Author: David Bandurski

Now Executive Director of the China Media Project, leading the project’s research and partnerships, David originally joined the project in Hong Kong in 2004. He is the author of Dragons in Diamond Village (Penguin), a book of reportage about urbanization and social activism in China, and co-editor of Investigative Journalism in China (HKU Press).

Post on July 1 Hong Kong protests deleted from Weibo

The following post by Xu Ji (许骥 ) about expected public protests in Hong Kong to commemorate the 15th anniversary of the territory’s return to China in 1997 was deleted from Sina Weibo sometime before 10:50am Hong Kong time today, June 28, 2012. Xu Ji, a well-known Chinese academic, has just under 24,000 followers, according to numbers from Sina Weibo. [More on deleted posts at the WeiboScope Search, by the Journalism and Media Studies Centre].
The post reads:

It is said a powerful typhoon is expected to sweep across Hong Kong on July 1. How many people will take to the streets on that day? The time has come to test the people of Hong Kong!

It includes the following map showing the trajectory of the tropical storm.


The original Chinese post follows:

据说七一当日有强烈颱风过境香港。当天还会有多少人上街?考验香港人的时候到了!


NOTE: All posts to The Anti-Social List are listed as “permission denied” in the Sina Weibo API, which means they were deleted by Weibo managers, not by users themselves.

Naked Official 裸体做官

Emerging in the 2000s as a term preferred by internet users to refer to corrupt officials who had already located their family members overseas, “naked official” began entering the more formal media discourse of anti-corruption in 2010. On February 22, 2010, the Ministry of Supervision issued a document called “Highlights of the Work of the National Anti-Corruption Bureau in 2010” (国家预防腐败局2010年工作要点), the first government document to make supervision of so-called “naked officials” a priority.

On March 5, 2011, Ma Ma (马馼), deputy secretary of the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection, said China would begin a registry for “naked officials” that year. In a media interview in 2016, Ma stressed that, “I personally believe that under reform and opening officials and citizens are the same, and sending sons and daughters overseas should not be a special right officials have.” Asked to estimate how many “naked officials” there were in China, Ma said: “I’m afraid we can’t arrive at these numbers right now.”

In 2017, the profile of the term “naked official” was further raised as it appeared in the Chinese TV drama “In the Name of the People” (人民的名义), a series based on the online novel written by Zhou Meisen (周梅森) that tells the story of a prosecutor who works to uncover corruption in a fictional Chinese city.

Free movement and urban rights

The following post by Ye Kuangzheng (叶匡政), sharing a post from low-volume Weibo user about the problem of urban benefits for migrants in China’s cities, was deleted from Sina Weibo sometime before 6:15am Hong Kong time today, June 27, 2012. Ye Kuangzheng, a well-known Chinese academic, has just over 141,000 followers, according to numbers from Sina Weibo. [More on deleted posts at the WeiboScope Search, by the Journalism and Media Studies Centre].
The original post, from a user called “A_FloatingOnTheNorthWind_hkc” (@A北风飘飘_hkc), reads:

Chinese people have the right to move freely on their own home soil. Beijing is a city belonging to China, and I’ve been admitted here [for work], so a school desk should be provided for my child. It is right and unalterable for children to live with their parents!

The original Chinese post follows:

中国人有权在自己国土自由迁徙,北京属于中国的一个城市,这儿接纳了我,就应该给我孩子一张课桌,孩子随父母生活天经地义!


NOTE: All posts to The Anti-Social List are listed as “permission denied” in the Sina Weibo API, which means they were deleted by Weibo managers, not by users themselves.

The internal struggle for the Party's military

As we approach a crucial handover of power at the Party’s 18th National Congress, perhaps no issue is of more critical concern to senior Party leaders than the CCP’s control of the country’s armed forces.
Earlier this year there were rumors that Chinese President Hu Jintao, also head of China’s Central Military Commission, was struggling internally for control of the military agenda. Other rumors suggested that one of the PLA’s most senior generals, Zhang Qinsheng (章沁生), was under investigation for his alleged support for nationalization of China’s armed forces.
The hints of division were given some credence in early May as a strongly-worded editorial in the People’s Liberation Army Daily warned against “international hostile forces” advocating that China’s military be commanded by the state rather than by the Party.
The “nationalization” issue claimed its first media casualty in late May, as one of China’s top investigative reporters, CMP fellow Yu Chen, was removed from his post at Southern Metropolis Daily. Chen’s removal stemmed from a social media post calling for nationalization of the military that was re-posted from the official Weibo account of the paper’s “In Depth” section, where Chen was an editor.
Yesterday, an editorial in the official People’s Daily by a top military official again reiterated the point that the pro-nationalization argument is “erroneous.” The editorial, “Actively Fostering Core Values Among Modern Revolutionary Military Personnel”, addresses the practical issue of how to ensure Chinese military commanders and troops fall into line with the Party.
The editorial is written by Yang Yuwen (杨玉文), identified as “a military commissar for an enterprise group within the Jinan Military Region.”
Yang’s editorial calls for a more vigilant attitude toward the ideological training of military personnel. Its headline on the international website of China Central Television brings the crux out more forcefully: “We Must State Clearly that ‘Nationalization of the Military’ is Wrong.”
Yang writes:

[We must] lead commanders and troops to be even more steadfast in their belief in the road of socialism with Chinese characteristics. Faced with noise and static in the ideological sphere, we must persist in using scientific standpoints, views and methods to state clearly from a theoretical standpoint why such views as ‘the non-Party nature of the military’ (军队非党化) and ‘nationalization of the military’ (军队国家化) are erroneous.

Yang goes on to prescribe a range of methods to ensure that Chinese military commanders and troops are properly indoctrinated. First of all, the military must “create effective platforms”. Yang explains:

In the modern era, mobile phones, the internet and other [tools] are daily becoming the primary platform by which commanders and troops (官兵), and an important cultural and lifestyle space. This demands that we actively occupy the spiritual and cultural position that is the internet, working hard to raise the influence and contagiousness of core [Party] values among contemporary revolutionary military personnel. . . In recent years, we have developed and improved our [offering of] a vital, healthy and upright study and entertainment platform, including more than 20 offering such as red animation [programming], online classrooms, online [information about] military history, military website-hosted blogs and chatrooms for military personnel.

Finally, in addition to effective online tools and training for military personnel, the Party must maintain tight-fisted control over the ideas to which members of China’s military are exposed:

Third, we must enhance information controls. In order to guard against the influence of harmful information on commanders and troops, we must build and perfect the release and censorship of information, and related systems such as for holding those responsible for harmful information to account, grasping information dynamics in a timely way, enhancing channeling of public opinion and cleansing the online cultural environment.

Smashed


Chinese social media have increasingly offered a platform for cartoonists to share more critical work. In this cartoon, shared by Sina Weibo user Koudai Yeshi (口袋野史), a giant hand smashes a tiny human being with its forefinger, a simple image of violence and cruelty. Koudai Yeshi writes: “This is the cruel situation facing ordinary Chinese: for each 10 you pay, you are exploited 7, for every 10 you dedicate, you have 7 forcibly seized. For each time you are vulnerable, you will once be raped, for each time you are conciliatory, you are once beaten. For each time you are foolish, you will once be cheated. For each time you are charitable, you will once be duped.

Post with stunning corruption figures deleted

The following post by Sun Yaoyang (孙钥洋) sharing the personal assets of six Chinese officials found guilty of corruption was deleted from Sina Weibo sometime before 9:50am Hong Kong time yesterday, June 25, 2012. Sun Yaoyang, a Chinese writer from Harbin, has just over 84,000 followers, according to numbers from Sina Weibo. [More on deleted posts at the WeiboScope Search, by the Journalism and Media Studies Centre].


The post, which makes tongue-in-cheek reference to the issue of reporting the assets of government officials (an issue that crops up repeatedly, but on which there has been no real progress), reads:

[Reporting the assets of Chinese official begins] 1. Maoming Deputy Mayor Yang Guangliang (杨光亮), properties 140, cash 1.2 billion. 2. Chuxiong Prefecture Head Hong Wei (红卫), properties 230, cash 1.7 billion. 3. Hangzhou Deputy Mayor Xu Wangyong (许迈永), properties 250, cash 1.4 billion. 4. Shanxi Pu Country Coal Office Director Hao Pengjun (郝鹏俊), 350 properties, cash three billion. 5. Shandong Deputy Governor Huang Sheng (黄胜), properties 460, cash nine billion US$. 6. Zhejiang Provincial Food and Drug Administration Director Huang Meng (黄萌), properties 840, cash two billion.

The original Chinese post follows:

【中国官员财产公示终于启动】:1.茂名副市长杨光亮房产140套,现金12亿;2.楚雄州长杨红卫房产230套,现金17亿;3.杭州副市长许迈永房产250,现金14亿;4.山西蒲县煤炭局长郝鹏俊房产350套,现金30亿;5.山东副省长黄胜房产460套,现金90亿美元;6.浙江省药监局长黄萌房产840套,现金20亿。


NOTE: All posts to The Anti-Social List are listed as “permission denied” in the Sina Weibo API, which means they were deleted by Weibo managers, not by users themselves.

Where does soft power begin?

As we edge closer to the 18th National Congress of the CCP, we can expect hard news to enter a new cycle of tightening at every level in China. No local leader wants “negative news” to erupt on their turf, especially now. So the soldiers of “news and propaganda work” will be working overtime to ensure the most “harmonious” environment possible for this crucial leadership transition.
On the policy side, we can see hints of this anticipated tightening in a “movement” unveiled earlier this month to combat various forms of media corruption, including “news extortion” and “paid-for news.” The campaign, coordinated by the Central Propaganda Department, cites specifically the need to “create a favorable climate for the successful opening of the Party’s 18th National Congress.”
This campaign almost certainly signals the generalized tightening on hard news and investigative reporting, not just a renewed determination to grapple with poor ethics in the news profession.
But while keeping bad news under wraps is an obvious priority for Party and government leaders, something we’ve seen play out for decades in China, there have been slight changes to the tone of media control as well, particularly over the past three to five years.
Leaders, particularly at the national level, seem far more sensitive now to the international impact of domestic stories than they have been in the past. And many seem to understand that in this age of rapid, decentralized sharing of information, it is difficult to separate domestic public opinion (and the project of information control) from the issues of foreign news coverage, China’s international image and — yes, here comes that magic word now so cherished by Chinese leaders — soft power.


[ABOVE: A poster for the state-financed propaganda film The Founding of a Republic, which hoped to make the Party’s line not just palatable but popular and profitable.]
Last week, the Party’s official People’s Daily ran an interesting piece exhorting Party cadres at the “grassroots level” — those officials at the bottom rungs of the power bureaucracy — to be mindful of the international implications of their handling of local incidents. The bottom line was that local leaders must recognize that their decisions about how to handle a “sudden-breaking incident” on their turf could impact China’s international image and the country’s ability to engage on global issues.
What I find most interesting about the People’s Daily piece is how it exhibits a more open and proactive attitude toward news stories — the idea, for example, that facts and transparency, and not just cover-up, are crucial — while it argues that “China’s voice” must be uniform and harmonious, which of course implies centralized control of the message (the “main theme,” as the Party calls it).
The most critical question facing China’s “soft power” is the question of whether “China’s voice” is diverse and multifaceted, or whether it is the product of government-engineered uniformity. Are we talking about “China’s voices” or about “China’s voice”?
The People’s Daily piece obviously answers for the latter. China has a single voice, one that is “full and accurate” in the sense that it is in line with the Party’s priorities — but is not messy or strident.
The concluding paragraph of the People’s Daily piece refers to a speech given in Hong Kong by the Chinese writer Lu Xun in the early 20th century. In that speech, “Silent China” (无声的中国), Lu Xun bemoans the silence not of “China” per se, but of the Chinese people, who have not had the means to articulate their own views partly because of the dominance of an official discourse in classical Chinese.
Lu Xun never talks about “China’s voice”, or zhongguo shengyin (中国声音). He talks about “the voice of the Chinese people themselves”, or zhongguoren ziji de shengyin (中国人自己的声音).
A vast gulf opens between “China’s voice” as conceived by China’s leadership today and the “popular Chinese voices” that Lu Xun called for. And that gulf explains, I would argue further, the most elementary of all problems facing China’s real “soft power”. “China’s voice” as modulated by the Chinese Communist Party can only be a limited voice, subjected to an unspoken political violence, and that invites a mistrust that ultimately undermines China’s soft power efforts.
To put it more simply, official soft power is soft power in which the individual “person”, or ren (人), is eliminated. It is “China’s voice”, or zhongguo shengyin (中国声音), as opposed to “Chinese voices”, or zhongguoren de shengyin (中国的声音).


[ABOVE: Did Lu Xun, one of the leading lights of modern Chinese literature, speak the secret of China’s soft power?]
Before we move on to the People’s Daily article, let’s consider the following portion from Lu Xun’s “Silent China”:

The youth can first turn China into a China with voices. They can speak with boldness, having the courage to move forward, forgetting all gains and losses, shoving aside the ancients, giving expression to their own truest words. The truth, naturally, is not easy. For example, in our comportment, it is difficult to be truthful. When I give a speech like this, this isn’t my true demeanor. Because when I conduct myself before my friends and my children, this is not my way. But still we can say things of relative truth, give expression to voices of relative truth. Only with voices of truth can we touch the people of China and the people of the world; we must have true voices, for only then can we live together in the world with the people of the world.
青年们先可以将中国变成一个有声的中国。大胆地说话,勇敢地进行,忘掉了一切利害,推开了古人,将自己的真心的话发表出来。——真,自然是不容易的。譬如态度,就不容易真,讲演时候就不是我的真态度,因为我对朋友,孩子说话时候的态度是不这样的。——但总可以说些较真的话,发些较真的声音。只有真的声音,才能感动中国的人和世界的人;必须有了真的声音,才能和世界的人同在世界上生活。

Those words, it seems to me, speak to the heart of China’s soft power. For Lu Xun, the voice of a nation is the sum of that country’s voices, spoken not from the heart of political power, but from the heart of the individual.
But let’s leave it there and move on to the People’s Daily piece, which is translated in full below.

The Government Must Consider the International Implications When Dealing With Domestic Issues
People’s Daily
June 21, 2012
In recent years, China, now the nation with the world’s second-largest economy, has constructively engaged the international community on both a government-to-government basis and a citizen-to-citizen basis, whether this has meant involvement in the six-party talks or grappling with the global financial crisis, the [global expansion of] Confucius Institutes or the promotion of national propaganda films (国家形象片). China has worked actively to tell China’s story, making “China’s voice” resound.
This “chorus” has resounded not just through the central Party, our foreign affairs departments and the official news media, but has involved another crucial mass group — our leaders at the grassroots level.
Think, for example, of the deputy mayor of Wuhu in Anhui province, who was photographed taking his daughter to school on a bicycle. That photo was “wildly shared” by internet users, who chattered about how he showed the down-to-earth nature of the Chinese cadre.
Then there is the example of a woman in Ankang, Shaanxi province, who was seven months pregnant and forced to have an abortion. How can you calculate the kind of adverse impact a story like that has on China’s international image?
The question then becomes: in the midst of an ever more resounding “China’s voice”, how can we become part of the melody and avoid becoming contributing noise and cacophony. This is something that now tests cadres at every level.
This, what we will call the “ability to engage public opinion” (舆论贯通能力), is a crucial part of the “world view” of those who govern. There is little question that epoch-making changes in technology have meant that information has broken through the boundaries between nations and between media. Everything is now a single interconnected platform. And these deep changes in the [global] public opinion environment can now have negative implications. Two ounces can be weighed up to a thousand pounds, and a single mouse dropping can spoil the whole batch of soup.
Against this backdrop, where is the key to the “ability to engage public opinion”?
Faced with complex changes in the public opinion environment, the first thing many people might think of is how they can “say the right thing”, how they can improve their ability to use the microphone in their hand, or how they can make their voice more readily heard.
This so-called “ability to engage public opinion” should first and foremost be about the capacity to negotiate the contrasts between public opinion and reality — and not just the ability to utilize public opinion sphere and command discursive power. For those who lead, what is most critical is how to support the conceptual through pragmatic steps, using facts to win understanding, using action to preserve one’s image [and that of the Party]. It should not be just about ways of dealing with the media, of reining the media in, or simply about handling all aspects of any given sudden-breaking incident.
We have a number of informative examples we can draw from. In the midst of the 2008 Wenchuan earthquake, timely and effective relief efforts and open and transparent reporting substantially raised China’s international image as a country with a deep respect for human life. Also, the Chinese government’s large-scale evacuation of personnel from Libya ahead of that country’s civil war was hailed as a success that reflected well on China’s international image.
We often say that actions speak louder than words, and that secondary public opinion is determined by primary conduct. This is because the facts ultimately win out over rhetoric. If leaders at various levels want to join the great harmony of “China’s voice,” and contribute to lifting the volume of harmony, they must concern themselves with more than just how the newspapers tell the story, how the television stations report it, or how it plays out online. It is more important to use good governance to write China’s melody across the great land of China, raising from the foundations the transmission capacity and influence of “China’s voice.”
Central party leaders have repeatedly emphasized that local leaders must consider the “international impact” of “domestic issues” as they handle them. If a local government unit does not plan with a clear sense of both the domestic and international [dimensions], if there is no sense of the “pre-positioning of public opinion” before actions are taken, it will be difficult to make “China’s voice” clear on the crowded canvas of international public opinion. And it will be very difficult to exhibit a full and accurate image of China.
Not only is there a need to raise discursive awareness, but even more is there a need to follow the main objective of governing for the people, to uphold the concept of governing the country according to the law, to hold to the principle of democratic politics, in order to increase the “favorable views” held by the people, and to strengthen “China’s voice”. There is a need to form a [positive] image of China through the steadily lifting the “prosperity index” of the people.
Eighty-five years ago, in a speech in Hong Kong called “Silent China,” Lu Xun called for for the “transformation of China into a China with a voice.” From the “silent China” of that era to today’s “China with a voice”, and now as we consider “how China should speak,” we have moved steadily through history, resolving issues as we go. If Lu Xun’s prescription back in his time was to “do away with ancient Chinese and survive”, what answer should leaders throughout China give today?

Hangzhou raises the bar for "migrant workers"


Chinese media reported in mid June 2012 that the city of Hangzhou in Zhejiang province has issued new regulations on migrant workers demanding migrants hold a high school degree in order to obtain a residence permit, or juzhuzheng (居住证). Migrants must also be able to show that they have a stable work in the city and no criminal record. In the following cartoon, posted by artist Cao Yi (曹一) to Sina Weibo on June 18, a street cleaner sweeps the migrant rubbish (rural migrants who don’t meet the high school degree threshold) into the sea outside the city of Hangzhou with a broom made out of the cleaner’s own “high school degree”.

Democracy quote by Chai Jing deleted from Weibo

The following post sharing a quote and picture from well-known CCTV anchor and former China Media Project fellow Chai Jing (柴静) was deleted from Sina Weibo sometime before 12:35pm Hong Kong time today, June 22, 2012. The post was made by Zatan Wuwei (杂谈五味), a user with just over 10,000 followers, according to numbers from Sina Weibo. [More on deleted posts at the WeiboScope Search, by the Journalism and Media Studies Centre].


The post reads:

[Tyranny must fall] “Why must authoritarian [regimes] necessarily fall? That’s because authoritarian system do not have the capacity to housekeep themselves, and the wicked will not withdraw of their own will. Authoritarian systems can only become more and more sordid, more and more bloated. Democracy, on the other hand, is a political form that does have the capacity to clean its own house and to root out the wicked. And so [democracy] can continue to develop” — Chai Jing, CCTV anchor

The original Chinese post follows:

【专制必然倒台】“专制为什么必然倒台?那是因为专制制度不具有自我清洁能力,恶人不会自己退出,专制体制只能越来越肮脏,越来越臃肿;而民主,是具有自我清洁能力的政治制度,淘汰恶人的制度。所以能够持续发展。”—中国中央电视台主持人 柴静


NOTE: All posts to The Anti-Social List are listed as “permission denied” in the Sina Weibo API, which means they were deleted by Weibo managers, not by users themselves.

Post of Ai Weiwei in cop uniform deleted from Weibo

The following post showing Chinese artist Ai Weiwei (艾未未) dressed up in a public security bureau uniform was deleted from Sina Weibo sometime before 7:05am Hong Kong time today, June 22, 2012. The post was made by Sunny Lee (李成贤), a journalist for The Korea Times. Lee currently has just over 10,000 followers, according to numbers from Sina Weibo. [More on deleted posts at the WeiboScope Search, by the Journalism and Media Studies Centre].


The post reads:

Is he a good cop or a bad cop?

International media reported this week that Ai Weiwei, one of China’s most recognized artists and dissident thinkers, was barred by police from attending a court hearing concerning tax evasion charges against him that some say are politically motivated.


NOTE: All posts to The Anti-Social List are listed as “permission denied” in the Sina Weibo API, which means they were deleted by Weibo managers, not by users themselves.