The 5:1 loss of the China men’s soccer team to Thailand on June 15 resulted in riots online and offline as fans vented their frustration over a series of setbacks for its national team in the world’s most popular sport. As disappointed fans poured onto social media to voice their anger, a joke dialogue between China and Thailand summed up frustration not just over the sucking sound of Chinese soccer, but over all of the patchy vulnerabilities in the country’s professed greatness.

China: We have 5,000 years of history!
Thailand: Your team was abused 5:1.
China: We have an area of 9.6 million square kilometres.
Thailand: Your team was abused 5:1.
China: One in every five people in the world is Chinese!
Thailand: Your team was abused 5:1.
China: Can’t we talk of something other than men’s football?
Thailand: You’re beaten down by local government officials every day.
China: …
Thailand: You eat toxic food every day.
China: …
Thailand: You suck in toxic air.
China: …
Thailand: Even if you struggle for a lifetime you can’t afford a house.
China: Let’s continue talking about the football team, OK?
Thailand: Your team was abused 5:1.”

In the above cartoon, posted by artist Zhu Senlin (朱森林) to Sina Weibo, China is depicted as a “paper tiger” of sports prowess, a body cobbled together with paper money and draped with an arrogant red banner that reads: “Sporting Giant!”

Blind activist and Chinese exile Chen Guangcheng (陈光诚), whose unhappy departure from New York University after a year-long fellowship there has recently kicked up a stink, arrived in Taiwan yesterday for a speaking tour. The news of Chen’s trip to Taiwan was heavily censored on Chinese social media.

The following post made to Sina Weibo after 6:33pm yesterday, June 23, shares an online Chinese-language report from France’s RFI about Chen Guangcheng’s visit to Taiwan. The post emphasizes the headline which reads: “Chen Guangcheng arrives in Taiwan today to experience a democratic environment first-hand.”
The Sina Weibo post was deleted sometime before 9:14pm yesterday, surviving for about three hours. [More on deleted posts at the WeiboScope Search, by the Journalism and Media Studies Centre]

NOTE: All posts to The Anti-Social List are listed as “permission denied” in the Sina Weibo API, which means they were deleted by Weibo managers, not by users themselves.

Seeking Truth, an official journal of the central CCP leadership, has run a new piece criticizing the use of the internet to attack the government and spread negativity about China.
The piece, which attempts to analyze the logic (or illogic) and ethos of China’s internet, concludes:

We must have an accurate grasp of online public opinion. The government must . . . see online public opinion as a way to understand the popular mood . . . At the same time, we must recognise that China’s mainstream are those who are busy going to work everyday, those employees busy at their jobs; they are those men and women pushing their carts at the supermarket; they are those strolling at the park on the holidays. In the online world, they are the silent majority, and they are the principal part of our modern society. . . When a voice emerges, one must ask who that voice represents, and how many people it can represent. One cannot listen to the wind and simply assume there is rain.

Seeking Truth, however, seems not to realize those people at the supermarket and strolling through the park are increasingly using smartphones.

Still wondering what Xi Jinping’s new buzzword, the Chinese dream, is all about? Well, the Red Flag journal, a sister publication of the CCP’s official Seeking Truth, continues this week with its series on what the Chinese dream IS NOT.
This latest theoretical rant, written by Yu Zhong (喻中), the head of the School of Law at Capital University of Economics and Business, is called, “‘The Chinese Dream’ and the Choosing of a Road to Democratic Politics.” The basic gist of the piece is that constitutionalism — the recent bugbear of China’s leadership — is a notion inferior and subordinate to the Chinese dream.
The logic that equates the Chinese dream with the “dream of constitutionalism” just as the American dream is associated with constitutionalism, says Yu, is “far too much of an oversimplification.”
Of course, he conveniently ignores the fact that few, if any, inside China who are talking about the issue of constitutionalism are talking about imitating the United States (Just read one of the articles originating the idea of “constitutionalism” and the Chinese dream this year and see for yourself.) Instead, they are talking about China living up to the constitution it already has.

It would be an act of kindness to say that Yu Zhong’s piece makes an argument. Here, for example, is one of several tasty morsels of nonsense he offers up:

The history of China over the past half-century has shown that “constitutionalism” is sometimes the “English dream” (英国梦), and sometimes the “Russian dream” (俄国梦), etcetera. This shows us that the patterns and experience of “constitutionalism” are pluralistic and diverse. In different ages, under different environments, different people have different “dreams of constitutionalism”. While they are all talking about “constitutionalism,” the constitutionalism you are dreaming about in a specific time and place is possibly different from the constitutionalism they are dreaming about in their own time and place. You can see that “the dream of constitutionalism” is not a uniform, clear and specific dream.

This isn’t an argument at all. It’s a common-sense platitude — like saying, “One size doesn’t fit all!” — thrown out as a rhetorical distraction. If this were logic, we could as easily use Yu’s “argument” to undue one of the CCP’s most unassailable political concepts, “socialism with Chinese characteristics”:

The history of China over the past half-century has shown that “socialism” is sometimes the “English dream” (英国梦), and sometimes the “Russian dream” (俄国梦), etcetera. This shows us that the patterns and experience of “socialism” are pluralistic and diverse. In different ages, under different environments, different people have different “dreams of socialism”. While they are all talking about “socialism,” the socialism you are dreaming about in a specific time and place is possibly different from the socialism they are dreaming about in their own time and space. You can see that “the dream of socialism” is not a uniform, clear and specific dream.

The core of Yu’s patronizing sally is the same irrational current of cultural subjectivity that underscores much of Chinese nationalism — the warm-breasted conviction that China is special and works by its own parallel universe of rules.
The notion of cultural subjectivity comes through clearly in this passage from Yu Zhong. Comb through the bluster and you realize he’s saying one thing only, that China is different and everyone needs to respect that. Admitting China’s uniqueness and its need to assert that uniqueness as a matter of cultural sovereignty, we have to admit that constitutionalism, a Western idea, is an assault on Chineseness:

In an age of pluralism, we must see that democracy and freedom have different meanings in different language environments. Under the banner of democracy, we have representative democracy, deliberative democracy, direct democracy, indirect democracy, and other forms of democracy. Under the banner of freedom, we have positive freedom, negative freedom, and also other types of freedom. These differences in freedoms and democracies remind us that we need to see our own process of the building of democratic politics (民主政治建设) and political reform through a different and compatible way of thinking. On this question, [the famous scholar] Fei Xiaotong (费孝通) said it best: “If people appreciate their own beauty and that of others, and work together to create beauty in the world, the world will live in harmony.”
Different countries have different dreams, and the dreams of different countries should “live in harmony.” In the current language environment, we can say more concretely and directly that the Chinese dream and the American dream should “appreciate the beauty of one another.” That kind of thinking that sees the American dream as representing the “dream of constitutionalism”, and then uses the “dream of constitutionalism” to represent the Chinese dream is a kind of cultural lack of confidence and a form of “lazy thinking” (懒汉思维).

This of course is “lazy thinking” at its most refined. Political conservatism — and ultimately the repression of rights and freedoms — is couched in the language of cultural preservation.
It’s not a surprise at all, then, that section three of Yu’s article leads us into a more detailed discussion of the “confidence” that must underlie the Chinese dream.

3. Where does confidence about the “Chinese dream” come from?
One necessary condition of understanding the Chinese dream is the emergence of cultural confidence. Without cultural confidence, there is no Chinese dream to speak of. So-called cultural confidence means establishing confidence about Chinese culture and its future. What is the premise of cultural confidence? Where does confidence in the Chinese dream come from? I believe the “great history” of Chinese culture can provide support for confidence in the Chinese dream.

Yu follows with a brief discussion of the history of Chinese culture, and the two major incursions of “Western culture,” in the form of Buddhism’s arrival from India in the 2nd century, and the arrival of Western Christian culture in the 19th century. He concludes with this affirmation of the future of Chinese culture:

At present, European and American culture may seem to have great attraction, and it may seem to represent a “conclusion” or “ultimate form” of human civilization. But change is the nature of things. Fundamentally speaking, while Chinese culture may assimilate European and American culture, Chinese culture will not become a replica of European and American culture. After Chinese culture has assimilated European and American culture, it will only become richer and more inclusive, and it will at the same time have greater vitality. This is the foundation of Chinese cultural confidence, and it is a precondition for our achievement of the Chinese dream.

This notion of “cultural subjectivity,” or wenhua zhutixing (文化主体性), is at work at the heart of Chinese nationalism — which in turn is the only tangible core meaning of Xi Jinping’s Chinese dream. The dream of national rejuvenation. The rise of China in all of its glorious uniqueness.
The problem, as I see it, is that the ideology of uniqueness is being advanced in order to repress the creative instincts of Chinese society and enforce a culture of unity. For all its rhetorical lightness and buoyancy, the Chinese dream has become a political colossus. How many native dreams will Xi Jinping crush to serve this tyranny of uniqueness?
Chinese historian Yuan Weishi perhaps summed up the pitfalls of “uniqueness” as a political value best when he wrote in 2007:

If we talk grandly about subjectivity, regardless of our ultimate designs, in the end we can only be of use to champions of nationalism and we will produce ideological trash.

[ABOVE: In this cartoon posted to the internet and Chinese social media, the artist depicts the Chinese Communist Party as a naked man sleeping sweetly and dreaming on a bed surrounded by the masses. The cartoon asks: whose dream is this exactly?]

The Snowden case has climbed the news charts rapidly in China over the past 72 hours. On Monday, June 10, there was just one story logged for the keyword “Snowden” (斯诺登) in mainland Chinese newspapers and newswires (WiseNews Database). That story, from China News Service — the country’s number two official newswire after Xinhua — ran under the headline, “American Intelligence Surveillance Case Whistleblower is Hiding in Hong Kong, Fears Capture.”
Today, June 13, there are 64 stories in China called up by the keyword “Snowden.” For those of you who need the simple visual, the four day news curve looks like this:

Looking at today’s coverage, it seems there is a mix of sources, although the major ones cited are still Xinhua News Agency, China News Service and People’s Daily Online (most of these based on foreign news coverage). Commercial newspapers seem to have been given a green light — or, at the very least, the light is stuck on yellow — and they are taking advantage, some using foreign news sources liberally.
China News Service has released 16 separate reports today on the case. Headlines include: “International View: Revelation of ‘Surveillance-Gate’ Puts the US Government in a Tight Spot”; “American ‘Surveillance-Gate’ Whistleblower: China and Hong Kong Have Long Been Targets of US Surveillance”; “Snowden Surfaces Again to Make Clear: He is Neither a Traitor Nor a Hero”; “Whistleblower Hiding in Hong Kong is a Test of US-China Relations: America Vexed By Whistleblower”; “Chinese Media Say America Has Extended the Hand of Anti-Terrorism Too Far.”
First Financial Daily (第一财经日报) appears to be the only newspaper that chose to put the Snowden story on its front page today [See right-hand column].

The news column, under the headline “Empire of Surveillance” (监视帝国), is written by Pan Yinru (潘寅茹), and summarizes many of the details in the Snowden case reported by international media over the past few days. The reporter, for example, introduces the NSA’s “boundless informant” program on the basis of “information this reporter obtained directly from the website of the Guardian newspaper.”
In an article on page A20 today, the Southern Metropolis Daily draws on numerous foreign news sources, including televised reports by ABC and CBS, to summarize the Snowden case and the “Prism” program. It reports also on the legal action filed by the American Civil Liberties Union against the US government.
The liberal use of American news sources by Chinese media adds perhaps a touch of irony to the case. Back in April, Chinese authorities tightened restrictions on the use of information from foreign media and websites. But here is the China News Service today in a report called, “US Whistle-blowing Hero Hiding in Hong Kong Becomes Problem in US-China Relations.” The report is based unashamedly on coverage by China’s Global Times newspaper that relies in turn on foreign news reporting:

America’s Wall Street Journal says that “the fate of the leaker of US surveillance programs may rest with Beijing” . . . Voice of America raised doubts on June 11th . . .
Voice of Russia said on June 11th that a number of American experts believe that Snowden could be a priceless secret informant if he was transfered to [the custody] of Beijing. The same day, America’s Foreign Policy journal said “Snowden would not become an intelligence asset for China” . . .
America’s Los Angeles Times on June 11th called Snowden “Hong Kong’s most famous refugee” . . .

On page 13 today, Shenzhen’s Daily Sunshine (晶报) runs a piece patched together from CNN’s interviews with Glenn Greenwald, the American journalist and Guardian columnist who has been central to the Snowden revelations, and the Guardian‘s Ewan MacAskill.
The Shenzhen Commercial News runs the Snowden story on page eight today with the headline, “Europe Seeks Explanation from America” (欧洲向美国讨说法). The story is sourced from Xinhua and People’s Daily Online. “Snowden is a Hero!” declares the image accompanying the report.

Whether or not Snowden is a hero, of course, is a matter of divided opinion. But as China New Service faithfully reports — relying, naturally, on a Reuters/Ipsos poll — one in three Americans see Snowden as a patriot.

China’s “urban management officers”, or chengguan (城管), a non-police force charged with keeping urban areas across the country orderly and clean (i.e, free of peddlers, migrant workers, illegal building structures), have a reputation for unruliness and viciousness. In a recent case of violent “management” by urban management officers that shook the whole country, officers viciously attacked the owner of a bicycle store in Yan’an, Shaanxi province, even jumping on his head. Following the incident, the official Global Times newspaper urged people to point the finger at individual violators, not at the entire urban management system. In this cartoon, posted by artist Lao Xiao (老肖) to Sina Weibo, viewers are presented with a mock quiz in which a blank is followed by the character for “management”, or guan (管) — visually rendered with striking fists, kicking feet and flying fruit (a clear reference to chengguan violence against street peddlers in China) — and viewers are asked to fill in the first character. Lao Xiao’s quiz underscores the absurdity of the idea that chengguan maintain order in the city at all. In many cases, indeed, they are a source of disorder..

The following post on Sina Weibo dealing humorously with Chinese President Xi Jinping’s (习近平) official visit to the United States was deleted sometime today, June 13, 2013. The post is not listed in the JMSC database at “permission denied,” but visits to the account in question show that the post has been removed from the system. [More on deleted posts at the WeiboScope Search, by the Journalism and Media Studies Centre]
The post shows an image of US President Barack Obama directing Xi Jinping in a gesture of welcome, his left hand extended with his palm facing the Chinese president. The user adds to the image a drawing of a palm bearing a message, suggesting the picture actually shows Obama giving Xi a secret word of reassurance. The message on the hand-drawn palm reads: “All of America is now in my party’s palm. The Party [CCP] can rest assured.”

NOTE: All posts to The Anti-Social List are listed as “permission denied” in the Sina Weibo API, which means they were deleted by Weibo managers, not by users themselves.

The following post on Sina Weibo waxing sentimental about former Chongqing party chief Bo Xilai (薄熙来) was deleted sometime before 4:47am today, June 13, 2013. [More on deleted posts at the WeiboScope Search, by the Journalism and Media Studies Centre]
The post reads: “One man moved an entire city. One man for a time moved all of China! The just people of China have not forgotten him, and history will not forget him!”

一个人感动一座城、一个人的暂离感动全中国！正义的中国人民没有忘记他，历史会记住他!

NOTE: All posts to The Anti-Social List are listed as “permission denied” in the Sina Weibo API, which means they were deleted by Weibo managers, not by users themselves.

On May 2, Dutch artist Florentijn Hofman debuted his latest work, a giant inflatable duck, in Hong Kong harbor. Tens of thousands of locals and tourists flocked to see the duck, which was afloat near the city’s famous Star Ferry. Within weeks copycat versions of the Hofman duck started appearing in mainland China, an apparently harmless act. But an article posted to the website of the Chinese Communist Party’s official People’s Daily newspaper on June 3 condemned the copycat ducks proliferating across the country as “kitsch” and a perversion of Hofman’s original message. In the following cartoon, posted by artist Gou Ben (勾犇) to Sina Weibo, the original duck wears an expression of shock as it is faced by goofy knock-offs claiming to be relatives. An obnoxious duck wearing a tacky purple ribbon shouts: “I’m the elder female cousin of your distant female cousin’s neighbor!”

“Where can I buy a copy of Investor Journal? This article is so, so, so fierce!” Writing on Sina Weibo last night, Wang Xiaoyu (王晓渔), a well-known Chinese scholar and social critic, was talking excitedly about this article posted to Investor Journal‘s Sina-hosted blog.
The article — fierce indeed (and now deleted from Sina’s blog platform) — compares the “war of words” raging between Sina Weibo users and official CCP media over the issue of constitutionalism over the past week to the Democracy Wall movement in October 1978 and to democracy demonstrations in “the early summer of 1989,” a not-at-all-veiled reference, of course, to protests ahead of the June Fourth Incident.
The article goes so far as to say — in its opening paragraph — that the intensity of the row over constitutionalism has surpassed the controversy kicked up in 1989 by the World Economic Herald, the celebrated liberal newspaper shut down in the midst of the Tiananmen protests.
Here is what the Investor Journal blog post looked like yesterday evening, before it was removed.

And without further ado, let’s get into the translation of the post, so all can appreciate its significance. My apologies for any inaccuracies — this was a quick job. I’ve included an image file of the original (which is still circulating on Weibo) at the bottom:

Let Us Continue to Care About Politics
Investor Journal
I don’t know whether people would agree with me or not if I said that Weibo and WeChat today are like the Democracy Wall thirty years ago, or like what we saw at Sanjiaodi (三角地) on the Peking University campus in the early summer of 1989. But the way I see it, the war of words last week between Weibo and official media over “constitutionalism” was of an intensity nothing short of, and perhaps surpassing, that we saw [in 1989] during the controversy caused by the World Economic Herald. At that time, it was possible for official mouthpiece [newspapers] to trumpet their own theories after summarily shutting the door on [the World Economic Herald].
This time things are different. The article published recently by Red Flag journal said constitutionalism is something belonging to capitalism, that it has no relevance to socialism. The People’s Daily followed with an article saying the loyalty CCP party members feel for the spirit of the Party is like the faith Christians place in Jesus. Clearly, official media are trying to voice their own reason to the masses, telling everyone inside and outside the Party at the same time just how crucial it is to remain “firm.” Thankfully, we can celebrate the fact that at least for now it seems Weibo won’t suffer the same fate as the Democracy Wall or the World Economic Herald , even though the words of official CCP media were roundly and universally mocked on Weibo as soon as they came out.
The most exaggerated voice among the [Party] mouthpieces came from the People’s Liberation Army Daily, which said that the “ism” it supported was the “truth of the cosmos” (宇宙真理). The most direct voice, meanwhile, came from the Global Times, a child paper of the People’s Daily, which said that those fighting for constitutionalism were actually those who politically were opposed to some things about the constitution. It didn’t bother to specify what these things are, but I think we all know.
What do all of these things have to do with our investments? According to my own experience, and that of others in the industry, our interest in political issues in China has not cooled down since the 18th National Congress of the CCP simply because a new crop of leaders has stepped out on stage. In fit, quite the opposite, each rhetorical move they make affects our guesswork into what’s going on behind the scenes. I’m sure that all of us, being of different persuasions, read this language [from official media] in our own way as suits our interests. Up until last week when these fierce rhetorical pieces came out and the overarching views (语言环境) of the new leadership became clear. He demands that Party members and cadres unite general public and to win people’s support (群众路线). [EDITOR’S NOTE: This was an approach pushed by Mao Zedong, and some people now think Xi’s actions signal the reappearance of a Mao-style rectification movement like the anti-rightist movement of the 1950s.] He [Xi Jinping] is not someone bringing a fresh approach, even less is he “cool.” In my view, those born in the 1950s are the most thorough generation [of believers] ever trained by the Party. Their educational experience is essentially devoid of contact and dialogue with the outside world, while those born in the 1940s and after the 1960s do have [such experience].
In investor circles the attention is actually on how exactly China’s economy will continue to develop, how it will get through a number of key transitions. We don’t like the so-called soft recovery. We don’t like reaching the ceiling. Even less do we like futures without the unexpected. Unlike intellectuals, who have a stronger sense of historical responsibility, investors aren’t willing to face the indeterminate risks of mass social chaos. But at the same time a society that is determinate, where growth is exhausted, where patterns of wealth are fixed, where discriminatory distribution creates insufficient consumption is also unattractive to us. Just as many people within society cherish the era of Mao, I know most of us investors cherish the era of Deng.
History is thoroughly interesting. In the Mao era the talk was of revolution. In the Deng era the talk was of reform. Mao talked about breaking through everything, but every word he spoke was seen as the truth. Deng talked about making big experiments, but Deng also created forbidden zones for reform. . . The late 1980s showed that as the government let go of more, society made greater progress; those areas that the government couldn’t manage, society took charge of, and miracles happened. History also has a way of toying with people. Deng Xiaoping also left much in suspense for those who came after — I’m talking about those forbidden zones he marked out. Dealing with these forbidden zones is something that has tested generation after generation of leaders since. To this day, we’ve had three generations of leaders whose only answer was to perpetuate these forbidden zones, and successors seems to lack the intelligence or courage to break through them. Will Deng and Jiang serve only as unsurpassable marks?
Truthfully, I have no answer to this. But I want to tell our readers that the heart of Deng’s thinking was about loosening restrictions and stimulating initiative. In my view, the forbidden zones Deng broke through himself were far more difficult than the breaking through by his successors of the forbidden zones he established. Because Deng’s successes demonstrate that the social reaction and impact of breaking through these forbidden areas is overwhelmingly positive, and doing so can only give greater strength to those who do break through them. Chinese society has already surpassed the early stages of industrialisation, and it’s inevitable that the culture of material consumption will be followed by consumption by the people of our country of more cultural and non-material products — the consumption of politics as well as life styles. Where there are forbidden zones, that’s where the hopes and opportunities of investors lie. No one could declare that these will be realized in the short term. But believe me, to see the results you won’t have to wait for long.

[ABOVE: The original link to the Investor Journal blog now yields a message that reads: “We’re sorry, the page you’re looking for does not exist or has been deleted.”]