Now Executive Director of the China Media Project, leading the project’s research and partnerships, David originally joined the project in Hong Kong in 2004. He is the author of Dragons in Diamond Village (Penguin), a book of reportage about urbanization and social activism in China, and co-editor of Investigative Journalism in China (HKU Press).
An editorial on page four of yesterday’s People’s Daily once again went on the attack against “rumors,” making the case for government control of social media in the wake of new regulations issued earlier this month.
The editorial, written under the name Zhong Xinwen (钟新文), was offered as a response to recent remarks from a spokesperson for China’s State Internet Information Office (SIIO), who said “no country on earth permits the spread of rumors, or information pertaining to violence, fraud, pornography and terrorism.” The spokesperson was speaking about new regulations from the SIIO announced by the official Xinhua News Agency on August 7, placing restrictions on mobile instant messaging in the country. Internet users have dubbed the rules “The WeChat 10” (微信十条).
The chief online regulator/censor, China’s State Internet Information Office is now led by hard-liner and former Beijing propaganda chief Lu Wei, who some Chinese journalists say was the architect of the recent crackdown on “Big V” account holders on Sina Weibo. Xinhua also reported yesterday that police in the Ningxia Hui Autonomous Region had detained a man accused of spreading an alleged rumor about baby trafficking.
A partial translation of yesterday’s People’s Daily editorial follows.
Speech Can Be Free, Rumors Cannot Be Free
Zhong Xinwen (钟新文) People’s Daily
August 12, 2014
[Mark Twain once said that,] “A lie can travel halfway around the world while the truth is still putting on its shoes.” In the information age, the challenges posed to people by rumors mount every day. No responsible government can look on and disregard such a situation. It’s for this reason that a spokesperson from the State Internet Information Office said in response to the “Ten WeChat Rules” (微信十条) that no country on earth permits the spread of rumors, or information pertaining to violence, fraud, pornography and terrorism. Our online space cannot become a chaotic space full of rage.
What constitutes a rumor? It means speech that has no basis in fact that is fabricated then somehow disseminated. The history of rumors is ancient, but in the new media age the creation and transmission of the rumor has been given new “wings” — and their transmission power and destructive power have also grown geometrically. In recent years, from the salt hoarding scare to earthquake rumors, to the Ms. AIDS incident (艾滋女事件), rumors have continued to violate the rights and reputation of others and do harm to public order. Therefore, an attitude of opposition to rumors evinces basic reason on the part of citizens, and serves to defend a society’s bottom line [of decency and order]. The logic we can obtain from this is that there is a dialectical relationship between freedom and order. And the freedom of any individual must be exercised within the scope of the law, and cannot tread over the bottom line, violating the freedom of others. To put it another way, speech should be free, but rumors cannot be free.
Some people believe that freedom of speech implies the right to speak in error, and that tolerance toward rumors means the protection of the right to speak — and conversely, that punishing rumors place limitations on speech freedom. This view is completely specious. As a legal right and a political right, free speech is the freedom to express one’s views, and the rational basis for this is tolerance for subjective likes and dislikes, the admission that views are pluralistic. And just as any freedom has its limits, free speech has its limits. The protection of the right to “say the wrong thing” does not mean toleration of deliberate rumors. Saying the wrong thing and manufacturing rumors are fundamentally different in nature. There is a famous saying from the United States Supreme Court: Absolutely no one has the freedom to falsely shout fire in a theater and create panic [See NOTE below]. To create and disseminate false facts does not, under the law, equate to the exercise of free speech, and in no country does free speech include the freedom to fabricate rumors. NOTE: The correct quote from the opinion of Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. in Schenck v. United States in 1919 is as follows: “The most stringent protection of free speech would not protect a man falsely shouting fire in a theater and causing a panic. . . The question in every case is whether the words used are used in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent.”
There is another view that holds that in the free market of speech, rumors will naturally collapse all on their own, and that the best thing is to take a laissez-faire attitude, letting rumors grow and die of themselves. Leaving aside for a moment the notion that oft-repeated lies can be accepted as truth, even if a rumor is really eliminated, do we just dispense with what is right and what is wrong? Does this erase the real damage that has resulted? On February 10, 2011, a rumor in Xiangshui County in Jiangsu Province said that an explosion was about to occur at a chemical enterprise in the Chenjiagang Chemical Park, and as a result people ignorant of the truth were in a state of terror and left their homes, resulting in auto accidents in which four people died and many were injured. To trample on the rights of others in the name of “free speech,” with real harm to public order — this is the real threat to freedom.
Any tool and any method is a double-edged sword — and new media are no different. In the new media age, understanding the dual aspects of new media is extremely crucial.
I saw on Facebook that President Xi is now on Facebook. What gives? Is he now ‘climbing the wall’ too? So if you can access Facebook, why is it that the rest of the people inside China can’t? If you’re on Facebook a lot of ‘kids shoes’ (trans: ‘fellow students’) will also want to get on. So why don’t you list restrictions? You must know the logic that the more you prohibit something the more irresistible it will be, right? I hope the venerable Mr. Xi opens up [the internet] quickly!
The following post by “Tian Gong TangV” (天公堂V), was deleted sometime before 1;21 AM today, August 8, 2014. [See more deleted posts at the WeiboScope Search, by the Journalism and Media Studies Centre]
The post shares remarks from Chinese economist Han Zhiguo on the ubiquity of official propaganda for Xi Jinping’s political buzzword, the “Chinese dream” (中国梦). Han’s remarks have been shared regularly on Chinese social media, and on Twitter, since March 2014:
Han Zhiguo: Vulgar interpretations of the Chinese dream in China’s media have blanketed China lately, and people find it almost unbearable. In my view, when we talk about it in a national sense, the Chinese dream is the dream of constitutionalism. Without constitutionalism, the Chinese dream is the dream of power, not the dream of rights — and while officials dream sweetly, the ordinary people will continue to suffer nightmares.
Hui Liangyu, Male, Hui ethnic group, born in October 1944, a native of Yushu (榆树) in Jilin province, entered the Communist Party in April 1966, began work in August 1964, with a college degree from the provincial Party School, degree in economics. Formerly served as vice-premier of the State Council.
Today is your birthday. The people stand with you! [heart] [birthday cake] [heart]
Bo Xilai, the “princeling” son of Bo Yibo, one of the Chinese Communist Party’s “eight immortals.” Bo Xilai was born on July 3, 1949.
The original Chinese post is below:
From their very first days in the classroom, this generation of children were taught to shout, “Long live Mao Zedong!” Steeped in the politics of class struggle, many of these youth also became red guards mobilized at the outset of the Cultural Revolution. In a report ahead of the 90th anniversary of the Chinese Communist Party in 2011, Guangzhou’s Yangcheng Evening News reported that at least 30 prominent people might be characterized as “second-generation reds” – including Zhou Binghe (周秉和), the nephew of Zhou Enlai (周恩来), the first premier of the People’s Republic of China and Hu Deping (胡德平), the son of former premier Hu Yaobang (胡耀邦). However, the term can be applied to any son or daughter of a Party leader, local or national, serving before or during the Cultural Revolution.
While the term, which emerged in the 1990s, has been used more readily online, it is rarely ever found in the traditional Party media. It has appeared just twice in the CCP’s official People’s Daily newspaper (to March 2021), both times in the Xi era. The first was an article on July 25, 2016, written by Zhang Fu (章夫), a member of the All-China Writers Association. In it, Zhang said: “Last November, I went with writer Gao Hong to visit the descendants of the Red Army in Zoige County, and I was lucky enough to meet a ‘second-generation red’ from Yilong during the interview.”
A reference to “second-generation reds” appears in the July 25, 2016, editing of the People’s Daily, in an article by Zhang Fu (top left).
In an article in the paper just a few days later, He Jiesheng (贺捷生), PLA general and the daughter of revolutionary and commander He Long (贺龙), wrote in the paper: “When I arrived in Chengdu, I was greeted by such second-generation reds as the daughters of my cousin, [Red Army commander] He Wendai (贺文岱) — He Nanan (贺南南), He Jinnan (贺锦南) and He Rongnan (贺蓉南) — and also the sons of my father’s favourite general He Bingyan (贺炳炎), He Leisheng (贺雷生) and He Lingsheng (贺陵生), and many other third-generation reds whose names I could and couldn’t say. All were smiling.”
Tomorrow, June 27, the China Media Project will launch its latest Chinese-language book, a memoir by Southern Weekly founder Zuo Fang (左方).
The book, which begins with a fascinating personal perspective on such historical events at the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution, tells one insider’s story of the birth and development of one of contemporary China’s most influential newspapers.
Readers can find more details about the event below. But here’s a little taste in translation of Zuo Fang’s book, from a section called “Three Journalism Teachers” (新闻业的三个导师).
My work in the media spanned a period of 36 years, and during that time I had three teachers. One was Huang Wenyu (黄文俞). He was a newspaper man of the intellectual sort, and he had a substantial impact on my ideas. At Nanfang Daily before the Cultural Revolution a major meeting of editors was held once a month. I would see Huang Wenyu up on stage, smoking cigarettes one after the other, spending up to two hours talking about the strengths and failings of our reports over the past month, and laying out our work for the coming month.
Huang quipped that he was the king of his own small country. The [paper’s] affairs all turned on him alone. But for some time I was perplexed. I would see Huang Wenyu return to the newspaper’s offices and head straight into his office. He never visited the different departments. So how could he possibly have a grasp of what was really happening at the newspaper?
Eventually, I figured it out. At home, in fact, Huang Wenyu had really decent tea as well as a television set given to him by the provincial television station. Every weekend and on Sunday evenings, mid-level editors from the paper would visit Huang at home. They would sip tea, watch television and chat. This was the secret of how he managed to keep astride everything happening at the paper.
Everyone at Nanfang Daily referred to him as “Wenyu.” Only on formal occasions would people append the title “comrade.” Nanfang Daily followed the Soviet model of newspaper publication after the Liberation in 1949. But as far as interpersonal relationships went, the intimate comrade-in-arms relationships of the war-time period still held — and this became a fine tradition at Nanfang Daily.
At that time, the editorial board of Nanfang Daily was under the direct control of the provincial party secretary, and Huang Wenyu was able to attend meetings of the provincial standing committee. Officials in the provincial propaganda department were not on the standing committee, so they could not control Nanfang Daily. . . .
[Much later] when Huang Wenyu was sick and in the hospital, I went to visit him and told him about the four guiding principles of Southern Weekly. Of the four, I said, three of them came from him, and only one was of my own creation. “What four principles?” he asked.
The first thing is specialization (主攻) and a good grasp of feature stories (副刊主守). This is something I learned from you, I said. In terms of specialization, I haven’t yet accomplished a great deal. We have only eight pages so far, and we don’t have enough manpower yet to do in-depth, investigative reporting. In terms of features, I’ve made one small innovation — I’ve told my colleagues responsible for the features to not “edit them” but rather to “have fun with them.” When you “edit” a paper you make it about official business. But when you “have fun” with it you treat it like a miniature bonsai landscape, fussing over its beauty and fineness. There’s just one character’s difference between “editing” and “having fun,” but a gulf separates the two. Specialization is about drawing the reader in, and features are about holding on to them.
At this point, Huang Wenyu nodded his head.
The second thing is that while there may be truths that we cannot speak, we must never utter falsehoods. This is something else I learned from you. But here also I made a small modification. I’ve divided the truths we cannot speak into two kinds. There’s what I call the “hard thunder zone” (硬雷区) and the “soft thunder zone” (软雷区). I think we can actually make breakthroughs for the vast majority of things in the “soft thunder zone.” The “soft thunder zone” is where I’ve decided to concentrate the main force of the newspaper.
The third thing is something I created myself. I call it, “First make the bottle, then make the wine” (先做瓶, 后酿酒). The bottle is about the form of the news, and the wine is about freedom of speech. When we accept that there are truths we cannot speak, this means we’ve already to some degree relinquished our right to freedom of speech. We should place our emphasis on innovating the form of the news, doing away entirely with the falsehood, bluster and emptiness (假, 大, 空) of the Pravda model of newspaper publishing. We should fashion our own brand new form of language. Freedom must arise through form. The realization of freedom begins with form . . .
The learn about Zuo Fang’s fourth “guiding principle” for Southern Weekly, join us tomorrow, June 27, at Cosmos Books in Wan Chai. Details below. See you there!
Zuo Fang’s new memoir joins our line-up of great titles with Cosmos Books.
Anyone interested is invited to attend the book’s launch, which will be attended by the author.
BOOK LAUNCH: How the Steel Was Not Refined (鋼鐵是怎樣煉不成的)
Co-published by the Journalism & Media Studies Centre/CMP and Cosmos Books When: June 27 (Friday), 3:30-5:30pm Where: Cosmos Books, No. 30, Johnston Road, Wan Chai, Hong Kong The event will be attended by the author, Zuo Fang, and other Southern Weekly veterans.
For more information, contact Cosmos Books at (852) 2823-9908, Ms. Zhang. CLICK HERE to register online for the event, or call the telephone number above.
JMSC新書《鋼鐵是怎樣煉不成的》—— 左方與《南方周末》新書發佈會定於2014年6月27日(星期五)下午3:30至5:30在灣仔莊士敦道30號天地圖書公司舉行。
本書作者左方先生是中國內地最受歡迎的報紙《南方周末》創始人,他在書中回憶了跌宕起伏的人生歷程;對於中國當代史和中國傳媒發展史,這本書提供的第一手資料彌足珍貴。左方先生和多位南周元老將到會。
請與天地圖書網上報名：http://web.cosmosbooks.hk/Default.aspx?ID=1248
Zuo Fang at work during the early days of Southern Weekly in the 1980s.
The following piece by well-known Southern Weekly columnist and former CMP fellow Yan Lieshan was posted to his Sina Blog on January 24, 2013, one week after human rights lawyer Pu Zhiqiang — who now remains in custody following his arrest in early May this year — was featured on the cover of Southern People Weekly. Yan’s blog piece, “How is it that Pu Zhiqiang hasn’t found himself ‘on the inside,” is an especially poignant reflection on Pu’s work and character, particularly now, following Pu’s formal arrest.
By Yan Lieshan (鄢烈山)
January 24, 2013
I have quietly observed human rights lawyer Pu Zhiqiang (浦志强) for a number of years, and I’ve often been concerned on his behalf. When will the day come, I’ve wondered, when he finds himself “on the inside”?
Pu Zhiqiang has made a career of sticking his neck out, championing clients accused of “defamation” for exercising their constitutional right to free expression. Time and again, he’s gone up against formidable plaintiffs, including local officials or government agencies. In a place like China, Mr. Pu’s business is an exceptionally dangerous one.
But still, even after taking on so many high-profile rights cases, Pu Zhiqiang remains stubbornly on the outside. Not only that, but he can kick up a stink, drawing national and even international attention to his work. Just think, by contrast, about lawyers like Li Zhuang (李庄), who for doing similar work have been forced to issue false confessions or have been stripped of their licenses. And here we have Pu Zhiqiang, this regular guy without big political connections, keeping his chin up and doing dangerous work.
How does he manage it?
To answer this question, I pored through all the media coverage of Pu Zhiqiang I could find. I read the cover story in the January 18, 2013, edition of Southern People Weekly from beginning to end, and I searched around on the internet, digging out a pretty thorough feature story on Mr. Pu that the Southern Metropolis Weekly did back in September 2012.
Pu Zhiqiang provides the cover shot for the January 18, 2013, edition of Southern People Weekly.
Yes, Pu Zhiqiang is upright, honest, sincere and courageous. These character traits are all par for the course, and they are the reason he has become the sort of person he is. But I was looking for more than that. I wanted to know how he had managed to avoid being “on the inside.”
In the above-mentioned reports I believe I’ve found my reason. I think I now understand Mr. Pu pretty well. And I must say that I truly admire Pu Zhiqiang’s “wisdom.” I’ll come back in a bit to what I mean by that.
In one of his interviews, Pu Zhiqiang is quite upfront with the reporter: “I’m really fearful about something happening,” he says. “I just want to inch the space forward (for freedom and rule of law).”
Mr. Pu describes himself as someone always treading along the security line. How exactly does he do this? First of all, in acting on behalf of his clients, he relies on facts and reason. Second, his confidence and charisma, and deep sense of goodness, are things that come naturally to him, not products of money or success. Finally, the cases Pu Zhiqiang takes on — mostly freedom of expression cases — are not the most directly threatening [form of resistance to the leadership].
A September 2012 feature story on Pu Zhiqiang in Guangzhou’s Southern Metropolis Weekly.
Acting in complete sincerity for the good of others is one of Pu Zhiqiang’s best forms of protection. This assures that most judges and police with any sense of conscience at all will — in their hearts, at least — stand on his side. Media coverage of Mr. Pu talks about situations where court bailiffs are ready to act against him but friends in the police come to his aid.
Pu Zhiqiang has said that working for the good of others demands a willingness to speak, a willingness to communicate and willingness to compromise. This is how he manages to get county leaders, city leaders, politics and law commissioners, propaganda leaders and all sorts of people to dispense with the view that he is an enemy that needs to be neutralized.
“Police officers ask me why I insist on accepting these loss-making cases, and I tell them it’s for the sake of fame,” [Pu Zhiqiang says in a tongue-in-cheek fashion]. “They ask me why I always go and talk to the media, and I tell them that’s just so I can hype up the story.” It’s responses like these that take the wind out of the sails of those who are ready to impugn his motives.
This tactic takes real confidence. It’s a very different approach from the more confrontational tone of others, and it’s one that works against the backdrop of Chinese culture, history and politics.
China has two thousand years of history in which moral proselytizing plays a strong part, and this means a surplus of hypocrisy that in turn fosters in people the nasty habit of always, and fiercely, questioning the underlying motives of others. We assume nothing legitimate can be done for fame or financial gain. And for the past half century, we’ve been educated in the need to “fight selfishness and repudiate revisionism” (斗私批修), to “act selflessly for the greater good” (大公无私). We’ve been forced to sing pseudo-pieties until we’re blue in the face. So ingrained is the habit that even now, with a market economy that tacitly accepts self-interest, many people can’t break the habit.
So when Pu Zhiqiang responds without hesitation to ready-made attempts to impugn his motives, quipping that fame and hype are what he is after, he leaves his doubters totally stupefied.
The unfortunate fact is that in China today, with an independent judiciary far from the reality, having a name that can draw media attention sometimes helps curtail government intrusion and yield less arbitrary verdicts. This is essentially why Pu Zhiqiang has used the media to “hype” his cases.
In China, any additional measure of transparency raises the chances of a more just outcome. Obviously, court cases should not be decided in the press, but without the involvement of the media, unfortunately, there is less hope of justice. We’re fond of talking about our unique “national characteristics” (国情), and here is one shining example.
Pu Zhiqiang has described himself as “understanding politics and tactics, but being muddleheaded about the law.” There is some self-deprecation in those words. But there is also a genuine admission of his own limitations. Mr. Pu, after all, studied history as an undergraduate. He earned his master’s degree in the classics. As for the law, he was mostly a self-taught student, and he took the bar exam on his own. This is sufficient for Pu Zhiqiang. He has no interest in being a theoretician of the law. To practice the law is enough.
So I think Mr. Pu’s “understanding of politics and tactics” is something he should be truly proud of.
Let me just give you a couple of examples that illustrate the point:
In October 2010, Pu Zhiqiang represented Feng Yongming (冯永明), the CEO of Yichun’s Guangming Furniture, who had been charged with embezzlement. The day the trial opened, Feng realized that an investigator who had beaten him during questioning was present in the courtroom. He stripped off his shirt, showing off his scars and bruises. Pu Zhiqiang shouted toward the gallery where the investigator sat. “Stand up!” he demanded. “This questioning through torture was your doing!” Pu strode over toward the gallery, ready to ferret the man out, but he was surrounded by a group of bailiffs while the investigator in question rushed from the courtroom. The courtroom was complete chaos until the judge was finally forced to adjourn. In that instance, right and wrong were completely self-evident to everyone present.
On May 27, 2011, when a case stemming from the taxi strikes in the city of Xianning opened, Zhou Bin (周彬), one of the defendants represented by Pu Zhiqiang and Si Weijiang (斯伟江), was charged with the crime of “disturbing public order” for helping a taxi driver prepare his petitioning papers and post them on the internet. When Pu Zhiqiang realized that the public prosecutor hadn’t even bothered to bring along the petition papers in question, he turned on him with fire: “You represent the state in bringing this case [against my client], but you don’t even bring a copy of the papers! How can you be so negligent?” By seizing on this detail, Mr. Pu exposed just how half-hearted the prosecution had been in its preparation. And this in turn revealed an indifferent attitude toward the rights of citizens, which meant that right from the start of the case the prosecutor lost the high ground both morally and politically.
People have talked about there being a certain “aura” to Pu Zhiqiang in the courtroom. Part of this is his overwhelming sense of righteousness, his deep sympathy for the weak and disadvantaged. He truly wants to win back a shred of justice and dignity for citizens who have been trodden upon. But another part of it, I think, is his use of politics and tactics, his way of subduing the enemy without a fight, which Sun Zi called the supreme art of war.
I have great admiration for Pu Zhiqiang. But why did I begin by saying I admire his “wisdom”?
“Wisdom,” or zhihui (智慧), is a word with Buddhist connotations. Wisdom is where Buddhism places its greatest emphasis. Buddhism is not concerned with morality so much as “consciousness” (觉悟), and “consciousness” means awareness, the ability to penetrate through human nature and the universe, to comprehend and transcend life and death. Buddhism talks, therefore, about the “root of intelligence,” about the intelligence that surpasses mere intelligence. This intelligence is about conviction and comprehension, but also about compassion.
Pu Zhiqiang’s wisdom is based on a conviction or belief in fairness and justice, an adherence to conscience. Further, it has a great sympathy for the weak, combined with insight into the weaknesses of human nature and compassion for all human beings. This sort of solicitude for others isn’t just a strategy to reduce confrontation; it comes from the heart. And the sum total of this wisdom is something far greater than mere intelligence.
There has been some degree of alarmism in the foreign press this week (1, 2, 3) over a (new?) set of restrictions issued by the Chinese government agency overseeing both print and broadcast media in the country. [READ Reuters report and China’s denial.]
It bears noting, however, that there is little of substance in the June 18 circular on “critical reporting” that we can say unequivocally represents a “tightening” or “worsening” of the situation for journalists in China. Which is not to say — I repeat, NOT to say — that continued attention to the issue of press freedom in China is not crucial (it is), or that there is any doubt we’ve seen a progressive worsening of the situation for professional journalists and internet users alike in China.
China’s State Administration of Press, Publications, Radio, Film and Television wants to reign in renegade acts of journalism.
Yes, the media situation in China has worsened in recent months and years. In a sense, for China’s traditional media, what looked like a seasonal freeze back in 2004 has settled into an extended Ice Age. You could say that the Southern Weekly incident in January 2013 was the culmination of tensions within Chinese media over the progressive rollback of professional gains made from the late 1990s up to 2003. These included bans on cross-regional reporting, efforts by the Party to more actively “use” commercial media as vehicles for its own propaganda, and the installment of news examiners inside media conducting prior censorship.
But when Quartz reported the headline yesterday that, as a result of the June 18 circular, “Now China can censor journalists before they even start reporting a story,” it got the both the story and the background wrong.
Now, let’s sum up the main points of the June 18 circular from the now dizzyingly named “State Administration of Press, Publications, Radio, Film and Television” (国家新闻出版广电总局) — the combined agency created from the former GAPP and SARFT last year. *** News media need to clean up their act, making sure their teams of reporters fall in line. This essentially reiterates what has always been true, that media “units,” administratively connected to the Party through so-called “sponsoring institutions” (主管单位), are responsible for maintaining “propaganda discipline” and curbing illegal conduct. [For more on how this process works, revisit our 2012 tutorial, which even shows you how to see where exactly media fit in China’s power structure]. *** News media must ensure that their “news bureaus” do not engage in “reporting activities across industries and across sectors.” This seems a strange one at first. But China’s publication licensing system has always imposed content restrictions on registered publications (which all publications must be). In other words, your publication focusing on financial services may have a valid kanhao (刊号), or publishing license, but that doesn’t mean you can go and do a feature story on a corrupt deputy mayor, or on foreign policy (etcetera). Licensing of publications — and of reporters — is an important aspect of media control, and the authorities are sending the message here that they are serious about enforcing existing restrictions. **** News media must make sure their journalists are not striking out on their own and maintaining independent websites, online news channels, special editions or internal references. In China, where the fundamental media policy from Mao Zedong still holds, that “the politicians run the newspapers,” or zhengzhijia banbao (政治家办报), private and independent media are not accepted, full stop. However, with the rise of cheap, easy-to-use multimedia tools as well as social media, the lines have blurred. “Media” can now emerge in myriad potential ways. For a rather stunning example of this potential, just have a look at this very professionally done video on illegal detentions, produced by “Pu Zhiqiang Studio” (浦志强工作室) and posted to YouTube — Pu Zhiqiang being the prominent rights lawyer detained last month. Yes, Pu is a lawyer, not a journalist. But the point is that the CCP wants to check similar “lineballs” by professional journalists that exploit the chaos caused by rapid changes in media technology. “Internal references,” or neican (内参), are internal reports, classified to varying degrees, that include often more serious reporting of local, regional or national stories that are viewed as too sensitive to share with the public. Think of it as an internal, invisible pipeline of information available to Party leaders. These reports are often produced by news media, on the side as it were, some on a regular basis and some as required. My guess is that the mention of “internal references” in the June 18 circular concerns the commercial exploitation of so-called internal references. In other words, a news media, or bureau, could create a neican in which it publishes “negative news” in order to extort payouts from companies and/or officials. In this way, risk can be mitigated because the reports are not openly published, but the threat of exposure internally is real.
Which brings us to the next point. *** There will be a renewed effort to expose news extortion, fake news and paid-for content at news media, and such conduct will be punished severely. These are all indeed major problems in China’s media. But as I’ve said repeatedly in the past, one of the chief underlying causes of corruption in China’s media is the system of control itself, which pushes news media — which after all must survive commercially — to pursue the safest, soft-glove, low-brow content possible, to sensationalize stories to attract attention, and to exploit such means as news extortion to increase revenue. Due to propaganda restrictions, the risk in doing investigative reporting is immense, often riskier than using the same “negative news” (which need never see the light of day) to extort money from others. In other words, the CCP has created motive. And it’s also true that state media enjoy a much greater degree of “opportunity” where news corruption is concerned. Because they have the power of the state behind them, they can be much more effective at striking fear into companies/individuals and making them pay up — well illustrated by the recent probe at China Central Television. ***News reporters and news bureaus are prevented from carrying out negative news reporting without prior approval from the news media where they work. This talk of “prior” restrictions is what I think has caused some confusion in foreign media coverage of the June 18 circular. But let’s be clear: Chinese journalists have never been permitted to carry out their own coverage independent of their respective media. Journalists have always worked within a Party press system in which even commercial media have direct ties to, and responsibility to, “sponsoring institutions” that are to maintain discipline. Editors play more than an editorial role. They are layers of control, even when they are aspiring professionals who hope to push a bit farther with their coverage.
That’s the basic drift.
So, when Radio Free Asia reported yesterday that the restrictions are the “latest in a long string of blows aimed at curbing criticism of the ruling Chinese Communist Party,” this was both true and potentially misleading.
As I said, there is nothing explicitly new here at all. However, it is true that the circular contains language that is dangerously ambiguous. RFA quoted veteran journalist, now freelancer, Zan Aizong as saying: “This directive is clearly intended to close off all possible channels for criticism. You can’t report outside your job description or outside your beat. And what does private mean here?”
Well, closing off possible channels for criticism is certainly the objective, as it always has been — a project that since June 4, 1989, has been called “guidance of public opinion.” But yes, indeed, what does “private” mean? We simply don’t know.
Think of the circular, then, as a warning siren alerting media to the fact that the Party remains vigilant, that in fact it is more serious now about exercising what it sees as its right — the control of all channels of information. This is much the same as the recent news that Chinese journalists would be required to take training in the Marxist View of Journalism, which the Los Angeles Times noted in its story on the circular this week. The content of these training sessions, which are not at all new, is a much less important issue than the signal the training sends to the media: We, the Party, are your master.
Moving on, I’d like to share one view on the June 18 circular from Shi Feike, a veteran Chinese journalist and blogger. He wrote on WeChat yesterday:
The ban from GAPP against journalists carrying out critical reports on their own is simply a reflexive response from the bureaucratic system following the cases involving Nanfang Daily, the People’s Daily and other [publications]. The content here is nothing new, and there is no clear rise to speak of in the intensity of controls — there’s no need to over-read this. The uproar is mostly an expression of irritation over the bureaucratic propaganda language style.
广电总局这个关于记者不能私下做批评报道的禁令，不过是南方日报和人民日报深圳站等案例出来后官僚系统的照例条件反射，内容并无新意，也谈不上是管制尺度的明显提升，用不着过度解读。目前坊间哗然，主要是被颟顸的官僚文宣语态刺激所致。
For those interested in exploring the background of the circular further, the eight cases outlined this week by the authorities are worth a glance. In the case of Nanfang Daily, for example, the authorities are saying that from June to August 2011, Nanfang Daily journalist Hu Yazhu (胡亚柱) worked together with Li Wei’an (刘维安) of the Guangdong Channel of the Legal Daily website to obtain money and goods valued at roughly 310,000 yuan from an unspecified company. So these and other cases may be, as Shi Feike says, the chief impetus behind the circular.
We also recommend a reread of this 2013 article by CMP fellow Zhan Jiang on the roots of media corruption in China.
We’ll leave it there . . . But for the benefit of our readers we’ve included both A) our own full translation of the Xinhua News Agency report on the June 18 circular, and B) a full translation of an interesting response to the circular from Shanghai’s Oriental Morning Post. The Post article, framed as a soul-searching mea culpa from the outset, actually manages to get in a few punches about the proper role of media — reporting the truth — and the media’s failure to report enough of it.
State Administration of Press, Publications, Radio, Film and Television: Journalists and News Bureaus Are Prevented From Carrying Out Critical Reporting on Their Own (国家新闻出版广电总局：禁止记者和记者站未经本单位同意私自开展批评报道)
June 18, 2014, 16:14:32
Xinhua News Agency
Xinhua News Agency, Beijing, June 18 (Reporter Qu Jing) — In a notice on June 18, 2014, the State Administration of Press, Publications, Radio, Film and Television demanded that all news media focus on the clean-up of news bureaus, websites, business units and editorial units, conscientiously correcting illegal conduct, maintaining an appropriate grip on news reporting activities, prohibiting news bureaus from engaging in reporting activities across industries and across sectors, prohibiting news reporters and news bureaus from carrying out negative news reporting without prior approval from their respective news media.
新华网北京６月１８日电（记者璩静）国家新闻出版广电总局１８日下发通报，要求各新闻单位对记者站、网站、经营部门、采编部门进行集中检查清理，认真纠正存在的违法违规问题，把好新闻采访关，禁止记者站跨行业、跨领域采访报道，禁止新闻记者和记者站未经本单位同意私自开展批评报道。
The notice also pointed out that all news media must maintain a firm grip on the examination [fact-checking] of news reports, prohibiting news bureaus and news reporters from setting up their own websites, local news channels of websites, special issues and editions, internal references, etcetera in order to publish critical reports; [they must] maintain a firm grip on business activities, prohibiting news bureaus and editorial staff from setting up advertising, circulation or public relations companies; prohibiting news bureaus and journalists from taking part in advertising, circulation, sponsorship and other business activities; prohibiting the dictating of business tasks [quotas] for news bureaus and editorial staff.
通报还指出，各新闻媒体要把好报道审核关，禁止记者站和新闻记者私自设立网站、网站地方频道、专版专刊、内参等刊发批评报道；把好经营活动关，禁止记者站和采编人员开办广告、发行、公关等各类公司，禁止记者站和记者从事广告、发行、赞助等经营活动，禁止向记者站和采编人员下达广告及发行等经营任务。
A relevant responsible person at the State Administration of Press, Publications, Radio, Film and Television said that all administrative divisions of the agency must increase the intensity of the campaign against news extortion and fake news, encouraging the broad participation of grassroots units and the public by repeatedly publicizing telephone reporting hotlines through the news media. In cases where news extortion, fake news and paid-for content are verified at news media, when the violations are of a serious nature publishing licenses will be immediately revoked; in any instance where a journalist is found to have sought illegitimate interests through their news reporting activities, press cards will be revoked without exception; cases where criminal conduct is involved must be referred to the relevant judicial departments for prosecution; as for those heads of news media who bear management responsibility, they must be referred to the discipline inspection departments of the sponsoring institution to determine whether disciplinary rules were violated.
国家新闻出版广电总局相关负责人表示，各级新闻出版广电行政部门要加大对新闻敲诈和假新闻打击力度，通过新闻媒体反复公布举报电话，广泛发动基层单位和群众参与监督。对查实存在新闻敲诈、有偿新闻、有偿不闻的新闻单位，情况严重的一律吊销出版许可证；对查实利用新闻采编活动牟取不正当利益的新闻记者，一律吊销其新闻记者证；对涉嫌犯罪的，必须移送司法机关依法追究刑事责任；对负有管理责任的新闻单位负责人，必须移送其上级主管单位纪检监察部门追究党纪政纪责任。
This responsible person also said that if grassroots units and individuals discover problems, they must report them at the earliest possible opportunity. State Administration of Press, Publications, Radio, Film and Television telephone number dedicated to the campaign: 010-65212870, 010-65212787; National Internet Information Office telephone reporting hotline: 12377; National ‘Anti-Indecency’ Office telephone reporting hotline: 12390.
该负责人还介绍，基层单位和个人如果发现问题，可第一时间进行举报。国家新闻出版广电总局专项行动举报电话：０１０－６５２１２８７０，０１０—６５２１２７８７；国家互联网信息办公室的举报电话：１２３７７；全国“扫黄打非”办公室的举报电话：１２３９０。
22 Critical Viewpoints on Chinese Journalists Oriental Morning Post
June 19, 2014
Today the General Administration of Press, Publications, Radio, Film and Television sent down a ban on journalists carrying out negative reporting on their own. This comes against the background of a number of journalists using their positions to carry out illegal activities. This tells us that there are quite a few problems in the journalism profession. We took this opportunity to look deeply at our own issues, having a democratic and free criticism of reporters.
In the spirit of “criticism supplemented with education”,” Internet users “fired their cannons” at us. With warm tears, we faced the barrage and selected what we felt were the most sincere opinions: 1. From “xuxususan”:
Right now the media is basically a relayer of information, and there is no process of verification, and there is no digging out of the news. They just repeat word for word what others say — the biggest megaphone for rumor-mongering. 2. From “hivene”:
[The media] fabricate things, making things up out of nothing. They don’t check the source of the news. The [sensational] headline writers (标题党) love to kick up waves even when there is no wind. 3. From Hopscotch “跳房子”:
Please be sure to adhere to conscience and to your principles, because you are not just reporting news — you are writing history! 4. From Lawyer Guo of Fuzhou “福州过律师”:
Take fewer red envelopes [of cash], and be more objective in your reporting. 5. From Minhua (敏华):
Journalists will always unconsciously stand on the moral high ground when doing reporting. 6. From Little C (小c):
You must be rigorous in what you report . . . Don’t publish fake news. 7. From Xie Junyi (谢君怡):
The level of professionalism is quite low compared to lawyers and doctors. The dragons and fishes are all jumbled together. There really needs to be regulation. 8. From Zhou Tuzi (周徒子):
My journalist friends, you are the drivers of public opinion, and the goal of those of us seated behind you is to lead better lives. Don’t you see where you are taking us? 9. From Yuan Yuan (圆圆):
The news is sometimes all about gimmicks, and things are exaggerated. For example, some media have to make it all about how public servants are whenever the government is involved, adding their bias and stirring up public animosity. There are no professional standards, and there is no integrity.
10. From Zhu Meng Meng (猪萌萌):
Journalists need to have their feet on the ground, but they can’t entirely pander to their audiences. They can be cute, but they must maintain their moral integrity. They can’t treat their readers like children, thinking that if they just tell a nice story they’ll be coaxed into obedience. They have to know that in the digital world of today no one will be so easily fooled. [CCTV host] Chai Jing (柴静) has said that we need to open our eyes and awake from ignorance. Don’t just stand up on your moral high horse and take a cold view of the world. More and more people are in cahoots with reporters. When the forest is big there are lots of different animals to be found. But basically, [the media] needs to stay afloat and not sink [morally]. 11. From Joleisa:
These days journalists are most often young reporters who recently graduated. They always report the surface, and they always want to direct the news . . . From this you can see how far behind China’s media is. At the “two meetings” [of the National People’s Congress and the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Congress] you could see that most foreign reporters were older journalists. This isn’t just about criticizing youthfulness, but just saying that this reporters probably have more ability. Today’s young reporters are too surface, and don’t have sufficient experience. Sometimes they even rush right in to interview when people are in the throes of tragedy. There’s also the situation with fake news. Truth is the soul of the news. If you can’t even get at the truth, can you still have news? And concerning cooperation between the media and the state, I think we still need to learn from Western countries, not just rushing right out to play the sentimentality card. 12. From Robin Xie:
Critical reporting is the most basic duty of our newspapers. Otherwise, is there any sense in having newspapers at all? Naturally, reporters need to put in the hard work when doing critical reports, basing everything on facts and not becoming hired hands for this or that vested interest. 13. From Splitting Hardwood – Jack Han (劈硬柴-Jack Han):
This so-called cleanup should be based in facts, and be held up to legal standards. This is a demand not only of those in the media, but also of so-called citizens. In a mature and healthy society, the media journalists — who are often called “the uncrowned kings” — should be able to report anything they want to so long as they follow the law and professional standards. What people want to know is, where is the legal basis for this prohibition against cross-industry and cross-sector reporting? 14. From Six Quartets Crossing Time and Space (穿越时空的六重奏)
You know you journalists don’t dare report about on major officials and corrupt officials, and you don’t dare report about government inadequacies. And you just use your press cards to get free entry to tourist sites. I just want to say, you journalists don’t dare report anything, but you want to talk about how you protest justice and peace. Aren’t you just toying with the people? 15. From Rock Blasting (爆石)
You’re told not to step offsides, but you step offside, and you don’t even make a goal. 16. From Alibaba’s Little Donkey (阿里巴巴的小毛驴):
As soon as I saw this topic, I thought of all the news reports I’ve seen about problems with the journalism profession, and the more I thought about it the more I felt ashamed of the way we have this habit of seeing a problem and only cursing it with resentment, but not actually looking at the reasons. There are a lot of things under the surface, and I hope that the Morning Post uses this as an opportunity to take the criticisms of its readers and put together a special report, letting everyone know more fully how the journalism profession works. Maybe a lot of what readers are seeing is not the truth, so it would be good to help everyone get a more comprehensive, multi-faceted view of this profession. 17. From Grandpa Ji (季爷):
I’ve been a little disgusted about how journalists interview the victims during accident stories. These people have already suffered greatly, and you have to go and interview them. Is this not a kind of psychological attack? And there’s also the question of other people’s privacy. Your interviewing and filming exposes the personal lives of people, and isn’t that too much for them to handle? 18. From Cultural Youth Who Loves to Sing (爱唱的文艺男青年):
Criticizing journalists like this for throwing their weight around isn’t as good as pointing the spear at certain editors who sensationalize. The are the [sensational] headline writers who rely on sensational content and inflammatory images to attract readers. They thrive on the vulgar, and can’t help themselves from turning every major incident into an opportunity to entertain . . . 19. From Super Hero
Their accepting of transportation fees [and other off-the-books payments] has harmed their reputation. Please, let’s consider raising their salaries. 20. From Zhang Shaojie (张少杰):
Some journalists wear their skirts too high, and some promote themselves shamelessly on Weibo. 21. From Wang Xia’er (王小二):
Journalists don’t get paid enough . . . and this has hurt the industry’s image. 22. From Mei Mu Yang (美目扬):
Your chief shortcoming is your integrity itself, the way you take on the prosperity of the country as your own sacred responsibility.
