Author: David Bandurski

Now Executive Director of the China Media Project, leading the project’s research and partnerships, David originally joined the project in Hong Kong in 2004. He is the author of Dragons in Diamond Village (Penguin), a book of reportage about urbanization and social activism in China, and co-editor of Investigative Journalism in China (HKU Press).

Xi Jinping's Story of Reform

Today marks the 40th anniversary of the opening of the 3rd Plenary Session of the 11th Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, the political meeting that marked the start of China’s long journey of “reform and opening.” For most, change was not immediately evident in the months following this important meeting. Even the term “reform and opening” was years away. In a bulletin from the meeting published in the Party’s official People’s Daily on Christmas Eve 1978 the words stood apart, in pledges to “seriously reform the economic management system” and to “engage in mutually beneficial economic cooperation with the various countries of the world.”
But that political session is rightly regarded today as a seminal moment that began China’s dramatic transformation into an economically dynamic nation — and this is why it is important for us to understand the vantage from which China’s current leaders choose to view that moment of transformation.
The 3rd Plenary Session of the 11th Central Committee was not of course just about economics. It was a commitment to a more open China, and it was a repudiation of the path the Party had previously taken, marked by the tragedies of the Cultural Revolution. The session criticised Mao’s failures to enable collective leadership, and spoke out against the personality cult that had developed around him. These criticisms were a prelude to the 1981 Decision Regarding Certain Historical Questions for the Party Since the Founding of the Nation (关于建国以来党的若干历史问题的决议), for which drafting began in November 1979 under the direction of Deng Xiaoping and Hu Yaobang.
Yesterday, on the eve of the anniversary, the People’s Daily ran a special feature extending over five full pages, from page five through to page 19, which we can read as an authoritative summary of the reform period as glimpsed through the lens of the current leadership. The special feature, called “Major Events of Reform and Opening” (改革开放四十年大事记), was prepared for the newspaper by the Institute of Party History and Documentation (中央党史和文献研究院), a Party office created in March this year through the merger (part of the resolution on “deepening reform”) of three bodies, the Party History Research Center, the Literature Research Center, and the Compilation and Translation Bureau. The feature runs to 54,000 characters.
So what does this special feature tell us? Here is our quick rundown, looking principally at the names of China’s top leaders, from Mao through the reform period, and how they are represented in the text.


Readers will notice that “Mao Zedong” appears in the text a total of 11 times, the lowest frequency among the five past leaders. Of these appearances, 8 occur within the phrase “Mao Zedong Thought” (毛泽东思想), and none of these refers to Mao in the context of the Cultural Revolution as major tragedy or misstep — a notable detail, of course, because, as we said previously, this assessment of Mao’s legacy formed an important component of “reform and opening.”
Even a section of the special feature that deals with the Decision Regarding Certain Historical Questions for the Party Since the Founding of the Nation emphasises only Deng Xiaoping’s remarks in March 1980 that “Mao Zedong Thought must be continued and developed.”
Deng Xiaoping, who is generally known as the “architect” of reform and opening, is mentioned a total of 60 times in yesterday’s special feature. Of these, six mentions are of “Deng Xiaoping Theory,” Deng’s so-called “banner term,” or political brand, while the vast majority of mentions occur in the context of Deng’s various meetings and speeches within the timeline of China’s reform history.
Jiang Zemin is mentioned 47 times in the text, of which 10 mentions are in the context of Jiang’s banner term, the “Three Represents” (三个代表). Jiang’s successor, Hu Jintao, trails the pack, with 39 mentions in total, 13 occurring in the context of his banner term, the “Scientific View of the Development” (科学发展观).
The star of the show, of course, is President Xi Jinping. This is something we might have guessed. But just look at how far Xi Jinping leaves the pack behind. His six years in office account for just 15 percent if the total duration of the reform era, and yet he receives 127 mentions in total in the text, more than double that of Deng Xiaoping.
Comparing with other contemporary leaders, we may also note that China’s current premier, Li Keqiang (李克强), is mentioned just three times within the entire text—and these mentions occur, moreover, only alongside other officials as Party appointments are noted. As for other important names, Zhao Ziyang (赵紫阳) appears 4 times in the feature, in the context of his appointment as premier, and in a policy document that includes his name. Hu Yaobang (胡耀邦) appears just twice. Wan Li (万里) appears once only (his appointment in 1988 as head of the NPC Standing Committee). Xi Jinping’s father, Xi Zhongxun (习仲勋) does not appear.
If memory serves, we often say. And in this case, the numbers make it very clear who the Party’s memory serves — and what that means, by extension, for the consensus reached in the early reform era regarding collective leadership.
This article was written in collaboration with researcher Dorothy Dong.

Internal Ren Zhengfei Speech Goes Viral

Among the top media stories in China this week, the Central Propaganda Department has created a new committee to make assessments of online games to determine whether they are harmful to society. The Online Gaming Ethics Committee has reportedly already made its first assessment of online gaming products, resulting in notices regarding 11 games for which changes are required to “eliminate moral risks” (消除道德风险), while approval was withheld for another 9 games. So far, however, there is little transparency about the group or how it reaches its decisions.
But of course one of the biggest stories in the Chinese media this past week was the release on bail of Huawei CFO Meng Wanzhou. Meng’s WeChat post shortly after her release was shared widely across social media. The day after her release, one of the most popular posts on social media was the text of an internal Huawei speech made back in September by Meng’s father, Huawei founder Ren Zhengfei, in which he spoke about the challenges facing Huawei in the West as a matter of a gap in understanding of values.
___________________
THIS WEEK IN CHINA’S MEDIA
December 8-14, 2018
Huawei CFO Meng Wanzhou is granted bail, her father’s speech on dealing with the West is shared on social media
Freezing Point articles on direct broadcasting to rural classrooms sparks debate about inequality
China forms Online Gaming Ethics Committee led by Central Propaganda Department
Public Security Bureau goes public about prosecution of extortion and blackmail by social media-based “Internet water armies”
[1] Huawei CFO Meng Wanzhou is granted bail, her father’s speech on dealing with the West is shared on social media
On December 11, 2018, Meng Wanzhou (孟晚舟), CFO of Huawei and daughter of the company’s founder, Ren Zhengfei (任正非), was granted bail by the court in Vancouver. That evening, Meng made a post through WeChat thanking all who had supported her and voicing her pride in the “mother country.” Her post became a focus of media coverage in China.


On the night of December 12, an internal speech delivered back in September by Ren Zhengfei called “Finding the Keys to Solving the World’s Problems in the Fruits of World Civilization” (从人类文明的结晶中,找到解决世界问题的钥匙), in which Ren repeatedly raised the problems facing Huawei in the West, was shared widely on social media. In the speech, Ren said China still lacks a deep understanding of the Western world, its value systems and its social psychology. Under the current situation, in which the discourse power and values of the West are dominant, said Ren, China can only understand Western values by seeing things from a Western perspective, and can only engage in dialogue on the basis of Western ways of thinking.
Understanding Western values, said Ren, was key to resolving the problems Huawei  faced  in the West.

“If we differ from the West in our values, how can we enter the West?” Ren asked in his speech. “They will tend to believe that we are attacking them, and they will build their walls even thicker and even higher, and our problems will be even greater.”
“Over the past few years, we have used Chinese ways of thinking to understand the world system, and to make guesses about the intentions of the West.”
Key Sources:
Netease (网易): 孟晚舟发朋友圈:以华为为傲,以祖国为傲
WeChat public account “People’s Daily” (人民日报): 刚刚,孟晚舟发了朋友圈:我以祖国为傲!
TMT Post (钛媒体): 任正非:华为要把5G做得更好,还要充分认识西方价值观 | CEO说
[2] Freezing Point articles on direct broadcasting to rural classrooms sparks debate about inequality
On December 12, the Freezing Point (冰点) supplement of China Youth Daily newspaper published an article called “This Screen Could Change Your Destiny” (这块屏幕可能改变命运), which reported that high schools in 248 poorer areas in China were taking classes and tests along with the famous Chengdu Number 7 High School via direct broadcasting (网络直播) and were experiencing much higher marks, with some of the schools in poorer areas even producing top-level provincial testers, or zhuangyuan (状元). In the past 16 years, Chengdu Number 7 High School has matriculated 72 thousand students, of which the vast majority have successfully tested into undergraduate programs and 88 have tested into China’s top two schools, Tsinghua University and Peking University.
The Freezing Point segment was meant to be a positive story about efforts to fight poverty, but for many it underlined instead the deep opportunity divide between China’s countryside and urban areas. Some also voiced the view online that it was disingenuous to talk about role of direct broadcasting as a form of instruction without addressing the prejudicial admissions policies of Tsinghua, Peking University and other elite schools.
Still others felt that the report was little more than a soft advertisement for East Edu, the for-profit educational services company operating the direct broadcasting services, which was founded in 2002 in cooperation with Chengdu Number 7 High School.
Key Sources:
China Youth Daily (中国青年报): 教育的水平线
WeChat public account “Freezing Point Weekly” (冰点周刊): 这块屏幕可能改变命运
WeChat public account “Vista Magazine” (看天下微杂志): 厉害了!直播不光能出网红,还能产状元!
Tencent (腾讯网): 不相信“一块屏幕改变命运”?这或许是一种“五环内”的偏见丨今日话题
InTouch Today (今日话题): “一块屏幕改变命运”,直播教学真有那么神?
Economic View APP (中新经纬客户端): 这块“可能改变命运的屏幕”背后:上市公司在布局
Luming Finance (鹿鸣财经): 这块屏幕可能无法改变命运,但却能造就亿万富豪夫妻
The Beijing News Online (新京报网): 别苛责“那块屏幕”了,它为贫寒子弟打开一扇窗还不够?
WeChat public account “No 4 QiYang Road” (启阳路4号): “这块屏幕可能改变命运”背后:行贿、挪用资金、股权冻结
STCN (证券时报网): “这块屏幕可能改变命运”刷屏,丁磊要捐1亿!这些公司正在布局
[3] China forms Online Gaming Ethics Committee led by Central Propaganda Department
On December 7, the official People’s Daily newspaper announced the formation in Beijing of the Online Gaming Ethics Committee, a new body under the Central Propaganda Department charged with making “moral assessments” (道德评议) of online games that are deemed to have a potential or actual negative impact socially, and with making recommendations to regulatory bodies concerning online games. According to state media reports, the committee will comprise representatives from Party and government agencies as well as from universities, “specialised organisations” (专业机构), news media and professional associations.
Shortly after being established, media said, the Online Gaming Ethics Committee had made its first assessment of online gaming products, which had resulted in notices to companies regarding 11 games that required alterations to “eliminate moral risks” (消除道德风险). Additionally, approval for 9 other games was withheld upon recommendation by the new body.
The Legal Daily quoted Zhu Wei (朱巍) , deputy director of the Communications Law Centre at Beijing University of Political Science and Law, as saying: “Right now the Online Gaming Ethics Committee is making determinations on ethical risk (道德风险), replacing a system of ‘hard supervision’ (强监管) with a system of ‘soft supervision’ (软监管), [making procedures] rather more flexible and more active.”
Zhu Wei also said that the assessment standards and work procedures of the Online Gaming Ethics Committee were not yet transparent, and over the longer term the rules would have to become normal procedures in compliance with Administrative Licensing Law. The China Culture Daily reported that “moral jurisdictional authority” (道德审查权) in the online gaming industry was a newly emerging authority and would need to be open and transparent, operating within the regulatory framework (在制度下运行). Furthermore, said the publication, the members of the Committee and the standards of assessment must be made public and be subjected to supervision.
Key Sources:
People’s Daily (人民日报): 网络游戏道德委员会成立并开展作品评议
Legal Daily (法制日报): 网络游戏道德委员会成立引关注专家分析 道德评议能否终结网游市场乱象
China Culture Daily (中国文化报):  网游有“德”需制度随行
[4] Public Security Bureau goes public about prosecution of extortion and blackmail by social media-based “Internet water armies”
China’s Public Security Bureau revealed its recent activities in regards to the investigation of cases  of extortion and blackmail (敲诈勒索) perpetrated by self-media accounts, or zimeiti (自媒体). Information was reported by Guangming Daily, the Economic Daily and other official state media. According to these media reports, the Public Security Bureau “broke” (侦破) 28 cases in 2018  involving so-called “Internet water armies,” or wangluo shuijun (网络水军), referring to teams of online posters paid to support or attack in line with certain commercial or other agendas. The police made 67 related arrests, shut down 31 websites, and closed the accounts of around 1,100 “Big V” social media account holders that it alleged had been involved in the extortion and blackmail of around 80 companies and institutions.
Official state media reports  said some “Internet water armies” had engaged in their activities under the banner of “supervision by public opinion”  (舆论监督) — a term sometimes synonymous with investigative reporting — and “social  supervision” (社会监督), using Weibo, WeChat and other social media platforms to blackmail other parties and force them into making hush payments or engaging in business deals.
Key Sources:
Guangming Daily (光明日报): 公安机关今年侦破“网络水军”违法犯罪案件28起 关闭各类网络大V账号1100余个 浇灭利用自媒体敲诈勒索的气焰
Economic Daily (经济日报): 公安部:重拳打击自媒体违法犯罪
Xinhua Daily Telegraph (新华每日电讯): 公安机关重拳打击“网络水军”违法犯罪 关闭“大V”账号千余个
The Beijing News Online (新京报网): 警方严打自媒体“网络水军”犯罪 关闭大V账号千余个

High Praise for a Fallen Official

From time to time, an oops moment in the Chinese media offers us a glimpse of how things work on the inside of a controlled media system. This week we had just such a case — and a humorous one at that. It happened on December 5, as the Fuzhou Daily (抚州日报), the official newspaper of the top Party leadership in the city of Fuzhou, ran a report on page two called “Lei Jianrong: An Industrious Leader” (雷建荣: 担当实干的”领头雁”) that sang the praises of a top county official in the urban management department. The problem was that this official had already been swept up in a corruption case several weeks earlier. Apparently, the newspaper had readied a report praising the official, but had subsequently forgotten to withdraw it from the roster of articles due to run.
But the biggest story in the media this week was of course the arrest  in Canada of Huawei CFO Meng Wanzhou(孟晚舟. CMP’s full translation of the strongly worded response in the People’s Daily is linked below.
___________________
THIS WEEK IN CHINA’S MEDIA
December 1-7, 2018
➢ Huawei CFO Meng Wanzhou Arrested in Canada on Day of Xi-Trump Meeting, Party Media Weigh In
➢ As Chinese media choose the 10 most popular phrases of 2018, “community of destiny” takes the lead
➢ Fuzhou Daily accidentally publishes propaganda praising official under investigation for corruption
➢ City of Beijing includes “media supervision” on its list of monthly assessment criteria
➢ Hong Kong News-Expo opens its door, the first museum to the news industry in Asia
[1] Huawei CFO Meng Wanzhou Arrested in Canada on Day of Xi-Trump Meeting, Party Media Weigh In
On December 1, police in Canada, responding to an extradition request from authorities in the United States, arrested Meng Wanzhou (孟晚舟), the chief financial officer (CFO) of the Chinese telecoms equipment manufacturer Huawei, as she was transferring flights in Vancouver. News of the arrest was not reported until December 5, when Canada’s Globe and Mail broke the story.
It was only later revealed that the arrest had happened on the very same day that Chinese President Xi Jinping had met with U.S. President Donald Trump in Buenos Aires, Argentina. China’s official Xinhua News Agency reported shortly after the Xi-Trump meeting that discussions had been productive and an “important consensus” (重要共识) reached on trade issues.
On December 9, the People’s Daily ran an official commentary called “The Legal and Reasonable Rights of Chinese Citizens Cannot Be Violated” (中国公民合法、正当权益不容侵犯). The commentary was attributed to “Zhong Sheng” (钟声), an official pen name used from time to time in the People’s Daily to comment from the Party’s official position on issues of international affairs. “This is a serious violation of the legal and reasonable rights of a Chinese citizen,” said the commentary, which threatened Canada with severe consequences if Meng was not immediately released. “The methods are unacceptable, the justifications unreasonable, and it is unacceptable and of a most vile nature.” CMP’s full translation of the commentary is here.
Despite the severe consequences promised for Canada in the People’s Daily commentary, the official Xinhua News Agency pointed the blame more directly at the United States. “The Canadian side,” said one Xinhua commentary, “goes against international law to blindly follow the United States, and pay the bill for America’s hegemonic ways.”
Key Sources:
People’s Daily (人民日报): 中国公民合法、正当权益不容侵犯(钟声)
Xinhua Online (新华网): 新华国际时评:中国公民合法权益不容侵犯
Xinhua Online: “为今后一个时期中美关系发展指明方向”——解读中美元首布宜诺斯艾利斯会晤
The Beijing News (新京报网): 华为CFO孟晚舟在温哥华被捕 中方向美、加严正交涉
[2] As Chinese media choose the 10 most popular phrases of 2018, “community of destiny” takes the lead
On December 3, the magazine Yaowen Jiaozi (咬文嚼字), a publication launched in 1995 by the Shanghai Cultural Publishing Group, published its list of the top-ten phrases in 2018. Two terms on the list come from the official political discourse of the Chinese Communist Party. They are “community of common destiny” (命运共同体), a key foreign policy phrase of President Xi Jinping, and “Dian Xiao Er,” a term that has come to refer to local government support of the corporate sector.
As Yaowen Jiaozi explained the first of these phrases — perhaps with a bit of wishful thinking — the notion of a “community of common destiny” was raised in numerous settings by President Xi Jinping after the 18th National Congress of the CCP in 2012, and promptly “became a popular phrase all round the world.” The phrase “Dian Xiao Er” is a reference to teashops and guesthouses in previous centuries in China, which had special assistants that would greet guests. A number of government leaders, including in Shanghai and in Zhejiang province, have previously used the the term to refer to the public service role of government departments, saying that leaders and cadres should “serve as the ‘Dian Xiao Er’ of companies and the grassroots.” This year, the term took on a new meaning, that of promoting local business development, referring to government officials who show attentiveness to companies.
Other terms on the list included “Koi” (锦鲤), “official announcement” (官宣), “I can see [it] in their eyes” (确认过眼神), and “left the group” (退群). The last of these terms, “left the group,” is a two-character phrase generally used when someone opts out of an online chat group on platforms like WeChat. The term has become popular more recently to talk about international affairs, particularly the way the United States has abandoned international pacts such as the Paris Agreement on climate change, or the Iran Nuclear Deal. The term also came to be used quite regularly this year in news reports.
Key Sources:
Zhengzhou Evening Post (郑州晚报): 《咬文嚼字》2018年十大流行语发布锦鲤、官宣、佛系、巨婴、杠精等上榜
Procuratorate Daily (检察日报): “店小二”的新与旧
Worker’s Daily (工人日报): 年度流行语:社会的一面镜子
Liberation Daily (解放日报): 《咬文嚼字》编辑部“官宣”2018年度十大流行语——命运共同体、锦鲤、店小二入选
[3] Fuzhou Daily accidentally publishes propaganda praising official under investigation for corruption


On December 5, Fuzhou Daily (抚州日报), the official newspaper of the top Party leadership in the city of Fuzhou, ran a report on page two called “Lei Jianrong: An Industrious Leader” (雷建荣: 担当实干的”领头雁”) that sang the praises of the chief of the Urban Management Department (城管局) in Le’an County (乐安县). The article said, for example that Lei Jianrong had “a fierce work ethic and sense of responsibility, works diligently in government to get things done, making positive contributions to the building of rule of law and a harmonious and beautiful Le’an.”
But there was problem. In mid-November, Lei Jianrong had fallen under serious allegations of corruption. The top Party leadership of Fuzhou had published a notice about the case on its website, and many media had followed up with reports of his wrongdoing.
Fuzhou Daily quickly discovered the error and pulled the article praising Lei from the digital version of the paper. The article was also scrubbed from Fuzhou News (抚州新闻网), the local official news website. The propaganda article in question was apparently prepared in advance of the announcement that Lei was under investigation, but was not removed from the newspaper’s system after the news of his fall from grace became public.
Key Sources:
The Paper (澎湃新闻网): 已落马官员被当作“实干领头雁”宣传,抚州日报急撤报纸版面
Beijing Great Wall (长城网): 落马官员与“领头雁”的距离就差一篇报道?
WeChat public account “Media Observer” (传媒大观察): 《抚州日报》闹乌龙,总编辑应承担责任
Jiangxi Law (江西法制网): 赣州、景德镇、抚州四名干部涉嫌严重违纪违法被查
WeChat public account “Jiangnan Metropolis Daily” (江南都市报): 乐安县公安局党委委员、县城市管理局局长雷建荣接受纪律审查和监察调查
WeChat public account “Le’an Fabu” (乐安发布): 乐安县公安局党委委员、县城市管理局局长雷建荣接受纪律审查和监察调查
[4] City of Beijing includes “media supervision” on its list of monthly assessment criteria
On November 30, the city of Beijing held a monthly meeting assessment meeting for district leaders, a session during which top district officials are meant to report on their work and field criticisms. According to media reports, Beijing has been convening these monthly meetings since August this year. At each meeting, three districts are singled out for assessments by the city leadership.
At the recent meeting, Beijing’s top leader, Party secretary Cai Qi (蔡奇), offered assessments of Beijing’s Fangshan, Huairou and Yanqing districts.  At one point, Cai reportedly remarked: “Each and every problem exposed by the media must be responded to immediately.”
A commentary in the Beijing Youth Daily newspaper responded positively to the news, saying that the inclusion of media supervision in the monthly assessments of top district leaders was a sign that Party and government leaders in the city views supervision from the media and the public as a more and more important aid to their work. Cai Qi also reportedly said at the meeting: “The supervision of the media and the public should be treated like another mirror [of our work].”
Key Sources:
Beijing Daily (北京日报): 市委召开第四次区委书记月度工作点评会 蔡奇主持并点评 陈吉宁李伟吉林参加
Beijing Youth Daily (北京青年报): 将媒体监督纳入“月考”值得点赞
[5] Hong Kong News-Expo opens its door, the first museum to the news industry in Asia
On December 5, a museum dedicated to the history of Hong Kong’s media industry opened its door in the territory’s Central District. According to Hong Kong media reports, the museum is the first in Asia dedicated to the topic of news and journalism.
Located in a historic building on Bridges Street, the Hong Kong News-Expo showcases more than 1,000 items about the history of Hong Kong’s news industry. The project was conceived a decade ago as part of a push to reuse and revitalise historic Hong Kong buildings.
The museum’s director, Lee Cho Jat (李祖泽), described the purpose of the museum as being “respectful of history, objective and impartial (客观公正), not offering opinion (不带观点).”  “Everyone must take fact as the basis of support, having a professional attitude, and employing news sources from different angles, but not offering fixed positions or views, so that observers can decide for themselves.”
Key Sources:
China National Radio Online (央广网): 香港新闻博览馆12月底对公众免费开放
HKSAR Government (香港政府新闻网):新聞博覽館開幕

People's Daily Growls Over Meng Arrest

In a page three editorial in the Party’s official People’s Daily newspaper today, China’s leadership makes the sternness of its position known in regard to the arrest in Canada of Huawei CFO Meng Wanzhou (孟晚舟), the daughter of the company’s founder.
The commentary is attributed to “Zhong Sheng” (钟声), a pen name used in the paper since November 2008 for important pieces on international affairs on which the leadership wishes to register its view. The name “Zhong Sheng,” literally “bell tone,” is a shortened version of “bell tone to warn the world,” or jingshi zhongsheng (警世钟声).
Particularly of note in this commentary is the way it conflates arguments about the rights and dignity of Meng Wanzhou — even throwing in the term “human rights” — with an argument about the stature of the company Huawei. It mentions the fall in U.S. stocks that followed the arrest, as if to suggest that legal process should simply be suspended in such a case,  or that Huawei is above the law.
But it is clear from the piece that the Chinese leadership, at least publicly, does not view this as a legal case at all, but purely as a political move on the part of the United States and Canada. The threats to Canada are unambiguous: dire consequences follow unless they relent and release Meng immediately.
 


_______________________
The Legal and Reasonable Rights of Chinese Citizens Cannot Be Violated
By Zhong Sheng (钟声)
December 9, 2018
The only way to avoid paying a much heavier price is for the Canadian side to correct this error, immediately desisting from this violation of the legal and reasonable rights of the Chinese citizen, giving the Chinese people the explanation they deserve.
The Canadian side has done something sufficient to make the international community feel deep astonishment. A Chinese citizen who was transferring flights in Vancouver, Canada, Huawei Chief Financial Officer Meng Wanzhou, was suddenly arrested by the Canadian side at the request of the American side. This is a serious violation of the legal and reasonable rights of a Chinese citizen. The methods are unacceptable, the justifications unreasonable, and it is unacceptable and of a most vile nature.
To arrest someone without offering a clear reason is an undisguised infringement upon the human rights of that person. The Canadian side, even though there had not been a trial and determination of guilt, went entirely against the spirit of the law, choosing to infer guilt and placing the person in handcuffs and fetters. To treat a Chinese citizen like a serious criminal, to roughly trample their basic human rights, and to dishonour their dignity, how is this the method of a civilised country? How can this not make people furious?
The various illegitimate methods employed to attack the Chinese company Huawei have exposed the dark psychology of certain shameful people, but it will ultimately be a stone dropped onto their own feet. With its every movement, Huawei influences the world. Huawei’s suppliers number over 2,000, and include not just AAC Technologies Holdings, BYD Company, Foxconn and other Chinese enterprises, but also Qualcomm, Intel, Broadcom and other American companies. After media reported that Canada had arrested the Huawei executive, the U.S. stock market fell across the board. Market analysts said that the arrest created uncertainty in the market about the future.
The Chinese side will not stir up trouble, but it does not fear trouble, and no one should underestimate China’s confidence, will and strength. As soon as it learned of the situation, the Chinese side entered into stern negotiations (严正交涉), voicing its hard line, and it immediately extended diplomatic assistance to the person involved. On December 8, China urgently called in Canadian Ambassador to China John McCallum, raising stern negotiations and expressing fierce opposition to the arrest by the Canadian side of a Huawei executive. The Chinese side fiercely pressed the Canadian side to immediately release the arrested person, conscientiously protecting their legal and reasonable rights. Otherwise, there would be serious consequences, and Canada would have take full responsibility for these.
The Canadian side must think clearly. Between justice and shamelessness there is no grey area. The only way to avoid paying a much heavier price is for the Canadian side to correct this error, immediately desisting from this violation of the legal and reasonable rights of the Chinese citizen, giving the Chinese people the explanation they deserve.

China Under the Grid

Earlier this month, in a piece called “A Rock Star’s Fengqiao Experience,” we looked at the recent arrest of celebrity Chen Yufan (陈羽凡) and how this affair, apparently unlinked to the politics of Xi Jinping’s so-called “New Era,” is in fact disturbingly reflective of it. We can link the Mao-era “mass line” notion of the “Fengqiao experience,” which Xi Jinping has revived over the past five years, to new and intrusive forms of social management. But these trends in social management also pre-date the Xi era.

One of the key terms relevant to this “social management system,” or shehui guanli zhidu (社会管理制度), is the notion of a “gridded community management system,” or wanggehua guanli tixi (网格化管理体系). But where does this idea of “grid management,” wanggehua guanli (网格化管理), come from?
In fact, “grid management” first appeared in Shanghai in 2004. The following is a report from the official Xinhua News Agency, shared at the News Center at Sina.com, at the time one of China’s leading news portals.


The report refers to the idea of the “gridding of management” in Shanghai as “visionary thinking” (瞻性思路) by the city leadership. At that time, this project was promoted by the Party secretary of Shanghai, Chen Liangyu (陈良宇).

Does that name sound familiar?

Chen’s fall from grace in the Shanghai pension scandal in 2006, less than two years after the above news story, was one of the most prominent corruption cases of the Hu Jintao era. In April 2008, Chen was handed an 18-year prison sentence for bribery, abuse of power and financial fraud for his alleged connection to the scandal. As a member of the Politburo, he was at the time the highest-level official to be toppled in more than a decade.


What is “grid management”? In the simplest sense, it is the digitising (数字化) and informationalising (信息化) of city management at the neighbourhood and community levels.

The “gridding” (网格化) of the communal space of the city requires unified city management and digital platforms, and involves the clear gridding of the city management zone into units within a comprehensive network. By strengthening the act of patrolling — including the mobilisation of community groups like those mentioned in our article on celebrity Chen Yufan — the government is able to proactively identify and handle any problems that might emerge. Consider: This was happening in Shanghai three years before the launch of the iPhone, and at least five years before the widespread availability of smartphones made mass data potentially available to governments. Combine this “visionary thinking” with the power of data, and it’s not difficult to imagine its implications in Xi Jinping’s so-called “New Era” a decade later.

Once we know what to look for, a simple Google search can tell us a lot about this method of social management, and offer up visualisations providing a clear idea of how local governments in China are putting the idea into practice:


We can even get a picture of how “gridding” works at the micro-level of the neighbourhood and street. Here, a graphic includes a single unit of an urban grid, with colour-coded sections, the street names and sub-districts clearly labelled.

Since 2012, into the Xi Jinping era, we can see a rather dramatic rise of the term “grid management” (网格化管理) in the headlines of online news articles in China. The following graph is based on my query using the advanced search function at Baidu News.


After the 18th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party in November 2012, marking Xi Jinping’s rise to power, we see not only the continued rise of the notion of “grid management,” but also its promotion and implementation at the regional and local level across the country.

Here, for example, is a page from Tibet Daily, the official Party mouthpiece of the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR), dated November 3, 2014. It looks at the implementation of “gridded management” down to the district level as part of a comprehensive rollout of the approach, clearly by this point dated back over two years.


It’s not at all difficult to find similar reports of the implementation of a “grid management system” for society across the country. These reports are made in official Party publications not just as “news,” of course, but as declarations to superiors in Beijing that policies are being followed and enacted.
Here is another page from the northwestern province of Qinghai:

The examples are legion. Here we have another from Inner Mongolia:

And as we move into 2017, we can already begin to glimpse these gridded systems as they are “upgraded,” making use of digital monitoring technology. The following image is of Minhang Daily, the official publication of Shanghai’s suburban district of Minhang. The headline announces that “Version 3.0” of the city’s grid management system has now gone online.

Coverage of the gridded management system in Minhang Daily was also shared on the Shanghai channel of People’s Daily online. That coverage included images, shared through the official WeChat account of Minhang District (@上海闵行), of the “Grid Management Control Center” (网格化中心).

Even tourism destinations now apparently have their own grid management “work stations” to ensure the comprehensiveness of the system.

Once the “gridding” process is designed and implemented, patrols and data gathering in these areas can be coordinated. This is where the mobilisation of community organisations comes in as part of the Party’s process of mass organisation, which harkens back, as we wrote previously, to Mao Zedong’s political method of the “mass line,” or qunzhong luxian (群众路线), and to ideas such as the “Fengqiao experience.” So these political ideas and grid management intersect with such groups as the “Chaoyang Masses” (朝阳群众), the “Haiding Internet Users” (海淀网友), the “Xicheng Aunties” (西城大妈), the “Fengtai Advising Squad” (丰台劝导队), and of course the “Old Neighbours of Shijingshan” (石景山老街坊) — the group that informed on rock star Chen Yufan.

To offer a further example, there is the story CMP reported last month about how Zhou Chen (周辰), a journalist at Caixin, had revealed in a tell-all account on the media’s website that she had been intimidated by local police in the city of Quanzhou, in coastal Fujian province, as she attempted to report on a chemical spill at a local oil port.According to Zhou’s account, she went to bed early on November 11 after filing her news report. She was in bed when she heard the sound of a keycard opening the door of her hotel room. Four men wearing police uniforms entered her room and asked to see her identification. They claimed to be conducting searches for prostitutes. One officer, said Zhou, told his deputies to search the toilet and balcony. They never produced their own identification. After the men left, the hotel service desk apologised to Zhou, saying police had demanded a copy of her keycard.When you understand China’s grid management system and how it operates, you can understand how this female journalist carrying out her professional obligation to conduct what in China we call “supervision by public opinion” (舆论监督), or monitoring through media coverage, would come under the shadow of the “grid” wherever she decided to stay in the course of reporting the story of the chemical spill. And under such as system, those personnel operating the grid management would be compelled to act.

The term “grid management” is a neologism in China, but it is something that could also be found in ancient times. The so-called “Baojia system” (保甲制) developed in China during the Song dynasty in the 11th century. Chinese society was divided under this system into jia (甲) consisting of 10 families, and 10 jia combined to form a single bao (保). Each jia had a leader, and its bao had a leader. This was essentially a militarisation of society in which control was exercised at every level.

The method was employed again in the 1930s, this time by the Kuomintang party as it encircled the base of the Chinese Communist Party in Jiangxi. The strategy was to tighten the noose around the neck of the Red Army, eliminating the threat they posed.

China’s 21st century grid management system seems to operate on the premise that Chinese society is a threat to itself.

China Cools Meng Wanzhou Arrest Story

Canada’s Globe and Mail newspaper reported yesterday that Meng Wanzhou (孟晚舟), the daughter of the founder of Chinese telecoms giant Huawei, Ren Zhengfei (任正非), has been arrested in Canada and faces extradition to the United States on suspicion of violating U.S. trade sanctions on Iran. Meng is also the deputy chair of Huawei, which in recent months has faced an international backlash over concerns the company is linked to the Chinese state and poses a security risk.
Precious little information is available still about Meng’s arrest, which reportedly occurred on December 1, and Ian McLeod, a spokesman for Canada’s Justice Department, told the Globe and Mail: “As there is a publication ban in effect, we cannot provide any further detail at this time. The ban was sought by Ms. Meng.”
So far, Chinese mainstream media have been largely silent on the case. A handful of media have picked up an early news release from the official China News Service that closely follows the press release from the Chinese Embassy in Canada. That release registered strong protest, saying that Meng’s arrest had “seriously harmed the human rights of the victim.”
The China Daily, published by the Information Office of the State Council, released an article in Chinese earlier today quoting the official release from Huawei saying that Meng has done nothing wrong and they are confident there will be a fair result.
The official Xinhua News Agency did not release a report in English until around 5PM today Beijing time. That report again closely followed the remarks from the Chinese Embassy in Canada and the official Huawei release. As of 8:30PM Beijing time there was still no Xinhua story in Chinese carried prominently on the service’s website, though far down the list of news was a transcript of the foreign ministry press conference.


Xinhua was focused instead on Xi Jinping’s trip to Spain, Portugal and Latin America, and on the 40th anniversary of China’s “reform and opening” policy. No doubt the timing of the Meng Wanzhou story, coming less than two weeks ahead of the formal anniversary on December 18, will also be a point of great sensitivity for the Party leadership.
There are also stories on both on the Chinese and English sides of Caixin. Interestingly, though, while the English report is prominent on the Caixin website, the Chinese report was pushed lower down at around 4PM Beijing time, emphasising in the headline the fierce response from the Chinese Embassy in Canada — and two hours later that story was not visible at all on the Chinese homepage.
The English-language page at Caixin gives the Meng Wanzhou arrest story central play, and by 5PM Beijing time also pairs it with the story of Huawei’s troubles in the UK.
 
The Chinese homepage of Caixin at around 4PM Beijing time on December 6 shows the Huawei story of the arrest of Meng Wanzhou way down below other featured articles.
 
By 5PM Beijing time on December 6, no stories about Huawei or its CFO, Meng Wanzhou, are visible on the Chinese-language Caixin homepage.
But lack of information on this breaking story, and relative silence from traditional and state-run media, cannot forestall the conversation in China. There has been a flurry of chatter and speculation on Weibo and WeChat, although of course that conversation is in a state of constant emergence and disappearance.
Here, courtesy of the Weiboscope, are a few of the more recent Weibo posts that have been removed, most dealing directly with the original report from the Globe and Mail.

2018-12-06 13:29:55 | #ImmigrantObvserver # MengWanzhou (Sabrina Wanzhou Meng) born 1972, is the daughter of Huawei founder and CEO Ren Zhengfei, and Meng Dongbo (孟东波), the father of her mother, Meng Jun (孟军), served as deputy governor of Sichuan province. She at the very least has Chinese, American and Canadian passports! ​
2018-12-06 07:31:11 | 【Meng Wanzhou, Daughter of Huawei CEO Ren Zhengfei, arrested in Canada] Canada’s Global and Mail newspaper reported that the daughter of Huawei CEO Ren Zhengfei, Huawei’s CFO Meng Wanzhou, has been arrested in Canada and faces extradition to the U.S. American law enforcement authorities have said that Meng Wanzhou is suspected of violating U.S. trade sanctions against Iran. http://t.cn/EyXG9Ao ​
2018-12-06 07:24:50 | 【Foreign Media: Ren Zhengfei’s daughter and Huawei CFO Meng Wanzhou has been arrested in Vancouver】News, Beijing time, December 6. According to Canada’s Globe and Mail, quoting Ian McLeod of Canada’s Justice Department, Canada has arrested Huawei CFO Meng Wanzhou. http://t.cn/EyXbNi9 ​

A Weibo search for “Meng Wanzhou” directs readers to two posts from state media, one from CCTV Online and the other from the Global Times. The CCTV post is a short video relaying the response from China’s Foreign Ministry calling on Canada and the U.S. to immediate release Meng and to “protect the legitimate rights of the person involved.” The Global Times post similarly focusses on what at present seems right now to be the core message of the leadership: Meng must be immediately released.


The battle by ordinary citizens and other non-official voices to have a say on the Meng case, over and against the official urge to control the development of the issue online, could be glimpsed openly on social media. In a post made around 8:30PM to Weibo, Zhu Wei (朱伟), an entrepreneur with more than two million followers on the platform, posted the following message:

This topic is so sensitive. The headline article on my WeChat public account “Teacher Zhu Wei” (朱伟老师), “Chinese Embassy in Canada: We Demand the Immediate Return of Meng Wanzhou’s Freedom” was deleted by the relevant departments. Right now I’m reposting it on Weibo, so read it really quickly before it’s gone.

In a Weibo post, entrepreneur Zhu Wei tells readers to quickly read his post already deleted from the WeChat platform — before it once again disappears.
The article in question by Zhu Wei, still available on Weibo as of 8:46PM Beijing time, offered a rundown of the official statements from the foreign ministry and from Huawei, and then included a paragraph by paragraph translation of the original report from the Globe and Mail.
Another post from the Weibo account of the Putian Media Group (莆田广播电视台) offered readers a video from talk Meng Wanzhou gave in English on September 26 at the World Academic Summit in Singapore. The post, which bore the hashtag “#MengWanZhouArrested,” noted that Meng’s talk had been about “how to promote industry innovation.” But the video was soon disabled, yielding the message: “We’re sorry, this video cannot be displayed. Please view another video.”

Some commenting on WeChat and other platforms voiced anger over Meng’s arrest, viewing it through the lens of U.S.-China competition, as a provocative act and a sign that the United States and other Western countries want to keep China down, even stripping it of its “right to develop.”

In a piece shared widely on WeChat, Mei Xinyu (梅新育), a financial writer with more than one million followers on Weibo, wrote:

Finally, I want to emphasise again the assessment I had a few days ago: through equal and rational dialogue a new cold war between China and the U.S. can be avoided, and this would be a great thing for both countries and for the world. But the sky rains when it wants to, and girls marry when the time comes, and if certain people insist on foisting a ‘new cold war’ upon us, China has sufficient courage to meet this challenge, upholding China’s right to development in the midst of this struggle.

 

Rapid Tone Change on Gene Story

One of the top global stories in the past week was the claim by Chinese scientist He Jiankui (贺建奎) to have successfully a healthy pair of twin girls in China using gene editing technology — a claim that quickly drew condemnation from the scientific community both in China and across the world. But for a very brief period in time, this story was pushed in the Chinese media as a major “breakthrough” for science and for China. According to one expert, early coverage by People’s Daily Online ahead of a scheduled presentation by He Jiankui at the University of Hong Kong suggested that there had been some coordination between He and state media.
Another major media story to NOT get adequate coverage in the Chinese media due to its sensitivity is the apparent detention in Xinjiang of award-winning Chinese photographer Lu Guang (卢广).
In other media news, we have continued pain and disruption in the traditional media space, with the announced closure of both the Legal Mirror (法制晚报), launched in May 2004, and Guangzhou Metro Daily (羊城地铁报), China’s first newspaper created for circulation on the subway system.
Finally, we have signs of China’s intensified push of its film culture through Southeast Asia, with screenings in the Myanmar countryside of such nationalistic state films as Wolf Warrior 2.
 
___________________
THIS WEEK IN CHINA’S MEDIA
November 24-30, 2018
➢ He Jiankui gene editing story in China goes From positive to skeptical in a flash\
➢ Photographer Lu Guang disappears while on trip to Xinjiang
➢ Legal Mirror announces it will close its doors next year, staff to be folded into the Beijing Youth Daily newspaper
➢ Chinese films enter the Myanmar countryside, including propaganda films and military-themed films
➢  Hengdian World Studios receives notice of overdue tax, seemingly undercutting promised local tax breaks for investment attraction
 
[1] He Jiankui gene editing story in China goes From positive to skeptical in a flash
On November 25, Chinese scientist He Jiankui (贺建奎), an assistant professor in the biology department at Southern University of Science and Technology in Shenzhen, announced in an English-language video posted to his YouTube account, “The He Lab,” that he had successfully created a set of twin girls using gene editing technology, the world’s first. Soon after the video surfaced, the news traveled through Twitter and was quickly picked up by international media, with many raising serious doubts about the ethical implications of the application of such technology, particularly without oversight.
At 10:51AM on November 26, The Shenzhen channel of People’s Daily Online ran a report called “World’s First Babies Edited Without AIDS Gene Born in China” (世界首例免疫艾滋病的基因编辑婴儿在中国诞生). The report, which largely took a positive attitude toward the news, and which called it an “historic breakthrough” (历史性突破), was later removed from the internet. The report was initially cross-shared by many Chinese news sites, including Caijing Online (财经网), Guancha.cn (观察者网), The Paper (澎湃新闻), Tencent Science and Technology (腾讯科技) and Sina News (新浪新闻).

Singapore’s Lianhe Zaobao reports on the growing scandal surrounding He Jiankui’s claims of gene editing. Image: He faces questioning from a panel during an event at the University of Hong Kong.
Also on November 26, He Jiankui received a joint letter from more than 100 scientists from the biomedical community in China, saying that his use of CRISPR-Cas9 technology to genetically edit human embryos was dangerous and unethical, and damaged the reputation of China’s scientific community.
On November 27, China’s Science and Technology Daily (科技日报) questioned in a report whether He Jiankui’s “prohibition breaking” (犯禁) experiment had actually achieved what . he said it had. “This is not clear,” it said, “but we can be clear about two things. First, too little information has been made available by the scientist and by approval authorities, and there is no way yet to prove whether the conduct was responsible. Second, scientific exploration cannot disregard principles and approvals, and it is wrong to spoil things through excessive enthusiasm” 拔苗助长).
The WeChat public account “Media Symposium” ran a commentary from Zhang Xianfeng (张显峰), the editor of China Higher Education magazine, saying that the first Chinese media reporting this story had uniformly treated the story as being about a major scientific breakthrough. Moreover, he said, the timing of their reporting suggested that they had “carefully planned” (精心策划) the report with He Jiankui, because a major international conference in the field was planned for the very next day. “Fortunately, the media that followed up on the story were extremely rational in their behaviour,” Zhang wrote, “the scientific community quickly made its voice heard, and official government departments also quickly responded, so that the entire agenda-setting process followed a pattern of rational public opinion feedback.”
“In my view, this is something that should be affirmed,” Zhang added.

The screenshot to the left shows the top three results on Google for a search of the headline of the original People’s Daily Online report on He Jiankui’s “breakthrough.” The first result, the link to the original People’s Daily Online story on the “Guangdong channel” of the site, is no longer available, yielding a 404 Error.
The second listed story, a re-post of the People’s Daily Online story at The Paper, is still available, however. The first paragraph of the story, attributed to People’s Daily Online and filed from Shenzhen, reads: “Scientist He Jiankui, from China’s Shenzhen, announced the day before the Second International Summit on Human Genome Editing that a pair of gene edited babies named Lu Lu and Na Na had been born in good health in November. The editing of the genes of this pair of twins means that they were born with natural resistance to AIDS. These are the world’s first gene edited babies to be born with AIDS immunity, and it means that China has made a historic breakthrough on the use of gene editing technology for disease prevention.”
The third link, the People’s Daily Online story shared at Phoenix Online, is also now unreachable, sending readers instead to the site’s homepage.
Key Sources:
WeChat public account “RUC News Workshop” (RUC新闻坊): 基因编辑婴儿事件:“众声喧哗”中的科学传播样本|特别观察
Xinhua Online (新华网): 国家卫健委、科技部、中国科协负责人回应“基因编辑婴儿”事件:已要求有关单位暂停相关人员的科研活动、对违法违规行为坚决予以查处
Science and Technology Daily (科技日报): 科学伦理的“高压线”不容触碰
Caixin Online (财新网): 贺建奎事件的公关教训:生命科学公司应当远离营销炒作
WeChat public account “Media Symposium” (传媒茶话会): 基因编辑婴儿引热议,科技报道怎样才能不闹笑话?
[2] Photographer Lu Guang disappears while on trip to Xinjiang
Overseas media and human rights groups reported this week that Chinese photographer Lu Guang (卢广), an award-winning photographer who has worked for years recording the lives of people on the margins of society, has been missing for more than three weeks, since arriving in the northwestern region of Xinjiang in October to take part in a photography dialogue.
Lu’s family lost contact with him on the evening of November 3. His wife, Xu Xiaoli (徐小莉) says she has not received any notice or documentation whatsoever concerning her husband, but authorities in Yongkang, Zhejiang province, where Lu Guang has his identity registration, have confirmed that he has been taken away by local authorities in Xinjiang.
Lu Guang is pictured in a video after winning a World Press Photo award in 2011.
This was reportedly Lu’s first trip to Xinjiang, where in recent months the government has imposed a highly repressive control regime, detaining hundreds of thousands of ethnic Uighurs and Kazakhs in special camps in what it has rationalised as a broad security and anti-terrorism campaign.
Media in mainland China did not report on Lu’s case, although it was mentioned on a number of public accounts on WeChat and on social media.
Lu Guang previously worked as a manufacturing worker, and later set up a photography studio and advertising company. In 1980 he began doing photography in his spare time, and in August 1993 he went to Beijing to study photography at the Central Academy of Fine Arts. Lu, a three time World Press Photo winner, is also reportedly the holder of a U.S. green card.
Key Sources:
BBC Chinese (BBC中文网): 中国摄影师卢广失联 妻子称其被新疆国保带走
WeChat public account “Photographic Artist” (影艺家): 卢广:摄影可以帮助很多人|自然祭
[3] Legal Mirror announces it will close its doors next year, staff to be folded into the Beijing Youth Daily newspaper
The Legal Mirror (法制晚报), launched in May 2004 as a newspaper focussed on legal affairs, announced this week that it would cease publication on January 1, 2019. The newspaper’s editorial team will be merged with the editorial team of its mother publication, Beijing Youth Daily (北京青年报), the official publication of the Beijing chapter of the Chinese Communist Youth League, where they will be tasked with the development of a new convergence media platform (融媒体平台) under the Beijing Youth Daily flagship — the “Beijing Lead Story” (北京头条) news app.
“Beijing Lead Story” is planned as a multi-function news app drawing together various resources from the Beijing Youth Daily, with a focus on news and information, and also hosting video, self-media (自媒体), online commerce and other services. Launch of the app is expected soon.
Also this week, China’s first newspaper for the circulation on a subway system, Guangzhou Metro Daily (羊城地铁报), announced that it would close its doors this month in order to undergo “comprehensive transformation” (全面转型).
Key Sources:
Legal Mirror Online (法晚网): 《法制晚报》转型新媒体
The Paper (澎湃新闻网): 《羊城地铁报》宣布12月起休刊:因全面转型升级需要
[4] Chinese films enter the Myanmar countryside, including propaganda films and military-themed films
In a video accompanying an article in the Global Times, a sound technician from Myanmar explains the process of readying Chinese films for local audiences.

The Global Times reported this week on a tour of Chinese films through Southeast Asia as part of the 2018 Chinese Film Festival’s “Mekong Journey of Chinese Film” (中国电影的澜湄之旅). The films, including Wolf Warrior 2 (战狼2), Operation Red Sea (红海行动), both highly nationalistic films produced by the state film industry, and Never Say Die (羞羞的铁拳), a comedy, are reportedly now being screened at village locations throughout Myanmar. This is the first time that screenings of Chinese films have been organised in Myanmar’s countryside, with free-of-charge open air screening.
Wolf Warrior 2 and Operation Red Sea, both of which openly advertise China’s military strength, have been regarded as a sign of the emergence of a new strain of nationalism in China, one that is more confident about China’s role and strength globally. Since 2017, numerous Chinese film events have been held in Rangoon, Naypyidaw and other major cities in Myanmar.
Key Sources:
Global Times (环球时报): 《战狼2》《红海行动》《羞羞的铁拳》等走进缅甸乡村
[5] Hengdian World Studios receives notice of overdue tax, seemingly undercutting promised local tax breaks for investment attraction

On November 29, a notice called “Hengdian Studios Meeting Details” (横店工作室会议内容) surfaced online and set off a storm of discussion in China’s film community. The notice revealed that Hengdian Studios, China’s largest film and television shooting base, had received a notice from national tax authorities saying that companies and performers working there must pay taxes amounting to roughly 20 percent of gross revenues for the years 2016-2018.
Beijing Business Today (北京商报) quoted an anonymous source from the studios saying that the taxes previously paid by the studio had been low because the local government had provided investment promotion policies, including tax benefits. The studios, the source said, had not evaded taxes, and this tax notice was essentially a nullification of the previous policies, demanding that the studio business pay one-off retroactive tax payments on the basis of the new policy.
Yang Zhiyong (杨志勇), a researcher at the National Academy of Economic Strategy (财经战略研究院) in the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, said that the notice now suggests that local governments do not in fact have the power to offer tax incentives as an attraction to businesses.
Similar news of tax demands from national authorities surfaced in the film community back in September this year.
Key Sources:
Beijing Business Today (北京商报): 影视工作室接补税通知
Beijing Youth Daily (北京青年报): 影视行业仍处自查自纠阶段 刘和平称与国家税务总局领导沟通很好 “对影视行业扶持政策不变,只会更好”
WeChat public account “Shangguan News” (上观新闻): 多家影视工作室接补税通知?17名艺人被约谈?来看看国税总局怎么说?
 

A Rock Star's "Fengqiao Experience"

On November 26, Chen Yufan (陈羽凡), a member of the celebrity rock duo Yu Quan (羽泉), was arrested in Beijing along with his girlfriend on charges of drug use and possession. According to a post made to the official WeChat account of police in the city’s western district of Shijingshan (石景山), Chen was arrested in “a local residence” after police received “a community tip” (群众举报). 

The community members providing the tip off were apparently from a “community group,” or qunzhong zuzhi (群众组织) known as the “Old Neighbours of Shijingshan” (石景山老街坊).

In Beijing, this is one of a number of fairly well-known and well-documented community groups. Others include the likes of the “Chaoyang Masses” (朝阳群众), the “Haiding Internet Users” (海淀网友), the “Xicheng Aunties” (西城大妈) and the “Fengtai Advising Squad” (丰台劝导队).

These groups point to an emerging, and already quite developed, new model of community management in China that is being linked quite explicitly to a Mao-era experiment in social management known as the “Fengqiao experience,” or fengqiao jingyan (枫桥经验) — an experiment President Xi Jinping has voiced enthusiastic support for since he was the top leader of Zhejiang province 15 years ago, and which now seems to be a core idea for social and public security management in the Xi Era.

A “gridded community management system,” or wanggehua guanli tixi (网格化管理体系), has already been implemented in many areas across China, so that a now popular saying in the media and online goes: “In the north, there are the ‘Chaoyang Masses,’ and in the south the ‘Wulin Aunties'” (北有朝阳群众,南有武林大妈). The “Chaoyang Masses” refers, of course, to the aforementioned Beijing community group, while the “Wulin Aunties,” or “Wulin Volunteers,” refers to a group of around 500,000 mostly older women mobilised in September 2016 in Hangzhou to conduct community sweeps during a meeting of the G20. Images of the “Wulin Volunteers,” sporting their pink vests and caps, were widely reported in the media and on social platforms in 2016. 

As Dushi Kuaibao (都市快报), a commercial newspaper in Hangzhou, remarked at the time: “Whether in Beijing or in Hangzhou, wherever the aunties roam there can be no secrets.” Whenever a new neighbour moves in, said the paper, the aunties know. If a pipe bursts somewhere, the aunties know. 

Two members of the “Wulin Aunties,” deployed in Hangzhou in September 2016, sport their pink vests and caps.

This month marks the 55th anniversary of Mao Zedong’s so-called “Fengqiao experience,” referring to the idea of mobilising the masses at the grassroots of society to enforce proper conduct, political or otherwise. In the earlier Maoist context, this was about the use of the masses to turn “class enemies” onto the right path through direct person-to-person contact and “on-site monitoring and rehabilitation.” For more information on the idea and its history, readers can refer to CMP’s 2013 article on the subject.

The CCP’s Central Commission on Political and Law holds a “2018 Safety Volunteers Service Summit Forum” in Zhejiang, linking the “Fengqiao experience” to present-day neighbourhood patrol groups. Source: Wechat public account “Capital News”.

This year marks the five-year anniversary of Xi Jinping’s national rehabilitation of the “Fengqiao experience” as General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party, and the 15th anniversary of Xi Jinping’s original rehabilitation of the “Fengqiao experience” as Party Secretary of Zhejiang province.

In light of these interlinked and overlapping anniversaries, we have seen a series of themed events across the country — and these can be seen in turn as connected in a roundabout but unmistakable way to Chen Yufan’s recent arrest in Beijing. 

On November 7, the local CCP Committee in Beijing’s Xicheng District jointly hosted an event with the CCP Committee of Hangzhou’s Xicheng District (下城区) that was called — we are not making this up — the “North-South Aunties Dialogue and Exchange Event” (南北大妈对话互动交流活动). This shindig brought together members of community groups across the country to share their, well, tattle-tale experiences, all under the clear banner of the “Fengqiao experience.” 

On November 12, the Chinese Communist Party’s Central Political and Legal Affairs Commission held a themed conference on the “Fengqiao experience” in Shaoxing, Zhejiang province, close to the origins of the concept and phrase in the Zhejiang city of Zhuji (诸暨). At the conference, the commission’s secretary, Guo Shengkun (郭声琨), praised the “Wulin Aunties” and the “Chaoyang Masses” for their “good work and good experiences.” Guo urged the need to create and apply a “‘Fengqiao experience’ for the New Era.”

This, in fact, has already been happening — and China’s countryside has been a major focus of activity. In September this year, the CCP released its Plan for Strategic Revitalisation of the Countryside 2018-2022 (乡村振兴战略规划: 2018-2022), which included explicit reference to Mao Zedong’s 1960’s concept: “[We must] comprehensively promote the ‘Fengqiao experience,'” said the document, “with small matters not leaving the village, and larger matters not leaving the township.” It added: “[We must] explore the tactic of gridded community management, promoting meticulousness and precision in grassroots services and management.”

All of this means that an army of aunties should be on the march in a village near you.

In 1963, when this experiment in social management was attempted in the Fengqiao District of the city of Zhuji, the idea was to “unleash and rely on the masses, adhering to [the idea of] not reporting tensions to superior levels, but rather resolving them locally.” This formed the core idea of what is called the “Fengqiao experience.” At the time, Mao Zedong issued written instructions ordering that the experiment be tried and applied in “various areas.”

On November 25, 2003, almost exactly 15 years ago, Xi Jinping, then Party Secretary of Zhejiang province, hosted a ceremony to commemorate the 40th anniversary of Mao Zedong’s written instructions on the “Fengqiao experience.” At that ceremony, Xi urged the renewal and innovation of the lessons of Fengqiao, saying that “taking the study and promotion of the ‘Fengqiao experience’ in the new era as the chief starting point in strengthening social and public security management.”

A headline on the front page of the official Zhejiang Daily on November 27, 2003 read: “Studying and Innovating the ‘Fengqiao Experience’ to Accurately Handle Internal Contraditions of the People in a New Era: Xi Jinping Delivers Speech, Lü Zushan Presides.” Lü Zushan was at the time the governor of Zhejiang, and therefore Xi Jinping’s number two, but we can suppose that the core ideas involved in that 2003 conference were reflective of Xi’s vision, crafted with those arrayed around him as he edged toward his designation as China’s heir apparent at the 17th National Congress in 2007.

The headline seems in retrospect to offer a tantalising glimpse of core leadership ideas to come. There is talk of “innovation” of a Maoist concept for a “new era” — though “new era” here is xinshiqi (新时期), rather than the much grander xin shidai (新时代) to come. And certainly this year, as China marks the 55th anniversary of the “Fengqiao experience,” the 15th anniversary of the 2003 conference on the concept is also being portrayed as an important political moment that should equally be marked.


A November 2018 conference held in Zhuji, Zhejiang province, celebrates both the 55th anniversary of the “Fengqiao experience” and the 15th anniversary of Xi Jinping’s rehabilitation of the concept.

Xi Jinping, who once rehabilitated the “Fengqiao experience” for a new era in Zhejiang, has now rehabilitated the “Fengqiao experience” for the New Era in China.

In this New Era, Xi Jinping’s vision of “strengthening social and public security management” through mobilisation of the masses can be seen in the activities of such “community organisations” as the “Old Neighbours of Shijingshan” (石景山老街坊), the group whose tattle-tale ways led last Monday to the arrest in Beijing of a Chinese rock ‘n’ roll celebrity, and the cancellation of his band’s 20th anniversary concert.

For Chen Yufan, as for millions of his fans, this rude awakening will be the first, and probably not the last, “Fengqiao experience.”


This article was written in collaboration with researcher Dorothy Dong. 

Propaganda in the Era of "Post-Truth"

When it comes to information and public opinion, the Chinese Communist Party has never had much need for that fanciful thing we call the truth. Truth is only ever a matter of the Party’s interest, something formed and unformed like a dirty ball of clay by however many hands can manage to shape it on the potter’s wheel of power. This basic fact about the political contingency of truth is the foundation of propaganda and media policy in the People’s Republic of China.
Which is why it is interesting to find articles emerging from Chinese officialdom, like this one published recently in China Press Publication Radio Film and Television Journal (中国新闻出版广电报), tossing in the term “post-truth,” or houzhenxiang (后真相), as though China shares in some general global truth malaise, driven by the rise of social media and mobile information. “In the era of ‘post-truth,'” says the article, “facts and data capable of reflecting the essence and changing nature of things are in extremely short supply, and mainstream [Party-state] media must place even greater emphasis on facts and data.”
Facts, of course, are generally in short supply in China not because authoritative sources are few and far between, or because people are driven by hopes and emotional impulses over rationality, but because — first and foremost — facts are regarded as politically hazardous insofar as they might coalesce into some form of truth not of the Party’s making. 

Post-truth has been understood in the West as a state in which the emphatic repetition of talking points is all that matters, in which facts are rhetorically weaponised. But the post-truth world is, domestically at least, the world the Party has always lived in, the garden it has carefully tended. The major difference, a significant one, being that the Party dominates the act of speech and the power of repetition. China is the promised land of post-truth, where the bullies have broken every pulpit but their own. Donald Trump, eat your heart out.  

What is clear from the piece in China Press Publication Radio Film and Television Journal is that Party pundits have seized on the notion of “post-truth” as yet another hook on which they can hang their accusations against voices emerging on the periphery, through social media and WeChat public accounts — the so-called “self-media,” or zimeiti (自媒体). The presumption is that media directly affiliated with the Party-state, which in China are referred to as “mainstream media,” or zhuliu meiti (主流媒体), are more reflective of the truth, more authoritative. This is easy enough to understand when we remember that we are talking here about the Party’s truth. When the Party’s will is standard, its media “mainstream,” all else is but pale shadow.
The piece is written by Zhao Shulan (赵淑兰), a journalist at the official Economic Daily. It is essentially the affirmation by a state press-worker of the role of the “mainstream media” in guiding or channeling public opinion in society in the “correct” direction, that most reflective of the Party’s truth-interest. Noting that self-media can be an “unstable factor” in the forming of public opinion, Zhao asserts (perfectly in line with the Party, of course) that “constant strengthening and elevating of the news and public opinion channeling capacity . . . . of the mainstream [state-run] media — ensuring the strengthening of correct public opinion channeling —  is an urgent and unavoidable topic of major significance.”
But how?
The key for Zhao is “subtlety,” or qiǎo jìnr (巧劲儿), which provides the headline of her piece: “Using ‘Subtlety’ To Raise the Channeling Power of Mainstream Media.” Subtlety in this case means the selective deployment of facts to make the case that best channels public opinion in a direction favourable to the Party. Zhao would probably not put it in exactly that way, but as she discusses recent cases such as the debate in China over “consumption downgrades,” her faith in the Party’s truth is overriding. A deep and abiding conviction that if you arrange the facts in just such a way, they will form the pre-truth of the Party’s infallibility and rightness.
“In the internet era,” Zhao concludes, “society is becoming a crystal lens, and the facts and the truth cannot be concealed.”
But certainly, oh certainly, they can be properly arranged.
 

Using “Subtlety” To Raise the Channeling Power of Mainstream Media
By Zhao Shulan (赵淑兰)
Lately, profound changes to structural patterns in the media and to the public opinion ecology have meant that the news and public opinion channeling of the mainstream [state-run] media face new terrain, new circumstances and new problems. In particular, the hyping done by certain self-media (自媒体) and online media out of commercial considerations often proves an unstable factor in the broadcasting of public opinion and its channeling [or control by the Party-state]. Therefore, the constant strengthening and elevating of the news and public opinion channeling capacity (新闻舆论引导力), broadcasting power (传播力), influence (影响力) and credibility (公信力) of the mainstream [state-run] media — ensuring the strengthening of correct public opinion channeling — is an urgent and unavoidable topic of major significance.
Consolidating Mainstream Public Opinion in Actively Responding to Public Opinion Flash Points
Recently, a post originating from self-media advancing the view that China’s private sector should step back [in favor of greater public sector involvement] made the rounds on the internet and created a storm of attention. The post said: “China’s private sector economy has already fulfilled its task of supporting the development of the state economy, and it should exit the field.” Concerning this [argument], the Economic Daily quickly responded with a post to its WeChat public account that same day, calling on all to be alert to and reject the stirring up of public anxieties over the idea that “the private sector must exit the field.” The post received more than 30 million hits within a short period of time, effectively guiding public opinion in the correct direction (有效引领了舆论的正确走向) and earning widespread praise. The next day, the Economic Daily again ran a commentary that clearly and unambiguously emphasised that the “Two Unshakeables” (两个毫不动摇) [policy of Xi Jinping, stating that both state and private sectors must be encouraged] could not be abandoned. The People’s Daily and many other mainstream media followed in making their voices heard, joining strength to propagate the attitude and policies of the Party and the government concerning the development of private businesses.
In the current public opinion ecology (舆论生态), public opinion flash points and their repercussions generally arise as suddenly as typhoons, with rapidity and violence. When these public opinion storms emerge, people are generally unable to make proper sense of things, incapable of distinguishing up from down and left from right — and often, thought they hear only thunder, they assume there must be rain. If the mainstream media step forward with courage, and at the right moment, helping people make sense of the confusion, formulating a plan, then everyone can get on the right path, finding their way through the blizzard, and this means that public opinion leadership can be better exercised and the influence of the mainstream public opinion [of the Party-state] can be effectively consolidated.
Public opinion leadership is about timeliness, and “time” is all about [seizing the] opportunity. Only be seizing timelinesses can a beneficial result be expected, and only with such beneficial results can we talk about strong and effective public opinion leadership. The assertive entry of the Economic Daily through its new media presence in the early stages of the “private sector exit” commotion, enabling clear positioning and clarification of errors, separating true and false, was a display of speed and timeliness, and it allowed seizure of the high ground and authority in public opinion face-off over economic questions.
Adequately Deploying Facts and Data to Raise the Credibility of Public Opinion Leadership
Using facts and data to speak is an effective way of strengthening the results of news and communication. In receiving news reports, what audiences want most are facts. And data are an integral part of the facts. On the domestic internet and in self-media at present, there is often certain information that stands between fact and rumour, or is outright rumour, and the goal of the disseminator certainly often to grab attention and draw the interest of the audience. In other cases they may wish irresponsibly to unburden their emotions, to make a name for themselves, or even to pursue hidden agendas (别有用心). In the era of “post-truth” (后真相), facts and data capable of reflecting the essence and changing nature of things are in extremely short supply, and mainstream [Party-state] media must place even greater emphasis on facts and data.
In August this year, a reporter for the Economic Daily went to Zhongguancun with the assignment of reporting on the results of innovation [in the Chinese economy]. In the midst of their reporting, they learned that a scientist formerly with the U.S. National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) had completely relocated the business he had started in the U.S. to Zhongguancun. Why would he make such a decision? He told the reporter: “I’ve worked in Silicon Valley before, and the pace of work there is pretty fast, but that pace is maybe half of what you find here in Zhongguancun.”
“As an entrepreneur, I vote with my feet when it comes to selecting the right environment for business,” [the source continued]. “I choose the place where things are best.” Top science and technology talent is increasingly choosing to gather in Zhongguancun, and in China. This fact illustrates that China’s science and technology development and industrial upgrading are something no country can contain. These real choices, ideals, efforts and goals define the prospects of China’s science and technology innovation and economic restructuring and upgrading.
To enhance their news and public opinion channeling capacity, mainstream media must pay special attention to styles and methods (方式方法). One extremely important aspect of this is to draw a concentric circle (同心圆) around public opinion in society rather than run counter to it. Drawing a concentric circle demands that we unite with the direction and policies of the Party and government, and that we identify these with the thoughts and hopes of the population. Only by remaining rooted in the concerns of the ordinary people can the media ensure their voices are accepted; and only by achieving acceptance can [the media] achieve resonance with the public and obtain favourable communication results.
Recently, self-media and online media have been talking a lot about “consumption downgrades” (消费降级), and at base this coverage is about spreading a pessimistic attitude. This is an issue on which the mainstream [Party-state] media cannot so easily achieve channeling through refutation; they cannot simply shout in response, saying these statements [about consumption] are false. But if they are able to calmly discuss the issue with self-media on a basis of equality, analysing the mechanics of how consumption increases or decreases, then the public opinion results can still be decent.
In fact, some mainstream [Party-state] media are not different from self-media and online media in terms of understanding why consumption rises or falls, and they simply “meet the enemy head on” before they even work out the sense of the matter at hand. Actually, the rise and fall of consumption corresponds to structural changes in consumption, and recent drops in consumption are really about consumption prices. This is a different problem, a different concept, with a different meaning, and can’t be confused with [a drop in consumption as consumer behaviour]. Objectively speaking, the self-media and online media embellishments over consumption declines are essentially an outpouring of displeasure over the pressures caused by exorbitant housing prices and rising commodity prices. If we take a more rational and expert approach, it’s not hard to see that drops in consumer prices have come not with cold consumer sentiment but with an explosion in consumption. This tells us that the drop in consumer prices is not caused by a drop in household incomes. If we then look further, we can see that the red-hot sales of low-price goods has to due with the return of more rational consumption attitudes, and with the wave in innovation of modes of consumption [in China]. At the same time, using data to show that consumption is unchanged can also burst the bubble of this idea of consumption downgrading.
. . . . If we offer a lesson to mainstream media in terms of public opinion leadership, I’m afraid it should be that . . . . with a correct sense of political orientation, public opinion guidance and value orientation, we should conduct public opinion leadership with attention to the expert professional art of redirection, rather than shouting at high volume and lecturing those we seek to guide from a position of superiority, compelling their submission.
In the internet era, society is becoming a crystal lens (水晶体), and the facts and the truth cannot be concealed. The mainstream [Party-state] media need to be attentive to social concerns, and official [Party-state] departments also need to support the mainstream media in responding to these social concerns, revealing the facts through the mainstream media in a timely manner.

 

Why is Huawei Out in the Cold?

December is just around the corner. That means the Chinese Communist Party is gearing up for the commemoration of the 40th anniversary of “reform and opening up,” which formally dates back to the 3rd Plenary Session of the 11th Central Committee of the CCP,  held in Beijing from December 18 to December 22, 1978.
Yesterday, the Party’s official People’s Daily newspaper published a list of 100 names of people it deems to have made “outstanding achievements” (杰出贡献) in the course of reform and opening. The list, introduced with an invitation to readers to make their own nominations, includes many well-known business people, the likes of Alibaba founder and CEO Jack Ma (马云), and Tencent founder Pony Ma Huateng (马化腾).

The listing for Jack Ma drew some raised eyebrows on social media and in both domestic and overseas media because it confirmed Ma’s membership in the Chinese Communist Party, which has not previously been acknowledged. Many have long assumed Ma was probably unaffiliated — or perhaps even a member of one of China’s consultative parties. Given Ma’s visibility internationally as one of the most important faces of Chinese tech innovation and business success, his outing as a Chinese Communist Party member certainly makes for eye-catching news.
But another detail regarding the People’s Daily list of “outstanding achievers” that drew the attention of Chinese was the fact that the list did not include Ren Zhengfei (任正非), the founder of Huawei, generally regarded as one of China’s biggest global business success stories of the reform period. Huawei is today the world’s largest manufacturer of telecommunications equipment, and just this year it overtook Apple to become the word’s number-two manufacturer of smartphones.
How can the Party’s flagship newspaper overlook the “outstanding achievements” made by Huawei and its chairman, Ren Zhengfei, currently ranked 83rd on Forbes’ “China Rich List 2018”?
Some have speculated that this was an intentional act of concealment connected to recent difficulties in the US-China relationship. As a post on the Wechat public account “Zhi Gu Qu Shi” (智谷趋势) argued yesterday:

This makes one think of the previous ZTE crisis, and also strict controls recently announced by the US government on [Chinese] tech exports, and wonder whether the relevant departments [in China] didn’t decide intentionally to hide [Huawei from this list] against the backdrop of US-China tensions? After all, Huawei’s expansion in the US could at any time be seen as “state conduct” and then the US Committee on Foreign Investment might make things difficult.

Few would take issue with the assertion that Huawei has emerged as one of the most successful and innovative of Chinese private enterprises in the reform period. As for its alleged links to the government, there are so far little more than guesses, though such conjecture is sure to haunt Huawei as it might any Chinese company.
In fact, all of China’s major enterprises are linked in countless ways to the government. When it comes to the accusation that this or that move on their part is “state conduct,” Alibaba and Tencent are equally as vulnerable.
But we can say with some certainty that the People’s Daily‘s publication yesterday of the 100-name list is a political wound in Huawei’s side.
For Ren Zhengfei, absence from the list leads to one of two very uncomfortable conclusions. Either he is in the unfortunate position of accepting his lot as one whose efforts do not constitute “outstanding achievement” within the Party’s reform and opening pantheon (a political indignity); or he must eat the bitter fruit of concealment, tacitly accepting his compromisingly close links with the government.
For reasons unclear, the list also excludes Hong Kong business magnate Li Ka-shing (李嘉诚) and economist Wu Jinglian (吴敬琏), both so conspicuous in their absences that storms of conjecture are inevitable.
This list, in short, is a lightning rod.
As China looks back, officially, across the expanse of reform and opening, what to conceal and how is of course an important question for the Chinese Communist Party. One of the most important figures sure to remain unacknowledged is of course Zhao Ziyang (赵紫阳), the 1980s premier whose name cannot be spoken.
China is now encountering a crisis of confidence, with public sentiment quietly in turmoil. Every misstep made by those in power pricks the nerves of society. Against this backdrop, the Party knows that it must tread carefully when it comes to the commemoration of the 40th anniversary of reform and opening, that it must tiptoe through the minefield and minimise all risks to itself. But there are, at the same time, plenty of foolish officials who glimpse an opportunity and act impulsively, becoming bulls in the china shop.
I haven’t the slightest idea who conceived of this very public act of adulation in the People’s Daily. Judging from the immediate results, however, it seems to have tossed a stone into the calm pool of public opinion, dividing society. One is reminded of the old saying: “The world might be free of trouble, if only fools would not go in search of it.”