Author: David Bandurski

Now Executive Director of the China Media Project, leading the project’s research and partnerships, David originally joined the project in Hong Kong in 2004. He is the author of Dragons in Diamond Village (Penguin), a book of reportage about urbanization and social activism in China, and co-editor of Investigative Journalism in China (HKU Press).

“The Darkest Day” for Indie Film

According to indie director Huang Wenhai (黃文海), the shutdown on Saturday of the 11th Beijing Independent Film Festival, an event held since 2006 and organized by a fund started by a well-known independent art critic, was “the darkest day in the history of Chinese independent film.”

The history to which Huang refers doesn’t go back much further than a decade, but this most recent crackdown may suggest authorities are no longer willing to tolerate the emergence of independent film voices (and the social networks growing around them) — even if they are already effectively marginalized.

BIFF 2014
Photo by Fei Pang Wong of the scene outside the offices of the Li Xianting Film Fund on Saturday, August 23, 2014.

In recent years, the Beijing Independent Film Festival has been one of a small number of forums inside China where indie filmmakers — understood in this context primarily as directors working outside the state-approved “mainstream” film culture of the Chinese Communist Party — have been able to share and discuss their work. And though this and other festivals (or “forums,” as they are sometimes more delicately called) have met with trouble consistently since around 2010, they have not to date been targeted so completely or aggressively.

One of the most important details to note in this case is that over the weekend police raided the offices of the festival’s organizer, the Li Xianting Film Fund, reportedly carting away records of the fund’s work. The fund, started by independent art critic Li Xianting (栗宪庭), has been a kind of pole star for the largely unorganized, dispersed and often lonely enterprise of independent filmmaking in China. The fund has supported filmmakers, offered advise and expertise (everything from editing to distribution), and helped introduce Chinese indie film to the rest of the world.

li xianting
Independent art critic Li Xianting has been a crucial personality behind the development of independent film voices in China. Photo from Woeser’s Blog.

For at least four years now, China’s government has actively sought to cut indie films off from the international film festival circuit — unfortunately, one of the only avenues open to filmmakers aside from the internet.

On a visit to France in 2010 to promote Zhao Dayong’s first feature film, The High Life, I was told by the artistic director of one prominent festival that they had dropped plans to screen Huang Wenhai’s documentary WE (and withdrawn Huang’s invitation) after facing tough diplomatic pressure. That was the first time I realized the era of tacit tolerance “off the radar” was over.

Indie filmmakers can prove resilient, like bright thistles in the garden (desert?) of the CCP’s mainstream film culture. So there’s no need to be overly pessimistic about the future. But the shuttering of the Beijing Independent Film Festival is an important sign. We’ll watch events carefully — and we’ll try to keep you posted.

Meanwhile, the following is Li Xianting’s basic timeline of happenings around the 11th Beijing Independent Film Festival, followed by the remarks of a few others:

August 18, 2014 — Posters and screening schedules for the “11th Annual Beijing Independent Film Festival” are released on the internet. Police guards are posted outside the door of my home, and outside the offices of the [Li Xianting] Film Fund.

August 19, 2014 — In the afternoon, state security police (国宝) visit the Film Fund offices and demand that the festival be stopped, mentioning two specific films by name. Agents from the Ministry of Education, Industrial and Commercial Bureau and the Tax Bureau come to the Film Fund offices asking questions about its affairs.

August 20, 2014 — At 10AM officials from Xiaobao Village (小堡村) visit my home to transmit the directive from their superiors, that the film festival must be cancelled. They agree, however, that the festival can be held outside Beijing in Yanjiao County in neighboring Hebei province [not far from the arts community at Songzhuang]. At 11:30PM state security again visit my home to demand the festival be stopped altogether.

August 21, 2014 — Film Fund [representatives] visit Yanjiao County and decide on the Huifu Hotel (汇福酒店) as the site of [festival] screenings.

August 22, 2014 — At noon leaders from the village Party committee of Xiaobao Village come to tell me: you’ve booked a hotel at Songzhuang, and our superiors say you are not permitted to head to Songzhuang [with the event]. Employees in charge of bookings and other planning matters come back and say that the hotel has not allowed us to sign in or stay there. At 1:30PM police from the substation at Songzhuang escort artistic director Wang Hongwei (王宏伟) and executive director Fan Rong (范荣) away. At 6:30PM they have still not been released. After Wang Hongwei is taken into the police substation, he receives two telephone calls. First, a caller identifying himself as a member of the security department in Songzhuang Township calls Wang and says, “The outer wall of your complex intrudes on an oil pipeline, and you have until the 31st [of August] to demolish it.” Next, the Huifu Hotel in Yanjiao, which has already collected a deposit, calls to say, “The police have notified us that our hotel is not permitted to accommodate your film festival.”

At the substation, police demand that Wang Hongwei and Fan Rong sign a letter pledging to cancel the film festival before they can be released. Wang Hongwei and Fan Rong are forced to sign the pledge of cancellation. Both Wang and Fan are released at 6:37PM. Shortly after, the Film Fund receives a notice from authorities in Xiaobao Village, where the festival was to have taken place, letting them know that their electricity will be cut off the next day.

Officials from the Immigration Bureau (入境管理局) also come to investigate the details concerning the Film Fund’s invitations for and accommodation of foreign film directors.

August 23, 2014 — On the day the 11th Beijing Independent Film Festival is set to begin, three roads leading to the offices of the Li Xianting Film Fund are blocked off. On the scene, police confiscate mobile phones and take video equipment from journalists. The scores of people who have come to take part in the festival are driven away several times by police.

Zhao Guojun (赵国君), a scholar of film and the arts, wrote on social media: “The roads in Songzhuang have already been blocked off, and Old Li’s home is surrounded by security police so that artists can’t get in. Songzhuang is first and foremost, it seems, in declaring itself independent — independent of rule of law.”

Independent filmmaker Hu Jie described the scene at the site of the planned festival like this:

We’ve just been to the site of Li Xianting’s independent festival, No. 126 Xiaobao Street North in Songzhuang. At the door and on the street there were police cars and a lot of villagers and others were sitting around. When they saw us heading over they surrounded us and tried to hustle us off. Their attitude was completely rude and callous. I got all the way to the door at No. 126 and saw that a notice had been posted there that the festival had been cancelled . . . I sat to take a rest under a shade tree outside the door. This great big guy came over and said in a ferocious voice that this was his spot and no one could sit there. We thought it best to leave.

At 1:28PM on August 23, 2014, Li Xianting made the following post to WeChat:

So what does it mean to “stir up trouble” (寻衅滋事)?

Let me tell you: it is when those who have unrestrained power mobilize the police and stir up the ignorant masses (不明真相的群众) and even local ruffians to lay siege to those things they regard as “illegal” — which in fact are normal public events for the arts, for religion or for rights defense.

“Stirring up trouble” on the part of local governments has already become symbolic of the abuse of power. . . . All roads leading to the old courtyard building in which our film fund is housed have been blocked with cars, rubbish bins, bicycles and all sorts of things by police and ignorant guards, so no one is permitted to enter.

Deleted Post: Bo Xilai, a year ago today

The following post by “He Zhe 315” (赫哲315), was deleted sometime around 3PM today, August 22, 2014. [See more deleted posts at the WeiboScope Search, by the Journalism and Media Studies Centre]
The post, which references the trial of former Chongqing Party chief Bo Xilai on August 22, 2013, reads simply:

Today one year ago, calm and composed, he entered the courtroom.

The original Chinese post follows:

去年的今天,他气定神闲进入法庭。

bo

What does Xi mean?

The discourse of the Chinese Communist Party can be mind-numbingly abstract and self-referential. And despite an early campaign that, ostensibly at least, opposed the use of official claptrap in Party meetings, Xi Jinping’s administration has brought more of the same.
But three months ago, one of the most senior Party officials in China’s media landscape, People’s Daily chief Yang Zhenwu (杨振武), made an effort to explicate for the benefit of his media colleagues several core remarks on media and ideology spoken by President Xi Jinping. And Yang’s exercise (in futility?) might offer some clues to Xi’s thinking on media policy.
Here, we offer some translated portions — underlining points we found particularly interesting — of the People’s Daily Online post on May 28, 2014, entitled, “Studying Important Remarks by Xi Jinping on Public Opinion Channeling With the People’s Daily Chief.”

Ideals and beliefs are the “calcium” of the Communist Party member’s spirit. Without ideals and beliefs, if ideals and beliefs are not firm, then [Party members] will be spiritually “low in calcium” and suffer from rickets.
—— November 2012, Speech to the First Collective Study Session of the Politburo of the 18th Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party

Yang Zhenwu’s Reading: This phrase and what it refers to are profound. News and propaganda are about carrying out construction inside the heads of people, and those involved in the work of news and propaganda must be even more steadfast in their ideals and beliefs, achieving the principle, “To make others believe one must first believe oneself.”

Standing on a great land of 9.6 million square kilometers, taking in the cultural nourishment gathered over the lengthy struggles of the Chinese people, with the gathered strength of 1.3 billion Chinese people, we are traveling our own road, a stage that is incomparably large, with a history that is incomparably deep, with a force moving forward that is incomparably great. The Chinese people should have the confidence [to walk this road] — each and every Chinese person should have the confidence.
—— December 2013, Speech to a forum commemorating the 120th anniversary of Mao Zedong’s birth

Yang Zhenwu’s Reading: This passage speaks clearly and thoroughly the reasons for our confidence, and the relationship between that confidence and the force [of our country] — and it provides us with the fundamental direction for confidence in our work toward strengthening public opinion channeling.

Propaganda and ideology work must take as its most basic responsibility cleaving to the center and serving the overall situation. [It must] mind the overall situation and grasp larger trends, finding the right starting point and focus — strategizing and acting in line with the situation.
—— August 2013, Speech at the National Propaganda and Ideology Work Conference

Yang Zhenwu’s Reading: The center and the overall situation are united, and the major situation and major events are connected. To cleave to the center [in propaganda work] we must grasp the overall situation [socially and politically], and to have a grasp of major events [unfolding in China] we must grasp the overall situation.

[We] must earnestly study and understand the spirit of the Third Plenum of the Third Plenary Session. The various deployments made at the Party’s 18th National Congress and the Third Plenum of the 18th Central Committee of the CCP form the base of our decision-making, and the leadership group must lead in studying them well, understanding them deeply, and digesting them thoroughly — so that they have a good view of the field and a strong grasp of major events. As [they] consider and research issues, [they must have a firm] stand on the two overall situations (大局), domestic and international, on the major tasks of the Party and the government, on the thorough deepening of reforms.
—— January 22, 2014, spoken at the first meeting of the Leadership Group for the Central Party’s Thorough Deepening of Reforms (中央全面深化改革领导小组)

Yang Zhenwu’s Reading: The key to properly carrying out public opinion channeling is understanding and being clear about the overall situation (大局). Only with a full understanding of the overall situation can we exercise self-control and handle situations with ease. If we are not clear about the overall situation, or have no idea at all, we will definitely find ourselves in dilemmas and make missteps [in our propaganda work].
Yang Zhenwu adds: Being mindful of the overall situation means focusing on the overall situation, acting under the overall situation, and serving and obeying the overall situation.
Being mindful of the two overall situations — domestic and international — the overall situation in Party and government work, and the overall situation as regards the overall deepening of reforms, we must consider and weigh all questions in the context of the overall situation.
Having a grasp of the overall situation requires strategising on the basis of the situation, acting in accord with that situation, and accommodating that situation in action. In talking about situations, we can talk about “situations” (形势), tendencies (走势) and trends (态势), and not only must we consider things from their economic, political, cultural and social aspects, but we must also consider and understand them both domestically and internationally.
Strategising according to the overall situation means raising one’s insight, making a keen observation of problems that are trending or in a latent phase, and then making a scientific judgement; acting in accord with the overall situation means raising your resourcefulness, acting in a timely and calm manner after you have seen the way things are developing. [You must] be on top of things and guide them, not allowing them to get out of hand. Accommodating the situation means raising your capacity to master things, showing your initiative and dealing with things effectively according to their own development.
Mindfulness of the overall situation, a grasp of the overall situation, demands that we thoroughly recognise modern China, and that we view the world objectively.
[We must] correct the public opinion prejudices of the West, clearing away its blindnesses and showing the world a fuller, truer and more multidimensional China. At the same time, we must view things that happen in the outside world through the principles of objectivity, thoroughness and truth, reporting them properly, even those things that are bad (不好的也要报道).

Adhering to unity and stability, and emphasising positive propaganda, are important policies that must be followed in doing propaganda and thought work. We are in the midst of a great struggle with many new historical particulars, and the challenges and difficulties we face are unprecedented. [We] must uphold and strengthen mainstream [CCP] public opinion, carry forward the main melody (弘扬主旋律), spread positive energy, and excite in our society the great force of forging ahead in unity.
—— August 2013, Speech at the National Propaganda and Thought Work Conference

Yang Zhenwu’s Reading: Carrying forward the main melody, and spreading positive energy, [are concepts that] further speak to the nature and responsibilities of the news profession in our country, and they further clarify the emphasis and direction of public opinion channeling. They are the basic standards by which we can assess the results of public opinion channeling. If what our propaganda reports and our public opinion channeling carry forward is not the main melody [of the CCP], then we have lost our value and meaning — which is to say that we have neglected our duty (失职). Doing public opinion channeling demands that we do even better at carrying forward the main melody, that we do even better at spreading positive energy.

[We must] take the fostering of, and carrying forward of, the socialist core value system as the breath and spirit, with the foundational project of strengthening our base, continuing and carrying forward the excellent traditional culture and traditional morals of the Chinese people (中华优秀传统文化和传统美德), widely conducting propaganda and education in the socialist core value system, positively channeling the people to speak morals, respect morals, preserve morals, and to seek higher moral values, constantly tamping down theoretical and moral foundations of socialism with Chinese characteristics.
—— February 2014, remark made during the Third Collective Study Session of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party

Yang Zhenwu’s Reading: Strengthening the socialist core value system and the propagation of core values is what it means to carry forward the main melody and spread positive energy.
Yang Zhenwu adds: The important work right now in carrying forward the main melody and spreading positive energy is to strengthen the socialist core value system and [to strengthen] the propagation of core values. [NOTE: Yang’s implication here with the word “propaganda,” or xuanchuan (宣传), is that the “propagation” of core values — those of the Party, naturally — will happen through media products that uphold the Party’s ideology and objectives, or “main theme.”]

Leading cadres, high-level cadres in particular, must have a systematic grasp of the basic tenets of Marxism as a decisive resource (看家本领). [They must] earnestly and fundamentally study Marxism-Leninism, Mao Zedong Thought, and particularly Deng Xiaoping Theory, the important ideology of the “Three Represents,” and the scientific view of development.
—— August 2013, Speech at the National Propaganda and Thought Work Conference

Yang Zhenwu’s Reading: The very basis of properly doing the work of public opinion channeling, speaking as a matter of method, is to apply materialism and dialectics to every stage of the propaganda report process.

The key to dealing with a whole series of tensions and challenges that our country presently faces is to thoroughly deepen reforms (全面深化改革). [We] must find the pulse of reforms from the midst of complexities, divining the inherent principles of thoroughly deepening reforms. [We must] in particular the major points of connection in grasping the deepening of reforms, and we must properly handle the relationship between liberating our thoughts (解放思想) and seeking the truth from facts (实事求是), the relationship between overall progress (整体推进) and seeking strategic breakthroughs (重点突破), the relationship between superstructural design (顶层设计) [i.e., reforms to the bureaucracy] and crossing the river by feeling the stones (摸着石头过河), the relationship between boldness and steadiness of step, and the relationship between reform and development and stability.
—— July 2013, Remarks During an Inspection Visit to Hubei

Yang Zhenwu’s Reading: Here, “inherent principles” refers to basic nature. Basic nature is not something that just sits there clearly, without any uncertainty, but rather requires the application of scientific methods, an analysis of layer upon layer, proceeding for coarse to fine, so that finally it can emerge and be recognised.

The crux is to raise the quality and level [of media content], having a good grasp of timeliness, depth and results. [It is about] increasing the attractiveness and infectiveness (感染力) [of content], so that the masses love to hear it and watch it, so that it creates resonance, fully unleashing the capacity of positive propaganda to encourage and inspire people. On major questions and those concerning political principles, [we] must be more proactive, grabbing the initiative, striking the first strike (打好主动仗), assisting cadres and the masses in drawing the line between truth and falsehood, recognising them clearly.
—— August 2013, Speech at the National Propaganda and Thought Work Conference

Yang Zhenwu’s Reading: A grasp of timeliness, depth and results is wherein lies the art and science of public opinion channeling, and it requires that we constantly deepen our systematic understanding [of how media and its consumption works]. Organically uniting the bearing forth of a clear banner [of ideology] with full solidarity [of purpose] flowing in silence (润物无声) is the border line we should seek in carrying out the work of public opinion channeling. As to what it means to have a clear banner, and what is “flowing in silence,” we are very clear: but as to how to organically unite these, this requires searching and experience.

People's Daily: speech is free, rumors are not

An editorial on page four of yesterday’s People’s Daily once again went on the attack against “rumors,” making the case for government control of social media in the wake of new regulations issued earlier this month.
The editorial, written under the name Zhong Xinwen (钟新文), was offered as a response to recent remarks from a spokesperson for China’s State Internet Information Office (SIIO), who said “no country on earth permits the spread of rumors, or information pertaining to violence, fraud, pornography and terrorism.” The spokesperson was speaking about new regulations from the SIIO announced by the official Xinhua News Agency on August 7, placing restrictions on mobile instant messaging in the country. Internet users have dubbed the rules “The WeChat 10” (微信十条).
The chief online regulator/censor, China’s State Internet Information Office is now led by hard-liner and former Beijing propaganda chief Lu Wei, who some Chinese journalists say was the architect of the recent crackdown on “Big V” account holders on Sina Weibo.
Xinhua also reported yesterday that police in the Ningxia Hui Autonomous Region had detained a man accused of spreading an alleged rumor about baby trafficking.
A partial translation of yesterday’s People’s Daily editorial follows.

Speech Can Be Free, Rumors Cannot Be Free
Zhong Xinwen (钟新文)
People’s Daily
August 12, 2014
[Mark Twain once said that,] “A lie can travel halfway around the world while the truth is still putting on its shoes.” In the information age, the challenges posed to people by rumors mount every day. No responsible government can look on and disregard such a situation. It’s for this reason that a spokesperson from the State Internet Information Office said in response to the “Ten WeChat Rules” (微信十条) that no country on earth permits the spread of rumors, or information pertaining to violence, fraud, pornography and terrorism. Our online space cannot become a chaotic space full of rage.
What constitutes a rumor? It means speech that has no basis in fact that is fabricated then somehow disseminated. The history of rumors is ancient, but in the new media age the creation and transmission of the rumor has been given new “wings” — and their transmission power and destructive power have also grown geometrically. In recent years, from the salt hoarding scare to earthquake rumors, to the Ms. AIDS incident (艾滋女事件), rumors have continued to violate the rights and reputation of others and do harm to public order. Therefore, an attitude of opposition to rumors evinces basic reason on the part of citizens, and serves to defend a society’s bottom line [of decency and order]. The logic we can obtain from this is that there is a dialectical relationship between freedom and order. And the freedom of any individual must be exercised within the scope of the law, and cannot tread over the bottom line, violating the freedom of others. To put it another way, speech should be free, but rumors cannot be free.
Some people believe that freedom of speech implies the right to speak in error, and that tolerance toward rumors means the protection of the right to speak — and conversely, that punishing rumors place limitations on speech freedom. This view is completely specious. As a legal right and a political right, free speech is the freedom to express one’s views, and the rational basis for this is tolerance for subjective likes and dislikes, the admission that views are pluralistic. And just as any freedom has its limits, free speech has its limits. The protection of the right to “say the wrong thing” does not mean toleration of deliberate rumors. Saying the wrong thing and manufacturing rumors are fundamentally different in nature. There is a famous saying from the United States Supreme Court: Absolutely no one has the freedom to falsely shout fire in a theater and create panic [See NOTE below]. To create and disseminate false facts does not, under the law, equate to the exercise of free speech, and in no country does free speech include the freedom to fabricate rumors.
NOTE: The correct quote from the opinion of Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. in Schenck v. United States in 1919 is as follows: “The most stringent protection of free speech would not protect a man falsely shouting fire in a theater and causing a panic. . . The question in every case is whether the words used are used in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent.”
There is another view that holds that in the free market of speech, rumors will naturally collapse all on their own, and that the best thing is to take a laissez-faire attitude, letting rumors grow and die of themselves. Leaving aside for a moment the notion that oft-repeated lies can be accepted as truth, even if a rumor is really eliminated, do we just dispense with what is right and what is wrong? Does this erase the real damage that has resulted? On February 10, 2011, a rumor in Xiangshui County in Jiangsu Province said that an explosion was about to occur at a chemical enterprise in the Chenjiagang Chemical Park, and as a result people ignorant of the truth were in a state of terror and left their homes, resulting in auto accidents in which four people died and many were injured. To trample on the rights of others in the name of “free speech,” with real harm to public order — this is the real threat to freedom.

Banned on Weibo: President Xi's Facebook presence

The following post by “Kid Shoes_1009” (小童鞋_1009), was deleted sometime before 1:02 AM today, August 11, 2014. [See more deleted posts at the WeiboScope Search, by the Journalism and Media Studies Centre]
The post discusses Chinese President Xi Jinping’s apparent presence on Facebook, and suggests China allows its citizens the same access beyond the Great Firewall that it appears to offer its leaders:

I saw on Facebook that President Xi is now on Facebook. What gives? Is he now ‘climbing the wall’ too? So if you can access Facebook, why is it that the rest of the people inside China can’t? If you’re on Facebook a lot of ‘kids shoes’ (trans: ‘fellow students’) will also want to get on. So why don’t you list restrictions? You must know the logic that the more you prohibit something the more irresistible it will be, right? I hope the venerable Mr. Xi opens up [the internet] quickly!

xi jinping facebook


The original Chinese-language post follows:

在facebook上看见了习总也上facebook了,这是啥节奏?难道他也翻墙?既然你也上facebook,为什么国内还不能上?既然你要上facebook,那国内的许多童鞋也要上啊,为什么不开禁?你应该知道越是禁越是要看的道理啊,希望老习尽快开禁!—–这是俺的留言

Remarks on the "Chinese dream" censored

The following post by “Tian Gong TangV” (天公堂V), was deleted sometime before 1;21 AM today, August 8, 2014. [See more deleted posts at the WeiboScope Search, by the Journalism and Media Studies Centre]
The post shares remarks from Chinese economist Han Zhiguo on the ubiquity of official propaganda for Xi Jinping’s political buzzword, the “Chinese dream” (中国梦). Han’s remarks have been shared regularly on Chinese social media, and on Twitter, since March 2014:

Han Zhiguo: Vulgar interpretations of the Chinese dream in China’s media have blanketed China lately, and people find it almost unbearable. In my view, when we talk about it in a national sense, the Chinese dream is the dream of constitutionalism. Without constitutionalism, the Chinese dream is the dream of power, not the dream of rights — and while officials dream sweetly, the ordinary people will continue to suffer nightmares.

Han Zhiguo


The original Chinese-language post follows:

韩志国:媒体对中国梦的庸俗化阐释铺天盖地,令人无法忍受。在我看来,上升到国家层面,中国梦就是宪政梦。没有宪政,中国梦就是权力梦,而不是权利梦;官员就会做美梦,平民就会做恶梦。

Corruption rumors axed from Weibo

The following post by “Zhen Shan 3” (臻善3), was deleted from Weibo yesterday, August 6, 2014, around 8:40 pm. [See more deleted posts at the WeiboScope Search, by the Journalism and Media Studies Centre]
The post simply shares basic biographical information about former vice-premier Hui Liangyu (回良玉), who was a member of the Politburo of the 17th CCP Central Committee, and who now, according to some sources, faces a corruption investigation stemming from his time as party secretary of Anhui province in the late 1990s:

Hui Liangyu, Male, Hui ethnic group, born in October 1944, a native of Yushu (榆树) in Jilin province, entered the Communist Party in April 1966, began work in August 1964, with a college degree from the provincial Party School, degree in economics. Formerly served as vice-premier of the State Council.

Hui Liangyu plane


The original Chinese-language post follows:

回良玉,男,回族,1944年10月生,吉林榆树人,1966年4月加入中国共产党,1964年8月参加工作,省委党校大专学历,经济师。曾任国务院副总理。(完)

Happy birthday post for Bo Xilai deleted

The following post by “In the Storm – Seeking ia” (–风雨中–追随-ia), a user with more than 1,300 followers on Sina Weibo, was deleted from Weibo today, July 3, 2014, at 8:25 am. [See more deleted posts at the WeiboScope Search, by the Journalism and Media Studies Centre]
The post, which includes an image of jailed former Chongqing party chief Bo Xilai (薄熙来) and a message reading “Happy Birthday!” says:

Today is your birthday. The people stand with you! [heart] [birthday cake] [heart]

bo


Bo Xilai, the “princeling” son of Bo Yibo, one of the Chinese Communist Party’s “eight immortals.” Bo Xilai was born on July 3, 1949.
The original Chinese post is below:

今天是您的生日,人民和您一起过![心][蛋糕][心]

Second-generation Reds 红二代

From their very first days in the classroom, this generation of children were taught to shout, “Long live Mao Zedong!” Steeped in the politics of class struggle, many of these youth also became red guards mobilized at the outset of the Cultural Revolution. In a report ahead of the 90th anniversary of the Chinese Communist Party in 2011, Guangzhou’s Yangcheng Evening News reported that at least 30 prominent people might be characterized as “second-generation reds” – including Zhou Binghe (周秉和), the nephew of Zhou Enlai (周恩来), the first premier of the People’s Republic of China and Hu Deping (胡德平), the son of former premier Hu Yaobang (胡耀邦). However, the term can be applied to any son or daughter of a Party leader, local or national, serving before or during the Cultural Revolution.

While the term, which emerged in the 1990s, has been used more readily online, it is rarely ever found in the traditional Party media. It has appeared just twice in the CCP’s official People’s Daily newspaper (to March 2021), both times in the Xi era. The first was an article on July 25, 2016, written by Zhang Fu (章夫), a member of the All-China Writers Association. In it, Zhang said: “Last November, I went with writer Gao Hong to visit the descendants of the Red Army in Zoige County, and I was lucky enough to meet a ‘second-generation red’ from Yilong during the interview.”

A reference to “second-generation reds” appears in the July 25, 2016, editing of the People’s Daily, in an article by Zhang Fu (top left).

In an article in the paper just a few days later, He Jiesheng (贺捷生), PLA general and the daughter of revolutionary and commander He Long (贺龙), wrote in the paper: “When I arrived in Chengdu, I was greeted by such second-generation reds as the daughters of my cousin, [Red Army commander] He Wendai (贺文岱) — He Nanan (贺南南), He Jinnan (贺锦南) and He Rongnan (贺蓉南) — and also the sons of my father’s favourite general He Bingyan (贺炳炎), He Leisheng (贺雷生) and He Lingsheng (贺陵生), and many other third-generation reds whose names I could and couldn’t say. All were smiling.”