We must frankly and honestly report our work to National People’s Congress delegates and to the people, creating the conditions for the masses to criticize the government, and fully hearing and taking on board the views of the people.
On January 11 this year, dissident Chinese writer Yu Jie (余杰) arrived in the United States with his wife and family for a self-imposed exile. At a press conference in Washington DC on January 18, Yu said he had been seriously beaten in 2010, the year he released his book China’s Best Actor: Wen Jiabao (《中国影帝温家宝》), which was highly critical of Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao (温家宝) and China’s government. At the press conference, Yu described how plainclothes security police had stripped him naked and subjected him to abuse. Yu said the men threatened him by saying: “If the order comes from above, we can dig a pit to bury you alive in half an hour, and no one on earth would know.”
In the weeks that followed Yu Jie’s press conference in the United States, his words were shared inside China through social media platforms such as Sina Weibo, and a new online catchphrase was born: “buried alive.”
For many social media users, the term has now become synonymous with courage of conviction — and with the unfortunate consequences such conviction can bring in a society that does not tolerate dissent. The term can also refer to acts of courage and dissent in speech.
Chinese novelist Ah Ding (阿丁), who resides overseas, wrote on Sina Weibo on January 19, the day after Yu’s Washington press conference”Happy New Year! May you make the bury alive list!”
On February 1, the official Weibo of Caijing magazine reported a Xinhua News Agency story about Premier Wen Jiabao encouraging the people to criticize the government. One user responded: “Of course after everyone’s voiced their criticism they will all be buried alive.”
In recent years, the word “traitor” has been used again and again by those who identify as members of the left [in China]. I understand that recently a list even came out of “China’s Ten Greatest Traitors” (中国十大汉奸).
While I’m a staunch advocate of freedom of expression as guaranteed in our Constitution, I’m puzzled by this sort of labeling. Have we gone back to that era after our victory in the Second Sino-Japanese War, when Chinese collaborators were actively weeded out? How is it, in an era of openness and globalization, that we can’t be more tolerant of the views of others, and of their right to express those views?
Are there really any way academics these days could truly sell out their country?
In other countries, the left is generally defined by its pursuit of social justice. It hopes to turn greater government powers to the restriction of capital, redistributing the wealth of society in order to extend a hand to those at its lower rungs. According to this logic, China’s left — whether we’re talking about the homegrown left advocating a return to the era of Mao Zedong, or the new left influenced by Western marxism — is grounded on [the idea of] the masses.
The so-called “right”, on the other hand, is also in China referred to as the liberal camp (自由派). The right advocates the development of constitutionalism, democracy and individual freedoms in order to check arrogant and roughshod power.
In a country like ours, with a long history of autocracy, corruption stemming from the abuse of power has never been eradicated. Today, as a market economy develops and rule of law has yet to take root, the economy is very often manipulated by government power in its favor. So the liberal camp has frequently advocated political reform in order to check government power.
As it stands, neither the right nor the left is happy with the current situation. And both, in fact, have contributions to make to society.
I still remember how in 2003, after the college student Sun Zhigang (孙志刚) was beaten to death in a Guangzhou detention center because he didn’t have a residency permit with him, the liberal camp surged up against this abuse of power and human rights.
Due in large part to the efforts of legal scholars and liberal academics, “Measures on Detention and Repatriation of Urban Vagrants”, which had been in effect for 21 years, was repealed. The left, by contrast, was conspicuously quiet [on the Sun Zhigang case], but the words of one web user called “Betel Nut” shook me to the core: “Beat me to death. We Chinese have made this land our temporary home for 5,000 years already!” [NOTE: The implication from the user here seems to be that Chinese remain insecure, not in control of their own destiny and therefore “homeless”.]
The Deng Yujiao case, which unfolded in Hubei’s Badong County in 2009, offered a better example of how the left and right could join in condemnation of local governments that ran roughshod over the people. True to form, the right spoke out against unbridled power. The left, meanwhile, drew out Mao Zedong’s doctrine of opposing bureaucracy as its weapon of choice, accusing corrupt officials of forgetting their duty to serve the people.
Unfortunately, aside from this example, the right and left in China are, in the vast majority of cases, like water and fire. The schism has degraded to the point where certain people feel they must brand those on the right traitors.
I don’t deny the value of the left, but based on my own observations, it’s generally people in the liberal camp who are the most active over such issues as social welfare and environmental protection, striving against concrete social injustices and speaking out as citizens.
The complexities of China’s social transition are such that it is impossible, I’m afraid, to apply the standards of left and right to the views of most individuals. The late American sociologist Daniel Bell once said that he had been “an economic socialist, a political liberal and a cultural conservative.” He viewed himself as a “left-leaning centrist”, but he was seen by much of the world as a right-leaning “new conservative.” Calling someone a leftist or a rightist is in most cases little more than careless labeling, a completely arbitrary act.
Recently, I attended an event held by the Heinrich Boll Foundation under the auspices of Germany’s left-wing Greens. What I found strange illuminating was the fact that the Chinese who had attended their previous events were, if not centrist civic-minded activists, intellectuals from the liberal camp generally regarded as left-leaning. Among the scores of names of those who had attended in the past I couldn’t find a single name from China’s left (中国左派).
What does it mean that China’s right rubs shoulders quite comfortably with Europe’s left?
I would like to urge the idea that it’s far better to achieve merit through good works (行善积德) than to spend time attacking others as “traitors” and “collaborators”. That working together in good faith and seeking points of commonality between left and right, while respecting our differences and complexities, is far better than spitting bile back and forth and venting grudges. And that concretely participating in real flesh-and-blood social issues as an expression of one’s values is preferable to the abstract pursuit of majestic ideals.
This article was published in Chinese at the Global Times on January 31, 2012.
The following post from Chinese cartoonist Perverted Pepper (变态辣椒), was deleted from Sina Weibo on January 31. Perverted Pepper currently has more than 42,000 followers on Weibo, according to Sina’s numbers. [More on deleted posts at the WeiboScope Search, by the Journalism and Media Studies Centre].
The cartoon in the post shows a crowd of faceless Chinese gazing on and cheering as a couple — representing race-car driver and blogger Han Han, and academic Fang Zhouzi, a well-known exposer of fraud who has accused Han of using a ghostwriter — engages in a brutal fight, which no ones lifts a finger to stop. The V’s on their backs mark them as VIP Sina Weibo users, users with usually higher followings whose accounts have been verified by Sina. These Meanwhile, behind the unseeing crowd, a group of figures represents the grave human rights abuses in China that no one seems to see or care to talk about at all. From left to right: 1. Wu Ying (吴英), the former legal representative for a company in Zhejiang recently sentenced to death for alleged illegal pooling of public deposits (吸收公众存款罪); 2. a Tibet monk, a reference to ongoing religious and ethnic strife in the Tibetan regions of west China; 3. Blind lawyer Chen Guangcheng, who remains under house arrest despite a groundswell of international and domestic pressure late last year; 4. Zhang Haidi (张海迪), a well-known author who is an outspoken disabled-right advocate and herself disabled. The reference here is not clear, but Zhang’s presence might be a reference to a 28-year-old author who has been called “Wuxi’s Zhang Haidi“. Afflicted with paralysis at a young age, Weibo users have reported that the author has been hospitalized. Only one of the VIP Sina Weibo users in the circle of spectators is turning to look at the Chen Guangcheng and the others, as if to say: “Hey, shouldn’t we be paying attention to those stories?”
Perverted Pepper’s original post, which included the cartoon above, follows:
变态辣椒2012 : 2012-01-30 23:42:33 感谢@Amy-Zone 给我灵感 涂鸦作品：无题
NOTE: All posts to The Anti-Social List are listed as “permission denied” in the Sina Weibo API, which means they were deleted by Weibo managers, not by users themselves.
The following post from Sha Yexin (沙叶新), a well-known playwright, was deleted from Sina Weibo on January 29. Sha, who was formerly head of the Shanghai People’s Art Theater, is now an honorary vice-chairman of the China Drama and Literature Academy. He currently has more than 120,000 followers on Weibo, according to Sina’s numbers. [More on deleted posts at the WeiboScope Search, by the Journalism and Media Studies Centre].
Thank goodness there is Hong Kong, where demonstrations are a normal thing. Thank goodness there is Hong Kong, where marches don’t end in disaster. Thank goodness there is Hong Kong, where the Independent Commission Against Corruption (ICAC) roots out the dirt. Thank goodness there is Hong Kong, where the government isn’t in bed with business. Thank goodness there is Hong Kong, where refuge is provided for exiles [from the Tiananmen Protests]. Thank goodness there is Hong Kong, where June 4 is not forgotten. Thank goodness there is Hong Kong, where magazines are free. Thank goodness there is Hong Kong, where you don’t have to scale the [Internet] wall. Thank goodness there is Hong Kong, where the sense of human rights is strong. Thank goodness there is Hong Kong, where there are prospects for democracy. Thank goodness there is Taiwan and Hong Kong, when the mainland’s back bristles with thorns and no one dares step too far out of bounds!
Sha’s original post follows:
沙叶新 : 2012-01-29 22:17:57 幸好有香港，示威很家常。幸好有香港，游行不遭殃；幸好有香港，廉署反贪脏。幸好有香港，政府不从商。幸好有香港，黄雀救流亡。幸好有香港，陆肆没有忘。幸好有香港，杂志有开放。幸好有香港，上网不翻墙。幸好有香港，人权意识强。幸好有香港，民主尚可望。幸好有台港，大陆背有芒，不敢太疯狂！
NOTE: All posts to The Anti-Social List are listed as “permission denied” in the Sina Weibo API, which means they were deleted by Weibo managers, not by users themselves.
The standoff last December between local authorities and villagers in Wukan, prompted by deep anger among villagers over corrupt land deals and the suspicious death of a protest leader in police custody, was one of the biggest stories of 2011. But the saga of Wukan, which is ongoing despite pledges by Guangdong’s top leadership to meet the demands of protesters, could continue to have an impact this year and beyond.
Some say the Wukan incident, an act of organized civil disobedience that infuriated local Party officials (and, no doubt, quite a few senior leaders as well), has established a “model” for villages facing seizure of their land, one of the most common causes of so-called “mass incidents” (群体事件) in the countryside and in areas outside developing cities. Some have cited Wukan as an example in calling for democratic reforms in China.
But even as international attention gradually shifts away from Wukan, it remains to be seen whether the villagers’ demands will ultimately be met — and whether provincial leaders will live up to their promises.
Discussion of Wukan continues inside China, but public discussion of its deeper implications is a sensitive matter.
A January 27 blog post on Wukan made by lawyer Yuan Yulai (袁裕来) to his blog on the Caixin Media platform was deleted by internet censors. Yuan followed up the same day by posting news of the deletion on Sina Weibo. Including an image file for the post (below), he wrote: “Is there no hope for the Wukan incident? Are leaders now setting the tone? (Why was this deleted? Is this still propaganda policy?)”
Yuan Yulai’s microblog post was also subsequently deleted. But the text-as-image file he posted on Sina Weibo, which we archived, is pasted below. In the file Yuan shares an account of words spoken by an unnamed senior leader at a recent meeting on stability preservation, the mobilization of domestic security forces to combat social unrest:
A certain leader said in an internal address at the CCP Work Conference on Politics, Law and Stability Preservation: Right now there are tens of thousands of mass incidents [in China each year], mostly happening in rural townships and villages and remote regions, the causes being principally economic. These are convenient for us to independently resolve or break up. But if these spread to coastal cities and are transformed into political demands, the result would be unimaginable. Some comrades lack a real sense of the dangers involved, thinking we are over-reacting. It would be better for a clear directive from the central authorities to over-react than to fall short [of what is needed].
. . . The Wukan incident is far from finished. Can challenges to the leadership status of the Chinese Communist Party evade retribution? That is a page we cannot open, that no one dares open.
The following is a partial translation of a review by journalist Chen Jibing (陈季冰) of the Wukan incident published in Outlook China magazine. Chen also posted the article to his weblog at QQ.com.
The Example of Wukan
Chen Jibing (陈季冰)
January 20, 2012
1.
Ahead of the Chinese New Year holiday news came of the latest development in the Wukan story. According to news reports, three special work teams constituted by Guangdong province to explore the issues of collective land [use and appropriation in Wukan], village finances and breaches of law and Party discipline by village officials notified the villagers of Wukan of their findings in the initial phase [of their investigation] on December 30. According to Zeng Qingrong (曾庆荣), chairman of the standing committee of the Guangdong Provincial Commission of Discipline Inspection and deputy-head of the [provincial government’s] supervisory office, who is serving as head of the special work team on breaches of law and discipline [in the Wukan case], they have already found that Xue Chang (薛昌), Wukan’s former Party branch chief, former village Party committee director Chen Shunyi (陈舜意) and others did indeed violate [Party] discipline in misappropriating collective assets of the village; a related personnel member in the marketing division of the Cooperative Association of Lufeng City Rural Credit Cooperatives (陆丰市农村信用合作社) pocketed 200,000 yuan in the process of land transfer (土地转让); various personnel in the Donghai Township State Land Office (东海镇国土所) of the Lufeng City Land and Resources Bureau (陆丰市国土局) accepted bribes in processing the transfer of land belonging to Wukan Village. At the same time, it has been initially established that some cadres from the Wukan Village Party Branch and village committee received rewards in the process of authorizing transfer of collective land [belonging to the village], and that some accounting staff in Wukan village are suspected of having personally used public funds [belonging to the village]. The cashier for the village committee, Zou Chai (出纳邹钗), also a committee member of the Party branch, has already been detained pending investigation for discipline violations (两规).
It was not long before this, owing to the direct intervention of the provincial Party leadership in Guangdong, that serious protests in Wukan Village, in [Guangdong’s] Shanwei City, finally calmed down in late December. While for reasons known to all newspapers, television and other mass media kept quiet on this incident out of fear, it was the most hotly watched public opinion storm on China’s internet — and particularly on microblogs — for some time.
On December 21, deputy provincial Party secretary Zhu Mingguo (朱明国), who has represented Guangdong province in handling this incident, met face-to-face with the chief acting village representative, Lin Zuluan (林祖銮), and agreed to the principal demands of the protesting villagers, including: to suspend and fully investigate the property development project in which the villagers’ interests were harmed and for which village cadres and the government illegally sold [village] land; to carry out a full and comprehensive investigation of the death of protest leader Xue Jinbo (薛锦波) while in police custody on December 11, 2011, to return his remains, and to release several other villagers who were detained for their involvement in the protests.
What has most unprecedented meaning is that the [Guangdong provincial] authorities also formally acknowledged the “leadership committee” chosen and constituted by the villagers themselves for the purpose of the protests, and that they pledged resolutely that they would not seek to settle scores with villagers involved in the protests at some convenient later date (秋后算账).
[Village representative] Lin Zuluan at least believes that their protest movement has already achieved the things they set out to achieve, and he has told media that he is satisfied with the outcome. “The higher-level government [authorities] have treated this matter with utmost priority, so I have all confidence that we can satisfactorily resolve this dispute,” [he said].
The attitude of the Guangdong Party leadership set the tone for the handling of the incident: “The basic demand of the people of Wukan Village in Lufeng City is fairness, and errors certainly did exist in the work among the masses carried out by the grassroots Party leadership and government, so certain unreasonable actions on the part of the villagers can be understood.” Moreover, Guangdong Party Secretary Wang Yang (汪洋) pointed out clearly that, “The occurrence of the Wukan incident was both a matter of chance and a matter of necessity. This is the result of paying insufficient attention . . . to tensions building up in the process of economic and social development, and it is a necessary result of our being ‘hard on one hand and soft on the other’ (一手硬一手软).” This hard on the one hand and soft on the other points clearly to the government’s active promotion of economic development while it has been soft on social management (社会管理).
On December 22, the People’s Daily ran an article called, “What does the ‘turnaround in Wukan’ clue us in to?” (“乌坎转机”提示我们什么), which called on governments at all levels [in China] to “eliminate the ‘oppositional stance’ in dealing with the masses” (扫除面对群众的‘对手思维’). The article said: “Looking back on many mass incidents over the past few years and assessing their basic character, [one realizes that] the vast majority arise from the fact that the masses, in response to appeals on behalf of their vested interests, have received no satisfaction or relief. This tells us that local government must have a keen awareness of prevailing conditions in facing the interest demands of the masses, even if these involve tension and conflict.”
Zhu Mingguo, who has personally handled this incident, subsequently stated that the villagers of Wukan Village raised two demands in particular. The first concerned the question of land. Wukan Village has 9,000 mu [or 6 square kilometers] of land, and now more than 6,700 mu [or 4.46 kilometers, 75 percent of the total] have been sold, leaving just over 2,000 [mu [or 25 percent of the original land]. But the villagers have not been transformed into city residents [of Lufeng City], nor has the issue of basic living allowances from the city been resolved [CHECK]. The demands of the villagers are reasonable. The second issue raised by the villagers was that the affairs of the village were not handled openly. They said that village cadres were corrupt, and that they were not consulted over the issue of land sales. “The villagers said to me that under the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party they had farmed the land without paying taxes and also enjoyed subsidies and free education. We do no oppose the Chinese Communist Party. The Chinese Communist Party is good! What we oppose is the village selling the land without telling us,” [said Zhu Mingguo]. Zhu Mingguo added: “If these demands had been satisfied earlier, would this matter have built up to such an extent?”
I’m confident there is a great deal of truth to these words. But the heart of the problem is the question of how the ruling Party and government can create a system for themselves in which they must resolve demands of this kind. Perhaps there is nothing better than external pressure to bring people to their senses, and competition offers the best instruction. [CHECK]
2.
The so-called “Wukan incident” originated back in March 2011, at which point the villagers, who had suffered in silence for more than a decade, finally united in action. It is alleged that after local officials were involved in one particular corrupt land deal, furious villagers assaulted the village Party branch, and in the three months that followed numerous conflicts erupted.
The incident suddenly escalated in mid-December. On December 13, 42-year-old Xue Jinbo — who according to some accounts was 43 years old — one of several representatives chosen by Wukan villagers, died of heart failure while in [police] custody. Official media denied that wounds were present on Xue Jinbo’s body, [a claim made by Wukan villagers]. Reports said that on December 10 fellow detainees reported that Xue Jinbo was in a poor condition, and Xue Jinbo was then dispatched immediately to a nearby hospital, where he died after 30 minutes of emergency treatment. Reports also said that Xue Jinbo had a history of asthma and heart disease. [According to the reports], certification issued by forensic specialists at Guangzhou’s Sun-Yatsen Hospital shows that Xue Jinbo had no clear visible external wounds aside from bruising on his knees and wrists. The reports quoted the deputy director of this [forensic] center as saying that in his estimate the bruises on Xue Jinbo’s wrists had been caused by handcuffs, and that the bruises on his knees had been caused by kneeling on the ground.
Xue Jinbo and two others were detained on December 9, the justification being that they they were charged with destroying public financial affairs and jeopardizing public affairs. According to statements by local police, Xue Jinbo had led the unrest in Wukan due to tensions over land, [village] finances and issues with local election of [village] officials. At the time, [said police], he and other villagers had forced their way into the local government office and police station, and had destroyed six police vehicles. Police claim that these accusations were confirmed in two interrogations on September 9 and 10.
Xue Jinbo’s family has come to the conclusion that he was beaten to death. It is said that Xue Jinbo’s mother, wife and older brother went to view his body and discovered numerous wounds and bruises, including three points where his bones had been broken.
The anger of villagers then ignited and they openly opposed the local government. They organized large-scale demonstrations, and after cadres from the village Party branch and village committee deserted the village, they organized the village to govern itself, even setting up barricades and organizing hundreds of armed deputies to prevent violent suppression by police.
On December 15, acting Shanwei mayor Wu Zili (吴紫骊) gave a harshly worded denunciation [of the villagers]. He traced the incident back to two villagers who had been chosen to represent the villagers in negotiating with the government, Lin Zulian (林祖恋) and Yang Semao (杨色茂). He vowed to strike out firmly against “those principal figures who had planned and organized the inciting of villagers to smash and destroy public property, impede public affairs and other illegal and criminal activities.” He urged these people to turn themselves in. In a video appearing online on December 18, Shanwei Party Secretary Zheng Yanxiong (郑雁雄) harshly accused the villagers for using foreign media to invite the attention of the outside world to this local situation. Zheng Yanxiong said that the villagers had not sought the government but had instead sought out “rotten” foreign media, and “these media will only be happy when our socialist nation is broken and divided.”
These statements roused even greater feeling among the opposing [villagers]. After the above-mentioned language by Wu Zili, 8,000 of the villagers in a village with a total population of 20,000 again held demonstrations, the numbers double that of the previous day.
In fact, the full story of the Wukan incident is not all that complicated. When villagers attacked the offices of the village Party branch back in September last year, they accused the [local] government of selling off agricultural land in the village to a development company for a price as high as one billion yuan, and without providing villagers with reasonable compensation — and after [the transaction] pocketing 70 percent of the income [from the sale] for themselves.
As for the full and accurate situation in Wukan, perhaps we will have to wait patiently for the results of an independent and credible investigation. But cases like this of conflicts over interests emerging as a result of land appropriations (征地) are something that can be found everywhere in China today. According to research by Chinese Academy of Social Science professor Yu Jianrong (于建嵘), this sort of dispute over land accounts for two-thirds of all of all “mass incidents” in the countryside. Yu Jianrong estimates that since 1990 local officials in China have forcibly taken farmland totaling 6.72 million hectares, and owing to the gap between the actual market value of land and the amount of compensation for land actually given to farmers, [Yu estimates that] farmers have [collectively] lost around 2 trillion yuan (US$316 billion) in rights and benefits.
While the central Party leadership has said again and again that it will take concerted action against illegal land use, and has created new regulations prohibiting forced land seizures, demanding that farmers be compensated according to market value . . . and in fact this year’s No. 1 Document (一号文件) points out clearly that the portion of income from land appreciation given to farmers needs to be raised, all of these measures have met with fierce opposition from local governments. This is because at present the normal operations of local governments rely to a high-degree on so-called “land financing” (土地财政). According to a report released by the National Audit Office of the PRC in June [2011], local government debt nationally in China reached 10.7 trillion yuan, and of this 2.5 trillion yuan (or 23 percent) was guaranteed (担保) by land sales. By contrast, the estimate of total land sales income for local governments nationwide in 2010 was 2.9 trillion yuan. Which is to say that total income from land sales by local governments in 2010 is probably only sufficient to pay back the debt that will come due for the next few years.
All of this means that if the current trends do not change, standoffs like that at Wukan will most likely only increase steadily.
Last week, ahead of the Chinese New Year holiday, the regional government in the Tibet Autonomous Region
reportedly distributed more than 1 million portraits of the four generations of Communist Party leadership. The portraits were to be placed in homes, schools and temples. This highly sensitive move came amid escalating tensions in the region. Chinese state media reported this week that Tibetans had clashed with security forces in western Sichuan province, an ethnically Tibetan region. Prominent lawyer and former CMP fellow Pu Zhiqiang (浦志强) wrote on his Sina Weibo account yesterday: “Temples in the Tibetan region . . . have been required to hang portraits of the leaders Mao, Deng, Jiang and Hu. In Yining, muslims are prohibited from wearing beards or headscarves, and they are subjected to repeated attacks. They claim to play down religious consciousness. Have the Han gone insane? Or is it the leaders of the Han who have gone insane?!” The post was quickly deleted. In this cartoon, posted by artist Crazy Crab (蟹农场) to his WordPress blog, a solitary Tibetan monk — an image of spiritual, cultural and political desolation — stands utterly diminished before four massive portraits of (in order from left to right) Mao Zedong, Deng Xiaoping, Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao.
Chinese New Year (Spring Festival) came early in 2012, beginning on January 23. This cartoon, posted by article Chen Chunming (陈春鸣) to his blog at QQ.com, captures one of the most familiar scenes of the Chinese New Year holiday, children setting off fireworks in celebration. The red firecracker at center bears the Chinese character for “Spring,” chun.
This month marks the twentieth anniversary of Deng Xiaoping’s “southern tour”, in which the architect of China’s reform and opening policy (retired at the time, but still powerful behind the scenes) re-invigorated economic reforms against staunch opposition. And there is a strong sense in China today that the country again stands at a reform crossroads.
Key figures within the Communist Party, including Premier Wen Jiabao (温家宝), and such notable academics as Sun Liping (孙立平) — the former doctoral adviser to now vice-president and successor apparent Xi Jinping (习近平) —have warned that China’s development is threatened by resistance to further reforms.
Others argue that China’s reform project is already a proven success, and that China’s government-led economic model is an example for others to follow. There is no need, in other words, for further reform.
Then there are those who believe reforms are to blame for the problems China faces today, and who say China should turn back.
Behind these competing views, which I have just vastly oversimplified, is a general sense of unease over exactly what China’s upcoming leadership transition this year will bring. This is more than a vague uncertainty. President Hu Jintao’s July 1 speech to commemorate the Party’s 90th anniversary, a carefully scripted text emerging no doubt from much internal wrangling, was a virtual blank slate, giving no indication of what anyone can expect beyond an emphasis on “stability.”
Adding to our dossier on the reform debate inside China, the following piece is from Qin Xiao (秦晓), a former Red Guard who has held a series of important positions at various state-run enterprises and is now chairman of the Boyuan Foundation, a Hong Kong-based economic think-tank.
This article, which first appeared on FT Chinese on January 20, has been re-posted on a number of China’s major internet portal sites, including QQ.com and Hexun. QQ.com attributes the article to Nanfang Online, the official website of the official Party newspaper in Guangdong province, Nanfang Daily.
A few comments on the article at QQ.com follow below:
“Reform in China Must Not Stop in its Tracks”
By Qin Xiao (秦晓)
People in China generally believed in the 1950s that socialism was the liberator of the people. Free markets, on the other hand, were detrimental to society. In the 1960s, when I was packed off to the countryside in Inner Mongolia for re-education (再教育) I recognized that the ideological fervor [over socialism] masked inherent defects in our planned economy. That is where I would like to begin telling China’s story.
As a corporate leader, I have personally experienced the past 30 years of reform. I have a greater understanding of the problems China must face. China is now in the midst of a latter phase of transition from a planned economy to a market economy — and our discussion of the relationship between the government and the market is vastly different from that seen in countries with mature market economies.
While China’s rate of economic growth has stood around 10 percent annually for three decades now, our debate still orbits around the following question: Has this success resulted from government control, or from free market [economics]? The answer [we give] to this question will decide China’s future. Will China continue to promote free market reforms that have yet to be completed, or will it bring three decades of transition to an end? Do the problems now facing China’s economy, and social tensions in our country, originate with market reforms themselves, or are they the result of bottlenecks and setbacks in the reform process? Is China’s [present] state-led economic model an end in itself, or should it be changed through deeper reforms?
In the process of tackling economic problems, democratic governments are restrained by the preferences of the electorate and by struggles among political parties. This can mean that efficiencies are sacrificed, or that responses are excessive. Modern democratic systems are not always ideal partners with market systems. Nevertheless, there are no utopias in our world, and there is no such thing as the ideal system. The question of whether these systems can be sustained and whether they can be accepted by society rests on whether or not they can avoid gross mistakes, whether they have mechanisms for correction and can make relevant and necessary adjustments.
Economists and statesmen have historically sought a model that might replace the modern market [economic] model. Two of the principal experiments put forward were the “Leninist-Stalinist Model” (列宁-斯大林模式) of the Soviet Union and the so-called “Asian Model” (东亚模式). The former provided the basis for China’s planned economy of the Mao Zedong era. Most representative of the latter model was Japan, and the model made economic stars of Japan and several other Asian nations.
In the 1930s, as the economies of the West slid into the “Great Depression”, the role of the Leninist-Stalinist Model in driving rapid economic growth in the Soviet Union was hotly discussed among economists. Thirty to forty years later the Japanese model became another hot point of debate. Nevertheless, history has already proclaimed the failure of these two models. The first model suffered sclerosis, sacrificing basic human rights to divert all energy to development of the economy and the military. The second model created price distortions (价格扭曲), misallocation of resources (资源错配) and corruption (官商勾结).
The modern democratic and market system still needs to be improved, but it remains viable — and no better choice has yet been found.
Well then, what does this teach China? In the 1970s, China’s government launched off on a process of reform and opening, setting aside the planned economic model and converting to a socialist market economy. In this way China’s economy was spared collapse and developed rapidly. In the early stages of this transition it was necessary for the government to play a leading role as the market was not yet developed, and this [necessity] resulted in the emergence of a government-driven model not unlike that of the [previous] Asian or Japanese models.
The mission of this government-driven model has now been achieved. But now we must cast aside the impediments [to further development] kept in place by powerful vested interests (特殊利益团体), transforming the function of the government and further promoting market reforms.
At present there are two tasks we must work to achieve. First, the government must shift the focus away from developing the economy (发展经济) over to improving rule of law and providing public services (公共服务). Second, our economic system must be transitioned from a government-led [model] to a market-led [model], with the government serving only a regulatory function.
In order to achieve the above-mentioned goals, the government must dispense with approval procedures for all sorts of economic and market activities (aside from industries that must necessarily be regulated). [It must] cease interfering with market pricing and transactions, progressively removing controls on land, labor, energy, mining and capital pricing (interest and exchange rates). The government must reform monopoly [state-run] enterprises. [It must] carry out a fair and efficient process of privatization of state-owned assets. [It must] reform tax institutions (税收制度) with the goal of improving social welfare. Aside from these, [the government] must increase spending on social security, healthcare, education, housing, the environment and other public services.
The spread of the economic crisis throughout [developed] capitalist countries has prompted skepticism about the future fate of free markets. Nevertheless, China’s story cannot become the justification for opposing free markets. Quite the contrary, market reforms are the reason China has achieved success over the past 30 years.
To move forward, China now must transform the role of the government in economic life, promoting further reform in the direction of a free market system. Our mission is still not accomplished.
The following are a number of comments appearing after this article at QQ.com:
(1) In fact reforms have already stopped. We’re even seeing a turning back!
实际上已经停止,而且出现倒退!
(2) Private ownership is the root of ten-thousand evils.
私有制是万恶之源。
(3) Aren’t reforms done? What need is there for further reform?
改革不是已改完了？怎么还要改？
(4) In order to protect vested interests, [reforms] have basically already stopped, or even gone backward! For example, state monopolies and such.
为了维护既得利益，已经基本止步，甚至倒退！比如国企的垄断等等。
(5) The impression people have now is: economic reforms have been stalled for a long time, and the progress on rule of law has gone backwards with major strides.
现在给人的印象是：经济改革长期停滞，法治化进程在大踏步后退。
(6) Prices are going up every year, and little people like me see no increase in wages so its really negative growth. How can I support reform achievements like that?
物价年年涨，我等小民收入没增就等于负增长，这样的改革成就我等如何赞成
(7) Constant reform is the only way of ensuring the country keeps in stride with the times.
不断改革乃是保证国家与时俱进的根本方式！
(8) The planned economy is just a power economy, an economy for officials. That’s where the obstacle to reform is, everyone knows that.
什么计划经济，就是权力经济，就是官经济。改革的阻力在哪里，国人都明白的。
Chinese media reported with shock in January 2012 that the airport in the city of Changsha, the capital of China’s Hunan province, was charging 68 yuan (US$10.7) for bowls of instant noodles the would ordinarily cost at most six yuan in the city. Despite nationwide reporting of these incredible prices, Changsha’s airport continued charging them as usual. In this cartoon, posted by Cao Yi (曹一) to his blog at QQ.com, TV cameras attempt to surround the Changsha airport, where a chef smiles self-assuredly as he offers bowls of noodles for 68 yuan — but the airport, disguised by a giant turtle shell, is utterly impervious.
