Article 35 of the Chinese Constitution grants Chinese citizens the right to freedom of assembly and association. The language is strikingly similar to Article 20 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), which sets the precondition for the development of a civil society comprised of non-governmental organizations. The EU defines as civil society “all forms of social action carried out by individuals or groups who are neither connected to, nor managed by, the state”. This independence is not to be found in China, as it would contravene the overarching political maxim that the CCP has absolute leadership over all political and societal affairs, as codified in Article 1 of the Chinese Constitution.

“Grid-based management,” or “gridded management,” is an administrative reform that divides the urban communities in China into discrete management units under a concept of unified urban management that relies both on the mobilization of human “grid managers” (who monitor and report within the community) and on digital technology platforms that enable widespread surveillance and analysis of information. In the simplest sense, “grid-based management” is the digitising (数字化) and informationalizing (信息化) of city management at the neighbourhood and community levels on the premise that Chinese society is a threat to itself.

A relic of the Mao Zedong era, the “Fengqiao experience” refers to a heavily mythologized approach to social and political governance that essentially directed the masses themselves at the local level to carry out the on-site “rectification” of so-called “reactionary elements” in society. The “Fengqiao experience” was the process of mobilizing the masses in order to “strengthen the dictatorship over class enemies.” It is named after Fengqiao Township (枫桥镇), which is today a part of the city of Zhuji in Zhejiang province. Though radically unsuited, many would say, to a contemporary China ostensibly ruled by law under the Constitution, the “Fengqiao experience” has made a prominent return under Xi Jinping, entering official language about rule of law and public security.

Broadly speaking, media convergence in any context is about the integration of information and communications technologies, various forms of media content, and computer networks – for which some scholars now use the shorthand “Three C’s” (communication, computing and content). In the context of China’s media environment, however, media convergence also has a strong political component, and refers to the harnessing of the digital media revolution to serve and preserve the political dominance of the Chinese Communist Party. Top officials have referred to media convergence as a “national strategy.”

Though perhaps sounding in English and other languages like a reference to a simple act of decision-making on a key issue, this phrase in fact denotes a specific decision-making act at the highest levels of the Chinese Communist Party. Through much of the reform period, the term has overlapped with another frequently seen term, to “give written comments,” or pishi (批示). In the Xi Jinping era, however, “important instructions” and “written comments” have become distinct acts, pointing to the changing dynamics of power in China today.

The word fèngquàn (奉劝) essentially means today “to offer a bit of advice,” or to “advise.” The tone, however, is far from constructive or consultative. It is meant to be withering, and it has come to be used by PRC diplomats under Xi Jinping in the context of criticisms of China overseas, as when the Ministry of Foreign Affairs fought back against suggestions in 2020 that China was negligent in its early handling of the outbreak of Covid-19. The term, which was frequently used in the decades after the founding of the PRC under Mao Zedong, was seldom used in the 1990s and 2000s, as foreign policy emphasized the idea of “concealing strengths and biding time” (韬光养晦). Its return in Xi Jinping’s so-called “new era” is perhaps another sign of the times.