Yesterday morning, July 30, CMP Director Qian Gang (钱钢) delivered a “letter from home” on RTHK Radio. Addressed to the journalists of China and Hong Kong, the letter looked back on a tumultuous week of coverage of the July 23 train collision in Wenzhou, full of victories and setbacks. The message of the “letter” was largely positive, remarking how July 29 had marked a rare high point for mainland Chinese media in particular, with bold and broad coverage of the Wenzhou crash and its implications.
But just as Qian Gang’s message was hitting the airwaves, he was watching the weather change online. Strict controls on China’s media had been rolled into force just the night before, with authorities saying that “public opinion inside and outside China has begun to become complex.” A notice demanded that Chinese media immediately cool down their reporting and commentary on the July 23 Wenzhou train crash, and scores of Chinese media had to move frantically to fill the gaps as planned reports on the crash were suddenly off limits.

Question: Are there serious safety problems with China’s high-speed rail and train system?
Answer: Through many years of development, we’ve made major technological progress in high-speed rail project construction, equipment manufacturing, operation and management and many other areas. But we still face many difficulties and challenges in the midst of this development. We are still full of confidence about the future of China’s high-speed rail system.”

One enlightening bit of coverage that did not see the light of day yesterday was an interview by The Beijing News with Wang Mengnu (王梦怒), a railway engineer and member of the Chinese Academy of Sciences who has long been on record as a major supporter of high-speed rail and was recently included — to the surprise of many — on the list of members of a special investigative team tasked with looking into the causes of the railway tragedy. Wang was plainly clueless about the nuts and bolts of the supposed investigation, raising further questions about credibility.

The Beijing News: Academician Wang, are you at the site [of the accident] now? Can you tell us, what is the preliminary situation with the investigation?
Wang Mengru (王梦ru): I’m not at the scene.
The Beijing News: Where are you? What are you doing?
Wang Mengru: I’m in the suburbs of Beijing. I’m on the road to Zhangjiakou right now. I’m busy dealing with some railway matters.
The Beijing News: Are you not an expert on the special investigative team? Don’t you have to go to the scene to investigate?
Wang Mengru: I’m busy. I don’t think I’ll be going. We’ll see how it goes.
The Beijing News: Well then, how is it you’re a member of the investigative team then?
Wang Mengru: About two or three days ago, I was in a meeting in Chengdu. I received a telephone notice from the State Administration of Work Safety asking me to go and participate as part of the investigative team.
The Beijing News: Do you not want to take part? Or is it something you can’t avoid?
Wang Mengru: I can’t be sure. If I can take part, I will. If I get a [formal] notice or not, either is OK. If I didn’t get a [formal] notice and didn’t go that would be better.
The Beijing News: Why would it be better not to get a notice?
Wang Mengru: Really soon I have to go to Japan for a meeting.
The Beijing News: When is that? Is it railway business too?
Wang Mengru: I have to go on August 3. It’s not this [railway business].
The Beijing News: So what happens if you get a [formal] notice to take part in the investigative team? If you can’t go to the scene you can’t possibly understand the situation, right?
Wang Mengru: Even if I don’t go to the scene I can analyze [the situation].
The Beijing News: Are other experts going to the scene?
Wang Mengru: I’m not really sure. I’m not really in touch with them.

The following are examples of three pages that were to be included in yesterday’s edition of Chinese Business View (华商报) but could not be because propaganda leaders were aggressively applying pressure. The spaces you see empty on these pages are not “sky windows,” or tian chuang (天窗), spaces left blank as a purposefull form of protest — something that happens on occasion in Chinese newspapers. The spaces were waiting for other content, in one case a cartoon, before they had to be pulled altogether.

In the midst of the ongoing crisis surrounding the July 23 train collision in Wenzhou, the Party’s official People’s Daily newspaper ran an editorial on its front page yesterday calling for more vigilance on the issue of “production safety.” The editorial said that while development must be a priority for China, “we do not want a GDP that comes with blood.”
The editorial raised some eyebrows both inside and outside China, but it should be remarked that the editorial does not mark a major departure. With the exception of the phrasing about “bloody GDP,” the piece offers little in the way of original ideas or approaches.

In Seeking Development, Safety Must Be Put First
People’s Daily
July 28, 2011
Up to now, 39 people have already died in the major “July 23” railway disaster in Wenzhou. These painful facts once again send a warning to us: nothing is more paramount than human life, and we cannot relax for one moment in seeking safety in production (安全生产).
China must develop, but we do not want a GDP that comes with blood. Let us mobilize all forces in society, resolutely pushing for victory in the war for safety in production, working hard to realize scientific development and safe development.
Safe production is an asset that concerns the lives of the people, that concerns the overall picture of reform, development and stability, that concerns the image and prestige of the Party and government. Prioritizing safe production is something that cannot be overemphasized. Grasping safe production is something we cannot neglect at any time.
In the recent period, a number of local areas have suffered a string of coal mine accidents and accidents at other non-coal mines, [major] traffic accidents, collapses of buildings and bridges, resulting in substantial loss of life and property for the people and at the same time exposing a weak consciousness of production safety among certain local governments, agencies and companies. Responsibility for safety has not been implemented, supervision and control have been inadequate, and there are still many gaps in systems and management. The lessons to be drawn are profound.
We must recognize clearly that the ultimate goal in seeking construction and development is to allow people to live good lives. Development is the overriding priority, but in seeking development we cannot fail to calculate the costs. Even less can we allow this [principle] to be twisted by a few into the idea that anything and everything can be set aside for the sake of development. In the process of development, we must secure the concepts of science, safety and sustainability, putting the safety of people in the first position; We must adhere to [the principle of] people first (以人为本), managing the relationship between speed, quality and efficiency well. We cannot superficially seek speed alone, “pursuing money but not seeking life”; We must resolutely establish the principle of “life above all else” through the entire process of production, business and management, holding the red line of production safety.

For months, doubts and accusations have swarmed on the margins of China’s high-profile push to develop its high-speed rail system. But harder questions — about corruption, waste, quality, safety, service and intellectual property — were submerged by feel-good propaganda, pushing claims of technological superiority to win political points.
The crash of a high-speed train near the city of Wenzhou over the weekend has whipped up a new wave of public anger toward the Ministry of Railways — and toward the government more generally — and brought a new and frenzied sharing of information online, even as authorities have moved quickly to stem media coverage.
For many Chinese, one of the most infuriating aspects of this story has been the government’s apparent unwillingness to answer the most basic questions, and its tendency to fall back on cryptic responses and tired propaganda memes.
On July 12, Chinese media asked how a lightning strike had caused a serious malfunction on July 10, why there was no contingency plan, why passengers had not been compensated, why backup power systems had not been used (leaving passengers in stifling hot cars)? Responses from the Ministry of Railways were not forthcoming, even as more malfunctions and delays piled up on July 12 and 13. The official line from the ministry last week, as delays continued to become an issue, was that it was only natural that the high-speed rail needed time to work out the kinks. To which Chinese internet users asked scathingly whether the Ministry of Railways thought Chinese passengers were lab rats (实验品). ［NOTE: Correction made here to note that the above-mentioned criticism of the ministry’s statements came from web users, not the Legal Mirror, which was the news story source.]
The tension between real answers and propaganda cageyness seemed to boil over at yesterday’s press conference with Wang Yongping (王勇平), the Ministry of Railways spokesman who arrogantly asserted on July 7 that China’s high-speed rail was far superior to Japan’s Shinkansen, and that the two “cannot be mentioned in the same breath.”
When Wang was asked yesterday how it was possible that a five-year-old girl was found alive after officials had declared an end to the search and rescue, Wang responded: “That was a miracle . . . ” Shouts erupted among the reporters, “It is NOT a miracle! It is NOT a miracle!”

This was a flat rejection of the familiar propaganda meme of love, unity and selflessness in the face of tragedy. The reporters didn’t want to hear more feel-good nonsense. They wanted to know exactly why the girl had not been found earlier, and what her discovery revealed about the nature and handling of the search and rescue itself.
But propaganda directives leaked online suggest Chinese authorities are doing their utmost to play on the emotions of the public, building a story about tragedy overcome. Their answer to real questions and concerns is to peddle more feel-good nonsense.
The directives read:

“On the Wenzhou train collision accident, various media must report information from the Ministry of Railways in a timely manner, media from various regions must not send reporters [to the scene] to report the story, and child papers and magazines as well as websites must especially be managed well [EDITOR’S NOTE: This refers to commercial newspapers and magazines like Southern Metropolis Daily and Caijing]. Links must not be made to the development of the high-speed rail, and reports looking back (反思性报道) must not be done.” [EDITOR’S NOTE: Reports “looking back” refer to reports that investigate the causes of an event and make suggestions, for example, about government responsibility.]
“Latest demands on the Wenzhou train collision accident: 1. Figures on the number of dead must follow numbers from authoritative departments; 2. Frequency of reports must not be too dense; 3. More reporting should be done on stories that are extremely moving, for example people donating blood and taxi drivers not accepting fares; 4. There must be no seeking after the causes [of the accident], rather, statements from authoritative departments must be followed; 5. No looking back and no commentary.
” . . . From now on, the Wenzhou train accident should be reported along the theme of ‘major love in the face of major disaster’. No calling into doubt, no development [of further issues], no speculation, and no dissemination [of such things] on personal microblogs! . . . ”

The culture of propaganda that has defined the railway ministry’s response after and leading up to the July 23 tragedy is in great measure responsible for the failings of China’s high-speed rail, as well as serious safety concerns and accidents that have plagued other major infrastructure projects that have gone forward without public scrutiny. Saturday’s accident is an indictment of China’s prevailing political culture, of which propaganda and information controls are an central part.
That culture operates without independent scrutiny, prioritizing grandiose visions — a Great Leap Forward mentality — over basic public concerns like safety and fiscal accountability.
On that note, it’s well worth revisiting a front-page piece that appeared in the Party’s official People’s Daily in December last year, six months before the formal launch of the Beijing-Shanghai High-Speed Rail. The piece valorizes a train engine driver, Li Dongxiao (李东晓), who was called upon in 2008 to master the “world’s most complex” train in just 10 days under a “dead order” from Chinese government leaders, before piloting his first train back to Beijing at 350 km/hr.
Simply assuming these details compact the sense of Li’s heroism, the People’s Daily piece emphasizes that Li and his colleagues — none of whom had even college educations — had to rely on instruction manuals that had been translated from German by an outside contractor, rendering many of the terms “extremely strange.” At one point, Li heroically bets his German trainer, who shakes his head and says it’s impossible to master the train in under 2-3 months, that he can do in 10 days.
The piece, partially translated here, now reads as a portrait of folly mistaken for glory.

Li Xiaodong, “Pioneer of Increased Speed”
(Pioneers of Our Day Series)
People’s Daily
December 14, 2010
PG 01
Li Dongxiao (李东晓) is a middle school graduate, an ordinary [engine] driver, but he has created many firsts for China’s high-speed rail. He passed the exam for high-speed rail operating permit 001, he chalked up the first world speed record for China’s high-speed rail, he trained the first generation of high-speed train [engine] drivers, and participated in the creation of China’s first training manual for the high-speed rail . . .
Diligent Study and Strenuous Training, Aspiring to Work, [Being Able to] Drive a High-Speed Train Home within 10 Days
Li Dongxiao, who stands at 1.8 meters tall, with big eyes and bushy eyebrows, crisply dressed in his uniform, is like a name card for the Transport Depot of the Beijing Railway Bureau. This is not just because he has been a train engine driver for the past 20 years, with no accidents, his skills refined, but because he is inseparable from China’s first high-speed railway, the Beijing-Tianjin intercity line.
On March 16, 2008, Li Dongxiao was among 10 engine drivers with the Transport Depot of the Beijing Railway Bureau to be selected as the Republic’s first group of high-speed rail drivers, and ordered to undergo driver training at Tangshan Railway Vehicle Co. Ltd. At that time, Li Xiaodong and his colleagues had never seen the domestically-made CRH3 high-speed trains, and they didn’t even know how many controls there were in the cab of the engine.
But the countdown had already started. On August 1, the Beijing-Tianjin Intercity Line was set to formally begin serving the Beijing Olympic Games, subject to review from passengers from all over the world. On July 1, the Beijing-Tianjin Intercity Line would enter its trial run period. The four months prior to this, the trains would have to run a total of 400,000 kilometers, the equivalent of 10 runs around the earth’s equator, completing adjustment and testing of the line system, signals, electrical supply, [passenger cars] and other areas.
An extra day of testing and adjustment means an extra thread of safety and comfort for passengers. The superiors [in the government] sent down a “dead order” [ie, and incontrovertible command]: They would train for 10 days, and after 10 days they must take their first train home to Beijing at a speed of 350 km/hr!
“Without two or three months, you guys can’t drive these out of here!” German expert Mark (?), who was leading the training at Tangshan Railway Vehicle, said, shaking his head. Beginning from zero, and only using 10 days to drive the world’s most advanced and most complex high-speed trains, [he said], this is an impossible task to complete.
“In just 10 days, not only did we have to learn it, we had to drive the trains back to Beijing!” Li Dongxiao [said], refusing to concede defeat.
“Well then, let’s make a bet! We definitely can drive them back in 10 days!” Li Xiaodong responded with more confidence than Mark. He coveted the badge pinned on Mark’s chest — a badge representing the highest driver qualification within the German high-speed rail system.
The difficulty and complexity of these engines was unprecedented. The CRH3 trains traveled at a speed of 350 km/hr, the fastest trains in the world. The structure of the train was complex, the [overhead] lines were thick as spider webs, connected to hundreds of thousands of component parts. There were more than 2,000 error codes alone.
The level of difficulty of engine operation was unprecedented. While [ordinary] trains had just over 10 switches on the dash [in the cab], the high-speed train had 40 or 50. Each operation was a combination of moves, and decisions had to be made in the wink of an eye, because in just one second the train moved ahead 97 meters. There was no room for error.
The level of difficulty of the [operational] instructions was unprecedented. The “Technical Materials on the CRH3 Train” is a 670-page volume “brick” written in German. The translation was outsourced by the railway ministry, and some of the technical terms were translated in extremely strange ways. Add to this the fact that the knowledge covered in the manual covered areas that were new [to the drivers], such as computers, material [science] and mechanics, and there was not a single college graduate among Li Dongxiao and his colleagues, so they had to study from scratch.

1. Expenses for overseas trips, ostensibly for government business but often for family vacations.
2. Expenses for food and entertainment
3. Expenses for public vehicles, usually including luxury sedans, private drivers, gasoline and related expenses, including maintenance

Back on February 27, 2010, Premier Wen Jiabao (温家宝) was asked during an online dialogue with internet users whether it was really so hard to deal with the problem of the “three public expenditures.” Wen responded that the government was committed to dealing with the problem, and said two things were necessary: 1. complete openness and transparency about all items of government expenditure and 2. democratic supervision, meaning that the press and public should be able to scrutinize public expenditures. But action on the “three public expenditures” has proved nearly impossible for China’s government.
In this cartoon, posted by artist Zhai Haijun to his blog at QQ.com, the “three public expenditures,” a huge, long-overdue dinosaur of a problem, sits stubbornly and immovably as a handful of ordinary citizens tug ineffectually on its tail in a hopeless attempt to bring change.