PhDs Played for Fools
Author: David Bandurski
Seizing a Pretext 借题发挥
In the context of Chinese journalism, “seizing a pretext,” or jieti fahui, refers to the strategic use of an opportunity afforded by external circumstances to push one’s own agendas or professional objectives.
One common form of “seizing a pretext” comes as government leaders make a pronouncement on an issue, or on the edge of an issue, that is generally too sensitive to deal with directly or in great depth.
In 2006, the Central Propaganda Department issued a ban on coverage of the fortieth anniversary of the start of the Cultural Revolution. As a result, there was virtually no coverage, even on the subtle fringes of the topic. Shortly after the anniversary, however, China’s cultural minister made a public statement about plans to eventually create a museum to commemorate the Cultural Revolution. More professionally-minded journalists in China used this public statement to run a brief (but still very careful) burst of coverage on the Cultural Revolution.
More recently, when Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao (温家宝) mentioned the need for “political system reforms” during a speech in Shenzhen in August 2010 to commemorate the thirtieth anniversary of the special economic zone’s founding, some journalists viewed this as an opportunity. One Chinese scholar remarked on Twitter: “As for Wen’s political reform speech, I think we can seize this pretext. Regardless of what Wen’s real meaning is, we can use this opportunity to talk about what we mean. Those who are courageous, speak directly. Those who are more fearful, speak as a response to Wen’s talk.”
Ran Yunfei quote
So is there anything we can use in Wen Jiabao’s speech? Sure. Now you can hold forums on his remarks, print t-shirts and hold it up when you go out and fight for your rights. But these ‘uses’ are mostly symbolic, not vested with real significance.
Tracking "political reform" in China
Discussions of “political system reform,” or zhengzhi tizhi gaige, blow hot and cold in China.
Back in October 2007, many observers of Chinese politics looked eagerly to the 17th National Party Congress for signs that China might push ahead more rapidly with substantive political reforms. They were largely disappointed, as CMP Director Qian Gang (钱刚) noted in his essay, “Wait a minute, what happened to political reform?” — which parsed the language of President Hu Jintao’s political report.
It wasn’t that President Hu Jintao hadn’t given a rhetorical nod to political reform. The language was there. But it was noticeably played down as a priority, even compared to past political reports from Jiang Zemin. For more on this, readers can turn to Xie Mingyuan’s guest CMP piece about how Hu Jintao stuck to the status quo on political reform at the 17th National Party Congress.
Despite Hu’s lukewarm treatment of the political reform issue, we did note at the time that “political reform” as a term experienced an understandable bump in use among Chinese newspapers running up to October 2007. The term (and perhaps the issue) received more coverage because the meeting itself brought it back onstage — but the issue had very soft play relative to other priorities.
After October 2007, the political reform rhetoric went cold again. There were other priorities, like the 2008 Olympic Games, and a series of sensitive historical anniversaries that needed finessing.
The issue is now back in the spotlight. Why? Because Premier Wen Jiabao (温家宝) said on a recent visit to Shenzhen to commemorate the city’s 30th anniversary that: “We need not only to promote economic reform, but must also promote political system reforms. Without the guarantee provided by political system reforms, the results of economic reform will be lost, and the goal of modernization cannot be achieved.”
Was this a bold and forward-thinking statement from the Premier? Did Grandpa Wen go off script?
No, not really.
Any statement on political reform is significant. And at the very least, Wen’s statement offers an opportunity for Chinese media to push more searchingly on this issue. But let’s not forget, either, that Wen Jiabao said the exact same thing during this year’s National People’s Congress back in June, when he delivered his government work report.
One section in Wen’s government work report dealt with political reform, and commercial media in particular pounced on his statements. Here is Guangming Daily, published by the propaganda department, reporting on the NPC. Basically, it is a play-by-play of who was at the NPC and what issues were covered. Not exactly exciting reading.
And here is the Xiaoxiang Morning News, a commercial newspaper in Changsha, Hunan province. The huge banner headline: “If we don’t reform the political system, modernization will not succeed.” Now that’s exciting stuff.
But Wen’s pronouncements on political reform did not represent a breakthrough then, and they do not now. In fact, the numbers suggest political reform — or “political system reform” — is not the hot topic now that it was during the NPC back in March.
[ABOVE: Number of articles with the term “political system reform” (政治体制改革) in the headline and/or the body appearing by month in 300+ mainland Chinese newspapers, January-August 2010. Source: WiseNews.]
[Frontpage photo by Jonathan available at Flickr.com under Creative Commons license.]
Chang Ping Under Pressure
Poisonous Milk Rears Its Head Again
Hypocrisy: Made in America
Cao Cao Tomb Scandal
Addressing the scandal surrounding the probably spurious tomb of the Han dynasty warrior Cao Cao in Henan Province, which was supposed to have been excavated last year, this cartoon shows a grey-clad CCP cadre standing in front of Cao Cao’s tomb on a pile of gold ingots labeled “tourism economy.” He folds his arms and insists, “It’s real,” as fingers point: “Fake! Fake! Fake!”
Hong Kong media must speak up on Xinjiang
On July 23, 2010, Xinjiang journalist Gehret Niyaz was sentenced to 15 years in prison for the crime of “endangering national security.” This is the stiffest sentence we have seen for any journalist in China in recent years. While his defense lawyers have launched an appeal, the case has prompted an international campaign for his support. Inside China, scores of intellectuals put their necks on the line last week by issuing an open call for “the release of the Xinjiang journalist, and respect for freedom of expression.”
But media in Hong Kong have been eerily silent on the Niyaz case.
After the verdict was handed down, most Hong Kong media settled on Reuters and BBC wire content. There was little follow-up coverage, and no attempt to dig deeper into the story. The only notable exception was coverage by Yazhou Zhoukan (Asia Weekly). It so happens that one of the reasons Niyaz was found guilty was that he granted an exclusive interview to Yazhou Zhoukan after last year’s July 5 riots in Urumqi.
This is one reason Niyaz’s fate deserves much greater attention from the people of Hong Kong. The use of an interview with Hong Kong media as evidence in proving guilt amounts to killing a chicken to frighten the monkeys. It is a warning to the Xinjiang and Chinese public that talking to media from outside China could land someone in Jail. This has a chilling effect on news gathering activities by Hong Kong media inside China.
Niyaz is a public intellectual who has the right to speak his mind. He is also entitled to a fair trial. Based on everything we know about Niyaz, he is a journalist and a patriot. As a Uighur, he is also deeply passionate about his people and Xinjiang. On Xinjiang’s ideological spectrum, he is a moderate who is opposed to the separatist cause.
One of the signers of the open letter, Xu Youyu (徐友渔), a prominent liberal academic, told media that, “Everyone believes Niyaz is a moderate voice, that he encourages interaction between Han Chinese and Uyghurs in a spirit of friendship, and that he has a rational approach. We believe that such a rational person is particularly essential to the handling of ethnic issues. And we urgently hope his treatment does not serve as a precedent for similar actions against others.”
It is puzzling that a person of Niyaz’s convictions has become a target of the authorities, and this raises more fundamental questions about the Party’s credibility, and their handle on the situation in Xinjiang.
In his Selected Works, Chair Mao wrote from the outset that “Who are our enemies? Who are our friends? This is a question of the first importance for the revolution.” If the Chinese authorities are incapable of distinguishing its friends from its enemies, how do they expect to win confidence in Xinjiang or anywhere else? How can they possibly formulate workable policies on Xinjiang and issues of ethnic minorities?
51 year-old Gehret Niyaz is a Xinjiang native. He graduated from the Chinese Studies department at the Central University of Nationalities in Beijing. He writes in Chinese, and works for the party-state press. He was formerly head of editorial desk at Xinjiang Legal News, a reporter for Xinjiang Economic News, and an editor and manager at Uighur Online. Xinjiang Legal News is published by Xinjiang Daily, the official paper of the Xinjiang party leadership.
Niyaz was detained on October 1, 2009, and he was sentenced in a closed trial. Chinese authorities have revealed nothing about the trial proceedings.
It is fair to say that Niyaz is a “party media” journalist, and everything about his public statements and background suggest he should be considered a “friend” by the CCP. His weblog, “The Cultural Perspectives of a Uighur Journalist,” still available on the Web, provides a glimpse into his thinking.
For example, Niyaz fiercely criticizes Uyghur businesswoman and activist Rebiya Kadeer, who is much hated by the CCP, charging that she has “no head for politics” and that “she cannot represent the interests of the Uighur people.” Kadeer has been singled out by Chinese authorities as “an outside terrorist and a prominent proponent of separatism and extremism,” as well as the “black hand” behind the July 5, 2009, unrest in Urumqi.
In his writings on affairs in Xinjiang, Niyaz is frank about problems of his own people living in the mainland — for example, drug use and trafficking, prostitution, organized crime, and so forth. He has encouraged the leadership in Xinjiang to tackle these problems head on.
And Niyaz does not mince words in his criticism of the local authorities in Xinjiang: “To put it less politely, if the authorities do not put the people first, if they do not resolve these social problems that bring increasingly disastrous consequences . . . the top party leadership and government officials might just as well return home and eat their sweet potatoes,” he writes.
In his blogs, Niyaz’s writes about Uighur culture and history, and relations with Han Chinese. His tone is always moderate, inclusive and reasoned.
Ilham Tohti, an economics professor at the Central Nationalities University in Beijing and director of Uighur Online, told ABC Radio Australia: “He [Niyaz] should be someone just like the government people. He holds the same views as the government. He thinks of himself as a cadre trained by the Chinese Communist Party. I never imagined that the authorities would take measures against him like they have.”
Niyaz’s remarks after Urumqi riots were among the most objective and factual available, deserving of careful consideration by state leaders. Instead, his well-meant words have been leveled against him as evidence of his crimes.
In his interview with Yazhou Zhoukan, Niyaz mentioned that the day before the riots he sent warnings to local authorities. On July 5, the day of the riots, he met with high-level Xinjiang leaders to suggest that authorities should take urgent action to address popular discontent and to prevent violence. His suggestions were ignored. According to media reports, Niyaz admitted his interview with Yazhou Zhoukan during his trial, but said his intentions were good and that he was only acting as a responsible citizen and journalist.
So far, most of the reports on the Niyaz case have come from online media and blogs, from Western human rights groups, and from foreign media, including ABC Radio Australia and Deutsche Welle.
Reporting on Xinjiang is difficult and requires sustained effort. But the Hong Kong media can do much more. This is their professional obligation as media working in a free society.
Three other journalists from Uighur Online were also found guilty in July of “endangering national security” and were given sentences of between 3 and 10 years. We call on prosecuting authorities in China conduct a fair and transparent review of the Niyaz case and the cases involving the three online journalists. This is the only way for the Chinese government to allay public concerns and to defend its own credibility.
A version of this article appeared in Chinese in Hong Kong Economic Times.
Riding the Rails in China
In late July 2010, a video surfaced on the Internet of a young man in Shanghai crawling under a train and filming it as it pulled over him into the station. The video generated massive traffic in China and ignited a debate online and in the traditional media about why someone would, well, want to do something so stupid. In this cartoon, the man holds his “DV” camera and shouts “I’ve got it on film!” as the train bears down on him.
