Now Executive Director of the China Media Project, leading the project’s research and partnerships, David originally joined the project in Hong Kong in 2004. He is the author of Dragons in Diamond Village (Penguin), a book of reportage about urbanization and social activism in China, and co-editor of Investigative Journalism in China (HKU Press).
As anger flared across Chinese social media yesterday following the deadly crash in Guizhou of a passenger bus transferring positive Covid cases, Gao Yu (高昱), the deputy executive editor and head of investigations at Caixin Media, posted a reflection on the tragedy to his WeChat friend group that was subsequently shared outside the chat.
In his post, Gao urged an end to China’s zero Covid policy, which he argued was unscientific, pursued out of unnecessary fear, and out of step with the rest of the world. “We must wake up! We must return to normalcy!” he wrote.
An image of the WeChat friend group post by Caixin Media deputy editor Gao Yu, posted yesterday.
As the post was shared more widely on the internet, censors moved quickly to stamp it out. An archived version is still available from China Digital Times.
Our translation of the post follows.
________
For someone to be afraid of Covid is completely normal, and something understandable. When I stand and look down from the third floor, I feel fearful too. But what is not normal, and what is not understandable is to hold 1.3 billion Chinese people in bondage because an extremely small number of people could contract Covid and die.
Right now the entire world is declaring that the Covid pandemic has ended. But in this huge country still, an entire building of people can be dragged away to quarantine because a single person is positive, and an entire city can be forcibly locked down. Entire countries are living normally. But still there are people [here] holding their copies of the People’s Daily and saying that China’s epidemic prevention and control policies are the most scientific, the most humane, and the greatest.
China’s population is huge, [they say], so even if the number of deaths is at just one in ten thousand, then out of 1.3 billion Chinese there will be 130,000 who die. Can’t you be responsible for those 130,000 people? Sure, but the number of people who die each year in car accidents is far greater than the number who die of Covid. And why don’t you prohibit the driving of cars?
So far in Guizhou, not a single person has died of Omicron. But the fear of the possible spread of Omicron has put six million people under lockdown and has resulted in the forced removal of 30,000 people to quarantine facilities, of which some 10,000 have been distributed to other cities.
And now, 27 people who were possibly infected have been killed in an accident that happened during transport [to a quarantine facility outside the city]! Just look at this doomed driver who doesn’t know what’s even happening, and he wearing a hazmat suit and two layers of masks, and senselessly he’s wearing goggles too, and probably two layers of protective gloves. And for the entire journey, he was prohibited from using the air conditioning. And it was 2:30 AM. This is the foggy trance in which this bus was driven toward death.
We must wake up! We must return to normalcy!
Resolutely oppose PCR testing of the whole population!
In the midst of more pressing stories, including a wave of Covid lockdowns and an earthquake in Sichuan, a government notice issued over the weekend on “the popularization of science,” or kepu (科普), may not command attention. But it is the latest sign of how politics and ideology have in recent years crept back into the heart of all endeavors in China.
Released by the general offices of the CCP Central Committee and the State Council, the notice encourages the spread of knowledge about science and technology, both in the government and in the wider population, in the interest of establishing a firm foundation for innovation and development. It speaks of “advocating the spirit of science,” and “promoting scientific approaches to activities,” and it signals concern over the fact that “the supply of high-quality science products and services remains insufficient.”
But science quickly moves aside for politics.
Point one in “General Requirements” opens with a clear declaration that the guiding ideology for science popularization is the top leader’s banner phrase, “Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for the New Era” (习近平新时代中国特色社会主义思想). The second point then addresses concrete “work demands”:
[Work must] adhere to the leadership of the Party, implementing the leadership of the Party through the whole process of science popularization, highlighting the political properties of science popularization, strengthening the leadership of values, practicing socialist core values, and vigorously promoting the spirit of science and the spirit of the scientist.
This talk of the “political properties” (政治属性) of science popularization is a salient reminder that through much of its history, particularly in the pre-reform period, the CCP has regarded science on the one hand as both a crucial contributor to national development, supporting economic growth and self-reliance, and on the other as intimately inter braided with political claims to truth as a source of political power.
Even as Xi Jinping has re-emphasized the need for self-reliance in science and technology, and has made innovation a key buzzword, his rule has reconsolidated Party control over the sciences. In science education, as in other fields, “ideological and political education,” or sixiang zhengzhi jiaoyu (思想政治教育) — sizheng (思政) for short — has been redoubled.
Biology textbooks in China now explicitly link the study of the subject to patriotic goals and love of the CCP. One textbook encourages an attitude of thankfulness and indebtedness, concluding: “Inspiring and leading students to use scientific knowledge to repay the kindness of the mother country is the best means of passing on red genes.”
Image from a Chinese biology textbook for universities, with a passage urging teachers to equate a lesson on DNA to the inheritance of “red genes.”
The phrase “red genes,” or hongse jiyin (红色基因), refers to the revolutionary spirit and history of the CCP as a form of political and cultural inheritance, the celebration of which is a means of consolidating the Party’s position within the national identity and thereby constructing the legitimacy of the regime.
Point 25 of the notice released on September 4 is crystal clear about the implications of science popularization for public opinion, the control of which the CCP regards as essential to maintaining political stability. The language emphasizes the need to “strengthen public opinion channeling in the field of science popularization,” “adhering to the correct political positions, and strengthening the construction and supervision of public opinion positions in science popularization.”
The release from the UN Human Rights Office on Wednesday of a report pointing to “serious human rights violations” in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region came with the Chinese government’s anger baked right in. A state response shared by the UN in its release said the report “wantonly smears and slanders China, and interferes in China’s internal affairs.”
China vented its fury again yesterday during a regular foreign ministry press conference. Asked what steps the government would take to address the concerns raised by the UN, foreign ministry spokesperson Wang Wenbin waved the report off as a “so-called assessment,” alleging that it had been “orchestrated and produced by the US and some Western forces.” Its real objective, he said repeatedly, was to “contain China.”
Reacting to the response, international media outlets made fury a part of the story. China had “lashed out,” reported the Washington Post. France24 spoke of China’s “furious riposte.” And an Associated Press story shared on scores of sites had everyone asking: “Why is China so angry?”
But perhaps the most revealing fact to note today, 48 hours after the release of the Xinjiang report, is that there has been almost no reporting at all inside China. If the external messaging of the China’s leadership has been all about pique, its internal messaging has been about creating a vacuum.
A search for “Xinjiang human rights report” in China’s Baidu search engine returns the message: “We’re sorry, we cannot find news content related to “Xinjiang human rights report.”
Today’s edition of the official People’s Daily, which might have reported the foreign ministry response, or even offered a rebuttal from the leading pen name in Party fury on international issues, “Zhong Sheng” (钟声), was silent on the question of Xinjiang. A search for “Xinjiang human rights report” in the WiseSearch database, which covers hundreds of Chinese-language newspapers as well as related websites and wire services, returns 127 articles today including the phrase, 13 from publications and 114 from websites. None of these sources are inside China.
Perhaps the most revealing fact to note today, 48 hours after the release of the Xinjiang report, is that there has been almost no reporting at all inside China.
There is nothing from the official Xinhua News Agency in Chinese. There is nothing from Xinhua in English, for that matter. There is nothing in China Dailyin Chinese.
The only front-page mention of Xinjiang today at China Daily in English is an article, tucked away in the corner of the homepage, by Adnan Akfirat, a Representative to China and Member of International Relations Bureau of Patriotic Party of Turkey. Called “No More Tarnishing Xinjiang,” the article is a personal tale of Akfirat’s experiences in Xinjiang. “[In] China, thanks to socialism with Chinese characteristics, the Uygurs, including Uygur women, can study the subjects of their choice, as well as master and develop their language, enrich their culture and modernize themselves by learning from the progressive aspects of Islam,” he writes.
An article by Adnan Akfirat urges readers to stop “tarnishing Xinjiang,” where everyone is happy.
Results in Chinese via Google for the past 24 hours, using the keyword “Xinjiang human rights report,” are entirely overseas Chinese media.
It is possible that China’s state media will find the words — furious ones? — in the days to come. But the silence tells its own story, of Xinjiang as a matter so sensitive to China’s leadership that the only voices permitted to speak are the megaphones intended for external audiences.
Which is why, of course, we have heard from the English-language edition of the Global Times. After an initial response on Wednesday, another story in English yesterday from the paper’s website again relayed the Chinese government view, that the Xinjiang report is a “patchwork of disinformation” and a “political tool” for the United States.
Earlier this week, CMP noted the unusual downward trajectory of a key buzzword signaling the power of Xi Jinping, the “Two Establishes” (两个确立), which seemed to indicate at least a momentary stall in the engine of Xi’s rise in the discourse of the CCP. In today’s People’s Daily, just days after the announcement of October 16 as the probable date of the 20th National Congress, we can clearly see that engine springing back to life.
The “Two Establishes” phrase, which has been a crucial power indicator since the 6th Plenum in November last year — underscoring the unassailable roles of Xi as the Party’s “core” and his “thought” as the guiding ideology — appears in five articles in the Party’s flagship newspaper today.
Two of these articles appear on the front page. The first is a love song for the People’s Liberation Army on the occasion of its 95th anniversary, emphasizing national security, and closing with a call to “unite more closely around the Central Committee of the CCP with Comrade Xi Jinping as the core, deeply understanding the decisive significance of the ‘Two Establishes.'”
The second is about the publication of the fourth edition of Xi Jinping’s The Governance of China (习近平谈治国理政). The article’s headline explains that Wang Huning (王沪宁), secretary of the CCP’s Secretariat, emphasized the need to “deeply study” Xi’s book, but also to “bring the study, propagation and implementation of Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era to a deeper level.”
The “Two Establishes” slipped notably in the second half of August. Are we witnessing a blip today, or the start of a September rally?
The Wang Huning article is a clear act of loyalty signaling, mentioning the “Two Establishes” and elevating Xi Jinping’s so-called “banner term,” or qizhiyu (旗帜语), the phrase that encompasses his legacy and claim to power. In all likelihood, the banner term will be shortened during the 20th National Congress from the current unwieldy 16-character version (习近平新时代中国特色社会主义思想) to the more potent five-character “Xi Jinping Thought” (习近平思想).
Another important article printed on page two reports on the opening ceremony for the fall study term at the Central Party School, the CCP’s top institution for the training of Party cadres. The opening address was delivered by Chen Xi (陈希), the current head of the CCP’s Organization Department, who reportedly emphasized that the “Two Establishes” is “one of the greatest political achievements of the Party in the New Era.” The article also includes the phrase in a large headline: “Firmly Supporting the ‘Two Establishes’ and Resolutely Achieving the ‘Two Safeguards'” (坚定拥护’两个确立’坚决做到’两个维护’).
A report on a speech by Chen Xi at the Central Party School mentions the “Two Establishes” in the headline.
The loyalty signaling continues on page nine, a full page of bright orange that pays tribute to the “great transformations” that have happened in China in the “New Era” over the past 10 years.
An article along the right-hand side of the page reads: “Resolutely Maintaining the Authority and Centralized Unified Leadership of the Central Committee.” It oozes about the past 10 years. “The decisive significance of the ‘Two Establishes’ is deeply rooted in people’s hearts,” it says.
Page 9 of today’s People’s Daily, with praise for the “great transformation” of the past 10 years, and two articles mentioning the “Two Establishes.”
Below is an article from Chen Li (陈理 ), the former director of the Academic and Editorial Committee of the Central Institute of Party History and Literature. The article is again classic loyalty signaling. It teems with “greatnesses” — great victories and glory (伟大的胜利和荣光), “great transformations” (伟大变革), “great projects” (伟大工程), and of course the “great rejuvenation” (伟大复兴).
But the key point is that Chen signals loyalty to Xi Jinping, emphasizing the need to “deeply comprehend the decisive significance of the ‘Two Establishes’ and resolutely achieve the ‘Two Safeguards.'” The “Two Safeguards,” or liangge weihu (两个维护), are about the need to 1) safeguard the “core” status of Xi Jinping within the CCP, and 2) to safeguard the centralized authority of the Party. Together, the “Two Establishes” and the “Two Safeguards” lay claim to the basic principles governing China today, centered on Xi himself — and they define the protection of these principles as the chief task of the country.
It looks like Xi Jinping’s train to the foggy heights of CCP discourse is chugging ahead once again.
A long-awaited report released yesterday by the United Nations on the human rights situation in Xinjiang concludes that China’s actions in the region “may constitute international crimes, in particular crimes against humanity.” The report, published along with a strongly-worded “state response” from China, was seen by international human rights groups as a vindication, and as “groundbreaking.” “We can breathe a sigh of relief,” one rights researcher wrote.
How have media inside China responded? With blistering silence.
A search for “Xinjiang human rights report” (新疆人权报告) in the WiseSearch database, which covers hundreds of Chinese-language newspapers as well as related websites and wire services, turns up 101 articles today. But just one is from mainland China. This is a post to Toutiao by an economics professor from Chongqing University of Technology, who dismisses the report as a “smokescreen” with “no credible evidence.”
“Yao Wen Observes the World,” an account from an economics professor in Chongqing with more than 200,000 followers, is one of the only mentions inside China today of the “Xinjiang human rights report.”
“As we all know,” the professor writes, “Xinjiang has developed rapidly and made great achievements in recent years under the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party and the government.”
Surely China’s major news services must have responded? Or People’s Daily Online, perhaps, the website under the CCP’s flagship newspaper? If all else fails we can surely expect a few words — and harsh ones at that — from the ever-faithful Global Times?
Searches for “Xinjiang human rights report” on the Xinhua News Agency websites, People’s Daily Online, China News Service and Global Times Online return no results — though China News Service has “human rights” related results attacking the United States.
Cricket sounds.
The only results returned at all are a pair of articles from the official China News Service, the first about how US hegemony is harming “digital human rights” globally, the second mentioning “the West’s manufacture of rumors about so-called human rights [problems] in Xinjiang.”
It is safe to assume that the Chinese Communist Party is loading its propaganda blunderbuss, and the next 24-48 hours should bring a torrent of commentaries — including one, perhaps, from “Zhong Sheng” (钟声) in the People’s Daily.
But while we wait, it might be a helpful exercise to look at how China has been talking about human rights in recent weeks and months, and what this reveals about how China engages on human rights issues through international institutions like the UN.
The Civil Society Front
As the focus at China News Service suggests, one of China’s primary tactics on human rights is to attack the record of the United States and its allies in the West.
In December last year, state media widely reported on the release by the China Society for Human Rights Studies (中国人权研究会) of a report called “Politicization of Human Rights by the United States Undermines the Foundations of Good Human Rights Governance.” In April this year, another report, “Anti-Asian Racial Discrimination Rises to the Surface to Confirm the Nature of Racist Society in America,” laid out instances of anti-Asian discrimination. The report was once again prepared and publicized by the China Society for Human Rights Studies.
As the focus at China News Service suggests, one of China’s primary tactics on human rights is to attack the record of the United States and its allies in the West.
Most recently, the CCP’s flagship People’s Daily reported along with other state media in early July that the China Society of Human Rights had released a new report called “US Commits Grave Human Rights Violations in the Middle East and Elsewhere.”
Who exactly is this group, the China Society for Human Rights Studies (CSHRS)?
The CSHRS refers to itself as “the largest national non-governmental organization in the field of human rights in China,” and “a national academic organization in the field of human rights in China.” It notes in an introduction on its website that it “enjoys a special consultative status with the United Nations Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), and is a member of the United Nations Conference of Non-Governmental Organizations (CONGO).”
A notice from the OHCHR in 2005 on a visit to China by the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights notes that the commissioner met with “non-governmental organizations” that included the China Society for Human Rights Studies.
The group is “active in human rights studies,” and it “endeavors to popularize human rights knowledge in an effort to raise the awareness of the importance of human rights throughout society.” The introduction also explains that CSHRS funding comes mainly from the China Foundation for Human Rights Development (中国人权发展基金会), or CFHRD.
CFHRD calls itself a “public foundation.” But it also states unambiguously in its formal charter from 1994 that “the business unit in charge is the Propaganda Department of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party (Information Office of the State Council).”
These organizations have sought to present themselves as being broadly representative of an alternative vision of human rights, one supported by Chinese society and to be taken seriously in the field of human rights studies. They have inserted themselves into international human rights governance, trading on their supposed status as “non-governmental organizations.” But their direct connection to the Central Propaganda Department, the heart of the CCP’s perception machine, underscores the fact that they are little more than a civil society front for the CCP’s global human rights agenda, meant to distract from criticisms of China’s human rights abuses.
Since the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party held its Sixth Plenum last November, the “Two Establishes” (两个确立) has been a crucial phrase within the Party’s discourse, reiterating Xi Jinping’s position as the“core” of the leadership, and underscoring his ideas as the bedrock of China’s future. As the 20th National Congress of the CCP nears, we should expect the phrase to soar into the heavens — an indication of Xi’s unassailable position at the top.
But that is not what is happening. And while the language of the CCP is never a perfect mirror, or a clear one, of the state of politics internally, these upset expectations are cause to reconsider. Is it possible that a combination of factors — including, perhaps, a flagging economy, the constant squeeze of a fanatical adherence to “dynamic zero,” and a miscalculated foreign policy of Russian hand-holding — have rubbed the gild off of what until recently seemed a steadily rising cult of personality around Xi?
Whatever the reasons, and whatever the outcome, which should become clear in the coming weeks, the fizzling of the “Two Establishes” in August, just as senior leaders emerged from the annual summer conclave at the beach resort of Beidaihe, seems to signal a turn or detour of some sort.
So what exactly is the phrase doing?
In fact, the only use of the “Two Establishes” in the People’s Daily today comes prominently on the front page. It is a bone-dry account of the development of China’s “high-quality team” of public servants since the 19th National Congress nearly five years ago. These are the selfless bureaucrats, the article tells us, that have formed “the backbone of governance in the New Era.”
The front page of today’s People’s Daily, an article mentioning the “Two Establishes” marked in red.
The article, which appears on the front pages of many of country’s provincial-level Party newspapers today as well, makes standard use of the “Two Establishes” as it closes with a nod to the upcoming congress:
Under the strong leadership of the Central Committee of the CCP with Comrade Xi Jinping as the core, the vast swathe of civil servants firmly defend the “Two Establishes,” resolutely achieve the “Two Safeguards,” remember the fundamental purpose of serving the people wholeheartedly, consciously serving for the prosperity and strength of the country . . . with real actions welcoming the opening of the Party’s 20th National Congress.
This is exactly the sort of signaling of loyalty that in recent months we had come to expect in the pages of the People’s Daily, often in article after article. In June and July, it was not uncommon to have between four and six such articles in a single day — and days without were few and far between.
But the second half of half has been a discourse drought for Xi Jinping when it comes to the “Two Establishes.” With one more edition of the People’s Daily due for the month, here is what the situation looks like for 2022, with numbers of articles plotted on a half-month basis.
The first half of August 2022 saw 34 articles in the People’s Daily using the “Two Establishes.” In the second half? Just 8 so far, with one day to go.
Setting aside the peak of uses for the phrase corresponding to the National People’s Congress in the first half of March, the “Two Establishes” has remained steadily in the 20-30 range since the second half of February. In the second half of August, after starting at the strongest point since the NPC, the phrase has dropped precipitously, returning to the low recorded in early February.
Judging from the trends in CCP discourse, it is difficult not to think that the engine of Xi Jinping’s continued rise has stalled. There is certainly time for a fall rally, and September could accelerate Xi’s race uphill toward a third term. But other scenarios are looking increasingly possible.
Exactly two weeks ago at CMP, we wrote that one crucial term signaling the power and prestige of Xi Jinping, the so-called “Two Establishes,” or liangge queli (两个确立), was trending strongly in the People’s Daily and in Chinese state media generally. The strong trend line for the “Two Establishes,” a phrase that reiterates Xi’s position as the“core” of the CCP, and underscores his ideas as the bedrock of China’s future under the CCP, was to be expected in the discourse build-up toward the 20th National Congress of the CCP, to be held later this fall.
But while extreme caution is warranted when it comes to reading CCP discourse, the trend lines are no longer so clear.
Taking the long view over 2022, the “Two Establishes” seems to be in the midst of an August rise. When we plot the number of articles in the People’s Daily using the term on a half-month basis since January, the following graph results, with 39 articles closing out the first half of August — the same amount recorded for all of June. The huge peak for March corresponds to the National People’s Congress (NPC), which was a major political event, and an opportunity for delegates and other senior officials to butter Xi’s toast with the “Two Establishes.”
SOURCE: The People’s Daily.
But the odd fact is that over the past week, since Xi Jinping re-emerged from the summer conclave at the beach resort of Beidaihe, there have been just two articles in the People’s Daily including the “Two Establishes.”
The first, appearing on page 11 on August 19, was a contribution by Yin Li (尹力), the top CCP leader in Fujian, who praised developments in his own province and took the opportunity to express his loyalty to Xi by saying there was a need for “a deep understanding of the decisive significance of the ‘Two Establishes.’”
Fujian CCP secretary Yin Li mentions the “Two Establishes” in the People’s Daily on August 19, 2022.
The second appears in the People’s Daily today, in a page-nine article by an official from Guangxi. The article closes by mentioning the same exact phrase used by Yin Li.
By the second half of July, it was typical to see 2 articles per day mentioning the “Two Establishes,” and in the first half of this month, that number was up to 2-3 articles per day.
It is still possible that Xi’s numbers for this phrase could pick up pace over the next week. But if they do not, we would need to reckon with a sharp drop on the graph that could bring numbers back to February levels. Given the ever-nearing 20th National Congress, that would be an odd trend line in the official discourse.
As we reported yesterday, the People’s Daily provides a fascinating glimpse into how the Taiwan visit by US House Speaker Nancy Pelosi, though international headline news and a serious point of unhappiness for China, takes third, fourth, or even fifth place against the country’s domestic politics. The top priority in the pages of the Chinese Communist Party’s flagship newspaper is to pave the path for Xi Jinping’s continued elevation at the 20th National Congress in a few months’ time.
Repeating the pattern today, the People’s Daily front page is a one-two-three hit of power signaling for Xi Jinping: a commentary on how the general secretary has led a “great self-revolution” of the Party in a new era of socialism; a Party puff piece about how everything is fine economically thanks to Xi’s “strategizing and raising the flag to point the way”; and a lineup of voices gilding “Xi Jinping Thought” for its coming apotheosis (“A people at the forefront of the times cannot be without theoretical thinking for the times.”)
And Nancy? Once again, she is pushed to page three, where she gets a generous dressing down. The entire page is a register of China’s official pique over the Pelosi visit, most of it drumming over the same points made yesterday.
But the top piece, a compilation of remarks from a grab bag of international voices on the Taiwan question, merits closer scrutiny. It is a textbook example of a key tactic in China’s international communication – the grooming of token voices to relay the CCP’s position on any issue as required, often with quotes that shamelessly mirror official-speak, or are apparently invented out of whole cloth.
Page three of today’s People’s Daily newspaper, with international voices on Pelosi’s Taiwan visit topping the page, at upper-left.
It has long been a priority for the Chinese Communist Party to maintain a network of quotable international sources. These sources often include minor political party leaders, particularly from socialist or other left-leaning parties, as well as scholars and political commentators who appear virtually nowhere outside of Chinese official state media reporting.
Today’s article on page three is called “International Society Fiercely Condemns Pelosi for Hurried Visit to China’s Taiwan Region” (国际社会强烈谴责佩洛西窜访中国台湾地区). So let’s have a look at what this “international society” looks like through the lens of the CCP’s flagship newspaper.
Borrowing Voices
After a brief histrionic summary of the Pelosi visit as a “serious trampling on international law,” the roundup of international voices begins with a hanging, unattributed quote that reads: “Pelosi’s conduct not only damages China-US relations but also amounts to a serious threat to regional and global peace.”
Further down in the article, this quote is attributed to Eduardo Regalado of the International Policy Research Center of Cuba (CIPI), discussed below. Placed at the top, however, the impression is that this comes from United Nations spokesperson Stephane Dujarric, who is mentioned first in the story. During a daily press briefing on August 2, Dujarric more or less dodged a reporter’s question on the Pelosi visit, simply pointing them to the 1971 UN resolution 2758: “I mean, the only thing I will say is that the policy of the United Nations on the issue of . . . on this issue is that we are guided by General Assembly resolution 2758 from 1971 on one China.”
The next remark in the piece comes from Ignacio Martinez, an international relations expert from the National Autonomous University of Mexico. Martinez calls Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan a serious violation of the one-China principle, and says, curiously echoing China’s foreign minister, Wang Yi, that “the United States should never play with fire on the Taiwan issue.”
Right at the start, Martinez illustrates the curious nature of China’s international experts. Search “Ignacio Martinez” and “National Autonomous University of Mexico” and you might expect academic results – published papers, research projects, perhaps even a faculty profile. Instead, all 12 of the links on the first page of results dealing with the same “Ignacio Martinez” are reports from Chinese state media and China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
Ignacio Martinez, identified as an international relations expert from the National Autonomous University of Mexico, is a regular in Chinese official media coverage on a range of issues, his views unerringly positive about China.
In 2016, Martinez “spoke highly of the Sixth Plenary Session of the 18th CPC Central Committee.” In January 2017, he was quoted by the official Xinhua News Agency as saying that Xi Jinping’s New Year’s greeting “reflected China’s confidence and style as a major power.” The report was shared through China Human Rights, the official website of the China Society for Human Rights Studies, a front organization that traces back to the Central Propaganda Department through the website’s publisher, the China Intercontinental Communication Center (CICC).
Last year, Martinez told Xinhua, in a piece published on the Chinese government’s website, that “China will play a crucial role” in sustainable infrastructure, environment, and technology. In March this year, Martinez told the China Daily, published by the government’s Information Office, that “China does not just talk about multilateralism, but has taken real actions.” Three months later, he was interviewed by CGTN and railed against the “so-called democratic criteria” of the United States.
Next in the People’s Daily lineup to represent “international society” is José Luis Centella, the president of the Communist Party of Spain, who says (though quotation marks are never used) that Pelosi’s “provocative behavior” (挑衅行为) in visiting Taiwan exposes “the consistent hegemonic thinking of the United States in international relations.”
Centella, too, is no freshman when it comes to amplifying positive views of China’s leadership. Commanding virtually no attention in the international media, he is a regular in China’s state media. Like many leaders of minor political parties, Centella has obliged China by participating in its regular “political parties summit,” an opportunity for the CCP to develop contacts – and external propaganda sources – through a sub-national level exchange. He was among the “many political leaders” in July 2021 who “lauded the governing experience” of the CCP, according to an article published online by the State Council Information Office.
In a video produced by GLOBALink, Xinhua News Agency’s global news service, Centenella was among several party leaders praising China to celebrate the centennial of the CCP. And most recently — before his Pelosi potshot in the People’s Daily — he appeared in a Xinhua special this week in which “political parties of various countries” opposed the House Speaker’s visit.
Centenella appears in a GLOBALink video celebrating the 100th anniversary of the CCP.
The pattern persists when we come to Eduardo Regalado of the International Policy Research Center of Cuba (CIPI), whose unattributed quote tops today’s People’s Daily article.
In October 2021, marking the 50th anniversary of the PRC taking its seat at the United Nations, Regalado told Xinhua that “China is sending a strong message to the international community about the importance of multilateralism and international cooperation.” In January this year, ahead of the Beijing Winter Olympics, Regalado heaped praise on the CCP as he spoke to the China Daily, saying that the “leadership and role of the Communist Party of China has been fundamental for the development of the Chinese society in the sports arena and the country as a whole.”
In May, Regalado was a guest at the Chinese Embassy in Cuba as it celebrated “International Chinese Language Day 2022.” Just days earlier, he was quoted by Xinhua stressing that China is “fundamental to the development of Caribbean countries in the coming years” – the article appearing also on the news agency’s Spanish-language channel.
Regalado has published scholarship outside the fishbowl of China’s external propaganda apparatus. His book China and its International Relations (China y sus relaciones internacionales), a collection of writings on China’s foreign policy, was published in April 2021. But his penchant for sounding off with positivity about any and every event that China hosts, and every news event that troubles its leaders, can be astonishing.
In November last year, as Xinhua cast about for an expert to praise the 4th China International Import Expo (CIIE) about to open in Shanghai, the Cuban scholar, presumably not attending, was happy to oblige with all the gusto of a marketing agency: “This fair will be a fundamental platform for exhibitors, business people, and government officials from the entire world to come together,” he said.
Pluck any personality out of today’s People’s Daily story and you will find similar paper trails across Chinese state media. There is Luciana Santos, chairwoman of the Brazilian Communist Party, who tells us that “Pelosi ignored repeated serious warnings from China.” You can find her on China National Radio (CNR) praising China’s “construction of modern socialism led by the CCP.” Or on Xinhua’s GLOBALink, insisting that “China would not see the tremendous growth and development achieved in society today without the Communist Party of China.”
There is Bambang Suryono, chairman of the Asia Innovation Study Center, an Indonesian think tank, whose state media credits are a mile long. And Ghassan Youssef, a Syrian political analyst and frequent state media soundbiter, who told Xinhua late last year that China’s economic achievements in Xinjiang are “undeniable,” and that the US is manipulating public opinion about the region for “political goals.”
None of this is to say there are no real voices in the world that oppose Pelosi’s Taiwan visit for reasons strategic, political, or personal. Real voices, however, are not the stuff external propaganda is made of. China’s leaders grumble that they cannot control the stage, that they lack sufficient “discourse power” to hold the realm of ideas. But shadow puppetry — that they can do.
On a day when US House Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan is headline news all over the world, with commentators everywhere speculating on how China will react, it might seem strange that the story does not top the front page of the Chinese Communist Party’s flagship People’s Daily.
In fact, the first article on the paper’s front page to mention Pelosi at all is tucked away in the bottom-right corner, fifth in order of importance – after an article about Xi Jinping’s recent meeting with provincial officials; an article about scientific farming techniques used in Jilin province; an article about provincial leaders studying the spirit of an “important speech” (重要讲话) by Xi; and an article about the critical importance of “united front work.”
Pelosi touching down in Taiwan has brought full-throated condemnation from China along with threats of retaliation. Is this story really of secondary importance to farming techniques in China’s northeast?
Mention of a visit to Taiwan by US House Speaker Nancy Pelosi is placed in the bottom right-hand corner of today’s People’s Daily newspaper.
Things become clearer when we understand that these stories about provincial leaders and farming techniques are ultimately stories about the most important matter before the country – the power and prestige of its top leader, Xi Jinping, and his elevation at the upcoming 20th National Congress of the CCP.
Even what some are calling the Fourth Taiwan Strait Crisis could not break through the rigidity of purpose at the People’s Daily.
The article on farming? A nod to Xi Jinping’s inspection there two years ago, and a testament to the miracles that can happen when “the wishes of the general secretary are borne in mind.” The articles on the meetings of provincial leaders? Both emphasize Xi’s pre-eminence, the first concluding: “Let us more firmly unite around the Central Committee with Xi Jinping as the core, upholding Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics as our guide.”
Recognize the power dynamics at play behind the scenes in China and you’ll understand one of the most important factors that will guide China’s leadership in responding to Pelosi’s visit in the coming weeks.
A Parade of Official Statements
So how has the People’s Daily covered the Pelosi story? The lineup in the newspaper today is a rather typical gathering of condemnations from various ministries and committees, all following a commentary from the paper (本报评论员) that relays the view of the leadership.
The commentary is called “The Determination of the Chinese government and the Chinese People to Realize the Reunification of the Motherland is Rock-solid” (中国政府和中国人民实现祖国统一的决心坚如磐石). It begins with a laundry list of solemn violations and outrages that are echoed in the pieces that come after, on page three of the newspaper:
For US House Speaker Pelosi to visit China’s Taiwan region in spite of China’s strong opposition and serious representations seriously violates the one-China principle and the stipulations of the three joint communiqués between China and the US, and has a serious impact on the political foundation of US-China relations. [It] is a serious violation of China’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, a serious breach of peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait, and sends a gravely wrong signal to the separatist forces of ‘Taiwan independence.’
After running through China’s official position on the matter, the commentary addresses reunification as an inevitable matter of the public will. “Public opinion cannot be violated, and the great trend cannot be turned back,” it says. “The motherland must be unified, and it will be unified.”
A notice printed below the commentary then points readers to page three of today’s newspaper and five separate statements. These are from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA); the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress; the CCP’s Taiwan Work Office; the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC); and the Ministry of National Defense.
The sixth Taiwan-related story on page three is a statement about planned “joint military operations” (联合军事行动).
At the top of page three is the Xinhua release on the response from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, emphasizing that “Taiwan is an inseparable part of Chinese territory,” and that “the government of the People’s Republic of China is the only legitimate government representing all of China.” The release begins with a stern condemnation of Pelosi’s visit, which it labels a “violation of the one-China principle” (一个中国原则):
On January 2, 2012, U.S. Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi visited Taiwan despite China’s strong opposition and solemn representations. It sends a serious wrong signal to the separatist forces of ‘Taiwan independence’ (“台独”分裂势力). China resolutely opposes and severely condemns this, and has made serious representations and strong protests to the US side.
The statement is stacked with formalized language familiar to anyone who has observed China’s protestations over the Taiwan issue through the years. Matters concerning Taiwan are China’s internal affairs (中国内政), in which the US has no right to interfere. The US must desist from playing the “Taiwan card” (台湾牌), and “using Taiwan to control China” (以台制华). Taiwan is of course referred to as “China’s Taiwan region” (中国台湾地区). The word “separatist forces” (分裂势力) is used repeatedly in the release.
Page three of today’s People’s Daily, with five statements on Pelosi’s Taiwan visit and one announcement of military exercises.
Directly below the MOFA-related story is a Xinhua transcript of a “talk” by a spokesperson from the Standing Committee of China’s National People’s Congress (NPC) “on behalf of the NPC Standing Committee” that again registers China’s opposition to Pelosi’s visit – making largely the same points as the first piece.
But the NPC Standing Committee statement also suggests more clearly that the Pelosi visit is the latest in a series of actions that go against the “solemn commitments” (郑重承诺) the US has made to China on Taiwan. “In its actions,” the statement says, “[the US] has continued to enhance substantive relations and official contacts between the United States and Taiwan, connived to support the separatist forces of ‘Taiwan independence,’ and engaged in ‘controlling China with Taiwan.’”
The third article in the page three series today is the statement, again released by Xinhua, from the Taiwan Work Office of the CCP Central Committee. The article, which begins by calling Pelosi’s visit “an escalation of Taiwan-US collusion, its nature terrible and its consequences dire,” focuses more than the other two pieces on the issue of reunification. Twice the article references Xi Jinping’s notion of the “great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation.” First, it accuses the US of “obstructing the complete reunification of China and the rejuvenation of the Chinese nation,” Pelosi’s visit being the latest and most egregious example. Second, it calls “Taiwan separatism” the greatest obstacle to the “reunification of the motherland” (祖国统一), and the “hidden danger for national rejuvenation” (民族复兴的严重隐患).
The Taiwan Work Office article concludes:
We urge the US side to look at the historical details of the Taiwan issue, recognizing the fact that both sides of the Taiwan Strait belong to one China, and to take practical action to abide by the one-China principle and fulfill the three US-China joint communiqués – not sliding further and further down the wrong path.
The fourth article on page three of the People’s Daily today is the statement from the Foreign Affairs Committee of the National Committee of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (全国政协外事委员会). Like the others, it voices “strong condemnation” (强烈谴责) of Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan, and emphasizes the inviolability of the one-China principle. Like the MOFA statement, it warns against “underestimating” the determination of the Chinese people on this issue: “No one should underestimate the strong determination, the firm will, and the powerful ability of the Chinese people to defend national sovereignty and territorial integrity!”
Fifth comes the statement from China’s Ministry of National Defense (国防部) that again voices “strong condemnation” and “firm opposition” (坚决反对) to the Pelosi visit. The statement reads:
China has repeatedly made clear the serious consequences of the visit to Taiwan, but Pelosi has knowingly and maliciously provoked and created a crisis, seriously violating the one-China principle and the provisions of the three US-China joint communiqués, seriously impacting the political foundation of Sino-U.S. relations, and seriously damaging the relationship between the two countries.
The statement says that the People’s Liberation Army is now in “high readiness” (高度戒备), and that it plans “a series of targeted military operations to counteract [the move], and defend national sovereignty and territorial integrity.”
Last, but certainly not least, comes the statement about “joint military operations” that are reportedly underway “around the island of Taiwan.” “The actions,” the release says, “are a serious deterrent against recent negative and escalating moves by the US on the Taiwan issue.”
As for the rest of the newspaper, there are two full pages on the glories of the “New Era.” There is, in “important news,” an entire page about “Studying Xi Jinping” (学习习近平). When it comes to what, or who, amounts to news – this is not a time for doubt, or for questions.
In a short question-and-answer transcript on Thursday, the Cyberspace Administration of China (CAC), the country’s chief internet monitoring and control agency, answered a number of basic questions about its action against the Chinese vehicle-for-hire company Didi, which included a fine of 1.2 billion dollars. Left conspicuously unanswered by the transcript, and the flood of Chinese media coverage of the Didi case, however, is the exact nature of the company’s alleged national security violations.
The CAC said it found “egregious” violations of data security laws relating to the collection and handling of personal customer data in its investigation of Didi, announced in July last year, just days after the company’s New York IPO. The company had illegally gathered user data – including location and facial recognition data as well as mobile phone camera data — since 2015, the CAC said.
As some analysts have noted, one curious aspect of the Didi decision is that two of the three laws the company is said to have violated actually took effect after the launch of the investigation in early July 2021. These are the Data Security Law (数据安全法), which took effect on September 1, 2021, and the Personal Information Protection Law (个人信息保护法), which did not take effect until November 2021. The CAC has also said that Didi violated the 2017 Cybersecurity Law (网络安全法).
But another point of curiosity in the decision against Didi is the question of national security violations. While the original grounds for the investigation centered on “national security and the public interest,” the CAC has not provided details about the exact nature of the government’s national security concerns.
On this issue, the agency’s question-and-answer transcript reads:
Previously, a cybersecurity review also found that certain data processing activities at Didi seriously impacted national security, and that it had refused to comply with the clear requirements of regulatory authorities, openly assenting but quietly violating, as well as other violations of laws and regulations such as the malicious evasion of oversight. The illegal and non-compliant operations of Didi have posed serious security risks to the security of critical national information infrastructure and data security.
The justification for silence on the nature of Didi’s national security violations is, well, national security. “As these relate to national security, they are not disclosed in accordance with the law,” the transcript said.
