EDITOR’S NOTE: The following piece, written by CMP fellow and former Southern Weekly journalist Xiao Shu (笑蜀), was published in the most recent edition of Hong Kong’s Yazhou Zhoukan. In his latest appeal against the criminal detention of prominent venture capitalist Wang Gongquan, a leader of the New Citizens Movement, Xiao argues that Wang’s detention concerns the rights and dignity of every Chinese person. “Will the Chinese people forever be mired in barbarism?” he asks.

“Wang Gongquan is the Bottom Line For Us All”
September 20, 2013
By Xiao Shu (笑蜀)
September 13, 2013. On this day, the well-known rights-defending journalist Chen Baocheng (陈宝成) was formally arrested by police in the city of Pingdu. Later in the day, superstar Wang Fei (王菲) announced that she was divorcing Li Yapeng (李亚鹏). But for those Chinese who care about the development of civil society [in China], the biggest shock came as the axe fell for one of China’s leading businessmen and venture capitalists, Wang Gongquan (王功权). On Sina Weibo, a platform mollified for many days by a storm of ostensible anti-rumor campaigning, there was suddenly a tide of discussion. This day was dubbed “Black Friday” by web users.
Wang Gongquan was taken away by the police at around 11 a.m. on “Black Friday.” At first he was issued with a subpoena, but that night at 8:17 p.m., before the end of the 12 or 24-hour period legally [given for compliance], Wang Gongquan’s family members received a notice of criminal detention (刑拘通知书) from the police. This time, many old friends [of Wang Gongquan] who supposed he would quickly regain his freedom could not help but feel bitterly disappointed.
Of course, as an old friend of Wang Gongquan’s, I’m very clear about this outcome. When our mutual friend, Xu Zhiyong (许志永), a chief proponent of the New Citizens Movement (新公民运动), was arrested on July 17, I was on a trip to Beijing. In the days after that, Wang and I saw each other every day. We talked about our strategy, we made tactical evaluations, up to the day that I was forcibly detained by state security police and taken away from Beijing. At that time, both of us of course prepared ourselves for the worst. As allies of Xu Zhiyong and his leading supporters, we knew we faced the greatest danger of our lives. At one point we talked about the possibility of being subpoenaed, and Wang Gongquan said firmly to me:
“I have a clear conscience. I won’t let them play this game of catch and release. I won’t submit to that kind of humiliation. If they want to subpoena me, I will refuse to answer any questions whatsoever. They can lean hard on me, but I’ll refused to go. They’ll have to arrest me and be done with it.”

The authorities also understood this kind of resolve. If he wasn’t as firm as this, if he showed an ounce of compromise, if he spoke so much as a soft word, the authorities would seize on it like a nugget of gold, and there would be a way to step down — Wang Gongquan wouldn’t be in the situation he’s in today. The authorities knew the cost of going after Wang Gongquan. But Wang Gongquan would not give the authorities any leeway. He would make no concessions. None at all!
Wang Gongquan, man of iron. Wang Gongquan, who cannot be shaken. A man consistent in his actions.
Wang Gongquan’s old friends all know two stories from his experience doing business.
In his Wintop days, Wintop planned a merger with a certain company in the northeast. The two companies were ready to go, they had basically completed negotiations, and Wintop had already worked out a strategic plan. Once the merger was completed, profits wouldn’t be a problem — investment risk was Wang Gongquan’s avocation. But the merger was held up by the local commission for economic restructuring (体改委). A certain top official in the commission wanted Wintop to fork out a toll before things could get moving again.
Wang Gongquan refused point blank. His colleagues couldn’t understand it. There was a heated and hurtful argument. But Wang Gongquan would not back down — even though this was a very common unspoken rule in China’s business world. The problem was that the company couldn’t suffer losses as a result. So what could they do?
Ultimately, everyone opposed had to keep quiet, and they couldn’t help but feel admiration — because Wang Gongquan remedied the situation by gouging flesh from his own body: whatever the company’s related losses, they would be taken from his own personal earnings from the company.
There is a similar story, but with very different methods.
Wang Gongquan is well known as the founder of CDH Investments. CDH manages entirely foreign funds, and aside from Wang Gongquan, all of the top managers [of CDH] have immigrated. Wang Gongquan’s refusal to immigrate means the company cannot be treated as a foreign enterprise, and loses out in terms of tax savings. No colleague of Wang Gongquan’s ever complained about this, but it made him uneasy. Later, he was willing to sell off all of his shares in CDH and take on all of the resulting personal losses, but he never budged on the immigration issue — he was determined to spend his whole life as a Chinese citizen. Because he loves this country. And at his daughter’s wedding on September 8, he said to them when extending his wishes: guard your conscience, love your country.
He loves his country deeply, fiercely, bitterly. It’s because he loves his country that he hates the ills of his country so passionately, that he refuses to bow his head, no matter what the cost to himself.
The Merciful Wang Gongquan
Because of this love, a soft heart, and an inborn goodness and sympathy, present a sharp contrast to Wang Gongquan’s iron resolve.
There is an amazing tale everyone has heard, about how at 10 p.m. on the night of January 1, 2011, at a black jail in Beijing’s Fengtai District, a group of petitioners pounded on the iron gates of the prison, shouting, “Open the gate, let us out!” None of those petitioners realised that multi-millionaire Wang Gongquan was among them, shouting along with them.
Another commonly-told tale is about a speech, “We Will Not Give Up”, delivered by Wang Gongquan at the annual meeting of the Open Constitution Initiative in 2010. The organiser, Xu Zhiyong, could not be present because he had been detained by police. The venue had also been changed because of police pressure, and undercover police were everywhere. Wang Gongquan stood up at the critical moment and made an impassioned address. This is how he spoke his own thoughts: he himself belonged to the vested interests, he said — but he could not give up his conscience for the sake of those interests.
Should we remain silent just because we stand to gain? Can we simply remain indifferent to all of the problems in our society because we stand to gain? If there are things that go beyond what we are willing to accept, can we just stand by and pretend we didn’t see? Or, coerced and intimidated, should we cut a deal and join the conspiracy? The choice is difficult, but these are things we cannot accept.
I have personally experienced his courage and persistence. Back in 2009, the Beijing police manufactured a case against the Open Constitution Initiative, detaining Xu Zhiyong and other members of OCI for tax evasion, their goal being to crush the entire network. At the time I was still working at Southern Weekly as an opinion writer. When I heard the news, I immediately bought a plane ticket and flew to Beijing to see Wang Gongquan. We agreed on a full plan to assist [Xu Zhiyong and the others]. It was late at night when we finished talking things through. We knew we couldn’t use a driver if we wanted to maintain the secrecy of our plan. So Wang Gongquan’s wife served as our driver, taking us all around the city to visit friend after friend, putting everyone on task. As Southern Weekly was in-system (体制内) — [meaning a Party-backed newspaper] — I could not draw trouble to the publication. I could only strategize behind the scenes. The actions on the front lines were eventually all taken by Wang Gongquan and the scholar Xiao Han (萧瀚), all while under the scrutiny of the intelligence apparatus, but the eventual result was earning freedom for Xu Zhiyong.
His courage and his persistence all arise from his sense of love. He loves his country. He loves his fellow countrymen. . .
“The Crime of Citizenship” (“公民罪”)
I met Wang Gongquan back in 2008. I regret that we met so late. First, because we both deeply love our country. Second, because we both have deep convictions about [the development of] civil society and peaceful transition (和平转型). He contributed many valuable suggestions for my lengthy essay on promoting organised rights defense. And it was because of his open praise of the article that it was banned from all web portals in China on September 11 last year, and both of our Weibo accounts were cancelled. After that, every account we attempted to open was cancelled. But Wang Gongquan, persistent as always, was not about to stop because of this. He was subsequently involved in numerous campaigns, including those for equal education and the ratification of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
But the courageous, thorough and resolute Wang Gongquan is also moderate and rational. Just as he is willing to set money aside, he disdains internal strife and the craven scramble for power. . . His highest ideal is to be an adequate citizen, not to achieve power, to be a proponent of peaceful transition, not an agent of regime change (做取代者). And so he has never seen himself as a champion. Never in his wildest dreams would he have imagined himself becoming a hero. He has always upheld what he sees as his responsibility to his country and people in a humble and understated manner . . .
But he is too naive. He despises wickedness, but maintains a deep faith in people, never seeing any particular person as an enemy. He treats all with a sense of humanity and peace. He never realized that others might view him as a formidable enemy, simply because he persisted in his faith in civil society and peaceful transition. The net began to fall at the start of the year, a political craze determined to hunt down the Open Constitution Initiative and capture the entire citizens movement. And eventually he too was sacrificed. On the morning of September 13 at 10 a.m., more than 20 Beijing police poured into his residence near the Haidian Theater. Everything came to an abrupt end. Before, he and I stood together with thousands of others speaking out for Xu Zhiyong and for all those suffering for the citizens movement. Now, it falls to me, and to all of us, to continue the campaign.
It is a great sorrow, a truly a great sorrow for our country — that the belief in the concept of the citizen, that upholding the idea of peaceful transition has become a major crime. And it is no wonder that the authorities have sought no other rationalisation, because in fact they will find no excuse with which to blame Wang Gongquan. They have already cast a net over Wang Gongquan for years, and they have found no handle to grasp. So in the end they directly apply this notorious charge of “disturbing the public order” (扰乱公共场所秩序).
In fact, Wang Gongquan, who believes wholeheartedly in peace, has never in any way disturbed the public order. His true crime is most accurately “the crime of the citizenship,” the crime of striving to be a competent citizen, the crime of striving for the civil rights guaranteed by the constitution.
This means that the criminal detention of Wang Gongquan is an important signal of the current political situation in China. In November last year, I gave a talk at Northwest University of Political and Law titled, “Civil Society is the Bottom Line, and the Bottom Line is Our Lifeline” (公民社会是底线，底线就是生命线). The situation now is obvious. Civil society is under attack, not just through media attacks against constitutionalism, but also through the blatant use of tyrannical methods, of violence without the restraint of the law.
Perhaps civil society already belongs to [what the Party has traditionally called, usually referencing foreign elements threatening the regime] “the hostile forces” (敌对势力). The pursuit of civil rights is seen as an affront to public power, and promoting peaceful transition is seen as a threat to the power elites (权贵集团). Both must be fiercely attacked. [Officials] must “show their swords,” allowing no space whatsoever.
But if calls for constitutionalism and civil society are smothered, won’t this in effect mean an open system of fascism? Is there still any chance that the Chinese nation will progress toward a modern civilization? Will the Chinese people forever be mired in barbarism? Is this not an insult to every single Chinese person?
In this sense, Wang Gongquan’s fate is far beyond a matter of personal fate. It concerns the fate of all Chinese people. Showing care for Wang Gongquan means showing care for ourselves. This is the bottom line we all share in common. There is no place left to retreat to!

In August 2013, China introduced new guidelines it hoped would “better safeguard judicial independence, build credibility for the judicial system and help to improve public trust.” At the root of the lack of independence of China’s courts, of course, is the issue of political reform. China’s courts are still subject to the whims of government officials. In the above cartoon, posted by artist Kuang Biao to Sina Weibo, the gavel of the Chinese court system bears the chop of the government. The gavel sits on a rumpled red bed sheet, suggesting the intertwining of sex and politics. The cartoon is a very rich and concise editorial comment on the institutional roots of corruption and the amoral political culture that results.

This week we have had a number of signs from official Party media of more conservative posturing on media policy. Editorials from both the central-level People’s Daily and the Beijing municipal-level Beijing Daily have invoked Xi Jinping’s recent speech on ideology and called for greater vigilance and a tougher hand from Party leaders (and in particular propaganda officials).
The gist of the editorials is that China is in the midst of a bitter “struggle in the ideological sphere” — a “fight to the death.” The chief battleground of this “struggle” is China’s internet, where Western hostile forces have vainly attempted to . . . bring down China.” The internet is a chaotic space, and it must be dealt with robustly and without fear or reticence.
The ruling Party cannot be hesitant and it cannot compromise. Maintaining dominance in the ideological sphere directly concerns the “security of society and the security of the regime.” The Beijing Daily editorial suggests tolerance is a weakness: “There are no enlightened gentry on this battlefield. Compromise will not bring harmonious compromise — only through struggle can we survive and develop. Faced with a complex ideological sphere in the present day, we must not ignore provocations or remain silent, we must not be vague and indefinite, and we must not retreat.”
Both the People’s Daily and Beijing Daily editorials use the phrase “showing one’s sword” to encapsulate the idea of official resolve in the face of ideological challenges. “‘Showing Your Sword’ At the Critical Moment” is the headline of the People’s Daily piece. The newspaper sums up the idea this way: “The courage to show one’s sword also means having a firm attitude and holding a clear position on those things that violate the interests of the masses and go against Party discipline and the laws of the nation.”
The “showing one’s sword” meme has spread rapidly across Weibo over the past two days. The following cartoon by artist Kuang Biao (邝飙), posted on Tuesday night, was quickly deleted by censors. Kuang Biao satirizes the notion of “showing one’s sword.” The party is a sluggish tortoise-tank hiding in its shell and drawing its sword against an ant, a reference to the term yimin, literally “ant people” (蚁民), or ordinary citizens.

Kuang’s cartoon sums up the issue quite well. While the Beijing Daily editorial suggests China is in the midst of an urgent struggle against “Western hostile forces” — a term associated with hardline, leftist pronouncements — ordinary Chinese are the target of this “struggle.” The Party is concerned about the use of the internet, and particularly social media, to air their frustrations and appeals. But there is an obvious asymmetry of power — hence the powerful gun atop Kuang Biao’s tortoise.
Partial translations of the editorials follow. Readers also might want to take note of another hardline piece in yesterday’s Beijing Daily, “We Must Not Lose Our Ideological Ground.”

“‘Showing Your Sword’ At the Critical Moment” (People’s View)
September 2, 2013
Page 5
People’s Daily
There is a true story that is now popular on Weibo. A German exchange student named Leike who made a huge number of posts that were negative and extreme. He wanted to discuss and explore a number of problems, but he ended up gloomy: “If I say China still has some areas that are imperfect, I’m attacked as an ‘ugly foreigner.’ If I say that China’s development path is correct, I’m attacked as a ‘foreign fifty-center’ (洋五毛). If I say only that I changed a light bulb at home, then I’m attacked for being ‘a shallow idiot.'” [NOTE: This story originated from a report in China Youth Daily earlier this year.]
Leike’s admission that he couldn’t understand the mood on Chinese Weibo exposed one phenomenon in China’s public opinion environment: on the internet, the more biased and aggressive language is, the more people validate it, and the more rational and positive something is, the more people kick up a fuss and attack it. The roots of this lopsided public opinion trend on the internet need to be analyzed in detail, but there is one factor that cannot be overlooked: this equivocal attitude in society indulges extreme language; and our leaders, when they do not show their swords at the key moment, also to a large extent allow extreme ideas to hold sway.

In an era in which everyone has a microphone, the larger trend is toward personal expression and the liberation of ideas, and the capacity to tolerate different views and accept different ideas is a measure of how sophisticated our society is. However, “liberating the personal” does not mean that the rational can be crushed without any hesitation, and “accepting diversity” does not mean that we can recklessly disregard truth and fact. Many leaders, when they confront a problem, either because they are afraid to speak, or because they are afraid they will suffer insult, choose to say little or even nothing. Even more serious are those who, because they “cherish their reputations,” play the part of the “enlightened gentleman” (开明绅士). They skirt around serious questions, remaining ambiguous out of an instinct for self-preservation, worried that someone might accuse them of being “unenlightened” (不开明). . .
The courage to show one’s sword also means having a firm attitude and holding a clear position on those things that violate the interests of the masses and go against Party discipline and the laws of the nation. Responding to the misgivings of the public and resolving social tensions is the duty of leaders at every level. Why did incidents like the Sanya food poisoning scandal or the killing of a Hunan watermelon seller have such awful social consequences. One important reason was the failure of relevant leaders to act properly, or their looking the other way . . . When a problem appears, it should be judged clearly and a position taken quickly, so that what the people see is honesty and determination. A number of leaders still have not recognized the importance of ideological work, and they fear sticking out their necks on a number of hot incidents that are the focus of public opinion and on which opinions are widely divided. . .

A partial translation of the September 2 editorial on the front page of the Beijing Daily follows:

“In the Struggle in the Ideological Sphere We Must Have the Courage to Show Our Swords”
Beijing Daily
September 2, 2013
Secretary Xi Jinping emphasized in his speech during the national propaganda work conference that ideological work is of extreme importance to the Party. [The Party] must, [said Xi], see the big picture and grasp overall trends, focus on major events, and accurately find breakthrough points . . .
Right now, we are in the midst of a great struggle with many new historical characteristics, and the struggle in the ideological arena is one important aspect. We must be firm about marxism’s leading position in the ideological sphere. We must be firm about the common ideas that form the foundation of the united struggle of the whole Party and the whole people. We cannot lack consciousness of our position and our struggle. We cannot vacillate. Even less can we be unsure of ourselves. If we do not have the proper grasp, a hard grasp and a strong grasp with hand of ideological work, if we are loose with how we handle the struggle in the ideological sphere . . . then in the end we will have major problems, and we will have historical problems that are impossible to undue. The disintegration of the Soviet Union and the major changes in Eastern Europe years ago, and the unrest, war and political change among countries in north Africa all should give us deep pause.

In struggling, we must not fear the ghosts, and we must not believe in fallacies. We must have the courage to grasp and control. We must have the courage to show our swards. Facing a global public opinion environment in which “the West is strong and we are weak” (西强我弱) and a situation in which the West is overbearing, particularly as the West “bad-mouths” our political system, our economic situation, our social problems and our cultural traditions at every turn, slandering us and making up lies to blacken us, we cannot be polite, and we cannot just hope they can offer balance, but rather we must do everything we can to speak our reasons and to advance them, strengthening our discourse power internationally. Faced with a complex ideological sphere at home, we must differentiate and focus on fuzzy understandings, problems in thinking, problems in political standpoint and other situations, doing our work meticulously.
. . .
The internet has already become the principal battlefield for today’s ideological struggle. Western hostile forces have vainly attempted to use this “biggest variable” (最大变量) to bring down China. Whether or not we can stand and be victorious directly concerns our country’s ideological security and regime security. If we do not take up our position, then others will take up position. It now seems that we must take the online struggle as the priority of priorities and the urgent matter of the moment in our ideological struggle. . . In the final analysis, if there is less confusion on the internet, if the online space can be cleared up, this can only be good, not bad, for the security of our nation and society, and for the good and prosperous lives of our people.
While there is no smoke to be seen in the struggle in the ideological sphere, it is nevertheless a fight to the death. There are no enlightened gentry on this battlefield. Compromise will not bring harmonious compromise — only through struggle can we survive and develop. Faced with a complex ideological sphere in the present day, we must not ignore provocations or remain silent, we must not be vague and indefinite, and we must not retreat. We cannot abide ambiguous ideas that seek only to play it safe. . . We must have the courage to struggle. We must have the courage to show our swords. This is our imperative choice in the present day.

The recent “China Internet Conference“, held in Beijing from August 13-15, agreed on what it called a “resolution” on the “mutual building of a favorable [online] environment.” The spirit of that resolution is encapsulated in what is now being called the “Seven Base Lines“, or qi tiao dixian (七条底线).
The “Seven Base Lines” are meant to provide all internet users, but particularly internet industry participants and online personalities (网络名人), with a set of guidelines for what constitutes acceptable online conduct and leads to a “healthy online environment.”
Run down the list of the “Seven Base Lines” and it is painfully obvious that this is part of a new government initiative to assert stronger control over online speech. What we are witnessing is yet another internet tightening in China ostensibly carried out to combat online “rumors.” [For my thoughts on the last major anti-rumor campaign two years ago, see my piece, “Rumor Fever.”
You might assume with all this talk of “rumors” that there are genuine concerns about the truth and accuracy of information. Perhaps the leadership wants to put a stop to the spread of false and destabilizing information — like talk of radiation fallout that prompts panic salt buying (one thing mentioned a lot during the 2011 anti-rumor crackdown).
You would be wrong.
Let’s look quickly as the “Seven Base Lines.”

1. The Base Line of Laws and Regulations
2. The Base Line of the Socialist System
3. The Base Line of National Interests
4. The Base Line of Citizens’ Legal Rights and Interests
5. The Base Line of Public Order
6. The Moral Base Line
7. The Base Line of Information Accuracy

Notice that information accuracy is at the bottom of the list. The most revealing are 2 and 3 above, which clearly define the political priorities of the leadership. Information cannot violate the “socialist system,” and it must abide by a generalized notion of upholding China’s national interests. Both of these are huge potential pitfalls.

No doubt we’ll keep any eye on these “Seven Base Lines.” But for now let’s turn to a commentary in today’s Nanfang Daily, the official Party paper of Guangdong province, which sums up the official view on this issue quite well.

“Resisting Online Rumors is the Responsibility of Every Citizen”
Nanfang Daily
August 27, 2013
The Public Security Bureau has recently launched a strike against organised fabrication and transmission of rumor and other crimes. A number of online personalities, including “Qin Huo Huo” (秦火火), “Li Er Chai Si” (立二拆四), Zhou Lubao (周禄宝) and Fu Xuesheng (傅学胜) have fallen into the net one after another for such activities as fabricating and spreading rumors, extortion and racketeering. These cases caution us once again that online society is not a lawless and unruly place, and that anyone who violates the law online will pay the legal price.
While the internet provides people with a convenient, fast and diverse experience, it has also become an important place for the spreading of rumors and the breeding of false information. While online society is a virtual space, it has a certain quality of the real, serving as a public space for an unspecified group of people, and to a large extent it has a direct impact on real society. After the emergence of Weibo and WeChat, the transmission of information happens much faster, people obtain information much more quickly, and it become much more difficult at the same time to spot rumors. This means that the harm and damage done by rumors is also substantially increased.
. . .
Online rumors are everywhere, and everyone can potentially become an unknowing pusher, and also an unknowing victim. This means not only that we must pursue the legal responsibility of those who fabricate rumors, but also requires civic consciousness on the part of every web users, so that we can protect the cleanliness of the online environment. In this age of sophisticated online information technologies, as we face mass amounts of information in a virtual world where transmission happens fast, many people don’t pay attention to whether information is accurate or not when it breaks — they care, rather, about whether it is sensational, whether or not it can attract people’s attention. And then they just blindly pass it on. This provides the soil in which rumors can spread. At the same time, because of the spread of these rumors, the rights and interests of certain people can be harmed, resulting in real damage. Rumors of a pest infestation striking tangerines resulted in serious drops in sales all over the country. Rumours of the “suspect” death of a young woman at a Beijing shopping mall resulted in a mass incident. These are all cases with important lessons. Rumors about nuclear radiation resulting in the hoarding of salt, and rumours about “leather milk” once again damaging the domestic dairy industry are further examples of the social harm done by rumors.
Clearing up the online environment to a large extent requires self-discipline and self-censorship on the part of web users, the raising of one’s own media literacy in the internet age, so that rumour can be avoided and positive energy (正能量) spread. We must make our own judgements about the truth of certain information, raising our good sense and our sense of responsibility, acting on the principle of “not spreading rumors and not believing rumors” (不传谣、不信谣). When we come across information of dubious origin, we must take this into consideration and seek to confirm it, not just jump on the bandwagon and spread it along. We must avoid becoming an opportunity that rumourmongers can exploit. We must not give rumours the opportunity to spread. Recently, the State Internet Information Office held a “Responsibility Forum for Online Personalities” (网络名人社会责任论坛) which reached a consensus about bearing social responsibility, about transmitting positive energy, and which held up “Seven Base Lines” [for online conduct]. These raise clear guidelines for online personalities to responsibly abide by the law. There is no such thing as unrestricted freedom, and this is especially important for online personalities.
As the internet grows daily more connection to economic and social life, the web is no longer just a virtual space — rather, it is a part of the real world, and extension of real life. Every person who is active on the internet corresponds to a real person in actual life. Therefore, we must ensure that social public opinion supervision, of which the checking of online rumors is a part, is brought into the orbit of the law, creating a normalised supervision system in which those responsible for fabricating online rumors and those who transmit them are held responsible under the law. Of course, from a legal perspective, eliminating online rumors first requires delimiting what exactly constitutes a rumor, and raises the question of who should make this determination; next, our laws must be improved, so that laws, regulations and penal provisions relevant to information on the internet are all in accord, the system of legal responsibility is improved, and the creation and spread of online rumors can be checked.

As China’s leadership once again ratchets up the pressure on so-called “online rumours,” focusing on social media accounts with strong followings, it’s a good time to call on the expertise of former CMP fellow Hu Yong (胡泳). One of China’s leading thinkers on the internet and new media, Hu Yong is a professor at Peking University.
The following is an interview we posted two years ago — during the peak of another anti-rumor campaign — in which Hu Yong dispels the notion that rumors are necessarily bad or malicious. Rumor, he argues, is a form of knowing as old as the hills. And the best way to ensure reliable information is to open up the conversation, not to restrict it.

[EDITOR’S NOTE FROM AUGUST 12, 2011] The following interview with communications scholar, new media expert and CMP fellow Hu Yong was published by Time Weekly. As the controversy continues in China over the so-called “anti-rumor league,” a group of online rumor busters who have advertised themselves as truth-seeking vigilantes out to identify and neutralize untruths in China’s burgeoning microblog sphere, this interview provides one of the best and most comprehensive looks at the question of what constitutes a “rumor” and how China can best use social media to promote openness, engagement and truth-seeking.
Time Weekly: Recently the problem of “rumors” on microblogs has become something of a concentrated phenomenon and has drawn a lot of controversy. How should we view the relationship between rumor and microblogs?
Hu Yong: Actually, rumors are a very old form of language, with a strong word-of-mouth character to them. In some sense, in the internet age we’ve seen the return you might say of some forms of communication in the past. Microblogs particularly resemble village markets where everyone mills around and the threshold for speaking is quite low. This kind of media form is actually extremely suited to the spread of rumor and hearsay. The transmission chain is short, the speed rapid, and the scope wide. And so, it’s fundamentally impossible to completely get rid of rumor on microblogs.
Time Weekly: Well then, owing to the special characteristics of microblogs, we can’t see all nonfactual information as rumor. We need to separate “inaccurate information” (错误的信息) from “manufactured information” (捏造的信息), in which the former is erroneous (讹) and the latter is rumor (谣). But I’ve noticed that even some journalists don’t always differentiate between what is “erroneous” and what is “rumor,” but simply talk about all nonfactual information as “rumor.”
Hu Yong: That’s right. This certainly happens, and it’s important to recognize the difference. But we need to point out further that if we simply define “rumor” as subjective and deliberate fabrication (观故意的捏造) and then add to this judgement about motives, this is really problematic. Put another way, the reason the “anti-rumor league” has invited so much controversy is because many people believe that they often make conjectures about the motives of those they focus on.
People generally assume that rumor is fabrication, and then suppose that it involves some sort of nefarious purpose. It never occurs to them that rumor is not necessarily in and of itself pure fiction, that there might be a particle of truth. I’m personally very opposed to the idea of ascribing motive in the definition of rumor. We all know that the ascription of motive (动机论) or the attacking of others in argument on the basis of assumed motive (诛心论) have a longstanding and well-established history in China. In the process of verbal exchange, or in the process of discourse and argumentation, we often don’t direct our language toward the conduct or language of the other, but rather directly criticize the other — why did they say what they did, why did they act in that way. We make conjectures about the motives of the other. This kind of motive ascription as a way of thinking is actually the greatest obstacle to reasonable discussion, and in many cases its interest is actually throttling freedom of expression.
Time Weekly: This kind of form of discussion that doesn’t ascribe motive should be a basic principle established in public discussion on microblogs. I know that the French critic [philosopher, sociologist] Raymond Aron placed great importance on this principle and emphasized it again and again. He said that in collective action less attention should be paid to the intention of those taking action and more attention paid to the results of that action.
Hu Yong: We have a tradition of ascribing motive, including during the Cultural Revolution when everyone talked about “literary prostitutes” (文痞) [in accusing certain intellectuals]. What they used was what we often call the billy-club method. This method is in fact one of the most commonly used forms of ascribing motive. If you ascribe motive excessively in your analysis of rumor, it is quite easy to wipe these so-called rumors with your own ethical judgements and then occupy a moral high ground for yourself. When you use this sort of method to carry out a process of demonization on rumor, that actually means that what you’re wiping out is the validity of the public’s questioning of you, or the validity of the public’s resistance. In other words, I think that in the controversy over the “anti-rumor league” there is something that has to be said clearly, and that is that the notion of “dispelling rumor” [piyao] does not have natural validity within the context of contemporary China.
Time Weekly: The “anti-rumor league” and the motive-ascribing form of thought that they represent is something we have to be alert to and critical of. We can also see that if we lump what is said in error with rumor, this kind of thought demands that people have to be all-knowing, and this expects far too much of people.
Hu Yong: In a basic sense, any time something happens information is asymmetrical, and no one is like God, seeing and knowing all. So oftentimes information will emerge incomplete or even in error, and its difficult to dismiss it directly as “rumor.” In a deeper sense, rumor is one way and means by which we come to recognize our society, a form of knowing (认知方式). Because as an individual or community when you meet with uncertainty you will naturally undergo acts of social cognition, or you’ll act in a collective manner, working to eliminate uncertainties in the information process. In the research of rumor, social scientists believe that rumors are in an important sense part of social cognition, a tool with which social communities resolve problems.
Time Weekly: Yes. Information, this basic concept, has been defined as something that dispels the cognitive uncertainties of the receiver. For example, the July 23 accident [of the high-speed train in Wenzhou], this sudden-breaking incident, created a great deal of uncertainty. At the same time it also generated a craving for accurate and timely information. But the government was extremely negligent in providing information about the disaster, and even had a desire to cover it up. So then, rumors in the sense that you just described them emerged.
Hu Yong: That’s right. On this issue a lot of people have a very superficial understanding, and perhaps have a lot of warped views. As I just said, we can make a distinction within rumors about truthful content and fictional content. But many people believe that rumors must all naturally be false. What’s more, a great many people believe that rumors are a form of social malady. And so we see even a lot of media saying metaphorically that rumors are spreading like an illness. In fact, some of the actions of the “anti-rumor league” have this sort of problem.
When you understand “rumor” purely as a kind of sickness, you commit an error of presumptuous arrogance, assuming that the public consists of people who easily fall victim to illness, that they easily believe rumors and lightly disseminate them. But in fact as we just discussed, rumors are a normal part of society, a normal condition, and not a sickness. Functional rumors will emerge among communities in our society as they seek answers to events that they cannot explain.
Time Weekly: So once we understand the function that rumors have, how do we understand “rumor busting” organizations like the “anti-rumor league” on microblog platforms? Actually, I’d rather replace the strongly suggestive term “rumor-bust” with “clarify.”
Hu Yong: The “anti-rumor league” says itself that it wants to take on social responsibility in the era of We Media (自媒体), leveraging spontaneous forces to promote self-discipline in speech. This follows the pattern of self-governing organizations in the We Media age, but the problem lies chiefly in the way as everyone has criticized they selectively target rumors, avoiding government rumors and only focusing on rumors from the public. They say themselves that they are bearing a social responsibility, but we can see from the microblog account of the founder of the “anti-rumor league,” Dou Hanzhang (窦含章), that he has labeled himself as someone who “speaks on behalf of the government” (替政府说话的人). This tells us quite clearly that he has a position. In my view, to target popular rumor and avoid official rumor is a failure of intelligence, whether it’s an active attempt at cover up or passive neglect. In sum, they have overlooked a relationship, I call it the relationship between rumors and lies.
The slogan of the “anti-rumor league” is, “Serving the Truth” (为真相服务). Well then, we then have to ask, under China’s present circumstances what is the biggest obstruction to the truth? Is it lies, or is it rumors? This is a question they must answer.
Time Weekly: In the microblog sphere, the “anti-rumor league” has been subjected to widespread challenge [by users], and you might say it has even become the proverbial rat crossing the road [which everyone hates and abuses]. But objectively speaking, microblogs are in need of a mechanism for clarification, or an information settlement platform (信息澄清平台). What form would you hope this would take, or what kind of people would constitute such a thing?
Hu Yong: As to the mechanisms of clarification, I think we can say as the ancients did that “the art lies outside the poetry” (功夫在诗外). Which is to say we cannot just focus on microblogs and ask what the best mechanism for clearing up [information] is. In fact, the best possible mechanism for clearing up [information] would be for the government to realize openness and transparency of information, would be to resolve the problem of lies that we just touched on. After that, it’s about the media doing fair and comprehensive reporting.
As a form of media, microblogs naturally have their own capacity for self-correction, because many people participate in microblogs and every person has their own strengths, information sources and social network, and sometimes these people may be on the scene [to give eyewitness accounts], etcetera. This is something traditional media often cannot accomplish. This kind of assembling could possibly lead to the emergence of a group intelligence. And this group intelligence is in fact what constitutes the mechanism of self-correction in the microblog sphere. This is one of the great sources of vitality for microblogs.
Time Weekly: Still, some people may be concerned that this sort of self-correcting mechanism is not necessarily complete. Is it possible that it might have systematic flaws, or have collective blind spots?
Hu Yong: This actually boils down to the question of how you regard group thinking (群体思维). There has always been different views about this. One view is the one we’ve already talked about, the view that groups can give rise to intelligence and that this intelligence corrects through exchange. But there has always been another understanding and view that says that if individuals gather into groups the intelligence represented by those groups will not necessarily be superior to individual intelligence, or even will not just not give rise to group intelligence but will instead give rise to crowd foolishness (群体的愚蠢). There are many examples used to support this view, for example Hitler’s Germany, China during the Cultural Revolution, etcetera. The French thinker Gustave Le Bon wrote about this in his book The Crowd.

In August 2013, as China’s leadership sought to reassert control over social media in the midst of the high-profile trial of former Chongqing Party boss Bo Xilai, and ahead of an important leadership conclave expected in October, it renewed pressure on celebrity Weibo accounts with large followings — the so-called “Big V’s” (大V). In an editorial on August 11, China’s official Xinhua News Agency argued that “as recognisable figures in the online world, ‘Big V’s’ must have a stronger sense of social responsibility than ordinary users.” On August 23, angel investor Xue Manzi (薛蛮子), one of China’s most visible “Big V” Weibo users, was reportedly taken away by police on charges of soliciting prostitution. Some commentators viewed Xue’s detention as a deliberate move by authorities to send a caution to influential social media users. In the above cartoon, posted to Sina Weibo by artist “Black White and Red Xiao Wei” (黑白红小卫32), a “Big V” Weibo account casts a huge shadow shaped like a megaphone, a reflection of its massive power to shape opinion. Meanwhile, small red dog (the Chinese government) wanders by and pees on the V. “That’ll make him stink!” the caption reads.