China faces a growing list of setbacks internationally that might suggest its turn in diplomacy away from a more “cautious and passive” approach in favour of active assertiveness is backfiring. Nevertheless, China’s top diplomat, Wang Yi (王毅), declares in the latest edition of the official Seeking Truth journal that his country’s new model of diplomacy is not just an unqualified success but an historically significant contribution to international relations.

In the florid language of a true devotee, Wang credits Xi Jinping with “the vision and sagacity of a great strategist” in sussing out the complexities facing the world, and crafting “comprehensive” long-term solutions in a tidy package now to be called “Xi Jinping Thought on Diplomacy.”

But reading Wang’s language in Seeking Truth in order to better understand the substance of Xi Jinping Thought on Diplomacy would be to miss the point. Wang’s article, which we must assume is the full text, or very nearly the full text, of his speech last month to commemorate the opening of a new “Research Center on Xi Jinping Thought on Diplomacy,” is really not about China and its relations with the rest of the world so much as grandiose visions of Xi Jinping and his seemingly unassailable position at the “core” of power.

Here are the first two paragraphs of Wang’s article in translation, which provides a taste of the general tone. I follow with some comments on the rest of the article.

Looking back on history, [we can see that] great eras must give rise to great thoughts. Since the 18^th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party [in 2012], socialism with Chinese characteristics has strode forward, head high, into a new era, and the Chinese people have, through long tribulation, welcoming a leap from standing up, to growing prosperous, to finally growing strong. Today’s China, is coming closer than it ever has come to realizing its dream of the great rejuvenation of the Chinese people, and it is moving closer than it ever has to the center of the world stage. At the same time, the world is in the midst of a major and unprecedented transformation, and is experiencing profound and complex change.

Facing uncertain international trends, General Secretary Xi Jinping has, with the vision and sagacity of a great strategist, accurately grasped the principles of the development of human society, fully determined the direction of international terrain and the historical position of our country, and he has raised a series of new concepts, new propositions and new initiatives to lead the trend of human progress. With a clear banner, he has answered the question of what kind of world China should advance and create, and what kind of international relations it should build. On what kind of diplomacy China needs, how to carry out diplomacy for the new era (新时代外交), and a series of other major theoretical and practical questions, the emergence and establishment of Xi Jinping Thought on Diplomacy with Chinese Characteristics for the New Era, or Xi Jinping Thought on Diplomacy, provides the fundamental guide for Chinese diplomacy entering the new era.

We should note that after the initial use of the longer 16-character phrase, seen in the opening passage above, the Seeking Truth article consistently uses the shorter phrase. This is significant because we have the prominent and repeated use in a major CCP journal of a term that clearly points to the emergence itself of “Xi Jinping Thought,” a shortened and more potent permutation of the leader’s banner term introduced at the 19^th National Congress of the CCP in late 2017, “Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era.” This is something Qian Gang wrote about in greater detail last week.

The Seeking Truth article is organized into two major sections. The first makes five basic assertions about Xi Jinping Thought on Diplomacy, beginning with bolded summary sentences. The bolded statements follow with my observations:

Xi Jinping Thought on Diplomacy is an integral part of Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era. Wang Yi emphasizes here that the “core concepts” of Xi Jinping Thought on Diplomacy are “the promotion of a community of common destiny for mankind” (推动构建人类命运共同体), and “the promoting of the creation of a new model of major power relations” (推动构建新型国际关系). He calls the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party the “most fundamental character” and the “greatest political advantage” of this diplomatic “thought.”

Xi Jinping Thought on Diplomacy is the latest result of 21^st century Marxism in the realm of diplomacy. The assertion by Wang follows the more vociferous promotion in recent weeks and months of the idea that Xi Jinping’s set of ideas under his banner term represent already, one-fifth the way into the new century, the totality of “21^st Century Marxism.” This is once again about shoring up the power and status of Xi Jinping himself, and has little substance otherwise.

Xi Jinping Thought on Diplomacy is a continuation and an innovation of China’s outstanding traditional culture. Here we find generalized references to the glorious past, conforming with the CCP’s increased use under Xi Jinping of references to China’s “excellent traditional culture” as a source of legitimacy.” Specifically, in this context, this brings modern-day diplomacy into the broader historical perspective of China’s return to prominence. Wang Yi does not elaborate the “traditional” elements of diplomacy today, other than listing out references to the phrases “all under heaven are equal” (天下为公) and “great harmony” (世界大同), which are drawn from the Confucian Book of Rites (I’ll avoid deeper discussion of these for the moment), and to “the spirit of the ancient silk road” (古代丝绸之路精神) as there is a reference to Xi’s Belt and Road Initiative.

Xi Jinping Thought on Diplomacy is a continuation and development of new Chinese foreign relations theory. This section emphasizes the links between Xi’s “new era” diplomacy and Chinese diplomacy since 1949, referring to the “collective diplomatic ideas of several generations of leaders.” This is essentially about China’s emphasis since Mao Zedong on its status as a “champion of the developing world,” reiterating its opposition to colonialism, hegemonism and might-makes-right politics.

Xi Jinping Thought on Diplomacy abandons and surpasses traditional international relations theory. This is a huge can of worms, and deserves more attention and research. What does China mean here by “traditional international relations theory,” and which aspects does it reject? Wang Yi speaks only in the broadest terms. “In recent years,” he writes, “traditional international relations theory finds it more and more difficult to explain today’s world, and views such as advocating strength and zero-sum thinking are becoming increasingly incompatible with the direction of the times.” This amounts rather transparently to the building of straw men in order to form the basis of Xi’s supposed breakthroughs. Do China’s strategic thinkers really suppose this is the sum total of “traditional international relations theory”? Wang goes on to talk about “unifying the common and fundamental interests of the Chinese people and the people of the world,” about “long-term peace,” “common prosperity,” “openness and tolerance,” “mutual respect.”  Anyone reading this passage in a vacuum might suppose that China invented peace, security and mutual benefit. Here also we find the concept of a “community of common destiny for mankind” (人类命运共同体).

In section two of the article, Wang deals with the study and practice of Xi Jinping Thought on Diplomacy. The three bolded statements in this section are as follows, with my observations added:

Further strengthening research, to truly and deeply understand the sense and essence of Xi Jinping Thought on Diplomacy. This talk of research and understanding yields nothing in the way of concrete formulations of Xi Jinping Thought on Diplomacy. If anything, it should remind us of the obvious point that international relations theories in China are not the products of the discipline of international relations so much as about the consolidation and protection of power and legitimacy within the CCP. This is more about internal relations than international relations. Wang writes of the “core significance” and “rich content” of Xi Jinping’s thought within the theoretical lineage of the CCP, which is clearly outlined in ritualistic form: “We must link together the study of Xi Jinping Thought on Diplomacy with Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for the New Era, link [it] together with the study of Marxism-Leninism, Mao Zedong Thought, Deng Xiaoping Theory, the important thought of the ‘Three Represents,’ and the scientific view of development . . . “This procession of CCP spirits is like the invoking of the ancestors who provide the basis for Xi’s legitimacy. For Wang, this is another opportunity to flatter Xi Jinping and hitch himself to the wagon of his growing power.

Actively carrying out international exchange, allowing other countries and other people’s more deeply understand the scientific and advanced nature of Xi Jinping Though on Diplomacy. Wang Yi argues here that “Xi Jinping Thought on Diplomacy is a thought with world significance, with important and practical significance for various global challenges facing the world.” Despite clear setbacks for China’s international relations that are not at all addressed in the article, Wang insists that “international society is giving ever greater attention and ever greater priority to Xi Jinping Thought on Diplomacy.” Wang says China must continue to “go out” and to “invite others in” (think of carefully scripted official junkets with guests from around the world), strengthening dialogue and cooperation with 1) state governments, 2) political parties (this is an crucial aspect of Chinese diplomacy in recent years), 3) think tanks (China has announced the intention of building up its own “new think tanks”), 4) the media and 5) “other areas.” The focus is on expanding what China has elsewhere called its “international discourse power,” though this term is not used here. It has been replaced increasingly in recent years with the Xi Jinping phrase “telling China’s story well.” Wang writes: “We must learn and apply Xi Jinping Thought on Diplomacy, telling China’s story, China’s concepts and China’s plans well internationally, steadily raising China’s influence and appeal.”

Insist on applying what we have learned, steadily using Xi Jinping Thought on Diplomacy to guide the practice of great power diplomacy with Chinese characteristics. Here, in the last paragraph before he closes, it seems that Wang is ready to talk about practical applications. He effuses: “Thought is the guide for action, and theory provides direction to practice.” But watch what happens next. Just as Wang begins to speak of the need to unite thought and action, he finds himself back on the carousel of legitimacy signaling language: “Maintaining a high-level of unity in our politics and actions with the CCP with Comrade Xi Jinping as the core, [we must] resolutely implement the strategic deployments of General Secretary Xi Jinping on diplomacy.” The very next sentence begins: “[We] must arm our heads with the new theory of Xi Jinping Thought on Diplomacy, leading us to steadily strengthen great power diplomacy with Chinese characteristics. . . .”

If the previous points do not convince the reader that Wang Yi’s Seeking Truth article is chiefly not about diplomacy, but about signaling obedience to Xi Jinping and advancing his personal power, the article’s conclusion should do the job.  It repeats the language of the “core,” urging the need to “more closely unite around the central Party with Xi Jinping as the core,” and then mentions the so-called “442 formula,” a fixed formula of three separate phrases (“four consciousnesses,” “four confidences” and “two protections”) that since 2018 has symbolized the need for party-state officials to pay loyalty to Xi as the party-state leader. The “two protections” refer specifically to the need to 1) protect the core status of General Secretary Xi Jinping, and to 2) protect the central, unified leadership of the Central Committee of the CCP.

The bottom line: Even as Wang Yi discusses the central concept now unifying Chinese diplomacy in one of the CCP’s most important journals of theory, his discourse of diplomacy is in fact not about diplomacy at all. It is a discourse of obedience and power-signaling. And this is something we can certainly expect a great deal more of as we approach the 100th anniversary next year of the Chinese Communist Party.

[Featured Image: Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi. Image by the Austrian Foreign Ministry, available at Flickr.com under CC license.]

News about China internationally this week has centered on deepening US-China tensions. Houston, we have a problem. But in much of China, it is disastrous floods, and not the dangerously ebbing relationship with America, that have stayed at the top of the headlines. Torrential rains have hammered central and south China this month, causing what state media characterized already 10 days ago as the worst flooding in more than two decades.

As with the coronavirus epidemic that eventually commanded the news in January, upsetting long-laid plans for a 2020 focussing on happier and more triumphal themes, like victory over poverty and newfound economic wealth, the floods have challenged propaganda authorities with their torrent of bad tidings. How can the government make its rhetorical best of a bad situation, inviting the population to avoid gloomy thoughts and unwanted criticism?

In the case of the epidemic, China eventually did manage to turn the narrative around, focusing on such the heroism of the doctors and nurses on the frontlines, and the sacrifices of ordinary people for the country and for the Chinese Communist Party – all, of course, aided by a robust system of information control. By the end of February, Xi Jinping was claiming a glorious victory.  Along the way, however, many attempts to draw out and emphasize the positives – what in Xi Jinping-speak is called “spreading positive energy” – backfired horribly, drawing anger from Chinese who resented the exploitation of tragedy to distract from government missteps amid a loud chorus of thank you’s.

This week, as flooding continued to wreak havoc China’s south, “Poyang Notices” (鄱阳发布), an official WeChat account operated by the county leadership of Poyang (鄱阳), an area in Jiangxi province that is home to China’s largest freshwater lake, published a post urging people to think of the positives – and of course to be thankful. The post was reminiscent of the bright-side enthusiasm shown in kitsch coronavirus tributes earlier this year, perhaps epitomized by the nauseating poem, “Thank You, COVID-19.”

The post, titled “The Flood is Not Completely a Bad Thing,” began with this summary of the ongoing floods: “Major flooding has done great injury to the people of Poyang and amounts to a grave disaster, but it has also catalyzed many moving stories in the lake city, where there has been rebirth in the midst of disaster . . . . It can clearly be seen that the evils of the flooding are not completely bad.” It then offered the following verse (only partially translated) to encourage positivity:

So bad and so fierce has been this historic flood,
which has torn our homeland to pieces
and upset the rhythm of our lives.
We grit our teeth in hatred of the spirit of the flood,
But rational and tenacious, do not curse the world,
for it has stirred our high-spirited resistance.
Poyang Notices has truly witnessed
in the roiling currents, not just the teeth and claws of the evil waves,
but flashes of the brilliance of humanity.

Further down, the third passage of poem came to the inevitable moment of thanks, with an image that painfully (and quite insensitively for local people, one would think) invoked at once the real floods and the metaphorical surge of gratitude. “The heart’s voice of thanks drifts at every moment through the land of Poyang.”  

Like other sickening tributes to the emotional positives of tragedy in the midst of the COVID-19 epidemic, the “Poyang Notices” post quickly drew the wrong sort of attention. It was shared across social media platforms to the embarrassment of Poyang’s propaganda authorities. Before long, the post had been deleted, but not before social media users and the media had weighed in.

One voice of criticism was this one from The Beijing News, which urged “serious consideration” of the post’s twisted logic:

This article has now been deleted, but the logic behind it still deserves our serious consideration. Looking at the form of the article, I am willing to believe that the author feels what they set to writing, that many bright and moving points have emerged in the fight against the flood. But a number of lines, such as “Can you say it is completely a bad thing?” and “The evils of the flood disaster are not so bad,” twist the article away from its sound intent, and instead invite discomfort . . . .

Praising the anti-flood spirit and affirming the contributions of personnel fighting the flood is a separate matter from the treatment of the disaster itself. If the refinement of the anti-flood spirit is achieved by beautifying the disaster and forcing on it notions of ‘positive energy,’ then this is an insult to the anti-flood spirit. I am confident that those personnel on the front lines of the anti-flood effort are also none too happy to see this ‘inappropriate’ attitude of affirmation.

A disaster is a disaster. In the process of fighting the flood, the inspiration offered by the spirit of cooperation within social groups and the sparks of radiance in human nature, are a form of the precious spirit of human society, and also an effective way of facing disasters. But to say that this is the benefit of disaster, this is obviously very wrong.

Another post at Pincong, a Chinese online forum for discussion of political issues, was dumbfounded by the tone-deafness and insensitivity of the “Poyang Notices” post:

I don’t know what happened to the editor at “Poyang Notices.” “The evil of the flood disaster isn’t all evil, but also gave rise to good”? What are those who became victims of the flood supposed to think? My friend is in Anhui. The flood has inundated his home. The houses in the countryside will not be structurally sound after soaking up so much water, to say nothing of all of the furniture and electrical appliances. If you were to show him this article, how could he restrain himself from leaping up and cussing his brains out?

Writing on the question-and-answer platform Zhihu (archived here), another user sarcastically encouraged the author of the “Poyang Notices” post to continue seeking out good in the most unlikely places:

I’d really like to invite the little brother (or little sister) who wrote the “Poyang Notices” piece to visit a prison and circulate freely among the murderers and rapists there. I’m sure they would find that those on death row are not all evil, but can also give rise to good.

Once again, CCP propaganda authorities have fallen afoul of their own positivity. These are sensitive times, indeed — when negative news and positive energy alike harbor the potential for undermining the leadership’s standing.

[Featured Image: Flooding in a Chinese city in 2016. Image by Paul Gonzalez available at Flickr.com under CC license.]

In recent months, page three of the Chinese Communist Party’s official People’s Daily newspaper has regularly featured strongly-worded commentary pieces addressing various aspects of the US-China relationship, and railed against what it now almost routinely calls a “Cold War mentality” (冷战思维) on the part of American officials.

Last weekend, for example, yet another commentary attributed to “Zhong Sheng” (钟声), a pen name used in the paper since November 2008 for important pieces on international affairs on which the leadership wishes to register its view, said unspecified “certain politicians” in the United States had formed a “gang of rumor-mongers” (造谣团伙) that sought continually to “blacken China.” The commentary was also promoted by the People’s Daily on Twitter, along with a photo of the White House and a stop sign.

Today, page three of the newspaper does not include a “Zhong Sheng” column, but instead features a massive article responding to 18 “rumors” it says were pushed by senior White House trade official Peter Navarro in an op-ed published by Fox News on June 7 — addressing each of these allegations point-by-point with lists of supporting bullet points.

The Navarro counterattack, which seems unusual in its level of scope and detail, is further illustration of just how rancorous the war of words between the US and China has become.

It’s important also to note that the People’s Daily article relies heavily on the authority of mostly Western sources, including the United States Director of National Intelligence, the New York Times, Business Insider, the UK’s Daily Telegraph, the COG-UK Consortium, the University of Washington Medical Center, the organization Responsible Technology Australia and so on. While China’s party-state media regularly excoriate “Western media” as being biased and unreliable, and attack what they call “so-called press freedom,” they draw heavily on international media and expert voices wherever possible to support official Chinese positions.

The article, which takes the full bottom half of page three, begins:

On June 7, Navarro, director of the of the Office of Trade and Manufacturing Policy (OTMP) at the White House, fabricated a series of China-related lies about the COVID-19 epidemic. Just as mankind faces assault by the COVID-19 epidemic, certain unscrupulous politicians in the US think nothing of combatting the virus in their own country, and even less of cooperating with the world in fighting the epidemic, but instead do everything in their power to attack and discredit China’s universally recognized success in the fight against the epidemic.

Lies are the credentials of those who are shameless and despicable, while the truth is the calling card of those who defend the truth. Here, we list 18 lies manufactured by Navarro, refuting each in order with facts and truths.

Among the “rumors” dealt with in the People’s Daily article (the first of which is the notion that the virus might have originated in a government lab) is the suggestion that Li Wenliang (李文亮), the Wuhan doctor who died of COVID-19 in February after having been reprimanded sharply by police in December 2019 for sharing information about the virus on WeChat, was a “whistleblower” and was “detained.” The People’s Daily attempts to reclaim Li’s legacy, something CMP wrote about back in March, stressing that he was a member of the Chinese Communist Party and that “his outstanding contributions have received the respect of the government and the people.”

The reclaiming of Li’s legacy was a clear propaganda tactic employed by the leadership in February and March to deal with widespread anger over the doctor’s well-documented mistreatment by Wuhan police for attempting to share information in the earliest stages of the epidemic. CMP dealt with the Chinese reporting about Li Wenliang in our February 18 article “The Li Wenliang Storm.” Today’s People’s Daily article notes only that police issued a warning to Li Wenliang on January 3, seriously playing down the intensity of the suppression of information on the epidemic by local authorities in Wuhan.

As CMP researcher Tao Lesi noted in a March article on the notion of “speaking politics” (讲政治) in the context of the epidemic, reports from a number of domestic Chinese media, including Southern Weekly and People magazine, confirmed that the Wuhan City Health Commission had warned doctors’ WeChat groups in late December: “We ask everyone please . . . . do not circulate at will to the outside notices and relevant information about a pneumonia of unclear origins . . . . otherwise the city health commission will subject them to severe investigation.”

On the question of Li, as with the other 17 so-called “rumors,” the tone of the People’s Daily article is stern: “All political manipulation of Doctor Li is immoral, and does extreme disrespect to him and to his family.”

[Featured Image: Peter Navarro, image from White House Office of Trade and Manufacturing Policy available at Wikimedia Commons under CC license.]

On the afternoon of July 1, as Hong Kong residents grappled with a new national security law and wondered how much space would be left to “act out our freedom,” a new media platform operated by Shanghai’s Liberation Daily, the official organ of the municipality’s CCP Committee, was busy keeping score. The headline in the Shanghai Observer was euphoric: “27:53! A test of strength plays out at the Human Rights Council over Hong Kong’s national security law.”

The Shanghai Observer report responded to events at the 44^th session of the UN Human Rights Council the previous day, at which two statements had been delivered back to back. The first statement (available here), was delivered by Julian Braithwaite, the UK’s ambassador to the WTO and UN in Geneva, on behalf of 27 countries. Braithwaite emphasized that the Joint Declaration between China and the UK is “a legally binding treaty, registered with the United Nations,” and that China’s passing of a national security law “without the direct participation of Hong Kong’s people, legislature or judiciary of Hong Kong undermines ‘One Country, Two Systems.’”

The second statement, delivered by Cuba on behalf of more than 50 countries, countered Braithwaite by emphasizing the principles of non-interference and the sovereign right of states to safeguard national security. “We believe that every country has the right to safeguard its national security through legislation, and commend relevant steps taken for this purpose,” the Cuban statement said. “In this context, we welcome the adoption of the decision by China’s legislature to establish and improve a legal framework and enforcement mechanisms for the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (HKSAR) for the purpose of safeguarding national security, as well as China’s reaffirmation of adherence to ‘One Country, Two Systems’ guideline.”

The apparent weight of support for Cuba’s statement in favour of China’s favoured frames of non-interference and national sovereignty over the Hong Kong national security law has justifiably been read by some as a clear illustration of just how far the UN Human Rights Council has tipped in China’s favour, particularly since the 2018 decision by the United States to withdraw from the council. Axios, which provided a helpful map of countries defending and criticizing Hong Kong’s new law at the HRC, noted that most supporters of China’s position have signed on to its Belt and Road initiative, and that many African countries joining Cuba’s statement are also negotiating debt repayments with China.

“This is one of the clearest indications to date of which countries are challenging a rising superpower, at least on human rights, and which are lining up behind it,” David Lawler wrote in his big picture summary of the HRC story.

Taking a closer look at coverage of the Human Rights Council story, however, one of the most interesting aspects is the way the apparent divide is reported and amplified internationally only through Chinese state media.

In other words, if there is a clear global media divide over the understanding and application of human rights and international relations principles in this case, it is not between the West (the 27 countries criticizing China, for example) and “the rest” (the Global South, etcetera). The divide is in fact between Chinese state media, which have a clear and unmistakable message, and everything else. While Chinese media have pushed the frames of non-interference and national sovereignty in regards to Hong Kong, these frames cannot be readily detected in other coverage around the world – unless Chinese state media content is being amplified through non-Chinese channels.

A Silent Axis of Shame

Some have referred to the countries supporting the pro-China statement at the Human Rights Council as an “Axis of Shame.” But outside the HRC statement, the countries comprising this “axis” seem to have said nothing themselves, and their media seem to have reported nothing, about Hong Kong and the national security law. The only country that seems to have actively spoken out on its own in support of Hong Kong’s national security law, and against tying it to the issue of human rights, is Russia, which did not sign the June 30 statement from Cuba. As Russia’s TASS news agency reported, Gennady Gatilov, Russia’s permanent representative to the United Nations in Geneva, called the HRC discussion “biased and politicized.” But this statement was made through Gatilov’s Twitter account.

A Google advanced search in English for “Human Rights Council” + “Hong Kong” + “Cuba” turns up just a handful of sources that are not Chinese state media. These include Axios and Fox News, which reported on both HRC statements.  

Aside from Axios and Fox News, sources reporting news of Cuba’s countering statement all have either content sharing arrangements with China’s official Xinhua News Agency, or share content from Russian sources, notably Sputnik, that are ultimately sourced from Xinhua.

Malaysia’s The Star website, for example, ran a Xinhua News Agency report on July 1 attributed to “Aseanplus News” with the headline: “52 countries welcome China’s adoption of HK security law.” The story was labelled in front as being sourced from Xinhua.

The Macau Daily Times reported on July 2, using Xinhua copy, that “the number of countries, which signed the joint statement Cuba read at the session, is expected to rise.” A headline the same day on the website of the Philippine’s Daily Tribune read: “52 countries welcome new bill.” The copy was again from Xinhua, and an identical report appeared also in Bangladesh’s The Daily Observer. 

Pakistan’s The Nation, published by the Nawaiwaqt Group, which signed a cooperation agreement with Xinhua in December 2019, ran a report on July 1 emphasizing the Cuban statement, and citing as sources both Xinhua News Agency and the Global Times. But the report was in fact taken directly from Russia’s Sputnik, which links in its lede to the original Xinhua News Agency news blurb on the June 30 Human Rights Council session. The headline for the Xinhua brief: “Urgent: Cuba on behalf of 52 countries welcomes China’s adoption of law on safeguarding national security in HK.”

But one of the most revealing aspects of this media divide is the origin of the text of the Cuban statement. While the UK statement at the Human Rights Council was posted in full to the government’s website, Cuba has apparently not made its statement public. It cannot be found anywhere on the website of the country’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs or other government portals.

Where do we get the text of the Cuban statement? From the website of China’s permanent mission to the United Nations. That begins to look like an odd bit of puppetry. Is this Cuba’s own statement? Or is it China’s statement delivered by Cuba?

All other sources referencing language contained in Cuba’s statement are from Chinese state media, or from China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which said on June 30 that China “highly appreciates the voice of justice that Cuba and the other countries so loudly aired. This proves again that justice is in the heart of the people and that the majority of the international community understand full well and respect China’s just and legitimate efforts to safeguard national security.”

And yet, how strange it is that this “majority of the international community” has otherwise been so completely silent. And how unlike the UK statement, which essentially says what the countries that signed it, as well as the European Union, have also said independently (for example Sweden, Germany, Japan). 

Given that it was Cuba that introduced the pro-China statement at the Human Rights Council, we might suppose Cuban media covered this story. But it appears they did not. Searching the English-language online edition of Granma, the official paper of the Central Committee of the Cuban Communist Party, there are no results for “Hong Kong.”

Granma’s Spanish-language coverage does turn up reporting on “Hong Kong” over the past week, but the articles, just three, simply report the passage of the Hong Kong national security law, and US-China wrangling over the issue. There seems to be no mention whatsoever of Cuba’s own statement. And the framing of the Hong Kong story in Granma does not echo the statement’s emphasis on national sovereignty and non-interference, save in remarks that are clearly sourced to China’s foreign ministry (and the US response, from Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, is mentioned as well).   

What of other countries reportedly supporting the Cuban statement?

One country to join Cuba’s statement was Nicaragua, where there was no evident support in the local media, or in government sources (based on targeted URL searches). La Prensa, a daily newspaper based in Managua, reported a “crisis” in Hong Kong on July 4 as a result of the “controversial” new national security law, re-running stories from the BBC and Deutsche Welle. Another leading Nicaraguan publication, La Jornada, reported on July 1, using copy from the Spanish news agency Europa Press (which also cited RTHK), that police in Hong Kong had prohibited demonstrations by “pro-democracy opposition” citing the risk of Covid-19 infection. There was no mention of the statements at the Human Rights Council. Confidencial, another of the country’s main print publications, has had no coverage of China and Hong Kong in recent weeks.

It bears noting that media in Nicaragua have also reported regularly on human rights issues in China. Before suspending publication in September 2019,  El Nuevo Diario, long one of the country’s top newspapers, featured on its front page a full video report from the New York Times in which members of China’s Uighur ethnic community outside China told harrowing stories of their relatives currently being held in detention centers in Xinjiang. 

Saudi Arabia was another supporter of the Cuban statement at the Human Rights Council. But the Saudi Press Agency (SPA) has apparently had no coverage in English of Hong Kong’s national security law over the past week, and in Chinese mentions only a brief telephone exchange between the foreign ministries of the two countries over the “strategic partnership.” The website of Al-Arabiya, one of Saudi Arabia’s largest broadcasters, reaching a pan-Arab audience, has reported nothing concerning Hong Kong in Arabic, only mentioning in a report on currency fluctuations that “the yuan stabilized as investors avoided forming big positions due to concerns about diplomatic tension between Washington and Beijing over civil liberties in Hong Kong.” In English, however, the broadcaster has run stories from Western news wires, including this one from Reuters on June 30, noting strong tones of objection over the national security law from the UK, Japan, Taiwan and Europe.

In Africa, the Cuban statement was joined by the Republic of Djibouti, whose sparse media is closely controlled by the state. Searching the French-language content of the national broadcaster, Radiodiffusion-Television de Djibouti (RTD), no coverage at all of China or Hong Kong can be found since June 26 (when the issue was “the development of Sino-Djiboutian relations”). In Mozambique, there was again no coverage at all of the Hong Kong issue in the state-owned daily newspaper Noticias. The same was true for the privately-owned daily O Pais.

Egypt’s Masrawy news portal, which serves the larger Arabic-speaking community in the Middle East, reported, using copy from AFP, that the national security law in Hong Kong is “controversial,” and it did not mention the Cuban statement at the Human Rights Council. The Egypt Independent, one of the country’s leading English-language sources, uses only news copy from Reuters and the Associated Press when reporting on recent events in Hong Kong, and there is again no mention of the Human Rights Council. Daily News Egypt, a top English-language daily news site in the country, shamelessly re-posted Xinhua News Agency propaganda about the great achievements of the Chinese Communist Party on July 1, but made no mention still of Hong Kong’s national security law or the HRC. (To be fair, Daily News Egypt has liberally run content from many news agencies, and a report on “concentration camps” in Xinjiang also appeared to the right of the Xinhua propaganda.)

This is by no means an exhaustive search, and it relies on imperfect machine translation of languages (Urdu, Arabic, French, Portuguese, Spanish) this writer cannot read. I welcome the input of others who might have seen the Cuban statement on Hong Kong proudly reported as a matter of shared values.

But it certainly appears that the sovereignty and non-interference frame on the Hong Kong national security law is China’s frame alone (and Russia’s), and is not shared beyond the political manoeuvre of the Cuban HRC statement, which no other government has mentioned or otherwise echoed independently.

Framing may be the primary point here. The Cuban (Chinese) statement, though of course a serious reflection of China’s impact on human rights mechanisms, was primarily an effort by China to assert its own frame on human rights issues — as they pertain especially to its domestic affairs. An important part of this ploy is to frame its preferred positions on national sovereignty and non-interference as reflecting the overwhelming global majority on human rights.

What does it tell us when the “majority of the international community” is so silent?

[Featured image: Screenshot from UN TV of Cuba making its statement on Hong Kong’s national security law at the Human Rights Council on June 30, 2020.]

“What people wish for, and what everyone hopes.” It is with this cryptic line that today’s official commentary in the People’s Daily on Hong Kong’s new national security law begins.

人心所向，众望所归
rén xīn suǒ xiàng, zhòng wàng suǒ guī

What does this mean? It means that whatever the people of Hong Kong may feel today about this dispiriting turn of events, a vague and expansive law that will likely have a chilling effect on the basic rights hitherto enjoyed in the territory, the Chinese Communist Party claims this as a victory for all Chinese, including “our brethren in Hong Kong.”

The page-three commentary, attributed to “a commentator from this paper,” or benbao pinglunyuan (本报评论员), which marks it as executed by top staff at the paper but representing views at the most senior levels of the Party, suggests that the implementation of the national security law is actually a reflection of the “original intention” of the Basic Law (香港基本法的初心), which was to “protect national unity and territorial integrity, and preserve the prosperity and stability of Hong Kong.”

As such, the new law is the most appropriate celebration of this year’s 30^th anniversary of the Basic Law – a return to “original intentions.”

“Not forgetting [our] original intentions,” or buwang chuxin (不忘初心), is of course a typical Xi Jinping catchphrase referring to the need for the Chinese Communist Party to remember both its original goals (such as the establishment of “socialism with Chinese characteristics”) and its correct political orientations (meaning the unshakeable rule of the CCP). Just today, the People’s Daily promoted on its front page the publication yesterday in the journal Seeking Truth of a January speech by Xi Jinping on precisely this issue, of “original intentions.”

Seen in this distorted light, the new Law of the People’s Republic of China on Safeguarding National Security in the Hong Special Administrative Region is simply a return to normalcy from the “chaos” that has threatened the “one country, two systems” formula. It puts “one country” back into “one country, two systems,” or so the argument goes:

For Hong Kong, only when ‘one country’ is consolidated can the benefits of ‘two systems’ be put into play.

On the question of “two systems,” the commentary again seeks to offer reassurances, that the law does not mark a fundamental change to Hong Kong’s system and values but simply accounts for a few bad apples:

It should be seen that the implementation of the Law of the People’s Republic of China on Safeguarding National Security in the Hong Special Administrative Region targets an extremely small minority of actions and activities that seriously damage national security, [that it] targets the forces of ‘Hong Kong independence,’ ‘Black Violence’ and ‘Burning Together’. The capitalist system in effect in Hong Kong will not change, the high level of autonomy will not change, the legal system will not change.

Those reassurances are difficult to square with the language of the new law. When everything comes out in the wash, how many of the freedoms now enjoyed in Hong Kong – beyond the celebration of its capitalism – will fade or disappear on the grounds that they “seriously damage national security.” The law, for example, specifies as a crime “inciting hatred of the central government.” What does that mean?

Commenting on the law, Czech scholar Martin Hala has rightly observed that the term “national security” is a mistranslation of guojia anquan (国家安全) in the Chinese case. The operative term here might more accurately be translated “state security.” Meaning that the broad purpose of this law is not to ensure the security of the Chinese population or of the “nation,” but rather to safeguard the party-state.

To what extent, then, will this law be used to move against any and all forms of criticism of the party-state in China – in the media, academia, and so on? In the same vein, what does today’s commentary mean when it talks about “anti-China forces sowing chaos in Hong Kong” (反中乱港势力)?

Since Hong Kong’s return, the practice of “one country, two systems” has achieved world-renowned success in Hong Kong. At the same time, it has encountered new situations and problems in the course of its exercise. Particularly in 2019 with the “amendment storm” (修例风波) occurring in Hong Kong, anti-China forces sowing chaos in Hong Kong (反中乱港势力) have blatantly advocated “Hong Kong independence,” “self-determination” and “referendums” and so on, engaging in activities that damage national unity and divide the country; certain foreign and outside forces (外国和境外势力) have blatantly interfered with Hong Kong affairs, bracing and encouraging anti-China forces sowing chaos in Hong Kong, providing protection, and using Hong Kong to engage in activities that harm national security. The people of China, including our brethren in Hong Kong, profoundly recognize that a longstanding “lack of defences” (不设防) on national security have caused Hong Kong to face its most serious situation since its return; the internal and external collusion and convergence of anti-China forces sowing chaos in Hong Kong has already become the greatest enemy to the continuation of “one country, two systems.”

Is it now a crime to be “anti-China” in Hong Kong, however broadly Chinese authorities wish to define this concept? What does that mean?

At the moment, all we have are questions.

[Image of Hong Kong skyline by Fabio Achilli available at Flickr.com under CC license.]

On June 10, the website China Military (chinamil.com.cn), a news portal operated by the People’s Liberation Army, ran an attack piece on the author Fang Fang, whose diary documenting 74 days under quarantine in Wuhan during the coronavirus epidemic was recently published in both English and German editions. Fang Fang’s Diary, in English titled Wuhan Diary: Dispatches from a Quarantined City, is an insider’s account of events in the city of Wuhan, the epicenter in January this year of what would eventually become a global pandemic, and it offers details about the crisis and the official response that are highly embarrassing for China’s leaders.

The piece at China Military, “The Lightspeed Publication of “Fang Fang’s Diary” Will Only Expose the Truth About More Western “Pot Throwing, alleges that certain “bad domestic media,” principally Hu Shuli’s Caixin Media, are responsible for pushing Fang Fang’s account and making it a tool for critics of China in the West.

The term “pot throwing,” or shuǎiguō (甩锅), which originated online in China, is roughly equivalent to the English phrase “shifting the blame.” The suggestion in the article is that unspecified “forces” in Europe and North America wish to use accounts like that of Fang Fang to blacken China’s name over the Covid-19 epidemic in order to direct attention away from the worsening situation in their own countries in terms of coronavirus infections and the epidemic response.

The article begins:

On April 8, the English edition of Fang Fang’s Diary that was promoted chiefly by Caixin Online began online sales on Amazon, and the German-language edition followed closely behind. Overnight, the public opinion maelstrom caused by this “diary” based on hearsay grew more and more fierce. The entire process of translation, proofreading and sales of the foreign language edition of this book was completed within just over 10 days. Behind this “rapid publication” are the obvious efforts of anti-China forces attempting to stigmatize the anti-epidemic efforts of the Chinese people.

The key allegations in the article are five-fold. First, that Fang Fang’s Diary is hateful toward China and therefore an “anti-Chinese” work. Second, that Fang Fang’s Diary was “promoted chiefly” by Caixin Online, suggesting that this widely respected news outlet bears responsibility for the attention given to the work to begin with. Third, that the “lightspeed” effort to translate the book reveals that it is an attempt by “anti-China forces” to call into question the efforts of the Chinese people to fight the epidemic. This third point is really about what is now a key message in much propaganda in party-state media – that the CCP’s response to the epidemic was an unalloyed victory. Fourth, the article disparages and seeks to discredit Fang Fang’s work as third-rate and little more than gossip.

Finally, beyond its attack on Caixin, the article suggests other domestic media were complicit. Here is a translation of the relevant passage in the piece:

Who could have guessed that this third-rate stage script could prompt such fierce attention domestically and overseas, something that is inseparable from the hyping and promotion done by certain bad domestic media. These bad domestic media promoted Fang Fang’s Diary through Weibo and apps, and even intentionally ran partial translations of Fang Fang’s Diary and interviews with the author on foreign websites, and the editor-in-chief even for a while promoted it once every day, fearing that traffic wasn’t yet sufficient, that things weren’t yet sufficiently chaotic.

It is never clear in the article what other domestic media or websites are being referenced by this charge levied at “certain bad domestic media” (国内某些不良媒体). But the reference to the “editor-in-chief” is clearly a shot taken at Caixin Media founder and editor-in-chief Hu Shuli (胡舒立).

Such open attacks on domestic Chinese media are rare. One of the last such attacks occurred in 2008 ahead of the Beijing Olympics and in the midst of unrest in Tibet, as more liberal media in China were attacked in commentaries and online as being unpatriotic for expressing more nuanced views on Tibet. At that time, Chang Ping (长平), a well-known editor at Guangzhou’s Southern Metropolis Daily, was roundly criticized for reacting to anger in China over the alleged bias of news outlets like CNN by pointing out the hypocrisy of Chinese state censorship.

Fang Fang’s Diary was first published as a series of blog posts at Caixin Online from January to April, with a total of 61 posts, most coming in February and March when the crisis was at its peak. In one entry translated into English at Caixin Global, Fang Fang cricticizes the suggestion by leaders in official propaganda that the Chinese people should be thankful to the government:

A word that crops up frequently in conversation these days is “gratitude.” High-level officials in Wuhan demand that the people show they’re grateful to the Communist Party and the country. I find this way of thinking very strange. Our government is supposed to be a people’s government; it exists solely to serve the people. Government officials work for us, not the other way around. I don’t understand why our leaders seem to draw exactly the opposite conclusion.

One of the more dubious privileges of the social media era in China is that all users, regardless of position, profession, nationality or geographic location, can experience the maddening process of censorship. Engaging means accepting that chats or posts may disappear in a matter of hours, minutes or days. The CCP’s massive project of engineering public opinion, and thereby securing the regime, is now more personal and more international than ever before.

Just ask the British Embassy Beijing.

Earlier today, the embassy made a Chinese-language post to its verified account on WeChat in which it tackled four assertions about Hong Kong that have been made in Chinese state media, offering factual rebuttals of each. The post was public long enough for users to actively share it on the platform, but by evening it had been removed, yielding a message that the post violated regulations.

Below is our screenshot of the post, made shortly before it disappeared.

The British Embassy post is organized as a series of four responses to specific state media reports and assertions for which links are provided. The first report, dated June 6, is a piece from Beijing Daily, the official mouthpiece of the Beijing city leadership, shared through the Shanghai news site The Paper (澎湃). The article itself responded to a June 3 commentary by Boris Johnson appearing in The Times, in which the prime minister said the UK would not “not walk away” on the Hong Kong issue.

The assertion in the Beijing Daily piece highlighted for rebuttal by the embassy post is that the UK supports Hong Kong Independence. The response: “This is not true. The UK has clearly said that under one country two systems Hong Kong is a part of  China. The UK hopes that this framework can continue, and this is also the crux of peace and prosperity in Hong Kong.”

The next assertion with which the embassy takes issue is that the Sino British Joint Declaration does not have “real significance.” This comes from a June 10 piece published online by the official China News Service, seen below.

The response:

The Sino British Joint Declaration is a legally-binding international treaty registered  with the United Nations, and it has been in effect since June 12,  1985. This international treaty between China and the UK makes clear the high level of  autonomy in Hong Kong, and aside from matters of foreign relations and defense, these rights and freedoms so enjoyed do not change for 50 years. The Declaration states: “The current social and economic systems in Hong Kong will remain unchanged, and so will the life-style.” This includes “rights and freedoms.” The pledges made by the Chinese side, including those concerning rights and freedoms, independent judicial power and rule of law, are critical to the guarantee of Hong Kong’s prosperity and its way of life.

The exchange comes at a tense time for Hong Kong, and a tense time for bilateral relations between China and the UK. News came yesterday that Beijing has put a draft of the proposed national security law before the standing committee of the National People’s Congress (NPC), and Hong Kong’s South China Morning Post has reported that language in the draft specifies “collusion with foreign forces” as a crime, adding to fears the legislation could be used to target dissent. The British government has exchanged barbs over the proposed legislation with both the Hong Kong government and Beijing, with Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs Dominic Raab saying it “raises the prospect of prosecution in Hong Kong for political crimes, which would undermine existing commitments to protect the rights and freedoms of the people of Hong Kong.”