Responding to a push from the central leadership to supercharge international communication at the local level, China’s southern Guangdong province launched four new digital platforms this month. Going live on July 2 alongside the release of a glossy propaganda film called “Go Guangdong” (够广东), the platforms include IP Guangdong, INFO Guangdong, LIVE Guangdong, and GO Guangdong.

Provincial propaganda officials have lauded the online portals as new forms of “citizen-based external propaganda” (人人外宣), and state media have suggested they mark an innovative departure from previous top-down approaches to global communication. But the sites, and the plans announced alongside them, have the same underlying flaw as all external media communication conceived by China’s leadership in the name of “enhancing cultural soft power.” The point is power first, never culture. As for “soft,” these initiatives involve aspects of outright deceit that clearly mark them as classic iterations of sharp power.

Backyard Story Furnaces

In their basic concept, Guangdong’s new platforms are echoes of Xi Jinping’s top-down reconfiguration of external propaganda since around 2018, a process accelerating from 2021 onward. That reconfiguration enlists provinces, cities and even counties across the country in a more localized mobilization of messaging — including through a rapidly growing number of “international communication centers” (ICCs). The Chinese Communist Party’s objective is to augment past forms of large-scale and top-down global broadcasting — think CGTN and China Daily — with local voices and narratives.

As the new portals were brought online, propaganda officials in Guangdong hyped what they called an international communication ecosystem in which “everyone can participate and everyone can communicate” (人人可参与、人人能传播). Initially, that might sound like a loosening of state control over international communication, or even an empowerment of grassroots voices. It is not. In fact, it is something starkly familiar — the mobilization by central authorities of local energies, expanding outward and downward by fiat. It is, if you will, the backyard furnace (土法炼钢) approach to external propaganda in the 21st century.

This provincial initiative in Guangdong is premised on a two-fold strategy. First, it aims to make active storytellers of passive audiences, meaning that ordinary Chinese and international creators (such as artists and influencers) can become global communicators by using a built-for-purpose content portal. Second, services for foreign nationals in the province, such as planned cultural exchanges, are to be utilized as communication assets (“服务力”转化为“传播力”) — meaning that the provincial propaganda office has an active plan to exploit foreigners as propaganda resources in the name of service provision.

How exactly will this work?

IP Guangdong is the primary portal for the first of these two approaches. The bilingual creative platform actively solicits submissions from international content creators worldwide. The system aggregates visual materials including photographs, videos, and design elements around eight themes showcasing Guangdong’s economic vitality and cultural achievements. The platform has opened registration, submission, and collaboration functions to global creators, it says, seeking to activate and use creative forces internationally.

Like all four of these new platforms, IP Guangdong is under the direct control of Guangdong’s propaganda office and is operated through its existing state-run media structure. An ICP search for IP Guangdong shows that it is run by Today (Guangdong) International Communication Co., Ltd., a subsidiary of the Nanfang Media Group, the conglomerate under the provincial CCP committee that publishes the official Nanfang Daily newspaper.

Click on the interactive graphic below to view these connections.

A report from the official People’s Daily newspaper claimed earlier this month that IP Guangdong already hosts 712 individual creators and 76 institutional participants. The platform, which enables global registration — and says it offers opportunities for overseas distribution, copyright trading, and exhibition — clearly hopes to become something of an international gathering point for Guangdong-focused content creation. On its Facebook account earlier this month, The South, a rebranding of the former Guangdong Today website, urged its followers to “co-create the world’s next favorite Guangdong story.”

While the platform clearly wishes for international participation, the current contributor breakdown between domestic and foreign participants is not specified, and the draw for international content creators is difficult to imagine. What interest, short of direct payment from the Guangdong government, could content creators possibly have in using this portal over channels like Instagram or TikTok where a truly international reach is possible?

It only makes sense that propaganda authorities in Guangdong have not thought such questions through. Just as local officials in the 1950s fired up their backyard furnaces to please zealous central planners, they have responded not to the needs of audiences and content creators, but to the urgency of political will at the top. It is a recipe for inferior steel, but the slogans of course remain hopeful. “Your video clip is a montage of Guangdong,” read one for IP Guangdong this month. “Your creativity is the new power of Guangdong!” said another, unknowingly fixing the root of the contradiction.

As welcome as the recognition might be in propaganda-think since around 2021 that top-down state propaganda is not paying real dividends among global audiences, the push to mobilize individual voices from the bottom up to serve the larger narrative goals of the state is hardly cute and lovable. It fails, miserably, to understand the root forces that drive individual creativity.

Not to be deterred by a lack of understanding of both creators and audiences, IP Guangdong claims that its initial roster of Chinese contributors includes sculptor Xu Hongfei (许鸿飞), cartoonist Lin Dihuan (林帝浣), and photography association leaders from Guangdong, Hong Kong, and Macau, who have been appointed as “special creators” (特约创作者).

Global Ambassadors

While the first aspect of the Guangdong strategy shows a woeful lack of sensitivity toward creative acts and audiences, the second is outright deceptive.

Another of the new portals, INFO Guangdong, is meant to serve as a “service platform” (服务平台) for foreign nationals living in Guangdong. State media claim that the portal will offer multilingual support across government services, legal assistance, investment guidance, and advice on tourism, education, and healthcare. But another aspect of the INFO Guangdong plan is to establish “Foreign Clubs” (外国人俱乐部) within international communities that can be used to organize cultural exchange activities and attract foreign nationals for the purposes of promoting Guangdong and China.

In discussing these plans, the People’s Daily is shamelessly explicit, making clear that the platforms will “use events like ‘Foreigners Telling Stories’ to transform service recipients into communication partners” (将服务对象转化为传播伙伴). This will likely take shape much as media campaigns currently do, with unwitting foreign students or expats participating in events or junkets that allow state media to project chosen narratives with foreign faces onstage and on-screen.

In fact, according to state media coverage of the plans, five “international community service points” (国际社区信息服务点) have already been designated under INFO Guangdong, with foreign business leaders appointed as “Global Ambassadors” (全球推介官) to facilitate integration (融入) so that “all can tell the Guangdong story” (共同讲述广东故事).

This is not — it should go without saying — a role that foreign business leaders should be asked to play as they do business anywhere in China. Nor should city or provincial governments view their provision of basic information services to expatriates, tourists or other visitors as something transactional, to be cashed in for the broader narrative goals of the Party-state.

Ultimately, Guangdong’s latest approach to external propaganda, heeding Xi Jinping’s call to remake China’s global communication, reveals the same fundamental contradiction that has plagued Beijing’s pursuit of “discourse power” for years. Even as China’s leaders recognize the failure of top-down messaging and scramble to harness individual voices, they cannot find the soft spot in soft power because they refuse to loosen their stranglehold on expression itself.

The logic is circular and self-defeating: creativity must serve the leadership, and precisely because it must, it will not. Until China’s leaders can allow genuine individual expression to flourish without political instrumentalization, their myriad localized efforts at external communication will yield nothing more than inferior steel.

Mandated from on-high by the Chinese Communist Party leadership, China’s new strategy to super-charge its international communication at the local level is certainly not a process of decentralization. It is a policy effort, however, that has launched a thousand centers. The latest addition to the growing roster of international communication centers (ICCs) nationwide is housed at the country’s largest state-owned oil enterprise — underscoring the role also to be played in this global propaganda push by state and private companies.

On June 30, the China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC), which operates in nearly 70 countries and ranks among the world’s top oil companies by revenue, announced the formation of the “China National Petroleum International Communication Center” (中国石油国际传播中心) in a ceremony in Beijing. The CNPC said the center, established under the corporation’s newspaper division, aims to implement the “spirit” of the CCP’s Third Plenum back in August 2024, where one of the key messages was the need to “steadily raise the effectiveness of China’s international communication” (不断提升国际传播效能). A readout from the ceremony also paid lip service to Xi as the CCP’s leadership core, suggesting the center would advance “Xi Jinping Thought on Culture” (习近平文化思想).

Officials from the CNPC said vaguely that the center would work to elevate the company’s multimedia communication capabilities, adapting to “new situations and requirements” for international communication work. This last statement was almost certainly a reference to how local Party-state bodies, agencies, universities and enterprises have all been pressed into the national objective of enhancing global communication.

In what could be read as further evidence of how this national drive for ICC creation has nosedived into farce, the CNPC announced that its new center would “tell China’s petroleum story well and spread China’s petroleum voice” (讲好中国石油故事，传播中国石油好声音).

The ceremony was reportedly attended by representatives from 12 central media outlets including the Economic Daily (经济日报) and China Daily (中国日报), both publications directly under the central government, along with media representatives from 23 countries in Africa and the Middle East. According to the CNPC, they included participants from Angola National Radio (安哥拉国家广播电台), Burundi Economic News (布隆迪经济报), the Congo News Agency (刚果通讯社), and Morocco’s 2M Television (摩洛哥2M电视台).

After Angola, the Democratic Republic of the Congo has the second-largest crude oil reserves in Central and Southern Africa. Morocco has substantial shale oil deposits, although it produces only marginal amounts of natural gas, oil and refined petroleum products. Burundi has no domestic sources of coal, natural gas or oil.

Since 2021, hundreds of international communication centers (国际传播中心) have been formed across China’s vast administrative structure, from county-level governments to provincial authorities, all tasked with projecting Chinese narratives to international audiences.

Also last week, the county of Pujiang in China’s coastal Zhejiang province announced the formation of the “Pujiang International Communication Center” (浦江国际传播中心), or PJICC. The county center reportedly plans to make its ten-millennia history as the “origin of rice cultivation” (稻作之源) a focus of its external communication efforts.

China’s leadership is serious about the development of ICCs as a new strategy, and many of these centers are redoubling their efforts online and across foreign social media channels. As such, these developments should be watched closely. At the same time, as the CNPC and Pujiang centers make clear, observers should maintain a sense of perspective — and perhaps also a sense of humor.

Il Guardiano del Patrimonio, “The Guardian of Heritage,” was the grandiose title of a television series promoting President Xi Jinping’s cultural philosophy as it was broadcast last month across more than 30 Italian media outlets — one of the more ambitious and expansive examples of how China enlists apparent cultural cooperation to advance its political narratives and foreign policy objectives.

The grand launch ceremony in Rome last month was attended by key Chinese officials including Shen Haixiong (慎海雄), deputy head of China’s Propaganda Department and president of CMG, and Chinese Ambassador to Italy Jia Guide (贾桂德). Top Italian attendees included Giuseppe Valditara, the minister of education and merit in Giorgia Meloni’s current administration, former Deputy Prime Minister and Culture Minister Francesco Rutelli, and Italian Football Federation President Gabriele Gravina.

The festivities were a sufficiently grand display of Chinese foreign policy that they earned a segment on the nightly official newscast on China Central Television, “Xinwen Lianbo” (新闻联播). The series, which began airing on Italian networks on June 26, was timed to commemorate the 55th anniversary of China-Italy diplomatic relations. Networks airing the production included Alma TV, Dona TV, Tourism TV, and Lazio TV, as well as the website of the Milan Financial Daily.

Under what specific arrangements did Italian media agree to broadcast this CMG-produced series? CMP has reached out to several, but has received no responses to date.

Produced entirely by China Media Group (中国中央广播电视总台), the state media conglomerate formed in 2018 through the merger of key media groups including China Central Television, the program showcases what it calls Xi’s “profound thinking” on cultural development and his “deep affection” for preserving cultural heritage. The series visits locations where Xi has worked or inspected, including the ancient capital city of Hangzhou in China’s eastern Zhejiang province, and Dunhuang in Gansu, an outpost on the edge of the once Silk Road that is home to a network of grottoes adorned with Buddhist statuary and frescoes.

While the program, originally produced by CCTV in 2023, ostensibly focusses on China’s cultural legacies, it clearly promotes Xi Jinping as an inspirational political figure leading an inspirational political party into an era of greatness. In line with China’s most recent remodeling of political discourse since the last CCP congress in October 2022, the country’s ancient civilization is portrayed as the root of the ruling party’s power and legitimacy. Shen Haixiong (慎海雄), deputy head of China’s Propaganda Department and president of China Media Group, said at the launch in Rome that Xi’s “broad-minded embrace” stems from his “confidence and cherishing of cultural roots.”

Apparently swallowing the hook, Valditara responded — awkwardly, it must be said, for an EU education minister touting a production overseen by the CCP’s Central Propaganda Department — that Italian audiences were “eagerly anticipating opportunities to understand more deeply the profound foundation of Chinese culture and contemporary China’s vigorous development.” He described Chinese and Italian civilizations, according to coverage in China’s state media, as “brilliant galaxies that complement each other” (意中文明如璀璨星河，交相辉映).

The festivities in Rome, and the program airing across Italian television, are not really about culture at all. They are efforts to push state-led narratives of political legitimacy and civilizational grandeur through geopolitical posturing dressed up as cultural exchange. Officials in Europe and elsewhere should engage with China — but they should know the difference between culture and state-sponsored theater.

Since he came to power in late 2012, one of Xi Jinping’s core objectives internationally has been to stage a revolution in perceptions of China abroad — notching up victories in what he characterized early in his first term as a global “public opinion struggle” (舆论斗争).

This project, centering on the concept of “telling China’s story well” (讲好中国的故事), responds to what the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) leadership perceives as a detrimental gap with the West of what it terms “discourse power” (话语权). Mainstreaming a hardline notion that emerged in the late 2000s, Xi has set out to resolve China’s historical “third affliction” (三挨) — the contemporary experience of international criticism following earlier periods of military defeat (挨打) and economic poverty (挨饿).

Xi’s vision of returning China — for that is how the Party conceives of history — to its rightful place in global public opinion has evolved beyond traditional national-level state-led messaging to an international communication strategy more actively involving Party-state coordination of voices across locales and administrative levels. It involves leveraging local and regional media and coordinating the production of local multimedia stories through “convergence media centers” (融合媒体中心). It also envisions the participation of businesses, educational institutions and all other aspects of society.

The transformation is happening across the country — with hugely mixed results. In some local areas, the proliferation of the “international communication centers” (国际传播中心), or ICCs, that coordinate much of this work seems a superficial, ineffective and potentially wasteful response to dictates from on high. There are even now international branches of local ICCs. These are more likely to become window-dressing for provincial leaders than substantive acts of global communication. Take, for example, Hainan province’s launch this month of a Middle East Liaison Center in the United Arab Emirates.

In more developed media cultures in cities like Shanghai and Guangzhou, the shift could represent a more substantive evolution. It is perhaps too early to say. In Shanghai, for example, the government’s push to remold its “international communication matrix” (国际传播矩阵) — to use a term often favored by state communication planners — resulted in the creation in November 2023 of ShanghaiEye, a multimedia brand under the Shanghai Media Group’s “SMG International Communication Center,” that now claims 3.1 million followers on overseas social media.

ShanghaiEye’s YouTube channel, which currently has more than 400,000 subscribers, runs daily videos covering news and culture. Many of these deal with innocuous issues like tourism, food and culture, but many too echo broader state narratives, about the “real China” (versus the prejudicial Western one, a constant CCP theme); echoing Russian propaganda on Ukraine (and here); and selectively mirroring foreign affairs ministry talking points without any additional reporting or context.

Even as accounts the hundreds of accounts, like ShanghaiEye, operated by China’s growing network of international communication centers (ICCs) seek to expand their presence on social media channels that are formally closed to Chinese users back home, they cloak or make ambiguous their association with the country’s broader external propaganda goals. On Facebook, ShanghaiEye mentions no affiliation to the Shanghai CCP leadership. The Facebook account for the government-run China Daily (中国日报), by contrast, clearly labels it as “state-controlled media.” Over at YouTube, ShanghaiEye is simply identified as “a multi-platform media brand focusing on high-quality videos.”

Xi Jinping’s new multi-stakeholder approach to what the CCP terms “external propaganda” (外宣) is described by communication scholars in China as a systematic evolution from traditional propaganda to coordinated “narrative innovation” (叙事话语创新) across government, media, business, and social sectors. The ICCs play a key role in this coordination. But ultimately, the approach requires the concerted effort of all.

In an article published online this month, drawing on the insights of several academics, Fudan University doctoral students Liao Xiang (廖翔) and Chen Jingwei (陈经伟) conclude that China’s international communication has moved toward what they term “multi-stakeholder collaborative cross-cultural communication” (跨文化传播的多主体协同). They define three key strategic shifts: 1) coordinated messaging across administrative levels to avoid the “fragmented” approach of previous eras; 2) precision-targeted regional strategies that align local advantages with national objectives; and 3) systematic integration of youth culture and digital platforms to reach “new generation audiences” globally.

The scholars cited in Liao and Chen’s article argue that this represents a fundamental departure from traditional state-led messaging — which in the past relied primarily on large news wires and broadcasters like Xinhua and CGTN — toward what they describe as a comprehensive ecosystem designed to overcome “cultural discounts” (文化折扣). The odd term is another way of referring to the reduced appeal and effectiveness of foreign content due to what the leadership has typically assumed are cultural barriers. Chinese communication scholars are inclined to think that these “discounts” have historically limited China’s ability to project appealing narratives internationally, always overlooking the detrimental role of CCP political control, which maintains a stranglehold on the very notion of culture.

For scholars like Liao and Chen, it has become second nature in the past few years to argue that the changes introduced to global communication by Xi Jinping are inspirational and ground-breaking. But the claims of success often have a revealingly circular quality, citing victories claimed in the manner of self-promotion as empirical evidence of progress.

One of the scholars cited by the Fudan doctoral students, Chen Zhi (陈智), suggests in his input that the YouTube account of Discover Changsha, an account operated by the Hunan provincial capital’s official ICC, “achieved outstanding results on overseas platforms” with Harry Potter-themed short videos about local culture. This sounds at first like an intriguing possibility. Are local “convergence media centers” responding smartly with international cultural references, and has this been impactful?

The truth is underwhelming. Chen’s example is just more of wishful self-magnification too often found among the country’s communication planners, and it underscores the yawning gap between lofty ambition within China’s airtight political culture and genuine efforts to understand and engage global audiences. In the three months since it was posted to YouTube, Discover Changsha’s Harry Potter-themed video on the dramatic art of face-changing (变脸) has drawn just 327 views. Oh, and zero comments.

Earlier this month, the southern island province of Hainan put its international communication efforts on the global map with the launch of its international media center (ICC). The move follows a trend pushed actively by China’s leadership since 2021 with the idea that local and regional state media and propaganda offices can help energize the country’s “discourse power” globally.

Inaugurated on June 19 at a formal ceremony at Dubai’s Expo China Pavilion, the Middle East Liaison Center (海南国际传播中心中东联络中心) of the Hainan International Media Center (HIMC) represents what Chinese officials described as a “key step” for Hainan’s free trade port in expanding its international media presence and “injecting innovative momentum” into China-Arab media cooperation (video HERE).

More than 50 guests attended the inauguration, including Chinese Deputy Consul General Xian Yi (鲜忆), Dubai Tourism’s Asia-Pacific Director Shahab Shayan, Hainan Broadcasting Group (海南广播电视总台) Deputy Director Wang Lei (王雷), and Dubai Radio Director Salama Suwadi.

Xian Yi called the center “another important milestone” in China-Arab relations that would serve as an “important bridge connecting China and Arab countries.” Dubai Tourism’s Shayan said the facility would become a “bridge for bilateral cultural dialogue, content co-creation and cultural exchanges.”

The language of bridge formation and cultural exchange is a common trope in China’s state led public diplomacy emphasizing that even professional activities such as media and the arts should serve the goals of bilateral harmony and “friendship.” Under this friendship formula, critical media practice has no place and is seen as undermining relations.

Nowhere was the intent and mechanics of “friendly” media relations more apparent than in the presence at the ceremony of China-Arab TV, an outlet that a previous CMP investigation has shown has extremely close ties to China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

During the ceremony, Hainan Broadcasting Group (HBG), the provincial-level radio and television conglomerate that along with the Hainan International Media Center (HIMC) forms two of the province’s three primary external propaganda outlets, signed a strategic cooperation agreement with China Arab TV (中阿卫视). The partnership will focus on programming about Hainan’s free trade port “institutional innovation,” industry openness and trade facilitation, as well as cooperation between Hainan and the UAE.

Officials said the collaboration would target Arab audiences through “program exchanges, content co-creation and channel sharing” to increase understanding of Hainan’s free trade port development and add “new highlights” to China-Arab relations.

Though formally referred to as a “media center,” HIMC is Hainan province’s answer to Xi Jinping’s call for the nationwide creation of what are known as “international communication centers,” or ICCs. These centers have proliferated across China since 2018 as part of a broader program under Xi intended to modernize the Party-led global propaganda system. The initiative gained further momentum in the wake of Xi’s May 31, 2021 call at a Politburo study session to revolutionize Party-state communication with the goal of making China “credible, lovable and respected” (可信 | 可爱 | 可敬). At the Third Plenum in July last year, he again urged what state media described as “important deployments” to “construct a more effective international communication system” (构建更有效力的国际传播体系).

For the Chinese Communist Party, achieving the objective of external propaganda is sometimes about spreading the word about the glories of Xi Jinping Thought, or the supposed benefits of the Belt and Road Initiative — and sometimes it’s about sensational robot boxing matches.

Last Sunday, the China Media Group (中央廣播電視總台), the state-run media conglomerate directly under the CCP’s Central Propaganda Department, staged what it claimed was the world’s first humanoid robot boxing competition, featuring G1 robots from Hangzhou-based tech firm Unitree throwing punches and executing kicks in one-on-one matches broadcast live by China Central Television.

The spectacle, the latest in a series of sporting robot events put on by state media, was about more than raw entertainment. Why robots? Because robots embody futuristic appeal. They are more visual and more marketable than the latest AI model grinding out text or video. They naturally generate viral content that travels across social media platforms and news outlets without appearing like overbearing state propaganda. The objective is simple tech showmanship, advertising China’s supposed technological prowess in newly attractive ways, both to Chinese and to audiences overseas.

While the impact of such campaigns is difficult to measure, their viral nature pegs them as natural candidates for reposting. Across the internet this week — shared by personal social media accounts and bona fide news outlets like the BBC, NBC and Al-Jazeera — the spectacle of battling robots titillated global audiences.

Media everywhere took the bait, paving the way for yet more soft state propaganda featuring robots doing incredible deeds.

Taking the Bait in Taiwan

The pattern of spectacle was repeated in the case of Taiwan, with one important difference. Coverage across the Taiwan Strait of the robot antics on CCTV fed immediately into state media propaganda about Chinese economic and tech prowess — and the inevitability of unification. Never mind that Taiwan is home to the world’s most advanced chips behind a whole range of industries, including robotics.

Several pan-blue Taiwanese media outlets provided enthusiastic coverage of the CMG robot tournament. CTi News (中天新聞台), the social media account run by the often blatantly pro-China Want Want Holdings-backed China Times (中國時報), TVBS News (TVBS新聞台), ETtoday and other largely pan-blue outlets — leaning, in other words, toward the opposition KMT and its more supportive stance toward China — all reported enthusiastically on what they characterized as a breakthrough moment. “Human fighting is very common, but this might be the first time we have robots in the ring,” said an over-excited report from Da Ai Television (大愛電視), a network founded by a Buddhist charity organization in Taiwan, which added that the event was “expected to become an important milestone in smart robot applications.”

Chinese state media then amplified this Taiwanese coverage as evidence of cross-strait admiration — not just for China’s advertised technological prowess, but also for its “leaping development.”

In a May 26 report by CMG’s “Look at the Taiwan Strait” (看台海) program, the broadcaster highlighted how “Taiwan compatriots see the rapid development of the mainland motherland” through CMG’s media technology innovations. The report quoted Chen Wencheng (陈文成), described as a Beijing University Taiwan teacher, as saying that many young Taiwanese “yearn for mainland technology and products.” They hoped, he said, that CMG could hold similar competitions “on Taiwan island” so that “compatriots on the island can directly experience innovative achievements in robotics industry development.”

Chen, who in the past has said that “mainland democracy is democracy that truly serves the people,” is affiliated with the All-China Federation of Taiwan Compatriots, a state-sponsored organization currently led by Zheng Jianmin (郑建闽), who serves as deputy director of the Overseas Chinese Affairs Committee of the CCP, which operates under Beijing’s United Front Work Department.

The Pursuit of “Cuteness”

CMG’s robots may be battling for supremacy in the ring, but the broader goal beyond the ring is to attain the “cuteness” (可爱) Xi Jinping referenced in a May 2021 collective study session of the CCP Politburo. In that address on international communication capacity building, Xi called for China to project a “credible, lovable, and respectable” image to the world — a mild corrective departure from the aggressive “wolf warrior” diplomatic style that had dominated Chinese foreign relations for several years to that point.

The timing was no coincidence. China’s international image had suffered significant damage amid rising tensions with Western nations over Hong Kong, Xinjiang, and the COVID-19 pandemic response. Xi’s call for “cuteness” represented a strategic pivot toward what Chinese officials describe as a more “humble and modest” approach to international engagement, while maintaining firm positions on core issues.

Culture and technology are regarded as key areas in which to engage foreign audiences. While China’s official messaging may at times, as necessary, be firm on key positions, those positions can often be better conveyed through soft content that achieves a sharp purpose.

As one Chinese government document on building China’s international image notes, the goal is to “construct multi-channel, three-dimensional international communication patterns” that showcase China’s technological achievements while demonstrating the superiority of its political system. Robot competitions serve this dual purpose perfectly — they appear apolitical while subtly reinforcing narratives about Chinese innovation and government effectiveness.

In an interesting contrast to the sensationalism of CMG, several other Taiwanese media, including the government-run Central News Agency and the pan-green Liberty Times, featured their own robot competition story this week. But the focus in this case was far more down to earth as they reported on elementary school students from Chiayi County’s Chailin Elementary School who won the world championship at the 2025 Robofest World Robotics Competition in Michigan.

No robot battles. Just inquisitive kids preparing their minds for the future, with battery packs, wheels and basic components.

Whatever the case in terms of China’s real preparedness and leadership when it comes to technology, the CMG propaganda formula appears set for expansion. The network plans additional robot competitions, including football and basketball tournaments. Robots are invading China’s media across the board, as evidenced in regular features like this one in yesterday’s Southern Metropolis Daily — an entire page, with a robot right at center, about investments by Chinese internet giants in embodied intelligence companies.

The enthusiastic coverage of CMG’s latest spectacle by global media outlets as well as pan-blue media in Taiwan suggests that this “cute” approach to sharp power could be effective in ways that are difficult to measure — particularly as related clips and memes fire across social media platforms.