Blind self-taught lawyer and rights activist Chen Guangcheng (陈光诚) has in recent years been one of the most enduring symbols outside China of the country’s human rights abuses. Inside China, meanwhile, Chen’s case has remained mostly unspoken and unknown — until recently.
A broad cross-section of Chinese — online and offline — have continued to push for justice in the Chen Guangcheng case since the beginning of this month, thanks in large part to social media.
Chen has remained under house arrest ever since his release from prison in September 2010 after serving a four-year sentence imposed by a local court in Shandong’s Linyi City. Chen was convicted in August 2006 of “malicious destruction of property and gathering a crowd to obstruct traffic” after campaigning on behalf of local villagers against forced sterilizations and other abuses of China’s family planning policies by Linyi authorities.

[ABOVE: Rights campaigner Chen Guangcheng wearing his trademark sunglasses.]
China’s homegrown “Free Guangcheng” campaign and related online activities and actions have been reasonably well documented by international media and English-language blogs, with notable stories by the Associated Press, at the Wall Street Journal’s China Real Time site, and an interesting comparison by William Farris of English and Chinese editorials on Chen’s case at the Global Times.
Searches on Chinese social media for “Free Guangcheng” (自由光诚) are now prohibited, but searches for “Chen Guangcheng” (陈光诚) are still allowed, and call up a wide array of chatter and coverage on the case.
It has been interesting to watch the ways online attention to the Chen Guangcheng case have also continued to spill over into real action. Here, for example, is a Sina Weibo post from last Sunday, which shows Chinese on Shanghai’s People’s Square carrying character placards that spell out: “Free Guangcheng: [We Want] Light and Honesty.”

“Light” and “honesty” are a play on Chen Guangcheng’s name, in which guang (光) means “light” and cheng (诚) means “honesty” or “sincerity.”
Perhaps taking the cake is a pair of videos originally posted to the domestic video sharing site Youku (but now on YouTube) in which supporters of Chen Guangcheng unable to gain access to his village put up a fireworks display on the village’s outskirts. “Lighting up the sky for you, Guangcheng,” says the voice on the video.

Getting back to the issue of newspaper coverage, however, it is important to note that the OCtober 12 Global Times editorial on Chen Guangcheng’s case (“The Chen Guangcheng Incident Should not be Turned Ideological”) was not just, as Farris said, “the first time the Global Times has ever mentioned Chen in a Chinese language piece” — it was the first time any Chinese newspaper mentioned Chen Guangcheng in any way, shape or form since 2004.
There were a handful of independent blog reports on Chen Guangcheng’s case, most notably by CMP fellows Wang Keqin (王克勤) and Zhai Minglei (翟明磊), but there was never any mention in mainstream news media.
And with that note, we turn to a much-overlooked piece appearing in response to the Global Times editorial in the October 13 edition of Shanghai’s Oriental Morning Post.
We would share a visual image of the Page 16 editorial, but as you can see from the screenshot of the paper’s electronic version below, Page 16 has been removed.

Our translation of the Oriental Morning Post editorial follows:

“Who is Chen Guangcheng?”
October 13, 2011
By Niu Ke (牛克)
On October 12, the Global Times ran an editorial called, “The Chen Guangcheng Incident Should not be Turned Ideological.” Concerning the case of a blind man named Chen Guangcheng (陈光诚) in Shandong’s Linyi City, it not yet having been made clear whether he has or has not been placed under “house arrest,” the Global Times made two points in this editorial. First, it demanded that relevant local authorities provide adequate information [on the case]. Second, it said in a roundabout fashion that the One Child Policy was part of a “complex overall environment,” and that Chen had, by “throwing caution to the winds to pursue that ‘ideal situation’ created a disturbance to local social order that laws and regulations could not withstand.” It was this, [the editorial said], that had resulted in Chen’s “twists of fate.” And the article’s conclusion was that in the Chen Guangcheng case, we must “dispense of ideologization” (去意识形态化).
The article was written in a most nebulous way. But who is this Chen Guangcheng? And what sort of fate has he suffered?
Previously, domestic media have not reported on the situation facing Chen, and this article from the Global Times was the first voice to appear on this incident. This isn’t the first time we’ve seen such “Global Times advocacy.” On a number of stories in recent years, we’ve seen no reporting at all from any other media but only mention of the story in editorial form at the Global Times. These pieces are always heavier on criticism and lighter on details, more about formula than reason, looking down from the commanding heights rather than having a common touch.
And yet, right before our eyes, journalism in our country is [supposed to be] undergoing a movement of “touching on the grass roots, transforming style of work and changing writing styles” (走基层、转作风、改文风). Central party leaders long ago sent out a notice calling on media to “avoid looking down from the heights, or speaking at though to oneself” (防止居高临下、自说自话). [NOTE: This comes from a notice based on a speech by propaganda minister Liu Yunshan (刘云山) back in August this year. The idea, essentially, is that media coverage should be more relevant and approachable, avoiding boilerplate Party journalism styles.]
So who is Chen Guangcheng? Back in 2003 and 2004 many media reported how in 2003 Chen Guangcheng publicly accused the Beijing Metro after being denied a fare exemption despite the fact he was carrying identification to show he was blind (盲人证) — and how he “spoke out for all people with disabilities in China.”
From that point on, there was no sign of Chen Guangcheng in the [Chinese] media. One investigative reporter close to him says: In August 2006, the People’s Court in Shandong’s Linnan County (which belongs to Linyi City) sentenced Chen Guangcheng to four years and three months in prison for malicious destruction of property and gathering a crowd to obstruct traffic. In 2009, this journalist tried to visit with [Chen Guangcheng’s] family members, but as soon as he exited from the highway he was confronted by men guarding the intersection: “What have you come to do?” From that point on they were tailed by a motorbike. When they reached the door of the Chen home, this journalist was surrounding by four to five men, and soon this turned into a group beating [of the journalist].
On October 5 this year, a journalist for a publication affiliated with Xinhua News Agency sought out Chen Guangcheng, who had already been released from prison. On the road they were detained and beaten by relevant departments in Linyi. Only after being deprived of his personal liberty for three to four hours was he finally allowed to return home.
The above account is not necessarily the whole truth. And demanding that the local government in Linyi release all relevant information is certainly the attitude media should have [toward this story]. But before the full truth is known, this commentary stringing abstract notions together with abstract notions comes out to the puzzlement of all.
For example, do the “twists of fate” alluded to in the article refer to the punishments he faced under the law, or do they refer to “extralegal punishments” that trampled on his legal rights? If there is really such a thing as “house arrest,” where is the legal basis? Article 37 of the Constitution of the People’s Republic of China reads: “The freedom of person of citizens of the People’s Republic of China is inviolable. . . Unlawful deprivation or restriction of citizens’ freedom of person by detention or other means is prohibited.”
The word “house arrest” has never appeared in Chinese law, and so-called “home observation” (监视居住) is something to be carried out by police, and not by other public officers, in strict compliance with China’s code of criminal procedure (刑事诉讼法).
Indirectly, the Global Times editorial admits that local authorities have not handled Chen Guangcheng according to “strict legal or human rights standards.” On the other hand, it finds that Chen has “created a disturbance that laws and regulations cannot withstand.” So are we to believe that one set of laws has two different rules of application? Wherein lies the seriousness of our nation’s laws?
This article emphasizes again and again what it calls the “small environment” at the grass-roots level. Do they not realize that our national laws are not to be bent to accommodate the “small environments” of local governments?
Comrade Mao Zedong once said that without investigating something you have no right to comment (没有调查，就没有发言权). Media need only objectively and comprehensively explain to the public, “Who is Chen Guangcheng?” That is enough, for the masses have sharp eyes.
(The writer is a media professional)

Culture has moved to the center of Chinese politics, thanks to the hefty pronouncements emerging from this month’s full plenary session of top Chinese Communist Party leaders.
According to official Chinese news reports, the big Party meeting of the year “heard and discussed the work report delivered by Comrade Hu Jintao” — that’s China’s president — on the issue of culture as a strategic part China’s overall national strength. The meeting adopted a document with the characteristically long-winded title: “Central Committee Decision Concerning the Major Issue of Deepening Cultural System Reforms, Promoting the Great Development and Prosperity of Socialist Culture.”
The gist is that China must — as Hu Jintao said during a joint study session of the politburo back in July 2010 — “deepen cultural system reforms [in order to] enhance China’s cultural soft power.” In other words, the Party must release creative forces in China (let’s not forget that political controls are still implied here) in order to become a truly influential world power.
This recent culture-focused plenary meeting in fact became part of the Party’s official agenda back in 2007 at the last National Party Congress, when President Hu Jintao pledged in his political report to “promote [the] vigorous development and prosperity of Socialist culture.” [CMP 2007 analysis here.]
This same political report was the first to mention “soft power,” or ruanshili (软实力), making it clear that Hu was talking about a renaissance in China’s global power and influence, not just a re-awakening of arts and letters.
Aside from China’s ideological goals, there is also of course an economic component. Leaders said during the recent meeting that the creative industries (文化产业), which presently account for just 2.75 percent of GDP, would account for five percent within five years.
As to what these new pronouncements could possibly mean in concrete terms for cultural creation in China, it remains painfully unclear. What substantive changes will there be to book publishing, film production, design, television, radio and the rest?
And it doesn’t help that the full text of this (we are told) crucial policy document is a virtual mystery. Here is a search for the full name of the document using the Baidu search engine. There are plenty of results, but click into each and you find only a one-line official news release from Xinhua News Agency, dated October 18:

The sixth plenary session of the 17th Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party deliberated and approved “Central Committee Decision Concerning the Major Issue of Deepening Cultural System Reforms, Promoting the Great Development and Prosperity of Socialist Culture.”

Given the fog surrounding this proclamation on the role and development of culture and creativity, it’s fair to say that China’s political culture is the real focus here. The point is that China’s political culture has now taken up the idea of culture in a big way.
Typically, when the central Party makes a big fuss about this or that new policy buzzword — they are called tifa (提法) in Chinese — everybody in the Party leadership, from the top down to the bottom, jumps on the bandwagon.
When Hu Jintao tossed out the term “cultural soft power” in his 2007 political report, he ushered in months of feverish creation — not by writers, artists, filmmakers or comedians — but by lower-level Party leaders scrambling to implement an abstract idea they scarcely understood. Even leaders at the county level across China were holding “mobilization meetings” to “accelerate the raising of cultural soft power.”
If there are aspects of this Party “Decision” that might have an appreciable impact on the creative industries, they remain to be seen. If changes in the media over the past two decades are any measure, the most interesting things we can expect are the unintended consequences of changes in the cultural sector as creative people try to push the political bounds and “hit line balls” in areas like film.
But the most immediate impact of the recent plenary session of the 17th Central Committee of the CCP will be a surging tide of political blather about culture and the “rejuvenation of the Chinese people.”
That of course isn’t how cultural creation works. You cannot mandate a renaissance. Political bandwagons don’t play Carnegie Hall.

[ABOVE: Page four of today’s official People’s Daily newspaper, with three articles at top about cultural reforms. At far left, a piece about how the top Party leader of the All-China Federation of Trade Unions says the proletariat must serve as a “main force” in advancing Socialist culture. At far right, an editorial decrying an over-emphasis on entertainment in television programming.]

[ABOVE: In April 2010, the city of Xingning (兴宁), a county-level city in Guangdong province, gave out awards to locals who had advanced “cultural soft power” in various ways.

In late October 2011, China was captivated by the distressing case of two-year-old Foshan girl Xiao Yueyue (小悦悦), who was coldly ignored by passersby as she lay bleeding in the street after being struck by a delivery van. Video shared widely across social media in China documented the October 13 incident in horrifying detail, including at least 18 people walking past Xiao Yueyue’s body without so much as a glance. Xiao Yueyue died in the hospital on October 21, 2011. Her case sparked a nationwide discussion in China about ethics, morality and social responsibility. One specific debate in Guangdong province, where the Xiao Yueyue case occurred, was over the legal aspects of the problem of “watching people die and not lifting a hand to save them” (见死不救) in Chinese society. Some experts and leaders in Guangdong talked about the need for a law holding people responsible for not acting to help those in danger. In the following cartoon, which illustrated a feature page on the Xiao Yueyue case at QQ.com, a crowd of Chinese looks on as though at a circus spectacle as someone drowns in a pond.

Everyone can guess on the basis of official Chinese news coverage that the recent full plenary session of top Chinese Communist Party leaders, which concluded in Beijing yesterday, was all about culture. But as for what the meeting actually spells for cultural creation in China, anyone could be forgiven for being totally stumped.
We’ll take a more in-depth look at cultural policy (both domestic and international) in the coming weeks. But for now we want to just give a flavor of how news coverage looks in China today as the plenary session language on cultural system reforms (文化体制改革) is being loudly promoted by media.
One of the most indicative pieces to be found nearly everywhere today is an official editorial from page two of the Party’s People’s Daily. “Without the flourishing development of socialist culture, there can be no socialist modernization,” the editorial begins. “The great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation must be accompanied by the thriving of Chinese culture.” And there are hints of soft power and the international dimensions of culture as well in the statement that without thriving culture “a country and a people cannot possibly stand strong in the forest of nations.”

[ABOVE: An editorial on page 2 of today’s official People’s Daily says great progress was made at the recent sixth plenary session of the 17th Central Committee of the CCP on the issue of cultural reforms.]
But beyond a dizzying deluge of formulaic Party language speaking to the essential role of cultural creation in the “rejuvenation of the Chinese people,” there are few specifics anywhere today to tell us exactly what any of this means.
The following is a very partial translation of today’s editorial in People’s Daily.

“The Great March Toward a Great Nation of Socialist Culture”
People’s Daily
October 19, 2011
Page 2
Without the flourishing development of socialist culture, there can be no socialist modernization; the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation must be accompanied by the thriving of Chinese culture.
The sixth plenary session of the 17th Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party concluded successfully. This important meeting held in the midst of the critical period of the comprehensive building of a moderately well-off society (小康社会), from the heights of the general layout of the cause of socialism with Chinese characteristics, made deployments for the deepening of cultural system reforms (文化体制改革), promoting the great development and prosperity of socialist culture. It emphasized the need to cleave to the road of development of socialism with Chinese characteristics, working hard to build a strong socialist cultural nation (社会主义文化强国). This has major practical significance and deep historical significance in mobilizing the whole Party and the peoples of our country, under the leadership of Party, in promoting the steady development of various undertakings, seizing new victories in the comprehensive building of a moderately well-off society to initiate a new situation in the undertaking of socialism with Chinese characteristics, realizing the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation.
The plenary meeting heard and discussed the work report delivered by Comrade Hu Jintao on behalf of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee, examining and adopting “Central Committee Decision Concerning the Major Issue of Deepening Cultural System Reforms, Promoting the Great Development and Prosperity of Socialist Culture” (中共中央关于深化文化体制改革 推动社会主义文化大发展大繁荣若干重大问题的决定). All were in agreement that with a rapidly changing international situation and facing the formidable tasks of maintaining reform, development and stability domestically, the Central Committee of the Party with Comrade Hu Jintao as General Secretary uniting with the whole Party, the army and the people, in implementing the scientific view of development, in accelerating a transition in methods of economic development, in thoroughly promoting the building of a socialist economy, politics, culture and society, as well as the building of ecological civilization (生态文明建设) and thoroughly promoting great new projects in building the Party, new advancements and new achievements were made for all the various tasks, and a solid foundation was set down for realizing a good start to the 12th Five-Year Plan period.
Culture is the circulating blood of a nation, the spiritual home of a people. From a strategic standpoint, this plenary meeting was an important meeting for research and deployment on cultural reform and development. . . The “Decision” fully expresses the Chinese Communist Party’s deep grasp of historical mission it bears, its scientific assessment of circumstances both domestically and internationally, its high level of awareness on culture construction (文化建设), and thoroughly reflects the common hopes of all the nationalities of China. It is the programmatic document leading current and future cultural reform and development in our nation.
. . . .
Without culture to guide the way, without the great richness of a people’s spiritual world, without bringing the spiritual strength of the whole nation into play, a country and a people cannot possibly stand strong in the forest of nations.

On October 14, Xinhua News Agency’s Economic Information Daily reported claims by commercial authorities in the city of Changsha that several local stores for the international retail chains Walmart and Carrefour in the city had been found to be re-labeling food products and selling them after expiration. The allegations come as Walmart China stores have been forced to close in the city of Chongqing and at least 37 employees detained over allegations regular pork was sold as organic pork. In this cartoon, posted by Kunming-based studio Yuan Jiao Man’s Space (圆觉漫时空) to QQ.com, a figure with a smiley face (representing Walmart in China) and a devilishly grinning figure with the long Pinocchio nose of a chronic fibber (representing Carrefour in China), work in cahoots to tinker with a clock.

China has been captivated this week by the distressing case of two-year-old Foshan girl Xiao Yueyue (小悦悦), who was coldly ignored by passersby as she lay bleeding in the street after being struck by a delivery van. Video shared widely across social media in China documented the October 13 incident in horrifying detail, including at least 18 people walking past Xiao Yueyue’s body without so much as a glance.
Xiao Yueyue is reportedly in stable but critical condition in a Guangzhou hospital. The implications of the incident are being widely discussed in China’s media, both new and old. According to People’s Daily Online, at least 151,342 microblog posts had been made on the incident by Monday afternoon. The vast majority of these (about 150,742), the site said, were from “ordinary users” (those, in other words, without large numbers of followers). The following is one composite image post made to Sina Microblog today:

[ABOVE: A composite image posted to Sina Microblog, one of China’s leading social media platforms. At top is Chen Xianmei (陈贤妹), who eventually did stop to help the child, Xiao Yueyue, who is pictured in the hospital on the right side of the composite.]
Traditional media have also jumped on the story, even local Party newspapers such as Foshan Daily, which ran a front page headline yesterday reading: “Today, they have shamed the whole of Foshan.” The headline refers to those 18 people who were caught on video walking or driving callously past the seriously injured Xiao Yueyue.

One of the lengthiest reports comes from the official, but also very commercial, Guangzhou Daily. The report quotes a number of experts, including Fudan University sociologist Gu Xiaoming (顾晓明), who said that people had lost their “reverence for life” and felt “indifferent or even cold about life or death” owing to the new complexities of Chinese social life. Faced with a situation like Xiao Yueyue’s, Gu said, many people don’t know how to act: “People will rationalize [the situation] and think, if I try to save her but she dies because I can’t, how will that make me responsible?”
Chen Xianmei (陈贤妹), the woman who eventually did come to Xiao Yueyue’s aid, told Guangzhou Daily that she asked four or five people who had stalls along the street whether they knew whose child this was. According to Chen they all responded, “It’s not mine,” and no one offered help. Chen then shouted in all directions, asking for help or information, and only then did the Xiao Yueyue’s mother come running.
At People’s Daily Online today, columnist Li Hongbing (李泓冰) writes: “Any one of us might become the ‘passerby’ at the side of Xiao Yueyue. Please, stop. Move her out of the center of the road. Or extend a hand of comfort, carrying her away from danger.”
Here are some Chinese news links on this story today:
“By extending a hand, we save ourselves,” Yangcheng Evening News
“Two drivers arrested for running over Xiao Yueyue,” Foshan Radio
“The Xiao Yueyue incident: gathering up the scraps of China’s conscience?,” Nanfang Daily
“Zhang Ming: those passersby who neglected an injured child are no better than animals,” Phoenix Online
“Good-hearted auntie: I did what I should have,” Hebei Youth Daily

In an interview with Southern Metropolis Daily, Han Han (韩寒), the widely popular blogger and cultural critic who doubles as a race-car driver, offers his views on China’s domestic film industry. Earlier today, the culture section of Southern Metropolis Daily shared portions of the interview through its official Sina Microblog account, pulling out Han Han’s choice quote on censorship.

It may be the case that the government in a country with cultural censorship no longer has to fear criticism or satire at the hands of its own creative works. But then the whole world subjects it to criticism and satire.

A portion of Han Han’s interview follows, but readers of Chinese are encouraged to read the original (and offer any pointers on our hurried translation).

Southern Metropolis Daily: Here’s a pretty cliche question, but can you talk about how you view “Lee’s Adventure” (李献计历险记)? Did you buy a ticket and see it? What kind of score do you give this film?
Han Han: This is a really tough question to answer. I bought a ticket at the theater to watch it, and before it came out I really wanted to see it. But during the first few days it was out I was racing, and there weren’t any theaters where I was. This is a film with the potential to become really great, but it falls short. I feel like the film actually could be made into three separate films. The first would be a fully animated “Lee’s Adventure,” nothing but animation; the second would be a youth film called “Lee’s Adventure”; and the third would be “Lee’s Adventure” the romantic adventure story. When all three of these are all put together, added to the narration bits that have a really distinct Beijing quality, a really sincere film with everything there falls a bit flat. But it’s still worth going to the theater and buying a ticket to see.
Southern Metropolis Daily: In the past you’ve commented on and graded a number of films, from “On His Majesty’s Secret Service” (大内密探零零狗) to “Founding of the Republic” (建国大业) and “Confucius” (孔子). You tend not to pull your punches. But lately you’ve not said very little about domestically-made films (国产电影), and we’ve not seen you scolding them much either. Is this because you’ve simply lost hope, or because you now know too many people in the industry and feel bad about being too critical? Can you talk about what films you’ve seen this year on your own dime that have really made a deep impression on you?
Han Han: I’ve not had contact with too many people in the film industry. It’s just that film criticism is something I’ve done in my spare time. I’ve not seen many good domestic films this year. “The Piano in a Factory” (钢的琴) was one, and while the part imitating Yugoslavian film and the totally unnecessary song and dance was a bit affected, the principal male character and the director held it together. “Lee’s Adventure” was another. Both films were filmed in a very lofty style, but both fortunately came back down to earth. Both films pushed hard to be moving and tragic but ultimately failed the audience.
Southern Metropolis Daily: Hong Huang (洪晃) once said that China doesn’t have independent film critics and needs more Han Hans. What did you think after hearing that? You’re not a film critic by trade, but many people (including the one sitting next to you right now) would read your reviews and weight them as they considered whether or not to go and see a film. Does knowing that make you more cautious in reviewing films?
Han Han: I do feel some caution about it. Every film, even the totally stupid ones, are the product of a lot of work and at the very least mean a whole crew has to get up early every day for three months. So sometimes I don’t have the heart [to be too critical]. I’m not saying though that work and effort are necessarily a good thing and should earn forgiveness. After all, killing and plundering, robbing and looting, are all a lot of hard work too. The efforts of others can’t become an excuse for forgiving [mediocrity].
Southern Metropolis Daily: You’ve started becoming involved with films in various ways, and sometimes you can be seen “standing up” for certain films. So are you planning to throw your strength in with filmmaking, or is this just out of friendship? And what if it’s you who are criticized once these films hit the screen?
Han Han: Basically it’s out of friendship, but these are all people I’ve picked out as people I can trust. I’m a pretty thin-skinned and soft-hearted person, but when I come across idiots my skin still thickens right up and my heart grows hard. So these are basically friends that I know won’t let me down. Fortunately, I don’t know that many. So I can preserve my independence.
Southern Metropolis Daily: You once had a director fire back at you, saying if you know so much about film why don’t you try making one yourself? You’ve talked before about how you have played with the idea of directing. So why have you not started? These past couple of years, film has been hot, and the money has flowed. On the surface, it seems to be flourishing, with box office numbers breaking hundreds of millions. Do you think there is a higher proportion of good films on the silver screen today?
Han Han: Films aren’t the work of a single person. If a film can’t make it into theaters, there’s no way I can face my investors and partners. The film market is flourishing, but it’s even harder to make decent films in China. The quality of Hong Kong films has been pulled lower as cooperation has been sought [with mainland film partners to reach both markets]. The film censorship system means current material [relating to life today] is avoided altogether. And many people who really should be in the field of television drama, or telemarketing for that matter, have entered the film industry — all of these are reasons the quality of filmmaking has gone down.
Southern Metropolis Daily: Do you think the film censorship system is the chief reason we have so many bad Chinese films?
Han Han: It’s an extremely important reason. When I was writing my book I found myself self-censoring, taking a lot of content out myself. And then the editor would take out more. This is even more the case with film. It may be the case that the government in a country with cultural censorship no longer has to fear criticism or satire at the hands of its own creative works. But then the whole world subjects it to criticism and satire.

Back in September, the [road-rage] attack case involving Li Tianyi (李天一), the son of major general and army vocalist Li Shuangjiang (李双江), once again (like the Li Gang Case of October 2010) drew the attention of the public to the arrogant attitudes and behavior of young Chinese with well-connected parents — that is, the sons and daughters of Party and government officials (官二代) and the sons and daughters of the rich (富二代).
Li Tianyi’s case was also cast as an illustration of the arrogant behavior of the sons and daughters of privileged entertainment stars, referred to as the xing’erdai (星二代). Right on the heels of the Li Tianyi case, Wang Ke (王珂) and Wang Shuo (王闹), two of the so-called “Beijing playboys” (京城四少) — both regarded as second-generation rich and powerful — crashed their luxury cars during a street race, which then led to a scuffle in which Wang Shuo allegedly pulled a gun on Wang Ke [More here from China Daily]. This case, like the others, focused attention on the dictatorial and unchecked behavior of some children of the second generation, and drew in related debates about social fairness and equality, corruption and rule of law.
Like Wang Shuo, the deputy general manager of property development company Beijing Wangfu Centurial Development, Wang Ke is regarded as a member of the so-called “second-generation rich,” or fu’erdai (富二代), but his exact family connections remain something of a mystery. In this cartoon by Kuang Biao (邝飚), “Second-Generation Running Amuck”(横行的二代) — in which the word hengxing, or running amuck, also means to “stalk” or “crawl” or “scuttle”, as in the movement of crabs — two crabs with lower bodies shaped like a government seal (left) and a sycee, or ancient Chinese gold ingot, battle it out for supremacy. The upper bodies of these crabs, which clearly represent the “second-generation powerful” and the “second-generation rich,” are shaped like, well . . . we leave the rest of the interpretation to our readers. (Could there also be a pejorative reference to Hu Jintao’s “harmonious society” and internet slang “river crab” here?)