Author: David Bandurski

Now Executive Director of the China Media Project, leading the project’s research and partnerships, David originally joined the project in Hong Kong in 2004. He is the author of Dragons in Diamond Village (Penguin), a book of reportage about urbanization and social activism in China, and co-editor of Investigative Journalism in China (HKU Press).

Can China really be called a people's republic?

The following re-post by prominent Chinese legal scholar He Weifang (贺卫方) was deleted from Sina Weibo sometime before 5:32pm Hong Kong time yesterday, March 14, 2012. He Weifang currently has more than 421,000 followers, according to numbers from Sina Weibo. [More on deleted posts at the WeiboScope Search, by the Journalism and Media Studies Centre].
He Weifang’s post was accompanied with the following image, a large white character for “difficulty”, or nan (难), on a black background.


He Weifang’s post with the image reads:

For more than 20 years we’ve shouted for a system for declaring the assets of officials (官员的财产申报制度), but the conditions [we are told] are still not right, the environment not right. But [changes to the criminal code] allowing for such things as residential surveillance, the extended detention of designated suspects without notification of their families, and the expansion of the search powers of the government, all these can thunder right up to the top of the agenda, and pass without the least obstacle. With the contrast of these two we have reason to ask: can this country of ours really be called a people’s republic?

The changes to the criminal code to which He Weifang were passed yesterday by the National People’s Congress.
The original Chinese-language post from Zheng Wei follows:

官员的财产申报制度呼喊了二十多年,还是条件不成熟,环境不具备。指定地点监视居住、特定犯罪嫌疑人拘留长时间不通知家人、公权力侦查手段的扩张等却可以迅雷不及掩耳之势上会,很可能畅通无阻地通过。两相比较,我们有理由质问:我们这个国还算得上是人民共和国么?


NOTE: All posts to The Anti-Social List are listed as “permission denied” in the Sina Weibo API, which means they were deleted by Weibo managers, not by users themselves.

The future begins with remembering the past

There are so many questions at a press conference, and they generally deal with all sorts of issues. But facing two entirely different questions yesterday, Premier Wen Jiabao mentioned China’s [1981] Resolution on Certain Questions in the History of Our Party since the Founding of the Republic twice. And that is something significant indeed.
Following President Hu Jintao’s mention of the Resolution in his July 1, 2011, speech to commemorate the Party’s 90th anniversary, the resurfacing of the Resolution in yesterday’s context is important and unforgettable. To review, Premier Wen Jiabao made the following two mentions of the Resolution.
First Mention: The Resolution in the Context of Political Reform
Answering a question from The Straits Times, Premier Wen Jiabao said that while the Party had, after the breaking up of the Gang of Four (四人帮), made a resolution concerning problems in its history and had carried out economic reform and opening, the impact of the errors of the Cultural Revolution and of feudalism had never been eliminated.
Further, Wen pointed out: “Reforms are now at a crucial stage (攻坚阶段), and without the success of political reforms, economic reforms cannot possibly be carried out fully, the gains we have already made stand to be lost, and we will be unable to fundamentally resolve newly emerging problems. There is also the possibility that we might repeat such historical tragedies as the Cultural Revolution.”
Second Mention: The Resolution in the Context of the Wang Lijun Incident
Answering a question from a Reuters reporter about his views on the Wang Lijun (王立军) case and whether it “would affect the central government’s confidence in the Chongqing government”, Premier Wen first addressed the issue of the investigation of Wang. He said “the people would have an answer, and that would be tested by the law and by history.” He went on to state clearly that, “the current Chongqing Party and government leadership must engage in reflection, earnestly drawing lessons from the Wang Lijun incident.”
Afterward, Wen clearly had something prepared. He mentioned the Resolution again and said: “We have traveled a winding path, and we have drawn lessons from this. Since the Third Plenum of the 11th Central Committee, and particularly with the central Party’s resolution on certain questions in our history, we made liberation of thought and seeking the truth through facts (实事求是) the basic ideological line of the Party, and we made the critical choice of opening and reform, which determined China’s destiny and prospects.” He added: “History tells us that all practices that accord with the interests of the people must be earnestly draw on the lessons of experience, and must withstand the test of history and experience.”
Connecting the two instances above we can see that the Resolution is mentioned first in connection with the Cultural Revolution and second with an emphasis on having a sense of history and of the important lessons of history.
In his second response, Wen Jiabao emphasizes that the authorities in Chongqing must draw on the lessons of the Wang Lijun incident, and then he talks about the lessons of the Cultural Revolution. In the first response, Wen voices concern that political reforms might be avoided and even that the Cultural Revolution might be replayed. Without a doubt, the re-mentioning of the Resolution again reveals a concern that the Cultural Revolution might be repeated.
Approved by the Sixth Plenum of the 11th Central Committee of the CPC in June 1981, the Resolution on Certain Questions in the History of Our Party since the Founding of the Republic offered a review and assessment of the 32 years since the founding of the People’s Republic of China. The most substantial thing about the Resolution was its complete rejection of the Cultural Revolution of May 1966 to October 1976, which was ruled as having been “erroneously initiated by [Party] leaders and manipulated by counterrevolutionary cliques, and bringing serious disaster and internal chaos to the Party, the nation and our people.” The Cultural Revolution “had not in any sense been, nor could it ever be, a revolution or mark of social progress.”
There has been debate ever since about the Resolution and its limitations. But whatever the case, the critical importance of such a senior-level rejection of the Cultural Revolution cannot be denied.
This year brings the 46th anniversary of the onset of the Cultural Revolution, and the 36th anniversary of its end. This history is not so far behind us, and yet two generations already have been shielded from it. In China today the memory of that period of internal chaos is not so keen. A museum to the Cultural Revolution proposed by the aging writer Ba Jin (巴金) has still not been built, and so much of the history of the Cultural Revolution has not been richly observed or examined. Files on that episode in our history remain “secret,” and the healthy process of academic research and discussion in the media has been routinely inhibited.
In the face of a “collective amnesia” in our society, some have defended the Cultural Revolution. And as others have even called rancorously for another Cultural Revolution, this has found some measure of sympathy. When Premier Wen Jiabao said that the influence of the Cultural Revolution had not been entirely eliminated, this was in fact an important and accurate assessment on the part of the collective central leadership.
Older generations do not dare look back, while our younger generations don’t have the remotest inkling of the Cultural Revolution. But can we truly forget it? At the very least, the Premier, in his final press conference at the “two meetings”, suggested that we do not have the right to forget.
The above is a translation of an opinion piece posted by Hu Shuli to Caixin Online on March 14, 2012.
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[NOTE: Hu Shuli’s commentary above was also reposted to the top of the commentary section at QQ.com on March 15, 2012. A screenshot follows.]

Real-name Weibo, for the good of all

This week Li Yizhong (李毅中), the former director of China’s Ministry of Industry and Information Technology (MIIT), spoke with the Beijing Times newspaper and QQ.com about the development of new media in China and related issues, including real-name registration for social media. Li also had time for a quip about Google’s exit from China.
Li, who is attending the “two meetings” in Beijing this week as a member of the Economics Committee of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC), said that real-name registration on China’s social media platforms, a policy formally taking effect on March 16, was meant to ensure “the privacy and secrecy of individuals, corporations and the nation.”


[ABOVE: Today’s edition of the Beijing Times with an interview with Li Yizhong.]
Responding to a question about Google’s “exit” from the China market and rumors that they were working on a re-entry, Li quipped that “if they wish to come back to China again, let them take this up with the relevant [government] departments.”
A partial translation of the internet with Li follows:

Beijing Times: When you were in your position [as director of MIIT], Google made its exit from China. Recently, Google has said it wants to return to China. What do you think about this?
Li Yizhong: Really? They didn’t bother to tell me (big laugh). Any multinational company in China will see a great return so long as they abide by Chinese laws. At that time they had been in China for three years and had 30 percent of the search engine market. They were free to enter or exit, but ultimately they made a trade-off. They partly went to Hong Kong, and partly stayed in mainland China. If they wish to come back to China again, let them take this up with the relevant [government] departments.
Beijing Times: Right now Weibo [microblogs] and other social media [in China] are making a trial run of real-name registration. How do you view this?
Li Yizhong: He he. Each question you ask goes even deeper. According to my own research, real-name registration for the internet is done by many countries around the world. But first it requires a basis in the law. In the mobile phone sector now we’re only at about 58 percent real-name registered, and about 40 percent of the market remains unregistered. This is a process, and it has to be explained. The trials with real-name registration on the Weibo are for the sake of the orderly and healthy development of the internet — in order to protect the privacy and secrecy of individuals, corporations and the nation.
Beijing Times: People within the [internet] industry often remark that the monopoly of [broadband services] by providers has created a situation in which [internet] speeds are low and prices high. Moreover, the National Development and Reform Commission has said it is conducting an investigation into monopoly practices by China Unicom (中国联通) and China Telecom (中国电信).
Li Yizhong: It’s not right to trace every problem back to monopolies. There is competition among the three major providers. I’ve noticed that in this year’s government work report [delivered by Premier Wen Jiabao at the outset of the National People’s Congress this week] already clearly states that private investment will be allowed to enter the telecoms sector. Right now the various [government] agencies are working to formulate concrete plans. The three major providers are all listed companies with about 30 percent social capital (社会资金) investment, so there’s private capital (民间资本) and even foreign investment (外资). In the future it will be opened up even more, allowing private capital (民营资本) to [further] enter the telecoms sector. There’s no question about this. To put it bluntly, the telecoms sector in any country is regarded as core infrastructure (基础设施) and is given great priority. Before we entered the World Trade Organization (WTO), China was not open on the domestic telecoms front, and in the future we will further open it up.

Images of urban brutality

The following re-post by He Bing (何兵), deputy dean of the law school at China University of Political Science and Law, was deleted from Sina Weibo sometime before 8:01am Hong Kong time today, March 9, 2012. He Bing currently has more than 164,000 followers, according to numbers from Sina Weibo. [More on deleted posts at the WeiboScope Search, by the Journalism and Media Studies Centre].
He Bing’s post includes an image of apparently badly beaten Chinese — presumably rural migrants in the city — leaning against the front of a van that reads “Urban Management Enforcement” (城管执法). Urban management personnel, or chengguan, were established in the 1990s in China, ostensibly to maintain order in China’s cities as they were flooded with migrants from the countryside. All chengguan, which are known nationwide for their brutality, are constituted at the city level.


He Bing’s post with the image reads:

So this is where national administration (国家治理) has brought us. Some people say that we are experiencing glory not seen since time immemorial, others that we are seeing chaos that we have not experienced since time immemorial. We could just say we are seeing wonders (奇迹) such as we have not seen since time immemorial.

The original Chinese-language post from Zheng Wei follows:

国家治理成现在这个样。有人说是旷古未有的盛世,有人说是旷古未有的乱世。总之是旷古未有的奇迹。

Sina Weibo user @dominedeus responded to He Bing’s post by asking: “Have you verified that the photo is accurate?” To which He Bing somewhat snidely answered, in a post also deleted: “What, you think these are false charges trumped up by female spies for the Kuomintang?”


NOTE: All posts to The Anti-Social List are listed as “permission denied” in the Sina Weibo API, which means they were deleted by Weibo managers, not by users themselves.

National People's Congress fashion watch

The following re-post by Qian Gang (钱钢), the director of the China Media Project, was deleted from Sina Weibo sometime before 3:24pm Hong Kong time yesterday, March 8, 2012. Qian Gang currently has just under 945,000 followers, according to numbers from Sina Weibo. [More on deleted posts at the WeiboScope Search, by the Journalism and Media Studies Centre].
Qian Gang’s re-post is of an original post (also deleted) by Zheng Wei (郑维), a reporter at the Singapore Straits Times who currently has just over 30,000 followers on Weibo. Zheng Wei’s post includes images of various National People’s Congress delegates appearing in news coverage this week, with blow-up images of the fashion they are wearing (and its prices) off to the right.


Zheng Wei’s post with the image reads:

I saw this a Tencent, so I’ll pass it on. What brands are National People’s Congress delegates representing this year?

The original Chinese-language post from Zheng Wei follows:

在腾讯看到的,转过来。人大代表,代言哪些品牌?


NOTE: All posts to The Anti-Social List are listed as “permission denied” in the Sina Weibo API, which means they were deleted by Weibo managers, not by users themselves.

The NPC, Jokers and Clowns?


The annual session of China’s national legislature, the National People’s Congress (NPC), began in China’s Great Hall of the People on March 5, 2012. While the NPC is technically the highest organ of state power in China, its still the Chinese Communist Party that calls the shots, and his highly ritualized event is generally regarded by pundits outside China (and may Chinese) as having little real political significance — and its “delegates” certainly not being representative of the Chinese people. The following cartoon, posted by artist Crazy Crab to his WordPress blog hosted outside China, needs no introduction. It depicts a congress of pigs in a setting very much resembling China’s Great Hall of the People painted as clowns and wearing joker hats. Crazy Crab is a Chinese cartoonist now living overseas who uses the internet and social media to distribute his cartoons inside China.

On fortified police vehicles outside the NPC

The following re-post by Qian Gang (钱钢), the director of the China Media Project, was deleted from Sina Weibo sometime before 11:21am Hong Kong time yesterday, March 7, 2012. Qian Gang currently has just under 945,000 followers, according to numbers from Sina Weibo. [More on deleted posts at the WeiboScope Search, by the Journalism and Media Studies Centre].
Qian Gang’s re-post is a response to another re-post by Chen Youxi (陈有西), a well-known lawyer with more than 92,000 followers on Sina Weibo. Both Qian Gang and Chen Youxi are responding in turn to another (since deleted) post by Yu Guang (俞光), the editor-in-chief of Air Travel (航旅) magazine, in which he posted an image (now unavailable) of police vehicles outside the Great Hall of the People, where the National People’s Congress is now going on. Yu Guang wrote: “The police vehicles parked outside the Great Hall of the People aren’t your ordinary police vehicles. They even have iron spikes sticking out. Just look at how unusual.”
Qian Gang and Chen Youxi responded:

Please give ordinary Chinese freedom from terror!//@ChenYouxi: I can not know the model of the vehicle, but I do know that Tiananmen Square is a public space, not a battlefield or a place under martial law. For this kind of vehicle to be driven onto a public space endangers public safety. This is basic legal knowledge. The Road and Transportation Safety Law (道路交通安全法) and the traffic rules of the Public Security Bureau clearly stipulate that [such vehicles] cannot be driven on [public] roads. Public power doesn’t enjoy special privileges, and must set the example. This should particularly be the case during the two meetings [of the National People’s Congress and Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference].

The original Chinese-language post from Qian Gang, with Chen Youxi’s post included, follows:

请给百姓免于恐惧的自由!//@陈有西: 我可以不知道车型号的设计,但是知道天安门广场是公众场所,不是战场和戒严时期场所.这种车开到公共场所,就已经危及公共安全.这是基本法律常识.<道路交通安全法>和公安部交通规章有明确规定不得上路.公权无特权,更要模范遵守.特别是两会期间


NOTE: All posts to The Anti-Social List are listed as “permission denied” in the Sina Weibo API, which means they were deleted by Weibo managers, not by users themselves.

Making sense of China's "public safety" spending

A finance official responding to questions over China’s central government budget, under deliberation at the National People’s Congress (NPC) this week, seems to have created only more confusion over the country’s spending on internal security.
Facing questions from Southern Metropolis Daily, a commercial newspaper based in the southern city of Guangzhou, a representative from the Ministry of Finance rejected reports from international media last year saying spending on domestic security in China had outpaced defense spending, and that these expenditures were being used for “stability preservation” — referring to the policy of maintaining social stability by mobilizing domestic security forces to put down rising incidents of social unrest.
Questioned by the newspaper about public security spending, which in the current draft budget under review at the NPC stands at 701.76 billion yuan against defense spending of 670.27 billion yuan, the Ministry of Finance representative said that “public security” included spending on such things as public transportation and construction safety.
The representative accused foreign media of “intentionally misconstruing” the budget numbers.
During last year’s session of the National People’s Congress, international media reported that China’s spending on internal security had for the first time surpassed military spending. These numbers, however, were never widely reported by Chinese media last year.
Writing on Sina Weibo today, Xie Wen (谢文), an IT expert and former general manager for Yahoo! China, asked how expenditures like public transportation and sanitation could possibly be included in the central government budget for public safety:

I don’t understand. Is public transportation public safety? Is public health not budgeted under health? Is construction safety not included within construction budgets?


[ABOVE: Urban management personnel, charged with maintaining “public safety” in China’s cities, hustle a balloon seller in a video posted to China’s web.
A translation of the report from Southern Metropolis Daily follows:

Stability Preservation Surpasses 700 Billion Yuan? Ministry of Finance: This is a Misrepresentation
Southern Metropolis Daily
March 7, 2012
Wang Haiyan (王海艳)
Beijing — Foreign media have reported that today China’s budget for stability preservation has already surpassed 700 billion yuan, more than its defense budget (军费预算). Yesterday, someone from the Ministry of Finance refuted this, saying that these expenditures were for public safety (公共安全), and that foreign media had misrepresented [the figures].
Yesterday, reporters from Southern Metropolis Daily consulted the “Report on the Situation of Central and Local Budget Implementation in 2011, and Draft Central and Local Budget for 2012” (关于2011年中央和地方预算执行情况与2012年中央和地方预算草案的报告), to be discussed at the National People’s Congress, and discovered that the section “Situation in Preparation of National Public Financing Expenditures for 2012” (2012年全国公共财政支出预算安排情况) states that this year the national defense budget will stand at 670.27 billion yuan, and the budget for public safety (公共安全) will stand at 701.76 billion yuan.
A relevant person with the Ministry of Finance explained that public safety includes the categories of public health (公共卫生), public transportation (公共交通), construction safety (建筑安全) and many others, and this cannot all be construed as stability preservation spending. For example, expenditures for strengthening the food safety inspection and detection capacity of grassroots regulators, and for promoting food safety protections, are also included in the budget. Foreign media, [they said], had deliberately misrepresented [the figures], intentionally building up [the story].
This [ministry] person said that with the exception of the United States and France, expenditures on public safety by most countries in the world surpass military spending. Therefore, [they said], it is normal for spending on public safety in China to surpass military spending.

Web censors not amused by Falun Gong jest

The following post by Tian Weihua (田炜华), the director of Chief Financial Officer magazine, was deleted from Sina Weibo sometime before 12:16am Hong Kong time today, March 7, 2012. Tian Weihua currently has just under 140,000 followers, according to numbers from Sina Weibo. [More on deleted posts at the WeiboScope Search, by the Journalism and Media Studies Centre].
Tian Weihua’s post includes an image of a one-yuan bill. But the bill has apparently been altered to include phrases about the practice of Falun Gong, a spiritual movement branded as an “evil cult” by the Chinese Communist Party in 1999, and still very sensitive today. The date on the bill is 1999, and the characters at the top, just to the left of “People’s Bank of China”, read: “Falun Dafa is Great!”
The tongue-in-cheek post by Tian Weihua reads:

Just now I was searching for change to pay my parking fee when out of nowhere I found this bill . . .


The original Chinese-language post from Lang Yaoyuan follows:

刚才找零钱付停车费,居然找到一张这样的。。。


NOTE: All posts to The Anti-Social List are listed as “permission denied” in the Sina Weibo API, which means they were deleted by Weibo managers, not by users themselves.

Ministry of Truth 真理部

Internet controls in China are now handled primarily through the powerful Cyberspace Administration of China (CAC), created in 2014 as the umbrella organization concentrating and overseeing cybersecurity and internet policy under the Central Leading Group for Cybersecurity and Informatization, directly under the leadership of CCP General Secretary Xi Jinping. In 2018, the leading group was formally upgraded to a commission, called the Central Commission for Cybersecurity and Informatization.
Before the Xi era, internet controls involved a dizzying array of party and government bodies, notably the Information Office of the State Council (SCIO), the office established in January 1991 as China faced international sanctions in the wake of the June 4, 1989, crackdown on pro-democracy demonstrations. The role of the office was to “explain China to foreign countries,” and the centering of internet policy there in the late 1990s demonstrates how the internet was seen as something foreign and external. By the 2000s, the Information Office was the most active agent of controls for the internet, its Internet Affairs Office regularly sending out directives to online news sites about sensitive content.
It was sometime in the late 2000s that the term “Ministry of Truth” emerged among Chinese internet users as Chinese neologism to describe the system of controls on internet content. The term is a reference to the department described in George Orwell’s novel Nineteen Eighty-Four, where speech is subjected to all-encompassing control by Big Brother, the totalitarian leader of the fictional Oceania. The term has often been trucked out by Chinese journalists and internet writers since the late 2000s to refer collectively to the various agencies involved in propaganda controls.