Earlier this month, state media across China went into overdrive to share the heart-stopping story of how Bupatam Abdukader, a 24-year-old female police officer in Xinjiang, had descended 40 meters into a narrow well to rescue a toddler, after attempts with conventional rescue equipment had reportedly failed. Dramatic video footage from the scene showed the officer stepping forward toward the perilous shaft, barely 40 centimeters wide, as she removed her jacket and said: “I’m thin, let me go down!”
Cue the tales of heroism and self-sacrifice, standard fare for official rescue reports in China’s tightly controlled media environment, which tend to play down questions of readiness and responsibility. State media related how Bupatam, who is from Luopu County in the region’s Hotan Prefecture, had battled oxygen and tight confines — maintaining consciousness through deep breathing techniques — to bring the small girl up from the muddy bottom of an abandoned well. “When I touched the child in the well, she grabbed my finger. Her hand was so cold, yet so strong,” she recalled emotionally to the reporters waiting above ground. “I had only one thought, to get the child up first.”
As the dramatic rescue footage captured attention across the country, including video footage showing Bupatam as she finally emerged, covered head-to-toe in mud, local officials made the most of the opportunity. They presented the officer with a reward of 10,000 yuan and nominated her for the county’s “Model of Bravery” (见义勇为模范) honor.
But as admiration for her heroism spread across Chinese social media, the conversation shifted rather suddenly to questions about Bupatam Abdukader’s employment status. In media reports, she was referred to generally as a “female auxiliary officer” (女辅警), making clear to the news-reading audience that she was a member of the “auxiliary police” (辅助警察) — meaning that rather than being under formal hire, she was support personnel for the regular police force, receiving inferior pay and benefits.
A screenshot from a video posted by Jimu News shows the moment Bupatam Abdukader removed her uniform to prepare to descend into the abandoned well.
Why, netizens wondered, should someone who had displayed such immense courage receive fewer benefits and less compensation than her formally employed counterparts?
Typically, unlike formal police officers with what are known as “established positions,” or bianzhi (编制), auxiliary officers receive lower salaries, reduced benefits, less job security, and fewer promotion opportunities despite the fact that they do the same work and face the same risks.
China’s two-tier system for police and rescue work has frequently become a point of social debate. One of the most egregious examples came to the fore nearly 10 years ago as a fire at a chemical storage facility in the city of Tianjin erupted as a massive explosion that killed 173 people. Many of the dead were firefighters later found to have been auxiliaries under part-time contracts.
As the officer’s heroic act in Xinjiang made the headlines, netizens pounced on the opportunity to reopen the longstanding debate about the gap between “official” and “auxiliary” status. “She should be given a formal position!” wrote one user. Another asked directly: “Why not give her a permanent position?”
On April 24, just over a week after the rescue, local authorities announced she would be “exceptionally promoted” from seventh to fifth rank within the auxiliary system. The announcement seemed only to throw the gap into sharper relief. While significant, the promotion maintained the officer’s auxiliary status rather than granting her formal employment.
As public pressure mounted, the Xinjiang government made an announcement through its official “Xinjiang Release” (新疆发布) account on social media channels in which it sought to rationalize the process of converting auxiliary hires to formal positions. Such a transition, it said, needed to follow strict procedures, including civil service examinations, merit-based special recruitment, and targeted recruitment programs.
“Bupatam is undoubtedly a hero,” the statement read, “but compared to the beautiful wish for ‘special handling,’ strictly following legal regulations for ‘conversion to permanent status’ requirements and serious, prudent merit recognition is what represents fairness and justice to all formal police officers and auxiliary police like her who fight on the public security front in various fields, selflessly protecting people’s lives and property.” In other words, the decision to keep Bupatam and others like her in “auxiliary” status, according to the statement, was about “system design.” And ultimately, the procedural approach prevented “favoritism and corruption to the greatest extent.”
In many respects, the statement was a distraction from the obvious. As state media are well aware, the highly discriminatory nature of China’s two-tiered employment system has been repeatedly and conclusively documented — and even, despite the country’s highly controlled media environment, talked about.
Six years ago, a report in China Comment (半月谈), an official journal under the government’s Xinhua News Agency, found significant pay disparities between auxiliary and formal hires. The latter were generally paid three times more for a marginally larger workload. And despite the fact that they remained essential, China Comment found that auxiliary officers experienced a profound lack of belonging (归属感) and social recognition, ultimately undermining the stability of the workforce and the effectiveness of the public security system.
This time around, mindful perhaps of the potential volatility of growing public calls to improve the status of an ethnic Uighur auxiliary officer, China Comment got behind authorities in Xinjiang. The journal praised the official response as exemplary crisis management that balanced institutional constraints with public sentiment, noting how it demonstrated that officials could find “the greatest common denominator” when navigating the tension between emotional appeals and regulatory frameworks. Echoing this sentiment, the state-run China Central Television commended the way officials, as it said, “did not avoid public expectations” but “explained facts and reasoning” while maintaining “respect for the hero.”
The mini storm of discussion prompted this month by the heroics of Bupatam Abdukader reveals how a story of dramatic rescue — or any story, in fact — can quickly transform into a platform for broader social debates about equality and fairness. But it equally reveals how rapidly and effectively such debates can be managed by the state, using the means of restraint and amplification at its disposal.
At its core, Bupatam’s story is about a gap in visions of what heroism means, and how it should be rewarded. While public sentiment called for the officer’s brave human acts to be rewarded with real and tangible benefits, and the dignity that comes with truly equal status, the authorities managed to contain her within the Party’s limited vision of heroism. In that vision, the hero’s extraordinary sacrifice works only to serve and preserve the system — even if that system is premised on the most ordinary perpetuation of inequalities.
With 12 million fresh graduates soon rushing into China’s already competitive job market, help is on the way, according to the People’s Daily. On April 7, the newspaper, the official mouthpiece of the country’s leadership, ran an article listing how AI was turbo-charging supply and demand in the job market, pointing to over 10,000 AI-related jobs on offer at a spring recruitment center in the city of Hangzhou. The piece was accompanied by a graphic from Xinhua, showing a smiling recruiter handing out jobs (岗位) to incoming students, with an AI bot ready and waiting to embrace them with open arms. The message is clear: graduates can literally walk into AI-related positions.
Image from Xinhua and reprinted by the People’s Daily, noting “AI jobs on the rise, demand for talent booming.”
But according to the Qianjiang Evening News (钱江晚报), a commercial metro newspaper published in Hangzhou under the state-owned Zhejiang Daily Newspaper Group, the reality is a lot tougher for new graduates. “It’s hard to find a job with a bachelor’s degree in this major,” said one of their interviewees, a recent graduate majoring in AI who was quoted under the pseudonym “Zhang Zixuan.” The graduate said they had gone to multiple job fairs without securinig a job. “I don’t know the way forward,” they told the paper.
China’s biggest tech companies are indeed angling for the leading edge in AI, battling it out to hire “young geniuses” (天才少年) graduating from AI programs at China’s top universities. But while these rarefied talents — whoever they are — may have their choice of elite positions, the picture is less rosy for the vast majority. “Despite the booming industry,” Qianjiang Evening News concludes, “many recent graduates of artificial intelligence majors from ordinary universities are still struggling in the job market.”
Hangzhou is now billed by Chinese media as a major hub for AI innovation and enterprise, home to China’s foremost large language model (LLM), DeepSeek. But if the city’s media are saying there are significant problems with AI recruitment, the rest of the country is likely experiencing similar complications. State-run media and universities in China are presenting the government’s AI policies as a gift for the nation’s entry-level job market. But these messages paper over a more complex reality.
The Hunt for AI Talent
The government has made it a priority to boost national AI development. In the government work report last year at the Two Sessions, China’s major legislative meeting, Premier Li Qiang launched the “AI+” initiative (人工智能+行动). The initiative aims to augment AI for every industry in the country, considering it a way to unlock “new productive forces” (新质生产力) — a signature phrase of Chinese leader Xi Jinping — that will bolster China’s economy and job market.
The latter needs it. Youth unemployment in China stands at 16.9 percent as of February this year, and comes at a time when graduate supply has never been higher. There are nearly four million extra graduates in the class of 2025 than there were even five years ago.
The stiff competition for jobs is a source of frustration for young Chinese. Earlier this month, Guangzhou’s Southern Metropolis Daily (南方都市报) reported that the state-owned nuclear power company CNNC had publicly apologized after boasting online that it had received 1.2 million resumes to fill roughly 8,000 positions. The company was accused by netizens of “arrogance.”
Aligning university education to accommodate AI training is considered by the leadership as key to harnessing this technology of the future. In 2017, a document from the State Council noted the country lacked the “high-level AI talents” needed to make China a global leader in AI technology. In 2023, the Ministry of Education issued a reform plan ordering that by this year 20 percent of university courses must be adjusted, with an emphasis on emerging technologies and a gradual elimination of courses “not suited for social and economic development.”
Universities across the country have responded with dramatic overhauls of their curricula. Ta Kung Pao (大公报), the Party’s mouthpiece in Hong Kong, reports universities in neighboring Guangdong province have already established 27 AI colleges, which are supposedly training 20,000 students a year. Meanwhile, universities like Shanghai’s Fudan University announced they will be cutting places in their humanities courses by 20 per cent as ordered, focusing instead on AI training. For Jin Li (金力), Fudan’s president, university courses must now explicitly serve China’s state-directed technological development goals. “How many liberal arts undergraduates will be needed in the current era?” he questioned rhetorically.
Technical Problems
State media says AI+ is already successfully reinvigorating the job market. Attending one job fair in Beijing this month, a reporter for the China Times (华夏时报), a media outlet under the State Council, noted a “surge in demand” among state-owned enterprises (SOEs) for AI talent, quoting one graduate trained in AI as saying he had seen “many work units that meet my job expectations.” Visiting job fairs in Shanghai and Guangdong, a reporter for Shanghai Securities News (上海证券报), a subsidiary of state news agency Xinhua, observed long queues in front of booths for jobs on algorithm engineering and data labeling. On that basis, he wrote “AI fever” had gripped the gatherings.
AI itself is also spreading positive messages about the jobs it can bring. Ahead of the Two Sessions this year, People’s Daily Online (人民网) pitched DeepSeek as helping citizens understand the “happiness code” (幸福密码) embedded in the Two Sessions. It does this by describing state-imposed solutions to current social problems, to ease the concerns of netizens.
One question the outlet asked was on what AI jobs were available to recent graduates. When we at the China Media Project asked DeepSeek the same question, it told us AI “offers abundant employment opportunities for recent graduates,” listing several well-salaried ones. One of these was “data labeling” (数据标注) with DeepSeek saying these positions are increasing by 50 percent year-on-year. The source for this claim was an article from the Worker’s Daily (工人日报), a newspaper under the CCP-led All-China Federation of Trade Unions (ACFTU), the country’s official trade union.
It should go without saying that the role of the ACFTU’s newspaper is to promote the leadership’s economic agenda rather than to accurately report the challenges for the nation’s workforce posed by technological change. This role can mean, once again, that hype takes precedence over fact. In this case, the Worker’s Daily cited the case of a data-annotation college in Shenzhen, suggesting that graduates from the college receive 10 job offers on average within an hour of uploading their resumes online.
Even if such data annotation roles are available right now, this does not point the way to a rosy future for aspiring young data annotators more broadly. Some data annotation roles, in fact, require few qualifications, and fresh trainees may be trusted by tech companies to do this work after just three weeks of training. Relatively unskilled jobs like this may be created by AI, but they are also vulnerable to replacement by AI itself. China’s state broadcaster CCTV reports that 60 percent of data annotation is now being done by AI, doubling in just three years.
The CCTV report points to a trend that few state media seem to be openly acknowledging amid the hype over AI jobs — that the field is already shifting towards more specialized employees. That will mean raising the bar for data annotator qualifications, and fewer people ultimately required to do this work. In its report, the Qianjiang Evening News quotes an anonymous application engineer as saying the number of data labellers at his company is decreasing already. “Big models can label themselves,” he told the newspaper.
The same report suggested that the demand for AI skills varies widely between companies. Zhang, the pseudonymous recent graduate, said that most of the companies at the university job fairs in which they participated did not have AI-related jobs on offer. The ones that did have such jobs demanded a higher degree of education, generally as the master’s level. The concerning lesson drawn from Zhang’s experience is that the training provided by these new AI education centers does not suit current demand from tech companies — to say nothing of future demand. While companies often require in-depth expertise within specialized areas like fine-tuning AI models, AI courses often sacrifice depth by giving their students shorter periods of training in a wide variety of AI skills.
A job advert on recruitment website Zhipin (直聘), from a vocational college in Hubei, says teaching experience is merely “preferred”, rather than “required.”
Another concern emerges: who will teach the next generation of AI specialists? The sudden expansion of colleges to accommodate the needs of the AI+ initiative is no doubt creating a talent dearth of its own. In a speech earlier this month, a senior scientist from Peking University claimed many AI centers employed inexperienced professors in order to fill teaching positions. He added that certain AI centers were moving members of their mathematics and art colleges to serve as “part-time” deans of these centers.
Vocational schools could struggle even more. These colleges are usually stigmatized in Chinese society, stereotyped as only attended by students who failed their university entrance exams. This would put them at the bottom of the pile for aspirational AI talent. For example, one vocational college in Hubei says it created an AI major in response to the Ministry of Education’s push to cultivate high-quality AI talent. But it is advertising AI teaching positions where prior experience in this complex field is merely “preferred” rather than required.
It should come as no surprise that state media narratives of jam-packed job fairs handing out AI positions are overly optimistic. The disconnect is stark. While the handful of elite graduates at the pinnacle of China’s AI sector may enjoy rich opportunities, it is misleading to suggest that their exceptional success stories are evidence that AI has promised employment for the broader masses. The larger context matters: as Xi Jinping’s government pushes AI as a cornerstone of China’s economic future, a widening gap has formed between top-down ambitions and on-the-ground realities for millions of graduates. Instead of excitedly focusing on the long queues at AI stalls in job fairs, Chinese media should also be asking deeper questions about the issues that create them.
As luminaries, including several Nobel laureates, mingled last month at the Zhongguancun Forum, an exchange in Beijing on high-tech innovation, a soaring report from China’s official Xinhua News Agency celebrated the spectacle of robots serving freshly ground coffee and performing backflips — concluding that the forum’s participants had “given aspirations wings to soar.”
Judging from the reports filed by the four Xinhua journalists covering the forum, an annual showcase for China’s tech achievements, it’s not clear that they came down to earth long enough to attend a speech on March 29 by one of the country’s top AI scientists, who warned that the nation’s AI sector, now the crown jewel of China’s technological ambitions, is perpetuating a lofty and unrealistic self-image. “Things are exciting on the surface,” he said, “but when it comes to substance they are chaotic.”
Currently dean of the Beijing Institute for General Artificial Intelligence, a research and development non-profit tied to the elite Peking University, Zhu Songchun (朱松纯) is one of the most influential figures in the sector. His message, that to remain globally competitive China needs fewer celebratory headlines and more substantive analysis, runs counter to the spellbound view of AI development that seems to have overtaken the government and official media like Xinhua.
But will Zhu’s message, as the lack of state media coverage suggests, fall on deaf ears?
Journalists or Cheerleaders?
According to a detailed summary of his speech by Tencent Technology (腾讯科技), a tech news outlet published by the Chinese tech giant, Zhu did not mince words about how AI hype and AI reality have become detached in China. The current AI landscape, he said, is one in which media narratives, investment patterns, and government initiatives present a distorted picture of progress. “What’s truly blocking our progress is not foreign technology restrictions,” Zhu told the audience, “but our own limited understanding.”
The reasons for this problem? Zhu says both Chinese media and officials tasked with promoting AI have little understanding of how it works. For their part, the media have fed the public “exaggerated” stories about AI. While Zhu notes this as a key problem, he tactfully steps around an important impetus behind this coverage — the fact that the leadership’s appetite for promoting AI as the next driver of development is also exerting pressure on state media to signal positivity and success.
Officials, meanwhile, again feeding into a vicious cycle of positive thinking, are under pressure from the public to implement policies based on the distorted narratives of the media, said Zhu.
An AI story by Tencent Technology is illustrated by an unspecified AI service.
AI technology is complex and relatively new to news organizations globally, meaning cutting through marketing hype from tech companies is a problem for journalists around the world. But as global AI competition heats up, Chinese media face additional pressure to exaggerate the capabilities of Chinese AI.
In March last year, the Cyberspace Administration of China (CAC), the country’s top regulator and controller of the internet and information, emphasized that online media must create “positive propaganda” (正面宣传) about Chinese achievements. At the same time, the “AI+ initiative” (人工智能+ 行动), which aims to augment AI for every industry in China and thereby turbo-charge the “new productive forces” (新质生产力) that will lift the Chinese economy out of malaise, has become a central policy of the Party-state.
That is a lot for AI to live up to, and this approach naturally demands cheerleaders over critical reporters. This is a typical approach for the Chinese Communist Party, for which hype and propaganda are often treated as rocket fuel, necessary to send the latest policy soaring to success. But such directives inevitably lead to unrealistic reports from China’s media outlets — which, as Zhu warns, can lead to magical thinking that is counterproductive.
On March 28, the Shenzhen-based Securities Times (证券时报), a newspaper published under a subsidiary of the CCP’s People’s Daily, ran a report for which multiple data center entrepreneurs were interviewed. All of these insiders claimed that there is high demand in China for data centers, which have been hyped by Party policy-makers and advisors as critical to the success of the AI+ initiative. However, a recent report from MIT Tech Review revealed that supply now far outstrips demand, and many of these data centers are in fact standing empty — an investor-driven bubble that is strikingly familiar to that seen over the decades in the property market.
Read more carefully between the lines in Chinese media reports, and the red flags start to reveal themselves. At one point in the Securities Times article, an interviewee remarks that one driver of data storage demand is “AI glasses.” But smart eyewear — a notion kicked around in the West since the 1960s as the technology of the future — has been a fallback focus of technology coverage in the Chinese state media for more than a decade. In fact, the market for AI glasses is not taking off. Smart glasses remain a gimmick trotted out every year by Chinese state media during political meetings, when outlets can demonstrate their embrace of the government’s high-tech goals.
During the annual meeting of China’s National People’s Congress last month, a foreign journalist was asked to try on a pair of smart glasses — and promptly became a headline story in state media. SOURCE: ShanghaiEye.
Talk of AI glasses as a driver behind data centers exposes the level of unreality that often takes hold, even among those cited as expert insiders. And the hype extends from foundational technologies and trends in China to self-assessments of the state of the industry.
In his speech, Zhu also took aim at another favorite meme among Chinese journalists, what has become known as the “six little large language model dragons” (大模型小六龙). This is a group of highly-valued AI start-ups specializing in LLMs, the artificial intelligence systems trained on massive text datasets to generate human-like responses across various tasks. Chinese media outlets are awash with coverage of these six companies and their newest releases of AI models, but they often omit key facts and context — such as more in-depth exploration of their products or business models.
Contrary to their stellar images as exemplars of Chinese AI strength, Zhu described these six companies as high-risk, overvalued and — at least so far — unprofitable. One of the six, Zhipu AI (智普AI), released its latest model at the Zhongguancun Forum, and this was billed by the Xinhua reporters as enabling AI “to leap out of the dialog box and perform real work for humans.” Once again, the language was all about leaps and bounds, even though none of the reporters actually tested the model.
The fact that Zhipu released this latest model for free and allowing unlimited use would seem to support Zhu Songchun’s view that sustainable revenue models remain grounded. In a freer and more vibrant media environment, that might be the real story. But the point of AI coverage in China’s media is to promote, promote, promote. And this lack of scrutiny extends to AI stories fired into the air for international audiences. The priority is to emphasize the successes of China under the current CCP leadership, which Xi Jinping has called “telling China’s story well” (讲好中国故事). The story of China as a high-tech hub and innovator has become one of the CCP’s central narratives, for audiences at home and abroad.
Once again, the language was all about leaps and bounds, even though none of the reporters actually tested the model.
If you want to know whether you are being sold a rocket or a firecracker, one approach is to simply look closer at news reporting basics. In November last year, Xinhua published an English-language article touting the innovations of an image diffusion model from Chinese-owned AI platform Vidu. The article claimed that the model had made ground-breaking improvements to “consistency,” a problem plaguing image diffusion models. But the piece quoted only the company’s CEO and one Western netizen on X to back up these claims. If Xinhua journalists had tested the software, as we did, or had spoken to other experts, they would have found the model highly inconsistent — and the claims dubious.
Reports like the above are a reminder of the obvious — that Chinese state media are not just duty-bound to promote the positives of national development over the challenges, but that they often have a too-cozy relationship with the companies on which they report.
Clipping the Wings of Criticism
For Zhu, the fundamental contradiction is clear: China’s AI sector cannot advance by chasing headlines rather than breakthroughs. He argued that when officials, media outlets and the public operate with a distorted understanding of AI capabilities, China’s entire innovation ecosystem suffers. This superficial approach, he suggested, has trapped China in a cycle of imitation rather than invention — simply scaling up language models and finding incremental applications that mirror Silicon Valley’s path. “If we just repeat the old path of the United States – computing power, algorithms, and deployment, we will always be followers,” he concluded.
Instead, Zhu called for a fundamental shift toward researching the nature of intelligence itself — a strategy that could potentially leapfrog current AI paradigms entirely. By focusing on these foundational questions rather than chasing quarterly breakthroughs trumpeted in promotional press releases, China might discover entirely new frameworks for artificial intelligence that competitors would scramble to replicate.
Yet Zhu’s critique of the propaganda-driven approach appears to have fallen victim to precisely the dynamic of hype he described. While his remarks found outlets in more market-oriented publications like Tencent Technology, Caixin and The Paper, flagship state media organizations like Xinhua and the People’s Daily conspicuously omitted his warnings from their coverage. Instead, these Party organs continued to showcase a parade of applications and robots — the very surface-level achievements that Zhu suggested are distracting China from the deeper scientific work needed to truly lead in artificial intelligence. In a system where positive messaging trumps critical analysis, even warnings from one of the nation’s top AI scientists can be edited out of the narrative.
Since the event, there are signs that Zhu’s wings may have been clipped even more decisively. On April 15, an institute from Peking University responsible for international cultural exchanges (中外人文交流) issued a “clarification” on his behalf, claiming that some media outlets had misrepresented his words in what the institute claimed had in fact been a “closed-door media communication meeting.” The timing suggests Zhu’s candid assessment of the industry may have drawn unwelcome attention from authorities eager to maintain the narrative of Chinese AI supremacy. The message is that everyone, including the media, must train their eyes upward on the future — even if it means ignoring the ground beneath their feet.
This disconnect was illustrated once again over the weekend, as Beijing hosted a half marathon where Chinese-built robots raced alongside human competitors. The CCP’s official People’s Dailydescribed the event as a “fierce competition” that had pushed the robots to their limits. Xinhua sang about “infinite possibilities,” and proclaimed in its headline that the racing event had “closed the distance between us and the future.” The less stellar reality, alluded to in a report by Guangzhou’s Southern Metropolis Daily that noted the “many problems” holding the race down, was that the robots had suffered constant failures and necessitated nearly constant repairs by the exhausted human crews running alongside them. In the end, only six of the 21 robot entries completed the race, and one quite literally lost its head.
But in another sense, the race pointed the way toward the possibility of a healthier, more open and more self-critical attitude toward technology and progress — an alternative to the propaganda of constant rise. The Global Times, though in English-language coverage only, remarked somewhat disingenuously that “[behind] this ‘imperfect’ robot half-marathon is the mature atmosphere of tolerance, understanding and acceptance of failure that has developed in Chinese society from top to bottom toward the high-tech industry.” If that were true, of course, no public moderation of Zhu Songchun’s remarks behind closed doors would have been necessary. It would be perfectly acceptable to say: We are getting this wrong. But the Global Times was on to something.
In its coverage of the Beijing half marathon, Caixin, an outlet tending more than most others in China to tell it like it is, reported that the robots had “walked with a staggering gait” (步履蹒跚). This might be the best image to capture a truth applicable to all innovation — that progress is made and measured by confronting limitations, not by promoting past them. As Zhu Songchun made clear in an address that perhaps now he has been made to regret, China will need to learn to stumble honestly — and openly — if it is to reach its grand AI ambitions.
The most important step forward is coming back down to earth.
Sitting back in early January with the latest edition of Guangzhou’s Southern Metropolis Daily, one of the country’s leading metro newspapers, daily news readers were treated to a splashy page-one story about how China’s national plans for artificial intelligence development — known as “AI+” — were being unleashed in every sector of the economy and society. But the cover, importantly, was itself proof of how AI is transforming another crucial sector: the media.
The cover featured a striking figure 8 — or infinity symbol — in gradient colors of teal, orange, and yellow, floating above a miniature cityscape. Around this mathematical representation of limitless potential were arrayed digital icons depicting various sectors transformed by AI: doctors consulting computer screens, autonomous vehicles, smart classrooms, and connected urban infrastructure. At the bottom of the bright page, down below its characteristic masthead — and its motto, “Making China’s Best Newspaper” — were the words “created with JimengAI.”
The cover signaled an important departure for a newspaper that for decades had been known for its bold front-page graphics and striking photojournalism. It is certainly just the beginning of a trend that will reverberate through China’s media sector. The country’s newspaper industry in particular has faced major challenges in recent years, with sharp declines in print circulation and the closure of 55 newspaper titles in 2023, pushing outlets to cut costs and accelerate digital transformation.
Talk of AI-led transformation in the media sector goes back at least six years to 2019, when surveys showed that 73 percent of Chinese journalists expected significant impacts on their profession due to AI technology. Meanwhile, state-run research institutes advocated strategically integrating AI across “news collection, production, distribution, reception and feedback” to comprehensively enhance “public opinion guidance capabilities” — in other words, to improve the party-state’s capacity to control information.
The cover signaled an important departure for a newspaper that for decades had been known for its bold front-page graphics and striking photojournalism.
In recent months, as developments in AI have accelerated, there have been rising concerns about the future of the journalism profession in China — which has already been jeopardized, something far less talked about, by stringent political controls under Xi Jinping. When AI can ask questions, correct grammar, find information, and even write articles, many wonder if journalists will become obsolete. Writing earlier this year in China Youth Daily (中国青年报), a paper under the Chinese Communist Youth League that from the 1980s through the 2000s was known for its sometimes breakout reporting, journalist Zhang Tiankan (張田勘) voiced the hope and the anxiety: “Machine and robots free people from heavy physical labor and boring work, to do more important work, or let people become supervisors — and this beautiful prospect has today been partly realized,” he said. “But other worries have also arisen.”
Et tu, Graphic Designers?
It remains to be seen what the changes at Southern Metropolis Daily will mean for its visual designers and photojournalists. But the paper, which has been known through the years for its sometimes stunning page ones, has clearly not given up on its visual team entirely.
Since January the newspaper has continued to feature strong news photography on the front page, such as its vivid full-page images during the Myanmar earthquake last month, or its stark cover back on April 5 showing then just-removed South Korean president Yoon Suk Yeol in profile.
Still, one wonders if the writing is on the wall.
Since the start of the year, a total of 36 front pages at the Southern Metropolis Daily have been generated with the help of AI, accounting for 35 percent of total covers. The vast majority of these have been produced by staff with the help of Jimeng AI, an AI image generation tool developed by Faceu Technology, a subsidiary of ByteDance — meaning these visuals were brought to you by the same company that gave the world TikTok.
Other images are produced using YuanBao AI (元宝AI), an AI assistant developed by the technology giant Tencent. A few were also made using Doubao AI (豆包AI), another Bytedance creation that until the DeepSeek burst onto the scene was regarded by some as the country’s number-one chatbot, with more than 60 million active monthly users by November 2024.
On average, Southern Metropolis Daily is producing two to three AI-generated front pages per week. One perhaps revealing gap occurred from March 5-11, corresponding with the “two meetings” of China’s parliament and political advisory body. During that period, none of the covers in the newspaper dealing with the political meetings in Beijing were generated using AI. In fact, they retreated into conservatism, using all-red backgrounds and stiff images from the Great Hall of the People. Even as the paper strained at its chains to provide visual interest, it was clear that the aesthetic from on high was all about sticking to the austere.
The transition to AI is certainly the order of the day, and media across the country will continue to harness the technology to save time, cut costs, and remain on the cutting edge. But for media whose role is focused through the lens of Chinese Communist Party control, certain optics will remain impervious to change.
Don’t expect AI-generated images of Xi Jinping — authorized ones, at least — any time soon.
Every morning at 8 o’clock, as she steps through the television station’s doors, the previous day’s ratings for all programs across the entire network appear before Chen Jiaqi’s eyes. The numbers are displayed more prominently even than the time clock.
“The gargantuan screen is impossible to avoid,” says Chen. “Apart from occasionally displaying banners welcoming visits from certain leaders and promoting some self-produced programs, its daily function is to broadcast the ratings rankings.” Each time she sees this screen, she says, pressure mixed with anxiety surges within her. “My heart rate also accelerates, a constant pounding.”
Why is this? Because once ratings falter, the corresponding program production team could face budget cuts, and could have difficulty getting approval for projects down the line, be forced to accept salary downgrades — or even be fired.
Chen Jiaqi works at a well-known provincial broadcasting and television group in China. Since 2023, the company has undergone several rounds of layoffs. Those who managed to hang on to their jobs had their wages cut by at least one-third. The official explanation from television station leadership went: “Times have changed, and broadcasting and television units also have to reduce costs and increase efficiency.”
Times have indeed changed.
In China today, there are 389 broadcasting and television stations at the prefecture-level and above, according to early 2024 data from China’s National Radio and Television Administration (NRTA), . There are 2,099 county-level television stations, and 33 educational television stations. Each television station broadcasts across several channels, and some operate 10 or more. But in 2024, as rumors circulated on social platforms that “nearly 2,000 local television stations are on the verge of collapse” (有近2000家地方電視台行將倒閉), the veneer of viability seemed to slip.
Regarding this figure, an individual working in a propaganda management department of a central government institution told Initium Media that while the above statement may to some extent be exaggerated, the fact that numerous local television stations face financial difficulties is undeniable. “Everyone is living like beggars, including China Central Television and leading provincial satellite TV stations,” they said.
The source shared an internal document showing that several institutions, including several provincial television stations, have shut down channels under their jurisdiction to cope with the financial crisis. This includes music broadcasting, public channels, livelihood channels, and foreign language channels — and the result has been a wave of unemployment across the industry.
Those fortunate enough to keep their jobs during this downturn are hardly less miserable. Li Ming was formerly a reporter at a county-level city television station. In 2022, responding to a reform plan from relevant departments, the television station completed a merger with party media and new media under the supervision of the municipal propaganda department. The result was a new type of media unit called an “integrated media center” (融媒體中心). Created across the country by the thousands, these are multimedia hubs that the leadership has pushed actively in the Xi Jinping era in a bid, it says, to modernize content production and maintain the party’s public opinion dominance. Currently, this integrated media center format covers almost all radio and television channels in China except for China Central Television (CCTV) and provincial satellite TV stations.
At the start of the Xi Jinping era in 2012, CRT televisions were standard, and flat-screen varieties were just beginning to become popular. But TV programming was still in its heyday. SOURCE: Tom Riggle via Flickr.com CC.
As a reporter for an integrated media center, Li Ming must, in addition to filming, write articles and coordinate with local government propaganda priorities. At the same time, he must fulfill his formal job description, supplying materials to provincial satellite TV stations. In his view, however, all these tasks are supplementary to the true overriding priority: “My primary job seems more like that of a salesperson,” he says.
The gradual “salesification” (銷售化) of reporters has become a trend for television station workers in China, including at major state-run outfits like China Central Television (CCTV). To alleviate financial pressure, many television stations assign business tasks to their staff, meaning that directors, editors, and reporters must actively solicit advertisements. This, in fact, has become the primary standard for assessment when it comes to key performance indicators, or KPIs.
“This is why many local television stations occupy large amounts of airtime repeatedly broadcasting advertisements for liquor, fake medicines, and health supplements,” Li Ming says. “These are among their few remaining ways to make money.”
In stark contrast to the threadbare and constantly distressed situation of local television stations in China, CCTV, the country’s central-level broadcasting behemoth, appears more sophisticated and at ease as it leverages its inherent national influence to sell credibility. “At the end of the day, we have so many professional producers, editors, and reporters,” says one producer who has worked for the broadcasting for two decades told Initium Media. “We know how to package content so viewers can’t even tell it’s an advertisement.”
However, unlike this producer who calmly accepted the identity transformation, when initially being “salesified,” Wang Mengkai chose eventually to resign from the city-level television station where he worked. “If a reporter can no longer do news but instead shamelessly sings praises under the banner of the ‘reporter’ or the ‘media professional’ while feeling self-gratified, this is something ultimately shameful,” he says. “I feel sorrowful for having once been part of this. I will forever feel a debt to my former readers and viewers.”
An image of the business tower of China Central Television in 2008, when it was still under construction. SOURCE: By Keso, via Flickr.com CC.
Aware of Wang Mengkai’s experiences and sense of self-blame, one media scholar who spoke to Initium Media took a consoling tone: “This is not his fault,” they said. “All of us, including him, are victims of the disappearance of news. The fundamental problem in the Chinese media has always been the lack of freedom; all other problems are byproducts of this absence of freedom.”
CCTV Sells Political Endorsement
A source close to current CCTV Director Shen Haixiong (慎海雄), who is also a deputy director of the Central Propaganda Department, revealed to Initium Media that at the end of 2024, Shen announced at an internal meeting with operational and advertising executives that he was willing to attend drinking and dining functions to help attract advertisements and commercial sponsorships.
The fundamental problem of Chinese media has always been the lack of freedom; all other problems are byproducts of this absence of freedom.
This information was confirmed by a senior program producer at CCTV, who said Shen’s personal engagement with advertising solicitation as station director becoming a hotly discussed topic in private among top management at the state-run broadcaster.
Another source familiar with the situation [at CCTV] revealed that after production costs, the broadcaster “had almost nothing left” in 2024, the urgent situation that had become the catalyst for Shen’s direct personal involvement in revenue generation.
The launch of the “CCTV Good Products” (央央好物) live e-commerce platform program on November 18, 2024, was a further sign of the direction things are heading. CCTV hosts are now involved in live-streaming sales to generate revenue for the network. Additionally, CCTV has created a variety show called “CCTV Good Products Happy Shopping Party” (央央好物嗨購派), for which 10-12 products are selected per episode. The show started broadcasting on CCTV’s Finance Channel earlier this year.
An ad for the “CCTV Good Products” show.
Hosts participating in CCTV’s live-streaming sales lineup includes not just Benny Sa (撒貝寧) and Neghmet Rakhman (尼格買提·熱合曼), long-time CCTV anchors who have hosted the annual Spring Festival Gala, but also such “national faces” (國臉) — a term in China for prominent public figures such as the hosts of the nightly official news show “Xinwen Lianbo” (新闻联播) — such as Lu Jian (魯健), Yang Fan (楊帆), Zhu Guangquan (朱廣權), and also the internet celebrity host Wang Bingbing (王冰冰), who has been actively promoted by CCTV in recent years.
In the eyes of outsiders, this is a commercial fall from grace for hosts at CCTV who represent an elevated national image and generally have high social status. A reporter from one of CCTV’s channels, however, tells Initium Media that the network has resorted to this practice out of necessity.
“Reporters for some channels now receive a basic monthly salary of just 7,000 yuan, less than what’s needed to live normally in Beijing,” they said. The same position 10 years ago would have earned up to 20,000 yuan a month.
When did this change occur?
As the CCTV reporter explains, the changes had to do with broader political changes at the network during Xi Jinping’s second term in office. “When the director [Shen Haixiong] first arrived at CCTV [in 2018], actually, everyone’s salaries generally increased. Later, however, as everyone witnessed, CCTV became increasingly ‘red’ and increasingly ‘specialized’ [on political programming]. Almost all programs became ‘CCTV News-ified,’ and the network was thoroughly transformed into a propaganda institution.”
“Once the level of valuable information reported [by CCTV] was ‘reset to zero,’ naturally no one was willing to pay anymore to appear alongside official propaganda. Meanwhile, the financial support provided by the government was insufficient to maintain the operation of such a massive team.”
Multiple CCTV employees interviewed by Initium Media all agreed that these changes are the primary reason CCTV has fallen into its current financial predicament — to the extent that almost all on-screen opportunities have become commodities with a price tag.
According to a producer who has worked at CCTV for more than two decades, there are many tactics now used to conceal these acts of selling out. “For example, if an entrepreneur wants screen time to advertise their business, we’ll put them on air by packaging them with another title, like as the director of some association, which blurs the lines,” said the producer. “And if the entrepreneur happens to sit on a local political advisory committee, that’s even better.” This sort of implantation, they say, is the highest form of public relations and advertising. It achieves what is now called in Chinese “soundless saturation” (润物无声) — which can refer to clever ways to communicate CCP agendas, but in this case means weaving together political and commercial messaging.
According to another CCTV employee who wished to remain anonymous, the quoted price for such acts of soft implantation is more than 4 million yuan.
“Almost all programs became ‘CCTV News-ified,’ and the network was thoroughly transformed into a propaganda institution.”
CCTV reporter
For a company, what is the value of spending more than four million yuan to appear on a state-run network that has become more intensely political? The CCTV producer mentioned above says that the greatest value of appearing on CCTV for an entrepreneur is to receive political endorsement — and commercial benefits generally do not come into their calculations. “Spending a few million to purchase a certain degree of security is absolutely worth it,” the producer says, “especially in the current environment.”
“Given this kind of situation, it’s easy to understand why program quality would suffer,” said the previously aforementioned CCTV reporter.
Within CCTV, these developments are an open secret — readily seen but never openly discussed. Department leaders will still criticize the young teams underneath them, chastising them for the network’s continuously declining ratings and poor revenue, which they say are due to the lack of “internet appeal” in what they produce.
What exactly is “internet appeal”? Even leaders at CCTV are unable to define it clearly.
Trying Wages to Traffic
Chen Jiaqi too is accustomed to being criticized for work “lacking internet appeal.” In most cases, however, the real cause of the network’s backwardness is its inherent [political] attributes and self-censorship.
A decade ago, as online video was in the midst of rapid expansion, the outlet where Chen worked created a streaming program platform that targeted audiences on iQiyi, the on-demand streaming service, and Tencent Video. While the program tried to differentiate its programs from traditional satellite TV productions, it was still linked to a state-owned provincial, broadcasting and television group. This meant, ultimately, that the internal logic was different from that at the privately owned iQiyi and Tencent.
Reached by Initium Media, staff at iQiyi and Tencent Video explained that their basic operational logic is to create programming on the basis of market research and market feedback data before introducing external investment funds.
Such an internal process is impossible at Chen Jiaqi’s platform, owing to its official background and longstanding internal culture. “Our foundation as a state-run institution means that nearly all our leaders are very traditional to begin with,” she said. “Plus, two years ago the station began implementing a ‘responsibility-to-the-individual system’ (責任到人), meaning that any time an error occurred when broadcasting, the person directly responsible would face dismissal.”
“[in such a system] everyone becomes more conservative and even actively self-limits, closely following the guidance documents of the propaganda department,” she says, adding a rhetorical question: “Under such an environment, how could these people from the old era, completely constrained, find the energy needed to command new territory?”
Therefore, as ratings continue to decline and soliciting advertising has become difficult, many television stations have become addicted to traffic games — trying their utmost to drive up numbers.
At Beijing Television, the state-run broadcaster under the capital city’s municipal-level CCP committee, the editor-in-chief used an internal employee chat group back in January to issue instructions that everyone promote the network’s Spring Festival Gala through their personal social media, according to one staff member interviewed by Initium Media. The instructions demanded that everyone make no fewer than 10 posts per day, and compliance was verified randomly by people within the station’s “communication center” (傳播中心), who reported back to the editor-in-chief. For some time, Beijing Television has been rumored to be going tottering on the edge of bankruptcy.
“Ratings numbers don’t lie. This so-called flooding of social media circles didn’t help the gala ‘break through,’” the staff member said. “This promotional effort was more like an internal self-celebration for the entire station.”
At other local television stations, the single-minded pursuit of traffic is even more flagrant.
According to Li Ming, performance evaluation standards for reporters at his integrated media center include — beyond soliciting advertisements — publishing 21 original short videos each month on the media center’s video social platform, producing four news pieces for broadcast on the TV channel, and at least one news clip submitted and accepted by the provincial platform (省級平台).
These are hard requirements, and if reporters fail to complete their required work tasks, deductions are made from their wages — 20 yuan for each for the first four original short videos they fail to post, and 40 for each one beyond that. If none of the news clips submitted that month to the provincial platform are accepted for re-broadcasting, this can mean an instant deduction of 800 yuan.
“Many of our reporters receive a fixed salary of at most 3,500 yuan per month,” says Li Ming. “So [this can mean] some people have their wages reduced by half.”
In some cases, avoiding deductions in wages pushes reporters to rack their brains and throw content together. For example, a short video about the opening of a new pancake shop in a residential area can be hyped as an original story about local food innovation simply because the shop uses a slightly novel ingredient.
Of course, pancake videos cannot offset wage costs, so last year the leadership at the station modified the performance evaluation and wage standards. Now employees are paid only a basic monthly salary of 800 yuan, or about 110 dollars, with performance-based pay issued according to the view count they receive for their short videos. Posts with more than 5,000 views are considered effective work output, with a performance bonus of 200 yuan per unit (video post). Reporters who manage to secure advertisements for liquor, pharmaceuticals, and health products are eligible for additional commission.
In smaller cities, where resources are more scarce, such practices can lead to a situation Li Ming describes as “more wolves than meat” (狼多肉少). Not every reporter has the ability to connect with liquor merchants. To earn more money, therefore, reporters may resort to purchasing traffic online. “On RedBook, for example, five yuan can buy you 2,000 views for your videos,” Li Ming explains. “Some colleagues with a bit more guts may even cooperate longer-term with public relations companies, and be able to boost view counts on some videos into the tens of thousands.”
Where there are measures, there are countermeasures. Leaders at Li Ming’s network now require more than 100,000 views across all platforms as the basic standard for short videos. In Li Ming’s view, this is wishful thinking — or perhaps a disguised method for network leadership to justify dismissing reporters.
Videos at local integrated media centers are generally of two types. Either they are broadcasts of speeches by local party or government leaders, or they are stories of the pancake variety — dealing with local novelties. But here there is a disconnect with local audiences, who comprise mostly small-time vendors, service industry workers, and farmers. This audience, on the one hand, is uninterested in broadcast content that is dry and highly propagandistic. On the other hand, if their appetite is for novelty, they will tend to seek it through popular apps like Douyin and Kuaishou.
Reporters who manage to secure advertisements for liquor, pharmaceuticals, and health products are eligible for additional commission.
As Li Ming explains the result of this odd arrangement: “An extremely absurd scene emerges in which everyone buys traffic with their left hand, then collects wages with their right hand. It’s a bit like we’re using our own money to pay ourselves.”
On top of these bogus games to manufacture traffic, television stations, especially at the local level, have seen strict performance management and enforced attendance as a lifeline. Last year, the network where Chen Jiaqi works began carrying out attendance checks. All employees were required to clock in on time — regardless of whether or not theft had location shoots or need to travel for work. The net result of these overbearing measures was to further sap everyone’s creative enthusiasm. It became normal to clock in on time but then slack off (摸魚).
In this sort of environment, says the young CCTV reporter mentioned above, as the propaganda tones of the network saturate all other functional attributes, everyone’s mindset undergoes a radical change. “When shopping around for topics these days, I find that what can be done, what meets CCTV’s [political] requirements, is very limited,” they say. “I automatically write off a large amount of information as sensitive content, and what can be done is just an endless recycling of past information. So I’m constantly feeling that I’m caught between information overload and information scarcity.”
The culture and its restrictions are a recipe for institutionalized deception. “Under orders from the leadership to clock in and out on time, the most I can do is pretend to be creating news from old news — that is, pretend to be working.”
Regarding subordinates “pretending to be busy,” the senior producer at CCTV said that everyone at the TV station, from top to bottom, actually understands what is needed for rating to improve. The recipe is simple. Stop restricting creative freedom. Use higher quality original scripts rather than an endless stream of serials about sent-down youth (知青), imperial palace dramas, and other red dramas set in the pre-reform era. Bring in foreign-produced animations. Produce programs that respond to the demands of common people. And even allow news programs that can criticize the government.
“But none of these things are possible,” the producer says. “So just let them have their way.”
Retreating In the Face the Era
In this environment, those who still have the heart to chase after program quality are suffocated by the network’s radical pursuit of “safety.”
Wang Rui (王瑞) and Wang Mengkai (王夢凱), who resigned from the network, both graduated from a well-known professional journalism school in southern China. The school has always adhered to a dual-mentor system comprising both academic and professional mentors, with professional mentors generally being senior business leaders from two well-known provincial TV stations. In most cases, graduates from this program with related majors are picked up by these two provincial TV stations, and Wang Rui was fortunate enough to join one of them.
But Wang Rui quickly felt the gap between her ideals and reality. “The producer of the project team I joined after starting my job was actually my industry mentor during school. While we were studying, he never limited our ideas and always encouraged us to observe society more and be more innovative,” she recalls. “But when the actual work started, everything was different.”
Wang Rui’s graduation project had been a short film documenting the “lying flat” (躺平) phenomenon among young people in China today. Her father invested more than 150,000 yuan, about 20,000 dollars, to support her creation, and her short film received unanimous praise from both her academic and her professional mentors. After joining the TV station, she hoped to continue filming a sister piece on this theme — telling the stories of college graduates who couldn’t find jobs.
Wang’s idea was rejected on the spot by the producer, however. The topic was not positive enough and didn’t align with the mainstream values advocated by the TV station — mainstream in this context meaning the political line of the leadership.
How were these mainstream values to be reflected in broadcast content? This, Wang explains, should be about young people enthusiastically working, making friends, nurturing the next generation, buying property, buying cars, and energetically supporting the country’s development. “That is how the producer explained the standard for a film production to me at the time,” Wang Rui recalls.
Of course, such content is obviously disconnected from the reality facing most Chinese. “This is a major reason,” Wang Mengkai says, “why audiences are increasingly unwilling to watch TV.
According to the “2024 China Smart TV Interactive New Trend Report,” a research report on television consumption by the Chinese consulting firm Analysys (易观分析), China’s TV turn-on rate has dropped from 70 percent to less than 30 percent since 2016.
As program content becomes increasingly detached from reality, it not only reduces viewership but also subjects TV station staff to considerable public criticism.
Chen Jiaqi has experienced this firsthand. Her parents, both veteran television professionals, commanded great respect among family and friends. “But in my generation, online references to our TV station are frequently paired with negative remarks like ‘bad habits,’ ‘two-faced,’ and ‘moral character’ [a sarcastic slur]. Sometimes people directly attack us with comments like ‘Are the XX station editors’ heads filled with garbage?'”
But Chen Jiaqi believes the root of the problem is that TV stations are now subject to too many constraints.
Take Hunan Satellite TV as an example. As the leader of provincial satellite TV in mainland China, Hunan Satellite TV has long occupied the top spot in national satellite TV ratings and was the first to try transforming from traditional TV to digital media, becoming one of the three streaming giants alongside Tencent Video and iQiyi.
At the same time, Hunan Satellite TV has been derided by some netizens as the “toilet station” (馬桶台) for producing a large number of “tacky and cringe-worthy” (又土又雷) idol dramas, asserting that Hunan Satellite TV staff have no taste or culture.
In 2009, Hunan TV could draw huge enthusiastic studio audiences for hit programs like “Super Girl” (超級女聲). SOURCE: Wikimedia Commons.
In fact, Hunan Satellite TV has also exclusively broadcast many quality TV dramas. For example, “Ming Dynasty 1566” (大明王朝1566) which scored 9.8 out of 10 on Douban, the popular Chinese social networking service and recommendation website, tells the story of how large-scale land annexation implemented by the state during the Jiajing Emperor’s reign in the Ming Dynasty caused millions of farmers to lose their land, while the autocratic rule of powerful ministers plunged the civil official system into a bloodbath. After its initial broadcast, the drama was immediately banned.
Another drama, “In the Name of the People” (人民的名義), triggered an unprecedented ratings frenzy that to this day remains unsurpassed. Regarding this drama’s successful “passing of review” (過審), a Hunan Satellite TV staff member who participated in the decision-making told Initium Media that this was the first TV drama in recent years in China with the theme of official government corruption. “The drama involves many official rules, and some villains even have a certain coloring of the tragic hero,” they say. “Some leaders were worried about causing displeasure up above. But after much consideration, we still broadcast it. Because audiences have always been eager to understand more details behind the anti-corruption campaign, even if this drama’s portrayal of officialdom is somewhat one-sided, it’s better than nothing. As for the potential price of broadcasting, we calculated that we could bear it.”
“TV stations gather China’s most outstanding media elites,” Chen Jiaqi says. “We know what is good and what is bad, and we also know what you, the audience, want — but we are being constrained more and more tightly.”
Chen Jiaqi’s classmate Zhang Xiang (張響) previously took part in the production of a music program. According to the program’s setup, the staff planned to invite singers from Hong Kong, Taiwan, and mainland China to sing their classic songs together. Part of the team’s motivation for planning this program was because they received a united front task from the propaganda department, meaning that they serve a role in fostering unity among the various Chinese-language communities. But setting aside the political mission, Zhang Xiang also had his own personal motivation — to use this program to help Chinese audiences regain an international perspective and tell them that Hong Kong and Taiwan people are not their enemies; that on the contrary, they share common cultural memories.
During implementation, however, the project encountered unexpected complications. “First, we needed to analyze the ‘quality’ of the Hong Kong and Taiwan artists we wanted to invite, to see if they were troublemakers for Hong Kong or suspected of supporting Taiwan independence,” Chen explains. “Then we had to thoroughly investigate all their past statements, including content they posted on social media platforms outside China — and even whether their social media contacts had any political issues. After all this was done, the leadership actually required us to guarantee that the Hong Kong and Taiwan artists we wanted to invite would absolutely never express any pro-Hong Kong independence or Taiwan independence views in the future.”
“Who can guarantee things about the future?'” Zhang Xiang sighed.
In the end, the program team abandoned Hong Kong and Taiwan artists and had mainland Chinese singers cover the Hong Kong and Taiwan songs needed for the program.
Zhang Xiang had quite a few misgivings about this: “The program was turned into an awkward hybrid,” he says, “so of course the ratings wouldn’t be good.”
But in the current environment where ratings determine everything, the team’s project leader devised alternative solutions—diverting part of the production budget to purchase trending topics on Sina Weibo for the program, and promptly submitting screenshots of these trending topics to higher-level leadership.
“So, everyone is just deceiving themselves and others,” Zhang Xiang says.
A Destined End
Despite the continuous decline in ratings and TV station revenue, most interviewees said they “would not leave.”
Chen Jiaqi became an officially hired employee at her station a few years ago through an examination process. Compared to other colleagues who signed labor contracts, she has public institution status (编制), enjoyed by just one-tenth of all employees. Under the protection of this status, no matter the economic situation of her platform, she cannot be dismissed.
She once thought this status was constraining, but due to pressure from her parents, she didn’t dare relinquish it so easily. And later she just made peace with it. “After all, it became clear to me that colleagues who left aren’t doing any better than when they were at the station,” she says.
The colleague she had in mind had been the director of a hit television program a few years back, but felt that restrictions at the station would only worsen. So they resigned and joined a streaming platform. But the completely different creative environment and rules, combined with the market cooling caused by the economic downturn in recent years, led platforms including iQiyi and Tencent Video to cut a large number of projects. In the end, Chen’s former colleague was forced to abandon what they had once thought would be a great opportunity to showcase their talents.
This cautionary tale reinforced Chen Jiaqi’s determination to remain at the station. Li Ming similarly decided to hold on to his position. Beyond wages, he explained, the additional benefits provided by the media center’s reputation are unimaginable to those on the outside.
“Having the identity of a media center reporter is very effective in small places,” he explains. “People will unconsciously respect you. In our small city, identity determines resources. So even if salaries haven’t been paid for several months, I haven’t seen any colleagues voluntarily leave.”
Colleagues mostly have their own ways of making money. For example, Li Ming, while being on close terms with liquor merchants, also established a wedding planning company with friends. Leveraging his identity as a TV station reporter, his company is extremely competitive in the local wedding planning industry. “I charge 2,000 yuan to host a wedding. In addition, our wedding company also provides wedding car rentals. For one wedding, I personally can earn at least 3,000 yuan, so the TV station’s salary doesn’t mean much to me,” says Li.
His direct supervisor at the TV station has openly established an advertising company. As Li Ming explains: “Those unscrupulous merchants who want to place fake drug advertisements on TV will directly give the business to my supervisor’s company. My supervisor can earn probably hundreds of thousands a year. Looking at it this way, even if the TV station’s ratings are zero, it doesn’t have much impact on us.”
Like Li Ming, the CCTV reporter and director interviewed by Initium Media also said they have no plans to leave the TV station anytime soon. They joined the station over a decade ago when CCTV still had its celebrated in-depth program “News Probe” (新聞調查) — modeled after the American “60 Minutes.” They had benefited from CCTV’s prosperity at that time, and had converted these gains into real estate before Beijing property prices soared. “So we don’t have too many financial concerns. If things really don’t work out, we can use the connections accumulated at CCTV to do some freelance work. We definitely won’t starve,” the director says.
The CCTV director refused to disclose his side business, but gave examples of those operated by others. “The simplest is to establish PR companies and advertising companies, and then to accept CCTV’s business through these companies, so the money naturally enters one’s own pockets,” he explains.
Rui Chenggang, a former well-known host of one of CCTV’s most powerful channels, the financial channel CCTV-2, had partnered with an executive from Edelman, the world’s top-ranked international PR company in China at the time, to establish a PR company. This was before Rui was arrested and imprisoned for his involvement in corruption cases related to the financial channel’s deputy director and some senior officials. This sort of situation, the director said, is extremely common at CCTV.
Aside from establishing their own companies, hosts also accept commercial hosting activities for large enterprises like Alibaba, Tencent Group, and China Merchants Bank. It is reported that, with the backing of their identities as CCTV hosts, these television celebrities can command fees of between 20,000 to 40,000 yuan per hour, or 2,500-5,000 dollars.
Ordinary reporters and directors at CCTV, those who did not enjoy the benefits of the network’s heyday, have found their own ways of making a living. The head of a media center at a well-known state-owned enterprise is particularly frustrated by one such practice. “Our company has developed five-star resort hotels in many tourist cities and scenic spots. CCTV reporters often contact us during holidays like May Day and National Day Golden Week saying they want to bring their families for vacation and ask our enterprise to provide rooms for them in our five-star hotels. These reporters sometimes actually stay with their families, but sometimes resell the rooms at high prices. The hotel expenses for a holiday are about 20,000 yuan,” he says.
A PR head of another well-known financial institution also revealed a similar experience of being squeezed by CCTV employees selling on their state media privilege: “It’s hard for outsiders to imagine that when we invite CCTV to interview our company’s executives, CCTV reporters will sometimes storm off with angry expressions because we didn’t provide each of them with a few thousand yuan in ‘channel fees’ in advance, leaving our scheduled interviewees stranded.”
To remedy the situation, this PR head transferred 4,000 yuan, about 550 dollars, to each CCTV reporter via WeChat as “compensation for hardship” (辛苦費).
“Enterprises simply don’t dare to offend CCTV reporters,” the abovementioned head of the media center says. “Once we make them unhappy and they write negative reports about a company, we in our role as PR personnel will face severe consequences, and the company itself will find it difficult to bear the political stigma.”
“This is one of the main reasons why some TV professionals remain loyal to their television stations,” says the young CCTV reporter.
In the long run, where will journalism in China go? Wang Mengkai is very concerned.
His closest university classmate, a reporter who continues to “endure” employment at the TV station due to financial pressures, offers him this consolation. Times are different now, he says, and the medium of communication has already changed. Nowadays, platforms like Kuaishou and Douyin are the main channels for dissemination of information, and ordinary people can express their own voices this way.
The aforementioned source working in the propaganda office of a central institution, shares this rosy view. In internal discussions in the past, he has advocated for maintaining a strong connection between video platform traffic and monetary rewards in order to preserve the lifeline for short video platform users. “If there is no financial incentive, many people might not create Douyin and Kuaishou videos,” he says, “and once the platform loses traffic, the voices of ordinary people at the grassroots level will go silent. They will become groups completely invisible to the outside world.”
As for the fate of television in China and its practitioners, his view is that the core function of television is to serve the public. Once it deviates from this founding idea, it essentially becomes self-destructive. He says that “the current remedies,” in the long run, are “all like arrows at the end of their flight.”
“Under the current atmosphere of high-pressure control and political prioritization, television will gradually die out,” he adds. “This is an inevitable end.”
(At the interviewees’ request, Chen Jiaqi, Wang Mengkai, Li Ming, Zhang Xiang, and Wang Rui are pseudonyms. The original Chinese version of this report can be found at Initium Media.)
As Tomb Sweeping Day approached last month, Yang Zhengan (杨郑安), a former deputy secretary of Zhengzhou’s local People’s Congress, found himself swept into a different kind of public ritual. Local party-run media in Henan’s capital city, amid the latest wave of anti-corruption actions rolling across the country, freshly reported his expulsion from the Communist Party last year for accepting shopping cards, bath house vouchers, and expensive liquor from individuals seeking to trade on his influence.
Yang is not alone. In recent weeks, official circulars and party-controlled media have publicized similar “exemplary cases” (典型问题) of corruption nationwide. But this is not corruption reporting. Rather, it is corruption signaling — designed to project toughness on corruption, direct public indignation toward isolated bad-apple scapegoats, and crucially, demonstrate to Beijing that local officials are complying with central directives.
This all-too-familiar pattern of corruption treatment in the media in China, which deliberately ignores systemic causes, illuminates how the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) addresses — and more importantly, fails to address — a problem that remains as entrenched today as it was a decade ago.
Why is China making a fuss about corruption right now, and yet again?
Ritual Without Reform
This latest wave began last month with the nationwide launch of a new disciplinary campaign that will run through July. During provincial tours in March, Xi stressed the need to “thoroughly understand the spirit of the Central Eight Regulations” and “resolutely combat the problems of formalism and bureaucracy.” These regulations, issued shortly after Xi took power in 2012, initially targeted official extravagance, banning lavish banquets, unnecessary travel, and excessive gift-giving — like those bath vouchers for Deputy Secretary Yang. They formed the cornerstone of Xi’s broader anti-corruption push that has been periodically reinvigorated through campaigns like the current one.
Recent media and propaganda responses to the renewed Central Eight Regulations push have come in several distinctive forms.
One is exemplified by Yang Zhengan and his shopping cards, an act of signaling using previous prosecutions and punishments as examples. The examples, or “exemplary cases,” have the dual role of finger wagging and demonstrating local action. Behave, the lists say to those below. Look at us behaving, they say to those above. Yang’s case, with only the sparsest of details provided, appeared late last week in a circular (通报) from Zhengzhou’s Discipline Inspection Commission, the local anti-corruption authority under the national-level Central Discipline Inspection Commission (CCDI). Among other media, the circular was published by the Dahe Daily (大河报), a newspaper directly controlled by Henan provincial party authorities.
A special sub-site on the Communist Party study portal 12371.com deals with the campaign, which it says is running to the end of July.
Also on the list of “exemplary cases” was that of Jin Yinhua (靳银华), a section-level official in Zhengzhou Economic and Technological Development Zone, an economic development area outside the provincial capital offering industrial access to central China’s transportation hub. Jin was disciplined in February this year for improperly hosting (违规操办) his son’s wedding banquet. According to the circular, he invited multiple individuals under his regulatory authority — presumably, companies located in the zone — and accepted gift money.
Finally, there was Chen Yinfu (陈垠甫), the former Party Secretary of Jiehe Village on the outskirts of Zhengzhou. He was expelled from the Party for repeatedly accepting cigarettes and alcohol as gifts from construction project managers in his village during banquets to celebrate Spring Festival and Mid-Autumn Festival between 2020 and 2023.
Behave, the lists say to those below. Look at us behaving, they say to those above.
Exemplary case lists like the one in Zhengzhou have already been posted in Guizhou province, Gansu province, and Henan province, and many more are sure to come this month. After all, the use of these exemplary case lists was prescribed by the CCDI earlier this month, when it directed inspection teams across the country to “use typical cases of violations of the Central Eight Regulations to strengthen warning education” as part of the nationwide learning campaign running through July.
A second form of media and propaganda response is “meta-propaganda,” a form of self-referential theater where performing the appearance of action becomes more important than the action itself. In a sense, the entire Central Eight Regulation push is a call for four months of corruption-related meta-propaganda. And this can readily be seen in specific examples over the past week.
The Fight for the Photo-Op
Across the country, the public accounts of discipline inspection offices on social media — most variations of the word “Clear Breeze” (清风) — have sprung into action since the anti-corruption push began. But this action is again about signaling action, not about taking action. At “Clear Breeze Xinxiang” (清风新乡), the account of a prefectural-level city in northern Henan, officials documented inspection teams conducting both open and covert monitoring during the recent Tomb Sweeping Day holiday. They claimed to have targeted the private use of government vehicles, exorbitant banquets and other infractions.
Did discipline inspectors in Xinxiang actually show their work? Certainly. But not in the way you might think. One of the local office’s most typical posts reports nothing about the specifics of related actions, only that inspectors “organized implementation of the spirit of the Central Eight Regulations.” This is an odd turn of phrase. Why, 13 years after the regulations were introduced, would their “spirit” need its implementation to be organized? The answer, of course, is that these are not rules or regulations to be systematically enforced as laws might be under a system of rule of law. These are political prescriptions pressed within the Party, which for all intents and purposes is above the law.
The root of the problem — the lack of real mechanisms governing a Party above the law — is right there, plain as day for anyone who looks past the pageantry. But this fact is a sacred chalice, a sin gilded as political virtue. No one can question or deny it, which is to say the Party’s supremacy, resulting in widespread impunity. But everyone can “implement the spirit.”
Photos from the discipline inspection office of the prefectural city of Xinxiang promote compliance with the latest anti-corruption push.
Understand that the Central Eight Regulations are political and ideological prescriptions within the Party, to be enforced as ever through campaign-style governance rather than consistent and concerted oversight, and you understand why officials at every level are scurrying off to “organize implementation” (组织开展….落实). And you understand why the meta-propaganda can quickly become ridiculous.
In the same post from the local discipline inspection office in Xinxiang, for example, officials are shown in proverbial action. One image shows a visit to the cigarette counter — to do what is unclear, but we may recall the cigarettes gifted, allegedly, to the local village official Chen Yinfu in the above mentioned case. Another image shows three officials staring at a sedan parked outside the discipline inspection office. The only explanation at all is to tell us that “the disciplinary inspection and supervision organs of Weihui City, Yanjin County, Weibin District, Hongqi District” and other counties under the city’s jurisdiction are “resonating in unison,” conducting inspections and “establishing new practices,” all to “promote the thorough implementation of the spirit of the Central Eight Regulations.”
We might laugh at the expense of these local discipline inspectors for their poorly-conceived act of political theater. But they understand, like every player in the system — the savvy and the less so — that this is how the story goes. Xi Jinping’s latest stage instructions mean that it is time to perform. It is time to “swat flies” (打苍蝇), or make an example of small-time officials while leaving the core system intact.
Changing the script on corruption would require a political shift so fundamental that it is unthinkable, upsetting the Party’s unassailable role above the law — and ultimately above accountability.
As a 7.7 magnitude earthquake struck Myanmar and Thailand last Friday, the temblor rattled buildings across the sprawling Thai capital of Bangkok, home to an incredible 142 skyscrapers. When the shaking ceased all were standing strong — with one very notable exception. The State Audit Office (SAO) building in Chatuchak district, a 30-story skyscraper still under construction by a subsidiary of a Chinese state-owned enterprise, collapsed into a heap of rubble, trapping nearly 100 people inside.
As of this week, 15 have been confirmed dead in the collapse, and a further 72 remain missing. Thailand announced over the weekend that it was launching an investigation to determine the cause of the collapse, and the prime minister said the tragedy had seriously damaged the country’s image.
As emergency teams sifted through the wreckage in the immediate aftermath, the building’s primary contractor, China Railway No. 10 Engineering Group, came under intense public anger and scrutiny. Anger was further fueled by clear efforts by the company, and by Chinese authorities, to sweep the project and the tragedy under the rug.
An image on a WeChat post deleted by China Railway No. 10 Engineering show the crew celebrating the capping of the Bangkok building.
Shortly after the collapse, the China Railway No. 10 Engineering Group removed a post from its WeChat account that had celebrated the recent capping of the building, praising the project as the company’s first “super high-rise building overseas,” and “a calling card for CR No. 10’s development in Thailand.” Archived versions of this and other posts were shared by Thais on social media, including one academic who re-posted a deleted promo video to his Facebook account — noting with bitter irony that it boasted of the building’s tensile strength and earthquake resistance.
Trying to access news of the building collapse inside China, Taiwan’s Central News Agency (CNA) reported that queries on domestic search engines returned only deleted articles from Shanghai-based outlets such as The Paper (澎湃新闻) and Guancha (观察网). In a post to Weibo, former Global Times editor Hu Xijin (胡锡进) confessed that the building “probably had quality issues.” Even this post was rapidly deleted, making clear that the authorities were coming down hard on the story.
Searches on Weibo today for “Bangkok” and “tofu-dreg projects” (豆腐渣工程), a term often used in Chinese to describe shoddy and dangerous construction, return almost entirely results prior to March 18, ten days before the collapse in Bangkok. One rare post from March 28, however, shares the screenshot of a social media post that day by Beijing Youth Daily (北京青年報), an outlet under the capital’s local chapter of the Communist Youth League, that apparently included street-view video of building collapse in Bangkok. A hashtag on the post reads: “#A building under construction in Bangkok collapses during earthquake#” (曼谷一在建高樓地震中坍塌).
The still image appears to capture an early moment in the building’s collapse, which was recorded at the same moment from another angle by a dashcam — footage shared in a report by the BBC. The Weibo user reposting the image from the Beijing Youth Daily account takes care not to directly mention the Chinese construction company, commenting only: “The earthquake was strong, but this was clearly a ‘tofu-dreg project,’ no? The relevant construction parties should be held to account!”
Several news outlets in the region have also reported, citing the commissioner of Bangkok’s Metropolitan Police Bureau, that an investigation has been launched into the alleged removal of 37 files from the building site, now a restricted zone, by four Chinese nationals. Bernama, Malaysia’s national news agency, reported Monday that one Chinese national, identifying himself as project director at the site, had been apprehended.
Meanwhile, the machinery of propaganda continued to turn out feel-good news on China’s response to the quake. The Global Timesreported that emergency assistance for Myanmar embodied Xi Jinping’s foreign policy vision of a “community of shared future for mankind.” In Hong Kong, the Ta Kung Pao (大公報) newspaper, run by the Liaison Office of China’s central government, twisted the knife into the United States as it reported on the earthquake response, noting the absence of USAID, recently dismantled by the Trump administration. Behind the news, the paper declared, “China’s selfless response demonstrates the responsibility of a great power.”
In the latest iteration of the leadership’s efforts to expand local-level involvement in the national project of global propaganda, Wangcheng District in Changsha, Hunan province’s capital city, has established the region’s first county-level international communication center, which the state-run China Daily says will “tell Wangcheng’s story” as well as convey the wisdom of Chinese leadership and development to the world.
The new hub offers a glimpse not just into the strategies of China’s leadership to advance the country’s “global discourse power” — but how such strategies may be seriously misguided, even foolish, as they unfold from the heights.
Located on the northwestern outskirts of Changsha city, Wangcheng is a rapidly industrializing district known for its historical ceramic production at Tongguan Kiln, the Lei Feng Memorial Hall (commemorating the model soldier celebrated in Communist Party lore), and several ancient towns along the Xiangjiang River. Once primarily agricultural, the district has been absorbed into Changsha’s expanding urban area since its conversion to district status in 2011.
The CCP’s mythologized selfless soldier, Lei Feng (雷锋), is claimed by Wangcheng District. But can his image translate into global soft power? SOURCE: Wikimedia Commons.
The Wangcheng International Communication Center (望城国际传播中心) was unveiled on Tuesday in a ceremony attended by the deputy director of Changsha’s propaganda office under the local Chinese Communist Party leadership, Yang Yi (杨溢), and Chen Kuang (陈旷), a district member of the CCP committee. At the launch event, officials said the center aims to “bring Wangcheng to the world and let the world understand Wangcheng.” They described the center as an “upgraded new media communication system” focused on “integrating resources and innovative communication.”
International Communication Centers (国际传播中心), or ICCs, have proliferated across China since 2018 as part of a broader program under Xi Jinping designed to modernize the Party-led system for global propaganda. The initiative gained momentum following Xi’s May 31, 2021 call at a Politburo study session to revolutionize Party-state communication with the goal of making China “credible, lovable and respected” (可信 | 可爱 | 可敬). This push was given further momentum after the Third Plenum in July last year, where Xi made what state media described as “important deployments” regarding “constructing a more effective international communication system” (构建更有效力的国际传播体系).
At the local level, these ICCs have intersected with a decade-long program under Xi to digitize and modernize Party-run “mainstream media,” preparing them to lead domestic public opinion — and now, international public opinion — in the 21st century.
Schools Become Recruitment Centers
As local and regional leaders have leapt to obey Xi Jinping’s instructions on international communication, one key issue local ICCs have faced is a lack of requisite talent. Communicating effectively requires a range of skills and savviness that are often scarce in China’s highly controlled and oxygen-deprived media space, and also a more international knowledge and outlook. Local leaders have increasingly tried to fill this gap by enlisting the country’s universities.
The launch in Wangcheng included the formation of “international communication volunteer teams” (国际传播志愿小分队) from three local colleges: Hunan Information Vocational Technology College, Central South University of Forestry and Technology’s Foreign Affairs School, and Hunan Foreign Trade Vocational College.
The government appointed what it calls the first batch of “Wangcheng International Communication Recommendation Officers” (望城国际传播推荐官) who will reportedly “showcase Wangcheng’s ‘ancient charm’ and ‘new trends'” to international audiences. Hoping to leverage the ICC to promote local culture and tourism, officials announced five “premium interview routes” — essentially, maps for promotion tours — that comprise more than 20 locations of interest. Not surprisingly, the list included the district’s Lei Feng Memorial Hall (雷锋纪念馆).
The center says it will use its “regional advantages,” including culture, to “display a real, multidimensional, and comprehensive Wangcheng to the world” through what officials term a “1+3+N” international communication model — one center, three workstations, and multiple college volunteer teams.
Xi Jinping’s vision for global propaganda and public opinion dominance in the 21st century is built on a basic, and deeply flawed, assumption that voices can communicate effectively if only they are mobilized politically.
Models like the “1+3+N” have multiplied across the country. Just one administrative level up, at the Changsha International Communication Center, the formula is “1+2+9+N,” describing a system of one city-level center, two sub-centers, nine district-level centers, and a range of “cooperation units” such as schools, think tanks, overseas liaison offices (海外联络站) and so on. In such formulas, “N” has become a variable describing the real extent to which this renewed national push for global influence has enlisted all aspects of Chinese society, both at home and abroad.
“N” speaks to what the leadership clearly regards as a primary strength of the international communication center push — the collective might of people and institutions across sectors. But it also stands in for one of the key vulnerabilities of this latest effort: its often haphazard and scattershot approach.
Xi Jinping’s vision for global propaganda and public opinion dominance in the 21st century is built on a basic, and deeply flawed, assumption that voices can communicate effectively if only they are mobilized politically. In an era of boundless information, however, the approach does little to account for audience preferences or interests, lacking meaningful feedback mechanisms. To the extent that “N” represents conscripting local and international students, enterprises, and other social actors, it also underscores the significant trade-offs the leadership demands to amplify its message — essentially requiring society to redirect resources and attention away from core missions toward politically-determined communication goals.
On Tuesday, China’s military released a propaganda video called “Vanquishing Evil” (降妖除魔) that framed military exercises encircling Taiwan in a show of military force as a blockbuster of mythic dimensions. Complete with video game references, the propaganda spot, promoted widely by state media, made it all seem like a testosterone-fueled game for adolescents — rather than drum-beating about aggressive actions that could set off a deadly regional conflict.
Staged by the Eastern Theater Command of China’s People’s Liberation Army, the video — released as China announced joint military drills in waters around Taiwan — employed supernatural imagery from the Chinese classic “Journey to the West” (西遊記) to depict the military operations as an epic battle morally justified.
Screenshot of a version of the PLA video on China Central Television, with an inset (by CMP) of the video game from which the animation footage seems to have come.
Slicing through bellicose montages of naval vessels, jetting aircraft, descending parachutes, and hustling ground forces, were title cards with martial arts terminology — overlaying video of the mythological Monkey King (孫悟空), the chief protagonist of the above-mentioned novel. These appeared to have been lifted directly from a popular video game, “Black Myth Wukong” (黑神话:悟空), which last year became the first major Chinese game to achieve breakthrough success in the West.
In Taiwan, meanwhile, audiences were not enjoying the theater.
Taiwan’s Presidential Office responded swiftly to the PLA’s exercises, with spokesperson Kuo Ya-hui (郭雅慧) saying that President William Lai (賴清德) had directed national security and defense agencies to monitor the situation closely. “In the face of external threats, our government will continue to defend our democratic and free constitutional system,” Kuo said. “We have the confidence and ability to safeguard national sovereignty, protect people’s safety, and maintain social stability.”
The PLA video made the rounds on midday news shows across Taiwan, and the country’s Central News Agency quoted China’s Global Times newspaper as saying that “the film seamlessly connects Sun Wukong’s demon-slaying abilities with the PLA’s powerful combat capabilities, highlighting the PLA’s aim to fight against and eliminate independence movements.”
Propaganda from the Eastern Theater Command of China’s PLA depicts Taiwanese President William Lai as a parasite, a frequent recent line of attack.
In recent weeks, Taiwanese President William Lai has faced a torrent of criticism from China after he characterized Beijing as a “hostile foreign force” (外部敵對勢力) during a March 13 national security meeting. This rhetorical escalation came alongside Lai’s announcement of plans to restore military trials amid a surge in Chinese espionage cases, with official data showing 64 people in Taiwan were indicted for spying for China in 2024 (three times that in 2021).
China’s official state media have portrayed Lai as a “parasite” gnawing away at Taiwan’s well-being and future — another theme featured in propaganda from the PLA’s Eastern Theater Command on Tuesday.
The PLA video’s five title cards all draw from “Journey to the West” mythology, repurposing supernatural abilities from China’s literary heritage as modern military capabilities. The first, “Vanquishing Evil” (降妖除魔), frames military action as a sacred duty to eliminate demonic forces, while the last, “Immobilization Technique” (定身术), represents the ability to paralyze an opponent’s defenses through electronic warfare and precision strikes.
While Beijing frames its military posturing as fantasy-inspired heroism, Taiwanese citizens face the sobering reality that these metaphorical “demon-vanquishing” techniques represent actual missiles, blockades — and presumed plans for invasion. The gamification of conflict may entertain mainland audiences. But across the strait, the consequences could not be more real.