In an open letter dated October 11 and posted to the internet on October 12, 23 Party elders, including Mao Zedong’s former secretary Li Rui (李锐) and former People’s Daily editor-in-chief Hu Jiwei (胡绩伟), called for an end to press censorship in China. The letter quoted Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao (温家宝), who said during an October 3 interview with anchor Fareed Zakaria on CNN that “freedom of speech is indispensable for any nation.”
The authors of the open letter argue that “privatization of newspapers and periodicals is the [natural] direction of political reforms” in China, and that without free and independent media it is impossible to “connect with the will of the people and attain true leadership.” In order to accommodate this goal, the signatories urge in Point Six of their concrete demands: “Southern Weekly and Yanhuang Chunqiu should be permitted to restructure as privately operated pilot programs [in independent media].”
The second of these publications, Yanhuang Chunqiu, is a journal (published since 1991) that is seen to reflect the views of more liberal thinkers within the CCP, and it has often over the years published relatively open views on Chinese history, politics and current affairs — frequently also drawing pressure from Party leaders. The journal has historically enjoyed the support of Li Pu (李普), former deputy director of Xinhua News Agency, and Li Rui (李锐), both signatories of the recent open letter, and other Party officials.
In the most recent issue of Yanhuang Chunqiu, Du Daozheng (杜导正), a former high-level Party official and aide to Premier Zhao Ziyang (赵紫阳), draws on recent public remarks by Premier Wen Jiabao to talk about political reform in China.
Du takes issue with the idea that Wen Jiabao is merely “putting on a show” in his attention to political reform, and also suggests that President Hu Jintao is a supporter of the Premier who has given him more license to handle a number of important issues in recent months.
The interview should also be seen as a rebuttal to recent remarks from leftist elements in the Party — such as this editorial in Guangming Daily — that argue that China must distinguish between the “false” democracy of Western capitalist nations and the “true” democracy of socialism with Chinese characteristics.

Democracy Should Not Be Divided Into Capitalist and Socialist
Yanhuang Chunqiu
October, 2010, p. 38.
Du Daozheng (杜导正), director of the editorial board at Yanhuang Chunqiu
In the history of China’s economic reform and opening, the special economic zone is an especially rich chapter. The [recent] commemoration of the 30th anniversary of the Shenzhen Special Economic Zone was something everyone, from the central [leadership] to the local areas, paid particular attention to. On August 20 and 21, on the eve of Shenzhen’s 30th anniversary, State Council Premier Wen Jiabao (温家宝) went to Shenzhen on an inspection tour and made a speech there. On September 6, in the midst of grand celebrations to commemorate Shenzhen’s 30th anniversary, CCP Central Committee General Secretary Hu Jintao (胡锦涛) also gave a speech. These two speeches from our Party and government leaders were hotly debated both inside and outside China. A number of us old friends have found it impossible to avoid discussing these issues when we come together. A number of my views have been gathered together by an old friend “spanning generations” in question-and-answer form. After looking it over I found it rather interesting, and thought it suitable to be published in concise form and presented in the interest of exchanging ideas among friends attending to these issues.
Q: Throughout the history of economic opening and reform, debates have never ceased. More recently, surrounding the commemoration of the 30th anniversary of the Shenzhen Special Economic Zone, we’ve seen what seems to be a new wave of debate. Many people are debating Premier Wen’s speech in Shenzhen. What are your views?
A: Premier Wen Jiabao’s speech has drawn attention, in my view, [principally] on the level of politics. Wen Jiabao mentioned political reform many times in Shenzhen, both in formal addresses and in informal remarks as part of his inspection visit, and he raised [the issue of] political reform to a new level. He said: Without the protection afforded by political reforms, we will lose the gains [we have made] through economic reforms, and our goal of modernization cannot be achieved.”
“We stand at a great new juncture in our history, and we must continue to liberate our thinking, searching bravely. [We] cannot stand still, and even less can we afford to step backward. Standing still and stepping backward will not only mean wasting the gains of 30 years of opening and reform and a precious opportunity for development . . . but these contravene the will of the people, and they are ultimately dead ends. On this major question concerning the fate and future of our country, we must not have a moment’s hesitation.”
Wen Jiabao refers to our present era as “a great new juncture in our history,” and I believe there is much sense in this. The history of opening and reform is 32 years long . . . and China’s economic reforms have brought achievements that command attention. But many problems have also emerged. Just as when Deng Xiaoping (邓小平) made his “southern tour,” the question of the direction forward for Shenzhen is actually a question about the direction China is heading. This demands that our Party clearly recognize the situation and the tasks that face us. I think Comrade Wen Jiabao, in placing the crux of continued advancement of reforms on the task of political reform, has cut to the heart of the issue. In recent years, our comrades in the Central Committee of the CCP have rarely paid such attention to political reform, nor especially have they [as Wen Jiabao has] elevated the obstructions to reform as “contrary to the will of the people” and as a “dead end” . . .
Q: In recent years, both in the political sphere and among the public, particularly on the internet, controversy over Wen Jiabao has never ceased. Some have said that he’s talked about things for years, but done very little, that he is “putting on a show.” What do you think?
A: I have something of a different view about the suggestion he is “putting on a show.”
“Putting on a show” is something one does before an audience of people, no? When you look at this more broadly, you can say that any leader, either before his people or in the realm of foreign relations, is acting in every instance in the manner of a performance. Now why do people say that Wen Jiabao is “putting on a show”? That’s because there are very few leaders in the Central Committee who have spoken as [Wen] has.
If we had more central leaders talking every day like this, putting on “shows” every day, that would be a wonderful thing. Sunshine governance, with a respect for the people’s right to know, would be immense progress over [the politics of] shadow and mystery.
Q: When people say Wen Jiabao is “putting on a show” this has another layer of meaning. His speeches are very fine, but they are rarely acted upon.
A: In my view he has always worked tirelessly for opening and reform. In terms of action, among the highest-level leaders in the Central Committee, he has not only made his position clear, but he has also worked very hard. His style and manner are about closeness and service to the people. During winter storms, earthquakes and floods he has appeared on the front lines at the first available moment. He has shaken hands with SARS sufferers and AIDS patients. He is also a living person, with his own thread of life, but he has worked without consideration for himself. This is not “putting on a show.” He is a very well read man, with a very good memory. I think that his manner and actions are based on his wide knowledge and the excellent traditions of Chinese culture.
On several occasions Wen Jiabao has openly spoken on the issue of political reform, and these I’m afraid were not incidental. In my view, he recognizes on the one hand the current predicament facing reforms in China, and on the other hand he has suggested that this is not [merely] his personal view. I personally believe that Hu Jintao supports Wen Jiabao. On a number of important questions this year, [Hu] has loosened his hand and let the Premier [take the lead]. Zhao Ziyang (赵紫阳）once said to me, “Wen Jiabao is a good person, and Hu Jintao is a sensible person.” I think this assessment is right on. I think Wen Jiabao should be given more support, creating the conditions enabling him to make use of his abilities. This would benefit the country and benefit the people. Protecting Wen Jiabao is about more than protecting an individual – it means protecting the claim to political reform, and protecting the forces [that might promote] political reform.
Q: Still, many people have noticed that contrary to Wen Jiabao’s speeches, Hu Jintao made little mention of political reform in his speech during celebrations [of Shenzhen’s anniversary], so perhaps these two have different views on this issue.
A: I’m not completely in support of this interpretation. I’m a Party member who has lived within this Party for some 70 years, and speaking in terms of the structural nature of the Central Committee, Wen Jiabao’s speeches should represent the spirit of the Party. The key points emphasized by Wen Jiabao and Hu Jintao can be different, but in [their determination to] unswervingly carry out reforms they are on the same page. Since Hu Jintao became General Secretary he has raised the issue of political reform and promoted democracy on numerous occasions. In his political report to the 17th Party Congress in 2007, Hu Jintao said: “In deepening political reforms, we must keep to the correct political direction, ensuring that the basis is that the people are the masters of their own destiny, and that the vitality of the Party and the nation are enhanced.” In 2005, Hu Jintao said to provincial Party cadres that the socialism and harmonious society that we need to build are ones of democratic politics, justice and fairness. We must actively and reliably promote political reforms [he said]. He was even so specific as to say during his speech commemorating Shenzhen that in the future reforms must be continued, that we must have the courage for innovation, “never becoming rigid, never standing still, not dreading any dangers, and not being distracted by any interference.” While he may not have spoken of political reform so openly as Wen Jiabao, toward reform and toward the SEZ’s role in striking out ahead [his remarks] have still contained much about political reform. Besides, Hu Jintao is the General Secretary, and when he speaks it is more wide-ranging, and it is natural that he accommodates all the various aspects of reform.
I recently saw a comment to this effect in one media: “Wen Jiabao is not a high-minded sermonizer, and nor is Hu Jintao an indecisive navigator. Many Chinese who are eager for reform are confident that Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao share feelings for [former reformist PRC leader Hu] Yaobang, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hu_Yaobang meaning they are not laboring separately for their own agendas, playing their own political games, but are launching a converging attack, that they working together to slay the tiger that guards the road to reform, and together opening the door to change in China.” This sentence represents my own views very well.
Q: In the course of the development of the Shenzhen Special Economic Zone and the process of opening and reform in China there have been three major debates concerning reform. This latest [and third] time has corresponded to the anniversary of Shenzhen’s founding. We’ve seen the emergence again of fierce debate around the speeches of Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao. How do you view this?
A: After the news came out of Wen Jiabao’s inspection tour in Shenzhen, there was an essay in one Beijing paper called, “Two Democracies of Different Natures Must Not Be Confused“, on September 4. The essay argued that on the question of “who should rule” and “how [they] should rule” socialism and capitalism had very distinct answers. Whether on the question of local experiments [in democracy], or in larger-scale moves, [the essay said,] we must begin by recognizing the difference between these two distinct forms of democracy. The essay talks about Shenzhen’s “separation of three administrations” [based on the idea that the functions of policy-making, enforcement and monitoring of the government must be separated], arguing that “concerning the separation of government powers, the understanding is somewhat fuzzy, and concepts even muddled . . . and the reason lies in that these concepts have not been clear about the line between socialist democracy and capitalist democracy, and rigid Western concepts are applied to Chinese realities.” I think its inconceivable that this idea represents the spirit of the Central Committee. Democracy is democracy. There is no division between democracy surnamed capitalism and democracy surnamed socialism. There is only real democracy and fake democracy.
Did you notice the language in Nanfang Daily? On September 6, Nanfang Daily, aside from having a special edition on the 30th anniversary of the SEZ, had a full page of editorials on political reform. It was called, “Political Reform: The Future Mission of the SEZ.” The headlines included, “The Deepen Reform and Opening We Must Keep to Marketization and Democratization,” “Using Political Reform as the Core in Promoting Other Reforms,” “Deepening Political Reform: The Breakthrough-Point for Future Reforms in the SEZ,” “In Realizing Justice and Fairness We Must Take the Lead,” and others. In concert with Wen Jiabao’s Shenzhen speech, they made concrete statements about political reform: “Political reforms and the building of democratic politics require that we liberate our thought, breaking through the news bonds of so-called socialist versus capitalist democracy, making use of the beneficial fruits of human political development and democracy building.” I think the language in Nanfang Daily represents the spirit of the Central Committee, and the will of the people.
Of course we support the views of Nanfang Daily. Moreover, I am confident that the Central Committee is as determined as ever to deepen reforms, and will be able to reach a new consensus on reforms. That consensus is that we must continue to break through these doubts about whether political reform is surnamed capitalism or surnamed socialism, just as Wen Jiabao has said: “[We must] bravely study and adopt the all of the civilized results of human society, and promote continued economic and social development in our country as we expand the process of opening.”

On October 11, 23 Chinese Communist Party elders known for their pro-reform positions, including Mao Zedong’s former secretary Li Rui (李锐) and former People’s Daily editor-in-chief Hu Jiwei (胡绩伟), submitted an open letter to the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress, formally China’s highest state body, calling for an end to restrictions on expression in China.
The letter urges the Communist Party to abolish censorship and realize citizens’ right to freedom of speech and freedom of the press. Seizing on the opportunity afforded by the awarding of Chinese dissident Liu Xiaobo (刘晓波) with the Nobel Peace Prize last week, the letter refers explicitly to prior statements on reform and free speech made by both President Hu Jintao (胡锦涛) and Premier Wen Jiabao (温家宝). [CORRECTION: It is premature to conclude that this letter has any connection whatsoever to Liu Xiaobo’s Nobel Prize. The letter is dated October 1, one week before the announcement from the Nobel Committee.]

Enforce Article 35 of China’s Constitution, Abolish Censorship and Realize Citizens’ Right to Freedom of Speech and Freedom of Press: A Letter to the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress

Written by Li Rui (李锐), Hu Jiwei (胡绩伟) and others
Dated: October 11, 2010
Dear members of the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress:
Article 35 of China’s Constitution as adopted in 1982 clearly states that: “Citizens of the People’s Republic of China enjoy freedom of speech, of the press, of assembly, of association, of procession and of demonstration.” For 28 years this article has stood unrealized, having been negated by detailed rules and regulations for “implementation.” This false democracy of formal avowal and concrete denial has become a scandalous mark on the history of world democracy.
On February 26, 2003, at a meeting of democratic consultation between the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party and democratic parties [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_political_parties_in_the_People’s_Republic_of_China], not long after President Hu Jintao (胡锦涛) assumed office, he stated clearly: “The removal of restrictions on the press, and the opening up of public opinion positions, is a mainstream view and demand held by society; it is natural, and should be resolved through the legislative process. If the Communist Party does not reform itself, if it does not transform, it will lose its vitality and move toward natural and inevitable extinction.”
On October 3, America’s Cable News Network (CNN) aired an interview with Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao (温家宝) by anchor Fareed Zakaria. Responding to the journalist’s questions, Wen Jiabao said: “Freedom of speech is indispensable for any nation; China’s Constitution endows the people with freedom of speech; The demands of the people for democracy cannot be resisted.”
In accord with China’s Constitution, and in the spirit of the remarks made by President Hu Jintao and Premier Wen Jiabao, we hereupon represent the following concerning the materialization of the constitutional rights to freedom of speech and of the press:
Concerning the Current State of Freedom of Speech and Press in Our Country
We have for 61 years “served as master” in the name of the citizens of the People’s Republic of China. But the freedom of speech and of the press we now enjoy is inferior even to that of Hong Kong before its return to Chinese sovereignty, to that entrusted to the residents of a colony.
Before the handover, Hong Kong was a British colony, governed by those appointed by the Queen’s government. But the freedom of speech and freedom of the press given to residents of Hong Kong by the British authorities there was not empty, appearing only on paper. It was enacted and realized.
When our country was founded in 1949, our people cried that they had been liberated, that they were not their own masters. Mao Zedong said that, “From this moment, the people of China have stood.” But even today, 61 years after the founding of our nation, after 30 years of opening and reform, we have not yet attained freedom of speech and freedom of the press to the degree enjoyed by the people of Hong Kong under colonial rule. Even now, many books discussion political and current affairs must be published in Hong Kong. This is not something that dates from the [territory’s] return, but is merely an old tactic familiar under colonial rule. The “master” status of the people of China’s mainland is so inferior. For our nation to advertise itself as having “socialist democracy” with Chinese characteristics is such an embarrassment.
Not only the average citizen, but even the most senior leaders of the Communist Party have no freedom of speech or press. Recently, Li Rui met with the following circumstance. Not long ago, the Collected Works in in Memory of Zhou Xiaozhou were published, and in it was originally to be included an essay commemorating Zhou Xiaozhou that Li Rui had written for the People’s Daily in 1981. Zhou Xiaozhou’s wife phoned Li Rui to explain the situation: “Beijing has sent out a notice. Li Rui’s writings cannot be published.” What incredible folly it is that an old piece of writing from a Party newspaper cannot be included in a volume of collected works! Li Rui said: “What kind of country is this?! I want to cry it out: the press must be free! Such strangling of the people’s freedom of expression is entirely illegal!”
It’s not even just high-level leaders — even the Premier of our country does not have freedom of speech or of the press! On August 21, 2010, Premier Wen Jiabao gave a speech in Shenzhen called, “Only By Pushing Ahead With Reforms Can Our Nation Have Bright Prospects.” He said, “We must not only to push economic reforms, but must also to promote political reforms. Without the protection afforded by political reforms, the gains we have made from economic reforms will be lost, and our goal of modernization cannot be realized.” Xinhua News Agency’s official news release on August 21, “Building a Beautiful Future for the Special Economic Zone,” omitted the content in Wen Jiabao’s speech dealing with political reform.
On September 22, 2010, (U.S. local time) Premier Wen Jiabao held a dialogue in New York with American Chinese media and media from Hong Kong and Macao, and again he emphasized the importance of “political system reforms.” Wen said: “Concerning political reforms, I have said previously that if economic reforms are without the protection to be gained by political reforms, then we cannot be entirely successful, and even perhaps the gains of our progress so far will be lost.” Shortly after, Wen Jiabao addressed the 65th Session of the United Nations General Assembly, giving a speech called, “Recognizing a True China,” in which he spoke again about political reform. Late on September 23 (Beijing time), these events were reported on China Central Television’s Xinwen Lianbo and in an official news release from Xinhua News Agency. They reported only Wen Jiabao’s remarks on the circumstances facing overseas Chinese, and on the importance of overseas Chinese media. His mentions of political reform were all removed.
For these matters, if we endeavor to find those responsible, we are utterly incapable of putting our finger on a specific person. This is an invisible black hands. For their own reasons, they violate our constitution, often ordering by telephone that the works of such and such a person cannot be published, or that such and such an event cannot be reported in the media. The officials who make the call do not leave their names, and the secrecy of the agents is protected, but you must heed their phone instructions. These invisible black hands are our Central Propaganda Department. Right now the Central Propaganda Department is placed above the Central Committee of the Communist Party, and above the State Council. We would ask, what right does the Central Propaganda Department have to muzzle the speech of the Premier? What right does it have to rob the people of our nation of their right to know what the Premier has said?
Our core demand is that the system of censorship be dismantled in favor of a system of legal responsibility (追惩制).
The rights to freedom of speech and the press guaranteed in Article 35 of our Constitution are turned into mere adornments for the walls by means of concrete implementation rules such as the “Ordinance on Publishing Control” (出版管理条例). These implementation rules are, broadly speaking, a system of censorship and approvals. There are countless numbers of commandments and taboos restricting freedom of speech and freedom of the press. The creation of a press law and the abolishment of the censorship system has already become an urgent task before us.
We recommend that the National People’s Congress work immediately toward the creation of a Press Law, and that the “Ordinance on Publishing Control” and all of the local restrictions on news and publishing be annulled. Institutionally speaking, the realization of freedom of speech and freedom of the press as guaranteed in the Constitution means making media independent of the Party and government organs that presently control them, thereby transforming “Party mouthpieces” into “public instruments.” Therefore, the foundation of the creation of a Press Law must be the enacting of a system of [post facto] legal responsibility (追惩制) [determined according to fair laws]. We cannot again strengthen the censorship system in the name of “strengthening the leadership of the Party.” The so-called censorship system is the system by which prior to publication one must receive the approval of Party organs, allowing for publication only after approval and designating all unapproved published materials as illegal. The so-called system of legal responsibility means that published materials need not pass through approval by Party or government organs, but may be published as soon as the editor-in-chief deems fit. If there are unfavorable outcomes or disputes following publication, the government would be able to intervene and determine according to the law whether there are cases of wrongdoing. In countries around the world, the development of rule of law in news and publishing has followed this path, making a transition from systems of censorship to systems of legal responsibility. There is little doubt that systems of legal responsibility mark progress over systems of censorship, and this is greatly in the favor of the development of the humanities and natural sciences, and in promoting social harmony and historical progress. England did away with censorship in 1695. France abolished its censorship system in 1881, and the publication of newspapers and periodicals thereafter required only a simple declaration, which was signed by the representatives of the publication and mailed to the office of the procurator of the republic. Our present system of censorship leaves news and book publishing in our country 315 years behind England and 129 years behind France.
Our specific demands are as follows:
1. Abolish sponsoring institutions of [Chinese] media [NOTE: This is the controlling organization that exercises Party control over the media], allowing publishing institutions to independently operate; Truly implement a system in which directors and editors in chief are responsible for their publication units.
2. Respect journalists, and make them strong (尊重记者，树立记者). Journalists should be the “uncrowned kings.” The reporting of mass incidents and exposing of official corruption are noble missions on behalf of the people, and this work should be protected and supported. Immediately put a stop to the unconstitutional behavior of various local governments and police in arresting journalists. Look into the circumstances behind the case of [writer] Xie Chaoping (谢朝平). Liang Fengmin (梁凤民), the party secretary of Weinan city [involved in the Xie Chaoping case] must face party discipline as a warning to others.
3. Abolish restrictions on extra-territorial supervision by public opinion [watchdog journalism] by media, ensuring the right of journalists to carry out reporting freely throughout the country.
4. The internet is an important discussion platform for information in our society and the voice of citizens’ views. Aside from information that truly concerns our national secrets and speech that violates a citizen’s right to privacy, internet regulatory bodies must not arbitrarily delete online posts and online comments. Online spies must be abolished, the “Fifty-cent Party” must be abolished, and restrictions on “tunneling/[anti-censorship]” technologies must be abolished.
5. There are no more taboos concerning our Party’s history. Chinese citizens have a right to know the errors of the ruling party.
6. Southern Weekly and Yanhuang Chunqiu should be permitted to restructure as privately operated pilot programs [in independent media]. The privatization of newspapers and periodicals is the [natural] direction of political reforms. History teaches us: when rulers and deliberators are highly unified, when the government and the media are both surnamed “Party,” and when [the Party] sings for its own pleasure, it is difficult to connect with the will of the people and attain true leadership. From the time of the Great Leap Forward to the time of the Cultural Revolution, newspapers, magazines, television and radio in the mainland have never truly reflected the will of the people. Party and government leaders have been insensible to dissenting voices, so they have had difficulty in recognizing and correcting wholesale errors. For a ruling party and government to use the tax monies of the people to run media that sing their own praises, this is something not permitted in democratic nations.
7. Permit the free circulation within the mainland of books and periodicals from the already returned territories of Hong Kong and Macao. Our country has joined the World Trade Organization, and economically we have already integrated with the world — attempting to remain closed culturally goes against the course already plotted for opening and reform. Hong Kong and Macao offer advanced culture right at our nation’s door, and the books and periodicals of Hong Kong and Macao are welcomed and trusted by the people.
8. Transform the functions of various propaganda organs, so that they are transformed from [agencies] setting down so many “taboos” to [agencies] protecting the accuracy, timeliness and unimpeded flow [of information]; from [agencies] that assist corrupt officials in suppressing and controlling stories that reveal the truth to [agencies] that support the media in monitoring Party and government organs; from [agencies] that close publications, fire editors and arrest journalists to [agencies] that oppose power and protect media and journalists. Our propaganda organs have a horrid reputation within the Party and in society. They must work for good in order to regain their reputations. At the appropriate time, we can consider renaming these propaganda organs to suit global trends.
We pressingly represent ourselves, hoping for your utmost attention.
October 1, 2010
Sponsors (23 people):
Li Rui (李锐)– former standing vice minister of the Organization Department of the CCP Central Committee, member of the 12th Central Committee of the CCP
Hu Jiwei (胡绩伟) — former director of People’s Daily, standing committee member to the 7th National People’s Congress, director of the Federation of Chinese Communication Institutes.
Jiang Ping 江 平– former head of the China University of Political Science and Law, tenured professor, standing committee member to the 7th National People’s Congress, deputy director of the Executive Law Committee of the NPC
Li Pu (李普) — former deputy director of Xinhua News Agency
Zhou Shaoming (周绍明) — former deputy director of the Political Department of the Guangzhou Military Area Command
Zhong Peizhang (锺沛璋) — Former head of the News Office of the Central Propaganda Department
Wang Yongcheng (王永成) — Professor at Shanghai Jiaotong University
Zhang Zhongpei (张忠培) — Research at the Imperial Palace Museum, chairman of the China Archaeological Society
Du Guang (杜光) — former professor at the Central Party School
Guo Daojun (郭道晖) — former editor-in-chief of China Legal Science
Xiao Mo 萧 默 — former head of the Architecture Research Center of the Chinese National Academy of Arts
Zhuang Puming (庄浦明) — former deputy director of People’s Press
Hu Fuchen (胡甫臣) — former director and editor-in-chief at China Worker’s Publishing House
Zhang Ding (张定) — former director of the China Social Sciences Press at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences
Yu You (于友) — former editor-in-chief of China Daily
Ouyang Jin (欧阳劲) — former editor-in-chief of Hong Kong’s Pacific Magazine (太平洋杂志)
Yu Haocheng (于浩成) — former director of Masses Publishing House
Zhang Qing (张清) — former director of China Cinema Publishing House
Yu Yueting (俞月亭) — former director of Fujian Television, veteran journalist
Sha Yexin (沙叶新) — former head of the Shanghai People’s Art and Drama Academy, now an independent writer of the Hui ethnic minority
Sun Xupei (孙旭培) — former director of the News Research Institute at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences
Xin Ziling (辛子陵) — former director of the editorial desk at China National Defense University
Tie Liu (铁流) — editor-in-chief of Wangshi Weihen (往事微痕) magazine (Scars of the Past).
Legal Counsel：
Song Yue (宋岳) — Chinese citizen, practicing lawyer in the State of New York, U.S.
———
执行宪法第35条，废除预审制，兑现公民的言论出版自由！
――致全国人民代表大会常务委员会的公开信
李锐 胡绩伟 等 10月11日,2010
全国人民代表大会常务委员会：
中华人民共和国1982年宪法第35条载明：“中华人民共和国公民有言论、出版、集会、结社、游行、示威的自由。”这一条文28年不兑现，被党政机关制定的“执行”细则所否定。这种原则承认具体否定的假民主，成为世界民主史上的丑闻。
2003年2月26日，胡锦涛主席上任不久，在中共中央政治局常委與民主黨派人士舉行的民主協商會上，明确地說：
新闻解禁、开放人民舆论阵地，是社会的主流意见和诉求，是正常的，要以立法形式解决。共产党自身不改革，不改造，就会失去生命力，走向自然消亡。
2010年10月3日美国有线电视台CNN播出了访谈节目主持人法瑞德?扎卡利亚对中国总理温家宝的专访。温家宝回答记者提问时说：
言论自由对任何国家都不可或缺；中国宪法赋予民众享有言论自由；人民对民主自由的诉求不可抗拒。
根据宪法和胡锦涛主席、温家宝总理讲话精神，我们仅就兑现言论出版自由之宪法权利方面陈情如下：
关于我国言论出版自由的现状
我堂堂中华人民共和国公民名义上“当家做主”61年，但我们享有的言论出版自由竟不如回归祖国前的香港，即不如殖民地居民。
回归前的香港是英国殖民地，女王政府任命总督管理这个地方，但港英当局给香港居民言论出版自由，不是空头的，纸面上的，是落实的，兑现的。
1949年建国，人民欢呼解放了，当家做主了，毛泽东宣布“中国人民从此站起来了。”但直到今天，建国61年，搞了30年改革开放，我们还没有得到香港人殖民地时代就有的言论出版自由。现在有些参政议政的书籍，要拿到香港出版，这不是回归祖国的福荫，是沿袭殖民时代的旧法。大陆人民的“当家作主”地位实在太窝囊。国家宣称的有中国特色的“社会主义民主”实在太尴尬。
岂止普通公民，连共产党的高级干部都没有言论出版自由。最近李锐遇到一件事情：不久前《周小舟纪念文集》出版，原来收进了李锐1981年在《人民日报》发表的纪念周小舟的一篇文章，但出版的书中没有。周小舟夫人打电话向李锐解释：“北京通知，不能用李锐的文章。”连1981年发表在党报上的旧作也不让收进文集，真是荒唐至极！李锐说：“这算什么样的国家？！我大声疾呼：新闻必须自由！扼杀公民的言论自由是完全违法的！”
岂止高级干部，连国家总理都没有言论出版自由！2010年8月21日温家宝总理在深圳发表题为《只有坚持改革开放，国家才有光明前途》的讲话。谈到“不仅要推进经济体制改革，还要推进政治体制改革。没有政治体制改革的保障，经济体制改革的成果就会得而复失，现代化建设的目标就不可能实现。”新华社21日通稿《开创经济特区的美好明天》，把温家宝讲话中政治体制改革的内容删掉了。
2010年9月22日（美国当地时间）温家宝总理在纽约与美国华文媒体和港澳媒体负责人进行座谈，再次强调了“政治体制改革”的重要性。温说：“关于政治体制改革，我曾经讲过，经济体制改革如果没有政治体制改革的保障，也不会彻底取得成功，甚至已经取得的成果还会得而复失。”温家宝随后在纽约联合国总部出席第65届联合国大会一般性辩论发表题为《认识一个真实的中国》的讲话，其中也谈及了政治体制改革。9月23日（北京时间）晚间，中央电视台《新闻联播》以及新华社通稿报导这些活动时，只报导了温家宝谈及海外华人的处境、海外华文媒体的作用等内容，提及政治体制改革的讲话，都被过滤掉了。
这些事情，如果追究责任，绝对查不到具体人，这是一只看不见的黑手。他们自知理亏违宪，通常以电话通知某人的作品不能发表、某事不能见诸媒体。打电话的官员不留姓名，叮嘱执行者为其保密，但必须执行他的电话指示。这只看不见的黑手就是中宣部。现在是中宣部凌驾于党中央之上，凌驾于国务院之上。试问中宣部有什么权力封锁总理的声音？有什么权力剥夺全国人民对总理讲话的知情权？
我们的核心要求是取消审批制，改行追惩制
把宪法第35条言论出版自由变成可望而不可及的墙上画饼，是经过《出版管理条例》等具体执行细则来完成的。这些执行细则，槪而言之就是深文周纳的审批制。有数不清的清规戒律限制言论出版自由。制定新闻出版法，废除审批制，已成为当务之急。
建议全国人大立即着手制定新闻出版法，废除《出版管理条例》和地方当局管制新闻出版的那些条条框框。落实宪法第35条给予公民言论出版自由，从体制上看就是从党政机关直接控制到媒体相对独立，从“党的喉舌”转变为“社会公器”。因此，新闻出版法的立法基础必须是实行追惩制，而不能再以“加强党的领导”的名义强化审批制。所谓审批制，就是出版物在出版以前须经党政机关的审查，批准了你才能出版，不批准出了就是非法出版物。所谓追惩制，就是出版物不必向党政机关报批，总编辑通过了就开印，出版发行完全自由。出版后如有不良后果和纠纷，政府再介入，根据法律判断是非对错。世界各国新闻出版法制的发展，走的是由审批制向追惩制过渡的道路。无疑，追惩制比起审批制是一个历史性进步，对推动人文科学和自然科学的发展，推动社会和谐历史进步起了伟大的作用。英国早在1695年即废除了预防检查制。1881年法国废除了预防检查制，报纸、刊物出版前的手续仅仅需要一份简单的声明，由报刊领导人签署，邮寄共和国检察院即可。我国目前实行的书报审查制度，比英国落后315年，比法国落后129年。
我们的具体要求
一、取消媒体的主管单位，由主办单位独立负责；真正落实出版单位的社长、总编辑负责制。
二、尊重记者，树立记者 “无冕之王”的社会地位。记者报道群体性事件，揭发官员贪污腐败，是为民请命的神圣事业，应受到保护和支持。立即制止某些地方政府和公安机关随意抓捕记者的违宪行为。追究谢朝平案的幕后操纵者，渭南市委书记梁凤民必须下台，以申党纪，以儆效尤。
三、取消限制媒体跨省进行舆论监察的禁令，保障中国记者在全中国领土上采访报道的权利。
四、互联网是社会信息和公民意见的重要交流平台，除确实涉及国家机密的信息和侵犯公民隐私的言论之外，网络管理部门不能随意删除网帖和跟帖，取消网特，取消“五毛党”，取消对“翻墙”的技术限制。
五、党史无禁区，中国公民有权知道执政党的罪错。
六、允许《南方周末》和《炎黄春秋》改制为民营报刊作为探路试点。报刊民营化是政治改革的方向。历史的教训是：施政者与评议者高度一体化，政府和媒体都姓“党”，自己搭台唱戏，自己鼓掌喝彩，是很难和民意沟通实现正确领导的。从大跃进到文化大革命，大陆所有的报刊杂志、广播电视，从来没有反映过真实的民意。党和国家领导人耳边听不到不同的声音，就既难发现、更难纠正正在发生的全局性的错误。执政党和政府拿纳税人的钱办媒体为自己歌功颂德，这在民主国家是不允许的。
七、允许已经回归中国的香港、澳门的书籍报刊在大陆公开发行。我国加入了WTO，在经济上已经融入世界，企图在文化上闭关锁国，是违背改革开放的既定方针的。港澳文化是送上国门的先进文化，观之于港澳报刊书籍备受群众欢迎而益信。
八、转变各级宣传部门职能，由制定多少个“不准”，转变为保障信息准确、及时、畅通；由帮助贪官污吏压制封锁批评揭露的稿件，转变为支持媒体对党政机关发挥监督作用；由封报刊、撤总编、抓记者，转变为对抗强权，保护媒体和记者。宣传部门在党内、在社会上名声很臭，要做几件好事恢复名誉。在适当的时机，可以考虑宣传部更名，以符合世界潮流。
迫切陈情，敬希亮察。
2010年10月1日
发起人（23人）：
李 锐（前中央组织部常务副部长，中共十二届中央委员，十二、十三届中顾委委员。)
胡绩伟（前《人民日报》社长、总编辑，第六、七届全国人大常委，全国新闻学会联合会会长）
江 平（原政法大学校长、终身教授，七届人大常委、人大法律委员会副主任）
李 普（原新华社副社长）
周绍明（原广州军区政治部副主任）
锺沛璋（原中宣部新闻局局长）
王永成(上海交通大学教授，欧洲科学、艺术与人文研究院通讯院士)
张忠培（故宫博物院研究员，原院长，中国考古学会理事长）
杜 光（原中共中央党校教授）
郭道晖 (原《中国法学》杂志社总编辑)
萧 默（原中国艺术研究院建筑艺术研究所所长）
庄浦明（原人民出版社副社长）
胡甫臣 (原中国工人出版社社长兼总编辑)
张 定（原中国社会科学院社会科学出版社社长）
于 友（原《中国日报》社总编辑）
欧阳劲 (香港《太平洋杂志》总编辑)
于浩成 (原群众出版社社长)
张 清（原中国电影出版社社长）
俞月亭 (原福建电视台台长、高级记者)
沙叶新 (前上海人民艺术剧院院长，现为回族独立作家)
孙旭培（原社会科学院新闻研究所所长）
辛子陵（原国防大学当代中国编辑室主任）
铁 流（民刊《往事微痕》总编辑）
法律顾问：
宋 岳（中国籍公民，美国纽约州执业律师）

On the day that three Chinese citizens in the county of Yihuang (宜黄) in Jiangxi province set fire to themselves to protest the forced demolition of their home, I was attending a forum on news design in Shanghai. At the meeting, one of the Chinese editors kept checking his mobile phone to monitor the situation in Yihuang. Thanks to the power of Twitter-like microblog services, he was tracking live a fast-breaking news story 800 kilometers away.
The Yihuang self-immolation story was a landmark in the contemporary history of Chinese media and a bitter victory for the microblog, a new communication technology known in Chinese as the weibo (微博). It has also offered sobering lessons for both the Chinese government and the public.
In recent years, the forced requisition of land and the destruction of homes to make room for development has pitted Chinese citizens against local authorities. While the central government have issued repeated orders to ban such forced demolitions actions, local governments have continued to act recklessly. The Yihuang affair was a particularly egregious example of this.
The ordeal began on the morning of September 10, as the three members of the Zhong family sought to defend their home against forced demolition. They included 59 year-old Zhong Zhifeng (罗志凤), her daughter Zhong Ruqin (钟如琴), 31, and Ruqin’s uncle, Ye Zhongcheng (叶忠诚), 79. In the course of their protest, all three set fire to themselves. Ye eventually died from the burns. The local officials insisted that the eviction was legal and that the victims had been “burned while carelessly handling gasoline.”
For an entire week there was no mainstream media coverage of the story. Online, however, video taken by local residents from the scene of the tragedy started trickling out.
On September 16, as the three victims remained in hospital, Zhong Rucui (钟如翠) and Zhong Rujiu (钟如九), daughters of Zhong Zhifeng, went to the local airport. Their plan was to take a flight to Beijing to petition for central government attention to the family’s case. Local officials responded by dispatching scores of police to the airport to stop them from traveling.
This time they were not alone. Holed up in the women’s restroom at the airport, they used their mobile phones to call a journalist who then posted the news about their plight and the actions of local officials on a popular microblog service. Over the next three hours, Deng Fei (邓飞), a reporter for the Beijing-based Phoenix Weekly, sent out more than 20 microblog posts with the help of a reporter on the ground in Jiangxi. In this way, they were able to report live the situation facing the sisters: ” With the help of internet users who responded to the call, the sisters fled from the airport but have to abort the trip to Beijing.
On September 18, the uncle, Ye Zhongcheng, died of his injuries. By this time, Zhong Rujiu had opened her own microblog account. She wrote shortly after: “Now 70 or 80 people from the government have come and surrounded me, taking away Uncle’s body. After the government took my uncle’s body away, I tried to stop the car of the county head Su Jianguo (苏建国), who was leading the caravan with the body, but Su Jianguo sat totally indifferent. After that, around 40 government cadres from Yihuang dragged me aside.”
Thanks to mobile phones, everyone can now become a news broadcast station in the event of a breaking story. By the following Friday, September 24, Zhong Rujiu had made 253 posts to her microblog, updating the world on the conditions of her family members in the hospital. Her posts drew at least 60,000 followers, with each entry re-posted by an average of a thousand others.
As information sped through microblogs, drawing popular attention to the forced demolition case, the Zhong family’s tragedy reached the ears of high-level government officials. On September 17, the day after the airport fiasco, the government announced that local officials implicated in the self-immolation case in Yihuang were being formally punished. Qiu Jianguo (邱建国), the Party secretary and top leader in Yihuang, and the county’s governor, Su Jianguo, were under formal investigation. The county’s deputy governor, Li Minjun (李敏军), was also removed from his post and subjected to investigation. The next day, the sacked officials make news all over the media. Some newspapers even defied bans by promoting the story to the front-page banner.
Microblogs, which are limited to 140 characters in length, can be sent from mobile phones or computers. Twitter, the original microblog service, has been blocked in China, but major websites have launched their own Twitter clones, and these have become an important alternative channel for information. It is interesting to note as well that 140 characters in Chinese actually makes for much richer content than the same in English.
As a new communications tool, microblogs are real-time, high-speed, fragmented and highly difficult to censor. Chinese journalists are now universally aware of the unique power of the microblog. Chinese new media expert Bei Feng (北风) has described the medium as “fragmented and decentralized communications.” Journalist and blogger Xiao Shu (笑蜀) has said that “observation is a power unto itself, capable of changing China through all-encompassing attention.”
CMP director Qian Gang (钱钢), who launched his QQ Microblog only five months ago, now has a following of 1.7 million. That means that each time he makes a post, he reaches 1.7 million readers who might share his post with still more. His broadcast power has surpassed that of many newspapers.
Microblogs have grown in influence in China. In the past two months, Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao (温家宝) has called for political reform on seven different occasions — in Shenzhen and Beijing, at the United Nations, and while on a state visit to Europe. Wen’s remarks have been handled cooly in China’s traditional media. Then last week, Wen Jiabao restated his support of political reform in an interview with CNN. “I will not fall in spite of a strong wind and harsh rain and I will not yield till the last day of my life,” he said. Savyy Chinese journalists and web users shared his remarks enthusiastically through the microblogs.
Active and vibrant communication online now stands in stark contrast to the strict, deadening controls offline.
In its “Hot Topics” section on the Yihuang tragedy, QQ.com concluded that “rights were fought and won through each microblog post.” In the push to defend the rights of citizens, microblogs have offered a ray of hope, helping to promote civil society in China.
As Qian Gang has said: “So long as we all involve ourselves, no information can be concealed.”

In the early moments following the announcement that Chinese dissident Liu Xiaobo (刘晓波) had won the Nobel Peace Prize, information was shared energetically through Twitter-like microblog platforms in China. Posts were swiftly removed, however, and many Chinese microblog users who had passed along information found their accounts disabled. One employee I know at Sina.com, who ordinarily is not involved on the censorship side, was borrowed for microblog censorship duty as the workload mounted. Said one website employee tasked with deleting comments to a friend: “I’ve deleted so much my hands are sore.”
The Twitter user “freemoren,” who often exposes official censorship directives, reported on Twitter at around 5:30 p.m., shortly after Liu Xiaobo was announced as this year’s Peace Prize laureate: “The Information Office [of the State Council] has issued its latest instructions on Liu Xiaobo’s winning the Nobel Peace Prize — microblog services across the country are to set [‘Liu Xiaobo’ and ‘Peace Prize’] as prohibited keywords, and forums, blogs and other interactive media are not, without exception, to release any [related] information. Xinhua News Agency will come out with an official news release momentarily.” About 15 minutes later, a statement called “Foreign Ministry Spokesman Mao Chaoxu Answers Reporters’ Questions” appeared on the official website of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Shortly after that, the official Xinhua release came out, parroting the words of the foreign ministry spokesman. The Chinese news website Netease initially posted the piece on the foreign ministry response, but this was quickly removed.
At 6 p.m., just on the heels of all of this activity, “freemoren” reported again on Twitter: “Here is the latest order from the Central Propaganda Department: the official news release (concerning Liu Xiaobo receiving the Nobel Peace Prize) has been released, but media are not to publish it. This includes all print media and Internet media.” After this, major domestic news sites in China did post the Xinhua News Agency release, but tucked it away in inconspicuous inside pages. That night, no mention of the Nobel Peace Prize was made at all on China Central Television’s main newscast, Xinwen Lianbo. After this, Chinese websites were subjected to even tighter controls, and all news of the prize seemed to disappear.
On October 9, the day after the prize was awarded, only a handful of official newspapers ran the Xinhua News Agency release. These included Guangming Daily, Economic Daily, Beijing Daily and Shanghai’s Wenhui Bao. The only commercial newspaper to run the official release was The Beijing News.
From domestic news sites there was scarcely a peep. Not from official news sites like People’s Daily Online and Xinhuanet, and not from commercial news sites such as Sina, Netease and Sohu. The only exception was Tencent’s QQ.com, which included a link under the “hot links” column of its inside news section about China’s opposition to awarding the prize to Liu Xiaobo.
On October 8th, the evening the prize was awarded, Twitter and domestic microblogs were abuzz with plans for celebrations by Chinese internet users across the country. In Beijing and Shanghai, however, some Twitter users reported being taken away by police before they had a chance to come together. Among them, Shi Feike (石扉客), a prominent journalist, planned to meet with others at the fountain on Shanghai’s People’s Square before they all went off to have dinner. But Shi Feike was unreachable after 6:30 p.m., and didn’t reemerge until police released him around midnight, by which time he and other Web users confirmed that police had been waiting at the gathering point. Only celebrations in Guangzhou were not harassed in this way. In the city of Hangzhou, a group of celebrants reported online that they had been trailed by police, but had not been otherwise harassed.
In Beijing, web users had arranged a time and place for celebrations ahead of the Nobel Committee’s announcement. The first two places they arranged for were closed for business under official orders, and the celebrants had to change venues three times. Around 6 p.m. on the evening of the 8th, ten or more web users arrived at a hot-pot restaurant near Beijing’s Ditan Park. At 6:22 p.m., rights defender Wang Lihong (王荔蕻), who was present at the gathering, made a quick post on Twitter: “The police have come,” he wrote. There was a burst of protest, but all those present were carted off by police. Reporters from both the Associated Press and Hong Kong’s South China Morning Post were there on the scene.
The web users were separated and taken to several different police stations. The next afternoon, 14 web users who had met the night before were formally arrested and likely faced administrative detention. That same day, Sun-Yatsen University professor Ai Xiaoming (艾晓明) circulated a petition calling on Beijing police to release all those who had met for the dinner celebration.
Prominent intellectuals were not spared harassment. On the afternoon of October 8, Peking University professor Xia Yaliang (夏业良) went to a tea shop near the home of Liu Xia, the wife of Nobel laureate Liu Xiaobo. Xia’s only intention was to mark this historic moment. But that night at 9:30 p.m. he reported on Twitter: “At around 6:20 tonight, university officials sent a car over to spirit me away from [Liu Xia’s] compound at Number 9 South Yuyuantan Street, where many were gathering. The leaders said they had come to get me in order to offer their protection.”
On the morning of October 9, quite a few Beijing activists were either placed under police observation or house arrest. Political scientist Liu Junning (刘军宁) wrote on Twitter that morning: “I woke up this morning and discovered I couldn’t go out. The drive was blocked by a white car with emergency signals.” Well-known rights defense lawyer Li Xiongbing (黎雄兵) similarly revealed on Twitter: “Early this morning Wang Haiwang (王海旺), head of the State Security division of Tongzhou District, came to my house with police officers from the [nearby] Liyuan police substation to inform me that I was under house arrest.” Fan Yafeng (范亚峰), a former associate researcher at the Legal Studies Institute of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, reported: “The internet connection in my house has been cut, and a car has been placed on guard downstairs.”
The response to Liu Xiaobo’s Peace Prize in China has been very two-sided. The vast majority of Chinese, numbed to the whole nature of politics in our country, have not responded at all, or perhaps don’t even realize Liu Xiaobo was given the prize. Among those Chinese who actively promote the democratization process, most are convinced that awarding the prize to Liu Xiaobo is a show of support and validation of China’s democracy movement. They believe the prize provides new strength to the process of democratization in China, and hope it will push the process forward.
Some scholars have voiced the hope that the Nobel Peace Prize for Liu Xiaobo will encourage the government toward a more open and enlightened approach. Beijing Film Academy professor Cui Weiping (崔卫平) said during an interview with Norway’s TV 2 channel: “I hope the Chinese government sees Liu Xiaobo’s Peace Prize as a friendly reminder, as an amicable call, as a new impetus for change in our society — and not as pure pressure.”
I spoke to one scholar, however — who wished to remain anonymous — who said that given two decades of suppression and amnesia, there are few Chinese who understand Liu Xiaobo, and his work is not widely recognized. Even awarding Liu Xiaobo with the Nobel Peace Prize, the scholar said, will do little to address the deep apathy most Chinese feel for politics.
As for the immediate effect of the Nobel Committee’s decision, Chinese columnist Mo Zhixu (莫之许) has written on Twitter: “For those who [oppose China’s present system], they will in the short term fall under immense pressure as the authorities resort to active suppression to deal with further acts of defiance that might arise from Liu Xiaobo receiving the prize.”
This is a translation of a Chinese version that appeared in yesterday’s edition of Hong Kong’s Ming Pao Daily. CMP conducted an additional search to confirm which Chinese newspapers did run the official Xinhua News Agency release on Saturday, October 9.