Author: David Bandurski

Now Executive Director of the China Media Project, leading the project’s research and partnerships, David originally joined the project in Hong Kong in 2004. He is the author of Dragons in Diamond Village (Penguin), a book of reportage about urbanization and social activism in China, and co-editor of Investigative Journalism in China (HKU Press).

What is the Price of Press Censorship?

Recently, the deputy chief of the Internet Team of the Haikou City Public Security Department was sentenced to 10 years in prison. His crime: accepting bribes. Local media made a point of obscuring his name, identifying him simply as Wei X-Ning (魏某宁). Only when Southern Weekly followed up with an investigative report did everyone learn that his name was Wei Yining (魏一宁).
But one thing no media inside China bothered to talk about was the fact that this was a case of corruption in which the power to control the press (舆论监控) was abused — and the case should prompt deeper reflection on corruption of the propaganda system itself.
The court found that Wei Yining had used “the convenience of his position,” with the power to control the internet, to delete more than 280 internet posts in exchange for around 700,000 yuan. The bribe payers were 11 web police from the public security bureaus of 11 local cities in 6 provinces. They were responsible [to their local superiors] for removing posts on two major Haikou-based websites that was detrimental to the image of their local governments. They would pay up, and Wei Yining would send down an order for the posts to be deleted.
The way this was done was actually quite simple. Once the local internet control officers had paid Wei Yining the fee he demanded, Wei would issue orders for deletion of the content to senior web managers at the sites in question via QQ message. For the web managers executing such orders was simply a matter of habit. Even if they had their doubts, they wouldn’t dare say anything. Generally, it would take only 10 minutes for an order to be executed from start to finish.
Censorship for Hire
The Wei Yining case makes clear just how much room there is for corruption in the execution of ostensible official business. It is now routine practice for local governments to pay for the removal of criticism or for the promotion of laudatory coverage.
Many people have already noticed the way that official Party mouthpieces and individuals can enrich themselves by virtue of their official power and monopoly status. Local governments, for example, engage in all sorts of misconduct in order to ensure that their own local prestige projects (形象工程) are reported on China Central Television.
According to a report from The Beijing News, there is now a case before the court in Beijing’s Fengtai District in which it has emerged that a public relations company was searching online for negative news about governments and enterprises and then approaching them with offers to delete the content for between 500 yuan and 2,000 yuan per item. The suspects in that case include a person named “Liu X” who is identified as an internet cop. This Liu X was allegedly using his position as an internet cop — responsible for removing pornography and other undesirable content — in order to delete posts on behalf of this public relations company. The case is estimated to involve more than one million yuan in bribes.
The Golden Goose of Propaganda
The fact that Chinese media don’t dare report is that in the larger context of corruption within the propaganda regime, these web police are actually insignificant. The golden goose is the propaganda department and its local branches. The propaganda department controls not just the internet, but also newspapers, television and book publishing. It has not just the power to order the deletion of web posts, but can also tell all of the media under its shadow what needs to be reported.
Moreover, the propaganda department also controls personnel issues for the vast majority of media. It can order the punishment of media staff, remove publishers or editors in chief, and even tell media to fire journalists. Many local propaganda departments even have the power to impose economic sanctions on media.
I wrote an article last year for the iSun Times called “Striking Back Against the Propaganda Department” (“反击宣传部”), which recently won a Human Rights Press Award in Hong Kong. In that article I talk about two basic characteristics of propaganda departments. First, they operate without checks and balances. Second, they are completely non-transparent. There are no mechanisms, not even with the Chinese Communist Party apparatus, to check propaganda departments and address problems. Most resolutions or instructions from administrative departments in China are documented, and in many cases they must be open to the public. But the bans issued by the propaganda department are protected by the justification of national secrecy — and propaganda organs are in fact less and less willing to leave any sort of trail.
Who Watches the Propaganda Department?
It’s probably difficult for most people even to imagine how a junior web control official can swallow millions in bribes. How much more is possible for a senior-level propaganda official with nearly boundless power? But the secret nature of propaganda work is such that no media would ever dare expose corruption among the commissars charged with keeping them in line.
However, if you conduct an internet search for the term “bribery by propaganda officials” (宣传部长受贿), you will discover to your surprise that a great many propaganda heads or deputy heads have been removed for corruption. Looking at the public trials or investigations for propaganda officials we’ve seen recently, we have big fish like former deputy propaganda chiefs Li Dongsheng (李东生) and Shen Weichen (申维辰), and small fry like the former deputy propaganda chief of Zhejiang’s Yuhuan County, Geng Jiangping (耿江平). And between these there are no doubt countless propaganda officials acting with impunity.
You will find, however, the none of these propaganda officials have been tried for corruption they engaged in while serving in propaganda positions. No one it seems (based on our partial sample) has been tried for abusing their power to censor the media.
Is is that there’s no fat to skim off the surface in propaganda posts? Is it that the conduct of these officials was unimpeachable while they serve in propaganda posts? This recent case against internet cop Wei Yining suggests that the answer to both questions is NO, and that this corruption is just the tip of the iceberg.
This article was first published in Chinese at PaoPao.

"Your post is inappropriate"

On April 11, 2014, the day a Chinese court upheld a four-year jail sentence for lawyer Xu Zhiyong, the founder of the New Citizens Movement, I posted the following Chinese passage from Xu on Sina Weibo.

公民们,就让我们从现在开始吧。无论你身在何处,无论你从事何种职业,无论你贫穷还是富裕,让我们在内心深处,在现实生活中,在互联网上,在中华大地的每一寸土地上,坚定而自豪地说出本来属于我们的身份: 我是公民,我们是公民.
Citizens, let us begin from this moment. No matter where you are, no matter what your profession, rich or poor, let us in the depths of our hearts, in our daily lives, on the internet, and on every inch of this vast land, firmly and loudly declare the identity that rightfully belongs to us: I am a citizen; we are citizens.

The post was removed minutes later, and I was sent the following personal message from Sina:

a

Hello, you have been informed on by another user for violation of regulations. According to Sina Weibo Community Management Regulations, your post made on April 11, 2014, at 11:39:37, “Citizens, let us begin from this moment …” has already been designated as inappropriate for public sharing.

I was directed to a “Help Center” that listed out questions any user whose post suffered a similar fate might wish to ask. Like this one:
Why have I been notified that I’ve said something I can’t?
Answer:

In order to provide users with a clean Weibo environment, if your Weibo account is disciplined because it was found to have violated the Sina Weibo Community Regulations or relevant laws, regulations or policies, you might result in your inability to make subsequent posts. The specific time of the punishment will generally be sent to you by private notice. You are advised to check your private inbox to confirm. In order to avoid this situation happening again, we advise you to share healthy and upright Weibo content.


I am a citizen

The second trial of lawyer Xu Zhiyong, the founder of the New Citizens Movement, is set to begin in Beijing this morning. For more, see our post yesterday.
The following are Xu Zhiyong’s words, conveying the spirit of the New Citizens Movement and shared today by the movement’s members:

Citizens, let us begin from this moment. No matter where you are, no matter what your profession, rich or poor, let us in the depths of our hearts, in our daily lives, on the internet, and on every inch of this vast land, firmly and loudly declare the identity that rightfully belongs to us: I am a citizen; we are citizens.
公民们,就让我们从现在开始吧。无论你身在何处,无论你从事何种职业,无论你贫穷还是富裕,让我们在内心深处,在现实生活中,在互联网上,在中华大地的每一寸土地上,坚定而自豪地说出本来属于我们的身份: 我是公民,我们是公民.

xu zhiyong

New citizens' website launches on eve of Xu Zhiyong verdict

A Chinese court is expected to rule tomorrow on the appeal by lawyer Xu Zhiyong against his four-year jail sentence for “assembling a crowd to disturb public order.” The charges against Xu arise from his founding role in the New Citizens Movement, a broad grassroots campaign for civil rights through civil action on a range of issues, from equality of education to government transparency.
Xu Zhiyong was criminally detained in Beijing on July 16, 2013, several months after he was placed under informal house arrest.
In a 2012 article laying out the foundations of a new movement of Chinese citizens, Xu wrote that China was in urgent need of a “political movement in which this ancient nation bids utter farewell to authoritarianism and completes the civilized transformation to constitutional governance.”
Despite attempts by the authorities to reign in the New Citizens Movement by arresting Xu Zhiyong and other core members, activities of the loosely organized movement have continued in cities across China.
The New Citizens Movement has also now launched an official website covering all aspects of the movement and civil society in China.
The following is our full translation of the preface written by Xiao Shu, a former journalist and a core member of the movement, on the occasion of the website’s launch.

Standing Firm and Working Tirelessly
— A Preface for the Launch of the New Citizens Movement Website

The website of the New Citizens Movement is now online.
Offline, meanwhile, in the nation’s capital, our colleagues — Xu Zhiyong, Ding Jiaxi, Zhao Changqing, Zhang Baocheng and Li Yuzheng — continue to suffer [at the hands of authorities in Beijing]. Illegal trial proceedings against them move ahead.
Elsewhere in the country, in Hubei, Jiangxi and other places, illegal trials commence and illegal verdicts are announced against other members of the New Citizens Movement. The systematic persecution of the New Citizens Movement and its members is now reaching its culmination.
The authorities, however, have failed to achieve their desired outcome: the collapse of the New Citizens Movement. This is a movement that cannot be stopped.
Six weeks ago, the Ministry of Education ruled at last that students from any of the country’s thirty provinces are now permitted to take the college entrance exam outside their native place of registry [a crucial decision for the children of migrant workers]. Clearly, the push by the New Citizens Movement for greater equality in education has achieved one stage of victory.
When the Decision of the Third Plenum of the 18th Central Committee of the CCP was released four months ago, it included language pledging to “actively carry out trials for systems of transparency for the newly appointed leaders and cadres on relevant matters.” These “relevant matters” must include disclosure of the assets [of government officials]. And ultimately, the authorities will have to respond to the call by the New Citizens Movement for disclosure of the assets of government officials.
The dinner gatherings of members of the New Citizens Movement in various cities have continued unabated, even in the face of tremendous pressure — and even in jittery Beijing.
As ever, it is within the capacity of the authorities to persecute any citizen who speaks up about problems in our society. But now, unlike the past, the authorities cannot possibly turn their backs on the problems themselves. They cannot dismiss the demands of the public.
Social progress entails a definite price. To pay that price, we are prepared to sacrifice ourselves. To pay that price, we are prepared to hazard imprisonment — in order to turn the public’s attention to public affairs, in order to create the pressure necessary to force concessions on the part of the authorities, in order to compel changes to unjust and unfair policies, in order to bring change to the system.
This road of peaceful resistance, of peaceful change, of the New Citizens Movement, has already been opened for us by Xu Zhiyong.
We are not about empty slogans. We are not about abstract grand narratives, or insincere talk of opposition. We are about returning to society and putting down roots, about joining with the lives of ordinary people and leading thousands and tens of thousands to take up and protect the rights that have always been theirs — to become citizens in the fullest sense.
This sort of concrete resistance, grounded in the very substance of life, cannot be defeated. Society provides it with a solid foundation, and life imbues it with tremendous force. False charges, persecution and forced suppression will not avail [against this resistance], but in fact will only steel our resolve.
Just as we understand that all acts of conscience throughout human history have met with adversity, and that suffering is something all acts of conscience must face, we understand that the New Citizens Movement cannot escape adversity. For us, suffering for conscience is a matter of honor.
When we suffer by taking the rights and responsibility of the citizen seriously, by taking freedom, justice and love as our practice, this serves only to iterate the absurdity of the system, and underscore the imperative of change.
Repression will not end the New Citizens Movement, and in fact Xu Zhiyong and the others have drawn new strength from their hardship on behalf of the whole movement. From the courtroom and from their prison cells, they have never ceased their struggle — and they have never rested in their advocacy of the principle of the New Citizen.
The illegal trials against members of the New Citizens Movement resemble the show trials held in Taiwan after the Formosa incident of 1979. They serve only to consummate the New Citizens Movement and to announce it to the world. For the New Citizens Movement, this is an historic moment.
International support for the New Citizens Movement has never ceased, and this too forms an integral part of the movement. International opinion has rushed to the support of the movement, and in places like Munich and Portugal people have even gathered to show their support through “wine and dine” sessions in which they raise their glasses and express solidarity with the New Citizens Movement, calling for peace and justice worldwide. [Translator’s Note: In combination, the Chinese words “food” and “drunkenness”, here rendered “wine and dine,” are homonyms of the phrase “commit a crime,” a reference to the wrongful trial and persecution of rights defenders. This practice originated in China in 2011.]
All of these supporters know that the spirit and values of the New Citizens Movement — freedom, justice, love and conviction — are core values not meant to destroy, but rather to build, through the routine practice of rights, an order in which love replaces hate and courage replaces anger. They believe this spirit of the New Citizen should be shared far and wide.
The New Citizens Movement represents the rise of civil society in China. It has earned the respect of the world, and it has earned dignity for the Chinese people.
Civil movements in the broader sense — social movements of citizens pursuing their civil and constitutional rights — have continued unabated in China too. In south China, labor movements have advanced through organised rights defence actions. Networks of human rights lawyers have strengthened despite constant pressure. And grassroots NGOs on issues like public welfare, environmental protection and communal self-reliance have found space to grow like never before.
Freedom is our goal, justice is our spirit, and love is our foundation. Through the citizens movement we will galvanise society, rebuild our values, remake our social core. The new society that emerges will lead China’s transition to constitutionalism. This is the prevailing tide of our time, and any attempt to hold it back is destined to fail, like beating back water with a sword.
Attacks on the New Citizens Movement continue. Our brothers and sisters continue to suffer. Though we may not be free of sorrow, we refuse to despair. The work of conscience cannot be beaten down. The New Citizens Movement will not be toppled. And so we remain confident. The strength in our hearts will not be bested.
Xu Zhiyong and the others have already sacrificed their freedom in order to open a road for the New Citizens Movement. This is the road to a free China. It is the road to a better China. We have only to take to this road, to join forces with the New Citizens Movement. We are duty bound to forge ahead.
These are the aims and mission of the New Citizens Movement website. We cannot say for sure what impact our actions will ultimately have — each of us has limitations. But we will stand firm, and we will work tirelessly for our goals.
April 11, 2014
The New Citizens Website
www.xgmyd.com

Gravely Overpriced

gravely overpriced

According to news reports in early April 2014, a cemetery park in Laishui County, Hebei province, has been marketing graves for around 60,000 yuan per square meter, saying the plots have ideal “dragon contour” positioning according to the art of fengshui, or geomancy. The prices for these grave plots were about 15 times as high as the local price for price real estate. News media also reported that the registered legal representative of the company that runs the cemetery park is the deputy head of the local civil affairs bureau. In the above cartoon, posted by The Beijing News to Sina Weibo, a local official cooks a gravestone over an open fire, a reference to cooking up prices.

Another anti-corruption post gets the axe

The following post by “Protect Human Rights” (保护-人权), a user with just under 20,000 followers on Sina Weibo, was deleted from Weibo sometime before 12:25pm today, April 9, 2014. [See more deleted posts at the WeiboScope Search, by the Journalism and Media Studies Centre]

If wining and dining with public funds was cut in half, kids in poor mountain regions could all attend school; if we cut the number of public vehicles [used by officials] in half, schools across China could all have school buses; if control was cut in half, we could become a cultural great power; if special privileges [enjoyed by officials] were cut in half, we would have true social harmony; if bribery and law-breaking were cut in half, no one would head to Beijing to petition; if we cut the number of public functionaries in half, the efficiency of our government agencies would achieve real progress; if we cut impudence in half, we would be a major power in earnest.

The original Chinese post follows:

如果把公款吃喝减一半,贫困山区的孩子都能上学了;如把公车减一半, 全国学校都有校车了;如把管制减一半,咱就成文化强国了;如果把特权减一半,社会就真的和谐了;如果把贪赃枉法减一半,就没人进京上访了;如果把公务员减一半,机关效率就真提高了;如果把无耻减一半, 咱真的就大国崛起了

official

Behind China's media cleanup drive

China’s Central Propaganda Department and other agencies recently announced an aggressive cleanup campaign for the country’s news profession. In response to the campaign — which like past ones has taken a highly moralistic tone — I wrote last week about the central role of state media censorship in driving the debasement of professional news and fostering what the recent joint notice calls “journalism diseases.”
Essentially, how can you appeal to the best professional instincts of journalists when they are not permitted to professionalize at all — meaning that their role, and the acceptability of their work, is still defined in terms of the Party’s priorities?
“Fake news” is one of the targets of this latest campaign. But no one inside China would dare openly criticise — as Hong Kong commentator Leung Man-tao has — the fatuousness of state media reporting of sudden-breaking news events.

fan changjiang
Journalist Fan Changjiang was persecuted during the Cultural Revolution and committed suicide in 1970. A recent People’s Daily online column quotes this “forefather” as it pushes for cleaner journalism.
That said, the notice is at least correct in saying that “news extortion,” “fake news” and other ills are frightfully common in China’s media.

On April 1, People’s Daily Online ran an editorial calling for greater self-discipline, truth and conscience on the part of Chinese journalists. The editorial alludes to a number of cases of media corruption that have been cited in the recent campaign.
One of the details that caught my attention was “journalist Yang X (杨某) of Hangzhou Daily, who accepted 300,000 yuan from a public relations company.” First of all, it’s interesting to note that the full name of “journalist Yang” is thoughtfully protected in this case, involving an official Party newspaper, while in the recent Chen Yongzhou incident, the reporter was (in violation of ethics and the law) paraded on China Central Television.
Second, we may notice “journalist Yang” was being paid by a public relations company while on staff at Hangzhou Daily, the official Party mouthpiece of city leaders in Hangzhou. We can presume that the reporter was valuable to the PR company because he could help the company place positive coverage in Hangzhou Daily and related publications on behalf of its clients (companies as well as, possibly, lower-level government leaders).
Chinese journalists have told me in the past about regional and national networks of “intermediary organisations” spanning media at different levels, with reporters and editors kept on retainer. They can help place coverage as well as alert clients to possible negative coverage.
Without a doubt, media is a dirty, dirty business in China. This cleanup campaign will do nothing to combat these systemic issues — but it certainly may help frighten the real professionals, those who care most sincerely about truthful and meaningful work, into the silent shadows.
A translation of the People’s Daily Online editorial follows:

People’s Online Commentary: Abuse of the Right to Watchdog Journalism Cannot Be Tolerated
(人民网评:舆论监督权岂容冒用滥用)
By Gu Song (孤松)
The news media have been called the “watchtowers of society,” and journalists have been called “the conscience of society.” But as the news profession miss continued to develop, the trends of abuse and careless use of the right to report (采访权), and particularly the right to conduct supervision by public opinion [or watchdog journalism].
Some real media and fake media, some real journalists and fake journalists, have abused and carelessly used the right to conduct supervision by public opinion, using critical reports and “revealing scandal” to entrap the subjects of the report, perpetrating extortion against small enterprises and others, turning illegal profits through criminal activity.
The Central Propaganda Department and eight other agencies recently issued a notice calling for a national crackdown on news extortion and fake news. At the same time they issued a group of classic cases of editorial staff and fake reporters, fake media and news extortion.
Judging from these cases of news extortion that have been released, there are three serious problems that exist:
1. Some news outfits have been driven by a profit-seeking motive and had chaotic management, resulting in cases of news extortion. For example, China Special Products was managed chiefly by retired staffers, most from the same family, so there was no capacity for properly managing news reporters and reporting activities. Some staff members were not paid at all and expected to scrape together income on their own. Some were able to earn upwards of 200,000 yuan per year.
Then there was the case of Enterprise Party-Building Reference News (企业党建参考报), which set business targets for all of its bureaus, so a number of bureaus and individual reporters illegally carried out interviews. How can these organisations, which directly define media as profit-making tools, be considered “watchtowers of society.”
2. A number of unscrupulous journalists abuse their right to interview and their right to conduct supervision by public opinion in order to gain privately. For example, journalist Yang X (杨某) of Hangzhou Daily, who accepted 300,000 yuan from a public relations company. And journalist Luo XX (罗某某) of the Securities Times, who accepted a 200,000 yuan hush fee from a computer company. How, with such cases of using news reports as a way to line the pockets of a few while hoisting the flag of watchdog journalism, can we talk about this kind of journalist being the “conscience of society”?
3. a number of fake reporters and fake media have carelessly used the right to conduct watchdog journalism to fabricate fake reports, committing brazen criminal acts that disturb the public order with serious negative effects.
For example, there was the “1/15” case in Xi’an, Shaanxi province, a case in which a fake reporter and an accomplice extorted money from a small enterprise, and after the accomplice had been arrested even cheated his parents. And there was the “11/25” case in Shandong, in which newspapers were illegally distributed –28 kinds of illegal publication, more than 11 million copies sold in 28 provinces, districts and cities.
With the Chen Yongzhou incident at the New Express right before our eyes, these cases illustrate that this type of behavior is not isolated, and that our news industry is not a clean terrain.
Various forms of abuse of the right to conduct watchdog journalism to perpetrate “news extortion” have already become a major source of damage to journalism. They not only damage the image of members of the press and diminish the authority and credibility of the news media, but also damage the fabric of society and upset social order. If we allow them to exist and spread, they will cause serious damage to the development and progress of society.
We must strike out resolutely, with the toughest action possible, to actively resolve these obvious problems that the people have expressed, and put a stop to the spread of news extortion and fake news. Only by getting rid of the false and allowing the truth, by resolutely punishing the “fake media” and fake reporters that blacken the name of media and journalists, can we ensure the good reputation of journalists and media, and guarantee that news reports have greater force.
. . .
In this age of diverse interests and enticements, media and journalists must uphold the law, be objective and fair, devoting themselves to the good of society — making media more credible and influential. here, we would do well to bear in mind the words of our press forefather Fan Changjiang (范长江), who said: “This society needs countless reporters of integrity who can struggle to represent the interests of the people.”
Our journalists must always maintain a sense of clarity and self-discipline. They must uphold the conscience of the profession, maintain integrity as journalists, have strong morals . . . being journalists with a sense of social conscience.

Lawyer wins open information case in Guangzhou

China probably will not formally commemorate the sixth anniversary of its national regulations on open government information on May 1 this year. But now is a good time to revisit the Ordinance on Open Government Information (政府信息公开条例), which made headlines this week thanks to a court case in Guangzhou that is atypical, if not exactly landmark.
On April 1, Guangzhou’s New Express reported that Guangdong’s Health and Family Planning Commission (省卫计委) had lost a lawsuit brought against it last year by Zhejiang lawyer Wu Youshui (吴有水), stemming from the commission’s refusal to provide information Wu had requested under the Ordinance on Open Government Information.

Wu Youshui SM
Zhejiang lawyer Wu Youshui is interviewed by Guangzhou’s New Express after his successful lawsuit against Guangdong’s Health and Family Planning Commission.
Passed in May 2007, China’s regulations on open government information (OGI) require government agencies across the country to “proactively” release certain categories of information through public and online services, and establish clear procedures by which citizens can request information. The regulations also require state-level agencies to compile annual reports on their work with respect to OGI.

The product of many years of wrangling, the regulations were an important step for China, calling into question the presumption that all government information must remain secret.
Implementation of the regulations has been uneven, however, and China’s culture of secrecy — and no doubt very real fears of exposure — has worked against them. It goes without saying that the era of “sunshine government” proclaimed with passage of the regulations remains far off indeed.
But the Ordinance on Open Government Information is undoubtedly important still, insofar as it establishes information openness as a duty incumbent on government agencies, and makes clear that access to government information (of certain kinds) is a right enjoyed by citizens.
On July 11, 2013, Wu Youshui submitted an open government information request to Guangdong’s Health and Family Planning Commission asking that it disclose exactly how funds from a levy for social expenditures were collected and utilised. In a response to Wu on July 31, 2013, the commission said this information could not be disclosed because it dealt with “internal management issues.”
Wu Youshui responded by bringing a lawsuit against the commission in the Guangzhou Intermediate Court. In its recent verdict, the court ruled in Wu’s favor, ordering the commission to re-process his request.
The Beijing News, in its lead editorial on April 2, the day after the report in the New Express, discussed the need to improve implementation of the open government information regulations. Most importantly, it argued, there must be improved mechanisms to hold agencies and individuals accountable when they fail to honor their obligations on information openness.
For those interested in learning more about OGI in China, we recommend the China Center at the Yale Law School, which provides overviews, translations and studies.
The following is a full translation of the April 2 lead editorial in The Beijing News, which ran on quite a number of websites, including Xinhua Online and People’s Daily Online.

When Open Government Information Lags Behind, Responsibility Must Be Assigned
(政府信息公开不到位,问责要到位)
■ Lead Editorial
According to one recent news report, a lawyer has filed a lawsuit because the provincial government in Guangdong refused to make public information about how a levy for social expenditures was collected and used. The Guangzhou Intermediate Court recently gave its verdict, ruling that the Health and Family Planning Commission re-process the plaintiff’s open government information request.
Instances like this, in which government agencies lose court cases on their home turf, are very rare.
The loss of this case by the Health and Family Planning Commission at the very least illustrates that there have been major problems with [the implementation of] open government information [regulations].
Moreover, cases like this one are not an isolated occurrence. According to a Beijing News report, an annual report on open government information at 49 departments under the State Council and 29 provinces, districts and cities shows that “updating [of information] is not timely,” “channels for making [information] available are too uniform,” and “the public is not interested in what is made public, and what the public is interested in is not made public.” These have become the three major problems [in the implementation of the 2008 National Ordinance on Open Government Information].
The reasons for this situation are a lack of specificity in laws and regulations, a deep tradition of secrecy, insufficient clarity about the scope of open government information, and the need to raise the level of enforcement. But there is one obvious issue we cannot forget about — and that is that without mechanisms to hold [the government] responsible there is no way to properly execute [regulations requiring government departments to release information]. Where has it gone, the responsibility system for open government information? How do we hold agencies and their employees responsible?
When we look at our system, we see that we don’t lack the necessary regulations. For example, Article 29 of the National Ordinance on Open Government Information stipulates a social evaluation system by which government agencies that do not carry out what is required of them [in terms of information openness] must first face censure and criticism from the public, a political and moral responsibility.
next come administrative proceedings in which [the agency responsible] possibly bears legal responsibility, and in cases where [the agency] loses the administrative proceedings it might be required to pay administrative compensation.
Aside from this, if [an agency] fails to carry out its obligations on open government information, then this constitutes dereliction of duty, negligence, misuse of authority, lassitude and other issues — and these should result in discipline and the upholding of administrative responsibility. In cases where the Criminal Law applies, criminal responsibility should be sought.
Of course there are many problems with these responsibility mechanisms, for example that they are too ambiguous and short on concrete procedures. But even under the circumstances, if government agencies take [regulations on open government] seriously we should not see situations like that of the Guangdong Family Planning Commission where disclosure is resisted outright.
Therefore, insufficiencies in our accountability mechanisms are only one aspect of the problem. But another aspect is that these accountability mechanisms are rarely taken seriously in practice, and very seldom are government agencies or employees held to account according to these mechanisms. The loss of this case by the Guangdong Family Planning Commission is the kind of thing we see only very rarely. But even in this case there is no indication that specific persons will be held to account [for their failure to abide by regulations on open government information].
If open government information is not handled sufficiently, and if accountability is not demanded, it’s no surprise that open government information work has in some sense become merely an abacus, [government agencies] acting only when they’ve calculated that they must.
Yesterday the Central Office of the State Council released its Key Points in Open Government Information Work for 2014, which again emphasised the need to strengthen monitoring, social assessment, accountability, the handling of investigations resulting from tip-offs and other aspects in order to fully build oversight mechanisms for open government information.
Article 35 of the Ordinance on Open Government Information clearly gives supervisory organs and superior administrative agencies the right to assign accountability in cases where information is not made public as required by law. But relevant government departments must first act on this right before we can ensure that open government information does not become an empty formality.

The press in China since June 4th

On March 29, CMP director Qian Gang attended the Annual Kam Yiu-yu Press Freedom Awards in Hong Kong and gave the following address on the struggle for freedom of speech in China since the 1989 June 4th Incident. The Kam Yiu-yu Press Freedom Awards are named in honour of former Wen Wei Po editor-in-chief Kam Yiu-yu (金尧如).
After martial law was declared in China in May 1989, Kam and other top editors at the CCP-aligned Hong Kong paper made the decision to leave a blank space, or tian chuang (天窗), in place of their lead editorial as an expression of protest.
The text in the blank space read simply: “Bitter and hateful lamentations!”

屏幕快照 2014-03-30 上午7.33.29-2

My friends:
It’s already been twenty-five years since the June 4th Incident of 1989. At that time I was a reporter at the Liberation Army Daily in Beijing, and I became embroiled in events that spring.
In April, the editor-in-chief of Shanghai’s World Economic Herald, Qin Benli, faced dismissal from his post because the paper had dared to run an article mourning the death of Hu Yaobang. As a personal decision, I sent a telegram to Qin voicing my support:

The full honor of history is yours, Qin Benli, pioneer of freedom of speech in China.

That May the students began their hunger strikes, and I went with a friend to Tiananmen Square to visit with them. Because of these two things, I was stripped of my post and removed from the army in the purges that came after.
Working in Beijing at the time, I already knew the editor-in-chief of Hong Kong’s Wen Wei Po, Lee Tze Chung, and Ching Cheong and Lau Yui-siu and I were already friends. The image of Yui-siu driving this old truck and speeding all over Beijing to interview students is burned deep into my memory. I had urged my own team of PLA Daily reporters to study Yiu-sui’s example as a model of professional journalism.
It’s been 25 years. Since the June 4th Incident, China’s journalists have spent another quarter century on the arduous road to freedom of speech.
My hosts have invited me to talk about the road we’ve traveled over the past 25 years. That’s not an easy ask, because there have been so many frustrations — and yet, so many changes too. Indulge me for just ten minutes as I make a simple sketch of this period in history.
We can see today that there have been five actors, or factors, that have been closely connected to the struggle for freedom of speech. These are: political power, the news media, the market economy, information technology and civil society. More concisely, let’s call them: power, media, market, technology and citizens. On the question of freedom of speech, these five things have interacted, counteracted and struggled.
In the Deng Xiaoping era there were only two of these factors at work, power and media. In the Jiang Zemin era there were three — power, media and market. And in the Hu Jintao era, technology and citizens were added to the equation.
In the Mao Zedong era before economic reforms, power devoured the media. All of the newspapers were the same, a single voice, and the media were merely tools of despotism. After economic reforms there was a return to some sense of professionalism and notions of autonomy. In the midst of the political reform wave that came in the 1980s there was a corresponding push for press reform.
Media at that time were all Party media. Media were controlled by power, but they sought a level of their own autonomy. Media were often forced by power to utter falsehoods, but they strove to speak truths. This was the game and the struggle that marked the times.
In the spring of 1989, as the pro-democracy movement gathered force, some journalists shouted openly for freedom of speech. There was still no market economy in China at the time, and while experiments in market-oriented media had begun — such as the Economic Weekly in Beijing — these were just delicate green shoots. Some commercial media had begun to appear, like the small tabloids sold at street side, but we were far from having anything resembling a media market.
The market economy in China was something Deng Xiaoping gave his final bursts of energy and influence to achieve. the period immediately following Deng’s “southern tour” was a brief honeymoon period for the media. Those who coveted freedom of speech sprang into action. That period brought the rise of such media as Southern Weekly and Caijing magazine. The two-dimensional structure of power and media became a three-dimensional structure of power-media-market. In his essay, “Democratic Reform Media in China, Hong Kong and Taiwan” (中港台传媒与民主改革的交光互影), Chin-chuan Lee analysed “liberalisation and political control” in detail.
In fact, Jiang Zemin’s phrase “be silent and make a fortune” (闷声发大财) could also be applied to the press policy of the Chinese Communist Party. During that period political power’s relationships and alliances with media and market were equivocal. Of course the Party wanted the media to behave, but it also wanted media to generate profits for them.
In the Jiang Zemin era, crony capitalism developed at a fierce pace. Those who sought freedom of speech used the weapon of marketisation to resist political power, and they discovered that power and the market were often locked in an embrace. Power required the market, the market regarded power with dread, and at times capital was willing to heed power or even work hand-in-hand to control and suppress the media.
But it was in the Jiang Zemin era that a new phantom emerged on the scene, and that was the internet. We can thank our lucky stars that Jiang Zemin did not recognise at the time that the internet would come to haunt China’s leaders. He was supportive of the internet at the time — even though he did not, like Mahatir in Malaysia, announce that there would be no attempt to censor the internet. Of course, it wasn’t until the Hu Jintao era that the internet really began to make its strength felt.
When Hu Jintao came to power in the fall of 2002 the internet was already a lively space, the main platforms being commercial internet news portals, chat rooms and comment sections accompanying news articles. About midway through Hu Juntao’s first term (2002-2007) blogs came on the scene and there was talk about the potential impact of “citizen journalists.”
Many sudden-breaking stories were reported first on the internet by citizens on the ground (internet portals were not permitted to have their own news teams). Corrupt officials we’re often exposed through internet “human flesh searches,” or renrou sousuo (人肉搜索). The internet became a boisterous and diverse space where various opinions could be amplified.
Around the middle of Hu Jintao’s second term (2007-2012) microblogging services emerged on the scene. And at the tail end of his time in office, WeChat came on the scene. More and more people in China were now using the mobile internet — smartphones and tablets. In the past, publishing newspapers, producing radio and television programming, all required high costs. Now the threshold for news production was being pushed lower and lower. The age of “me media” had arrived. Sharing images and video was now easier than ever. This was a subversion and a challenge. It was a challenge to political power and a challenge to capital. The ultimate beneficiaries of information technology were the citizenry.
Over the ten years of Hu Jintao’s rule, civil society developed steadily. This was not thanks to the leadership, of course, but came only through constant struggle by citizens against constant barriers. The interface between civil movements and new media was like a storm cloud moving in, changing the weather in unforeseen ways.
We can already see the changes brought about by this five-dimensional structure of power-media-market-technology-citizen.
Information technology has shaken traditional media such as newspapers and magazines. At the same time, it has created countless new media. In the media marketplace, the internet already reigns supreme. Among internet companies, the big players are the companies listed overseas — the like of Sina and Tencent. In terms of their financial structures, these media are entirely different from Party and government media. The intimate relationship between information technology and the nedia marketplace has already become a major force that cannot be underestimated.
For the traditional media, these are tough times. On the one hand they face strict controls from the press censorship system, and on the other they face stiff and unrelenting competition from new media. Still, there are plenty of journalists of conscience still working in the traditional media. Meanwhile, many professional journalists have migrated from newspapers and magazines to new opportunities to push the bounds and struggle for freedom.
We can expect citizens and civil society to become catalysts for further change. In fighting for their own interests, and for justice and fairness, citizens must struggle also for openness of information and freedom from guilt by expression. Freedom of speech is not just about the rights of the media. It is about the basic rights of all citizens. Many of the people now leading civic organisations and social movements are also major personalities online.
It goes without saying that on the internet at least half of what you see isn’t real. The terrain is chaotic. In our coarse age of sunken values, it’s not a surprise to find unscrupulous media and unscrupulous reporters.
The best balancing factor against poor professional conduct by the media is civil society. Civil society has the potential to demand media act responsibly as they pursue the truth. In fact, more and more journalists in China have become involved in the process of civil society development. Standing together with citizens who seek freedom of expression, experienced journalists who know the terrain well have used the internet to challenge barriers in news coverage. Sometimes they have made advances, and sometimes they have been ruthlessly checked.
The officials in China charged with controlling public opinion are distinctly aware of the challenges they face. In the past 25 years since the June 4th Incident, the market, technology and citizens have compelled political power to change the old system of controls. So far as they are concerned, the most urgent task before them is to turn the immense resources of state capitalism toward the task of both utilising and controlling the media market and information technology, and suppressing civil society. Their hope is to use the market and technologies to advance the Party’s own goals, to strengthen the influence of the Party’s own publications, website and media groups. They reserve the right to purge any voice online, at any time, that they regard as “static” or “noise.” During the second half of 2013, as Xi Jinping spoke, in hardline echoes of the past, of a “public opinion struggle,” the internet entered a period of deepfreeze. Weibo suffered a blow from which it has yet to recover.
Where is the road ahead for freedom of speech? I think, rather than answer this question with talk of optimism or pessimism, of hope or despair, we should answer it with action. We should engage ourselves in those deep changes that are happening right now. These changes could come in many shapes and sizes. They might be changes impelled by social pressure. They might be the product of strife within the political ranks. Or they might be changes actively pursued by those in power (what we called “political system reforms”).
The most decisive changes are likely to come from the market, from technology and from civic action. 2014 is not 1989. Just imagine, if we had the internet at that time, if there had been Twitter and Facebook, Weibo and WeChat, if mature civic organisations like those we have now had existed — would things have happened differently? We doesn’t yield to conjecture. But the future, that is something we can make ourselves.
Over the past 25 years, the road toward freedom of speech has been rough and winding. To be frank about it, we’ve not progressed very far these twenty-five years. But I’ve seen so many journalists, and so many online writers, who have struggled on even as their blogs are “harmonised,” as they’ve suffered abuse or even been detained. They have never given up the fight. They continue to voice their belief in freedom through their actions.
So perhaps the most important question we can ask about achieving freedom of speech, about truly realising the rights to freedom of expression and freedom of the press as guaranteed in Article 35 of China’s Constitution, is: what can we do today?
Thank you, everyone!

In China, an odd mix of bawdy and serious

Read the news about the news in China today and you might note the sober and severe tone. The official Xinhua News Agency reports that nine government departments have jointly launched a concerted campaign to “crack down on news extortion and fake news.” [Click here for a past CMP example of “fake news”].
The notice, we are told, refers to these practices as “journalism diseases (新闻界病害) that seriously damage the image of the press corps and erode the authority and credibility of the news media.”

BTV on fake news
Beijing TV reports on the government’s new campaign to strike down “fake news” and “news extortion.”
I have written extensively about the relationship between media control and the basest conduct in China’s media. Almost eight years ago, I wrote in Index on Censorship:

The whole ecology of speech and information in China today faces a crisis of credibility. The media is invested with power by virtue of its traditional role as agent of the Party’s will. As it is hustled away from public interest coverage and toward profitability, the temptation to abuse that power and pander to the basest interests of the public grows stronger. China now has its own brand of yellow journalism. There is ‘news extortion’, in which journalists write critical news reports about companies and then pressure them into taking out ad contracts. There is ‘paid-for-news’ — state-controlled media coverage sold to the highest bidder. There is ‘fake news’ — fabricated content tailormade to ‘attract eyeballs’. In one case several years ago, a newspaper convinced a young woman to donate her liver so they would have an exclusive news story. And of course, there is good-old-fashioned propaganda.

News extortion and fake news have been endemic to China’s media environment since at least the mid-1990s. Campaigns against them are nothing new — which, of course, should raise questions about the efficacy of fist-pounding campaigns to enforce government notions of professional practice in the media.
Way back in May 2006, I wrote about an official bulletin released through state media outlining six cases of news extortion and warning media to watch their conduct.
Unable to loosen their grip, Party leaders fail to understand that control itself, combined with the commercial imperative, has lead to the steady erosion of credibility in China’s media. If you tell underpaid journalists that their role is not to report real news but to serve the Party, that public interest stories are off limits, but that somehow they must find a way to win over readers (or otherwise create revenue), you have a recipe for media corruption. And in fact the temptation to extort money is even greater for Party and government media, which have the power to pack a real punch. (The “gold nugget” case reported by Liu Chang at China Youth Daily is a strong case in point.)
As I read the news of the notice this morning and thought — yet again — about how I might illustrate the hypocrisy that looms behind these government pronouncements on credibility and responsibility, I suddenly realized the answer was right in front of me:

BTV news coverage

Can’t quite make it out?
Well, here’s a close-up that might help. The image to the right of the Beijing Daily article, the slightly racy one with the woman lying supine, bears the headline — and I apologize to anyone who finds this offensive: “How many times can a woman take it in one night?”
close up 2

I was reading the report, along with a video of the Beijing TV newscast, on a Chinese news portal called China.com.cn. Do a WHOIS search on the website and you find that it is associated with China.org.cn. No? Doesn’t ring a bell? Well here you go:

The authorized government portal site to China, China.org.cn is published under the auspices of the State Council Information Office and the China International Publishing Group (CIPG) in Beijing.

The Chinese introduction for China.com.cn says essentially the same thing:

China.com.cn is an important national news portal that is under the leadership of the Information Office of the State Council and the China Internet Network Information Center, and is managed by the China Foreign Languages Publishing Administration. . .

I’ll avoid the temptation to editorialize any further on this most recent campaign, which at best is pointless and at worst could justify a crackdown on real news reporting.
But I do wonder what the folks over at the Office of the National Working Group on Anti-Pornography, one of the nine departments behind this “special movement,” think of the salacious content being peddled on this “important national news portal . . . under the leadership of the Information Office of the State Council.”
Then again, I’m sure their eyes are focused piously on the campaign ahead.
A full translation of the Xinhua report follows.

Nine Departments Including Central Propaganda Department Issue Notice: Harshly Cracking Down on News Extortion and Fake News (中宣部等九部门印发通知: 严厉打击新闻敲诈和假新闻)
March 28, 2014
Original headline: Harshly Cracking Down on News Extortion and Fake News
Xinhua News Agency, March 27, 2014, wire — In recent days, nine official departments, including the Central Propaganda Department, Ministry of Public Security, State Administration of Taxation [http://www.chinatax.gov.cn/], State Administration of Industry and Commerce, the State Administration of Press, Publication, Radio, Film and Television, the State Internet and Information Office, and the Office of the National Working Group on Anti-Pornography, jointly issued a notice in which it was decided that a special movement should be launched to strike out against the practice of news extortion and fake news nationwide.
The notice pointed out that news extortion and fake news are journalism diseases (新闻界病害) that seriously damage the image of the press corps (新闻队伍) and erode the authority and credibility of the news media. The response of various corners of society [to these practices] has been intense, and the masses regard [them] with abomination.
The notice demands that propaganda department at various levels must take the lead in building [local] systems of joint meeting of relevant departments in order to strengthen coordination of this movement. Every department must perform its respective tasks, strengthening cooperation and setting up joint investigative task forces to address major case of news extortion or the fabrication and transmission of fake news, so that investigation is carried out by many departments in a cooperative fashion.
The notice emphasized that laws, regulations and management principles must be constantly improved, so that plans and system operate strictly, in order for there to be effective support for striking out against news extortion and fake news. Mechanisms to report complaints must also be improved. At various levels, the State Administration of Press, Publication, Radio, Film and Television, the State Internet and Information Office, the Office of the National Working Group on Anti-Pornography, and the All-China Journalists Association must set up special services for online complaints and publicize complaint hotlines — so that complaints from society can be gathered quickly. Search systems for open information should be improved, enabling members of the public to determine whether journalists or media are or are not real, and so they can check information about websites. Media assessment systems (媒体评议制度) must be improved, with the regular organization of assessments by members of society and industry representatives to determine if news media, internet sites and media personnel are maintaining good discipline and professional ethics, so that the level of self-discipline can be raised by effective oversight by society.