Now Executive Director of the China Media Project, leading the project’s research and partnerships, David originally joined the project in Hong Kong in 2004. He is the author of Dragons in Diamond Village (Penguin), a book of reportage about urbanization and social activism in China, and co-editor of Investigative Journalism in China (HKU Press).
NOTE: The following post by veteran journalist and former Southern Weekly commentator Xiao Shu (Chen Min) was posted to his Facebook account today. Xiao Shu is an important figure in the New Citizens Movement launched by lawyer and social justice advocate Xu Zhiyong. He has called repeatedly this year for the release of Xu Zhiyong, Wang Gongquan, and other leaders of the movement.
Yesterday, my writings from more than eighteen months ago were dragged out again by Phoenix Online — and once again they started making the rounds. For more than a year I’ve been blocked out entirely on China’s internet, and I suppose there must be readers who have missed me.
I remember those few days over a year ago when they started to force me out, shutting my accounts down and blocking anything I wrote or had written. I watched from the sidelines as internet users shared their comments. It was like watching my own funeral. I was so deeply moved — it’s something that’s hard even to describe.
These past few years I’ve been driven into exile, hunted down and attacked from all sides. And now I feel quite certain it’s all been worth it.
In early August this year I was abducted by state security police. Under orders to bring me in for questioning, state security from Guangzhou detained me in Beijing. They said in no uncertain terms: There’s no sense in arguing — we fully intend to marginalize you all.
At the time I responded: So, you think marginalization is really going to work? And today I think I can repeat that question to those who would silence me. They blocked me entirely on China’s internet. They blocked so many of my friends as well. But have they succeeded in winning back public opinion? Have they won the will and support of the people?
Today, more and more of my friends suffer the same fate, having their internet lives entirely annihilated. Even the most moderate voices, like that of Zhang Qianfan, are not spared.
But we should not despair. Today is not yesterday. Being blocked is not something terrible. It is, in fact, a kind of honour. It is a testament to your strength and to your contributions. Last year they snuffed me out, and no doubt in the future they will seek to restrain my voice in every aspect possible. But life goes on, and in fact I enjoy perhaps even more space than I did before. Those who have real strength have nothing to fear from their obstruction.
The truth is, those who restrain us are the ones whose hearts are burdened by fear.
We cannot give up simply because we are curtailed. Nor should we allow ourselves to be provoked by their actions. We must be cool-headed and resolute, neither haughty nor humble, pushing ahead on our own terms, traveling the path we must travel even as attacks rain from all sides. We must trust in time. We must trust in the human heart. We must trust in our own discipline.
Following a report in December 2013 by the Beijing News about poor migrants living in underground wells in the capital’s Chaoyang District because they could not afford housing there, local authorities sent teams to seal the well entrances with concrete. The story underscored the problems facing many migrants in China’s major cities, where real estate prices have soared in recent years, making basic living space unaffordable. In the following cartoon, posted by artist Kuang Biao (邝飚) to Sina Weibo, the pitiable denizen of an underground well shouts and raises his hands pleadingly as a combat boot seals the entrance to the well.
[Today is a big day] December 10 — World Human Rights Day. Every life is precious, regardless of whether one is rich or poor. No one’s rights can be infringed, whether they are high-level officials or ordinary people. No one’s right to free speech can be infringed, no matter whether they are famous or obscure. On World Human Rights Day, let us embrace equality, embrace human rights! Today, let us salute all those brave people who have sacrificed in the pursuit of human rights. Let us salute all the brave people who fight for human rights.
NOTE: All posts to The Anti-Social List are listed as “permission denied” in the Sina Weibo API, which means they were deleted by Weibo managers, not by users themselves.
Xi Jinping ignores US Vice President Joe Biden. Britain’s Daily Telegraph and other foreign media report that the visas for 24 journalists from the New York Times and Bloomberg in China will expire at the end of this month. They say this is because the reports done last year by the two media about the wealth of the families of Wen Jiabao and Xi Jinping. Last Thursday (December 5) US Vice President Joe Biden raised this issue during a high-level meeting [in China], but Biden said the Xi Jinping was totally indifferent.
NOTE: All posts to The Anti-Social List are listed as “permission denied” in the Sina Weibo API, which means they were deleted by Weibo managers, not by users themselves.
In November 2013, top Chinese leaders released their “Decision” coming out of the Third Plenum of the 18th Central Committee of the CCP. The decision, which outlined a series of reforms planned by the leadership, caused exuberance among many observers — and markets in Asia rallied. Others were less excited about the Party’s decision, which was articulated in dense Partyspeak, and noted there were no hints of the kinds of institutional reforms necessary to make promises (on issues like land reform, for example) real. The above cartoon, posted by artist Lao Xiao (老肖) to Sina Weibo, depicts the language coming out of the recent plenum as red banners being lifted skyward on balloons of red sperm. The reference to self pleasure goes without saying.
According to the most recent news reports, a fire at a warehouse in southeast Beijing yesterday, November 19, has killed 12 people. The following post by Xiao Han (萧含), a journalist with Yanzhou Metropolis Daily, was deleted from Sina Weibo sometime before 2:18am today, November 20, 2013. The post criticized the official police notice of the fire, which begins with a list of local leaders who are directing work on the scene, implying praise for the government’s robust response. Xiao Han currently has more than 45,000 followers on Sina Weibo. [More on deleted posts at the WeiboScope Search, by the Journalism and Media Studies Centre]
The deleted post reads:
Such a short official notice, and it starts with the list of leaders like a dung beetle rolling dung, gliding right over the 10 [now 12] dead.
NOTE: All posts to The Anti-Social List are listed as “permission denied” in the Sina Weibo API, which means they were deleted by Weibo managers, not by users themselves.
Ding Dong: Why was the Soviet KGB so terrifying to people? / The KGB in the Soviet era has suddenly drawn intense the attention of the Chinese people. It’s full name is the “Komitet gosudarstvennoy bezopasnosti”, which translates to “National Security Commission.” Given its notorious reputation in history, it can’t help but throw up all kinds of associations for people. People can’t help but wonder whether they too might soon be living in a nightmare in which secret police are everywhere.
NOTE: All posts to The Anti-Social List are listed as “permission denied” in the Sina Weibo API, which means they were deleted by Weibo managers, not by users themselves.
It’s a new week, and the mood seems to have flip-flopped over the Chinese Communist Party’s reform plans emerging from the Third Plenum. The communique released last week — the menu before the meal — left many observers disappointed. The full text of the “Decision”, however, released last Friday, served up plenty of tasty tidbits of language with which we can now stuff ourselves.
We’ll leave the meatier bits about the economy to others and focus on this cold side-dish of ours — media policy.
There are basically three points in the “Decision” that deal with media or culture. And we also have relevant language in the “explanation” released on Friday by Xinhua News Agency. So we’re looking at four elements here.
Xi Jinping has outlined his direction for China’s future. What will it mean for media and culture in the country?
Jumping right in, Section 36 of the decision, on “strengthening institutional protections and innovating mechanisms for opposing corruption” (加强反腐败体制机制创新和制度保障), includes a mention of “supervision by public opinion,” or yulun jiandu (舆论监督), among the mechanisms needed to combat corruption, which are referred to collectively as a “system of laws and regulations to fight corruption” (反腐倡廉法规制度体系).
Yulun jiandu, which can be translated “watchdog journalism,” is meant as a sort of state-santioned media supervision of power. It made its first high-level appearance in the CCP political report in 1987, used by Zhao Ziyang, and it has been a regular feature of Party language on supervision ever since. So this is no surprise. But, we could say, better to see it here than not at all.
Moving on, Section 38 of the decision deals with “promoting the innovation of cultural systems and mechanisms” (推进文化体制机制创新). Much of this section is the same boilerplate language we saw in the political report to the 17th Party Congress in 2007 and at the October 2011 plenary meeting on cultural reforms. China’s goals are to create a “socialist strong-culture nation” (社会主义文化强国) and to “enhance national cultural soft power.” As it pursues these goals, China must remain loyal to its socialist and Marxist core values.
These are points President Xi Jinping re-emphasized in his August 19, 2013, speech on ideology.
The “Decision” also pledges a “deepening of cultural reforms,” though the precise meaning of these reforms (deep or not) has always been murky.
The next portion of this section is noteworthy for the questions it leaves open. Here is what it says:
(38) Improving cultural management systems. Under the principles of separating government functions from enterprise management and separating public service units from the government, promoting the transition from [a mode of] government units operating media to government units regulating the media (政府部门办文化/政府部门管文化), and promoting further rationalising of the relationship between Party-government units and the cultural state-run institutions associated with them (推动党政部门与其所属的文化企事业单位进一步理顺关系). [We must/will] create regulatory agencies for the oversight of state-owned cultural assets, carrying out the integrated management of personnel, affairs, assets and [public opinion] guidance (建立党委和政府监管国有文化资产的管理机构，实行管人管事管资产管导向相统一).
The transition here is from “operation” (办) of culture by government units to “regulation” (管) of culture by government units. What exactly does this mean? One could argue that it means a kind of stepping back from culture, less direct meddling in favor of letting cultural enterprises do their thing.
But don’t hold your breath. Control is still the overriding priority here, and the next paragraph of section 38 makes this very clear. This paragraph addresses the issue of “systems and mechanisms” for “adhering to correct public opinion guidance.” This term, public opinion guidance, or yulun daoxiang (舆论导向), remains the cardinal term governing media and cultural practice and their relationship to the Party and public. The idea of “guidance” is that the Party must control the media, and therefore public opinion, in order to maintain social and political stability.
Here is the passage, which will leave in Chinese as well for the convenience of our readers:
[We must/will] perfect systems and mechanisms for adhering to correct guidance of public opinion. We must fully build interactive mechanisms for the work of basic management, content management, industry management and the crackdown on and prevention of criminal conduct online. [We must/will] perfect mechanisms for handling online sudden-breaking incidents, creating an online public opinion work pattern that integrates positive public opinion channeling and management according to rule of law. [We must/will] integrate news media resources, promoting the integrated development of tradition media and new media. [We must/will] promote the institutionalization of news release. [We must/will] strengthen the professional credentials system for news workers, and prioritize the use and management of new media, and regulate the communication order.
健全坚持正确舆论导向的体制机制。健全基础管理、内容管理、行业管理以及网络违法犯罪防范和打击等工作联动机制，健全网络突发事件处置机制，形成正面引导和依法管理相结合的网络舆论工作格局。整合新闻媒体资源，推动传统媒体和新兴媒体融合发展。推动新闻发布制度化。严格新闻工作者职业资格制度，重视新型媒介运用和管理，规范传播秩序。
The possible warning flags here are the crackdown on “criminal conduct online” and the language about strengthening the “professional credentials system for news workers.” In recent months, there has been a sustained crackdown in China on ostensibly “criminal” conduct online. But while this campaign has been rationalized by playing up “rumors” and “false information” as a sort of public health threat the leadership must stamp out in the public interest, it is clear the real priority is to maintain good old-fashioned “public opinion guidance” in the face of the new challenges presented to the Party leadership by social media (think “Big V” crackdown).
As for professionalism in the media, we can’t think of this issue right now without thinking of the recent and ongoing mess of the Chen Yongzhou affair. The big question with this language in the decision, and with the Chen Yongzhou affair too, is whether the leadership has a genuine interest in improving the professional conduct of journalists, or whether this is ultimately about keeping journalists at bay. The tension between the control mandate and the “supervision” mandate has always been there, presenting problems for the notion of watchdog journalism as a tool to fight corruption (Section 36).
The decision’s conclusion (Section 60) gives us our third bit of media-related language, the need to “strengthen propaganda and public opinion guidance in order to create a favorable social environment for the deepening of reforms.” That’s classic control language once again. Not particularly noteworthy.
Finally, the “explanation” released on Friday provides us with the most explicit media-related language emerging from the plenum. It makes clear that the internet and social media are issues of primary concern to the leadership.
Our experiences have shown that there are clear deficiencies in our current management systems in the fact of the rapid development of internet technologies. These principally are: overlapping management bodies (多头管理), overlapping functions (职能交叉), conflict of rights and responsibilities (权责不一) and lack of efficiency (效率不高). At the same time, as the qualities of internet media grow stronger, online media management and industry management cannot keep up with development and change. In particular, as we face the rapid development of Twitter (微客), WeChat and other social media and real-time communication tools that are rapid, influential, and have scale and social mobilization capacity, the question of how to strengthen online legal building and public opinion channeling to ensure order in online communications and national security has already become a conspicuous problem standing before us.
This passage tells us that the leadership is deeply concerned about the challenges it faces to its dominance of public opinion as new technologies bring new possibilities. But of course it is also up to the challenge, determined to “strengthen online legal building and public opinion channeling.”
There is only one other aspect of this passage I find noteworthy. The explanation says that new media have presented challenges to “online information order” and “national security.” One of the biggest stories coming out of this plenum has been the creation of a new National Security Commission. So I just want to put this question out there . . . How might the Party re-tool and redefine its approach to the internet and social media in light of its shifting approach to national security?
Hong Kong’s Apple Daily reported on Sunday that China Media Capital (CMC), a media investment fund with close ties to the government, has purchased a controlling stake in Caixin Media, the media group run by veteran journalist Hu Shuli (胡舒立). The newspaper said that Caixin was in the process of transferring licensing for its various publications — including Caixin Century and China Reform — to Shanghai from Zhejiang, as CMC’s operations are based in the financial capital.
There have been rumors since September this year that CMC has close ties to “princelings,” the children of influential Communist Party leaders, and that in fact the true controlling hand behind CMC is Li Tong (李彤), the daughter of former politburo standing committee member and ideology chief Li Changchun (李长春).
China Media Capital CEO Li Ruigang (黎瑞刚) has denied ties to influential princelings, including Li Tong. [UPDATE: See also Li’s recent interview with Hong Kong’s Singtao Daily, in which he says he has never had dealings with Li Tong, and says media have confused his China Media Capital with China Cultural Industrial Investment Fund, which Li Tong does oversee.]
Hong Kong media reports suggest Li Tong, above, the daughter of former propaganda czar Li Changchun, is the real power behind CMC, which is rumored to have bought a controlling state in Caixin Media.
Li Tong, currently CEO of Bank of China International (See also this release), reportedly also runs the China Cultural and Media Investment Fund, a state-backed cultural promotion and investment vehicle that was approved by the China’s National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) in May 2010. According to a press release on the fund’s website, the formation of the fund was a “significant move in the implementation of the Cultural Industry Promotion Plan promulgated by the State Council.”
The China Media Project has not yet confirmed the purchase of the Caixin stake by CMC. However, in an interview with 21st Century Business Herald published on November 15, Li Ruigang said only that it was “inconvenient to respond” to rumors that CMC had completed the purchase of the Caixin Media stake.
The following post by Nantong Dan Lihua (南通单利华), a petitioner from the Jiangsu city of Nantong, was deleted from Sina Weibo sometime before 3:04pm today, November 13, 2013. In the post, Dan reports being detained by a stability preservation official from Nantong city at the railway station in Beijing. Dan Lihua currently has with more than 1,300 followers on Sina Weibo. [More on deleted posts at the WeiboScope Search, by the Journalism and Media Studies Centre]
The deleted post, in which Dan tags the official Weibo of the Beijing police, reads:
Right now I’m in the North Plaza at the Beijing South Railway Station and I’ve been intercepted by seven people led by Liu Yi (刘毅), the head of the petitions office in Gangzha District, Nantong City, Jiangsu. I’m sitting on the cold ground. I’ve already dialed 110 to report my case to Beijing [authorities], but the police haven’t come. Please won’t you web users pay attention to my case. Thank you! My phone number is 13615235498.
NOTE: All posts to The Anti-Social List are listed as “permission denied” in the Sina Weibo API, which means they were deleted by Weibo managers, not by users themselves.
