The following post by a Beijing-based accountant with 26,000 Weibo followers, was deleted from Sina Weibo on July 15, 2012. The post relates a conversation over lunch in which Chinese diners come to the conclusion that China in fact is the country that most discriminates against China — which is to say, against Chinese. [More on deleted posts at the WeiboScope Search, by the Journalism and Media Studies Centre].

When we were eating lunch, everyone was talking about which country discriminates most against China. From that point on the list filled up with [examples] of [how China itself is] the most discriminatory place in the world for Chinese: preventing Chinese from freely coming and going, limiting Chinese in purchasing homes, preventing Chinese from buying cars, limiting Chinese children in going freely to school, forcing Chinese to pay higher taxes, making Chinese pay higher prices for fuel, and higher prices for internet access, giving Chinese hogwash oil [to eat] and Mengniu milk powder [to drink], intruding on the rights of Chinese to have elections . . . After that, no one had anything else to say.

The original Chinese post follows:

中午吃饭，大家讨论哪个国家最排华？于是开始列举，全世界最排华的地方在哪里：限制华人自由出入、限制华人买房、限制华人买车、限制华人子女自由上学、强迫华人缴纳更高的税、限制华人购买更高价的油价、缴纳更贵的网费、给华人吃地沟油蒙牛奶粉，剥夺华人选举权……最后，所有人都不说话了（转发）

NOTE: All posts to The Anti-Social List are listed as “permission denied” in the Sina Weibo API, which means they were deleted by Weibo managers, not by users themselves.

From July 2 to July 3, the residents of the city of Shifang in China’s western Sichuan province staged protests to oppose a molybdenum-cooper project they feared would poison their community. The protests were marked by fierce conflict, and the government exercised strict controls over news reporting. Meanwhile, one side of the net was left open for social media — and chatter about Shifang was lively on platforms like Sina Weibo.
Websites and print media are tightly controlled
I have previously used the term “Control 2.0” to describe the way information and news controls have evolved in China over the past few years. Since President Hu Jintao articulated a new set of media policies in 2008, authorities at various levels in China have often used online official state media like People’s Daily Online and Xinhua Online to report sudden-breaking incidents at the earliest moment possible (第一时间). The idea is to seize the opportunity, and the power, to set the agenda.
This practice, which in Hu Jintao’s 2008 formulation is called “channeling public opinion,” or yindao yulun (引导舆论), has sometimes been informally called “grabbing the megaphone” (抢喇叭).
In the early stages of the Shifang incident, these two aforementioned websites jumped into action. On the afternoon of July 2, they related an open letter from the Shifang city government announcing that a so-called “mass incident”, or quntixing shijian (群体性事件), had occurred. Later in the evening they cited a notice from the Shifang government saying that local police had “used tear gas and stun grenades to disperse over-excited crowds.”
This was the earliest and most important official news on the story, and it was re-posted by scores of websites. But media were quickly muzzled by a ban from the Central Propaganda Department.

[ABOVE: An image shared through Chinese social media this month shows riot police gathering in the streets of Shifang.]
On the afternoon of July 3, the local government in Shifang suddenly announced that the molybdenum-copper project would be terminated. Xinhua Online and People’s Daily Online did not run this important bit of news — quite different from what we saw with the Dalian PX protests in August last year, when official media did report news of the suspension of that PX project. Instead, these official news sites simply relayed bits of information from the local government in Shifang.
What’s more, reports on Shifang from the previous few days were suddenly removed from the web. Commercial internet portals sat on their hands. The Shifang story could not be found in prominent sections of these sites, and no special aggregation pages were put together, as is often done for major news stories.
Newspapers, television and other traditional media were all silent. The official People’s Daily newspaper and China Central Television, central Party media that were relatively vocal over the high-speed rail collision in July 2011, the Dalian PX protests in August 2011 (reporting the suspension of the project, not the protests themselves) and the Wukan incident last fall, said not a word about Shifang.
Searching the WiseNews database of Chinese language newspapers, I found that on July 3, among hundreds of mainland papers, only Shanghai’s Oriental Morning Post and the Global Times, a spin-off of the People’s Daily, made any mention of the protests in Shifang.
On July 4, a small number of newspapers reported the termination of the molybdenum-copper project in Shifang, most in the securities section (the project concerned the fortunes of the listed company Sichuan Hongda Co. Ltd.). But no mention was made of the protests.
An editorial on the July 4 edition of China Youth Daily, a newspaper published by the Chinese Communist Youth League, alluded to the Shifang incident, but didn’t even mention the city by name. The editorial was called, “There Are Some Things You Cannot Pretend Not to See” (有些事，无法假装看不见)：

. . . There are no words in the print media, no images on television. . . Sometimes the boisterous diversity and confusion of the Weibo entirely constitutes a different world of public opinion from those traditional media that pretend not to see in the face of objective truth. And here, sometimes, one can sense also two entirely different China’s.

Newspapers and news websites could not “take to the highway”, reporting directly on Shifang. But they did try taking the back roads. On July 3 and 4 a number of newspapers and more than 200 websites reported that the Shifang incident had pushed a sudden rise in the stock of a certain biotech company — because the Capsaicin manufactured by the company was used in the production of tear gas.
Weibo becomes the chief communication channel
In the midst of the Shifang incident, Chinese microblogs became a boisterous place. Unlike the case with the Wukan incident last year, in which “Wukan” became a sensitive keyword, the term “Shifang” was left alone. Posts about the Shifang incident were not entirely restricted, and search functions on the Sina Weibo platform were not shut down.

[ABOVE: An image shared through Chinese social media this month shows a protester in Shifang kneeling before a line of riot police.]
According to my own searches, between July 1 and July 4 (at around 8pm), there were around 5.25 million posts on Sina Weibo containing “Shifang”. Of these about 400,000 included images and close to 10,000 included video. The vast majority of these had to do directly with the Shifang protests. Searching the exact same period last year, I found that there were only 300 posts in total containing “Shifang” on Sina Weibo.
We can break the Shifang posts on Weibo into the following numbers:

ORIGINAL POSTS WITH IMAGES
July 2: 155
July 3: 11,674
July 4: 3,296
ORIGINAL POSTS WITH VIDEO
July 2: 8
July 3: 194
July 4: 92

Original materials provided by people on the scene sketched out the general picture of what was happening in Shifang. The millions of reposts and comments on Sina Weibo from across the country were based on these materials. And many of the pictures and video on Weibo were picked up and used by Hong Kong and international media.
In fact, a decent portion of the image files shared on Sina Weibo were text shared in image form. Owing to limits in the character length of microblog posts — and of course also to restrictions on content on websites — many longer accounts or comments about Shifang were shared as images. These included essays on Shifang by well-known writers and commentators such as Han Han (韩寒), Li Chengpeng (李承鹏), Xiao Shu (笑蜀), Wuyuesanren (五岳散人) and the legal scholar Xiao Han (萧瀚).
Writers like Han Han and Li Chengpeng are well versed in the art of online communication, and they are also quite sensitive to popular moods. They often respond quickly to stories like Shifang with strong satirical writing that frames the issue and draws a wide readership.
On Shifang, Han Han had this to say in a piece called, “The Liberation of Shifang” (什邡的释放):

If the local government used tear gas on the people, this in fact is sufficient to reveal them for the tyrants they are.”

And in a piece called, “The Strange Mission: An Open Letter to the Shifang Government Leaders” (奇怪的使命——给什邡市各级领导的一封信), Li Chengpeng criticize the development approach of local leaders:

“This is about taking the interests of four to five-hundred thousand people and exchanging them for the interests of four or five. It’s about a task that takes 50 years into a five-year term of office.”

According to my numbers, as of 9:30pm on July 4, Han Han’s essay, which was posted on July 3, had been shared 298,173 times on Sina Weibo.
Another interesting aspect of the role of Weibo in the Shifang incident was the sudden popularity of two accounts in particular. The first, on Sina Weibo, was called “Vital Shifang” (活力什邡). The second, on Tencent’s Weibo platform, was called “Shifang Announcements” (什邡发布). These are both, according to verification by their respective platforms, official microblogs operated by the information office of the Shifang government (什邡市政府新闻办公室).
Each of these official Weibo account made around 20 posts through the duration of the Shifang incident. In fact, the People’s Daily Online report of July 2, which reported the stand-off between Shifang residents and police, cited information from “Vital Shifang”.
At around 9am on July 3, “Vital Shifang” posted a notice from local police sending out a warning to those who “are inciting, planning or otherwise organizing illegal gatherings, demonstrations, protests by means of the internet, mobile phone messages and others methods.”

[ABOVE: The official Shifang government Weibo “Vital Shifang” posts a notice on July 3 warning members of the public not to incite illegal gatherings and protests.]
Later that same day as the government relented, videos of a speech by Shifang’s Party secretary and a text-as-image file announcing the termination of the molybdenum-copper project were shared on both “Vital Shifang” and “Shifang Announcements.” On average these posts were shared around 10,000 times, and at the height some posts were shared as much as 40,000 times.
Official police Weibo should also be noted. A number of special police who took part in the “stability preservation actions” (维稳行动) to quell the protests posted details from the scene, even providing explanations and voicing anger.
This is something we have never seen before. Since 2009, social media have developed rapidly in China. Sina Weibo and Tencent Weibo have both said they already have more than 300,000 million registered users on their platforms. In the case of the Shifang incident, China’s news media as a whole were under overbearing pressure, and only social media could serve as a channel for sharing information.
Of course, Weibo cannot escape the reach of China’s censors. Most posts attacking the government were deleted from the platforms. One of my own posts decrying the senselessness of information controls was deleted after being shared just over 2,000 times.
Li Chengpeng arrived in Shifang on July 3, and his report, “A Case of the Lucifer Effect: A Little Investigation of Shifang” (一次路西法效应实验——什邡小调查), is one of just a few reports we have from the scene. The report, which documents police brutality in Shifang, was shared rapidly on Weibo. I posted an image version of the report that was re-posted 854 times within 50 minutes before being deleted. Other pieces to be completely killed on social media, like Li Chengpeng’s, were legal scholar Xiao Han’s “Open Letter to Police Who Used Violence in the Shifang Incident” (致什邡事件中施暴警察的一封公开信) and Wuyuesanren’s “Shifang: Dread, After Violence Fails” (什邡，对暴力失效的恐惧).
What tyranny fears most is professionalism
Some web users used the phrase “covering one’s ears while stealing a bell” (掩耳盗铃) — like the English “burying one’s head in the sand” — to describe information controls on the Shifang incident. The authorities strangled traditional media and mainstream news websites, but the flow of information was not entirely stopped thanks to Weibo.
There’s no denying that Weibo users of all stripes have pushed to open up new space for expression. But in the case of the Shifang incident, what we saw is best described as “license” (特许).
Some have suggested that this more “open” approach to social media was quite intentional. In the run-up to the 18th National Congress it is critical for the leadership to be on guard against popular animosity toward the government. On the other hand, they must ensure tensions have an outlet lest they erupt into more destabilizing conflict.
Others have read Shifang differently. They say that what we see in the case of Shifang are different political factions struggling behind the scenes, with different ideas about how incidents like this should be handled.
It’s hard to favor either reading without more evidence. But I believe what we have in this case is still a method of “kill and use” (打杀和利用). Compared to the high-speed rail collision and Dalian PX protests last summer, we are seeing a definite and serious retreat by mainstream media (including both Party and commercial media). Sure, controls on Weibo have relaxed this time around — as compared, for example, to the Wukan incident last year.
But on social media, the general tone is one of emotional unburdening — and facts and analysis are seriously wanting. What we are seeing in fact is an unhealthy form of communication emerging under a malformed system of controls.
The basic role of the media is to provide information and to present viewpoints. Professional journalism celebrates and pursues the idea that media, as instruments that serve the public (公器), must provide accurate information and offer diverse points of view. In this era of emerging social media, these values, far from being archaic, are more timely and valuable than ever.
In the case of numerous sudden-breaking events in China in recent years, we have seen seasoned professional journalists active on both traditional media and social media, working together across various platforms. The high-speed rail collision in Wenzhou last year was a good example of this. Harnessing the power of social media, experienced investigative reporters have become like tigers with wings. They have an entirely new means of investigation at their fingertips. And at the same time social media give them a new means to reach mass audiences.
But this is not what authorities in China have hoped for. And in the Shifang incident we can see the way traditional media and experienced professional journalists have been completely tied down. Journalists were prevented from going to the scene, which meant every vessel and vein of real reporting that might have fed both traditional and new media was closed off.
As the Shifang incident crested and fell, the public was treated to two days of information fast-food. They watched scenes of chaos and conflict. They listened to clamors of anger against the local government. They saw the government forced to back down in defeat. But through it all there was an utter dearth of real reporting, and a serious deficiency of cool-headed analysis.
What exactly was the cause of this incident? Exactly what kind of project was this “molybdenum-copper” project? Who was responsible for the original environmental impact assessment? Why was this conflict so fierce? Were the tactics used by police — this was apparently the first time stun grenades have been used in such an incident — illegal or not? Are there any lingering legal issues stemming from the government’s hasty announcement in the face of public resistance that a project already contracted will be stopped? If this potentially polluting project will not be located in Shifang, where then will it be located? How should we deal with these ever-more-frequent “Not in My Backyard” (NIMBY) environmental protests in China?
None of these issues have been explored. The public deserves serious reporting by professional media, but under the current system this is impossible.
News controls in China have long stood at odds with China’s constitution, but over the past decade, these controls have also taken on a strong flavor of political opportunism. This is a system that does not tolerate freedom of expression and has little tolerance for professional journalism. After all, only professional journalism can ensure the information is independent, responsible and based in fact, not manipulated by any power. Only professional journalism can challenge the scourges of corruption and misrule.

The following post by an Sina Weibo user with the alias “Ben Ren Wu V” (本人无V) sharing U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton’s remarks this week on democracy during her visit to Mongolia, was deleted from Sina Weibo sometime before 9:51am Hong Kong time today, July 11, 2012. “Ben Ren Wu V” has just over 12,000 followers, according to numbers from Sina Weibo. [More on deleted posts at the WeiboScope Search, by the Journalism and Media Studies Centre].

[Who is Hillary talking about?] Hillary: Recently, democratic reforms and elections in Mongolia, Burma, East Timor and other Asian countries and “they stand in stark contrast to those governments that continue to resist reforms, that work around the clock to restrict people’s access to ideas and information, to imprison them for expressing their views, to usurp the rights of citizens to choose their leaders, to govern without accountability, to corrupt the economic progress of the country and take the riches unto themselves.”

The original Chinese post follows:

【希拉里说谁呢？】希拉里：近期蒙古缅甸东帝汶等亚洲国家的民主改革和选举“与某些国家的政府形成了鲜明对比，后者整日忙于限制民众接触思想和获取信息，关押表达自己观点的民众，篡夺民众选择领导人的权利，在自己不承担责任的情况下管治国家，用腐败行为败坏国家的经济增长，侵吞经济增长带来的财富

NOTE: All posts to The Anti-Social List are listed as “permission denied” in the Sina Weibo API, which means they were deleted by Weibo managers, not by users themselves.

Yesterday we shared a Sina Weibo post deleted by the authorities in which a Beijing-based producer of “micro films”, or wei dianying (微电影), put out a call for footage from the scene of last month’s Tianjin fire. That post offered a revealing glimpse into an emerging grey space in China — features and documentaries filmed on mobile phones and distributed to potentially mass audiences through social media.
Could such a space enable Chinese to delve deeper into sensitive or contested issues? With a “micro documentary”, for example, about the June 30 blaze at a shopping mall in Tianjin?
Not so fast, says China’s State Administration of Radio Film and Television (SARFT). The body, which controls and regulates all radio and television programming as well as like content online, announced new restrictions this week on “micro films”, “online dramas” and other emerging forms of video content.
The bottom line: the government is now staking out a position on this emerging grey space. Of course, we should bear in mind that this is not the first time SARFT has flexed its muscles over online video.

[ABOVE: A poster for the popular “micro film” Si Xin Men. Films like this could now come under much stricter scrutiny by the authorities.]
Released yesterday, the SARFT regulations, “Notice on the Further Strengthening of Regulations on Online Dramas, Micro Films and Other Online Audiovisual Programs” (关于进一步加强网络剧、微电影等网络视听节目管理的通知), cites vulgarity and general low taste as justification for tighter controls:

In recent years, online dramas, micro films and other online audiovisual programs have developed rapidly as a new form of online culture. But problems of vulgarity, tastelessness and dramatization of violence and sexuality have appeared in some programs, some are full of vulgar language, and some intentionally pander to base interests . . .

But a SARFT spokesperson clearly stated that “as cultural products directed toward mass audiences” online video programs had to “adhere to correct guidance,” a lynchpin propaganda policy that suggests control of not just vulgar or indecent content, but also of content that in the broadest sense goes against the policies, aims or “spirit” of the ruling Party.
In practice, it appears that the regulations demand that all online programs be subject to pre-approval before being distributed. Further, the regulations explicitly hold distributors of online video programming responsible for violations of propaganda discipline.
It remains to be seen how SARFT intends to enforce these regulations, particularly in the case of user-generated content. Clearly, if followed to the letter, the “Notice” would require massive resources.
Despite SARFT’s insistence that these new measures stem from a public outcry over online content, the reaction to the announcement online has been largely negative today.
A reporter for Guangzhou’s Southern Metropolis Daily newspaper steamed on Weibo: “You even want to concern yourself with the number of flies in the latrine! What is there that you don’t want to control? There’s not a single thing you can manage properly! And you still think the world will stop spinning if you don’t control it.”
The theme of control freaks who can control nothing adequately was a popular one. “You control everything, but manage nothing well!” said one user. “We should let these guys handle the problem of food safety,” said another, referring to an endless series of scandals over the safety of milk and other products in China.
Other users questioned whether the SARFT had adequate means and manpower to apply old-school rules to new media:

This is the era of We Media (自媒体), and SARFT still wants to approve [films] one at a time. Apparently, they’re not afraid of dying of exhaustion.

Ten days after a deadly blaze in a shopping mall in Tianjin claimed 10 lives, according to official media accounts, doubts are still circulating in China about the true extent and circumstances of the tragedy. Claims on the internet and social media have suggested that the real death toll is 378. The following cartoon, posted to Sina Weibo by artist Xiao Mao (@_小矛) — and constantly shared and deleted, moving from place to place — shows a government official in a suit and tie grinning as he declares: “There is just one body!” The head of one corpse is visible outside a white blanket laid over what is clearly a pile of corpses by a pair of what are probably thugs or government hands. Two news reporters shake and sweat as they report live from the scene.

The following post by Gao Jun (高军), a producer at a Beijing company that specializes in “micro-films” (微电影), was deleted from Sina Weibo sometime before 5:40am Hong Kong time today, July 9, 2012. The post calls on internet users to share any information they have on the June 30 fire in Tianjin, the full facts of which remain unclear. Gao Jun has just under 300,000 followers, according to numbers from Sina Weibo. [More on deleted posts at the WeiboScope Search, by the Journalism and Media Studies Centre].

The post reads:

【Call Out】How many secrets about the Tianjin fire have yet to come out? If you were on the scene, or if you had relatives who perished in the fire, please get in touch with us. We will pay money for videos from the scene (that have not yet been shared on the internet). We don’t care about politics. We only want to document the lives of those who perished! Please send relevant video material to: [email protected]. We promise to preserve the privacy of those who provide material, and will pay for related videos.

The original Chinese post follows:

【征集】天津那场火灾，有多少秘密，未被公开，如果您在现场，如果您的亲人在火灾中逝去，请您和我们联系，我们可以付费购买现场的视频（互联网未公开过），政治和我们无关，我们只为逝去的人，证明活过！！相关视频内容请发在： [email protected]，我们承诺：保守提供者秘密，付费购买相关视频

NOTE: All posts to The Anti-Social List are listed as “permission denied” in the Sina Weibo API, which means they were deleted by Weibo managers, not by users themselves.

Cartoons can be a simple and powerful means of conveying basic ideas and truths, and eliciting emotions. The following cartoon, posted by artist Ah Ping (阿平) to Sina Weibo, could refer to any of the many instances in China of government suppression of Chinese citizens pushing for change, from artists like Ai Weiwei to lawyers like Xu Zhiyong, from journalists like Shi Junrong to ordinary citizens on the streets of Shifang. In Ah Ping’s cartoon, a tree spreads its limbs to the sky like outstretched arms, effortlessly defying a pair of handcuffs that restrained it lower down. A new pair of cuffs has been attached to the new limbs. The caption on the picture reads: “How many pairs of handcuffs does it take to keep the future from coming?”

The following post by software engineer Li Tiejun (李铁军) sharing in image from a recent purported first-hand account from recent protests in Shifang, Sichuan province, was deleted from Sina Weibo sometime before 1:23am Hong Kong time today, July 6, 2012. Li Tiejun has just under 18,000 followers, according to numbers from Sina Weibo. [More on deleted posts at the WeiboScope Search, by the Journalism and Media Studies Centre].
The article, “On the Shifang Incident”, is dated July 4 and was written by Xiao Liye (小李爷).

This is the post that was just deleted. It was gone as soon as I passed it along, killed outright.

The original Chinese post follows:

刚才被删那个，岂止是一转没，简直是秒杀。

NOTE: All posts to The Anti-Social List are listed as “permission denied” in the Sina Weibo API, which means they were deleted by Weibo managers, not by users themselves.

The following post by Chinese writer Xu Xin (徐昕) sharing an image from the recent July 1 demonstrations in Hong Kong was deleted from Sina Weibo sometime before 3:05am Hong Kong time today, July 6, 2012. Xu Xin has just over 108,000 followers, according to numbers from Sina Weibo. [More on deleted posts at the WeiboScope Search, by the Journalism and Media Studies Centre].
In the image, a Hong Kong protester holds up a sign that reads: “If we don’t stand up today, we won’t be able to stand up tomorrow.”

[“If we don’t stand up today, we won’t be able to stand up tomorrow”] Hong Kong, image from @PhoenixMedia

The original Chinese post follows:

【今日不站出来，明天站不出来】香港，图片来自@凤凰东方传媒

NOTE: All posts to The Anti-Social List are listed as “permission denied” in the Sina Weibo API, which means they were deleted by Weibo managers, not by users themselves.

Yesterday we shared a number of (deleted) Chinese social media posts on recent protests in the city of Shifang, in which thousands of residents took to the streets to oppose the construction of molybdenum-copper alloy factory by Sichuan Hongda Co. Ltd. While information about the protests on platforms like Sina Weibo was actively removed by the authorities, social media were still virtually the only source on the story available to Chinese readers.
Has the story appeared at all in Chinese traditional media? Yes. But the offerings are not rich, to say the least.
There is quite a pronounced contrast between robust controls on traditional media on the one hand, and a relatively fertile — though constantly undermined and restricted — space on social media.
According to a search of the WiseNews database of Chinese-language newspapers and magazines, 14 reports today deal directly or indirectly with recent unrest in Shifang and its consequences. Of these, 11 concern the fallout for Sichuan Hongda and its share price, mentioning the suspension of the molybdenum-copper project but tiptoeing around reporting on the public demonstrations and violent crackdown.
Here are the papers carrying reports today, with a brief summary of the story being reported:

1. Global Times — 2 articles, both mentioning unrest
2. China Securities News — 3 articles, none mentioning unrest (saying the proposed project in Shifang has “reached a dead end”)
3. Oriental Morning Post — 1 article, no mention of unrest
4. Shenzhen Special Zone Daily — 2 articles, 1 mentioning detention of 27 “criminals” allegedly involved in recent unrest, 1 reporting the business side of the story with no mention of unrest
5. Shanghai Securities News — 1 article, no mention of unrest
6. Beijing Business Today — 1 article, no mention of unrest
7. National Business Daily — 1 article, no mention of unrest
8. Information Times — 1 article, no mention of unrest
9. The Beijing News — 1 article, no mention of unrest
10. Chengdu Commercial News — 1 article, no mention of unrest

Just to give readers a taste, here is the lede for the story appearing on page 28 of Chengdu Commercial News, a Sichuan newspaper:

Recently, Sichuan Hongda (600331) has been the focus of attention over its molybdenum-copper project in Shifang. Yesterday (July 4), Sichuan Hongda, which suspended trading for one day, said that the company received a notice on July 3 demanding that . . . construction be halted for the project. This negative factor drove Sichuan Hongda shares down 9.2% on re-opening of trading . . .

[ABOVE: A story (bottom-left) on Sichuan Hongda’s fall in share price appears on page 28 of today’s Chengdu Commercial News.]
It bears emphasis that two of the three articles dealing directly with the unrest in Shifang today are from the Global Times.
The first is an editorial on page 14 that deals with the news (reported elsewhere only in Shenzhen Special Zone Daily) that 27 people were held in the aftermath of the protests, and that “21 were released, 3 kept under administrative detention, and 3 kept under criminal detention.” The last three are apparently accused of having overturned a police vehicle.
Giving us a taste of debate in Chinese society that has for all intents and purposes been completely erased from traditional media, the Global Times editorial says: “A number of well-known figures in society have supported ‘releasing’ [those who have been detained]. Some have even gone themselves to Shifang in order to expand the impact of this call on the internet and in Shifang itself.”
The editorial goes on to say that while “public opinion should be taken into consideration, the framework of the law should be followed.” (The newspaper’s own approximate translation of the editorial into English is HERE.)
The second piece is a summary of an article appearing yesterday on the website of Hong Kong’s South China Morning Post. Explaining the basic import of the SCMP article, the Global Times says: “Recently, large-scale protests unfolded in the city of Shifang in Sichuan province opposing a molybdenum-copper project that had already been planned. This demonstrates that environmental issues are increasingly becoming a primary reason for social instability.”