想富，先修路). And he said, “Those who unite in purpose can move mountains” (人心齐，泰山移). Everyone present nodded in praise.
His domestic and international views were expressed in the following way:
“China is right now in the midst of a thorough deepening of reforms, and it is pushing ever closer to its goals of the ‘Two Centennials’ (两个一百年) [of the CCP in 2021, and of the “New China” in 2049]. China’s economy will continue to grow in a healthy manner, and China’s development cannot do without Asia or without the world. We will firmly and steadfastly pursue a win-win strategy of opening up. I have talked about building a Silk Road economic belt, a 21st-century Silk Road of the seas, and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank with the goal of deepening economic cooperation among the nations of Asia — in order to achieve common development. We will do our utmost to ensure that China’s own development benefits the nations of Asia and the world.”
That day, Xi Jinping also conducted “foreign affairs by telephone.” On the other end of the line was Indonesian President Joko Widodo. Xi Jinping congratulated Widodo on his becoming the new Indonesian president, and he invited him to attend the informal meeting of leaders at the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) in Beijing next month.
Xi Jinping’s work rhythm is “fast,” to use the words of CCP Central Committee Politburo member and General Office director Li Zhanshu (栗战书). Li Zhanshu recently wrote in an article in Secretary Work (秘书工作), [a magazine published by the Research Office of Secretariat of the CCP Central Committee], that “General Secretary Xi Jinping demands that we ‘work so there is no backlog, and nothing left overnight’ (案无积卷、事不过夜). The general secretary works like this himself. His work style is very rigorous, and his rhythm is very fast. [Policy] documents requiring instructions from the general secretary always come back with written instructions by morning the next day, regardless of how late they get to him, even if its at midnight.”
This sort of work attitude and style was expressed most incisively in the afternoon as Xi Jinping met with visiting Tanzanian President Jakaya Mrisho Kikwete. When the welcome ceremony outside the East Gate of the Great Hall of the People was concluded, Xi Jinping proceeded with rapid steps to the conference room, so that those of us behind had to jog along to keep up. As soon as the Tanzanian delegates were seated, Xi Jinping said there were many things they needed to talk about today, and to save time they should use simultaneous interpretation.
The facts show that simultaneous interpretation substantially increases the efficiency of meetings, and the meeting ended by 6:15 in the afternoon. Leaders from both countries then went straight to the signing ceremony for the cooperative agreement, held in the Hebei Hall (河北厅). Even though there was just a short walk between the two halls, I saw for myself how Xi Jinping and President Kikwete were engaged in intense conversation.
These two tense meetings in the morning and afternoon would be enough to exhaust anyone, so it was time for a much needed rebalancing. And this is how Xi Jinping accomplished it. When the heads of the two countries came to the table where they were to sign, Xi Jinping noticed that President Kikwete seemed to want to sit down, so he quipped cheerfully, we have to stand and serve as a backdrop for them. Hearing this, the translator instantly interpreted the remark as Kikwete listened attentively, and then the whole atmosphere of the scene relaxed a great deal.
I noted that during the signing ceremony one of Tanzania’s ministers forgot to shake hands with Xi Jinping after the copies were exchanged, and at the express urging of Kikwete, there was a quick “makeup shake” (“补握”). At that moment, Xi Jinping, perhaps thinking himself that this touch was rather interesting, started to laugh.
Whatever you do, don’t imagine that Xi Jinping’s day was then over. Because after that he still needed to host a banquet for President Kikwete. The lights were brilliant on the third floor of the Great Hall of the People, and at this time the lights went on over Chang’an Avenue as well, a parade of lights. As most people were having family dinners or watching television, he was still busying himself with affairs of state.
I thought of the time last year when Xi Jinping was visiting Russia. When he was meeting with Chinese Embassy staff in Moscow and representatives of Chinese-invested businesses there, he said: “They say misery can be accompanied by happiness; but for me, I find joy in exhaustion.”
And based on my observations over that one day, Xi Jinping not only “finds joy in exhaustion” when he is on foreign tours, but at home too he “finds joy in exhaustion.”
China released a communique late yesterday from the Fourth Plenum of the 18th Central Committee of the CCP. The document, which offers a preview of the full “Decision” to come in the next couple of days, deals with the “comprehensive advancement of rule of the nation by law (依法治国), with the overall goal of building a socialist system of rule by law with Chinese characteristics, and the building of a socialist country ruled by law.”
What does that mean? It’s difficult to say — and it’s certainly premature to speculate before the full decision is released.
However, it is worth noting that the communique does include a pair of political phrases CMP director Qian Gang (钱钢) analyzed at some length back in September: “ruling the nation in accord with the constitution” (依宪治国) and “governing in accord with the constitution” (依宪执政). For more, readers can see “The Missing Speech” and “Xi’s Missing Terms Emerge Again.”
Here is what Qian Gang wrote about the terms in the first of these pieces:
These were Xi Jinping’s most jarring slogans after taking the Party’s top post in 2012, and they were closely tied to the subsequent championing of “constitutionalism” that we saw among intellectuals in China. The rise and fall of these terms reflects internal political sensitivities. In January 2013 — the month that the Southern Weekly incident erupted in Guangzhou around the censoring of the New Year’s message on constitutionalism — the terms did not appear in the People’s Daily. Then, after appearing once each in February and March that year, the terms disappeared from the paper altogether from April to July. In August, there was one appearance of either term, just as the propaganda tide against constitutionalism reached its height. In October 2013, there was one appearance. In November, two appearances. In February, 2014, there was one final appearance — and since then we’ve not seen the terms at all.
These Xi Jinping phrases seem to be the subject of some degree of internal Party wrangling, and it remains unclear how central they were originally conceived as being to Xi Jinping’s own goals and legacy building. As Qian Gang wrote, the phrase uniting the two terms “was very possibly conceived originally as a Xi Jinping banner term, like Jiang Zemin’s “Three Represents” (三个代表) and Hu Jintao’s “Scientific View of Development” (科学发展观).”
One thing we can say about yesterday’s communique is that it seems to bring these terms back into prominence, and they’re virtually assured a visible position in the full “Decision.”
Still, optimists be cautioned. Despite all the talk of “rule by law” in the communique, the Party’s position of dominance remains absolutely clear in the language, and it remains to be seen how Xi Jinping and other Party elites view the notions of “ruling the nation in accord with the constitution” and “governing in accord with the constitution” over and against the supremacy of the Party’s position.
If the hot-and-cold history of the terms themselves is something to go by, that question is a point on which there is a lot of division.
But there is another term in the communique that deserves attention as well. And it is arguably a point in favor of those who lean toward a more pessimistic reading. In graph nine of the communique, the term “governing the nation with virtue” (以德治国) is added to the list of governance principles:
To realize these goals [of ruling in accord with the law], [we] must uphold the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party, uphold the principle position of the people, uphold equality of all people before the law, uphold the combination of ruling the nation in accord with the law and ruling the nation with virtue (以德治国), upholding the [principle of] proceeding on the basis of China’s realities.
What does it mean to “rule the nation with virtue”?
For a precedent for the use of this term we have to go all the way back to Jiang Zemin. Jiang used the term in an almost identical manner when articulating the Party’s governing principles in June 2000. “[We must] uphold the combination of governing the nation in accord with the law and governing the nation with virtue,” he said (坚持依法治国与以德治国相结合).
But after 2000, the term fell entirely out of favor. So we are witnessing the return of a ghost after a 14-year absence. And who can say what that means?
At a state-sponsored forum on arts and culture held earlier this month, President Xi Jinping said works of art and literature “should be like sunshine, blue sky and the spring breeze, inspiring minds, warming hearts and cultivating taste.”
What kind of taste exactly? Well, first of all, tastes and values should be uniquely Chinese. And they should also be full of “positive energy,” or zhengnengliang (正能量) — a term used widely in China’s state media since 2012 to refer to positive and uplifting content and attitudes (as opposed to critical and negative ones).
In the wave of Chinese media coverage attending the arts and culture forum, one representative in particular was singled out as the flag-bearer of “positive energy,” just the kind of voice that China needs to stake out its cultural place in the world. According to news reports, President Xi shook the hand of internet writer Zhou Xiaoping (周小平), a commentator known for his patriotic essays, and said: “Zhou Xiaoping, from here on out you must carry forward positive energy on the internet.”
One of Zhou Xiaoping’s best known writings is called A Sunshine Boy for the Mother Country (我待祖国如暖男), Zhou’s manifesto of sorts on how he sees his values and purpose. The term “sunshine boy,” or nuannan (暖男), is a new internet slang referring to a young man who, like the sunshine, instills people with feelings of warmth.
For cultural nationalists, Zhou Xiaoping certainly fits the bill.
An interview with internet writer Zhou Xiaoping appears on page 6 of today’s People’s Daily.
The following is our translation of an interview with Zhou Xiaoping published today on page 6 of the People’s Daily.
We leave it to readers to decide whether Zhou Xiaoping makes inspired points, or whether this familiar brand of cultural nationalism will, as the historian Yuan Weishi wrote a number of years back, “produce ideological trash.”
“Exclusive Interview With Post-80s Internet Writer Zhou Xiaoping: We Must Uphold Our Own Cultural Values” (专访80后网络作家周小平: 必须坚持我们自己的文化价值观)
October 24, 2014
Post-80s internet writer Zhou Xiaoping (周小平) has been a hot property lately. At the Work Forum on Arts and Culture held on October 15, he received the affirmation of General Secretary Xi Jinping as a representative at the meeting. The general secretary said he hoped [Zhou] would “create even more works with positive energy” (正能量). From Please Don’t Let Down This Age (请不要辜负这个时代) to A Sunshine Boy for the Mother Country (我待祖国如暖男), Zhou Xiaoping has voiced his own thoughts on himself, on this age and on China, and he has drawn widespread attention on the internet. Our reporter interviewed Zhou Xiaoping on related questions. “My sense of responsibility is pretty heavy, but I don’t feel pressure, because I’m confident I can do it well.” Reporter: Not long ago, you took part in the Work Forum on Arts and Culture led by General Secretary Xi Jinping. Seeing as it was your first time taking part in such a meeting, how did you feel? Zhou Xiaoping: The deepest personal feeling I had was first of all that General Secretary Xi Jinping had read a great many cultural works. Not only had he read these book, but he could talk about the content in detail — and he had even been to many of the places in these works.
His understanding about arts and culture is very profound, and that really surprised me. Because to my mind, leaders are too busy and they shouldn’t have the time to pay attention to these things. But General Secretary Xi is different. He in fact pays a great deal of attention, and he had a lot of stories to tell.
What General Xi Jinping really thirsts for is to express his innermost thoughts about the the revival of Chinese culture. This really shows between the lines — how he wants China’s cultural market to prosper, and it also shows how he wants to see Chinese culture have more confidence. Reporter: When General Secretary Xi urged you to creative even more works with positive energy, what were your feelings right then? Zhou Xiaoping: Actually, I had a lot of feelings going on. I’m a pretty ordinary guy, born in a far-flung place in Sichuan. That day I checked on a map and realized that there’s 1,800 kilometers between my hometown and the Great Hall of the People. So a huge distance, and such disparity of status, and it gave me this hopeful feeling. I never for the life of me believed that something like this would happen to me. My sense of responsibility is pretty heavy, but I don’t feel pressure, because I’m confident I can do it well. I can take three years, or five, or ten, or even longer to use the richest way possible to express the things I want to express, to convey my ideas and concepts through even richer and more colorful works. “I fiercely recognize that only by returning to a sense of confidence in Chinese culture can we make our country and our lives better.” Reporter: The many writings you’ve posted online have drawn a lot of attention and also stirred up criticism. How do you view this controversy and criticism? Zhou Xiaoping: I read this piece that analyzed my frame of thought and said that it was inconceivable that Zhou Xiaoping’s way of thinking wouldn’t be attacked in today’s public opinion climate and cultural community. Because the first opposition voice to speak up is always the one that gets criticized. This is just normal. Today many people talk about democracy and have to talk about Greece, or talk about human rights and have to talk about the West, or talk about innovation and have to talk about America and Europe. They think Chinese culture is decadent. They have no confidence in Chinese culture. So at a time like that for someone to stand up and dare to have confidence in Chinese culture, that’s something that gets on the bad side of a lot of prejudiced people — so naturally they are attacked.
And what do my essays actually talk about? I fiercely recognize that only by returning to a sense of confidence in Chinese culture can we make our country and our lives better. In their hearts, web users hold a love for their country, and they feel conflicted about the dark mood that prevails on the internet. That’s when people like me use our own way to tell them: your country has a sunny side. And when we show that sunny side, we earn the respect of a lot of people. They don’t necessarily agree with everything I say, with every viewpoint, with every story, with all the numbers. But what they do agree with is my feelings toward the country and my pursuit of light. This is something no one can refute. “Shaming the country is not criticism, and scolding the country is not criticism; we accept criticism, but we do not accept insults and abuses.” Reporter: These ideas of yours can’t have come from nowhere. What is the relationship between your views and your life experiences? Zhou Xiaoping: When I was little I was influenced a great deal by Western culture. At that time, I pretty much idolized the United States, Japan and Europe, and I didn’t feel a sense of affirmation about my own country. In Please Don’t Let Down This Age, I wrote that when I was young I wrote a lot of really foolish essays criticizing the government and voicing my admiration for the United States and Japan. But something happened when I served in the army, and it had a major impact on my values and my view of the world.
I started my military service in 1998, and the American bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade happened in 1999. At that time I was stationed on the border in Tibet, rifle in hand, and we stopped training and entered Level Two combat readiness (二级战备). That day, all admiration I had for America and Japan vanished. My liking for Europe disappeared too. Why? What I thought about was if we really went to war, what would my mom and dad do about those American bombs? And what about my relatives and friends? At the time I thought: If they really want to murder my relatives and friends, then they first have to step over my dead body! So from that time I went from being a baby soldier who didn’t understand a thing to a fighter devoted to the protection of his own country. Your faith comes out and you become a man, and you think, I need to protect my own country — so your sense of patriotism emerges too. My time as a soldier had a very big impact on my view of life.
I think cultural values should be diverse. When it comes down to China, we should have our own cultural values. That’s why General Secretary Xi says, “‘Getting rid of Chinese-ness’ (去中国化) is pathetic.” Because you are Chinese. And so what you adhere to can only be Chinese cultural values, and Chinese cultural values by the way are not too shabby.
For much of the broad sweep of history we were in first, and right now we’re catching up and getting ready to pass. The creativity emerging from this civilization, from our Chinese spirit, the inclusiveness and strength of our Chinese cultural inheritance, is something that deserves our pride. In China, we must adhere to the cultural values of the Chinese people. This is the only way we can live proudly in the world.
I think the fostering of this sort of attitude and the building of cultural values is a long-term project. Perhaps thirty or fifty years later, young people will have a different view of today, and a different view of the world. But how their views are different is a matter of what we do today. If we lose our culture, if we have no cultural values of our own, if we are entirely destroyed behind a tide of Western ideologies, well then, what will all of our struggles since 1840 have been for? So we have to make Chinese people feel pride and not shame for their culture and their history. Reporter: And you think that is what love of one’s country means? Zhou Xiaoping: Yes. General Secretary Xi has said, that we stand today closer than we ever have been to the Chinese dream. This is true. You need to understand that right now where you stand on this piece of ground, are the bones of so many martyrs. So many who sacrificed themselves. Think how many scientists returned to repay their country. How many ordinary people all playing their part . . . How can we just accept a total Westernization? I think that’s something shameful.
I think that’s how I see cultural values. We must uphold our own cultural values. Some people are always substituting their own concepts. I say, patriotism is not ass-kissing. Carrying forward the Chinese spirit is not empty flattery. We have to make a clear division over these. Shaming the country is not criticism, and scolding the country is not criticism; we accept criticism, but we do not accept insults and abuses.
The reasons are simple. For example, your child does something wrong at home. You criticize him. And maybe you spank him a couple of times. This is for his own good. In your heart you love him. But if someone comes over and says your child is a bastard, that he’ll be locked up in jail when he grows up, you would definitely sucker punch them. What we’re opposed to are those things that shame China. Reporter: So what are your plans now that the forum [on arts and culture] is over? Zhou Xiaoping: I’ve been a soldier. I’ve been a public servant. I’ve been a television host. And now I’ve started up a new company. From here on my main occupation won’t be essay writing, but I hope to create more and richer cultural products to express my ideas and serve society. And I hope these works truly influence others.
Think media. Think innovation. Think content and presentation for the future. Then blurt out the first newspaper that pops into your head. . . OK, how many of you said the People’s Daily?
It’s no secret to the most cursory of media observers that the People’s Daily and other Party papers — we can call them “the dailies” as most all of them end in the characters ribao (日报), and most all are directly administered by Party committees at their respective administrative levels — more or less missed out on the commercial revolution that remapped China’s media landscape in the 1990s.
Yes, Party media have to varying degrees trailed along behind their commercial media peers, adding pages and selling some advertising. But they remain principally propaganda organs, charged with narrowly reflecting the actions and policy pronouncements of the Party leadership.
While commercial newspapers, which rely entirely on outside sources of revenue (circulation/advertising), have led the reorientation toward the reader since the 1990s, Party papers have had far less need or incentive to respond to the market. Generally, these “mother papers,” or mubao (母报), are supported either by government layouts, or by revenue passed up from their bulkier commercial “child papers,” or zibao (子报).
To understand how their differing orientations — though both of course are ultimately controlled under the mandate of “public opinion guidance” — translated into very divergent media “products,” we need only look at today’s front pages from the People’s Daily, controlled by the Central Committee of the CCP, and its commercial spin-off, the Beijing Times, controlled directly by the People’s Daily as a market-oriented publication.
On the left, the official People’s Daily: high-density text with few images, dry official news. On the right, the Beijing Times, more vivid layout and a freer hand with headlines.
In light of the very restricted role and reality of Chinese media today, it is often fascinating to look at the official discourse inside China about communications design and strategy. Unable to speak freely about the political restrictions and demands placed on media, ostensible communications experts must nevertheless pontificate about the basic principles of media and communications.
No one can talk openly about the elephant in the room — namely, how the overarching business of media control rigs and subverts the game of media strategy.
In an article posted earlier this week to People’s Daily Online, communications scholar Wang Zhi (王志) offers a copious analysis of the People’s Daily, “the leading light of Party newspapers,” and asks how it can maintain its advantage as the “China’s most authoritative and most influential newspaper.”
“As the era of new media arrives, opportunities remain for print media, but the challenges predominate,” the article begins. “The People’s Daily is no exception.”
No exception?
But of course the People’s Daily is an exception. The paper is the chief propaganda organ of the Chinese Communist Party. It is supported by state outlays. It’s 24 daily pages generally carry only four full pages of advertising (which frankly the newspaper could take or leave). Its pages are filled day after day with tinder-dry reports of official goings-on, without any consideration whatsoever of graphic interest or how the paper’s front page might play at newsstands.
What makes the People’s Daily so important is precisely the fact that it is the exception.
Wang Zhi, however, must press ahead with his disingenuous analysis of “the style of the People’s Daily.” He apparently finds nothing ironic about the fact that he is writing about a future in which newspaper layouts matter, at a time when even the commercial newspapers of yesteryear are dying under the onslaught of new media.
Enjoy.
An Elementary Analysis of Page Layout in the People’s Daily (浅析《人民日报》的版面风格)
By Wang Zhi (王志)
October 21, 2014 SUMMARY: The People’s Daily is the leading light of Party newspapers (党报); it is the mouthpiece of the government and of the people. At the same time, as China’s premier newspaper, it is China’s most authoritative and most influential newspaper. Even in the age in which “content is king” (内容为王), it has not lost its shine. But in the age of “image-reading” (读图时代), with the era of information upon us, page layout becomes ever more significant. The excellence of a newspaper is determined by the unison of its content and its page layout, and neither of these two factors can be neglected. The quality of a newspaper’s content, and the richness and vitality of its page layouts affects that survival and development of that newspaper. This article analyzes the style of the People’s Daily in terms of its page layouts, seeking new horizons for future editorial work at the People’s Daily and for its survival and development.
As the era of new media arrives, opportunities remain for print media, but the challenges predominate. The People’s Daily is no exception. How can we allow print media to better face their challenges, so that they might step back from death’s door? This is an issue explored constantly be traditional media — how to break through the obstacles raised by new media, how to maintain advantage, how to find constant innovation in order to preserve their invincible positions.
Newspaper content and page layout are equally important. Content determines style, and style reacts to content. If it divorces itself from either, a newspaper has now long-term development prospects. There is no doubt that the content of the newspaper page remains important, but if the page layout is a mess, [the newspaper] will not be long for this world. By the same token, if a newspaper is eye-catching in terms of its layout . . . but the quality of its content is inferior, this over-reliance on attractive layouts will eventually be rejected in the test of time. And so, to run a good newspaper, you must maintain the quality of its content while at the same time giving care to the layout of its pages.
Doing in-depth reports and using opinion pieces to channel public opinion — this is beyond the reach of new media; if you have your own consistent style in terms of layout, but within that consistency have some measure of change, this gives the reader a sense of freshness. Only this kind of newspaper will have a strong vitality. Page layouts for a People’s Daily supplement. Are you enthralled?
The People’s Daily is the official organ newspaper (机关报) of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, and in terms of both authority and influence it is number one in China. It bears a heavy responsibility to the Party, to the government, to the people and to history. It must speak as a representative of the Party and the government, earnestly doing propaganda work for the Party’s line, principles and policies; it must also speak in place of the masses, expressing the innermost voice of the people. It must uphold correct guidance of public opinion (正确的舆论引导人); it must also point out unhealthy tendencies, carrying forward the national spirit.
In the 1990s, media in our country began going the route of “state-sponsored institutions with enterprise-style management” (事业单位，企业化管理). The People’s Daily also took part in market competition. As the newspaper took responsibility for its own profit and loss, the market had a decisive impact on its survival and development — and its relatively strong market was determined by both its content and its page layout.
Chinese President Xi Jinping (习近平), who last month earned the affectionate title “Big Daddy Xi” (习大大), spoke out last week on the subject of the arts, essentially encouraging innovation and originality in the arts in China while stressing that such creation must serve the country and the socialist cause.
The tension in Xi Jinping’s speech between creation and coercion is of course an old one, going back to Mao Zedong’s 1943 talks at the Yan’an Conference on Literature and the Arts, in which he said “mass culture,” or qunzhong wenhua (群众文化), should serve the interests of politics and be focused on peasant lives. In his speech, Xi Jinping similarly emphasized the importance of the focus in the arts on “people’s lives.” Cultural workers, or wenyi gongzuozhe (文艺工作者), he said, must “be steadfast in upholding a creative direction taking the people as the core” (人民为中心的创作导向).
The New York Times has a good online summary of Xi Jinping’s address to the Arts Work Symposium (文艺工作座谈会) on October 15. But readers can also turn to Chinese state media, which have compiled a list of “10 Arts One-Liners From Big Daddy Xi” (习大大的10句文艺妙语) which conveys some of the key points in Xi’s address to the recent symposium.
We’ve included a translated version along with the original below:
Our quick translation of the editorial, which appears at the bottom-left of the front page, follows:
“Firmly Supporting the SAR Government’s Administration According to Law” (坚决支持特区政府依法施政)
By this paper’s editorial writer (本报评论员)
October 15, 2014
Ever since a few people in Hong Kong launched the illegal gathering called “Occupy Central,” the Government of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region has handled the matter in accordance with the law. Its prudent response has won the widespread support of city residents, and it has the full support also of the central government. At the same time, the organizers of “Occupy Central” have taken the SAR government as their target, constantly seeking to create agendas and stir up dissension, fiercely attacking the authority of the chief executive and hindering the actions of the government. Any person who cares about Hong Kong and about the people of Hong Kong should say “NO” to this hijacking of the general public will for personal objectives, and should support the actions of the SAR government under the principle of rule of law.
At present, the development of constitutional rule in Hong Kong has come to a crucial point. According to the Basic Law, the SAR Government has, after extensive consultation, provided the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress with a related report; following the decision of the NPC Standing Committee, the SAR Government will hold a second round of consultations over the question of political reform. Whether or not this process can legally move forward in a smooth manner directly concerns the question of whether or not Hong Kong can hold general elections in 2017.
But some, ignoring the Basic Law and the decision of the NPC Standing Committee, have instigated a campaign of so-called “civil disobedience” (公民抗命), seeking through the plainly illegal method of “Occupy Central” to force the central government to make concessions on an important matter of principle. In order to achieve this goal, they have pointed blame at the SAR Government and its chief executive, cooking up allegations and spreading rumors in an attempt to force a chief executive out of office who has the support of the central government, playing out a “color revolution” (颜色革命) in Hong Kong. But they have chosen the wrong place, and they are doomed to fail.
Democracy must have a foundation of rule of law. It cannot be a tyranny of the few, and it certainly cannot become an excuse by which the vast minority defy laws both human and divine to do whatever they please. In the “Occupy Central” movement, a few have attacked the normal social order, paralyzing traffic and affecting people’s livelihoods, so that people feel indignation. The SAR Government and the police have handled this illegal gathering in accord with the law in order to preserve social order and uphold their responsibility to protect the public interest, as demanded by the protection of rule of law.
Just imagine if nothing at all were done in response to this illegal conduct. Who would preserve Hong Kong core values? If those who indulge in law-breaking will not desist, who will protect law-abiding citizens? The rule of law is the greatest public interest. Supporting the SAR Government in administration according to law means respecting the responsibility of the SAR Government and the police to preserve the basic interests of seven million Hong Kong residents.
Stability means prosperity, and chaos mean calamity (稳定是福，动乱是祸). As for differing demands for the development of Hong Kong’s democratic system, we can seek common ground while reserving differences. And we can use any number of legal means to express [our demands]. Many facts and histories outside China instruct us that if we yield to political blackmail when certain people launch radical and illegal actions, this will only bring even more and even more serious illegal movements, which will only aggravate unrest and chaos until there is never any peace in society.
Only through unswerving support for the legal preservation of stability in Hong Kong by the SAR Government led by chief executive C.Y. Leung can we preserve a favorable business climate in Hong Kong, preserve Hong Kong’s status as a center for international finance, trade and shipping, and accomodate the interests of various rungs of Hong Kong society and foreign investors.
Under the “One Country, Two Systems” formula, the administrative, legislative and judicial organs of the SAR all have a responsibility to respect and carry out the Basic Law, and all have a responsibility to preserve rule of law. The central government will continue unswervingly to implement the principle of “the people of Hong Kong running Hong Kong’s affairs” (港人治港), with a high degree of autonomy. [The central government will] unswervingly support the administrative, legislative and judicial organs of the SAR in carrying out their various roles and responsibilities in accordance with the law, together preserving the sovereignty, security and development interests of the state, and protecting the long-term prosperity and stability of Hong Kong.
In the wake of revelations of alleged news extortion at 21cbh.com, a financial news website under the auspices of the 21st Century Business Herald newspaper, CMP fellow Zhu Xuedong wrote about what he called an “age of corruption” in China’s media.
Describing the corruption practiced (apparently as a business model) at 21cbh.com, China’s official Xinhua News Agency used words like “shocking” and “unbelievable.” But for anyone who has closely observed the media landscape in the country over the past decade, these revelations are altogether unsurprising.
As I’ve emphasized again and again, a combination of stringent media controls and commercial imperatives are primarily responsible for the worsening environment. The bottom line is that while Chinese authorities encourage media to go out and generate income, they remain hostile to good journalism and sound (and therefore valuable) information.
I made the same argument again recently in “Who Warped China’s Media?”, in which I tried to show that even the official discussion of media corruption in China is blighted with a poisonous combination of money-worship and assumed political control. If Chinese authorities are serious in their efforts to grapple with media corruption, surely one of the most fundamental problems is that no-one in China is permitted to have a full discussion about the root causes of corruption.
But hold on. Can we really assume the authorities are serious about media corruption? Do the recent purges and televised confessions really signal a renewed determination to tackle media corruption?
I have my doubts. Let me show you why.
If you’d begin by opening up Guangming Online, the state-run website operated by Guangming Daily, a newspaper published by China’s Central Propaganda Department. Now, if there’s any media interest that should run a tight ship from the standpoint of news and ideology, it’s the Guangming Daily. You wouldn’t expect a media group run by the Central Propaganda Department, the supreme authority on what content is proper or improper in China, to be crossing any lines.
Here’s how Guangming Online describes itself in its “About” section:
Guangming Online was created on January 1, 1998, one of the earliest news websites to be established inside China. Over the past ten years, Guangming Online has extended and brought into play the core values and traditional advantages of Guangming Daily, and it has a powerful impact in the cultural sphere, knowledge community and among web users.
Civilized internet operation (文明办网) is the special characteristic that Guangming Online adheres to throughout. Guangming Online was the first in the entire country to raise the concept of “civilized internet operation, civilized internet use” (文明办网、文明上网). It was the earliest to advocate “online civilization projects.”
Guangming Online proclaims its sense of social and political responsibility right at the top of the site, with a button that allows readers to involve themselves in the policing of improper content, notifying the authorities of its presence.
A special “inform” feature on the web portal operated by Guangming Daily allows readers to tattle on others.
Now, move past the top three headlines on the news section, probably about Xi Jinping and Li Keqiang and then randomly select a headline. When I visited last, it was this story about the public reappearance of North Korean leader Kim Jong Un. On the right-hand side of the news article — mine a video by China Central Television — you can find all manner of click-bait designed to generate traffic for the site. And you will probably find plenty of images of partially clothed young women under the category “Great and Hot Photos.”
In fact, I stumbled across Guangming Online’s bawdy sidebar content yesterday when I clicked into an editorial regurgitating President Xi Jinping’s remarks on propaganda policy. The piece gabbed on about the need for stability, achieved in part through “positive propaganda”:
News, public opinion and ideology work are of particular importance. Whether the work is done well or poorly directly concerns reform and development and overall stability. We must throughout uphold the encouragement of unity and stability, putting positive propaganda first, upholding the correct political orientation, grasping correct guidance of public opinion . . .
And as I continued to read this verbose tribute to Xi Jinping’s renewed vision of the paramount importance of political control of the media and public opinion, my eye was drawn ineluctably to the side-bar where . . . well, here you go.
I’ll leave it to readers to judge for themselves whether the linked content fits with the spirit of Guangming Daily. But make no mistake — this is all about the monetizing of the Guangming Daily Media Group’s ostensible public role.
This online news page, with its bawdy juxtaposition of political hardlines and female softlines, sums up the status quo in China’s media perfectly well.
Anyone who finds the content at Guangming Online offensive or distasteful might try sharing their views through the online “supervision channel.” But don’t hold your breath.
The control of the internet in China has intensified over the past two years, under the leadership of President Xi Jinping. Controls have become so intrusive, in fact, that companies and researchers have complained that business and innovation are being affected.
In the above cartoon by artist Cheng Tao (成涛), posted to Sina Weibo, a computer keyboard and mouse are taped and chained while the image on the screen becomes a virtual jail cell. The meaning of Cheng’s cartoon is inescapable, but he writes nevertheless: “This is my last satirical cartoon. Don’t just glance at it: every piece was drawn under immense pressure. I draw and I share, at immense risk. . . There’s basically no risk for all of you in passing it along. These past few days, my family have all had words with me, my mom and grandma pleading with me through tears not to continue drawing. I give up. From this day forward I temporarily desist from satirical cartoons. From here on out I’ll change over to entertainment cartoons. I’ve disappointed all of you.
The following post by former CMP fellow and investigative reporter Wang Keqin (王克勤) was deleted around 11:36PM Saturday, October 11, 2014. [See more deleted posts at the WeiboScope Search, by the Journalism and Media Studies Centre]
The post, which includes an image of the Notice of Detention (拘留通知书) for legal activist Guo Yushan (郭玉闪), who was detained on October 9, simply reads: “Guo Yushan charged with picking quarrels and causing trouble” (郭玉闪被寻衅滋事). A large number of similar posts sharing the news of Guo’s detention were shared on Chinese social media over the weekend, most of them removed by censors.
Guo becomes the latest in a string of detentions and arrests of prominent dissidents in China, including former CMP fellow Pu Zhiqiang.
Wang Keqin currently has more than 657,000 followers on Weibo.
The trend of sparse coverage of Hong Kong’s “Occupy Central” (占中) continues inside China today, with a single official news release from Xinhua News Agency accounting for 60 percent of total content (24 of 39 articles).
The focus in the Xinhua report is on disruption, and calls for life in Hong Kong to return to “normal.” Here is a taste of that news release:
Xinhua News Agency, Hong Kong, filed Oct. 12 [reporter Niu Qi (牛琪)] — The illegal gathering called “Occupy Central” has entered its 15th day, with large amounts of people still assembling in Admiralty, Mong Kok and other areas. Various quarters of Hong Kong society have urged the occupiers to leave the streets immediately, allowing the lives of city residents to return to normal.
On October 12, the government of the Hong Kong SAR urged members of “Occupy Central” to immediately clear away barricades from the intersection of Lung Wo Road and Tamar Road, allowing the resumption of normal traffic in and out of the government headquarters.
A spokesperson for the SAR government said that since October 3 more than 60 meetings and events originally planned for the government headquarters had been deferred, cancelled or relocated to other venues. Of the 80 events on the schedule for the next two weeks, at least 12 were being considered for cancellation, deferral or relocation.
And here is how the news release appears on page 13 of today’s Beijing Daily, the official mouthpiece of the Beijing city leadership. It’s the article right at the top, under the large bold headline.
The Chinese-language Global Times newspaper, published under the auspices of the official People’s Daily, continues to offer the only “original” content available on the Hong Kong protests — which is to say, content that is not from either of China’s official news services. There are three articles mentioning “Occupy Central” in the Global Times today, two dealing particularly with the movement.
The first article, an opinion piece on page 14 written by Xiang Guangren (向广仁), is an acerbic takedown of the protests snidely rejecting comparisons to China’s May Fourth Movement of 1919. Here is the beginning, along with the article’s lovely headline:
“Occupy Central’ Will Not Stamp Its Name in History, But Only Leave a Stink That Lasts 10,000 Years”
The “Occupy Central” movement that has gone on in Hong Kong for more than 10 days now has been the target of public discontent for the way it has tied up transportation and impacted the normal lives of city residents. But in the early days of the movement, some scholars quite surprisingly compared this illegal and chaotic movement incited by a small number of politicians to “May Fourth,” thereby deceiving students, who felt that they were taking part in a movement for justice and would likewise go down in history. In fact, this idea is a deliberate misrepresentation meant to confuse the public. And I warn them: “Occupy Central” will only leave a stink for 10,000 years; it will not make its mark on history.
On page 16, the Global Times continues with its firebrand approach to the Hong Kong protests, characterizing them as a destructive event aided and abetted by “black hands” and foreign “hostile forces”:
Hong Kong’s illegal “Occupy Central” movement entered its third week yesterday, but there were signs that is was dying. The spokesperson for Scholarism, the most lively of the “Occupy Central” organizations, announced her resignation on October 11 due to “feelings of extreme helplessness and exhaustion.” This means the departure of one of the most important internal figures in “Occupy Central.” Now the focus has turned to whether or not this will cause a domino effect. Hong Kong media have revealed that rifts within the “Occupy Central” alliance are intensifying, with organizers calling on “Scholarism” and the “Hong Kong Federation of Students” to relinquish their leadership . . .
“Occupy Central,” which has resulted in the most violent riots in Hong Kong since the handover, is already seen as a catastrophe for Hong Kong. Who is providing “black money” for it? Which people should be held criminally liable? Hong Kong’s Legislative Council has already launched an investigation into the black hands behind “Occupy Central.”
The “already launched” investigation to which the Global Times refers is in fact merely the passing of a motion by pro-Beijing lawmakers in Hong Kong to launch an investigation. As the South China Morning Post has reported, the motion is likely to be defeated later this month by pan-democrats.
But if you’re searching for such nuance in today’s coverage of the Hong Kong protests by mainland media, don’t waste your time.
In this photo, taken by David Bandurski during the first week of protests in Hong Kong, a student volunteer passes out free bread at a peaceful protest site.
