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Tag: external propaganda

Beware the Tigers

Last week, a delegation from one of Europe’s oldest universities toured a center in northeast China dedicated to the preservation of the Siberian tiger and Amur leopard. The tour concluded with a strategic cooperation agreement between the university and a local state-run media group to “jointly promote the development of Sino-Spanish humanities and international communication” between the two countries.

The deal, and the odd circumstances of its conclusion, are a classic example of how China has in recent years sought to advance state narratives abroad and tip the scales of what it calls “discourse power.” The strategy, meant to raise positive perceptions of China in the world, relies on encouraging provinces and cities to reach out globally, a phenomenon that at CMP we have called “Centralization+.”

But seeing how this connects to tigers and leopards, which are regarded in China’s northeastern Jilin province as both a natural treasure and a cultural brand — and how a European university became caught up in what is essentially a ruse over cultural exchange — will require a bit of context.

As for the basics of the deal, on April 23, Jishi Media (吉视传媒), Jilin Province’s only state-owned listed cultural enterprise, signed a strategic cooperation agreement with the University of Salamanca pledging to jointly produce a documentary on ecological themes, build “international communication capacity” — which in a Chinese official context refers concretely to China’s external communication — and deepen exchanges in journalism, culture, and AI. You Zhiqiang (由志强), Jishi Media’s Party secretary and chairman, signed for the Chinese side, while Salamanca rector Juan Corchado signed for the Spanish. The ceremony was witnessed by the propaganda office of the Jilin Provincial Committee of the Chinese Communist Party and the China Public Relations Association (中国公共关系协会), or CPRA.

Select PRC Media Engagements in Spain
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Tracking Beijing’s expanding media presence in Spain — through broadcaster deals, journalist training, and ambassador-penned opinion pieces.
Jan
2009
CCTV and RTVE Sign Agreement
During Premier Wen Jiabao’s (溫家寶) official visit to Spain, China Central Television (CCTV) and Spain’s public broadcaster RTVE signed a cooperation agreement covering news exchange, documentary co-productions, cultural programming, and professional training.
Aug
2014
Xinhua Partners with Policy Observatory
Xinhua News Agency (新華社) and Spain’s Observatorio de la Política China signed a cooperation agreement in Madrid to exchange information, organize joint seminars, and circulate publications on Chinese politics. China’s ambassador to Spain presided over the ceremony.
May
2016
Xinhua Chief Meets Agencia EFE
Xinhua editor-in-chief He Ping (何平) met Agencia EFE (埃菲通訊社) president José Antonio Vera in Madrid, calling for Xinhua to serve as a “bridge” between the two countries — language characteristic of the CCP’s framing of state media as instruments of public diplomacy.
Oct
2019
Xinhua and Europa Press Collaborate
Xinhua and Spain’s largest private news agency, Europa Press, announced a partnership described as “a privileged broadcast channel” for Spain in China. The agreement aimed to increase Chinese state news coverage in Europa Press’s International Service.
Mar
2023
China-Spain Anniversary Series Launched
China Media Group and Spain’s Ministry of Culture launched “China-Spain Cultural Journey” (中西文化之旅), a documentary series marking 50 years of diplomatic relations, broadcast via CGTN and Spanish partners including TVE, Telemadrid, Canal Sur, and Britel Media Group.
Nov
2023
Ambassador Pens Economy Op-Ed
Chinese Ambassador Yao Jing (姚敬) published a signed article in Barcelona’s El Periódico promoting China’s economic record. Despite targeting a Spanish readership, the piece was laden with CCP terminology, including a reference to “the central CCP leadership with Xi Jinping as the core” (習近平同志為核心的黨中央).
Jul
2024
CMG Signs Deal with Mediapro
China Media Group (中央廣播電視總台) and Barcelona-based Mediapro Group (梅迪播集團) signed a memorandum covering media resource sharing, audiovisual production, and technology applications. CMG director Shen Haixiong (慎海雄), who also serves as a deputy head of the CCP Publicity Department, signed for the Chinese side.
Jul
2024
CMG Signs Deal with UN Tourism Body
China Media Group signed a cooperation memorandum with the United Nations Tourism Organization (UNWTO) in Madrid, covering tourism news reporting and brand promotion. Shen Haixiong cited the CCP’s Third Plenum reforms, claiming “unlimited potential” in media-tourism integration.
Jul
2024
CMG Hosts Cultural Exchange Event
CMG hosted a cultural exchange event in Madrid titled “China’s Deepening Reform in the New Era,” bringing together the president of the Communist Party of Spain and Ambassador Yao Jing. CMG announced plans to bring Spanish journalists to China and invited Spanish museums to join CCTV’s National Treasure (國家寶藏) program.
Sep
2024
CMG and Culture Ministry Sign MOU
China Media Group and Spain’s Ministry of Culture signed a memorandum for strategic cooperation on broadcasting and film production, witnessed by Premier Li Qiang (李強) and Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez during Sánchez’s second official visit to China.
Sep
2024
CMG Secures La Liga Rights
China Media Group and La Liga signed a media cooperation agreement in Beijing, granting CMG broadcasting rights for the 2024–25 La Liga season across television and digital platforms. The signing coincided with Prime Minister Sánchez’s visit to China.
Sep
2024
Xinhua President Meets Agencia EFE Again
Xinhua president Fu Hua (傅華) met Agencia EFE president Miguel Ángel Oliver in Beijing, expressing interest in expanded news and personnel exchanges. Fu also promoted the World Media Summit, a Xinhua-organized forum that serves as a channel for Chinese state framing of global media responsibilities.
Feb
2025
Ambassador Pushes One China Line
Ambassador Yao Jing published an article in El Periódico de España arguing that UN General Assembly Resolution 2758 settled Taiwan’s status as part of China — a claim that mirrors CCP official policy but goes beyond the resolution’s actual text, which makes no mention of Taiwan.
May
2025
Consul Writes Op-Ed in Catalan Magazine
Meng Yuhong (孟宇宏), China’s consul general in Barcelona, published an op-ed in El Triangle warning that any attempt to separate Taiwan would be “harshly responded to by 1.4 billion Chinese.” The piece also claimed Prime Minister Sánchez had “reiterated” support for Beijing’s One China Principle — a characterization not reflected in Spanish government readouts of his April 2025 Beijing visit.
Aug
2025
26 Spanish Journalists Sent to Beijing
China International Communications Group (中國國際傳播集團), a body directly under the CCP’s Central Propaganda Department, organized a ten-day training course in Beijing for 26 Spanish journalists and analysts. Participants included reporters from El País. A CIDCA official described the program as “a concrete action to implement initiatives proposed by President Xi.”
Sep
2025
Ningbo Photography Exhibition Opens in Madrid
The “Ningbo Through the Lens” (光影裡的寧波) exhibition opened at the China Cultural Center in Madrid, organized by Ningbo’s city-level propaganda office and China International Publishing Group (中國外文局), which reports directly to the Central Propaganda Department. The event was framed as implementing the China-Spain Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Action Plan (2025–2028).

The CPRA, an ostensible non-profit association, is a prime example of how the cloaking of Party-state ties is a key strategic aspect of China’s international outreach. In fact, the association is directly run by the Central Propaganda Department, the body under the CCP in charge of ideology, media control, and international messaging. One of its key objectives is to “strengthen international exchanges and continuously expand the international influence of China’s public relations work.”

The upshot is that while the University of Salamanca and its officials may have believed they were completing a media and cultural exchange deal with credible Chinese partners, they were in fact sitting across the table from several different arms of China’s Party-state propaganda structure, all sharing the singular agenda of promoting Chinese narratives back in Spain and across Europe.

That China’s chief interest in this deal is more positive communication about the country globally is clear not just from last week’s signing, but from previous agreements between Spanish entities and Jishi Media. In April 2025, the state-run company signed a memorandum of understanding with the Fundación Conocer China (西班牙知华讲堂基金会), a Madrid-based foundation dedicated to deepening Spanish understanding of China, pledging to develop materials “helpful for Spain to understand 21st century Chinese reality.” This is a subtle reference to China’s state position on external communication, which holds that the country is treated unfairly in global public opinion — owing largely to Western media dominance — and needs to counter-balance this state of affairs with a robust approach, including media partnerships of the kind tracked at CMP’s Lingua Sinica.

An image from the official web page at the University of Salamanca website for the Confucius Institute, established in May 2025.

Another key aspect of the Salamanca-Jilin story is the involvement of the Northeast Tiger Leopard Cultural International Communication Center (东北虎豹文化国际传播中心). Founded in January 2025 by Jishi Media and the Northeast Tiger Leopard National Park Administration, the center is Jilin Province’s fourth provincial-level international communication center — and a textbook example of the strategy documented in CMP’s Centralization+ report, which describes how China has since 2018 built a nationwide network of such centers under provincial propaganda department oversight to advance Party messaging goals abroad.

The deal last week illustrates the ways that potential partners around the world, including in Europe, can be vulnerable to outreach from media groups and other actors that are simply shifting faces of the Chinese Party-state with a single agenda — to advance China’s official narrative.

The university’s own announcement described the agreement as establishing “a roadmap for the development of joint projects in the field of media communication, especially in areas linked to digital innovation, content production and specialized training.” That language, entirely about the supposed intellectual value of the exchange, gives no hint whatsoever of the Party-state apparatus that lies behind the deal, or its own agenda.

The idea of China’s Central Propaganda Department and the Jilin propaganda office offering substantive exchange on “media communication” to a leading European university is absurd on its face. The whole deal sits uneasily with the core purpose of educational institutions, whose interest is in openness and the free exchange of ideas.

Historical Revisions on Parade

For the Chinese leadership, the 80th anniversary of the country’s victory in the War of Resistance Against Japan in World War II is a major milestone — an opportunity to signal the power of the ruling Chinese Communist Party to people at home, and the country’s global ambitions to audiences abroad. These goals were on full display during the ritualized pageantry of the military parade yesterday in Beijing, attended by Russian leader Vladimir Putin and North Korean dictator Kim Jong Un.

Preparations for the celebrations, coinciding with this week’s Tianjin meeting of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), an event that has sparked lively discussion and speculation about whether or not we are witnessing a fundamental shift in the world order, were months in the making. In recent days, the logistical preparations have brought the center of the capital to a literal standstill.

But in the days ahead of this week’s parade of high-tech weaponry, ideological moves of equal or greater importance have prepared the way for the CCP’s new historical consensus. This view rewrites the history of global war and peace to firm up the narrative of China’s centrality. It was the CCP, the story goes, that decisively won the war for Asia and for the world.

Backbone Narratives

On Sunday, the China Youth Daily, an official newspaper under the Chinese Communist Youth League (CCYL), ran an article by Shi Quanwei (史全伟), a research fellow at the Party History and Literature Research Institute of the CCP Central Committee. Shi argued the CCP had been the “backbone” (中流砥柱) of the entire nation’s resistance during the War of Resistance Against Japan. Furthermore, Shi says it was the united front leadership, guerrilla warfare tactics, and exemplary governance of the CCP that made it crucial to China’s wartime resistance.

“The experience of three revolutions, especially the War of Resistance, has given us and the Chinese people this confidence,” he wrote. “Without the efforts of the Communist Party, without Communists serving as the backbone of the Chinese people, China’s independence and liberation would have been impossible.”

Just as the celebrations yesterday invited talk of the conspicuous sidelining of the United States as a global leader — and by extension what state media like to call the “US-led West”(美西方) — reconstructed narratives made much of the historically inflated importance of the US in the global conflict 80 years ago. 

Quoting from several global talking heads, the government-run China Daily pressed the point that the attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941, the quintessential inflection point in American narratives of fascist resistance, had been given too central a role in the broader global story — as had the role of the United States in the Pacific theater. Instead, it was the CCP that had led the decisive grassroots resistance years before the belated American entry. As the descendant of one Soviet pilot was quoted as saying, glossing over the role of Republican forces in China at the time: “China’s resistance war was already underway before the Pearl Harbor incident. Chinese forces long tied down Japanese military strength and manpower, preventing them from extending their influence to the Pacific and the entire Far East region at that time.”

This wave of writing and commentary on WWII history was promoted through traditional state-run outlets and new social media accounts all through August. According to these pieces, the emphasis on the US role had for decades overshadowed, or inexcusably sidelined, China’s role in the global conflict.

On August 16, an article appeared on WeChat that claimed American academia had deliberately downplayed China’s role — which was to say, the role of the CCP. In recent years, the author wrote, the geopolitical rivalry between China and the US had led American historians to overlook China’s role in the Pacific theater, “fully exposing the United States’ political manipulation of history to gain political advantage.” 

A man identified as a descendant of a World War II-era Soviet fighter pilot praises China’s central role in the Pacific theater, accusing the US of broad historical revisionism.

That argument, of course, has many flaws — not least the absurd assumption that US historians (like Chinese ones?) are an organized and geopolitically-motivated force, lacking professional integrity and unable to distinguish between the present-day People’s Republic of China (PRC) and the Republic of China (ROC). This latter was China’s recognized government during World War II.

But the nature of the messenger in this and many other instances of historical redrafting in recent weeks is perhaps more telling than the substance. The author of this piece, “How Has American WWII Historical Research ‘Drifted’?,” was a scholar from the American Academy (美国研究所), a unit within the China Institute of Contemporary International Relations (中国现代国际关系研究院) — a front organization operated by the Ministry of State Security (MSS) and charged with engaging with foreign scholars.

And what of the outlet that published this piece — a drop in the wave of efforts to re-center China at the expense of the truth? It is a website launched in 2021 called “China’s Diplomacy in the New Era” (习近平外交思想和新时代中国外交), an outlet under the China International Communications Group (中国外文出版发行事业局), or CICG. The office, which masquerades as a press group, operates scores of online outlets including such government sites as China.com.cn, and has been tasked by Xi Jinping as a key vehicle for the CCP’s international communication. CICG’s parent is the Central Propaganda Department of the CCP Central Committee. 

The social media account of “China’s Diplomacy in the New Era” — whose Chinese moniker bears the name of Xi Jinping himself — has been pushing a variety of articles on World War II in recent weeks. These mostly re-interpret the conflict through the lens of current geopolitics, colored with familiar state narratives, including contemporary Chinese claims to sovereignty in the South China Sea.

As the soldiers, tanks, missiles and drones goose-stepped and rolled along Chang’an Avenue on Wednesday, and Vladimir Putin had his smiling moment with Xi Jinping, some might have felt a sense of America sliding out of contemporary relevance. But behind the physical demonstrations of military might and the cementing of partnerships, there was an insistent narrative effort on all fronts to re-position China — and by extension, the CCP — at the center of the global historical narrative. For the leadership’s vision of a “new type of international relations,” nudging American leadership out of contemporary geopolitics is only half the battle; ensuring that it slips out of the history books may be equally important.