On May 4, 2012, Chinese leaders fired a cannonade of editorials through Beijing Daily and three other Beijing-level newspapers criticizing U.S. Ambassador Gary Locke for his meddlesome “little tricks” — relatable, common-man conduct like carrying his own backpack, or buying coffee with discount vouchers.
The suggestion that Locke’s simple gestures were “disgraceful” and showed insufficient respect for China might have found an audience somewhere, but the predominant response to the editorials on Chinese social media seemed to be ridicule. By afternoon of the day the editorials were published, even the search keyword “Beijing Daily” was blocked on Sina Weibo, a virtual admission of propaganda defeat.
Chinese users poked fun at what some clearly saw as the government’s inexplicable objection to honest, genuine and fundamentally human gestures. How exactly should Ambassador Locke act? The following Weibo post, for example, jokingly depicted Locke being subjected to a struggle session of the kind that would have been seen during China’s Cultural Revolution, a placard around his neck listing out his crimes, including “carrying his own backpack.”

The photo’s caption read: “The only way out for Ambassador Locke is to be whole-heartedly corrupt!”
What is perhaps most interesting about Gary Locke’s “little tricks” in China — and perhaps what discomforts Chinese leaders most — is the way Chinese have seized on his actions to reflect back on China’s own political culture. And China’s government has arguably deepened the sense of reflective value by obsessing on Locke’s actions, putting itself in the awkward position of fussing about minutia like backpacks and cups of coffee.
Today, Locke is again grabbing attention for his “little tricks”, this time over a recent exchange with Shanghai third grader Yang Zhimei (杨芷湄), 9, who happens to be the daughter of one of China’s finest investigative reporters, former CMP fellow Yang Haipeng (杨海鹏).
In October 2011, Ambassador Locke made a visit to Shanghai that included a stop at the Museum of Contemporary Art, where he spoke with a number of local primary school students. Yang Zhimei had a brief opportunity to speak with Locke, and her photo was later featured on the website of the U.S. Consulate in Shanghai and in various local media.
Yang Zhimei later made her exchange with Locke the subject of an essay submitted for consideration for China’s Lu Xun Youth Literature Prize. The essay was posted to the competition’s website on May 10, and shared by Zhimei’s father, Yang Haipeng, through his Sina Weibo account yesterday.
The crux of the essay, and of the discussion surrounding it today, is the fact that Ambassador Locke knelt before Yang Zhimei and addressed her at eye level, something that can be seen from several photographs.

A translation of Yang Zhimei’s essay follows:

Ever since I was small I’ve had this dream, that me Dad will “kneel” before me to speak.
My Dad is big and tall, built like a pagoda. Even having grown to this point, I’m a full meter below him, and when I talk to him I have to tilt my head back. While this happens, he’ll answer his phone and start thinking about something else . . . When I can’t say something clearly, he’ll get impatient, and wave me off with his hand: “Go, go go. Go watch that animation flick you like. I’m busy.”
I know he really loves me, but I don’t know how to talk with him. What I like best is going traveling with him. At those times, he’ll have a lot more time, and can patiently listen to what I have to say. He’s more like a “big brother.”
I’ve seen a lot of TV dramas where foreigners will kneel before kids and talk. When the adults kneel they’re the same height as kids, and they can look eye to eye. It looks so amiable. So once I said to my Dad: “Dad, can you kneel when you speak to me?”
Dad would look very amused and smile, saying: “Your Dad is too fat. If he kneels, his pants will split.” Then he’ll laugh this big laugh, and tell me to go back.
It’s really hard to say anything to Dad.
In October last year, I took part in an exhibition of Pixar animation [in Shanghai]. An older woman approached me and said: “Excuse me, little friend, is there something you’d like to ask Ambassador Locke?” This Ambassador Locke she was referring to is an uncle a head shorter than Dad. At the time he was talking to someone else. He’s the U.S. Ambassador, and he was the most important figure in the room. Reporters were clustered around him taking photographs.
Timidly, I went over behind him and said: “Mr. Ambassador, sir, when you were in primary school what was homework like?” The Ambassador turned his head around in surprise and said in English: “Why do you ask this question?” I responded: “This time around, I tested 82 on English, and Mom was really unhappy with me.” I didn’t mention that I was quickly losing faith.
Ambassador Locke and the interpreter “kneeled” down in front of me. I was so surprised I froze. He spoke for more than 10 minutes, and I was terrified by this move of his and all of the camera flashes going off around me. The only thing I remember him saying was that when he was in sixth grade he was just a rookie (菜鸟). One time, he said, he did a really bad thing, and his teacher made him write a self-criticism and even made him read it before the whole class. He thought to himself at the time, I can’t keep on like this, and from that time forward he did his best, becoming a really excellent student.
I don’t remember that much of what he said. My head is just full of that image of him kneeling before me. I can see clearly those eyes of his full of care and love, and those wisps of white hair next to his ears.
At the time, I thought — when will my Dad kneel like this and talk to me?
Later, the photo [of me and Ambassador Locke] made the newspaper. Adults talked about it a lot. Some people admired [what Locke did] while other said “he was just making a show.” A friend of Dad’s who had studied abroad in the United States and come back said all Americans were like this, that they were brought up this way.
My Dad was really in favor of this way of doing things. He said it gave children, who were in a relative position of weakness, a shot at equality. But when I pressed him to “kneel” for me, he only did it twice before things went on just as they had before.
Really, I think it’s much harder for grown ups to change themselves than it is for kids. One time, my Dad told his students that a hundred years ago in Shanghai, it took twenty years to change the habit city residents had of carrying live chickens and ducks through the streets.
I corner Dad and said: “Dad, you say we should speak on terms of equality, but why then can’t you kneel before me to speak like Gary Locke?”
Dad said distractedly that he had hurt his knee hiking in Yunnan, so we could talk about it another time.
I don’t know how long it will be before that “another time” comes.
I dream of the day that I’m just as tall as Dad is. That way he won’t need to kneel before me for us to talk.
On May 8 it was Dad’s birthday and I helped him clean the house. I even made a really pretty card for him. Dad was so happy. He held me and said, “Oh, Sweetheart! Oh, Sweetheart!” Then he asked me what wish I had.
I said to him: “What I want is really simple. If I really am your sweetheart, then please kneel when you talk to me.”

The full Chinese text of Yang Zhimei’s essay follows:

爸爸，请你“跪”下来跟我说话
作者:杨芷湄
上海市江苏路第五小学三（七）班 杨芷湄
从很小的时候，我就有一个梦想：我的爸爸能“跪”下来对我说话。
我的爸爸又胖又高，身体像坐宝塔，我长到现在，还跟他差半米，跟他说话，我要仰着头。中间，他还会接电话，想起什么别的事，拔好手机哇啦哇啦地说一通。我跟他说话，脖子会酸，不知怎么表达。说不清的时候，他会烦躁，扇子一般的大手一挥“去去去，看你的动画片去，我忙着呢”！
我知道他很爱我，但我就是不知道怎样和他说话。我最喜欢和他一起旅行。那时，他会有很多时间，耐心的听我说话，像一个“大哥哥”。
我看电视剧里，有许多外国大人蹲着甚至跪着对小朋友说话，大人蹲下与小朋友一样高，目光可以平视，样子很慈祥。我曾经对爸爸说：“爸爸，你能蹲下来对我说话吗？”
爸爸却嘻皮笑脸地说：“爸爸太胖，蹲下来，裤衩会裂开。”然后哈哈大笑，把我的要求挡回去了。
跟爸爸说句话很不容易。
去年十月，我参加“美国皮克斯动画展”。一个阿姨问我：“小朋友，你想问骆大使一个问题吗？”她所说的骆大使是一个比爸爸个头稍矮的伯伯，正在跟其他人说话。他是美国大使，是这里最大的人物，很多记者围着他拍照片。
我怯怯地走到他身后，说：“大使先生，你小学时候功课怎么样？”大使惊讶地回过头，用英语说：“为什么问这个问题？”我回答道：“我这次英语考了82分，妈妈骂了我。”我没有说自己快没信心了。
骆大使和翻译单膝“跪”在我面前。我惊呆了。他讲了十几分钟，我被他的动作和周围照相机的闪光吓坏了。只听到他说：他在小学六年级前，是只“菜鸟”。有一次，他做了件很坏的事，老师让他写检讨，还让他在全体同学面前读了。他觉得这样下去不行，于是他发奋努力，成为一个优秀的学生。
我没有记住多少他的话。我的脑海只有他们跪下来的画面。我清晰地看到他关爱的眼神，还有耳边的白头发。
那时候，我在想：什么时候我的爸爸，可以跪下来跟我说话？
后来照片上了报纸。大人们讨论很多。有些人赞赏，有些人说“他在作秀”。我爸爸一个美国留学回来的朋友说：美国大人都这样，这是教养。
我爸爸很赞赏这个方式，认为这是给弱者小孩平等的机会。但当我要求他，能不能“跪”下来跟我说话时，他只做了两次，又回到原来的样子。
真的，我觉得大人想改变自己，比小孩都难。有一次，爸爸跟我他的学生说：在一百多年前的上海，改变市民提着活鸡活鸭上公交车的习惯，大约用了二十年。
我插话说：“爸爸，你说应该跟我平等对话，为什么不能像骆家辉一样跪下来跟我说话呢？”
爸爸愣了一下，然后说自己在云南爬山，膝盖坏了，以后再说。
我不知道这个“以后”会多久？
我梦见自己长大，跟爸爸一样高，这样他用不着跪下来跟我说话了。
5月8日，爸爸过生日，我帮他收拾了房间，还制作了漂亮的贺卡。爸爸高兴死了，抱着我“宝贝宝贝”地叫，问我要什么？
我对他说：“我的要求很简单，如果我是你的宝贝，就请你跪下来跟我说话。”
(转自鲁迅青少年文学奖网）

In mid-April 2012, Chinese media exposed the wide-scale use of recycled leather products and other harmful materials in the manufacture of gelatin capsules in the pharmaceutical industry. On April 19, 2012, Sun Zhongshi (孙忠实), an expert at China’s Ministry of Health said on the Strong Nation Forum at People’s Daily Online that people would not ingest too much chromium if they took pills three times a day, two pills each time. So, he said, Chinese should cool down over the poisonous capsules scandal, not assuming capsules were too harmful. At the Economic Observer, Xu Zhiyong, a lawyer and activist, asked: “Chinese, Why Aren’t You Angry?” Xu talked about how issues of consumer safety remained unresolved in China despite continued scandals like the poisonous milk scandal in 2008. In this cartoon, posted by Dayu Manhua (大雨漫画) to his blog at QQ.com, a disturbed Chinese patient uses a pair of chopsticks to pick up medicinal capsules shaped like missiles. The bottle in the foreground is labelled “CAPSULES.”.

In May 2012, the Global Times newspaper, generally known for its jingoistic nationalism and xenophobia, ran a series of editorials highly critical of blind lawyer Chen Guangcheng (陈光诚), whose escape from house arrest in Shandong and refuge in the U.S. Embassy in Beijing had become a major international story. In a May 9 editorial, the paper said Chen had been manipulated by the West. In this cartoon, posted by artist Kuang Biao (邝飚) to Sina Weibo, a brain resembling a human figure kneels down cravenly before the master. Kuang Biao writes to accompany the picture: “Reading the Global Times, I was moved to draw this cartoon.”

With the 18th Party Congress just around the corner, and important questions about political succession in the balance, anyone could have guessed 2012 would be a sensitive year for China’s media. But China has so far exceeded expectations, imposing rigid restrictions on media across the board — from newspapers to social media — and actively and directly using commercial websites and newspapers to advance explicit agendas.
For both the Bo Xilai and Chen Guangcheng stories, examples of control and use of the media are abundant. Most recently, we wrote about how Beijing newspapers were employed last Friday to send a stern message to the United States on its handling of the Chen Guangcheng case, even as the facts and history of Chen’s case were kept entirely out of domestic media.
Back in 2008, and many times afterward, we wrote about Hu Jintao’s media policy, what we termed “Control 2.0.” Essentially, this approach, formalized in Hu Jintao’s speech during a visit to the People’s Daily in June 2008, involved a strategic combination of control and use of the media to accommodate changes to the nature of “news and propaganda work” in information age. Control alone wasn’t enough anymore, said Hu. The Party had to more actively “channel” public opinion by using all sorts of media to get its own version of important stories out.

[ABOVE: President Hu Jintao chats online with web users during a visit to People’s Daily Online in June 2008. Behind him stands Li Changchun, China’s propaganda czar.]
Aside from the build up of domestic web-based platforms like People’s Daily Online, this strategy involved an international push by state media such as Xinhua News Agency and China Central Television. It also involved the more active “use” of a whole new generation of domestic commercial newspapers that had grown since the late 1990s. “With party newspapers, magazines, and television and radio stations in the lead,” Hu Jintao said, “[we must] integrate the metropolitan media (都市类媒体), the Internet media and other various propaganda resources.”
That is exactly what happened last week, as The Beijing News a paper known for its strong professional tradition, was forced to run an editorial critical of the U.S. handling of the Chen Guangcheng case.
But while China’s leaders have shown a renewed determination — desperation? — to employ press controls to maintain a white-fisted grip on the agenda, they have unwittingly exposed the cost and limitations of control in the face of a networked public with a keen interest in social, economic and political affairs.
This was patently clear last Friday, as the Beijing editorials were widely criticized on Sina Weibo, so that by day’s end China’s censors had to turn on their own propaganda.

[ABOVE: A search in Chinese for “Beijing Daily” returns a message saying the results cannot be shown “according to relevant laws, regulations and policies”.]
Friday culminated with an oblique show of courage posted by The Beijing News to its official Weibo at midnight, an admission that it had been forced to run the Chen Guangcheng editorial against its own conscience: “In the still of the deep night, removing that mask of insincerity, we say to our true selves, “I am sorry.” Goodnight.”
Events like those we saw last Friday may suggest that the growth and popularity of social media in China has substantially raised the political cost of media control and other forms of repression.
Whether or not one believes it is politically necessary, media control is a dirty business, and its mechanics are best kept hidden. This is why propaganda directives to media in China have traditionally been delivered by phone and during informal “breeze sessions.” It is also why social media platforms like Sina Weibo have done their utmost to minimize the experience of censorship — for example, by leaving deleted posts on users’ personal pages even as they are invisible to others.
Thanks to Weibo, China’s active censorship of ideas is something millions of Chinese experience daily and directly. And if, like me, you’re a foreign user of Weibo, you too can experience the joys of having your carefully-crafted Chinese sentences “harmonized.”
But while social media controls may be a matter of necessity for China’s jittery leaders, the very act could have a long-term corrosive effect on the Party’s credibility.
We have another good example of this tension today as the tactics of China’s security police have been openly exposed on social media — even as censors have tirelessly removed the traces.
The Sina Weibo account of Wang Xiaoshan, a prominent blogger and activist in China, was apparently removed yesterday. Speaking to the South China Morning Post, Wang said the decision was not Sina’s, although he did not elaborate.
Wang Xiaoshan, writer Murong Xuecun and Zuo Yeben (作业本) — all users discussed intently on Weibo today — were active in the case of blind lawyer Chen Guangcheng.
A blog post by Beijing-based journalist Paul Mooney back in November 2011 makes a record based on an account by writer Murong Xuecun of the involvement of both Zuo Yeben and Wang Xiaoshan in an attempt to visit Chen Guangcheng while he was under house arrest last year.
Murong Xuecun recalls:

Zuo Yeben got a van for us, and helped us plan our trip. To prevent the unexpected, Wang Xiaoshan and I left our wallets and credit cards with our friend Yang Ruichun. We took our IDs and some cash. We mulled over the prospect of travelling back to a previous age. Inside, each of us tried to give ourselves a pep talk: the worst thing that can happen is that you get a beating. Don’t be scared.

Posting on Sina Weibo today, users discussed the dismantling of Wang Xiaoshan’s account, some posting memorial messages — like this one with a single candle emoticon and the words, “In remembrance of Wang Xiaoshan.”

[ABOVE: A Weibo post on May 9, 2012, expresses condolences to Wang Xiaoshan for the removal of his social media account on Sina.]
By noon, however, Wang Xiaoshan’s account was apparently reinstated, as was Murong Xuecun’s (which some had reported was down for a time). But there was news of trouble for Zuo Yeben. As this user posted:

@WangXiaoshan has come back to life, but we have lost @ZuoYeben
@王小山 复活了，可是我们丢了@作业本

In fact, Zuo Yeben’s story played out more or less live on social media, as he was taken away by state security and the, eventually, returned home.
In a Weibo message posted at around 9:54am, documented by a Shanghai-based Weibo user in this post, Zuo Yeben wrote: “Three state security officers have taken me to a hotel . . . in the capital, opened up a room and said they want me to cooperate with their investigation. Things are fine right now.”
The Weibo user from Shanghai responded: “I hope this isn’t the last post [from Zuo Yeben]. I’m re-posting it first, so everybody can keep it in evidence.”

Finally, in a message posted at 12:49pm, Zuo Yeben said: “We’ve finished talking and we’re leaving the hotel now. I’m on the road home, I’ll post a text-as-image file in a bit. :)”
That post drew 1,796 reposts and 2,786 comments within 30 minutes, all messages of support.
At 1:24pm, Wang Xiaoshan re-posted the news of Zuo Yeben leaving the hotel on his resuscitated Sina Weibo account: “In these troubled times, it’s good if only the people themselves are OK,” Wang wrote.

At 2:38pm, Zuo Yeben finally posted his text-as-image account of his visit with security police, omitting the details of what was discussed (presumably dealing with Chen Guangcheng). Zuo’s post was called “My First Time” and began: “The sun is shining today, and there is a slight breeze in the streets. But I never thought that today would be the first day that I would disappear.”

The following post by Liu Buchen (刘步尘) on the editorial attack last week against the United States and its ambassador to China, Gary Locke, was deleted from Sina Weibo sometime before 6:02am Hong Kong time today, May 7, 2012. Liu Buchen, a corporate public relations expert who frequently writes for Chinese media, including Southern Metropolis Daily, currently has more than 197,000 followers, according to numbers from Sina Weibo. [More on deleted posts at the WeiboScope Search, by the Journalism and Media Studies Centre].

Let’s see whether you dare make a show before the Chinese people again.

Liu Buchen’s post is a caption for a striking Photoshopped image that depicts U.S. Ambassador Gary Locke being persecuted in the way typical during China’s Cultural Revolution. He kneels down to face bitter criticism and physical abuse, a placard hung around his neck. Locke’s name in Chinese. Luo Jiahui (骆家辉), is crossed out. The text above it reads as list of supposed crimes, such as “buying coffee with discount coupons” and “carrying your own backpack.” These man-in-the-street gestures by Locke since he began serving as ambassador last year have drawn a great deal of attention on China’s social media, but the official editorials on May 4 accused Locke of using “little tricks.”
The large caption immediately below the image of the kneeling Locke reads: “The only way out for Ambassador Locke is to be whole-heartedly corrupt!”

Liu Buchen’s original Chinese post follows:

看你还敢给中国人作秀。

NOTE: All posts to The Anti-Social List are listed as “permission denied” in the Sina Weibo API, which means they were deleted by Weibo managers, not by users themselves.

News readers in China today woke to a cannonade of coordinated editorial attacks on American “scheming” over the case of blind lawyer Chen Guangcheng, much of it directed at U.S. Ambassador Gary Locke. The editorials, which were all published in top newspapers under the control of Beijing’s city leadership, should be understood, in our view, as China’s attempt to send a strong message on the Chen Guangcheng case while dissociating this criticism from the Chinese state per se in the midst of bilateral meetings.
Essentially, China wants to make a fuss, but prefers what you might call a “medium fuss” to a full-blown fuss through central Party organs like the People’s Daily or through the official Xinhua News Agency.

[ABOVE: An editorial in today’s Beijing Daily has strong words for the United States and the “hostile forces” of the West.]
The “Why Beijing?” question also puzzled Chinese readers today, such as Sichuan television journalist Miao Hong (妙红), who posed the question on Sina Weibo: “What puzzles me is: why is it Beijing Daily?”
In total, four editorials were run today (we’re excepting the Global Times), all in paper’s formally overseen by city-level Party leaders. The most confrontational of the editorials came from Beijing Daily, the official mouthpiece of Beijing’s Municipal Party Committee and its top leader, Liu Qi (刘淇).
That editorial, which accused U.S. Ambassador Gary Locke of playing “little tricks”, said that blind activist Chen Guangcheng represented not ordinary Chinese but only his “backstage boss, namely the interests of the hostile forces of the West.” It said Chen had become “a tool and pawn by which politicians in the United States blacken China.”
Editorials were also run in the Beijing Times and The Beijing News — which came under the management of Beijing city leaders only late last year — and Beijing Youth Daily, which is published by the Beijing chapter of the Chinese Communist Youth League.
The inclusion of the Beijing Times and The Beijing News in the editorial mix today was of particular note, as until recently both papers, which have substantial circulations, were central-level publications — the former a spin-off of the People’s Daily, the latter under Guangming Daily. The Beijing News in particular has long had a reputation as one of China’s top professional newspapers, and its brazen use in today’s salvo was upsetting to many Chinese journalists.
Veteran news editor and former CMP fellow Gong Xiaoyue (龚晓跃) wrote on Sina Weibo: “The Beijing News has been raped. And Beijing Daily has again screwed out a climax. No one seems to have any shame.”
The editorial on page A3 of today’s The Beijing News, “Foreign Diplomats Cannot Overstep Their Own Role” (外交官不能逾越自己的本分), employs far less severe language than the Beijing Daily editorial, but criticizes the United States over the Cheng Guangcheng affair: “Over this incident, some American diplomatic personnel have beyond a doubt played a disreputable role,” it said.

[ABOVE: Page A3 of today’s The Beijing News with an editorial critical of the U.S. handling of the Chen Guangcheng case.]
The Beijing Youth Daily editorial, run on page 2, was called, “Making a ‘Show’ Does Not Serve the Preservation of the Overall U.S.-China Relationship” (“作秀”无助于维护中美关系大局). The editorial directly criticized Ambassador Locke for what it depicted as his willful dramatization of Chen Guangcheng’s departure from the U.S. embassy.

When Chen Guangcheng left the American Embassy in China on May 2, Ambassador Gary Locke was all drama and flair (大秀特秀). Not only did he “personally” escort Chen Guangcheng to a hospital in Beijing, but in the hospital he “personally” pushed Chen Guangcheng’s wheelchair, both of them appearing before the glare of the foreign media.

[ABOVE: Page 2 of today’s Beijing Youth Daily carries an editorial, second from the top, criticizing the U.S. handling of the Chen Guangcheng case.]
In fact, the real impact of the editorials within China is inconclusive. By the end of the day much of the attention inside China had turned not on the United States or Chen, but on the editorials themselves and what they had to say about China’s own message and methods.
Writing on Sina Weibo, one of China’s most popular social media platforms, one user remarked: “Beijing Daily can only represent the views of itself! What era is this we’re living in? . . . We still have these people trying to make personal political gains. They go against the arguments and ideas of civilization . . . The most apt market for them would be North Korea, not a modern-day China in which Deng’s reform and opening polices are advocated.”
“Every sentence in that stupid editorial in Beijing Daily is full of blather,” said one user on Weibo. They continued satirically: “It’s been a long time since I’ve seen an article of such a high standard.”
“Just ace!” wrote one user on Sina Weibo before invoking Premier Wen Jiabao’s recent warning in the midst of the ouster of Chongqing leader Bo Xilai, in which Wen said China risked repeated the horrors of the Cultural Revolution. “It seems that it’s not just possible that the Cultural Revolution might be repeated. It’s already being repeated at Beijing Daily!”
A user listed as being from Liaoning province remarked snidely on a line from the Beijing Daily editorial meant to criticize American diplomats: “Beijing Daily says that the 1.3 billion people of China aren’t so easily deceived. I do agree with that sentence.” To which another user responded: “I hope that starting from tomorrow the Beijing Daily bears that sentence in mind every day: the 1.3 billion people of China aren’t so easily deceived.”
Another journalist writing on Sina Weibo today said that “the Global Times and Beijing Daily aren’t media but are clubs wielded by the Party, tools of the emperor, the watchdogs of certain groups.”
Caixin Media, the professional news outfit run by former Caijing magazine founder and editor-in-chief Hu Shuli (胡舒立), noted on its official Weibo account:

[Media Under Management of Beijing Municipal Propaganda Department, Beijing Commission of the Chinese Communist Youth League Criticize U.S. Conduct Over Chen Incident] Beijing Daily, the Beijing Times, The Beijing News and Beijing Youth Daily have issued relevant commentaries. For the commentaries see this link. Up to now, Chinese media and Chinese authorities have not reported the full sequence of events in the Chen affair.

[ABOVE: A Weibo post from Caixin Media sends readers to coverage of today’s Beijing editorials and notes that the facts of the Chen Guangcheng case have not been shared with Chinese.]
The second link in the Caixin Media post directed readers to a full synopsis of the commentaries appearing today in Beijing media. In its pull-out summary at the top of the article, Caixin noted that the Beijing media had singled Chen Guangcheng out as “a representative anti-social and anti-institution figure” (反社会、反体制的代表人物).
While the Caixin piece sticks to the basic facts about today’s spate of editorials, its implications seem clear enough — that these editorials misrepresent the Chen case to the public, which has had no access to the full facts of Cheng Guangcheng’s case.
In clear contradiction to the inflammatory language of today’s Beijing Daily editorial, Jerome Cohen has noted repeatedly Chen Guangcheng’s explicit interest in resolving his rights concerns through China’s institutions.

You know, Chen Guangcheng said to me once, why can’t I go into court and settle these problems? Do they want me to go into the streets? I don’t want to go into the streets.

Translated portions of the editorial in Beijing Daily follow:

“Reading the Measly Performance of U.S. Politicians through the Cheng Guangcheng Affair”
Beijing Daily
May 4, 2012
Page 3
. . . The United States and other Western countries have paid particular attention to Chen Guangcheng for some time. It is through the packaging of the United States and Western media that this so-called “rights defense hero” has been marked as a striking political symbol, and has become established as representative figure opposing society and opposing the system. But looking at again at the situation, it is clear that Chen Guangcheng cannot represent very many. Who he really represents is the backstage boss, namely the interests of the hostile forces of the West. Chen Guangcheng has already become a tool and pawn by which politicians in the United States blacken China. . .
. . . It must be said that for some time, the American Embassy in China and the new U.S ambassador to China, Gary Locke, have used various means that are incommensurate with their roles and responsibilities — their “little tricks” have continued unabated. This causes people to ask, is it the role of this ambassador to do his utmost to advance the U.S.-China relationship, bridge gaps and eliminate misunderstandings, or is it to hatch schemes and bound out into Chinese society to make trouble, manufacturing new and greater fissures between China and the United States.
. . . If the United States truly wishes to develop a good long-term relationship with China, then it must not persist in pandering to, and even encouraging, extreme language and actions from a few that damage the stability of Chinese society. By the same token, if Gary Locke wants to serve as a good ambassador then he must be more earnest and serious, not employing these under-the-table deals, these ugly little affairs that only bring disgrace to himself. . .
Today, the importance of the U.S.-China relationship cannot be over-estimated. But what is shot through with contradictions is that American politicians will so lightly make a show of these actions that show insufficient maturity and are insufficiently dignified, so that it seems they always are looking to upset China, so that it seems they are alway looking to seek trouble out in Chinese society. The Chen Guangcheng affair is one example. And for the discerning these kinds of actions are vulgar and clumsy. The facts show that the principles obstacle to the advancement of U.S.-China relations lies with the United States. The United State must learn to respect China’s core interests. It must learn to treat with China on the basis of equality. “Do unto others as you would have the do unto you.” Holding up the banners of “human rights”, “freedom” and “democracy” to make trouble will only expose one’s own ugliness, and will have no impact on China. Nor is it good for the United States.
In advancing U.S.-China relations, there must be equality and mutual understanding. As to the differences that exist, these must be resolved satisfactorily through dialogue and exchange, enhancing mutual understanding in order to avoid impacting the larger climate of U.S.-China relations. It should be said that in handling U.S.-China relations China’s attitude is consistent, candid and practical. For a win-win relationship between the U.S. and China, “the way to get along” must be through mutual respect and mutual cooperation. If American politicians can set aside their messy and twisted thinking (歪心思) and read up thoroughly on the canon of U.S.-China relations, then the interest of the people of both China and the United States can be satisfied.

A leadership change announced today at the top of one of China’s most important media groups, the Guangzhou-based Nanfang Daily Media Group, could herald new troubles ahead for its longstanding culture of relative editorial independence.
According to a news report from Caixin Media today — which happens to be World Press Freedom Day — the position of party secretary at the Nanfang Daily Media Group will now be held by Yang Jian (杨健), who serves also as a deputy minister in Guangdong’s provincial propaganda department.
This is the first time a top position at the group will be held by an “outsider,” sources say, and the first time the top positions — party secretary (党委书记) and director (社长) — will be held separately.
“There were several attempts in the past to install Party officials at the top level of the Nanfang Daily Group, but these attempts were always successfully opposed by the group,” one former top editor told CMP.

[ABOVE: Yang Jian, former deputy propaganda minister of Guangdong and previously head of Xinhua News Agency’s Guangdong bureau, will take over as party secretary of the Nanfang Daily Media Group.]
In the past, the top positions at the Nanfang Daily Media Group have been held by a single individual emerging from within the group and respectful of its unique, often pioneering character as a news organization. Former directors like Fan Yijin (范以锦), who participated in the launch of professionally-inclined newspapers like Southern Weekend and The Beijing News, have commanded respect within the organization and in the Chinese journalism profession at large.
Yang Xingfeng (杨兴锋), who is stepping aside as party secretary at the group to make room for Yang Jian, will reportedly continue to serve as the group’s director.
Yang Xingfeng began work as a news reporter at Nanfang Daily in 1982 and rose through the organization, becoming the group’s editor-in-chief in 2001 and party secretary and director in November 2006.
The irony of this move at the top of one of China’s top press groups coming on World Press Freedom Day did not escape users on Sina Weibo. “On World Press Freedom Day, there is change at the Nanfang Daily Group,” wrote one user, linking to the report from Caixin Media on ifeng.com.
Another user wrote: “There’s a personnel change at the Nanfang Daily Group. Will it be readable after this?”
But perhaps the best indication of what the change at the top at the Nanfang Daily Media Group could mean came in a post made to a verified Sina Weibo account by an “investigator” for the Hubei provincial propaganda department:

The Nanfang Daily Group’s public opinion guidance will now be more correct, and more authoritative!
南方报业的舆论导向将更准确、权威！

The following post by journalist Xiong Peiyun (熊培云) on China’s demand for an apology from the U.S. over the Cheng Guangcheng affair was deleted from Sina Weibo sometime before 6:02am Hong Kong time today, May 3, 2012. Xiong Peiyun currently has more than 181,000 followers, according to numbers from Sina Weibo. [More on deleted posts at the WeiboScope Search, by the Journalism and Media Studies Centre].

How can you not be ashamed that a dignified citizen must flee inside his own country? You must live up to the sun that shines every day across this land. Sixty years [of CCP rule], and what this country needs is to settle its soul. What it needs is a set of core values the people of the nation can be proud of. What this country needs is its own way [and principles], not an apology from another country. I’ve heard the saying, “A just cause deserves abundant support, and an unjust cause must find little support” (得道多助，失道寡助). But I’ve never heard the saying, “An apology deserves abundant support, and no apology must find little support” (得道歉多助，失道歉寡助).

Xiong Peiyun’s original Chinese post follows. Readers may note that in his final line Xiong is playing on the popular saying by replacing “way/principles/morals”, or dao, with “apology”, or daoqian (道歉):

你怎能不羞愧于一个堂堂正正的公民在自己的国家逃亡？你要对得住太阳每天还在照着这片土地。六十余年了，这个国家需要安顿自己的灵魂，需要有让本国国民引以为傲的价值观，这个国家最需要的是自己的道，而不是他国的道歉。我听过“得道多助，失道寡助”的，没听过“得道歉多助，失道歉寡助”的。

NOTE: All posts to The Anti-Social List are listed as “permission denied” in the Sina Weibo API, which means they were deleted by Weibo managers, not by users themselves.