Speculation over the Wang Lijun (王立军) case continues to fly across Chinese domestic social media today. Users of every description, including prominent journalists and academics, are sharing purported inside information — the possible involvement, for example, of a wealthy Chongqing businessmen who has now, some suggest, fled overseas.
Foreign media reports are being actively shared on social media like Sina Weibo and QQ Weibo, some with screenshot images that might stand a better chance of eluding censors. For example, many versions of a bilingual transcript of questions answered on Wang Lijun by US state department spokesperson Victoria Nuland, who said, for example: “Wang Lijun did request a meeting at the US consulate general in Chengdu earlier this week . . . He did visit the consulate and he later left the consulate of his own volition.”
In stark contrast to Chinese social media, where as of Friday afternoon the keyword “Wang Lijun” remained unblocked, Chinese traditional media have been on lockdown.
According to the WiseNews database of Chinese newspapers, 37 articles on the Wang Lijun case appear in China’s press today — all of these, without a single exception, are verbatim versions of the official news release issued by Xinhua News Agency, which reads:

Ministry of Foreign Affairs Spokesman Answers Questions on the Wang Lijun Incident
Xinhua News Agency, Beijing, February 9 — The spokesperson office of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs said in response to questions on the 9th that Chongqing Vice-Mayor Wang Lijun entered the U.S. Consulate in Chengdu on February 6, and left after remaining there for one day. Relevant departments are now investigating this [matter].

The uniformity of today’s coverage of the China certainly suggests there has been a directive from the Central Propaganda Department instructing media to use only information from Xinhua (and perhaps the People’s Daily).
But how have papers dealt with the niggardly material available from Xinhua?
Newspapers, both Party and commercial, from different regions actually used the Xinhua release in slightly different ways. Many put the news deep in inside pages, giving it very subdued treatment. But 8 of the 37 newspapers actually did put the story on page 1. Three of these were commercial spin-offs of local Party newspapers, four were local Party newspapers, and the last, China Economic Times, is a paper published by the Development Research Center under China’s State Council:

Changjiang Daily (长江日报)
First Financial Daily (第一财经日报)
Lanzhou Morning Post (兰州晨报)
Beijing Morning Post (北京晨报)
Shantou Daily (汕头日报)
Qingdao Daily (青岛日报)
Jinan Daily (济南日报)
China Economic Times (中国经济时报)

The Lanzhou Morning Post put the Wang Lijun story in a box to the right-hand side of the page, just to the right of a photograph of a girl playing in the snow.

The following post by veteran investigative reporter and CMP fellow Yang Haipeng (杨海鹏) was deleted from Sina Weibo sometime after 7am Hong Kong time today, Febuary 10, 2012. Yang Haipeng currently has more than 169,000 followers on Weibo. [More on deleted posts at the WeiboScope Search, by the Journalism and Media Studies Centre].

It is said that this cataclysm in Chongqing has to do with a wealthy and influential businessman, Li Junyi (李俊亦), who fled [the country]. Li had [a fortune of] several billion in assets, all taken [seized?], and before he was taken [arrested] he fled on a plane from Chengdu. After this, when Li was overseas, he informed about some secrets (阴事) concerning the anti-vice [campaign in Chongqing]. Some inside stories about Chongqing have also been put in the hands of senior leaders. Li has connections with the Chengdu military district and is an above-board businessman (合法商人).

Yang Haipeng’s original Chinese-language post follows:

据说，此次重庆骤变，与一个落跑富豪李俊亦有关。李拥有数十亿资产，均被充没，在抓捕前，从成都坐飞机逃亡。后，李氏在海外举报打黑阴事，一些重庆内情也为高层掌握。李与成都军区有关，合法商人

The following post by CMP researcher David Bandurski (班志远) was deleted from Sina Weibo sometime after 5:24pm Hong Kong time, Febuary 9, 2012. The post is a simple re-post, without comment, of an original Weibo post sharing an image of Hong Kong coverage of the Wang Lijun case. David Bandurski currently has more than 3,000 followers on Weibo. [More on deleted posts at the WeiboScope Search, by the Journalism and Media Studies Centre].
The image from the original post re-posted by David Bandurski follows. It shows a newspaper page from Hong Kong media with coverage of the case of Wang Lijun (王立军), the crime-busting official in the city of Chongqing whose own political fortunes are now in question, leading to speculation about internal wrangling within the Chinese Communist Party.

The following re-post by veteran Chinese journalist and CMP director Qian Gang (钱钢) of an original post by Wu Jiaxiang (吴稼祥), a prominent Chinese academic, was deleted from Sina Weibo sometime after 5:57pm Hong Kong time, Febuary 9, 2012. The original Wu Jiaxiang post was also deleted by Sina Weibo. Qian Gang currently has more than 831,000 followers on Weibo, according to Sina’s numbers. Wu Jiaxiang has just under 185,000 followers. [More on deleted posts at the WeiboScope Search, by the Journalism and Media Studies Centre].
Here is a translation of the Wu Jiaxiang post re-posted by Qian Gang:

[The intelligent Wang Lijun] Actually, Wang’s misfortunes arrived back on May 12, 2011. On that day, his former partner, Gu Fengjie (谷凤杰), the head of the Public Security Bureau in Liaoning’s Tieling City, was detained pending an official investigation (两规). We can be quite sure that ever since that time, both Wang and Bo [Xilai] have been performing a song and dance duet. The latter [meaning Bo Xilai] knows only too well that this [investigation possibly implicating Wang] comes with evil intent, and he has wanted to cut off all connection with Wang [Lijun], knowing its best to let this continue in eternal silence. His going to the American consulate perhaps reflects his concern that the hand next to him [Bo Xilai’s] might fall more quickly than the hand of Beijing.

Wu Jiaxiang’s original post follows:

［聪明人王立军］其实，王的厄运从2011年5月12日降临，那一天，他以前的搭档，辽宁铁岭市公安局长谷凤杰被两规。可以肯定，从那时起，王和薄，就进入二人转大戏。后者知道，来者不善，想切断与王的所有联系，最好让其永远沉默。到美领事馆，大概是他担心，身边的手，比北京的手来得快。

The following post from veteran journalist and CMP director Qian Gang (钱钢) was deleted from Sina Weibo sometime after 11:51am Hong Kong time today, Febuary 9, 2012. Qian currently has more than 830,000 followers on Weibo, according to Sina’s numbers. [More on deleted posts at the WeiboScope Search, by the Journalism and Media Studies Centre].

Hong Kong media reports on Wang Lijun.

Qian Gang’s post was a re-post of another Sina Weibo post sharing links and images of coverage of the Wang Lijun case from Hong Kong media. We were unable to archive the original post, which has also been deleted.
Qian Gang’s original post follows:

香港媒体对王立军的报道

The following post from Sina Weibo user and blogger Zuo Yeben (作业本), a pen name that means “Homework Book,” was deleted from Sina Weibo sometime after 1:31pm Hong Kong time, Febuary 8, 2012. Zuo Yeben currently has more than 178,000 followers on Weibo, according to Sina’s numbers. [More on deleted posts at the WeiboScope Search, by the Journalism and Media Studies Centre].

You cannot expect me, who from birth to death cannot expect to know what a ballot looks like, who lives in a country that has been top-ranked on a global national satisfaction [survey], to look on as you: sleep night after night in luxury villas, drink tea and read the paper every day in sumptuous public buildings, escort your mistresses around in sedans of privilege, eat and drink from your own special supply, send your sons and daughters overseas, pocket huge welfare funds and cheat people left and right, bribe and embezzle and hide the money away overseas, and fall asleep as soon as any meeting begins . . . And me, even to open a miserable Weibo account I have to use my real name.

Zuo Yeben’s original post follows:

你不能让一个从生到死没见过选票长什么样的我，在一个全球国家满意率排名第一的国家，看着你们：夜夜睡在豪宅里，天天在豪华办公楼里喝茶看报，开着特权车包着二奶，吃喝着特供把子女送到国外，拿着高额福利到处欺负人，受贿行贿把钱存到海外，一开会就睡觉……而我，上个破微博还要实名制？

The following post from veteran journalist Luo Changping (罗昌平), the chief editor of Caijing magazine, was deleted from Sina Weibo sometime after 2pm Hong Kong time, Febuary 7, 2012. Luo currently has more than 84,000 followers on Weibo, according to Sina’s numbers. [More on deleted posts at the WeiboScope Search, by the Journalism and Media Studies Centre].

An urgent notice sent out [from the leadership] on Tibet says that in this critical time of stability preservation (维稳关键时刻), anyone without exception who is absent without leave or shrinks from responsibility, with serious consequences [for stability], will be dismissed from his official post and then subjected to discipline, regardless of who it is or what level of cadre. http://t.cn/zO7BfSt

Luo’s post is in fact a summary of a news article from Tibet Daily, the region’s official Party newspaper. The shortened link at the end of Luo’s post takes readers to the Tibet Daily notice, which was still available as of 3:19pm February 8, 2012.
Luo’s original post follows:

西藏紧急通知，对维稳关键时刻擅离职守、临阵退缩，造成严重后果的，无论什么人，无论哪一级干部，一律先就地免职，再纪律处分http://t.cn/zO7BfSt

The following post from veteran investigative reporter and CMP fellow Yang Haipeng (杨海鹏) was deleted from Sina Weibo sometime after 2pm Hong Kong time, Febuary 7, 2012. Yang currently has more than 161,000 followers on Weibo, according to Sina’s numbers. [More on deleted posts at the WeiboScope Search, by the Journalism and Media Studies Centre].

Caijing magazine editor Ding Buzhi (丁补之) revealed today: [250 million in cash] In a villa located in Beijing’s Huilongguan (回龙观) area, investigators opened up a door and discovered that about half of the room, measuring about 40 square meters, was concealed with a sheet. As soon as they pulled it back, they found the whole thing was cash stacked up like a mountain. One source says the owner of the house is a certain district substation head of the Beijing Public Security Bureau who has already fallen for corruption, and who previously served in substations of the Beijing Public Security Bureau in many districts.

Yang’s original post follows:

《财经》的编辑丁补之今天爆料：【2.5亿，现金】在位于北京回龙观的一套别墅内，调查人员拉开一扇门，发现这个40多平方米的房间中，半个房间为遮掩物覆盖。扯开一看，原来堆积成小山的，全是现金。消息源称，别墅主人为已落马的北京市公安局某区分局前局长，曾在北京市公安局某处及多个分局任职。

Popular tensions have been on the rise between mainland China and the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region in recent weeks. What began as a spat between Hong Kongers and visiting mainland Chinese over the eating of noodles on Hong Kong’s MTR subway system back in January has escalated into hateful name-calling.
The barbed exchanges began in mid-January after a mainland mother traveling with her child on Hong Kong’s metro transit system, or MTR, dropped noodles on the floor of a subway car. A local man demanded an apology for this breach of Hong Kong regulations and propriety, to which the mainland woman responded that it was “no big deal.” After the train was stopped and MTR representatives called to the scene, a shouting match ensued, caught on video and later posted to the internet.
Here is video of the scene in January. At the end, a Hong Kong man can be heard to shout: “There’s no sense in arguing with them. Mainlanders are all like this! Get off the train!”

As the incident drew attention on the internet and became a media frenzy in Hong Kong, Kong Qingdong (孔庆东), a well-known professor at China’s Peking University, escalated tensions by called Hong Kongers “dogs of British colonialists.”
On February 1, Hong Kongers crowd-sourced funding on the internet to pay for a full-page ad in the local Apple Daily newspaper which likened mainlanders coming to Hong Kong to an invasion of locusts.
The Apple Daily ad fomented against the social pressures they said mainland visitors were placing on Hong Kong. The black headline at the top of the ad read: “Are you willing to pay one million HK dollars every 18 minutes to take care of mainland children born in Hong Kong?” A second bold yellow headline below read: “Hong Kongers have had enough!”

Hong Kong and the Mainland Should Treat Their Differences Leniently
People’s Daily
February 6, 2012
Of course there are differences between Hong Kong and the mainland — historical, cultural, economic, legal and lifestyle differences . . . There are differences big and small, including such things as whether food can be eaten on the subway. But who would have guessed that a mainland girl eating noodles on the Hong Kong MTR would become a major story, that a video of the incident feverishly shared on the web during the Chinese New Year holiday would spark debate and even a crossfire of insults?
Differences have long been the focus of rapid integration and common interests between [Hong Kong and the mainland]. At the start of reform and opening thirty years ago, for example, differences in economic development drove Hong Kong’s manufacturing sector to shift production across to Guangdong almost overnight. The “three plus one trading mix” (三来一补), [custom manufacturing with designs, materials or samples supplied], which for a long time was the way of doing things, is already outmoded. But the model set down the first stage of economic reforms. Investment in the mainland from Hong Kong tops [that from all other territories and countries outside the mainland], and our brethren in Hong Kong can be written into the history books for their contributions to opening and reform.
It’s also difference that has, since opening and reform, driven mainlanders from all provinces and cities to travel to Hong Kong, . . . enriching the territory’s economy by strength of numbers and strength of spending. Today, while many people in Hong Kong voice anger over the way travelers from the mainland have upset their peaceful lives, they will no doubt recognize the contribution these travelers have made to the Hong Kong economy.
Difference is a double-edged sword. Difference can attract, and difference can divide.
Hong Kong has clear regulations against eating on the subway, and Hong Kong people generally don’t see people digging into a meal on the subway — so seeing a young girl from outside [the territory] eating noodles [on the MTR] was an offense to the eye. In mainland China there are no such rules, and the question of whether or not one can eat [on the subway] is a grey area. [The thinking on the mainland is that] children are precious, and not a moment is to be lost when they are hungry, so how can eating a little something cause people to fume with rage? . . . So the bad blood boiled over the noodle issue, words flying, and this became the focus of attention in both Hong Kong and the mainland.
This isn’t actually such a big deal. Surely, it’s not just about Hong Kong and the mainland, and between Hong Kongese and Hong Kongese, between Beijinger and Beijinger, you can also find differences that are the cause of tension. Put-off onlookers can say, with a slight smile: “Little Sister, in the Hong Kong subway eating is not permitted. You’ll be fined.” And being cautioned, the other can say, before putting the food away: “I’m sorry, my child is really hungry.” With a degree of leniency over differences, [tensions] can pass with a smile.
But if the response to seeing a girl eating noodles is sharp denunciation of how “mainlanders” are, and the person attacked fires back about how “you Hong Kongers” are, the tables are turned quickly and issues become serious. A bowl of noodles can kick up animosities old and new. And how do we clear our heads of the tensions and misunderstandings from the differences between our two regions that then come to the surface?
Escalating differences to an even higher plane, one person in mainland China used extreme speech to label those who objected to the eating of noodles [on the MTR] as “colonial dogs” (殖民地的走狗) . . . And in Hong Kong, some likened the eating of noodles [by mainlanders on the subway] to “locusts”, something that is, if not a case of whipping up hatred with ulterior motives, certainly itself an uncultured act. This is a cruel logic of death to those who resist (逆我者亡) — [in other words, a form of intolerant extremism] — itself not too far off from the abyss of fascism.
Fortunately, I have noted many moderate and reasonable voices amid the sea of commentary. Internet user “Deep-Mountain Wizard” (深山之巫) wrote: “I am a Hong Konger, born and raised, and I can say that Hong Kongese do not discriminate against their [mainland] brethren. The war of words has stemmed from differences in values. Some from the mainland aren’t familiar with the rules in Hong Kong. In the eyes of the Hong Kong people they’ve broken the law, and that’s why the reaction has been so strong. Actually, all they need to do is admit when they’re in the wrong, saying they didn’t know the rules, and that will be the end of it. There are good people and bad in both Hong Kong and the mainland, and I hope this isn’t the cause of bad feeling.”
A domestic media in mainland China wrote: “Piling on more abuse won’t cause Hong Kong to change its regulations because of criticism from the mainland. It will only cause others to laugh at us. When you go out, please just respect the local laws and regulations . . . ”
Treating differences with leniency demands a show of understanding on the part of the home team and respect from the visiting team. Understanding and respect are both cultured responses. The world isn’t a fairy tale, of course, but when understanding and respect are lacking, ready-made channels, like administrative offices, can be turned to for complaint resolution. . . Today, as Hong Kong and the mainland grow ever closer, the differences aren’t limited to “eating noodles” [on the subway]. How administrative offices in the two regions face up to differences, how they encourage tolerance toward differences (引导善待差异), and how the people on both sides learn to treat differences, this is a test of the wisdom and character of both regions.