Author: David Bandurski

Now Executive Director of the China Media Project, leading the project’s research and partnerships, David originally joined the project in Hong Kong in 2004. He is the author of Dragons in Diamond Village (Penguin), a book of reportage about urbanization and social activism in China, and co-editor of Investigative Journalism in China (HKU Press).

"Media control" in the United States

After several weeks of uncertainty over the visa status of reporters for the New York Times and Bloomberg working in China, it appears some — but not yet all — are receiving the press cards necessary for them to renew their visas and continue working in the country. [Homepage image by “oldandsolo” posted to Flickr.com under Creative Commons license.]
This development, however, by no means puts to rest lingering questions about China’s worsening treatment of foreign journalists. As I said to the Straits Times, the recent visa row is probably the clearest indication that Chinese leaders now view foreign media reporting on China as damaging not just to the country’s international image but to the essential project of domestic public opinion control.
The New York Times expose on the wealth of the family of former Premier Wen Jiabao, published in October 2012, was discussed widely on social media inside China, even as it was aggressively targeted by domestic censors. Given the potential domestic impact of more probing reporting in China like that done recently by journalists at the New York Times and Bloomberg, the Party leadership may see a more aggressive stance toward foreign media as a necessary part of domestic public opinion guidance.
As the one-year anniversary of the Southern Weekly incident approaches, there is plenty to observe in China’s media landscape. The ideological environment continues to tighten, with a renewed push to remind journalists of their obligations to the Party.
To keep heads cool and spread a bit of holiday cheer, we turn to latest ideological masterpiece tumbling out of the world of CCP punditry.
In a blog post last week, Wang Xiaoshi, a mysterious writer — possibly not a single individual — who has made waves before with his/her/their hardline writings, attacked the notion of American press freedom. The post was shared on the website of the Party journal Seeking Truth, which emphasized that it represented only the writer’s personal views. (How convenient.)
The following is a partial translation of the lengthy post, which argues that American journalism serves only rich and powerful families out to police their own political dominance — though the writer somehow manages to brand the American media as virulently anti-corporate as well:

American Freedom of Speech and Control
December 16, 2013
Sina Blog
By Wang Xiaoshi (王小石)
Owing to the longstanding influence of American common sense as it is drum-beaten by the liberal media [in China], many Chinese now have the impression that the United States is a society in which the news is absolutely free, and the government has no control over what media report. [NOTE: The term “liberal media” here is 普世系媒体, which refers to commercially-driven media, such as Southern Metropolis Daily and Southern Weekly, that tend to uphold “universal values” such as freedom of the press.]
The government, [they believe], is powerless to do anything about this, given the protection of press freedom in the American Constitution. I’d like to set out some materials below in an attempt to give a truer picture of the press environment in the United States.
1. The Basic Nature of American “Press Freedom”
There is a rather insightful political manifest written by an American in which they tell this story:
An American arrived on a small island in order to study their system of democracy. The king of this small island informed him that they handled things in a very democratic fashion. When they held meetings to discuss affairs all of the island’s people were present, each one holding a golden trumpet. When the time came for voting, a matter was decided by whichever side, for or against, made the greatest sound.
When the American heard this, he thought it was very democratic indeed. He asked if he could witness the proceedings for himself.
On the day matters were debated, he discovered that each time it came to determine the measures to be taken, it was always the same few people who sounded off their trumpets. Everyone else was silent and motionless. The American thought it was strange, and so he asked the king: “Why don’t the others make a sound?”
The king answered: “Because they can’t afford to buy golden trumpets.”
That wasn’t democratic at all, the American said. It was simple rule by the wealthy. To this the king responded: “Well then, how does your democracy work?” So the American started to introduce the idea of press supervision, how the power of the government could be checked by the media.
“Well,” asked the king, “who does your media belong to?”
“To the wealthy,” the American answered.
The king laughed. “This is exactly like our golden trumpets.”
If you live in the United States for very long, then you’ll entirely understand this incisive declaration. American media are concentrated in the hand of the super-rich, and no matter how they appear they all publish content that is to the advantage of capitalist financial cliques (资本财团). So-called “freedom of the press” is in fact freedom of capital. Perhaps sometimes different capitalist financial cliques will be in conflict, and perhaps at times they’ll roast the government over the grill. But the basic nature of media as beholden to capital will not change.
The most dazzling aspect of American press freedom and supervision is the way media often sing a different tune than the government. In the eyes of those who have a strong sense of righteousness, going against the government is the fullest expression of freedom, and it means carrying out supervision. Compared to other countries in the world, news media in the United States certainly do seem to care little about the government’s face. Nor do they fear the power of the government. They specialize, it seems, in going at odds with the government. Major newspapers are at odds with the federal government, and small newspapers are at odds with local governments. No politician in the United States is immune from criticism. The federal government has already been taken to task for 200 years in the United States, to the extent that this has become force of habit. If there’s no criticizing, people start to think something’s wrong. . . But if you think about it, is anyone really going to behave themselves just because they’ve been criticized in a newspaper?
According to From Washington to Obama: 200 Years of Family Politics in America, by Jing Huzi, the United States did not have the concept of freedom of the press during its colonial period, but there were not too many limitations on the news, because there weren’t so many papers anyhow. There were newspaper publishers from the time of the Franklin brothers, but papers at that time weren’t about providing information to the public, and they weren’t about monitoring the government — rather, they were a way of articulating the political views of the publishers themselves, most of whom opposed the government (which is to say, the English king).
[NOTE: This mysterious book was published by the Xinhua News Agency Publishing House in 2009, and written by the mysteriously prolific Jing Huzi (京虎子), or “Beijing Tiger Child.” This is possibly the nom de plume of a Party-backed group of writers.]
During the movement for the independence of the colonies, Samuel Adams published a newspaper. His goal in publishing a newspaper was not to supervise the administrator dispatched by Britain, nor was it to offer his opinions to the Massachusetts legislature. His goal was to spread the idea of independence, making people believe that independence was the only path open to the colonies. It was about getting his own views out in order to incite revolution and bring about independence. The costs of the newspaper were provided by John Hancock, so from the beginning public opinion [i.e., the content of the newspaper] was controlled in the hands of a wealthy [patron] and there was no notion whatsoever of independence of the news. Public opinion was controlled by Adams and a number of people who advocated independence, and this was an important reason why American independence could succeed.
After independence, Washington and Hamilton hoped to create a strong federal government, and so naturally they hoped there would be no messy speech [i.e., dissent]. Jefferson, on the other hand, and others who opposed federalism naturally hopes there would be dissent. Therefore, Jefferson elevated freedom of the press to a new high: “Our freedom rests upon freedom of the press, and if we limit the latter the former will be lost. . . ” [NOTE: Jefferson’s words in 1787 were: “The basis of our governments being the opinion of the people, the very first object should be to keep that right; and were it left to me to decide whether we should have a government without newspapers or newspapers without a government, I should not hesitate a moment to prefer the latter. But I should mean that every man should receive those papers and be capable of reading them.”
Freedom of the Press is protected by the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, which says: “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.”
This is the freedom of the press later so praised by Americans. This freedom was not mentioned in the Declaration of independence, nor was it mentioned in the Constitution. It was not until 1791 that it was set down with an amendment to the Constitution. Why was this content written into the Constitution in 1791?
It was because there were political parties.
Not long after this amendment appeared, the number of newspapers started to multiply. The proliferation of newspapers was not because freedom of expression was set down in the law, but because there were political parties. Between 1791 and 1792, the two earliest political parties in the United States were founded, the Federalist Party and the Democratic-Republican Party.
The first party to be formed was the Federalist Party. From Boston to Philadelphia, perhaps all of the newspapers at the time were talking about the advantages of forming a strong federal government. Soon after, the Democratic-Republican Party was formed and there was another wave of newspaper publishing — all of these newspapers talking about states’ rights and opposing a large federal government.
Before long newspaper publishing took off in cities across the United States. Generally, several hundred copies of each newspaper were published, mostly to attack the other side. When John Adams became president, the newspapers controlled by Jefferson and his clique issued daily attacks on the government . . .
If they relied on sales, not a single one of these newspapers would probably survive. But these papers continued to publish, because those who were printing them had plenty of money. The newspapers published by the Federalist Party were supported by Hamilton, and the newspapers controlled by the Democratic-Republican Party were supported by Jefferson. So from the beginning newspapers were controlled by powerful and influential families.
Regardless of who controlled the newspapers, during this period the freedom of public opinion in America was protected by the Constitution. But in 1798, when war broke out between the United States and France, the Congress passed the Alien and Sedition Act, which said that anyone conspiring to oppose federal law, provoking revolt or slandering the president or the Congress would be subject to fines up to 5,000 dollars and maximum prison sentences of five years.
This act went against the First Amendment of the Constitution and amounted to depriving Americans of their right to free speech. It meant that Americans could express no critical views of national policy or of the president.
The act was not just window dressing. In the two years from the act’s introduction to the end of Adams’ presidency, it was dutifully enforced by the government, and in all 24 newspaper distributors and editors were charged, 10 of them found guilty. These people were exclusively from the Democratic-Republican Party, the party opposed to that of President Adams, the Federalist Party that held the majority of seats in Congress.
We can basically say that in this period there was no freedom of the press — and even less was there anything resembling press supervision.
Among those convicted [under the Sedition Act] . . . was James Thomson Callender, a newspaperman in Philadelphia who specialized in publishing materials of a political nature. In 1797, he published a book that printed in full the love letters of Hamilton, all at once destroying Hamilton’s political prospects. [NOTE: Callender’s book, The Prospect Before Us, was sharply critical of the Adams administration and directly attacked the president.]
. . .
When Jefferson took the presidency in 1800, he pardoned those convicted under the Sedition Act and Callender was released from prison. Feeling that going to prison had been a great sacrifice for the Democratic-Republican Party, Callender requested the president appoint him as postmaster general of Richmond, Virginia.
Jefferson gave Callender no response, so all at once he changed, heading for a pro-Federalist Party newspaper to serve as editor, issuing constant attacks on President Jefferson. First, he accused Jefferson of bribing news reporters, which of course Jefferson denied. Callender responded immediately by publishing a letter that Jefferson had written him. It was at this point too that he revealed Jefferson’s longstanding romantic relationship with one of his slaves. This story was fatal to Jefferson’s moral reputation.
Of course Jefferson was furious at the noise Callender was making, so he had others go and dig up nastiness on Callender — for example, that he mistreated his wife. Jefferson’s supporters even physically attacked Callender. In 1803, Callender fell into the James River and drowned. It was said he had been drunk and didn’t know how to swim, but it was difficult for Jefferson and those around him to escape suspicion.
Callender was the originator of American freedom of the press, and the freedom of the press that he created was not a freedom about objectivity and impartiality, of the disinterested observer. It was about personal prejudice, and to a large extent about “going where the milk was.” When Jefferson was his gold master, he served the interests of Jefferson and attacked Hamilton. When he didn’t get the official post he wanted he started working for the Federalist camp, attacking Jefferson. This sort of freedom of the press is about serving the interests of influential families, mingled with prejudice and personal interest — because there is fundamentally nothing impartial about it.
It’s precisely because its been a tool of influential families, from that time all the way through to today, that the American press is so clearly different from that of European countries — especially fond of reporting bad news (so-called “muckraking”). News media have become base camps for social liberals and reformists, and they are attracted by that sort of news that challenges corporations, the government, the police, the military and other interest and power centers in society. The topics of their coverage are the greedy merchants, the politicians acting in collusion, the arrogant bureaucrats, sadistic generals and cruel police. The describe the poor, minorities, the elderly and the working class as those sacrificed by extreme greed and political ignorance, by the coldness of high officials. They are particularly inclined to draw their information from liberal and reform-inclined special interest groups, and they maintain skepticism toward information from the government, corporations and the scientific community. It is precisely because their channels for obtaining information are already insufficiently objective or non-objective that their reports have a short supply of objectivity and are extremely one-sided.
American news media seldom expend great energy to report about the debauched private lives of this or that business person, even though this would be equally brilliant. . . What they love most is nasty news about political figures, because this is the way they can reach their goal — and that is, political struggle (政治斗争).
The wealthy and influential from various regions rely on the media they control to leverage negative news as tools against their opponents. And the vast majority of those political figures attacked by the news media are political figures who emerged without money or connections, especially those who are from poorer backgrounds and have relied on their own efforts to become visible figures in politics. The effect of these news reports is to draw people’s attention away from the powerful and influential and the fact that they control politics. This is the goal that the media seek behind the scenes.
. . .
In order to protect national sovereignty, the government of no country on earth would allow language in the media that encourages national division, exacerbates domestic tensions or incites revolt against the government. It’s difficult to imagine any country allowing within its system a “freedom of the press” that goes against its national interest.
The fact of national interest makes it such that media control is a line that sovereign nations today must draw.
Freedom of the press is a common ideal pursued by humanity. The pursuit of freedom of the press is a gradual, historical process of constant improvement that has no end. And appropriate news controls are a constant companion in the development of freedom of the press — they are a method of both checking freedom of the press and protecting freedom of the press.
But out of their own private interests, liberal media in China on the one hand turn a blind eye to and refuse to talk about American controls on the news, and on the other hand criticize China’s legal controls that seek to uphold the country’s national interest, their goal being to create confusion.

Thoughts on my online annihilation

NOTE: The following post by veteran journalist and former Southern Weekly commentator Xiao Shu (Chen Min) was posted to his Facebook account today. Xiao Shu is an important figure in the New Citizens Movement launched by lawyer and social justice advocate Xu Zhiyong. He has called repeatedly this year for the release of Xu Zhiyong, Wang Gongquan, and other leaders of the movement.
Yesterday, my writings from more than eighteen months ago were dragged out again by Phoenix Online — and once again they started making the rounds. For more than a year I’ve been blocked out entirely on China’s internet, and I suppose there must be readers who have missed me.
I remember those few days over a year ago when they started to force me out, shutting my accounts down and blocking anything I wrote or had written. I watched from the sidelines as internet users shared their comments. It was like watching my own funeral. I was so deeply moved — it’s something that’s hard even to describe.
These past few years I’ve been driven into exile, hunted down and attacked from all sides. And now I feel quite certain it’s all been worth it.
In early August this year I was abducted by state security police. Under orders to bring me in for questioning, state security from Guangzhou detained me in Beijing. They said in no uncertain terms: There’s no sense in arguing — we fully intend to marginalize you all.
At the time I responded: So, you think marginalization is really going to work? And today I think I can repeat that question to those who would silence me. They blocked me entirely on China’s internet. They blocked so many of my friends as well. But have they succeeded in winning back public opinion? Have they won the will and support of the people?
Today, more and more of my friends suffer the same fate, having their internet lives entirely annihilated. Even the most moderate voices, like that of Zhang Qianfan, are not spared.
But we should not despair. Today is not yesterday. Being blocked is not something terrible. It is, in fact, a kind of honour. It is a testament to your strength and to your contributions. Last year they snuffed me out, and no doubt in the future they will seek to restrain my voice in every aspect possible. But life goes on, and in fact I enjoy perhaps even more space than I did before. Those who have real strength have nothing to fear from their obstruction.
The truth is, those who restrain us are the ones whose hearts are burdened by fear.
We cannot give up simply because we are curtailed. Nor should we allow ourselves to be provoked by their actions. We must be cool-headed and resolute, neither haughty nor humble, pushing ahead on our own terms, traveling the path we must travel even as attacks rain from all sides. We must trust in time. We must trust in the human heart. We must trust in our own discipline.

xiao shu

Trapped

well homes

Following a report in December 2013 by the Beijing News about poor migrants living in underground wells in the capital’s Chaoyang District because they could not afford housing there, local authorities sent teams to seal the well entrances with concrete. The story underscored the problems facing many migrants in China’s major cities, where real estate prices have soared in recent years, making basic living space unaffordable. In the following cartoon, posted by artist Kuang Biao (邝飚) to Sina Weibo, the pitiable denizen of an underground well shouts and raises his hands pleadingly as a combat boot seals the entrance to the well.

World Human Rights Day post deleted

The following post by Old Mu on Various Topics (老慕杂谈), a media executive with more than 1.7 million followers on Sina Weibo, was deleted from Weibo sometime before 10:46am today, December 10, 2013. The post commemorates World Human Rights Day, making no direct mention at all of China. [More on deleted posts at the WeiboScope Search, by the Journalism and Media Studies Centre]
The deleted post reads:

[Today is a big day] December 10 — World Human Rights Day. Every life is precious, regardless of whether one is rich or poor. No one’s rights can be infringed, whether they are high-level officials or ordinary people. No one’s right to free speech can be infringed, no matter whether they are famous or obscure. On World Human Rights Day, let us embrace equality, embrace human rights! Today, let us salute all those brave people who have sacrificed in the pursuit of human rights. Let us salute all the brave people who fight for human rights.

The Chinese-language original follows:

【今天是个大日子】12月10日—-世界人权日。无论贫穷还是富裕,生命尊严不可侮;无论高官还是百姓,人身权利不可欺;无论名人还是草根,言论自由不可阻。世界人权日,让我们拥抱平等,拥抱人权!今天让我们向世界上所有为争取人权牺牲的勇士们致敬。向所有为人权而奋斗着的勇士们致敬。

world hr day

NOTE: All posts to The Anti-Social List are listed as “permission denied” in the Sina Weibo API, which means they were deleted by Weibo managers, not by users themselves.

Posts on Biden China visit deleted

The following post by Jilu Mei Xin Qing (記錄每欣晴), a journalist with just under 67,000 followers on Sina Weibo, was deleted from Weibo sometime before 10:06am today, December 10, 2013. The post mentions US Vice President Joe Biden’s recent visit to China, during which he pressed China on its handling of visas for US journalists in the country. [More on deleted posts at the WeiboScope Search, by the Journalism and Media Studies Centre]
The deleted post reads:

Xi Jinping ignores US Vice President Joe Biden. Britain’s Daily Telegraph and other foreign media report that the visas for 24 journalists from the New York Times and Bloomberg in China will expire at the end of this month. They say this is because the reports done last year by the two media about the wealth of the families of Wen Jiabao and Xi Jinping. Last Thursday (December 5) US Vice President Joe Biden raised this issue during a high-level meeting [in China], but Biden said the Xi Jinping was totally indifferent.

The Chinese-language original follows:

习近平不理美国副总统。英国《每日电讯报》等外媒报道,《纽约时报》和彭博社有24名驻华记者的签证将于本月底到期,中国拒绝为他们续签。有分析称,这或与两家媒体去年报道温、习两家族财富有关。上周四(12月5日)访华的美国副总统拜登在与习及其他高层会面时提出此事,但拜登称习对此似乎无动于衷。

press card Weibo

NOTE: All posts to The Anti-Social List are listed as “permission denied” in the Sina Weibo API, which means they were deleted by Weibo managers, not by users themselves.

Seeds of Doubt

sperm balloons

In November 2013, top Chinese leaders released their “Decision” coming out of the Third Plenum of the 18th Central Committee of the CCP. The decision, which outlined a series of reforms planned by the leadership, caused exuberance among many observers — and markets in Asia rallied. Others were less excited about the Party’s decision, which was articulated in dense Partyspeak, and noted there were no hints of the kinds of institutional reforms necessary to make promises (on issues like land reform, for example) real. The above cartoon, posted by artist Lao Xiao (老肖) to Sina Weibo, depicts the language coming out of the recent plenum as red banners being lifted skyward on balloons of red sperm. The reference to self pleasure goes without saying.

Post criticizing police notice on deadly fire deleted

According to the most recent news reports, a fire at a warehouse in southeast Beijing yesterday, November 19, has killed 12 people. The following post by Xiao Han (萧含), a journalist with Yanzhou Metropolis Daily, was deleted from Sina Weibo sometime before 2:18am today, November 20, 2013. The post criticized the official police notice of the fire, which begins with a list of local leaders who are directing work on the scene, implying praise for the government’s robust response. Xiao Han currently has more than 45,000 followers on Sina Weibo. [More on deleted posts at the WeiboScope Search, by the Journalism and Media Studies Centre]

police notice

The deleted post reads:

Such a short official notice, and it starts with the list of leaders like a dung beetle rolling dung, gliding right over the 10 [now 12] dead.

The Chinese-language original follows:

这么简短的通报,却是一溜屎壳郎似的领导名单,10名死亡者却是一笔带过,@平安北京 你这好意思这么通报火情~?

Xiao Weibo

NOTE: All posts to The Anti-Social List are listed as “permission denied” in the Sina Weibo API, which means they were deleted by Weibo managers, not by users themselves.

National Security Commission: Chinese KGB?

The following post by Xie Wen (谢文), the former head of Yahoo China, was deleted from Sina Weibo sometime before 10:35am today, November 18, 2013. In the post, Xie shares a link to an online piece written by current affairs columnist Ding Dong (丁咚) in which the National Security Commission announced by the recent Party plenum is likened to the Soviet Union’s Committee for State Security, better known as the KGB. Xie Wen currently has more than 180,000 followers on Sina Weibo. [More on deleted posts at the WeiboScope Search, by the Journalism and Media Studies Centre]
The deleted post reads:

Ding Dong: Why was the Soviet KGB so terrifying to people? / The KGB in the Soviet era has suddenly drawn intense the attention of the Chinese people. It’s full name is the “Komitet gosudarstvennoy bezopasnosti”, which translates to “National Security Commission.” Given its notorious reputation in history, it can’t help but throw up all kinds of associations for people. People can’t help but wonder whether they too might soon be living in a nightmare in which secret police are everywhere.

The Chinese-language original follows:

丁咚:苏联“克格勃”为什么很吓人?_共识网 苏联时代的克格勃突然引起中国人的浓厚兴趣。它是俄文三个首字母КГБ的音译,全称国家安全委员会。由于在历史上臭名昭着的名声,不禁让人浮想联翩到时局,人们普遍担忧自己会不会在不久的将来生活于秘密警察遍布的恐怖之中。

xie wen

NOTE: All posts to The Anti-Social List are listed as “permission denied” in the Sina Weibo API, which means they were deleted by Weibo managers, not by users themselves.

What are Xi's plans for China's media?

It’s a new week, and the mood seems to have flip-flopped over the Chinese Communist Party’s reform plans emerging from the Third Plenum. The communique released last week — the menu before the meal — left many observers disappointed. The full text of the “Decision”, however, released last Friday, served up plenty of tasty tidbits of language with which we can now stuff ourselves.
We’ll leave the meatier bits about the economy to others and focus on this cold side-dish of ours — media policy.
There are basically three points in the “Decision” that deal with media or culture. And we also have relevant language in the “explanation” released on Friday by Xinhua News Agency. So we’re looking at four elements here.

xi media
Xi Jinping has outlined his direction for China’s future. What will it mean for media and culture in the country?
Jumping right in, Section 36 of the decision, on “strengthening institutional protections and innovating mechanisms for opposing corruption” (加强反腐败体制机制创新和制度保障), includes a mention of “supervision by public opinion,” or yulun jiandu (舆论监督), among the mechanisms needed to combat corruption, which are referred to collectively as a “system of laws and regulations to fight corruption” (反腐倡廉法规制度体系).

Yulun jiandu, which can be translated “watchdog journalism,” is meant as a sort of state-santioned media supervision of power. It made its first high-level appearance in the CCP political report in 1987, used by Zhao Ziyang, and it has been a regular feature of Party language on supervision ever since. So this is no surprise. But, we could say, better to see it here than not at all.
Moving on, Section 38 of the decision deals with “promoting the innovation of cultural systems and mechanisms” (推进文化体制机制创新). Much of this section is the same boilerplate language we saw in the political report to the 17th Party Congress in 2007 and at the October 2011 plenary meeting on cultural reforms. China’s goals are to create a “socialist strong-culture nation” (社会主义文化强国) and to “enhance national cultural soft power.” As it pursues these goals, China must remain loyal to its socialist and Marxist core values.
These are points President Xi Jinping re-emphasized in his August 19, 2013, speech on ideology.
The “Decision” also pledges a “deepening of cultural reforms,” though the precise meaning of these reforms (deep or not) has always been murky.
The next portion of this section is noteworthy for the questions it leaves open. Here is what it says:

(38) Improving cultural management systems. Under the principles of separating government functions from enterprise management and separating public service units from the government, promoting the transition from [a mode of] government units operating media to government units regulating the media (政府部门办文化/政府部门管文化), and promoting further rationalising of the relationship between Party-government units and the cultural state-run institutions associated with them (推动党政部门与其所属的文化企事业单位进一步理顺关系). [We must/will] create regulatory agencies for the oversight of state-owned cultural assets, carrying out the integrated management of personnel, affairs, assets and [public opinion] guidance (建立党委和政府监管国有文化资产的管理机构,实行管人管事管资产管导向相统一).

The transition here is from “operation” (办) of culture by government units to “regulation” (管) of culture by government units. What exactly does this mean? One could argue that it means a kind of stepping back from culture, less direct meddling in favor of letting cultural enterprises do their thing.
But don’t hold your breath. Control is still the overriding priority here, and the next paragraph of section 38 makes this very clear. This paragraph addresses the issue of “systems and mechanisms” for “adhering to correct public opinion guidance.” This term, public opinion guidance, or yulun daoxiang (舆论导向), remains the cardinal term governing media and cultural practice and their relationship to the Party and public. The idea of “guidance” is that the Party must control the media, and therefore public opinion, in order to maintain social and political stability.
Here is the passage, which will leave in Chinese as well for the convenience of our readers:

[We must/will] perfect systems and mechanisms for adhering to correct guidance of public opinion. We must fully build interactive mechanisms for the work of basic management, content management, industry management and the crackdown on and prevention of criminal conduct online. [We must/will] perfect mechanisms for handling online sudden-breaking incidents, creating an online public opinion work pattern that integrates positive public opinion channeling and management according to rule of law. [We must/will] integrate news media resources, promoting the integrated development of tradition media and new media. [We must/will] promote the institutionalization of news release. [We must/will] strengthen the professional credentials system for news workers, and prioritize the use and management of new media, and regulate the communication order.
健全坚持正确舆论导向的体制机制。健全基础管理、内容管理、行业管理以及网络违法犯罪防范和打击等工作联动机制,健全网络突发事件处置机制,形成正面引导和依法管理相结合的网络舆论工作格局。整合新闻媒体资源,推动传统媒体和新兴媒体融合发展。推动新闻发布制度化。严格新闻工作者职业资格制度,重视新型媒介运用和管理,规范传播秩序。

The possible warning flags here are the crackdown on “criminal conduct online” and the language about strengthening the “professional credentials system for news workers.” In recent months, there has been a sustained crackdown in China on ostensibly “criminal” conduct online. But while this campaign has been rationalized by playing up “rumors” and “false information” as a sort of public health threat the leadership must stamp out in the public interest, it is clear the real priority is to maintain good old-fashioned “public opinion guidance” in the face of the new challenges presented to the Party leadership by social media (think “Big V” crackdown).
As for professionalism in the media, we can’t think of this issue right now without thinking of the recent and ongoing mess of the Chen Yongzhou affair. The big question with this language in the decision, and with the Chen Yongzhou affair too, is whether the leadership has a genuine interest in improving the professional conduct of journalists, or whether this is ultimately about keeping journalists at bay. The tension between the control mandate and the “supervision” mandate has always been there, presenting problems for the notion of watchdog journalism as a tool to fight corruption (Section 36).
The decision’s conclusion (Section 60) gives us our third bit of media-related language, the need to “strengthen propaganda and public opinion guidance in order to create a favorable social environment for the deepening of reforms.” That’s classic control language once again. Not particularly noteworthy.
Finally, the “explanation” released on Friday provides us with the most explicit media-related language emerging from the plenum. It makes clear that the internet and social media are issues of primary concern to the leadership.

Our experiences have shown that there are clear deficiencies in our current management systems in the fact of the rapid development of internet technologies. These principally are: overlapping management bodies (多头管理), overlapping functions (职能交叉), conflict of rights and responsibilities (权责不一) and lack of efficiency (效率不高). At the same time, as the qualities of internet media grow stronger, online media management and industry management cannot keep up with development and change. In particular, as we face the rapid development of Twitter (微客), WeChat and other social media and real-time communication tools that are rapid, influential, and have scale and social mobilization capacity, the question of how to strengthen online legal building and public opinion channeling to ensure order in online communications and national security has already become a conspicuous problem standing before us.

This passage tells us that the leadership is deeply concerned about the challenges it faces to its dominance of public opinion as new technologies bring new possibilities. But of course it is also up to the challenge, determined to “strengthen online legal building and public opinion channeling.”
There is only one other aspect of this passage I find noteworthy. The explanation says that new media have presented challenges to “online information order” and “national security.” One of the biggest stories coming out of this plenum has been the creation of a new National Security Commission. So I just want to put this question out there . . . How might the Party re-tool and redefine its approach to the internet and social media in light of its shifting approach to national security?

CMC buys stake in Caixin Media?

Hong Kong’s Apple Daily reported on Sunday that China Media Capital (CMC), a media investment fund with close ties to the government, has purchased a controlling stake in Caixin Media, the media group run by veteran journalist Hu Shuli (胡舒立). The newspaper said that Caixin was in the process of transferring licensing for its various publications — including Caixin Century and China Reform — to Shanghai from Zhejiang, as CMC’s operations are based in the financial capital.
There have been rumors since September this year that CMC has close ties to “princelings,” the children of influential Communist Party leaders, and that in fact the true controlling hand behind CMC is Li Tong (李彤), the daughter of former politburo standing committee member and ideology chief Li Changchun (李长春).
China Media Capital CEO Li Ruigang (黎瑞刚) has denied ties to influential princelings, including Li Tong. [UPDATE: See also Li’s recent interview with Hong Kong’s Singtao Daily, in which he says he has never had dealings with Li Tong, and says media have confused his China Media Capital with China Cultural Industrial Investment Fund, which Li Tong does oversee.]

Li Changchun daughter
Hong Kong media reports suggest Li Tong, above, the daughter of former propaganda czar Li Changchun, is the real power behind CMC, which is rumored to have bought a controlling state in Caixin Media.
Li Tong, currently CEO of Bank of China International (See also this release), reportedly also runs the China Cultural and Media Investment Fund, a state-backed cultural promotion and investment vehicle that was approved by the China’s National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) in May 2010. According to a press release on the fund’s website, the formation of the fund was a “significant move in the implementation of the Cultural Industry Promotion Plan promulgated by the State Council.”

The China Media Project has not yet confirmed the purchase of the Caixin stake by CMC. However, in an interview with 21st Century Business Herald published on November 15, Li Ruigang said only that it was “inconvenient to respond” to rumors that CMC had completed the purchase of the Caixin Media stake.