In the midst of more pressing stories, including a wave of Covid lockdowns and an earthquake in Sichuan, a government notice issued over the weekend on “the popularization of science,” or kepu (科普),  may not command attention. But it is the latest sign of how politics and ideology have in recent years crept back into the heart of all endeavors in China.

Released by the general offices of the CCP Central Committee and the State Council, the notice encourages the spread of knowledge about science and technology, both in the government and in the wider population, in the interest of establishing a firm foundation for innovation and development. It speaks of “advocating the spirit of science,” and “promoting scientific approaches to activities,” and it signals concern over the fact that “the supply of high-quality science products and services remains insufficient.”

But science quickly moves aside for politics.

Point one in “General Requirements” opens with a clear declaration that the guiding ideology for science popularization is the top leader’s banner phrase, “Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for the New Era” (习近平新时代中国特色社会主义思想). The second point then addresses concrete “work demands”:

[Work must] adhere to the leadership of the Party, implementing the leadership of the Party through the whole process of science popularization, highlighting the political properties of science popularization, strengthening the leadership of values, practicing socialist core values, and vigorously promoting the spirit of science and the spirit of the scientist.

This talk of the “political properties” (政治属性) of science popularization is a salient reminder that through much of its history, particularly in the pre-reform period, the CCP has regarded science on the one hand as both a crucial contributor to national development, supporting economic growth and self-reliance, and on the other as intimately inter braided with political claims to truth as a source of political power.

Even as Xi Jinping has re-emphasized the need for self-reliance in science and technology, and has made innovation a key buzzword, his rule has reconsolidated Party control over the sciences. In science education, as in other fields, “ideological and political education,” or sixiang zhengzhi jiaoyu (思想政治教育) — sizheng (思政) for short — has been redoubled.

Biology textbooks in China now explicitly link the study of the subject to patriotic goals and love of the CCP. One textbook encourages an attitude of thankfulness and indebtedness, concluding: “Inspiring and leading students to use scientific knowledge to repay the kindness of the mother country is the best means of passing on red genes.”

The phrase “red genes,” or hongse jiyin (红色基因), refers to the revolutionary spirit and history of the CCP as a form of political and cultural inheritance, the celebration of which is a means of consolidating the Party’s position within the national identity and thereby constructing the legitimacy of the regime.

Point 25 of the notice released on September 4 is crystal clear about the implications of science popularization for public opinion, the control of which the CCP regards as essential to maintaining political stability. The language emphasizes the need to “strengthen public opinion channeling in the field of science popularization,” “adhering to the correct political positions, and strengthening the construction and supervision of public opinion positions in science popularization.”

Earlier this week, CMP noted the unusual downward trajectory of a key buzzword signaling the power of Xi Jinping, the “Two Establishes” (两个确立), which seemed to indicate at least a momentary stall in the engine of Xi’s rise in the discourse of the CCP. In today’s People’s Daily, just days after the announcement of October 16 as the probable date of the 20^th National Congress, we can clearly see that engine springing back to life.

The “Two Establishes” phrase, which has been a crucial power indicator since the 6^th Plenum in November last year — underscoring the unassailable roles of Xi as the Party’s “core” and his “thought” as the guiding ideology — appears in five articles in the Party’s flagship newspaper today.

Two of these articles appear on the front page. The first is a love song for the People’s Liberation Army on the occasion of its 95^th anniversary, emphasizing national security, and closing with a call to “unite more closely around the Central Committee of the CCP with Comrade Xi Jinping as the core, deeply understanding the decisive significance of the ‘Two Establishes.'”

The second is about the publication of the fourth edition of Xi Jinping’s The Governance of China (习近平谈治国理政). The article’s headline explains that Wang Huning (王沪宁), secretary of the CCP’s Secretariat, emphasized the need to “deeply study” Xi’s book, but also to “bring the study, propagation and implementation of Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era to a deeper level.”

The Wang Huning article is a clear act of loyalty signaling, mentioning the “Two Establishes” and elevating Xi Jinping’s so-called “banner term,” or qizhiyu (旗帜语), the phrase that encompasses his legacy and claim to power. In all likelihood, the banner term will be shortened during the 20^th National Congress from the current unwieldy 16-character version (习近平新时代中国特色社会主义思想) to the more potent five-character “Xi Jinping Thought” (习近平思想).

Another important article printed on page two reports on the opening ceremony for the fall study term at the Central Party School, the CCP’s top institution for the training of Party cadres. The opening address was delivered by Chen Xi (陈希), the current head of the CCP’s Organization Department, who reportedly emphasized that the “Two Establishes” is “one of the greatest political achievements of the Party in the New Era.” The article also includes the phrase in a large headline: “Firmly Supporting the ‘Two Establishes’ and Resolutely Achieving the ‘Two Safeguards'” (坚定拥护’两个确立’坚决做到’两个维护’).

The loyalty signaling continues on page nine, a full page of bright orange that pays tribute to the “great transformations” that have happened in China in the “New Era” over the past 10 years.

An article along the right-hand side of the page reads: “Resolutely Maintaining the Authority and Centralized Unified Leadership of the Central Committee.” It oozes about the past 10 years. “The decisive significance of the ‘Two Establishes’ is deeply rooted in people’s hearts,” it says.

Below is an article from Chen Li (陈理 ), the former director of the Academic and Editorial Committee of the Central Institute of Party History and Literature. The article is again classic loyalty signaling. It teems with “greatnesses” — great victories and glory (伟大的胜利和荣光), “great transformations” (伟大变革), “great projects” (伟大工程), and of course the “great rejuvenation” (伟大复兴).

But the key point is that Chen signals loyalty to Xi Jinping, emphasizing the need to “deeply comprehend the decisive significance of the ‘Two Establishes’ and resolutely achieve the ‘Two Safeguards.'”  The “Two Safeguards,” or liangge weihu (两个维护), are about the need to 1) safeguard the “core” status of Xi Jinping within the CCP, and 2) to safeguard the centralized authority of the Party. Together, the “Two Establishes” and the “Two Safeguards” lay claim to the basic principles governing China today, centered on Xi himself — and they define the protection of these principles as the chief task of the country.

It looks like Xi Jinping’s train to the foggy heights of CCP discourse is chugging ahead once again.

Since the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party held its Sixth Plenum last November, the “Two Establishes” (两个确立) has been a crucial phrase within the Party’s discourse, reiterating Xi Jinping’s position as the“core” of the leadership, and underscoring his ideas as the bedrock of China’s future. As the 20^th National Congress of the CCP nears, we should expect the phrase to soar into the heavens — an indication of Xi’s unassailable position at the top.

But that is not what is happening. And while the language of the CCP is never a perfect mirror, or a clear one, of the state of politics internally, these upset expectations are cause to reconsider. Is it possible that a combination of factors — including, perhaps, a flagging economy, the constant squeeze of a fanatical adherence to “dynamic zero,” and a miscalculated foreign policy of Russian hand-holding — have rubbed the gild off of what until recently seemed a steadily rising cult of personality around Xi?

Whatever the reasons, and whatever the outcome, which should become clear in the coming weeks, the fizzling of the “Two Establishes” in August, just as senior leaders emerged from the annual summer conclave at the beach resort of Beidaihe, seems to signal a turn or detour of some sort.

So what exactly is the phrase doing?

In fact, the only use of the “Two Establishes” in the People’s Daily today comes prominently on the front page. It is a bone-dry account of the development of China’s “high-quality team” of public servants since the 19^th National Congress nearly five years ago. These are the selfless bureaucrats, the article tells us, that have formed “the backbone of governance in the New Era.”

The article, which appears on the front pages of many of country’s provincial-level Party newspapers today as well, makes standard use of the “Two Establishes” as it closes with a nod to the upcoming congress:

Under the strong leadership of the Central Committee of the CCP with Comrade Xi Jinping as the core, the vast swathe of civil servants firmly defend the “Two Establishes,” resolutely achieve the “Two Safeguards,” remember the fundamental purpose of serving the people wholeheartedly, consciously serving for the prosperity and strength of the country . . . with real actions welcoming the opening of the Party’s 20th National Congress.

This is exactly the sort of signaling of loyalty that in recent months we had come to expect in the pages of the People’s Daily, often in article after article. In June and July, it was not uncommon to have between four and six such articles in a single day — and days without were few and far between.

But the second half of half has been a discourse drought for Xi Jinping when it comes to the “Two Establishes.” With one more edition of the People’s Daily due for the month, here is what the situation looks like for 2022, with numbers of articles plotted on a half-month basis.

Setting aside the peak of uses for the phrase corresponding to the National People’s Congress in the first half of March, the “Two Establishes” has remained steadily in the 20-30 range since the second half of February. In the second half of August, after starting at the strongest point since the NPC, the phrase has dropped precipitously, returning to the low recorded in early February.

Judging from the trends in CCP discourse, it is difficult not to think that the engine of Xi Jinping’s continued rise has stalled. There is certainly time for a fall rally, and September could accelerate Xi’s race uphill toward a third term. But other scenarios are looking increasingly possible.

Exactly two weeks ago at CMP, we wrote that one crucial term signaling the power and prestige of Xi Jinping, the so-called “Two Establishes,” or liangge queli (两个确立), was trending strongly in the People’s Daily and in Chinese state media generally. The strong trend line for the “Two Establishes,” a phrase that reiterates Xi’s position as the “core” of the CCP, and underscores his ideas as the bedrock of China’s future under the CCP, was to be expected in the discourse build-up toward the 20^th National Congress of the CCP, to be held later this fall.

But while extreme caution is warranted when it comes to reading CCP discourse, the trend lines are no longer so clear.

Taking the long view over 2022, the “Two Establishes” seems to be in the midst of an August rise. When we plot the number of articles in the People’s Daily using the term on a half-month basis since January, the following graph results, with 39 articles closing out the first half of August — the same amount recorded for all of June. The huge peak for March corresponds to the National People’s Congress (NPC), which was a major political event, and an opportunity for delegates and other senior officials to butter Xi’s toast with the “Two Establishes.”

But the odd fact is that over the past week, since Xi Jinping re-emerged from the summer conclave at the beach resort of Beidaihe, there have been just two articles in the People’s Daily including the “Two Establishes.”

The first, appearing on page 11 on August 19, was a contribution by Yin Li (尹力), the top CCP leader in Fujian, who praised developments in his own province and took the opportunity to express his loyalty to Xi by saying there was a need for “a deep understanding of the decisive significance of the ‘Two Establishes.’”

The second appears in the People’s Daily today, in a page-nine article by an official from Guangxi. The article closes by mentioning the same exact phrase used by Yin Li.

By the second half of July, it was typical to see 2 articles per day mentioning the “Two Establishes,” and in the first half of this month, that number was up to 2-3 articles per day.

It is still possible that Xi’s numbers for this phrase could pick up pace over the next week. But if they do not, we would need to reckon with a sharp drop on the graph that could bring numbers back to February levels. Given the ever-nearing 20^th National Congress, that would be an odd trend line in the official discourse.

Stay tuned!

On a day when US House Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan is headline news all over the world, with commentators everywhere speculating on how China will react, it might seem strange that the story does not top the front page of the Chinese Communist Party’s flagship People’s Daily.

In fact, the first article on the paper’s front page to mention Pelosi at all is tucked away in the bottom-right corner, fifth in order of importance – after an article about Xi Jinping’s recent meeting with provincial officials; an article about scientific farming techniques used in Jilin province; an article about provincial leaders studying the spirit of an “important speech” (重要讲话) by Xi; and an article about the critical importance of “united front work.”

Pelosi touching down in Taiwan has brought full-throated condemnation from China along with threats of retaliation. Is this story really of secondary importance to farming techniques in China’s northeast?

Things become clearer when we understand that these stories about provincial leaders and farming techniques are ultimately stories about the most important matter before the country  – the power and prestige of its top leader, Xi Jinping, and his elevation at the upcoming 20^th National Congress of the CCP.

Even what some are calling the Fourth Taiwan Strait Crisis could not break through the rigidity of purpose at the People’s Daily.

The article on farming? A nod to Xi Jinping’s inspection there two years ago, and a testament to the miracles that can happen when “the wishes of the general secretary are borne in mind.” The articles on the meetings of provincial leaders? Both emphasize Xi’s pre-eminence, the first concluding: “Let us more firmly unite around the Central Committee with Xi Jinping as the core, upholding Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics as our guide.”

Recognize the power dynamics at play behind the scenes in China and you’ll understand one of the most important factors that will guide China’s leadership in responding to Pelosi’s visit in the coming weeks.

A Parade of Official Statements

So how has the People’s Daily covered the Pelosi story? The lineup in the newspaper today is a rather typical gathering of condemnations from various ministries and committees, all following a commentary from the paper (本报评论员) that relays the view of the leadership.

The commentary is called “The Determination of the Chinese government and the Chinese People to Realize the Reunification of the Motherland is Rock-solid” (中国政府和中国人民实现祖国统一的决心坚如磐石). It begins with a laundry list of solemn violations and outrages that are echoed in the pieces that come after, on page three of the newspaper:

For US House Speaker Pelosi to visit China’s Taiwan region in spite of China’s strong opposition and serious representations seriously violates the one-China principle and the stipulations of the three joint communiqués between China and the US, and has a serious impact on the political foundation of US-China relations. [It] is a serious violation of China’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, a serious breach of peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait, and sends a gravely wrong signal to the separatist forces of ‘Taiwan independence.’

After running through China’s official position on the matter, the commentary addresses reunification as an inevitable matter of the public will. “Public opinion cannot be violated, and the great trend cannot be turned back,” it says. “The motherland must be unified, and it will be unified.”

A notice printed below the commentary then points readers to page three of today’s newspaper and five separate statements. These are from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA); the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress; the CCP’s Taiwan Work Office; the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC); and the Ministry of National Defense.

The sixth Taiwan-related story on page three is a statement about planned “joint military operations” (联合军事行动).

At the top of page three is the Xinhua release on the response from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, emphasizing that “Taiwan is an inseparable part of Chinese territory,” and that “the government of the People’s Republic of China is the only legitimate government representing all of China.” The release begins with a stern condemnation of Pelosi’s visit, which it labels a “violation of the one-China principle” (一个中国原则):

On January 2, 2012, U.S. Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi visited Taiwan despite China’s strong opposition and solemn representations. It sends a serious wrong signal to the separatist forces of ‘Taiwan independence’ (“台独”分裂势力). China resolutely opposes and severely condemns this, and has made serious representations and strong protests to the US side.

The statement is stacked with formalized language familiar to anyone who has observed China’s protestations over the Taiwan issue through the years. Matters concerning Taiwan are China’s internal affairs (中国内政), in which the US has no right to interfere. The US must desist from playing the “Taiwan card” (台湾牌), and “using Taiwan to control China” (以台制华). Taiwan is of course referred to as “China’s Taiwan region” (中国台湾地区). The word “separatist forces” (分裂势力) is used repeatedly in the release.

Directly below the MOFA-related story is a Xinhua transcript of a “talk” by a spokesperson from the Standing Committee of China’s National People’s Congress (NPC) “on behalf of the NPC Standing Committee” that again registers China’s opposition to Pelosi’s visit – making largely the same points as the first piece.

But the NPC Standing Committee statement also suggests more clearly that the Pelosi visit is the latest in a series of actions that go against the “solemn commitments” (郑重承诺) the US has made to China on Taiwan. “In its actions,” the statement says, “[the US] has continued to enhance substantive relations and official contacts between the United States and Taiwan, connived to support the separatist forces of ‘Taiwan independence,’ and engaged in ‘controlling China with Taiwan.’”

The third article in the page three series today is the statement, again released by Xinhua, from the Taiwan Work Office of the CCP Central Committee. The article, which begins by calling Pelosi’s visit “an escalation of Taiwan-US collusion, its nature terrible and its consequences dire,” focuses more than the other two pieces on the issue of reunification. Twice the article references Xi Jinping’s notion of the “great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation.” First, it accuses the US of “obstructing the complete reunification of China and the rejuvenation of the Chinese nation,” Pelosi’s visit being the latest and most egregious example. Second, it calls “Taiwan separatism” the greatest obstacle to the “reunification of the motherland” (祖国统一),  and the “hidden danger for national rejuvenation” (民族复兴的严重隐患).

The Taiwan Work Office article concludes:

We urge the US side to look at the historical details of the Taiwan issue, recognizing the fact that both sides of the Taiwan Strait belong to one China, and to take practical action to abide by the one-China principle and fulfill the three US-China joint communiqués – not sliding further and further down the wrong path.

The fourth article on page three of the People’s Daily today is the statement from the Foreign Affairs Committee of the National Committee of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (全国政协外事委员会). Like the others, it voices “strong condemnation” (强烈谴责) of Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan, and emphasizes the inviolability of the one-China principle. Like the MOFA statement, it warns against “underestimating” the determination of the Chinese people on this issue: “No one should underestimate the strong determination, the firm will, and the powerful ability of the Chinese people to defend national sovereignty and territorial integrity!”

Fifth comes the statement from China’s Ministry of National Defense (国防部) that again voices “strong condemnation” and “firm opposition” (坚决反对) to the Pelosi visit. The statement reads:

China has repeatedly made clear the serious consequences of the visit to Taiwan, but Pelosi has knowingly and maliciously provoked and created a crisis, seriously violating the one-China principle and the provisions of the three US-China joint communiqués, seriously impacting the political foundation of Sino-U.S. relations, and seriously damaging the relationship between the two countries.

The statement says that the People’s Liberation Army is now in “high readiness” (高度戒备), and that it plans “a series of targeted military operations to counteract [the move], and defend national sovereignty and territorial integrity.”

Last, but certainly not least, comes the statement about “joint military operations” that are reportedly underway “around the island of Taiwan.” “The actions,” the release says, “are a serious deterrent against recent negative and escalating moves by the US on the Taiwan issue.”

As for the rest of the newspaper, there are two full pages on the glories of the “New Era.” There is, in “important news,” an entire page about “Studying Xi Jinping” (学习习近平). When it comes to what, or who, amounts to news – this is not a time for doubt, or for questions.