China’s “urban management officers”, or chengguan (城管), a non-police force charged with keeping urban areas across the country orderly and clean (i.e, free of peddlers, migrant workers, illegal building structures), have a reputation for unruliness and viciousness. In a recent case of violent “management” by urban management officers that shook the whole country, officers viciously attacked the owner of a bicycle store in Yan’an, Shaanxi province, even jumping on his head. Following the incident, the official Global Times newspaper urged people to point the finger at individual violators, not at the entire urban management system. In this cartoon, posted by artist Lao Xiao (老肖) to Sina Weibo, viewers are presented with a mock quiz in which a blank is followed by the character for “management”, or guan (管) — visually rendered with striking fists, kicking feet and flying fruit (a clear reference to chengguan violence against street peddlers in China) — and viewers are asked to fill in the first character. Lao Xiao’s quiz underscores the absurdity of the idea that chengguan maintain order in the city at all. In many cases, indeed, they are a source of disorder..

The following post on Sina Weibo dealing humorously with Chinese President Xi Jinping’s (习近平) official visit to the United States was deleted sometime today, June 13, 2013. The post is not listed in the JMSC database at “permission denied,” but visits to the account in question show that the post has been removed from the system. [More on deleted posts at the WeiboScope Search, by the Journalism and Media Studies Centre]
The post shows an image of US President Barack Obama directing Xi Jinping in a gesture of welcome, his left hand extended with his palm facing the Chinese president. The user adds to the image a drawing of a palm bearing a message, suggesting the picture actually shows Obama giving Xi a secret word of reassurance. The message on the hand-drawn palm reads: “All of America is now in my party’s palm. The Party [CCP] can rest assured.”

NOTE: All posts to The Anti-Social List are listed as “permission denied” in the Sina Weibo API, which means they were deleted by Weibo managers, not by users themselves.

The following post on Sina Weibo waxing sentimental about former Chongqing party chief Bo Xilai (薄熙来) was deleted sometime before 4:47am today, June 13, 2013. [More on deleted posts at the WeiboScope Search, by the Journalism and Media Studies Centre]
The post reads: “One man moved an entire city. One man for a time moved all of China! The just people of China have not forgotten him, and history will not forget him!”

一个人感动一座城、一个人的暂离感动全中国！正义的中国人民没有忘记他，历史会记住他!

NOTE: All posts to The Anti-Social List are listed as “permission denied” in the Sina Weibo API, which means they were deleted by Weibo managers, not by users themselves.

On May 2, Dutch artist Florentijn Hofman debuted his latest work, a giant inflatable duck, in Hong Kong harbor. Tens of thousands of locals and tourists flocked to see the duck, which was afloat near the city’s famous Star Ferry. Within weeks copycat versions of the Hofman duck started appearing in mainland China, an apparently harmless act. But an article posted to the website of the Chinese Communist Party’s official People’s Daily newspaper on June 3 condemned the copycat ducks proliferating across the country as “kitsch” and a perversion of Hofman’s original message. In the following cartoon, posted by artist Gou Ben (勾犇) to Sina Weibo, the original duck wears an expression of shock as it is faced by goofy knock-offs claiming to be relatives. An obnoxious duck wearing a tacky purple ribbon shouts: “I’m the elder female cousin of your distant female cousin’s neighbor!”

“Where can I buy a copy of Investor Journal? This article is so, so, so fierce!” Writing on Sina Weibo last night, Wang Xiaoyu (王晓渔), a well-known Chinese scholar and social critic, was talking excitedly about this article posted to Investor Journal‘s Sina-hosted blog.
The article — fierce indeed (and now deleted from Sina’s blog platform) — compares the “war of words” raging between Sina Weibo users and official CCP media over the issue of constitutionalism over the past week to the Democracy Wall movement in October 1978 and to democracy demonstrations in “the early summer of 1989,” a not-at-all-veiled reference, of course, to protests ahead of the June Fourth Incident.
The article goes so far as to say — in its opening paragraph — that the intensity of the row over constitutionalism has surpassed the controversy kicked up in 1989 by the World Economic Herald, the celebrated liberal newspaper shut down in the midst of the Tiananmen protests.
Here is what the Investor Journal blog post looked like yesterday evening, before it was removed.

And without further ado, let’s get into the translation of the post, so all can appreciate its significance. My apologies for any inaccuracies — this was a quick job. I’ve included an image file of the original (which is still circulating on Weibo) at the bottom:

Let Us Continue to Care About Politics
Investor Journal
I don’t know whether people would agree with me or not if I said that Weibo and WeChat today are like the Democracy Wall thirty years ago, or like what we saw at Sanjiaodi (三角地) on the Peking University campus in the early summer of 1989. But the way I see it, the war of words last week between Weibo and official media over “constitutionalism” was of an intensity nothing short of, and perhaps surpassing, that we saw [in 1989] during the controversy caused by the World Economic Herald. At that time, it was possible for official mouthpiece [newspapers] to trumpet their own theories after summarily shutting the door on [the World Economic Herald].
This time things are different. The article published recently by Red Flag journal said constitutionalism is something belonging to capitalism, that it has no relevance to socialism. The People’s Daily followed with an article saying the loyalty CCP party members feel for the spirit of the Party is like the faith Christians place in Jesus. Clearly, official media are trying to voice their own reason to the masses, telling everyone inside and outside the Party at the same time just how crucial it is to remain “firm.” Thankfully, we can celebrate the fact that at least for now it seems Weibo won’t suffer the same fate as the Democracy Wall or the World Economic Herald , even though the words of official CCP media were roundly and universally mocked on Weibo as soon as they came out.
The most exaggerated voice among the [Party] mouthpieces came from the People’s Liberation Army Daily, which said that the “ism” it supported was the “truth of the cosmos” (宇宙真理). The most direct voice, meanwhile, came from the Global Times, a child paper of the People’s Daily, which said that those fighting for constitutionalism were actually those who politically were opposed to some things about the constitution. It didn’t bother to specify what these things are, but I think we all know.
What do all of these things have to do with our investments? According to my own experience, and that of others in the industry, our interest in political issues in China has not cooled down since the 18th National Congress of the CCP simply because a new crop of leaders has stepped out on stage. In fit, quite the opposite, each rhetorical move they make affects our guesswork into what’s going on behind the scenes. I’m sure that all of us, being of different persuasions, read this language [from official media] in our own way as suits our interests. Up until last week when these fierce rhetorical pieces came out and the overarching views (语言环境) of the new leadership became clear. He demands that Party members and cadres unite general public and to win people’s support (群众路线). [EDITOR’S NOTE: This was an approach pushed by Mao Zedong, and some people now think Xi’s actions signal the reappearance of a Mao-style rectification movement like the anti-rightist movement of the 1950s.] He [Xi Jinping] is not someone bringing a fresh approach, even less is he “cool.” In my view, those born in the 1950s are the most thorough generation [of believers] ever trained by the Party. Their educational experience is essentially devoid of contact and dialogue with the outside world, while those born in the 1940s and after the 1960s do have [such experience].
In investor circles the attention is actually on how exactly China’s economy will continue to develop, how it will get through a number of key transitions. We don’t like the so-called soft recovery. We don’t like reaching the ceiling. Even less do we like futures without the unexpected. Unlike intellectuals, who have a stronger sense of historical responsibility, investors aren’t willing to face the indeterminate risks of mass social chaos. But at the same time a society that is determinate, where growth is exhausted, where patterns of wealth are fixed, where discriminatory distribution creates insufficient consumption is also unattractive to us. Just as many people within society cherish the era of Mao, I know most of us investors cherish the era of Deng.
History is thoroughly interesting. In the Mao era the talk was of revolution. In the Deng era the talk was of reform. Mao talked about breaking through everything, but every word he spoke was seen as the truth. Deng talked about making big experiments, but Deng also created forbidden zones for reform. . . The late 1980s showed that as the government let go of more, society made greater progress; those areas that the government couldn’t manage, society took charge of, and miracles happened. History also has a way of toying with people. Deng Xiaoping also left much in suspense for those who came after — I’m talking about those forbidden zones he marked out. Dealing with these forbidden zones is something that has tested generation after generation of leaders since. To this day, we’ve had three generations of leaders whose only answer was to perpetuate these forbidden zones, and successors seems to lack the intelligence or courage to break through them. Will Deng and Jiang serve only as unsurpassable marks?
Truthfully, I have no answer to this. But I want to tell our readers that the heart of Deng’s thinking was about loosening restrictions and stimulating initiative. In my view, the forbidden zones Deng broke through himself were far more difficult than the breaking through by his successors of the forbidden zones he established. Because Deng’s successes demonstrate that the social reaction and impact of breaking through these forbidden areas is overwhelmingly positive, and doing so can only give greater strength to those who do break through them. Chinese society has already surpassed the early stages of industrialisation, and it’s inevitable that the culture of material consumption will be followed by consumption by the people of our country of more cultural and non-material products — the consumption of politics as well as life styles. Where there are forbidden zones, that’s where the hopes and opportunities of investors lie. No one could declare that these will be realized in the short term. But believe me, to see the results you won’t have to wait for long.

[ABOVE: The original link to the Investor Journal blog now yields a message that reads: “We’re sorry, the page you’re looking for does not exist or has been deleted.”]

Students at Jinxi Primary School in Huaihua, a prefectural-level city in Hunan province, got a jolt Tuesday morning as two “distinct rocking movements,” each lasting six to seven seconds, hit the upper floors of the school shortly after morning classes began. At 11:40am, a post made by Huaihua News, a Sina Weibo account with nearly 60,000 followers, sounded an alarming note, saying Jinxi Primary School was “tofu architecture,” a term referring to substandard and unsafe structures built with cheap materials:

Huge news! The school building at Jinxi Primary School in Huaihua is a tofu structure. It’s already leaning and its collapse is imminent. Parents, go and get your children.

The post shared a photo of Jinxi Primary School, apparently with teachers and students gathered outside in the schoolyard. (Here is the city of Huaihua on our Media Map, with a link to the official Party newspaper, Huaihua Daily.)

By Tuesday afternoon, the above post had been removed from Huaihua News. And at 5:41pm, the Weibo account posted in its place an official notice from the education department of the Huaihua city government that was apparently made earlier in the afternoon. The notice suggests that within the space of four hours a full and thorough investigation has taken place, and students are now able to return to the school.

Notice Concerning the Situation of Tremors Occurring at Jinxi Primary School
On May 28, 2013, at 8:15am, two distinct rocking movements occurred on the west side of the Jinxi Primary School building, each lasting for about 6-7 seconds. After these incidents occurred, the school immediately instituted emergency response procedures, sounding an emergency alarm and evacuating students and staff to the sports ground within 3 minutes. In order to protect the safety of students and staff, the city’s education department ordered a suspension of classes at the school, and at 10am the school notified parents and asked them to pick up the students at school. As of now, the emotions of the students and teachers are basically sound.
Following the incident, city leaders gave this top priority. The city’s deputy secretary and mayor Li Hui (李晖) phoned himself to learn more about the situation and make arrangements for the necessary work. The city’s deputy mayor, Ouyang Ming (欧阳明), and education chief Yang Changhong (阳畅宏) went immediately to the school to investigate the situation. They arranged for the heads of the [local] earthquake bureau (地震局), planning bureau (规划局), construction office (建设局), the school builders and designers, construction contractors, and supervision inspectors as well as technical personnel to go to the site and confer. Based on onsite surveys by earthquake and quality supervision authorities, the school building has not experienced cracks, nor is it leaning, nor is there damage to the surface of the walls. The cause of the tremors was construction work being carried out in the sports field adjacent to the building. A pavement roller at work caused tremors that caused a resonance effect to the school building. Right now, the education department is making arrangements for Jinxi Primary School to resume classes this afternoon.
We hope that city residents, students and parents do not heed erroneous information and rumours, that they return quickly to normal and productive lives and studies. We hope that city residents, students and parents believe in science. The construction quality of Jinxi Primary School has been determined to be safe and reliable by construction quality supervision and earthquake authorities, and [the school] can entirely be used as normal. We hope that relevant authorities further build on knowledge and training for earthquake and disaster preparedness, actively raising their scientific IQs and their capacity to deal with earthquakes and other safety issues.
Huaihua City Education Department
May 28, 2013

In May 2013, Chinese economist Mao Yushi (茅于轼)) warned that China was in the midst of a “leftist revival”. Mao Yushi’s remarks, which stem in part from verbal attacks he has received from leftists in recent weeks and a hardline editorial directed at him in the Global Times newspaper, also come against the backdrop of an apparent ideological tightening in China. Recent events in China have raised concerns that the new leadership under President Xi Jinping is taking a leftward turn. In January 2013, Xi warned against attacks on the legacy of Mao Zedong, suggesting this could undermine the Chinese Communist Party and create chaos in China. The following cartoon, posted by artist Zhu Senlin (朱森林) to Sina Weibo, shows a dangerous mountain road (a reference, apparently, to the difficulty of China’s present path). A bridge on the road has collapsed, but instead of repairing it, two workers roll out a red carpet (leftist Party ideology) to expediently close the gap.

In one of Sina Weibo’s most popular posts over the weekend, with more than 25,000 re-posts by Monday morning, prominent Chinese scholar Yu Jianrong (于建嵘) sent this message to police in his parents’ hometown of Qidong County in Hunan province.

I ask the police bureau in the Chengxi Police Substation (城西派出所) in Qidong County (祁东县), Hengyang City (衡阳巿), Hunan province — do you have no shame?! My mother is 82 years old and had to return from Beijing to renew her personal identification card, and you say she will have to wait there for a month before it can be issued. You even force her to pay 10 yuan as a phone notification fee (电话通知费)! You must explain to me: why are phone calls so expensive in a county town? She has suffered a stroke (有严重的脑溢血), and if you set off her condition by working her up, I’ll definitely come after you!

The post, which includes a photo of Yu Jianrong with his mother, prompted a lively debate on Sina Weibo about the proper limits of power.

By 11am today Yu Jianrong’s post had drawn more than 13,000 comments.

In its annual white paper on human rights, released earlier this month, China once again affirmed its citizens’ “right to know and right to be heard.” But the country’s ideological mood has darkened in recent weeks in what seems to reflect growing anxiety in the leadership over potentially destabilizing public opinion.
A recent document insiders say was issued by the central Party leadership urges officials across the country to be “fully alert to the threat posed by the ideas advocated by the West.” Those ideas reportedly include what have been recently termed the “Seven Don’t Speaks” (七不讲). Widely reported in Hong Kong media and confirmed by mainland media insiders (though no one, it must be noted, has seen a reliable document), they are:
1. universal values
2. freedom of speech
3. civil society
4. civil rights
5. the historical errors of the CCP
6. official bourgeoisie
7. judicial independence
Most of these terms have not been particularly sensitive in China in recent years. Here is how CMP director Qian Gang has generally defined China’s ideological spectrum.

The Party’s dominant language is in the LIGHT RED, terms like “Socialism with Chinese Characteristics.” LIGHT BLUE terms are more liberal ones that are not used by the Party but are not off limits (They might be seen, for example, in commercial newspapers like Southern Metropolis Daily, but not in the People’s Daily, unless there is an important ideological shift). DEEP BLUE terms like “multiparty system” are off limits, hence the vertical red line.
Terms 1-4 and 7 above might all be classified as LIGHT BLUE terms in the prevailing ideological spectrum of roughly the past decade. They are part of a developing (expanding?) liberal discourse in China.
If the “Seven Don’t Speaks” are treated seriously, they mark a clear shift of the DEEP BLUE spectrum to the left, meaning that the liberal discourse is being squeezed.
We can also see this ideological shift in a number of recent pieces in official Party journals railing harder against the DEEP BLUE. One article in Red Flag Journal this week, for example, written by Yang Xiaoqing (杨晓青), a law professor at People’s University of China, argues that “Western” political concepts like multiparty elections and separation of powers are alien and unsuited to China. It discusses the merits of “people’s democracy” (人民民主) — essentially the idea of greater public participation in political affairs controlled and managed by the CCP — over constitutionalism. (Just think of people’s democracy as “self-rule beneficently administered by another,” one for Bierce’s dictionary).
The authorities have also taken more robust action against “Big V” Weibo accounts, which tend to have sizable audiences and can also be unruly gardens of LIGHT BLUE speech.
All of the signs lately point to intensified media control across the board, from more serious talk about strengthening social media constraints to state media pledges to help realize “China’s Dream” by adhering to the Party line and being more “positive.”
“Positive energy” seems to be a recently popular phrase in official discussions of the media’s role. And we see this again in another piece from Red Flag Journal this week. The piece is called, “Media Must Unite to Amass Positive Energy.”
The basic idea of the piece, written by Ke Chu (柯楚), is that China is a great big vessel of civilization sailing off to the bright horizon of the China Dream. Now, as it draws so close to its promised shore, is not the time for people to rock the boat with negativity.
“The Party media and various new media, and the internet masses, must maintain clear heads,” Ke writes. “They must not change directions or banners. The closer we get to the shores of our dream, the easier it is to run aground.”
Western nations (“certain powers,” Ke calls them), with their destabilizing values, are out to sink the “Great Ship.” They “hope to use the internet as a means to bring about the collapse of China.”

[ABOVE: A cartoon posted anonymously to Sina Weibo in 2012 shows greedy government officials cannibalizing the ship of state to build their own escape boats.]
Ke Chu’s piece is an interesting portrait of CCP anxiety over the possibly corrosive effect of technology and broader social change on the Party’s ability to control public opinion and maintain its rule.
The acknowledgements of media change are interesting in and of themselves. The concern that “traditional media audiences have been scattered, their space has been squeezed and their impact weakened.” The concern that “positive propaganda” has become ridiculous and toothless, that it is “generally subjected to satire and ridicule.”
Perhaps most fascinating is the section where Ke Chu attempts to plead the relevance of “Party sponsored and managed media” by suggesting they have always been responsive to problems emerging online. “Most of the reports resulting from problems exposed on the internet have come from Party sponsored and managed media,” he writes.
This is a clever bit of sophistry. In most cases, the Party media as we generally understand them — those newspapers serving as “mouthpieces” of the Party leadership at various levels — do not report stories emerging online first, or usually at all. In almost every case, the commercial media are the first to the punch. But technically, of course, these media are “Party sponsored and managed.” They are spin-offs of the official Party papers [Read our related round-up of how this works HERE].
The most troubling aspect of Ke’s piece — particularly if it can be seen as reflective of thinking at the top (which is unclear) — is the way he lumps together all media, including the commercial press and new media, as “mouthpieces of the Party.” He writes: “Media are not just the mouthpieces of the Party, they are also the eyes and ears of the Party; they are the Party’s primary care physicians.” And soon after: “Other domestic new media must at least serve as the eyes and ears of the Party, and as its primary care physician — the information they release must benefit the health of the body of government.”
Like a new age healer, Ke Chu wants everyone to come together to generate “positive energy.” But no one, apparently, is supposed to tell the body that it is sick or corrupt.

“Media Must Unite to Amass Positive Energy” (媒体要凝聚放大正能量)
Red Flag Journal (红旗文稿)
By Ke Chu (柯楚)
May 21, 2013
In China today, two types of media objectively exist. The first type is traditional media, principally newspapers, magazines, radio and television. The second type is new media, founded on the basis of internet technology. These have formed two distinct fields of public opinion (舆论场).
organic integration of these two public opinion fields, combining forces to create cohesion, expanding the positive energy originating from web users, thereby promoting social progress, the enrichment of the people and the strength of the nation.
For a long time, traditional media have taken on the propaganda tasks of the ruling Party, and they have played an irreplaceable role in the uniting of the masses, the inducing and mobilizing the people, and the promoting of forward progress in terms of revolution and development. As the situation [domestically and internationally] has changed, internet-based new media have become an emerging force, traditional media audiences have been scattered, their space has been squeezed and their impact weakened.
These days, there are a great number of young people who do not read newspapers or magazines every day, who do not listen to the radio or watch television. But those who do not go online everyday are few and far between. The positive propaganda carried out by traditional media is generally subjected to satire and ridicule on emerging media [platforms]. Topics elaborately planned [for propaganda purposes] are generally mocked by new media. Examples of positive reporting are generally dissimilated by new media, becoming negative incidents. Responses to negative incidents are routinely pulverized to the point that nothing can possibly be good [NOTE: The writer means to say here that nothing the authorities do is immune from criticism]. The effectiveness of traditional media needs to be raised urgently in order to better bring together, release and promote positive energy for scientific development (科学发展).
In recent years, the development of new media has continued unabated, and this has had a positive impact on development in a number of areas, such as national politics, the economy, culture, technology and military affairs. But problems existing in the communication system (传播秩序) of new media are also rather salient. Some websites distort headlines [NOTE: The writer is referring here to the habit of commercial news websites to highlight certain aspects of news, sensationalize or imply criticism in writing headlines, even for news officially released by the government]. Some posts spoof others. Some Weibos wantonly attack others verbally.
Things are not equal online. False information is common online, and those innocents attacked have not recourse. In Western countries, when media broadcast false information, they face severe punishment, and in some cases are fined to the point of bankruptcy. In any country, including in the West, speech that disrupts or subverts state power and social order is not tolerated. An unfavorable ethos online clearly does not benefit the release and accumulation of positive energy.
Many web users have a clear understanding [of these issues], and many web users have their own very original opinions on specific problems. Top Party leaders at various levels and principal government leaders must go online frequently, taking suggestions on board, listening to opinions, enhancing their understanding for the benefit of government affairs, and improving their work. On this count, web users should respond positively and offer their support, voicing more rational and constructive opinions and suggestions and minimizing irrational recriminations and complaints. [We must work] steadily to expand the frequency and amplitude of positive interaction between web users and the government, and between web users and web users. [We must work] steadily to amass and expand positive energy.
Amassing positive energy does not mean excluding supervision by public opinion (舆论监督). Media are not just the mouthpieces of the Party, they are also the eyes and ears of the Party; they are the Party’s primary care physicians. The Party, the government and the media have never rejected normal supervision by public opinion (正常的舆论监督). Party sponsored and managed media (党办党管的媒体), including traditional media, have often used the issues voiced on new media as sources [for coverage], carrying out their own related news reporting. Most of the reports resulting from problems exposed on the internet came from Party sponsored and managed media. Other domestic new media must at least serve as the eyes and ears of the Party, and as its primary care physician — the information they release must benefit the health of the body of government (有益于政府机体的健康). As for communications that do malicious harm (恶意危害) to the government, no nation on earth will permit these.
Right now, it would be difficult for any country or organization to use economic or military means to check and prevent the great sailing ship of China’s revival. But there are certain powers that hope to use the internet as a means to bring about the collapse of China. The Party media and various new media, and the internet masses, must maintain clear heads — they must not change directions or banners. The closer we get to the shores of our dream, the easier it is to run aground. Over the past 30 years, as our economy has developed rapidly, quite a number of problems and tensions have also accumulated. The actions and determination of the new generation of central Party leaders in alleviating tensions are universally recognized, but time is necessary [if they are to find solutions]. Media as well as the masses of web users must do their utmost to release and amass positive energy, in order to urge on the Great Ship of the Chinese People (中华巨轮).