Author: David Bandurski

Now Executive Director of the China Media Project, leading the project’s research and partnerships, David originally joined the project in Hong Kong in 2004. He is the author of Dragons in Diamond Village (Penguin), a book of reportage about urbanization and social activism in China, and co-editor of Investigative Journalism in China (HKU Press).

A Rock Star's "Fengqiao Experience"

Written by David Bandurski on . Posted in China Newspeak.

On November 26, Chen Yufan (陈羽凡), a member of the celebrity rock duo Yu Quan (羽泉), was arrested in Beijing along with his girlfriend on charges of drug use and possession. According to a post made to the official WeChat account of police in the city’s western district of Shijingshan (石景山), Chen was arrested in “a local residence” after police received “a community tip” (群众举报). 

The community members providing the tip off were apparently from a “community group,” or qunzhong zuzhi (群众组织) known as the “Old Neighbours of Shijingshan” (石景山老街坊).

In Beijing, this is one of a number of fairly well-known and well-documented community groups. Others include the likes of the “Chaoyang Masses” (朝阳群众), the “Haiding Internet Users” (海淀网友), the “Xicheng Aunties” (西城大妈) and the “Fengtai Advising Squad” (丰台劝导队).

These groups point to an emerging, and already quite developed, new model of community management in China that is being linked quite explicitly to a Mao-era experiment in social management known as the “Fengqiao experience,” or fengqiao jingyan (枫桥经验) — an experiment President Xi Jinping has voiced enthusiastic support for since he was the top leader of Zhejiang province 15 years ago, and which now seems to be a core idea for social and public security management in the Xi Era.

A “gridded community management system,” or wanggehua guanli tixi (网格化管理体系), has already been implemented in many areas across China, so that a now popular saying in the media and online goes: “In the north, there are the ‘Chaoyang Masses,’ and in the south the ‘Wulin Aunties'” (北有朝阳群众,南有武林大妈). The “Chaoyang Masses” refers, of course, to the aforementioned Beijing community group, while the “Wulin Aunties,” or “Wulin Volunteers,” refers to a group of around 500,000 mostly older women mobilised in September 2016 in Hangzhou to conduct community sweeps during a meeting of the G20. Images of the “Wulin Volunteers,” sporting their pink vests and caps, were widely reported in the media and on social platforms in 2016. 

As Dushi Kuaibao (都市快报), a commercial newspaper in Hangzhou, remarked at the time: “Whether in Beijing or in Hangzhou, wherever the aunties roam there can be no secrets.” Whenever a new neighbour moves in, said the paper, the aunties know. If a pipe bursts somewhere, the aunties know. 

Two members of the “Wulin Aunties,” deployed in Hangzhou in September 2016, sport their pink vests and caps.

This month marks the 55th anniversary of Mao Zedong’s so-called “Fengqiao experience,” referring to the idea of mobilising the masses at the grassroots of society to enforce proper conduct, political or otherwise. In the earlier Maoist context, this was about the use of the masses to turn “class enemies” onto the right path through direct person-to-person contact and “on-site monitoring and rehabilitation.” For more information on the idea and its history, readers can refer to CMP’s 2013 article on the subject.

The CCP’s Central Commission on Political and Law holds a “2018 Safety Volunteers Service Summit Forum” in Zhejiang, linking the “Fengqiao experience” to present-day neighbourhood patrol groups. Source: Wechat public account “Capital News”.

This year marks the five-year anniversary of Xi Jinping’s national rehabilitation of the “Fengqiao experience” as General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party, and the 15th anniversary of Xi Jinping’s original rehabilitation of the “Fengqiao experience” as Party Secretary of Zhejiang province.

In light of these interlinked and overlapping anniversaries, we have seen a series of themed events across the country — and these can be seen in turn as connected in a roundabout but unmistakable way to Chen Yufan’s recent arrest in Beijing. 

On November 7, the local CCP Committee in Beijing’s Xicheng District jointly hosted an event with the CCP Committee of Hangzhou’s Xicheng District (下城区) that was called — we are not making this up — the “North-South Aunties Dialogue and Exchange Event” (南北大妈对话互动交流活动). This shindig brought together members of community groups across the country to share their, well, tattle-tale experiences, all under the clear banner of the “Fengqiao experience.” 

On November 12, the Chinese Communist Party’s Central Political and Legal Affairs Commission held a themed conference on the “Fengqiao experience” in Shaoxing, Zhejiang province, close to the origins of the concept and phrase in the Zhejiang city of Zhuji (诸暨). At the conference, the commission’s secretary, Guo Shengkun (郭声琨), praised the “Wulin Aunties” and the “Chaoyang Masses” for their “good work and good experiences.” Guo urged the need to create and apply a “‘Fengqiao experience’ for the New Era.”

This, in fact, has already been happening — and China’s countryside has been a major focus of activity. In September this year, the CCP released its Plan for Strategic Revitalisation of the Countryside 2018-2022 (乡村振兴战略规划: 2018-2022), which included explicit reference to Mao Zedong’s 1960’s concept: “[We must] comprehensively promote the ‘Fengqiao experience,'” said the document, “with small matters not leaving the village, and larger matters not leaving the township.” It added: “[We must] explore the tactic of gridded community management, promoting meticulousness and precision in grassroots services and management.”

All of this means that an army of aunties should be on the march in a village near you.

In 1963, when this experiment in social management was attempted in the Fengqiao District of the city of Zhuji, the idea was to “unleash and rely on the masses, adhering to [the idea of] not reporting tensions to superior levels, but rather resolving them locally.” This formed the core idea of what is called the “Fengqiao experience.” At the time, Mao Zedong issued written instructions ordering that the experiment be tried and applied in “various areas.”

On November 25, 2003, almost exactly 15 years ago, Xi Jinping, then Party Secretary of Zhejiang province, hosted a ceremony to commemorate the 40th anniversary of Mao Zedong’s written instructions on the “Fengqiao experience.” At that ceremony, Xi urged the renewal and innovation of the lessons of Fengqiao, saying that “taking the study and promotion of the ‘Fengqiao experience’ in the new era as the chief starting point in strengthening social and public security management.”

A headline on the front page of the official Zhejiang Daily on November 27, 2003 read: “Studying and Innovating the ‘Fengqiao Experience’ to Accurately Handle Internal Contraditions of the People in a New Era: Xi Jinping Delivers Speech, Lü Zushan Presides.” Lü Zushan was at the time the governor of Zhejiang, and therefore Xi Jinping’s number two, but we can suppose that the core ideas involved in that 2003 conference were reflective of Xi’s vision, crafted with those arrayed around him as he edged toward his designation as China’s heir apparent at the 17th National Congress in 2007.

The headline seems in retrospect to offer a tantalising glimpse of core leadership ideas to come. There is talk of “innovation” of a Maoist concept for a “new era” — though “new era” here is xinshiqi (新时期), rather than the much grander xin shidai (新时代) to come. And certainly this year, as China marks the 55th anniversary of the “Fengqiao experience,” the 15th anniversary of the 2003 conference on the concept is also being portrayed as an important political moment that should equally be marked.


A November 2018 conference held in Zhuji, Zhejiang province, celebrates both the 55th anniversary of the “Fengqiao experience” and the 15th anniversary of Xi Jinping’s rehabilitation of the concept.

Xi Jinping, who once rehabilitated the “Fengqiao experience” for a new era in Zhejiang, has now rehabilitated the “Fengqiao experience” for the New Era in China.

In this New Era, Xi Jinping’s vision of “strengthening social and public security management” through mobilisation of the masses can be seen in the activities of such “community organisations” as the “Old Neighbours of Shijingshan” (石景山老街坊), the group whose tattle-tale ways led last Monday to the arrest in Beijing of a Chinese rock ‘n’ roll celebrity, and the cancellation of his band’s 20th anniversary concert.

For Chen Yufan, as for millions of his fans, this rude awakening will be the first, and probably not the last, “Fengqiao experience.”


This article was written in collaboration with researcher Dorothy Dong. 

Propaganda in the Era of "Post-Truth"

Written by David Bandurski on . Posted in Headlines and Hashtags.

When it comes to information and public opinion, the Chinese Communist Party has never had much need for that fanciful thing we call the truth. Truth is only ever a matter of the Party’s interest, something formed and unformed like a dirty ball of clay by however many hands can manage to shape it on the potter’s wheel of power. This basic fact about the political contingency of truth is the foundation of propaganda and media policy in the People’s Republic of China.
Which is why it is interesting to find articles emerging from Chinese officialdom, like this one published recently in China Press Publication Radio Film and Television Journal (中国新闻出版广电报), tossing in the term “post-truth,” or houzhenxiang (后真相), as though China shares in some general global truth malaise, driven by the rise of social media and mobile information. “In the era of ‘post-truth,'” says the article, “facts and data capable of reflecting the essence and changing nature of things are in extremely short supply, and mainstream [Party-state] media must place even greater emphasis on facts and data.”
Facts, of course, are generally in short supply in China not because authoritative sources are few and far between, or because people are driven by hopes and emotional impulses over rationality, but because — first and foremost — facts are regarded as politically hazardous insofar as they might coalesce into some form of truth not of the Party’s making. 

Post-truth has been understood in the West as a state in which the emphatic repetition of talking points is all that matters, in which facts are rhetorically weaponised. But the post-truth world is, domestically at least, the world the Party has always lived in, the garden it has carefully tended. The major difference, a significant one, being that the Party dominates the act of speech and the power of repetition. China is the promised land of post-truth, where the bullies have broken every pulpit but their own. Donald Trump, eat your heart out.  

What is clear from the piece in China Press Publication Radio Film and Television Journal is that Party pundits have seized on the notion of “post-truth” as yet another hook on which they can hang their accusations against voices emerging on the periphery, through social media and WeChat public accounts — the so-called “self-media,” or zimeiti (自媒体). The presumption is that media directly affiliated with the Party-state, which in China are referred to as “mainstream media,” or zhuliu meiti (主流媒体), are more reflective of the truth, more authoritative. This is easy enough to understand when we remember that we are talking here about the Party’s truth. When the Party’s will is standard, its media “mainstream,” all else is but pale shadow.
The piece is written by Zhao Shulan (赵淑兰), a journalist at the official Economic Daily. It is essentially the affirmation by a state press-worker of the role of the “mainstream media” in guiding or channeling public opinion in society in the “correct” direction, that most reflective of the Party’s truth-interest. Noting that self-media can be an “unstable factor” in the forming of public opinion, Zhao asserts (perfectly in line with the Party, of course) that “constant strengthening and elevating of the news and public opinion channeling capacity . . . . of the mainstream [state-run] media — ensuring the strengthening of correct public opinion channeling —  is an urgent and unavoidable topic of major significance.”
But how?
The key for Zhao is “subtlety,” or qiǎo jìnr (巧劲儿), which provides the headline of her piece: “Using ‘Subtlety’ To Raise the Channeling Power of Mainstream Media.” Subtlety in this case means the selective deployment of facts to make the case that best channels public opinion in a direction favourable to the Party. Zhao would probably not put it in exactly that way, but as she discusses recent cases such as the debate in China over “consumption downgrades,” her faith in the Party’s truth is overriding. A deep and abiding conviction that if you arrange the facts in just such a way, they will form the pre-truth of the Party’s infallibility and rightness.
“In the internet era,” Zhao concludes, “society is becoming a crystal lens, and the facts and the truth cannot be concealed.”
But certainly, oh certainly, they can be properly arranged.
 

Using “Subtlety” To Raise the Channeling Power of Mainstream Media
By Zhao Shulan (赵淑兰)
Lately, profound changes to structural patterns in the media and to the public opinion ecology have meant that the news and public opinion channeling of the mainstream [state-run] media face new terrain, new circumstances and new problems. In particular, the hyping done by certain self-media (自媒体) and online media out of commercial considerations often proves an unstable factor in the broadcasting of public opinion and its channeling [or control by the Party-state]. Therefore, the constant strengthening and elevating of the news and public opinion channeling capacity (新闻舆论引导力), broadcasting power (传播力), influence (影响力) and credibility (公信力) of the mainstream [state-run] media — ensuring the strengthening of correct public opinion channeling — is an urgent and unavoidable topic of major significance.
Consolidating Mainstream Public Opinion in Actively Responding to Public Opinion Flash Points
Recently, a post originating from self-media advancing the view that China’s private sector should step back [in favor of greater public sector involvement] made the rounds on the internet and created a storm of attention. The post said: “China’s private sector economy has already fulfilled its task of supporting the development of the state economy, and it should exit the field.” Concerning this [argument], the Economic Daily quickly responded with a post to its WeChat public account that same day, calling on all to be alert to and reject the stirring up of public anxieties over the idea that “the private sector must exit the field.” The post received more than 30 million hits within a short period of time, effectively guiding public opinion in the correct direction (有效引领了舆论的正确走向) and earning widespread praise. The next day, the Economic Daily again ran a commentary that clearly and unambiguously emphasised that the “Two Unshakeables” (两个毫不动摇) [policy of Xi Jinping, stating that both state and private sectors must be encouraged] could not be abandoned. The People’s Daily and many other mainstream media followed in making their voices heard, joining strength to propagate the attitude and policies of the Party and the government concerning the development of private businesses.
In the current public opinion ecology (舆论生态), public opinion flash points and their repercussions generally arise as suddenly as typhoons, with rapidity and violence. When these public opinion storms emerge, people are generally unable to make proper sense of things, incapable of distinguishing up from down and left from right — and often, thought they hear only thunder, they assume there must be rain. If the mainstream media step forward with courage, and at the right moment, helping people make sense of the confusion, formulating a plan, then everyone can get on the right path, finding their way through the blizzard, and this means that public opinion leadership can be better exercised and the influence of the mainstream public opinion [of the Party-state] can be effectively consolidated.
Public opinion leadership is about timeliness, and “time” is all about [seizing the] opportunity. Only be seizing timelinesses can a beneficial result be expected, and only with such beneficial results can we talk about strong and effective public opinion leadership. The assertive entry of the Economic Daily through its new media presence in the early stages of the “private sector exit” commotion, enabling clear positioning and clarification of errors, separating true and false, was a display of speed and timeliness, and it allowed seizure of the high ground and authority in public opinion face-off over economic questions.
Adequately Deploying Facts and Data to Raise the Credibility of Public Opinion Leadership
Using facts and data to speak is an effective way of strengthening the results of news and communication. In receiving news reports, what audiences want most are facts. And data are an integral part of the facts. On the domestic internet and in self-media at present, there is often certain information that stands between fact and rumour, or is outright rumour, and the goal of the disseminator certainly often to grab attention and draw the interest of the audience. In other cases they may wish irresponsibly to unburden their emotions, to make a name for themselves, or even to pursue hidden agendas (别有用心). In the era of “post-truth” (后真相), facts and data capable of reflecting the essence and changing nature of things are in extremely short supply, and mainstream [Party-state] media must place even greater emphasis on facts and data.
In August this year, a reporter for the Economic Daily went to Zhongguancun with the assignment of reporting on the results of innovation [in the Chinese economy]. In the midst of their reporting, they learned that a scientist formerly with the U.S. National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) had completely relocated the business he had started in the U.S. to Zhongguancun. Why would he make such a decision? He told the reporter: “I’ve worked in Silicon Valley before, and the pace of work there is pretty fast, but that pace is maybe half of what you find here in Zhongguancun.”
“As an entrepreneur, I vote with my feet when it comes to selecting the right environment for business,” [the source continued]. “I choose the place where things are best.” Top science and technology talent is increasingly choosing to gather in Zhongguancun, and in China. This fact illustrates that China’s science and technology development and industrial upgrading are something no country can contain. These real choices, ideals, efforts and goals define the prospects of China’s science and technology innovation and economic restructuring and upgrading.
To enhance their news and public opinion channeling capacity, mainstream media must pay special attention to styles and methods (方式方法). One extremely important aspect of this is to draw a concentric circle (同心圆) around public opinion in society rather than run counter to it. Drawing a concentric circle demands that we unite with the direction and policies of the Party and government, and that we identify these with the thoughts and hopes of the population. Only by remaining rooted in the concerns of the ordinary people can the media ensure their voices are accepted; and only by achieving acceptance can [the media] achieve resonance with the public and obtain favourable communication results.
Recently, self-media and online media have been talking a lot about “consumption downgrades” (消费降级), and at base this coverage is about spreading a pessimistic attitude. This is an issue on which the mainstream [Party-state] media cannot so easily achieve channeling through refutation; they cannot simply shout in response, saying these statements [about consumption] are false. But if they are able to calmly discuss the issue with self-media on a basis of equality, analysing the mechanics of how consumption increases or decreases, then the public opinion results can still be decent.
In fact, some mainstream [Party-state] media are not different from self-media and online media in terms of understanding why consumption rises or falls, and they simply “meet the enemy head on” before they even work out the sense of the matter at hand. Actually, the rise and fall of consumption corresponds to structural changes in consumption, and recent drops in consumption are really about consumption prices. This is a different problem, a different concept, with a different meaning, and can’t be confused with [a drop in consumption as consumer behaviour]. Objectively speaking, the self-media and online media embellishments over consumption declines are essentially an outpouring of displeasure over the pressures caused by exorbitant housing prices and rising commodity prices. If we take a more rational and expert approach, it’s not hard to see that drops in consumer prices have come not with cold consumer sentiment but with an explosion in consumption. This tells us that the drop in consumer prices is not caused by a drop in household incomes. If we then look further, we can see that the red-hot sales of low-price goods has to due with the return of more rational consumption attitudes, and with the wave in innovation of modes of consumption [in China]. At the same time, using data to show that consumption is unchanged can also burst the bubble of this idea of consumption downgrading.
. . . . If we offer a lesson to mainstream media in terms of public opinion leadership, I’m afraid it should be that . . . . with a correct sense of political orientation, public opinion guidance and value orientation, we should conduct public opinion leadership with attention to the expert professional art of redirection, rather than shouting at high volume and lecturing those we seek to guide from a position of superiority, compelling their submission.
In the internet era, society is becoming a crystal lens (水晶体), and the facts and the truth cannot be concealed. The mainstream [Party-state] media need to be attentive to social concerns, and official [Party-state] departments also need to support the mainstream media in responding to these social concerns, revealing the facts through the mainstream media in a timely manner.

 

Why is Huawei Out in the Cold?

Written by David Bandurski on . Posted in Headlines and Hashtags.

December is just around the corner. That means the Chinese Communist Party is gearing up for the commemoration of the 40th anniversary of “reform and opening up,” which formally dates back to the 3rd Plenary Session of the 11th Central Committee of the CCP,  held in Beijing from December 18 to December 22, 1978.
Yesterday, the Party’s official People’s Daily newspaper published a list of 100 names of people it deems to have made “outstanding achievements” (杰出贡献) in the course of reform and opening. The list, introduced with an invitation to readers to make their own nominations, includes many well-known business people, the likes of Alibaba founder and CEO Jack Ma (马云), and Tencent founder Pony Ma Huateng (马化腾).

The listing for Jack Ma drew some raised eyebrows on social media and in both domestic and overseas media because it confirmed Ma’s membership in the Chinese Communist Party, which has not previously been acknowledged. Many have long assumed Ma was probably unaffiliated — or perhaps even a member of one of China’s consultative parties. Given Ma’s visibility internationally as one of the most important faces of Chinese tech innovation and business success, his outing as a Chinese Communist Party member certainly makes for eye-catching news.
But another detail regarding the People’s Daily list of “outstanding achievers” that drew the attention of Chinese was the fact that the list did not include Ren Zhengfei (任正非), the founder of Huawei, generally regarded as one of China’s biggest global business success stories of the reform period. Huawei is today the world’s largest manufacturer of telecommunications equipment, and just this year it overtook Apple to become the word’s number-two manufacturer of smartphones.
How can the Party’s flagship newspaper overlook the “outstanding achievements” made by Huawei and its chairman, Ren Zhengfei, currently ranked 83rd on Forbes’ “China Rich List 2018”?
Some have speculated that this was an intentional act of concealment connected to recent difficulties in the US-China relationship. As a post on the Wechat public account “Zhi Gu Qu Shi” (智谷趋势) argued yesterday:

This makes one think of the previous ZTE crisis, and also strict controls recently announced by the US government on [Chinese] tech exports, and wonder whether the relevant departments [in China] didn’t decide intentionally to hide [Huawei from this list] against the backdrop of US-China tensions? After all, Huawei’s expansion in the US could at any time be seen as “state conduct” and then the US Committee on Foreign Investment might make things difficult.

Few would take issue with the assertion that Huawei has emerged as one of the most successful and innovative of Chinese private enterprises in the reform period. As for its alleged links to the government, there are so far little more than guesses, though such conjecture is sure to haunt Huawei as it might any Chinese company.
In fact, all of China’s major enterprises are linked in countless ways to the government. When it comes to the accusation that this or that move on their part is “state conduct,” Alibaba and Tencent are equally as vulnerable.
But we can say with some certainty that the People’s Daily‘s publication yesterday of the 100-name list is a political wound in Huawei’s side.
For Ren Zhengfei, absence from the list leads to one of two very uncomfortable conclusions. Either he is in the unfortunate position of accepting his lot as one whose efforts do not constitute “outstanding achievement” within the Party’s reform and opening pantheon (a political indignity); or he must eat the bitter fruit of concealment, tacitly accepting his compromisingly close links with the government.
For reasons unclear, the list also excludes Hong Kong business magnate Li Ka-shing (李嘉诚) and economist Wu Jinglian (吴敬琏), both so conspicuous in their absences that storms of conjecture are inevitable.
This list, in short, is a lightning rod.
As China looks back, officially, across the expanse of reform and opening, what to conceal and how is of course an important question for the Chinese Communist Party. One of the most important figures sure to remain unacknowledged is of course Zhao Ziyang (赵紫阳), the 1980s premier whose name cannot be spoken.
China is now encountering a crisis of confidence, with public sentiment quietly in turmoil. Every misstep made by those in power pricks the nerves of society. Against this backdrop, the Party knows that it must tread carefully when it comes to the commemoration of the 40th anniversary of reform and opening, that it must tiptoe through the minefield and minimise all risks to itself. But there are, at the same time, plenty of foolish officials who glimpse an opportunity and act impulsively, becoming bulls in the china shop.
I haven’t the slightest idea who conceived of this very public act of adulation in the People’s Daily. Judging from the immediate results, however, it seems to have tossed a stone into the calm pool of public opinion, dividing society. One is reminded of the old saying: “The world might be free of trouble, if only fools would not go in search of it.”
 

The Video That Sank a Fashion House

Written by David Bandurski on . Posted in Headlines and Hashtags.

This week we have quite a mix of stories topping the list from Chinese media, including an offensive chopstick video that will probably sink the fortunes of fashion house Dolce & Gabbana in China, a second-place marathon finish that put (excessive?) Chinese nationalism in the spotlight, and an order to one of the country’s most successful broadcasters, Hunan TV, to tone down its entertainment content.
Another significant story this week is about a video conference in which the Central Propaganda Department apparently urged government and Party organs, and Party members, to make sure they are reading official Party newspaper and periodicals. That should be read as another signal of the Chinese Communist Party’s determination to maintain and renew dominance over public opinion in the face of a mobile-driven revolution in communications.
___________________
THIS WEEK IN CHINA’S MEDIA
November 17-23, 2018
➢ Dolce & Gabbana sinks in China after insulting online video and insensitive response
➢ Official WeChat public account of Central Political and Legal Affairs Commission comments on marathon flag incident
➢ Central Propaganda Department holds video conference on circulation of official Party newspapers and periodicals, Gansu Daily emphasizes need for Party officials to read Party publications
➢ Hunan TV ruled “too focused on entertainment” in official inspection tour, set for more news content during prime time
➢  Local police in Quanzhou apologize after Caixin magazine runs account of intimidation of journalist covering local chemical spill
 
[1] Dolce & Gabbana sinks in China after insulting online video and insensitive response
Italian luxury fashion house Dolce & Gabbana inspired fury in China on November 18 with a short advertising video called “Eating With Chopsticks,” in which a Chinese model was shown attempting to eat Italian foods such as pizza with chopsticks, accompanied by remarks from a Chinese narrator that many viewers found insulting to traditional Chinese culture and to women. At one point, as the model attempts to eat a ridiculously sized cannoli, the narrator asks: “Is it too big for you?”

Worsening matters, the immediate response to the rising controversy by Stefano Gabbana, the fashion designer who co-founded the fashion house with Domenico Dolce, was to unambiguously insult China and Chinese in private messages that were leaked to the media.
In an apparently heated exchange with Instagram user @michaelatranova, Gabbana refused to take responsibility for the controversy or disavow the video. “It was deleted from Chinese social media because my office is stupid as the superiority of the Chinese,” he wrote. “And from now on in all the interviews that I will do international I will say that the country of [poop emojis] is China.”
“China Ignorant Dirty Smelling Mafia,” he added with unmistakable venom.
On November 21, a Dolce & Gabbana fashion event called “The Great Show,” planned for that evening, was cancelled. The show had previously been billed as the biggest fashion show in the house’s 33-year history. The China market has recently accounted for roughly one-third of Dolce & Gabbana’s global sales.
The next day, major Chinese online retailers such as Xiaohongshu (小红书) and Ymatou (洋码头) dropped Dolce & Gabbana.
On November 23, Domenico Dolce and Stefano Gabbana finally sought to address what was now a full-blown crisis with an apology video in which they said “sorry” in Chinese. But by this point it was already too late to stem the damage, and the outright rejection of the D&G brand and even more extreme expressions of Chinese nationalism became a form of political correctness. Those trying to inject nuance into the discussion had to tread very carefully.
Hu Xijin, the editor-in-chief of the Global Times newspaper, which is generally among the first to fan nationalist responses to international affairs, wrote on Weibo: “We see one Italian fly into a rage against China in a chat and this quickly becomes something that ignites nationalist sentiment throughout public opinion — with celebrities also openly expressing their feelings about it, some even directly appealing to nationalism. This scene strikes one as somehow not right. On one side is an Italian individual and company, and over here on our side we quickly make it an issue for our entire society. How is it we make this out to be something like the Mukden Incident or the Marco Polo Bridge Incident?
Tsinghua University professor Guo Yuhua (郭于华) wrote on November 24 on his WeChat public account that the readiness to denounce so fully and harshly anyone who insults China is a mark of fragile confidence. Guo’s post was quickly removed by censors.
Key Sources:
Beijing Youth Daily (北京青年报): D&G设计师被曝辱华 上海大秀宣布取消 品牌方道歉并称“设计师Instagram账号被盗” 原定出席其时装秀明星纷纷取消计划
AND: 京东官方声明称下架相关商品 小红书和洋码头也官方回应下架相关商品 D&G中国在线销售渠道全断了
Guangming Daily (光明日报): D&G自取其辱 道歉须有诚意
WeChat public account “People’s Daily” (人民日报): 刚刚，D&G宣布取消上海大秀！此前中国众星抵制该涉嫌辱华品牌
Sina Weibo account of Hu Xijin (@胡锡进): TEXT TEXT TEXT
WeChat public account “Laobin Dong Lei” (老兵东雷): 那位把D&G带入深坑的网友，谢谢你！
[2] Official WeChat public account of Central Political and Legal Affairs Commission comments on marathon flag incident
During the Lake Taihu Marathon, held in the city of Suzhou on November 18, female long-distance runner He Yinli (何引丽) twice had her form thrown off by race volunteers who rushed onto the course and placed the Chinese national flag in her hands. In the end, He Yinli finished just 5 seconds behind Ethiopian runner Ayantu Abera Demisse, accepting the second-place prize. The actions, broadcast live on Chinese state television, drew criticism from commentators and were the subject of lively commentary online.
On November 20, a spokesperson for Wisdom Sports, which hosts the Run China marathon series along with China Central Television and the China Athletic Association, said that the handing off of the national flag had not been intentional, emphasising that these were spontaneous acts. But media quoted some sources as saying that the handing out of national flags to Chinese competitors was standard practice for the Run China series. https://www.scmp.com/news/china/society/article/2173995/chinese-marathon-runner-loses-race-after-marshal-tries-hand-her
The WeChat public account “Central Political-Legal Committee Chang’an Sword” (中央政法委长安剑) pointed out that the International Association of Athletics Federations, the global sports governing body, has ruled that even judges may not step out onto marathon courses. It is not a courtesy to destroy fairness, said the account, nor is it patriotism to neglect the rules. The account called the acts at the marathon “crass red worship” (低级红) that “profaned the love of country.”
Key Sources:
Tencent Sports (腾讯体育): 国内马拉松赛场终点前递国旗成固定环节 网友呼吁取消
WeChat public account “Central Political-Legal Committee Chang’an Sword” (中央政法委长安剑) : 递国旗是礼遇？这是典型的低级红高级黑
[3] Central Propaganda Department holds video conference on circulation of official Party newspapers and periodicals, Gansu Daily emphasizes need for Party officials to read Party publications
On November 16, China’s Central Propaganda Department hosted a video conference dealing with the circulation of Party publications. The video conference was reportedly intended to convey the demand to Party and government organs at all levels that they must strengthen their “subscription work” (订阅工作) and “increase expenditure guarantees” (加强经费保障) — meaning essentially that they must spend money on subscriptions to official publications to ensure that “the circulations of Party newspapers and periodicals remain stable” (党报党刊发行数量稳定). The conference also urged the need for Party publications to use electronic reading boards (电子阅报栏) and new media channels to expand their reach among media audiences, including Party members and officials.
The conference almost certainly reflects broader concern within the Party leadership that the digital transformation of the media is making it more difficult for traditional Party media to make themselves heard.
On November 19, Gansu Daily, the official newspaper of the provincial Party committee of Gansu province, began a three-day series of front-page commentaries saying that “Party members and cadres must read Party newspapers and periodicals.” The first commentary said that the question of whether or not Party members and official subscribe to Party publications is not a matter of personal preference, but a reflection of “whether or not they invest their hearts in the voice of the Party.”
Key Sources:
WeChat public account “Media Observer” (传媒大观察): 《甘肃日报》连发三天系列评：不看党报是对党的声音不上心
Gansu Daily (甘肃日报): 让党报党刊成“精神大餐”——“党员干部要看党报党刊”系列谈之一
AND: 加强学习从读党报开始——“党员干部要看党报党刊”系列谈之二
AND: 落实意识形态的一项重要工作——“党员干部要看党报党刊”系列谈之三
[4] Hunan TV ruled “too focused on entertainment” in official inspection tour, set for more news content during prime time
Official state media reported this week that a central Party inspection group (中央第八巡视组) had conducted inspections of Hunan TV from February to July of this year, and had relayed results to the Party’s provincial committee in Hunan complaining that the network’s programming was “too focused on entertainment” (过度娱乐化). China National Radio reported on November 19 that the provincial leadership has instructed Hunan TV to deal with “three excesses” (过度) — namely, “over-concentration of performing arts and entertainment (过度集中综艺娱乐), over-reliance on entertainment celebrities (过度依赖明星艺人), and over-prioritisation of commercial values and market results (过度追求商业价值和市场效果).”
Reports said Hunan TV planned to address these concerns first by increasing the amount of news programming during prime time, and also by increasing “public welfare programming” (公益类节目) and public service announcements.
Key Sources:
CNR Online (央广网): 解决卫视过度娱乐化、严惩违规吃喝 湖南做好巡视“后半篇文章”
Hunan Daily (湖南日报): 立行立改 猛药去疴——湖南卫视整治“过度娱乐化”见成效
[5] Local police in Quanzhou apologize after Caixin magazine runs account of intimidation of journalist covering local chemical spill 
On November 17, Caixin, one of China’s most respected news outlets, ran a story called “A Chronicle of Fear in a Quanzhou Hotel” (泉州酒店惊魂记), which detailed how the writer, journalist Zhou Chen (周辰), had been intimidated by local police in the city of Quanzhou, in coastal Fujian province, as she attempted to report on a chemical spill at a local oil port earlier this month.
In her account, Zhou said she had reached the scene of the spill soon after initial news of the accident emerged on November 4. But on November 11, as she continued to report the story, she alleges that she was tailed by a law enforcement officer. Later that night, she says, she was invited to the lobby of the hotel where she was staying to have a talk with the propaganda chief of Quanzhou’s port district — an invitation she declined.
Typically, such invitations in China can offer officials or others an opportunity to offer journalists payment to back off of a story, or to otherwise pressure them to drop their inquiries. Editors at media with a stronger sense of professionalism, such as Caixin, will generally instruct their reporters to avoid such traps.
Zhou Chen then wrote and filed her report on the spill, heading off to bed early. She was already in bed when she heard the sound of a keycard opening the hotel room door. Four men wearing police uniforms barged into the room, saying they were from the local police station and asking to see her identification. They claimed they were conducting searches for prostitutes and their clients.

The official WeChat account of the People’s Daily reports the apology from Quanzhou police over the November 11 intimidation of a Caixin journalist.
A bald-headed officer, says Zhou, instructed two of his deputies to search the toilet and balcony to see if anyone else was present. During the search, she says, they never produced any identification. After the men left, Zhou received a phone call from the hotel service desk apologising and saying that the police had demanded that they provide a copy of the keycard for Zhou’s room, and confirming that they had not demanded keycards for any rooms other than Zhou’s.
On November 20, the Quanzhou Public Security Bureau issued a formal apology and said four officers were under investigation for overstepping their authority and causing “a negative social impact.” Three of these were “auxiliary officers,” the bureau said, meaning that they were charged with assisting police. The bureau also said that a deputy bureau chief was facing disciplinary measures.
In a post this week, the WeChat public account “Zero Distance Pollution Squad” (零距离污染特攻队), which tracks pollution issues in China, said that based on its observations, the spill in Quanzhou is larger than the 6.97 tons still officially reported by the local government.
Key Sources:
WeChat public account “Journalist’s Station” (记者站): 财新女记者泉州采访被查房：派出所长作检讨，民警被停职
Caixin Online (财新网): 国风|泉州酒店惊魂记
WeChat public account “Zero Distance Pollution Squad” (零距离污染特攻队): 追问“6.97吨碳九泄露量”真相
 

Journalist Exposes Police Pressure

Written by David Bandurski on . Posted in Headlines and Hashtags.

Journalists routinely face pressure and harassment in China in the course of their work. But every once in a while, an opportunity comes to push back — particularly if their work involves clear instances of negligence at the local level, where officials are not powerful enough to go head-to-head with national or regional media.
Such was the case this week as Caixin, one of China’s most respected news outlets, ran a story called “A Chronicle of Fear in a Quanzhou Hotel” (泉州酒店惊魂记), which detailed how the writer, journalist Zhou Chen (周辰), had been intimidated by local police in the city of Quanzhou, in coastal Fujian province, as she attempted to report on a chemical spill at a local oil port earlier this month.

In her account, Zhou said she had reached the scene of the spill soon after initial news of the accident emerged on November 4. But on November 11, as she continued to report the story, she alleges that she was tailed by a law enforcement officer. Later that night, she says, she was invited to the lobby of the hotel where she was staying to have a talk with the propaganda chief of Quanzhou’s port district — an invitation she declined.
Typically, such invitations in China can offer officials or others an opportunity to offer journalists payment to back off of a story, or to otherwise pressure them to drop their inquiries. Editors at media with a stronger sense of professionalism, such as Caixin, will generally instruct their reporters to avoid such traps.
Zhou Chen then wrote and filed her report on the spill, heading off to bed early. She was already in bed when she heard the sound of a keycard opening the hotel room door. Four men wearing police uniforms barged into the room, saying they were from the local police station and asking to see her identification. They claimed they were conducting searches for prostitutes and their clients.
A bald-headed officer, says Zhou, instructed two of his deputies to search the toilet and balcony to see if anyone else was present. During the search, she says, they never produced any identification. After the men left, Zhou received a phone call from the hotel service desk apologising and saying that the police had demanded that they provide a copy of the keycard for Zhou’s room, and confirming that they had not demanded keycards for any rooms other than Zhou’s.
On Monday, following publication of Zhou’s account, a communications official from the Public Security Bureau in Quanzhou said that the allegations made by Zhou Chen were under investigation. Yesterday, the Quanzhou Public Security Bureau issued a formal apology and said four officers were under investigation for overstepping their authority and causing “a negative social impact.” Three of these were “auxiliary officers,” the bureau said, meaning that they were charged with assisting police. The bureau also said that a deputy bureau chief was facing disciplinary measures.
 

Account Unmasks Its Powerful Backing

Written by David Bandurski on . Posted in Headlines and Hashtags.

On November 20, the Wechat public account “Chang’an Jian” (长安剑), which translates as “Chang’an Sword,” openly confirmed through a simple act of rebranding what many have long suspected — that it is in fact an official account operated by the Central Political and Legal Affairs Commission (中央政法委), the body directly under the Chinese Communist Party taking charge of political and legal affairs. More specifically, the purpose of the commission, and its local and regional affiliates, is to implement Party policy in and among legal institutions — and its operations have been most visible in major initiatives such as crackdowns on organised crime. [Featured Image: Secretary general of the Central Political and Legal Affairs Commission, Chen Yixin.]

The new logo of “Chang’an Sword” proudly announces its association with the powerful Party commission.
Reporting that the”Chang’an Sword” public account had changed its name to “Central Political-Legal Commission Chang’an Sword” (中央政法委长安剑), directly linking itself to the powerful office, the official China News Service said that “in three years of operation, this is the first time [the account] has made its identity openly known to the public, and the long-time guesses are now confirmed.”
Party and government organs in China have redoubled their efforts to establish a strong presence on social media platforms over the past few years, part of a broader shift of official information channels into the age of mobile media.
In a Christmas Day speech in 2015, during a visit to the People’s Liberation Army Daily (and several months ahead of a major media address in which he said media “must be surnamed Party” and serve the leadership), President Xi Jinping said the state must capitalise on changes in the media landscape. “Right now, media patterns, the public opinion ecology, target audiences and communication technologies are all undergoing profound change ,” he said, “and the internet in particular is driving a transformation in the media sector such as we have never seen before.”
“Wherever the readers are, wherever the viewers are, that is where propaganda reports must extend their tentacles, and that is where we find the focal point and end point of propaganda and ideology work.”
Xi’s remarks came as official public accounts on WeChat, Jinri Toutiao (今日头条) and other platforms were already proliferating. According to Xinhua News Agency, “Chang’an Sword” appeared on September 24, 2015. The account was positioned at the time as being “non-governmental” (民间身份), but reflecting an official position on political and legal affairs, with the stated goal of “promoting the spirit of rule of law” (弘扬法治精神).
Back in May this year, Chen Yixin (陈一新), secretary general of the Central Political and Legal Affairs Commission, created a stir online when he outlined what he called “the Six Grabs,” or liu ge zhua (六个抓), referring to six areas where his office and its affiliates needed to focus their efforts. Chen’s sixth grab, “grabbing Big Vs” (a reference to social media users with large fan bases), pointed to the need to develop trusted social media channels, on WeChat and other platforms, to share official information. When internet users read, however, that a top law-enforcement official was talking about “grabbing Big Vs,” they mistakenly assumed the intention was to arrest influential account holders.
More comments from Chinese users on the recent unmasking of “Chang’an Sword” are available at this Chinese-language post.

Tougher Days Loom for "Self-Media"

Written by David Bandurski on . Posted in Headlines and Hashtags.

Our roundup of top media stories this week is dominated by the Cyberspace Administration of China (CAC), which is having a busy time as it pushes a broad cleanup of social media publishing platforms, or “self-media” (自媒体). New regulations released by the agency on Thursday ordered internet information services of “a public opinion nature” (舆论属性) or “having the capacity for social mobilization” (社会动员能力) to implement a “voluntary” system of security evaluations designed to ensure that self-media — and even the unforeseen information products of the future — are under strict control.
These new regulations could, in fact, have a deep impact on the vibrance of the self-publishing environment, and provision of services, on platforms like WeChat. See the relevant comments below from media expert Wang Sixin.
Also this week, Hu Shuli, the founder and publisher of Caixin, offered a peek at how her media group has been performing since it introduced a paid subscription model back in October 2017.
___________________
THIS WEEK IN CHINA’S MEDIA
November 11-16, 2018
➢ Letters of contrition from former cyber chief Lu Wei put on display at National Museum of China
➢ Cyberspace Administration of China (CAC) brings self-media platforms (自媒体平台) in for discussions ahead of cleanup campaign
➢ Hu Shuli reveals the state of Caixin’s subscription model since introduction last year
➢ Cyberspace Administration of China (CAC) introduces new regulation calling for security evaluations for internet information service providers
[1] Letters of contrition from former cyber chief Lu Wei put on display at National Museum of China

Handwritten letters at the National Museum of China attributed to former CAC head Lu Wei. Image: Global Times Online.
As a new exhibit called “Major Transformation: Celebrating 40 Years of Reform and Opening,” opened its doors at the National Museum of China, visitors found that the exhibit contained “letters of remorse,” or chanhuishu (忏悔书), from Lu Wei (鲁炜) the former deputy minister of the Central Propaganda Department who for several years serviced as head of the Cyberspace Administration of China and was the country’s most visible face of internet control. Lu Wei was detained in an internal corruption probe back in November 2017, and plead guilty to charges of bribery in his trial last month. A formal verdict and sentencing are expected soon.
In one of the handwritten letters on display at the museum, Lu Wei wrote: “I was in severe violation of six major points of discipline . . . . and my errors were many, deep and disgusting, doing major harm to the work of the Party and blackening the Party’s reputation.”
A portion of Lu Wei’s letter mentioning his wife and his personal life drew particular attention online in China, some readers remarking that it had all the hallmarks of the marching of criminals through the streets (游街示众). Lu Wei wrote: “My conduct resulted in great harm to her, and we often argued about this. She entirely lost faith in me, and once said to me with grief and indignation: ‘I can’t control you, but before long the Chinese Communist Party will control you.’ How true her words have become!”
Key Sources:
Beijing Youth Daily (北京青年报): 超3万人昨参观“伟大的变革——庆祝改革开放40周年大型展览” 反腐成果引观众点赞 鲁炜等多名落马高官忏悔书曝光
Central Discipline Inspection Commission (中央纪委国家监委网站): 【镜头——庆祝改革开放40周年大型展览】全面推进党的建设新的伟大工程
Xinhua News Agency (新华社): 习近平参观庆祝改革开放40周年大型展览
AND: 庆祝改革开放40周年大型展览开幕 王沪宁出席开幕式并讲话
[2] Cyberspace Administration of China (CAC) brings self-media platforms (自媒体平台) in for discussions ahead of cleanup campaign
Since October 20, the Cyberspace Administration of China has carried out a wide-ranging campaign to assert greater control over so-called “self-media,” or zimeiti (自媒体), a term that refers to accounts on social media that are used for publishing activities. Since the start of the campaign, the CAC has reportedly taken punitive measures against around 9,800 accounts.
According to the CAC, most of these accounts are hosted on the WeChat (微信) and Weibo (微博) platforms, and also include accounts on Jinri Toutiao (今日头条), Baidu (百度), Sohu (搜狐), Phoenix Online (凤凰) and other platforms. Some, said the agency, have distributed “harmful political information” (政治有害信息), have “maliciously falsified Party or national history” (恶意篡改党史国史), have “defamed heroic figures” (诋毁英雄人物), or have “tarred the national image” (抹黑国家形象). Others have spread rumours, trafficked in sensational headlines, included indecent content or committed other “challenges against the moral bottom line.”
As is typical for such actions, the CAC portrayed the campaign as a response to “a fierce response from society” (社会反映强烈).
The CAC announced on November 12 that it would be calling meetings with major platforms, including those mentioned above, and holding them responsible for content violations. The agency said it would push platforms to work in concert to improve a “blacklisting” system (黑名单制度), so that accounts shut down on one platform could not simply reemerge on another platform, or under another account.
Key Sources:
Cyberspace Administration of China (中国网信网): 国家网信办“亮剑”自媒体乱象 依法严管将成为常态
AND: 国家网信办约谈客户端自媒体平台 主体责任不容缺失
CCTV Online (中央电视台): 《焦点访谈》 20181110 自媒体 要自律不要自戕
[3] Hu Shuli reveals the state of Caixin’s subscription model since introduction last year
Hu Shuli (胡舒立), the founder and publisher of Caixin, one of China’s leading financial and current affairs magazines, accepted an interview on November 16 in which she revealed the current state of her group’s subscription model.

Caixin founder Hu Shui. Image from Caixin.
According to the figures Hu provided, the Caixin Pay (财新通) service currently has 200,000 individual subscribers, and Caixin Online logs approximately 100 million page views (PV) per month and 50 million unique visitors (UV). Hu said that readership had risen steadily and was generally higher than that for competitors in the industry.
For Caixin, Hu Shuli said, the switch to a paid subscription model just over a year ago, in October 2017, had been with the hope of finding a sustainable model for survival as a news media “whose core value was on-the-scene reporting.” Hu said she hoped Caixin’s success with the model so far might encourage other media to follow suit, and might also help to change China’s culture of rampant copyright violation.
In an interview with the Associated Press in January this year, Hu Shuli declined to discuss subscription or revenue numbers.
Key Sources:
SCTN (证券时报网): 胡舒立：”财新通”个人付费用户超20万 将推多种方式降低阅读门槛
Tencent (腾讯网): 财新传媒从办会到付费阅读：为什么，想什么，做什么
[4] Cyberspace Administration of China (CAC) introduces new regulation calling for security evaluations for internet information service providers
In new regulations released on November 15, the Cyberspace Administration of China (CAC) required that all providers of internet services of “a public opinion nature” (舆论属性) or “having the capacity for social mobilization” (社会动员能力) “must voluntarily conduct security evaluations” (安全评估). The regulations are designed to create formal mechanisms by which the government can ensure that any and all internet services with the potential to impact the news cycle, set the public agenda or support collective action have systems in place — subject to regular government oversight and participation, and properly supported in terms of personnel and technology — to prevent “security risks.”
For an initial reading and partial translation of the regulations, see our earlier post.
On November 16, the day after the regulations were announced, WeChat announced that it would lower restrictions on personal registration of public accounts from 2 accounts to 1, meaning only a single account would be allowed per verified individual. For companies, the restriction would be lowered from 5 public accounts to 2.
Wang Sixin (王四新), a professor at Communication University of China and director of the Internet Intellectual Property Research Center (网络法与知识产权研究中心), said that the change in restrictions on public account registration at WeChat had to do directly with the release of the new regulations by the CAC. “WeChat has both public opinion nature and social mobilization capacity, and the release of . . . . the new regulation means that WeChat and other internet information service providers that have both public opinion nature and social mobilization capacity will face much greater operational risk,” said Wang. By limiting the number of public accounts that can be registered by users, both individual and corporate, said Wang, WeChat can reduce the pressure stemming for the security evaluation requirements.
Wang Sixin said the new regulations would have an impact not just on platforms like WeChat and Weibo, and on forums and video sites, but would also have an impact on ride-hailing apps like Didi (滴滴约车) and many other services, from education to healthcare.
Key Sources:
Cyberspace Administration of China (中国网信网): 具有舆论属性或社会动员能力的互联网信息服务安全评估规定
WeChat public account “Media Tea Time” (传媒茶话会): 个人只能注册1个公号，这与国家网信办新规有啥关系？

Preventing Cyber Shock

Written by David Bandurski on . Posted in Headlines and Hashtags.

In new regulations released on Thursday, the Cyberspace Administration of China (CAC) required that all providers of internet services of “a public opinion nature” (舆论属性) or “having the capacity for social mobilization” (社会动员能力) “must voluntarily conduct security evaluations” (安全评估). The regulations are designed to create formal mechanisms by which the government can ensure that any and all internet services with the potential to impact the news cycle, set the public agenda or support collective action have systems in place — subject to regular government oversight and participation, and properly supported in terms of personnel and technology — to prevent “security risks.”
The regulations make clear that “security risks” are understood as arising from the online population itself, and we should understand this not as an attempt to make the internet a more secure space for users (through data protection, etc.), but rather a more secure space politically for the government and for the Chinese Communist Party. The regulation is premised on the fundamental fear that communication technologies might overwhelm the government, making it impossible to achieve what has long been a central objective — the control of public opinion in order to ensure social and political stability.
Of particular interest to understanding the impetus behind these regulations are several stipulations contained in Article 3, about the need for active review and reporting on “new technologies or new applications that result in a dramatic shift in terms of the functional attributes of information services . . . . resulting in major changes to the public opinion nature [of communications] or to the capacity for social mobilization.” Right after this comes mention of circumstances “where there is a clear increase in user scale, resulting in major changes to the public opinion nature or capacity for social mobilization of the information service.”
Over the past decade, China’s leadership has repeatedly found itself in a reactive position regarding the impact of new communication technologies such as Weibo or WeChat. But cyber policy under Xi Jinping has become far more proactive. The above language takes into account the potential for shocks that might come as a result of new technologies, or even modification of existing ones. The government does not want to be caught on its back feet. It wants to prepare for and neutralize such shocks, and so incorporating this in the system of “voluntary” security evaluations makes a great deal of sense from the standpoint of this underlying fear.
Our partial translation of the new regulations through the end of Article 6, covering most of the basics, follows:

Regulation on Security Evaluation for Internet Information Services of a Public Opinion Nature or Having Capacity for Social Mobilization

具有舆论属性或社会动员能力的互联网信息服务安全评估规定

Cyberspace Administration of China (CAC)
November 15, 2018
Article 1: In order to strengthen the safety management of internet services of a public opinion nature (舆论属性) or having the capacity for social mobilization (社会动员能力), and of relevant new technologies and uses, in order to regulate internet information service activities, protect national security, social order and the public interest, this regulation is formulated in accordance with the Cybersecurity Law of the People’s Republic of China,
the Regulation on Internet Information Service of the People’s Republic of China and Measures for Security Protection Administration of the International Networking of Computer Information Networks.
Article 2: For the purposes of this regulation, internet services of a public opinion nature or having the capacity for social mobilization include the following circumstances:
(1) The opening of [discussion] forums, blogs, microblogs, chatrooms, communication groups (通讯群组), public accounts, short video, live broadcasting, information sharing, mini programming and other information services or corresponding associated functions.
(2) The opening of other internet information services that provide public channels for voicing of public opinion (公众舆论表达渠道) or the capacity to engage social participation in particular activities (发动社会公众从事特定活动).
Article 3: Providers of internet information services in any of the following circumstances must voluntarily conduct security evaluations (安全评估) and take responsibility for the results of these evaluations:
(1) Having online information services of a public opinion nature or having the capacity for social mobilization, or other information [existing] information services that add such facilities;
(2) Using new technologies or new applications that result in a dramatic shift in terms of the functional attributes of information services, the implementation methods of technologies, or the allocation of foundational resources (基础资源配置), resulting in major changes to the public opinion nature [of communications] or to the capacity for social mobilization;
(3) Where there is a clear increase in user scale, resulting in major changes to the public opinion nature or capacity for social mobilization of the information service;
(4) Where illegal and harmful information is disseminated, demonstrating that the existing security measures cannot effectively prevent online security risks;
(5) Other circumstances when notices made by affiliated offices of the Cyberspace Administration of China at the prefectural level or above (地市级以上) require that security evaluations be carried out.
Article 4: Providers of internet information services may voluntarily conduct security evaluations, or may entrust the process to a third-party security evaluation body.
Article 5: In carrying out security evaluations, providers of internet information services must conduct comprehensive evaluations to determine the the effectiveness of their security measures in terms of the legality of their information services and new technologies or applications, their implementation of laws, administrative regulations, departmental rules (部门规章) and standards, and their effectiveness in preventing security risks, with priority placed on evaluation of the following content:
(1) The situation with regard to determination of the security management personnel, information audit personnel (信息审核人员) and/or the situation with regard to the construction of the security management structure;
(2) Measures to check the true identities of users and maintain their registration information;
(3) Measures to maintain logfiles of the account numbers, times of activity, nature of activity, source IP address and destination address, network source port, client hardware, etcetera, as well as logs of the information sent by the user;
(4) Measures to maintain records for users and distribution groups (通讯群组) of names (名称), nicknames (昵称), bios (简介), notes (备注), logos or signs (标识), information posted (信息发布), [information] shared (转发), comments (评论), as well as records of the prevention or handling of illegal or harmful information through distribution groups and other services;
(5) Technical measures taken to protect personal information and prevent the spread of illegal or harmful information, and the risk that control is lost of social mobilisation functions;
(6) The situation with regard to timely handling of information regarding complaints, [the operation of] informant systems (举报制度), the making public of procedures for complaints and informing [of illegal or harmful information by users];
(7) The situation with regard to the establishment of technical, data and assistance mechanisms to assist cyberspace authorities in carrying out their legal supervision and management of internet information services;
(8) The situation with regard to the establishment of technical, data and assistance mechanisms to assist national security agencies in carrying out their legal investigation of crimes;
Article 6: When internet information service providers discover security risk in the course of security evaluations, they must rectify these in a timely manner and ensure that they these security risks are eliminated.
When security evaluations are carried out, in accord with laws, administrative regulations, departmental rule and standards, these must be compiled as a security evaluation report (安全评估报告). The security evaluation report must include the following content:
(1) Basic information and licensing concerning the functions and service scope of internet information services, the hardware and software facilities involved;
(2) Results in terms of the operation of the security management system and technical measures to prevent risk;
(3) Conclusion of security evaluation;
(4) Other relevant circumstances that require elaboration.
 

Tiger in the River

Written by David Bandurski on . Posted in Headlines and Hashtags.

In the discourse of the Chinese Communist Party, a “tiger” refers to a high-level corrupt official. The tiger I’m writing about here is Qian Yin’an (钱引安), a top official in Shaanxi province who was placed under investigation earlier this month. And the river? The river here is not in fact a river, but a reference to Liangjiahe (梁家河), the village with the character for “river” in its name where President Xi Jinping is said to have spent his formative early years as an official more than four decades ago. Allow me to explain.

On November 1, news that Qian Yin’an was under investigation made the rounds on the internet. At the same time, another point of related interest and speculation gained some traction on social media, based on an article published back in the summertime from the very same Qian Yin’an — praising Xi Jinping in language so obsequious it turns the stomach.
Qian’s essay, which ran in the Study Times journal on August 3, was called: “Searching for Liangjiahe in My Heart.” Study Times is published on a weekly basis by the Central Party School.

Emphasizing his loyalty to the Chinese Communist Party, Qian Yin’an wrote, with a not-so-veiled reference to Xi Jinping Thought ( 习近平思想):

As a cadre in Shaanxi, I have visited Yan’an many times, and I went into Liangjiahe many times. For me, each time was an exercise in refining my sense of Party nature (党性), a baptism of the spirit (灵魂的洗礼). And every time I came away with new thoughts and understanding.
. . . . . There are major teachings in those remote valleys, and those teachings contain great spirit.
. . . . . Systems of thought never come without foundations, and great systems of thought must necessarily take root in great soil (伟大的土地).

In May 2017, Qian Yin’an was promoted to a ministerial level position (省部级) in the leadership, serving as a member of the provincial standing committee in Shaanxi. At that time, an article appeared online that spoke with praise of Qian’s steady rise through the ranks. At the age of 34, it said, Qian Yin’an had served as the deputy chief of a district in the city of Xi’an, later rising to a positions as a district Party secretary in the city, as a deputy major, as mayor of Baoji city, and finally as Party secretary of Baoji city.
“This most recent rise by Qian Yin’an is an affirmation by the Shaanxi Party Committee of Baoji’s development in recent years,” the National Business Daily reported, “and also an acknowledgement of [Qian’s] abilities.”

In Chinese officialdom, leaders of prefectural-level cities (地市级) and above generally leave traces in official news coverage. Qian Yin’an appeared for the first time online in 2009. The article below, which was posted to Netease but sourced from Xi’an Evening Post, shows Qian accepting his appointment as deputy mayor of Xi’an.

The August 2011 article below, sourced to the China Business View but appearing here at People’s Daily Online, talks about how then deputy mayor Qian Yin’an invited other Xi’an city officials along with him on an undercover inspection tour.

And here is the announcement on Christmas Day in 2013 of Qian’s appointment as major of Baoji.

From 2009 to his fall from grace this month, Qian appeared five times in the People’s Daily. Since 2014, his name has appeared in 198 articles in newspapers across the country, some of these announcing his name among the appointment of delegates to the 19th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party. His name appears in the headline of 52 articles.
Qian’s byline has also appeared a number of times. On December 15, 2015, Qian wrote an article for China Discipline Inspection Daily in which he said all the requisite things about the need to uphold “political responsibility”:

In 2016, he wrote another article, this time for China Business View, about “always defining loyalty to the Party as the first mark of character”:
 

In March 2018, he wrote about “commanding with political construction” (以政治建设为统领), borrowing again from political discourse as it was trending in the uppermost ranks:

Doing a simple analysis of these reports, we can gather that Qian Yin’an has a knack for following along. His speeches and articles are peppered with whatever political buzzwords are trending at that moment, phrases like “mass line” (群众路线), “strict governance of the Party” (从严治党), the “four consciousnesses” (四个意识), and so on.
At a meeting on June 29, 2018, Qian Yin’an stressed that: “[We] need to raise our political position, fully placing politics in the first position, resolutely preserving the core status of General Secretary Xi Jinping, and resolutely preserving the authority of the Central Committee of the CCP and centralized, unified leadership.”
In fact, “resolute preservation” is just a favored slogan of Qian’s. Back when he was serving as a district chief in Xi’an, luxury property developments went up in an area of the Qingling Mountains under his jurisdiction that was supposed to have been ecologically protected. In recent years, Xi Jinping repeatedly asked in written comments that these developments be investigated, but these instructions were impeded. It is generally believed that the umbrella of protection over the luxury development case has been Qian Yin’an.
In late July this year, under pressure from the Central Committee, Shaanxi finally began dealing with the issue of the illegal developments in the Qingling Mountains. And it’s significant to note that the Qian Yin’an article about the lessons of Liangjiahe was published in the Study Times just three days after a special conference was held to address the question of the illegal developments.
Could this have been a coincidence? Possibly. But it is also possible that Qian’s article was intended as a form of disaster management. In China, red and black — meaning loyalty to the Chinese Communist Party and corruption — are often two sides of the same coin, and when things turn difficult politically, the tigers know that the surest form of protection is to wrap themselves in a mantle of red.
The timing of Qian’s August paean to Xi Jinping is most definitely food for thought. I hope that the Study Times comes clean with the process of how and when the article was submitted, which might tell us a great deal about how messy politics can become within the official Party media.
Three months after Qian’s article in the Study Times, this was the news as announced on the website of the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection (CCDI): Qian Yin’an, a member of the Party Committee of Shaanxi province, was now under investigation for corruption.

As one internet user aptly responded on social media, making underhanded reference to Liangjiahe, that place advertised as having been so formative for President Xi: “Qian Yin’an has fallen into the river.”
 

A Very Chinese World Internet Conference

Written by David Bandurski on . Posted in Headlines and Hashtags.

The fifth World Internet Conference (WIC) concludes today in the scenic water town of Wuzhen in China’s coastal Zhejiang province. As Quartz noted yesterday, this year’s WIC seems even less worldly than previous events, with just one representative from Silicon Valley among the list of speakers.
This is corroborated if one searches through the photo library of the event provided by Xinhua News Agency and other official state media. The events seem conspicuously short on non-Chinese participation. Take, for example, the photo below from the side panel on “International Cooperation Along the Digital Silk Road.”

Predictably, the English-language China Daily has still found a way to report that foreign attendees have responded with enthusiasm to the Chinese official line, which was conveyed at the start of the conference with a welcome letter from Xi Jinping. One China Daily report quoted Kevin Collins, a managing director at the global management consulting firm Accenture, as saying that it was “very nice to see one official after another get up and say effectively the same thing that brings everyone together.”

Assuming these comments — delivered without quotation marks — are Collins’ at all, does this note about the “same thing” reflect a heartening consensus, or blind uniformity? Collin’s remarks could easily be read as ironic.
Whatever the case, it is crucial to the Chinese Communist Party, even in this era of greater apparent confidence on the international stage, to demonstrate foreign approbation of its positions.
For those of you who are not familiar (having never had your teeth pulled one by one by Global Times reporters trying to get you to say what they mean), this is the hey-foreigner-what-do-you-think genre of Chinese state media coverage. Basically, put a foreigner on the spot for a soundbite at a China-hosted event that offers general praise because an opportunity is never afforded, as in a real interview, to get down to substance.
We can almost visualise the set-up job in the photograph of Collins, in which he is pictured holding at arm’s length a copy of China Daily that was no doubt handed to him by the reporter as she inserted herself before a panel kicked off.
We can also note that Collins is a clear minority in this photograph. The attendance is overwhelmingly Chinese. This is no doubt one important reason why instructions from propaganda authorities have reportedly included a prohibition against live broadcasting of this year’s WIC. China has gone out of its way at WIC to emphasise themes such as the need to reach common trust globally over internet policy and development, and to build a “community of common destiny in the online space (网络空间命运共同体) — a mapping onto cyberspace of Xi Jinping’s foreign policy notion of a “community of common destiny [or future] for humankind.”
The theme of global destinies would hardly play well online in live broadcasts showing conference rooms full of almost exclusively Chinese. So much better to control the optics by sending young China Daily reporters off to round up foreigners and their friendly views.
So what were these foreigners supposedly so enthusiastic about? What were the lines drawn by China’s number one cyber visionary, Xi Jinping himself? The following is a translation of the summary of Xi’s welcome letter as given by the People’s Daily news app, and promoted during WIC near the top of the news at People’s Daily Online.
The core idea here is building what China sees as a fairer global community of internet governance for an expanding global digital economy, meaning that China itself has a greater say in the shape of of global cyberspace and is able to legitimise its own views on governance.
__________________
Xi Jinping Gives His Newest Assessment of Internet Development Trends and the Digital Economy
November 8, 2018
People’s Daily App
The water town of Wuzhen has again caught the attention of the world. On November 7, the Fifth World Internet Conference opened in Wuzhen. President Xi Jinping sent a letter of congratulation. While the congratulation letter was not long, it contained a wealth of information. What are the trends in world internet development? How important is the digital economy? How can countries work together to build a community of common destiny in the online space (网络空间命运共同体)？In his letter, Xi Jinping gave the newest answers.
One major trend: the world is right now undergoing another revolution in science and technology and industrial change that is larger in scale and deeper [than ever before]
Xi Jinping pointed out that the world today is right now going through another revolution in science and technology and industrial change that is larger in scale and deeper [than ever before]. In his view, the internet, big data, artificial intelligence and other modern-day information technologies are constantly making breakthroughs, the digital economy is flourishing in its development, and the interests of various countries are becoming more closely interrelated.
One assessment: In order that a new tool for world economic development can be added, the accelerated development of the digital economy is urgently needed
In his analysis of trends in the development of the internet, Xi Jinping picked out on key phrase: the digital economy (数字经济).
Xi Jinping has given the digital economy strong priority all along. At his previous letter [in 2017] to the World Internet Conference, Xi Jinping pointed out that “the development of China’s digital economy will take to the express lane,” and that [China will] “promote other countries of the world joining together in stepping aboard the internet and digital economy development express.”
At this year’s National Cyberspace Work Conference (全国网络安全和信息化工作会议), Xi Jinping emphasised: “[We] must develop the digital economy, accelerating the promotion of digital industrialisation.”
Why is the digital economy so important? Xi Jinping offered his newest assessment. He said the in order that a new tool can be added for world development, we urgently need accelerated development of the digital economy, and [we must] promote the movement of the global internet governance system in a fairer direction.
One proposal: advancing together and profiting together, taking a road of mutual trust and common governance
As a major internet nation (互联网大国), China prioritises not only its own development, but also works to build a community of destiny for the online space.
How concretely can that be done? In his letter, Xi Jinping first analysed the “three differences” and the “three similarities” between various countries in the world. While nations all have different national circumstances, their stages of internet development differ, and the actual challenges they face differ, they share a desire to promote digital economic development, and an interest in dealing with cybersecurity challenges and strengthening the governance of the online space.
On this basis, Xi Jinping raised a proposal for various countries deepening practical cooperation: with common advancement as the impetus and common benefit as the goal, traveling a path of mutual trust and common governance, making the community of common destiny in the online space more full of vitality.
One hope: allowing the people of various countries in the world benefit from the fruits of internet development
The theme of this year’s World Internet Conference is “Creating a Digital World of Mutual Trust and Common Governance: Joining Hands to Build a Community of Common Destiny in the Online Space Together” (创造互信共治的数字世界——携手共建网络空间命运共同体). In the conclusion to his letter, Xi Jinping raised one hope: the hope that everyone could pool their wisdom to enhance common understanding, together promoting global digital development, building a sustainable digital world, and allowing the fruits of internet development to enrich all the people of the world.
 

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