It was a busy week last week for China’s media. Once again, we’ve picked out a few stories that merit particular attention. First, we note the wave of accusations last week of sexual harassment against prominent figures in the media. These accusations, the latest in China’s domestic #MeToo Movement, relied to a great extent on the platform afforded by WeChat.
WeChat also played an important role in the development of another major story last week, the revelation of the sale of tainted vaccines produced by produced by Changchun Changsheng Life Sciences, one of the country’s largest producers. Concerns about vaccines produced by Changchun Changsheng and others had been voiced online for nearly a week before a single article, “King of Vaccines” (疫苗之王), was posted to a WeChat public account and went hugely viral. The article can be credited with advancing the story and eventually forcing the government to respond more robustly.
This Week in China’s Media July 21 – July 27
➢ Online Accusations of Sexual Harassment Hit the Media, Prompting Discussion of China’s “MeToo” Movement
➢ WeMedia Article Prompts Doubts About Vaccine Inspection System
➢ Jiang Jianguo (蒋建国) Removed as Head of the State Council Information Office, Replacement Not Yet Decided
➢ Facebook’s Company in China is Shut Down, Possible Links to China-US Trade Tensions
➢ Shandong Calls for More ‘Supervision By Public Opinion’ Directed at Local Administration
[1] Online Accusations of Sexual Harassment Hit the Media, Prompting Discussion of China’s “MeToo” Movement
Since October 2017, the #metoo hashtag has been widely used on Twitter, Facebook and Instagram as women report cases of sexual harassment and share their experiences. This week, China experienced its own wave of #metoo reports focussing in particular on media and public intellectuals. July 23 — An anonymous female volunteer posts a long article to a WeChat group accusing Yi You Charity head Lei Chuang (雷闯) of sexual assault in an incident happening 3 years earlier. July 23 (evening) — The founder of “Natural University,” well-known environmental activist Feng Yongeng (冯永锋) is accused of sexual assault, physical assault and rape by several different women. July 25 — An article called, “Zhang Wen: Please Stop Your Violations” (章文, 请停止你的侵害), goes viral online, accusing well-known media personality Zhang Wen (章文), a member of the editorial board of China Newsweekly, of rape in an encounter on May 15, 2018. Zhang Wen denies the accusations in a letter from his lawyer and in a media interview. Writer Jiang Fangzhou (蒋方舟) and journalist Yi Xiaohe (易小荷) come forward to also accuse Jiang of sexual harassment. July 26 — An anonymous web users accused China Central Television anchor Zhu Jun (朱军) of sexual harassment dating back to 2014. The accusation is reported on the Weibo account of Phoenix Online, but is continually deleted by censors.
At 2:56PM on July 27, Caixin Media posted a follow-up report on the accusations against Zhu Jun called “Female Intern Accuses Zhu Jun of Sexual Harassment” (女实习生指控朱军性骚扰). According to the report, the victim actually reported the abuse to police at the time accompanied by teachers, fellow students and a lawyer, but in the end nothing came of the case. By the evening of the 27th, the Caixin Media report had been deleted.
Some commentators pointed out that the fact that the focus in this recent wave of sexual assault allegations was on men in the university, charity and media sectors was not an indication of unique problems in these areas, but rather a reflection on the difficulty and sensitivity of reporting such abuses when they involve powerful men within the system. Key Chinese Reports:
WeChat Public Account “Living” (在人间): 一直删除 新进展
WeChat Public Account “Living” (CM大大): #Me Too#对性侵勇敢说“不”!
[2] WeMedia Article Prompts Doubts About Vaccine Inspection System
In mid-July, a scandal quietly broke online in China concerning safety concerns about vaccines produced by Changchun Changsheng Life Sciences Limited (长春长生生物科技有限责任公司), known for short as Changchun Changsheng (长春长生). According to a notice from the China Food and Drug Administration, the company had been ordered to stop production, and its Good Manufacturing Practice (GMP) certification (生产质量管理规范证书) had been revoked. According to a news report by the Shanghai-based outlet Jiemian, the investigation had been prompted by an older staff member working inside a production facility who had come forward. Despite concern about the case online, it simmered for nearly a week before becoming a full-fledged national scandal.
Finally, on July 21, a post made to the WeChat public account “Shou Lou Chu” (兽楼处) threw oil onto the embers. The post, called “King of Vaccines” (疫苗之王), drew more than five million reads before finally being deleted, leaving behind a notice saying it was a “violation of laws and regulations” (涉嫌违法违规). A version of the post is still available here.
The “King of Vaccines” post provided an overview of publicly available information about the vaccine scandal, and revealed that Changchun Changsheng had cheated safety tests in the production of its rabbies vaccines, and that other vaccines manufactured by the company had failed safety tests, though an estimated 250,000 problem doses had already been sold on the market.
This is a rare, and relatively new, instance a post from a WeChat public account having an immense impact on the direction of public opinion in China. At 11PM on July 22, the day after the “King of Vaccines” post, an article appeared on the website of China’s central government: “Li Keqiang Issues Official Comment on the Vaccine Incident: We Must Give the People of the Country a Clear Explanation” (李克强就疫苗事件作出批示:必须给全国人民一个明明白白的交代). The article said: “Premier Li Keqiang has issued official comments on the vaccine incident: This vaccine scandal has crossed a moral red line for the people, and we must give the people of the country a clear explanation.” Key Chinese Reports:
WeChat Public Account “National Business Daily” (每日经济新闻):《疫苗之王》火爆朋友圈,牵出隐秘富豪发迹史
[3] Jiang Jianguo (蒋建国) Removed as Head of the State Council Information Office, Replacement Not Yet Decided
Since January 2015, Jiang Jianguo has served as director of the State Council Information Office, and as a deputy director of the Central Propaganda Department.
On July 25, China’s Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security issued a routine announcement on appointments and dismissals in which it was revealed that Jiang Jianguo (蒋建国) would be relieved of his duties as head of the State Council Information Office, a position he has held since 2015.
As of July 27, a replacement for Jiang has still not been formerly announced. However, some speculated that Xu Lin (徐麟), a close ally of Xi Jinping and current head of the Cyberspace Administration of China, would replace Jiang. Others have speculated that Jiang’s replacement may be due to the recognition within the top leadership that the overseas propaganda strategies under Jiang, emphasizing China’s growing dominance as a global power, have failed in light of pushback from the United States and other countries. Key Chinese Reports:
China.com.cn (中国网): 国务院任免国家工作人员
United Daily News (联合新闻网): 扭轉中國形象 習近平親信傳將出掌宣傳部門
[4] Facebook’s Company in China is Shut Down, Possible Links to China-US Trade Tensions The New York Timesand other international media reported on July 25 that China had withdrawn approval for the setup of a Facebook subsidiary in the city of Hangzhou. Facebook has said publicly that it planned to use the subsidiary to set up an innovation hub. On July 26, Securities Daily (证券日报) reported that the status of the planned company — Facebook Technology (Hangzhou) Ltd. (脸书科技(杭州)有限公司) — had already been designated “revoked” (撤销). Currently, no information about the company is available through China’s National Enterprise Credit Information Publicity System. Concerning the reasons for the denial of approval for Facebook’s subsidiary in China, a Foreign Ministry spokesperson said at a press conference on July 26 that the question should be directed to the “responsible department” — presumably meaning the State Administration for Industry and Commerce. Key Chinese Reports: Securities Daily (证券日报): Facebook在华子公司被撤 财报公布后股价暴跌超20%
[5] Shandong Calls for More ‘Supervision By Public Opinion’ Directed at Local Administration
According to a report in Dazhong Daily (大众日报), the official newspaper of the provincial Party committee in Shandong province, Provincial Party Secretary Liu Jiayi (刘家义) chaired a meeting on ideology and propaganda on July 23 during which he urged “news units” (新闻单位) to intensify so-called “supervision by public opinion” (舆论监督) — a practice often associated with investigative reporting, or the monitoring by the media of instances of corruption or negligence. Liu said that cases in which local officials inadequately implement the policies of the Central Party, or in which they violate laws and regulations or do not heed the concerns voiced by the people, must be “firmly exposed.”
On July 25, Jilu Evening News (齐鲁晚报), a provincial-level evening newspaper, ran a commentary called “Strengthening Supervision by Public Opinion, The Time is Right” (加大舆论监督力度,正当其时). The commentary criticized unspecified government departments for “causing obstructions” (关卡压) and “dragging their feet” (推绕拖) as a matter of convention. The commentary said that supervision by public opinion played a crucial role in breaking through these bottlenecks and resolving key issues.
While the call for greater “supervision” may sound like a positive development, we need of course to be cautious. Generally, a call like this by a top provincial leader would be a call essentially for top-down monitoring by the leadership using Party media. It cannot be construed as giving license to media generally to conduct bottom-up monitoring of power structures. Key Chinese Reports: Dazhong Daily (大众日报): 省委意识形态和宣传思想工作领导小组第二次会议召开 用习近平新时代中国特色社会主义思想强基铸魂更加积极主动做好意识形态各项工作 Jilu Evening News (齐鲁晚报): 加大舆论监督力度,正当其时
The detonation of a bomb this afternoon outside the US Embassy in Beijing was understandably the topic of feverish social media activity, rapidly dominating WeChat groups. Many people in the area posted photos and video in the immediate aftermath of the incident. And predictably, the authorities moved quickly to contain comment and speculation — though certainly with limited success. As one user remarked: “WeChat groups are swamped!”
Screenshot of video posted online showing smoke engulfing the area around the US Embassy in Beijing.
Below we have a selection of Weibo posts about the explosion that were deleted from the platform. We have arranged them in order of appearance, the first happening at 1:30PM Beijing time, 20 minutes or so after the explosion.
A search on Weibo for “embassy” (大使馆) now turns up an array of official responses to the explosion, including information from the official Weibo account of the Beijing police, and the response from China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs as reported by the Global Times. Said MOFA spokesman Geng Shuang (耿爽): “I want to say that this incident which happened at Tianze Road and Anjialou Road is an isolated security incident, and the Chinese police have already swiftly and appropriately dealt with it.”
The bomb was reportedly detonated by a single attacker, who has been identified as a 26-year-old man from Inner Mongolia surnamed Jiang. Other than the attacker, no one was injured in the attack.
If you want to understand how sensitive the sharing of eyewitness material can be in China, definitely watch this thread from AFP correspondent Becky Davis.
2018-07-26 13:30:46 | An explosion at the US Embassy . . . Huh? 2018-07-26 13:30:46 | 美国大使馆爆炸。。。呃 ?
______ 2018-07-26 13:43:11 | What’s up with the US Embassy? http://t.cn/Rp7gR9V 2018-07-26 13:43:11 | 美国大使馆怎么了? http://t.cn/Rp7gR9V
______ 2018-07-26 13:47:04 | At the US Embassy, a video provided by a web user http://t.cn/ReygA33 2018-07-26 13:47:04 | 美国大使馆,视频来自网友提供。 http://t.cn/ReygA33
______ 2018-07-26 13:47:45 | 【Explosion Occurs at US Embassy in Beijing】According to numerous internet users, it’s possible that an explosion occurred just now in the area of the US Embassy in Beijing. There is already a police line around the area of the embassy. from Sohu News http://t.cn/ReyrNxx 2018-07-26 13:47:45 | 【美国驻华大使馆附近疑似发生爆炸】据多名网友爆料,刚刚,在位于北京的美国驻华大使馆附近疑似发生爆炸。使馆附近已经拉起了警戒线。 via.搜狐新闻 http://t.cn/ReyrNxx
______ 2018-07-26 13:49:20 | What’s going on at the US Embassy? 2018-07-26 13:49:20 | 美國大使館怎麼啦?
______ 2018-07-26 13:50:34 | Is Trump secretly visiting China? http://t.cn/Reyez3i 2018-07-26 13:50:34 | 特朗普沒私下訪華吧? http://t.cn/Reyez3i
______ 2018-07-26 13:51:40 | Hong Kong Media: An explosion has occurred outside the US Embassy in Beijing. It is suspected that a petitioner caused the explosion. http://t.cn/ReyeiqX 2018-07-26 13:51:40 | 港媒:北京美国驻华大使馆外发生爆炸 疑似访民引爆炸药http://t.cn/ReyeiqX
______ 2018-07-26 13:59:46 | Explosion at the US Embassy in Beijing 2018-07-26 13:59:46 | 美国大使馆发生爆炸
______ 2018-07-26 14:10:44 | An explosion outside the gate to the US Embassy [SURPRISE] [SURPRISE] It is said that there was someone self-immolating. How scary ……. http://t.cn/Rp7gR9V http://t.cn/ReUvEkR 2018-07-26 14:10:44 | 美国使馆门口爆炸了[吃惊][吃惊][吃惊]据说有人自焚,好吓人…… http://t.cn/Rp7gR9V http://t.cn/ReUvEkR
______ 2018-07-26 14:15:52 | Video from the scene of the US Embassy explosion [SAD], I hope this is not another Sarajevo Incident [NOTE: This refers to the assassination on June 28, 1914, of Archduke Franz Ferdinand] [MOURNING] http://t.cn/ReUhbKT 2018-07-26 14:15:52 | 美国大使馆爆炸现场视频[伤心],希这不是第二起萨拉热窝事件[衰] http://t.cn/ReUhbKT
______ 2018-07-26 14:17:04 | WeChat groups are swamped! [There is news of an] explosion in front of the US Embassy. http://t.cn/ReUhNU3 2018-07-26 14:17:04 | 朋友圈刷屏了,美国大使馆前发生爆炸 http://t.cn/ReUhNU3
______ 2018-07-26 14:18:21 | There’s been an explosion near the US Embassy. This is too scary! [MOURNING] http://t.cn/ReUhdsN 2018-07-26 14:18:21 | 美国大使馆附近爆炸了,这个也太恐怖了吧![衰] http://t.cn/ReUhdsN
______ 2018-07-26 14:22:12 | #suddenbreaking #according to @CGTN news, and explosion has occurred near the US Embassy in Beijing. An explosion was reported near the US Embassy in Beijing on Thursday, Reuters reported. 2018-07-26 14:22:12 | #突发#据@CGTN 消息,美国驻华大使馆附近疑似发生爆炸。An explosion was reported near the US Embassy in Beijing on Thursday, Reuters reported.
______ 2018-07-26 14:26:22 | News flash: Explosion occurs at the US Embassy. What a scene. So someone truly goes to the US Embassy to commit an act of terrorism. Beijing isn’t Beirut. http://t.cn/ReUZLkF 2018-07-26 14:26:22 | 快讯:美国大使馆发生爆炸 好热闹 真有人去美国大使馆搞恐怖袭击了 北京不是贝鲁特http://t.cn/ReUZLkF
______ 2018-07-26 14:50:28 | 【News Brief】- US Embassy in Beijing: An explosion has occurred outside the US Embassy in Beijing, caused by one person with a bomb. Aside from this person with the bomb, so far no one else is injured. 2018-07-26 14:50:28 | 【快讯】- 美国驻华大使馆:位于北京的美国驻华大使馆外发生炸弹爆炸,一人引爆炸弹导致爆炸发生;除了引爆炸弹的此人之外,尚无其他人受伤。
______ 2018-07-26 14:56:16 | 【Reports Say Explosion Happened Near US Embassy】- Many sources have reported that on Thursday an explosion occurred outside the US Embassy in Beijing. Video shared on social media shows emergency personnel on the scene and smoke everywhere. This area has many other embassies, including the Indian embassy. The incident happened around 1PM local time. According to reports from Reuters and the Associated Press and official Chinese media . . . [Full article]: http://m.weibo.cn/1649159940/4266046372763082 2018-07-26 14:56:16 | 【美国驻华大使馆附近据报发生爆炸】- 多个消息源报道称,周四在北京的美国驻华大使馆外发生了一起爆炸事件。社交媒体上的视频显示,现场有紧急救援人员,烟雾弥漫。该地区还有其他多个国家的驻华使馆,包括印度使馆。这起事件发生于当地时间下午1点左右。据路透社和美联社报道,中国官方媒体称,事发…全文: http://m.weibo.cn/1649159940/4266046372763082
______ 2018-07-26 15:02:08 | @USEmbassyinChina What did you guys do? Who did you do wrong to? Did you go the wrong road when it came to that person who planned the bombing? http://t.cn/ReUqcb1 2018-07-26 15:02:08 | @美国驻华大使馆 你们那咋啦?得罪谁啦?搞爆炸的那人,你是不是走错路了? http://t.cn/ReUqcb1
______
In May 2018, Chen Yixin (陈一新), the secretary of China’s top political body overseeing law enforcement, rolled out what in the brittle-dry world of Chinese political discourse might amount to a memorable new catchphrase.
Addressing a forum on propaganda, Chen spoke of the need for “6 grabs,” or liu ge zhua (六个抓), the idea being that the Chinese Communist Party had to be aggressive in several key areas if it hoped to set the agenda on policing and other law enforcement matters.
Chen outlined his “6 grabs” as follows:
* The need to “grab” correct guidance (抓导向), meaning control of the political discourse.
* The need to “grab the team” (抓班子), meaning to ensure a strong and cohesive leadership group for political and legal affairs.
* The need to “grab” talent (抓人才), recruiting the right people for leadership.
* The need to “grab” reforms (抓改革), meaning to actively implement necessary changes for strong leadership.
* The need to “grab” policies (抓政策), meaning resolute implementation of the Party’s agenda.
* The need to “grab Big V’s” (抓大V), meaning to build influence on social media platforms in order to reach ordinary citizens with law-and-order propaganda.
Chen’s words were a fairly typical deployment of Partyspeak, another bullet-list formula to project a can-do attitude. But the storm of reactions from internet users on social networks underscored just how difficult leaders like Chen can find it to speak a language ordinary people can understand.
American investor Charles Xue is shown on Chinese television following his arrest in 2013 on charges of soliciting prostitution.
Recalling the Party’s campaign against the “Big Vs” — a term sometimes referring to prominent social media influencers with the power to drive online opinion in directions the leadership finds objectionable — some internet users initially understood the call to “grab Big Vs” as an ominous warning. It was less than five years ago, in August 2013, that big-name microbloggers like American investor Charles Xue were swept up in a campaign of intimidation. Xue’s arrest was publicly linked to charges of soliciting prostitution. But the official Xinhua News Agency made the true objective clear by reporting that the arrest “has sounded a warning bell about the law to all Big V’s on the Internet.”
Was Chen, the country’s top law enforcement official, now issuing another call for the arrest of popular “Big V” influencers?
A closer reading of the official news coverage revealed the simple misunderstanding. The word “grab,” which in colloquial Chinese simply means to grasp something with one’s hand, or to apprehend a suspect, can mean something quite different in the Party’s tradition of political discourse. The Paper, a Shanghai-based media outlet, sought to clarify Chen’s meaning with a more direct headline on the “Big V” question: “Chen Yixin Outlines Innovative Move for Politics and Law, Putting Effort Into Training and Supporting a Large Group of Big Vs to Become Internet Celebrities.” A Brief Party History of the Word “Grab”
The word “grab” in Chinese was originally an active verb, used in phrases like “scratching an itch,” or zhuayang (抓痒), or “to arrest a person,” zhuaren (抓人). The essential meaning is “to grasp” or “seize” (把握), as in to “seize the time” (抓紧时间). Over decades, however, “grab” has become formalized as a part of the official Party discourse, pointing to active and conscientious leadership.
When we look at the Party’s People’s Daily going back to the 1940s, we find uses of the character in the early period under the Chinese Communist Party that accord with the common usage “to grab.” For example, the phrase zhuabin (抓兵), meaning “to capture [enemy] soldiers.” By the end of the 1940s, however, ahead of the founding of the People’s Republic of China, we can find the meaning changing as Maoist discourse exerts a powerful influence on the language.
When Mao Zedong summed up the “12 work methods” (12条工作方法) for Party committees at the Second Plenum of the 7th National Congress of the CCP in early 1949, sixth on the list was the need to “firmly grasp,” or zhuajin (抓紧). Mao said that to “grasp but not tightly was tantamount to not grasping at all” (抓而不紧,等于不抓). So here we find the character zhua directly associated with the verb “to lead,” or lingdao (领导). From this point, “firmly grasping” starts to become synonymous with “strengthening leadership,” or jiaqiang lingdao (加强领导).
After the middle of the 1950s, we see this sense of “grab” picking up in the People’s Daily, with a pair of relevant phrases appearing, for example, in an article on December 28, 1956: “grabbing crucial points, then talking about rectification and improvement” (抓关键——再谈整改); “looking to three years for ten year [planning], and for three-year [plans] grabbing the first year” (十年看三年,三年抓头年). In 1958, during the Great Leap Forward, the word “grab” became a constant feature of Party discourse. The phrase “grabbing ideology, grabbing production and grabbing lifestyles” (抓思想抓生产抓生活) became a regular slogan.
For Mao Zedong, zhua was first and foremost about “grabbing the struggle” (抓斗争) and “grabbing the revolution” (抓革命). In 1963, Mao Zedong raised his famous slogan, “Once struggle is grabbed, miracles are possible” (阶级斗争,一抓就灵). During the Cultural Revolution, Mao’s slogan “Grab revolution and promote production” (抓革命, 促生产) became ubiquitous. In 1967, a total of 1,132 articles in the People’s Daily made mention of this slogan.
Following Mao’s death in September 1976, Hua Guofeng moved to arrest the members of the “Gang of Four” and bring the Cultural Revolution to an end. His strategy during his brief leadership was to “grab the key plan and govern the nation” (抓纲治国), which essentially meant bringing the terror of the “Gang of Four” to an end while still maintaining Mao’s ideological line of class struggle.
As the Third Plenum of the 13th National Congress in December 1978 ushered China into a new era of reform and opening, many of the Party’s slogans were abandoned, and some language considered negative during the Mao era came to represent positive values. The meaning of “grab” within the Party discourse persisted, though it came with new priorities: “grabbing the economy” (抓经济), “grabbing administration” (抓管理), “grabbing practical matters” (抓实事), “grabbing the system” (抓制度), “grabbing the One Child Policy” (抓计划生育), “grabbing the vegetable basket [of food supply]” (抓菜篮子), and “grabbing reform” (抓改革). Addressing the need for China to expand computer use among the population, Deng Xiaoping said in 1984 that “the popularization of computer use must be grabbed starting with the babies” (计算机的普及要从娃娃抓起).
Chinese political discourse has continued to evolve through the reform period, but as the recent Chen Yixin case shows, the gap with common language use can fuel misunderstanding. Criminal suspects can be “grabbed,” but so can political objectives. This article was contributed to CMP by freelancer Olivia Yin Li and translated from Chinese.
Last month’s “two sessions,” the National People’s Congress and the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Congress, was an occasion to stress repeatedly the historical “banner terms,” or qizhiyu (旗帜语), of the Chinese Communist Party — those phrases associated with the political and ideological legacies of top leaders going back decades. Coverage around the political meetings meant we could expect to see a relatively strong showing for legacy terms like “Deng Xiaoping Theory” (邓小平理论), the “Three Represents” (三个代表) and the “Scientific View of Development” (科学发展观), associated respectively with Deng Xiaoping, Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao. And in fact, this was the case.
This month, however, we see something very different. And this is our top TAKEAWAY from the April 2018 Discourse Climate Report: In a total of 3,101 articles appearing in the Party’s official People’s Daily newspaper in April, the three banner terms of President Xi Jinping’s predecessors appeared just once each. Moreover, these appearances of previous banner terms all occurred in just one article, called “Marxism Has Eternal Value” (马克思主义具有永恒的价值). This was one of a number of articles preparing for the celebration in in May of the 200th birthday of Marx.
This rather dramatic month-to-month slide in the banner phrases of Xi Jinping’s predecessors is perhaps a reflection of Xi’s continued dominance of the ideological sphere in the Party. In April, there were 238 mentions in the People’s Daily of Xi’s own banner term, “Xi Jinping Thought of Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for the New Era” (习近平新时代中国特色社会主义思想).
The full April 2018 Discourse Climate Report follows:
A delegation from the United States arrived in Beijing today for what many expect will be tough negotiations over trade, with both countries threatening tariffs in an escalating stand-off in recent months. The U.S. delegation includes Treasury Secretary Steve Mnuchin, Commerce Secretary Wilbur Ross, Trade Representative Robert Lighthizer and National Economic Council Director Larry Kudlow. China signalled this week that it would not back down in the face of American pressure, and there were already indications that Chinese officials may travel to the United States next month for further talks.
On Chinese social media, meanwhile, authorities sought to remove speculation about how contentious negotiations might become.
The following message, posted to Weibo by Singapore’s Lianhe Zaobao at 9AM this morning, was deleted within three hours:
[Difficult negotiations, China-US trade delegates will find it tough to reach a consensus this week] U.S. media believe that this round of negotiations will have little chance of eliminating divisions between China and the United States, because both sides plan to meet force with force. U.S. delegates have already prepared for a hard-line posture, and therefore did not according to custom send personnel to Beijing in advance for preliminary consultations — rather, they prepared to reaffirm U.S. concerns face-to-face during negotiations, forcing China to agree to move more quickly on deeper structural reforms.
Lianhe Zaobao currently has more than two million fans on Weibo.
The following is a screenshot of the Lianhe Zaobao Weibo post on trade negotiations as it appears in the WeiboScope archive:
In a post made to Weibo early this morning, one Chinese user wrote: “[#ChinaIsNotScared#] I’ve heard Trump is getting angry, and now considering another 100 billion in tariffs against China? Let me tell you: China is not scared! Whoever wants to prevent China’s expansion will pay a painful price in the end!”
A poster from the Cultural Revolution expressing opposition to the “American empire.”
The post, its clear support for China in the ongoing spat over trade notwithstanding, was quickly deleted by censors — indicating that the topic of tariffs and trade is a highly sensitive one for the leadership, which hopes to curtail discussion among internet users even as it actively pushes a state-led narrative of resistance. It is clear from a Weibo search of the keyword “trade war” (贸易战), however, that much related content remains on the platform, including coverage and commentary from official and non-official news outlets, like the People’s Daily and Caixin.
Much coverage takes a tone not unlike that of the deleted Weibo post above, pledging, as one China Business News Weibo post says, parroting the People’s Daily, that “China has nothing to be polite about, and will make the United States pay a price.”
In a rebuttal to the#ChinaIsNotScared# Weibo post made at 9:38AM, and also deleted about 90 minutes later, user “Zhang Zanbo” (張贊波) wrote: “This state media way of talking is like one of those poses from the Cultural Revolution.”
The post included the image of a propaganda poster from the early 1970s. The poster shows a band of soldiers and workers in a triumphant pose, with the red slogan underneath: “It’s not the people who fear the American imperialists, but the American imperialists who fear the people” (不是人民怕美帝而是美帝怕人民).
When it comes to intensifying controls on online content, the people have once again spoken. Or so claims China’s broadcast regulator in an action announced earlier this week, demanding that two of the country’s most popular media platforms, live-streaming app Kuaishou (快手) and Jinri Toutiao (今日头条), a news aggregator, put a freeze on video uploading services for new account holders and be subjected to a purge of existing programs.
In a notice posted to its official website and WeChat account on Wednesday, the State Administration of Press, Publication, Radio, Film, and Television (SAPPRFT) — which is due to be dissolved into a new National Radio and Television Administration under an institutional restructuring plan revealed last month — said it was prioritizing action against the platforms to respond to “fierce attention in public opinion from society about programming at the Jinri Toutiao and Kuaishou sites that violated social morals.”
Both services, in fact, were the target of criticism in Chinese state media in the days leading up to the SAPPRFT announcement for such issues as false and misleading advertising, and China Central Television’s “Economics Half-Hour” (经济半小时) program ran a special report on alleged violations at Jinri Toutiao. The action announced Wednesday, in other words, has been building for some time.
According to the SAPPRFT notice, Jinri Toutiao and Kuaishou will be subject to the following “rectification measures” (整改措施):
Comprehensive inspection of existing stored programs, with immediate pulling offline of indecent (低俗), violent (暴), bloody (血腥), pornographic (色情) or otherwise harmful (有害) programs.
Ceasing of all new accounts with video uploading functions, and comprehensive review of all existing accounts. Suspension of uploading functions or indefinite blocking of all accounts that have uploaded harmful or illegal programming.
Investigation of the responsibility [liability] of website reviewers and managers in cases of broadcasting of content that it illegal.
The uploading of vidoe programming must immediately be reduced to a scale fitting to the capacity of review and management (网站审核管理力量相匹配的规模), ensuring that no programs are broadcast that have not been reviewed.
More information about the move by SAPPRFT is available at Caixin Global and SCMP.
When the news broke last Sunday that China planned to introduce changes to its Constitution removing term limits for the president and vice-president — paving the way for Xi Jinping to remain in the position beyond 2023 — observers outside China puzzled over the fact that this news seemed to break first through an English-language report from the official Xinhua News Agency.
Media in Hong Kong are now reporting that the English-language news brief from Xinhua was the cause of some consternation in Beijing, where unspecified central Party leader have ordered an investigation into what has been called a "serious political error" (严重政治失误). It is reported that the editor responsible has been removed, and that top leaders at Xinhua have been asked to submit self criticisms (检讨).
Shanghai-based former investigative reporter Yang Haipeng (杨海鹏), a former CMP fellow, was one of the first to report word on February 26 that the Xinhua news brief had been identified as a problem. Here is Yang's post on Twitter:
昨天新华社英文版那条报道处理下来了,正在传达,定性: 严重失误,政治失误。 处理: 各种撤职,社领导检讨。— 杨海鹏 (@1oVkSudMpws1PGQ) February 27, 2018
TRANSLATION: That English-language report that went around yesterday from Xinhua News Agency is now being handled, the word going around that it has been labeled a "serious error, political error." The result: various removals, self criticisms from agency leaders.
Hong Kong's Apple Daily reported that it had confirmed the disciplinary action with a source who wished to remain anonymous. The source told the newspaper that they believed there was nothing seriously wrong with the English-language report — an assessment possibly corroborated by the fact that the report remains accessible online — but that it might have fallen afoul of certain influential Party officials who were angered by the immediate wave of negative commentary overseas in the wake of the announcement.
Reached by the newspaper, an employee at Xinhua News Agency's External News Office would only say: "This . . . . This kind of thing. There is no way we can confirm it for you."
Generally, the External News Office (对外部) at Xinhua enjoys a level of discretion in the dissemination of English-language releases. These generally begin as Chinese-language official release copy that is first approved (both content and images) by the General Office of the Chinese Communist Party. The copy is then translated into foreign language copy for release by the External News Office.
Zhang Lifan (章立凡), an independent scholar and historian based in Beijing, told the Apple Daily that it was possible the English-language news brief had angered Party leaders because it focused only on the removal of presidential term limits, and avoided mention of other proposed changes to the Constitution. This might have been blamed for the immediate focus internationally on this aspect of the news, putting propaganda authorities on their back foot in terms of framing the story.
Image taken at the scene of today’s Beijing mall attack, posted to the official Weibo account of the Global Times.
As of late evening, the Beijing police notice entirely dominated information about the incident on mainstream news sites and on social media. This short news piece from People’s Daily Online also cites as its source “the official Weibo account of the Beijing police.”
But even as news based on the police notice remained on the official accounts of some state media and local Beijing media, such as this post from Beijing Evening News and this from the Global Times, sharing of the notice and comment from some users was subject to deletion on Weibo.
The following post from “Ji Siliu” (吉四六), a former journalist for The Beijing News with more than 77,000 fans on Weibo, was deleted sometime after 4:35PM Beijing time today. It responded to a post of the notice from Beijing police, also for some reason deleted, by adding an apparent detail about events at the scene of the attack.
“I saw a security guard rushing in with wooden stool,” “Ji Siliu” wrote.
Over the weekend, the China Media Project released the Chinese-language version of co-director Qian Gang’s annual report on Chinese political discourse — his “Discourse Climate Report 2017” — through Taiwan’s Storm Media. For this year’s report, special thanks go to the Robert Bosch Academy in Berlin, where Qian Gang is currently on fellowship.
We will have a full English version of the analysis available soon. Until then, here are a few of the key takeaways from the report.
1. The discourse highlight of the year was the “crowning,” or guanming (冠名), of Xi Jinping in the introduction of his “banner term,” or legacy-marking phrase, which is: “Xi Jinping’s Thought of New Era Socialism with Chinese Characteristics” (習近平新時代中國特色社會主義思想). But Xi Jinping was not just “crowned,” meaning that his name appeared within the formulation of his banner term. The introduction of a “Xi Jinping Thought” — as opposed to a “theory” (like Deng Xiaoping) or “strategy,” or “concept,” marked an unexpected intensity of elevation, arguably putting Xi on parity with Mao Zedong.
2. There were clear and renewed statements in 2017 about the power of the Party and the “core” status of Xi Jinping as the Party’s leader.
3. A clear and continuing downward trend was noted for terms related to political reform.
4. Economic development remains the chief axis and emphasis in political discourse. China’s “principal contradiction,” or zhuyao maodun (主要矛盾), was redefined in Xi’s political report to the 19th Party Congress as “that between unbalanced and inadequate development and the people’s ever-growing needs for a better life” (人民日益增長的美好生活需要和不平衡不充分的發展之間的矛盾).
One of the most important ongoing questions the discourse trends of 2017 pose for 2018 is precisely how the “core” discourse around the personality of Xi Jinping will develop. The fawning language in praise of Xi and his greatness around the 19th Party Congress in October even inspired some expressions of fealty at the local level in China that were eerily reminiscent of the Mao era.
These self-serving local expressions of obedience to Xi were followed by rumors that the Central Party leadership had issued guidelines restricting the use of such phrases. Given language in the Party’s own charter against cults of personality, and related warnings internationally in the wake of the 19th Party Congress, Xi has perhaps been trying to suss out exactly how high his ceiling is. On November 1, the Party released a “Decision” outlining three acceptable phrases that could be used to kiss up to Xi Jinping. They were as follows: Loved by the entire Party (全党拥护) Loved and respected by the people (人民爱戴) Fully worthy and deserving [of core leadership status] (当之无愧)
But not all local leaders, it seems, received the memo. On November 10, 2017, Qianxinan Daily, a local Party newspaper in Guizhou province, referred on its front page to Xi Jinping as “great leader,” or weida lingxiu (伟大领袖). Not long after, however, the digital version of the newspaper was doctored to remove the page in question. In its place (see both pages below) an entirely fictional page layout appeared.
As Qian Gang’s discourse report notes, even the three above-mentioned terms sanctioned for use in praise of Xi Jinping had diminished markedly in use by the end of November 2017.
How mightily will Xi be praised this year? Stay tuned.