Author: David Bandurski

Now Executive Director of the China Media Project, leading the project’s research and partnerships, David originally joined the project in Hong Kong in 2004. He is the author of Dragons in Diamond Village (Penguin), a book of reportage about urbanization and social activism in China, and co-editor of Investigative Journalism in China (HKU Press).

Informants in the Chinese Classroom

Written by David Bandurski on . Posted in Tracking Control.

Teachers hold your tongues. What you say in a Chinese classroom may or may not be held against you. Xu Zhuanqing (许传青), an assistant professor at the Beijing University of Civil Engineering and Architecture, learned this lesson the hard way back in April. She was alleged to have made, during a class on probability theory, unspecified remarks suggesting Chinese people were inferior to Japanese. A notice from the university dated April 4 said Xu had been disciplined as a result of her “inappropriate comparisons,” which were “reported by a student after class.”

In early June, Xu Zhuanqing’s case became a focus of interest on WeChat and Weibo, in part due to the popularity of a post on Weibo by user “LiuHu9plus” (刘虎9plus), who introduced a concept to the discussion around the disciplining of Professor Xu that was unfamiliar to many, and an open secret to many others — the use of “student informants,” or xuesheng xinxiyuan (学生信息员), to keep tabs on China’s classrooms.

In a May 30 post, LiuHu9plus wrote: “A professor at Zhejiang University says he originally thought ‘student informants’ only carried out surveillance of teachers in the humanities and social sciences. But after seeing this disciplinary decision [against Xu], they realized that teachers in science and engineering were treated in the same way.”

The topic of “student informants” was cracked wide open. Who were these classroom spies? How and under what conditions were they deployed? By whom? How long had this been going on?

As interest rose, the spotlight turned to other cases. Also in April, Zhai Jiehong (翟桔红), an assistant professor at Wuhan’s Zhongnan University of Economics and Law, was stripped of her teaching responsibilities after she was accused of criticizing recent amendments to China’s Constitution.

In a story about Xu and Zhai with a suggestive headline about “Cultural Revolution winds returning” (文革风重来), Hong Kong’s Sing Pao Daily News quoted a university professor in Shanghai as saying the problem of students informing on their teachers was worsening. “At university students inform against their teachers,” the professor said. “In the future, out in society, who will they inform against?”

The sentiment was echoed in a WeChat private group, where one user remarked, referring to the former East German secret police: “We are all Stasi” (人人都是斯塔西).

Discussants on social media then started digging, and exposed the various “informant systems” (信息员制度) in place at universities. In fact, they realized, universities in China had organized teams of student informants as early as 2008. Ferreted out by one user, a document from the Hunan University of Commerce showed that this was characterized as “intelligence work” (情报信息工作) that was “secretive in nature” (具有隐秘性). It was also paid work. Generally, student informants would receive between 20 and 50 yuan for providing a single piece of information, and for information regarded as more critical they could be paid 200 yuan.

Informant systems were in place not just at universities, however. Others contributing to the discussion found evidence — most of it right out in the open — that the same systems were being implemented in middle schools and even in primary schools. And beyond the education system, there were even “stability maintenance informants” (维稳信息员) being cultivated and deployed in rural townships.

These systems, which in the beginning had been treated as highly secret programs, had in recent years become increasingly open, and it was possible even to find academic papers online that studied these systems. Take, for example, this 2012 paper published in Vocational and Technical Education Forum, a journal openly circulated by Jiangxi Science and Technology Normal University. Written by Yan Guirong (闫贵荣), a scholar from the Tianjin Vocational Institute, the paper is rather explicitly titled: “A Study of the Building and Operation of Student Informant Systems in Professional Schools: Drawing on an Exploration of Practices at the Tianjin Vocational Institute.”

This paper, accessed through the CNKI database of Chinese periodicals, a leading resource for academic studies in Chinese, was shared and discussed in June as attention turned to the issue of “informant systems” and “student informants,” or xuesheng xinxiyuan (学生信息员), a term that appears in the paper. Search the CNKI database now, however, and you find that the paper is missing. In its place is a notice that reads: “The paper you are looking for does not exist.
 
 
 

Debate Rages Over Treatment of Chinese Tourists

Written by David Bandurski on . Posted in Headlines and Hashtags.

The following is our quick roundup of several key stories in the Chinese media this week. On the policy side, the story to watch most closely is that last in our lineup — language in the share prospectus of Chinese mobile content provider Qutoutiao, which listed on Nasdaq last week, saying the company may offer “shares with special rights” to a state-owned Chinese media firm in order to assist with its application for an “Internet news license.”
Another big story this week was the accusation by state media that police in Stockholm, Sweden, treated three Chinese tourists cruelly by refusing to let them remain in a hotel many hours ahead of their scheduled booking. Cue online rage — and some skepticism too.
THIS WEEK IN CHINA’S MEDIA
September 15 to September 21, 2018
➢ Party Media Do Intensive Coverage of Taiwan Spy Case, Keeping Close to Official Line
➢ Film Director Reveals Problem of Falsified Ratings, National Radio and Television Administration Launches Investigation
➢ Chinese Tourists in Sweden Claim Police Abuse, Opinions in China Deeply Divided Over the Issue
➢ The Chinese Economists 50 Forum Opens in Beijing, Discussion of Public Versus Private Sector Role in Economy a Focus
[1] Party Media Do Intensive Reporting on Taiwan Spy Case
On September 15, the official nightly news program Xinwen Lianbo (新闻联播) reported that China had uncovered a major Taiwanese spy operation in 2018. The “Focus” news program on China Central Television ran a two-part special program called “Wei Qing Die Ying” (危情谍影) over two consecutive days, introducing what it characterized as several “representative examples” of breakthroughs into alleged Taiwanese espionage operations. According to official news reports, Taipei had sought to lure mainland Chinese students in Taiwan into taking part in spying activities.
For this sensitive story, the only sources available inside China were official state media sources, and reports showed little or no variation in facts and details. Experts commenting on the coverage outside China said the case reflected growing tensions between China and Taiwan.
Key Chinese Sources:
China Central Television, “News Probe” (央视《新闻联播》): “2018-雷霆”专项行动：破获百余起台湾间谍案件
China Central Television, “Focus” (央视《焦点访谈》): 20180915 危情谍影（上）
WeChat Public Account “Zheng Zhidao” (微信公众号“政知道”): 这次披露的台湾间谍案，和之前有何不同？
Hunan Daily (海南日报): 海南公布两起台湾间谍案：旅行社司机兼职拍摄三亚某军用机杨
Global Times (环球时报): 社评：高度警惕台湾间谍诱骗大陆学生
Xinhua Online (新华网): 国台办发言人：台湾有关方面应立即停止针对祖国大陆的情报破坏活动
[2] Film Director Reveals Problem of Falsified Ratings, National Radio and Television Administration Launches Investigation

On September 15, film director Guo Jingyu (郭靖宇) exposed through his social media account the problem of ratings fabrication for television serials in China, writing that before his latest serial, “Niang Dao” (娘道), was broadcast a satellite broadcaster he did not name demanded he purchase ratings before the program could be broadcast.
Guo called on the television industry to unite against such practices, rooting out the problem of false ratings. Guo also alleged that another of his serials, “Tian Sheng Chang Ge” (天盛长歌), was dropped by a broadcaster after just 14 episodes because he could not afford to pay their exorbitant ratings fees.
On September 16, the National Radio and Television Administration (NRTA) announced through its official WeChat account that it was launching an investigation into the practice. One has to wonder: How could officials at the NRTA have been previously unaware of such abuses?
Key Chinese Sources:
Weibo Account ‘@GuoJingyu (新浪微博@郭靖宇)
Qilu Evening News (齐鲁晚报): 郭靖宇捅破收视率造假“窗户纸”
WeChat Public Account “National Radio and Television Administration” (微信公众号”国家广播电视总局”): 总局就收视率问题展开调查
China Business Journal (中国经营网): 严肃查处收视率造假行为

The National Radio and Television Administration (NRTA) announces through its official WeChat account that it will launch an investigation into fraudulent ratings.
[3] Chinese Tourists in Sweden Claim Police Abuse, Opinions in China Deeply Divided Over the Issue
On September 15, Chinese media widely reported the story of the alleged abuse of three Chinese tourists in Sweden that took place almost two weeks earlier, on September 2. The coverage ran at many outlets under the headline “Chinese Tourists Cruelly Treated by Swedish Police” (中国游客遭瑞典警察粗暴对待). The story quickly became the focus of anger and heated debate within China, with opinions divided.
For some, the story was confirmation that Westerners apply a double standard to Chinese, treating them with prejudice and disdain. For others, the story once again highlighted ugly behavior by Chinese tourists abroad, who lashed out with extreme actions when rules or misfortunes went against their favor. Still others, noting the high-level register of anger from China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs over what they felt was a trivial matter suggested the real issue was diplomatic tension between China and Sweden.

Screenshot of video shared online of Chinese tourists in Stockholm, Sweden, being forced out of a local hotel.
The incident in question occurred on September 2 outside Generator Stockholm, a hotel located in the center of Stockholm. A Chinese guest, Mr. Zeng, arrived with his parents after midnight, with a room booked for later in the day — with check-in generally not possible, as most travellers should know, until mid-morning or early afternoon. Mr. Zeng suggested they be permitted to wait in the chairs in the hotel’s lobby. Staff at the hotel called the police, who according to accounts in the Chinese media then dragged Mr. Zeng’s father from the hotel. When a police vehicle arrived, the three Chinese were placed — “forcibly” (强行) according to official Chinese media reports — in the vehicle and taken to the skogskyrkogården area of Stockholm, near a subway station, church and cemetery. The Chinese Embassy in Sweden said publicly that it had on numerous occasions tried to hold “serious negotiations” (严正交涉) with the Swedish side over the incident.
While the position in Chinese media coverage clearly focused on the incident as an outrage against Chinese tourists, some internet users also questioned whether Mr. Zeng and his parents had “unreasonably made a scene” (撒泼) and “acted out to demand special treatment” (碰瓷), both relatively common behaviors in China.
Before long, these criticisms were also attacked in state media as anti-China conspiracies. On September 19, the WeChat public account “China Anti-Cult” (中国反邪教) ran an article called “Behind the Inverted Storyline of the Chinese Tourism Incident in Sweden: What is Hiding There?” (中国游客瑞典受辱事件剧情反转的背后，究竟藏着什么?) . The article alleged that the Falun Gong spiritual cult overseas had sought to tar the reputations of Mr. Zeng and his family by accusing them of “making an unreasonable scene” (撒泼) and “stirring up trouble” (胡搅蛮缠). On September 20, the WeChat public account “People’s Daily,” the official WeChat account of the flagship newspaper of the Chinese Communist Party, re-posted the article.
Key Chinese Sources:
WeChat public account “CCTV News” (微信公众号”央视新闻”): 中国游客遭瑞典警方粗暴对待，一家三口被扔坟场！
And: 中国游客遭瑞典警方粗暴对待 任何原因都不该成为粗暴执法的理由
WeChat public account “Global Times” (微信公众号”环球时报”): 看完能气炸中国人！瑞典就是这么一个国家？！
WeChat public account “China Anti-Cult” (微信公众号”中国反邪教”: 中国游客瑞典受辱事件剧情反转的背后，究竟藏着什么？
WeChat public account “People’s Daily” (微信公众号”人民日报”): 中国游客瑞典受辱事件剧情“反转”的背后，究竟藏着什么？
[4] The Chinese Economists 50 Forum Opens in Beijing
The 20th annual gathering of the Chinese Economists 50 Forum was held on September 16 at China’s historic Diaoyutai Guest House. This year’s event commemorated the 40th anniversary of economic reforms in China. The theme of the forum was “New Missions for Reform and Opening in the New Era” (新时代改革开放的新使命), a title making obvious reference to the banner ideology of President Xi Jinping, “Xi Jinping Thought of Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for the New Era,” which has been prominent in the official discourse across disciplines since entering the Party Charter in October last year.

Screenshot of the official website of the Chinese Economists 50 Forum.
The consensus among those commenting on this year’s meeting seemed to be that the views being aired regarding the state of the domestic economy were unusually frank. The state and role of the private sector was reportedly an issue of intense interest, particularly given the recent post by economist Wu Xiaoping (吴小平) arguing that the private sector should now take a back seat to the private sector so that China could consolidate its national strength and effectively counteract the trade actions taken by the United States — a view that last week was criticized by some state media.
Ma Jiantang (马建堂) the deputy director of the Development Research Center of the State Council, said at the forum that the concerns of many in the private sector have to do with fair competition, insufficient rule of law and inadequate intellectual property protections. Other issues, he said, included debt and financing. But the deeper question addressed at the meeting was “how to view the private sector” (怎么看待民营经济). A common theme in discussions at the forum, related to all of the above concerns, was the phenomenon of “the state sector advancing while the private sector recedes” (国进民退).
Key Chinese Sources:
Phoenix Online (凤凰网): 纪念中国经济改革开放四十年暨50人论坛成立二十周年学术研讨会
The Enterprise Observer (企业观察报): 聚焦国企混改 激辩民企发展 2018中国发展高层论坛专题研讨会及中国经济50人论坛在京召开
Deep Blue Finance (深蓝财经): 纪念改革开放四十年暨50人论坛成立二十周年学术研讨会（全程实录）
Sina Finance Topics (新浪财经专题)
[5] Qutoutiao Lists on Nasdaq, May Seek “Special Management Shareholding” from State-Owned Media Company
On September 14, the Chinese mobile content provider Qutoutiao Inc listed on the Nasdaq exchange. In its initial share prospectus, the company said it was considering the provision of “special management shares” (特殊权利股份) to a Chinese state-owned enterprise in order to advance its application for an “Internet News Service License” (互联网新闻服务许可证). In August this year, a foundation directly under People’s Daily Online and Shanghai -based news group The Paper (澎湃新闻) both became strategic investors in Qutoutiao.

In its initial share prospectus from August 2018, Qutoutiao explains how it might in the future issue “shares with special rights” to a state-owned Chinese company in order to obtain an internet news license.
In order to better exercise control over information platforms, the Central Office of the Chinese Communist Party and the General Office of the State Council released in January 2017 a document called “Opinion on the Healthy and Orderly Development of the Mobile Internet” (关于促进移动互联网健康有序发展的意见), which proposed “the carrying out of pilot projects in the holding of special management shares in [companies] in sectors such as online information and online video. In May 2017, the Cyberspace Administration of China (CAC) released new regulations called “Provisions for the Administration of Internet News Information Services”(互联网新闻信息服务管理规定), which included language about “implementing a special management share system for internet news information service providers meeting the criteria.” Wang Sixin (王四新), a professor of politics and law at Communication University of China, said the “special management share” system is directed principally at news and information platforms that have already “developed strongly” (做大做强), a Chinese phrase that generally refers to firms that have scaled to include a range of information services. The special management share system, he said, is about making sure that the state has “voting rights” (表决权) where these major platforms are concerned.
There are already precedents for the special management share approach. In January 2017, the personalized news reader platform ZAKER received major investments from the Guangdong South Media Integration Development Investment Fund (广东南方媒体融合发展投资基金), the Shenzhen Newspaper Group (深圳报业集团), Jiangsu Modern Express Media Co., Ltd. (江苏现代快报传媒有限公司) and other state-invested media firms. In August 2017, People’s Daily Online announced that it had purchased at 1.5 percent stake in the website Tiexie.net (铁血科技), making the site an early pilot in the special management share concept.
Key Chinese Sources:
Huxiu.com (虎嗅网): 上市前夕给澎湃发1%“特殊股”，趣头条能过“牌照关”吗？
P5W.net (全景网): 趣头条登陆纳斯达克，成为移动内容聚合第一股

American-Made Typhoons

Written by David Bandurski on . Posted in Headlines and Hashtags.

Among the posts deleted from China’s popular Weibo platform today was the following bizarre missive from Chinese journalist and novelist Wang Zhanguo (王湛国), who currently has more than 92,000 fans.  The post made the tongue-in-cheek suggestion that the tropical storm that recently swept across the Philippines and south China was a super weapon conjured up by the United States.
Though made in jest, Wang Zhanguo’s post was accompanied by the image of a group chat on the WeChat platform in which one user seriously discussed the possibility that the typhoon was man-made. The post suggested giant waves could be generated by ocean going vessels coordinated by satellites.

The authorities were surely keen to avoid the spread of such rumors, particularly given the currently tense relations between China and the US.

Original user id: Author Wangzhan
Date: 2018-09-19 08:02:06
Censored time: 2018-09-19 08:49:42.229529
Content:
Typhoon Mangkhut has already passed. Even if it hadn’t we would not having anything to fear. No doubt this was an atmospheric weapon deployed by the American imperialists, the same thing they previously used when invading Vietnam. This is nothing new. These days the gallant masses have already reverted to Yin Yang Tai Chi Theory (阴阳太极理论) to decode the world!
______
Original user id: 作家王湛
Date: 2018-09-19 08:02:06
Censored time: 2018-09-19 08:49:42.229529
Content:
台风山竹过去了。它没过去也不可怕，这个无非是美帝的气象武器罢了，过去侵略越南时已经用过，并不是什么新鲜玩意儿，现在我英勇的人民群众早已根据阴阳太极理论找到破解之道了！ ​
 

 

The Breakdown of the Feedback Loop

Written by David Bandurski on . Posted in Headlines and Hashtags.

In a post earlier this week, we took a look at an article the latest edition of Seeking Truth (求是) journal by the president of Xinhua News Agency, Cai Mingzhao (蔡名照), which sought to unpack the “spirit” of President Xi Jinping’s speech last month to a national conference on propaganda and ideology. Cai’s article laid the official discourse on thick, emphasizing the core status of President Xi Jinping and his banner term (旗帜语), “Xi Jinping Thought of Socialism With Chinese Characteristics for the New Era.” He also stressed the importance of what is now being called the “15-character mission,” or shiwuzi shiming renwu (15字使命任务).
All of Cai’s language boiled down to a single unmistakable message — the need to assert the absolute dominance of the Chinese Communist Party, with Xi Jinping as its core leader, in all media and propaganda work. Journalists at Xinhua, said Cai, must “maintain a high level of uniformity in terms of political positions, political orientation, political principles and political path with the Central Party with Comrade Xi Jinping as the core, firmly preserving the core status of General Secretary Xi Jinping within the Party’s Central Committee and within the entire Party.”

An article in the August 31 edition of Xinhua Daily Communication is titled: “Grassroots Propaganda Offices Must Cure ‘Sensitivity to Supervision'”.
How odd it seems then that it is also Cai Mingzhao’s own Xinhua News Agency that in recent weeks has bemoaned the fact that journalists, particularly at the local level, not longer criticize Party and government officials. On August 31, in the wake of Xi Jinping’s address to the work conference on propaganda and ideology, Xinhua Daily Communication (新华每日电讯), a paper published by the news agency since 1993, ran a piece that criticized local officials in China of “having a sensitivity toward supervision by public opinion” (舆论监督敏感症). It bemoaned the fact that certain media, and particularly journalists working at the local and regional levels (as opposed to the center), have “lost their capacity to conduct supervision by public opinion.” They have, instead, “nurtured the habit,” said the paper, of “reporting only the good news, not the unpleasant news,” or baoxi bu baoyou (报喜不报忧).
How should we understand this deep inconsistency — between Cai’s genuflection and his agency’s call for a more critical, even adversarial, attitude?
In the West, the notion of “watchdog journalism,” that journalism plays an important role in holding institutions accountable, is subject to considerable discussion and debate. But whether or not one accepts this “normative vision” of journalists in pursuit of the public interest, few certainly would take seriously the notion that enforcing broad uniformity of political views around a single political figure could encourage or ensure accountability within a political system. In China, this idea is not just taken seriously; it is regular feature of discourse about the role of the press and of journalism.
The Chinese Communist Party has deep tradition of media control. Think of the way Cai’s recent statement in Qiushi about the need for “politicians to run the news agency” recalls Mao’s language about “politicians running the newspapers,” meaning that the press should be wielded as a tool of the Party. But there is also a coexisting notion that the media should, empowered by the Party, serve a supervision role as well. One of the most important phrases to encompass this idea is “supervision by public opinion,” or yulun jiandu (舆论监督), a difficult term to come to grips with within a system that does not have a robust system of press supervision.
At times, the term “supervision by public opinion” can denote the exposure at one stratum of political power of negligence or misconduct at a lower stratum. More often than not, however, the exposure isn’t of misconduct within the Party or government at all, but of corporate or individual misconduct. Think of the way, for example, that China Central Television recently exposed — once again — possibly fraudulent doctoring of health related search results by the Chinese search engine giant Baidu.
This sort of top-down monitoring through the media has sometimes been called “swatting at flies and letting the tigers run free,” a phrase that in fact sums up quite well the fundamental problem at the heart of the Party’s notion of monitoring by a press under strict control. Party leaders are the tigers, and when “supervision by public opinion” is conducted at all, we can best imagine government officials lounging at their leisure as they swat the flies idly with their tails.
However, there have been times in the past four decades when Chinese scholars and journalists have in complete seriousness discussed “supervision by public opinion” as being in much the same vein, if not essentially the same practice, as what we call in the West “watchdog journalism.” Here’s a 2011 piece from Forbes that reviews our book on the subject, looking at a number of important stories covered in the Chinese media from the late 1990s to the early 2000s — some of the best examples still of Chinese investigative journalism in practice.
Since Xi Jinping came to power in late 2012, in-depth and investigative reporting have become extremely difficult in China. And though the disruption of the news industry by digital platforms, and changing commercial models, may have some role in shaking up the practice of journalism, the primary cause is without a doubt the intensification of controls on reporting, and on information more broadly. Xi Jinping has redoubled the emphasis on the primacy of the Chinese Communist Party, telling media in March 2016 that they must be “surnamed Party.” He has stressed that reporting must “spread positive energy,” or zhengnengliang (正能量).
Xi Jinping has brought journalism to heel. But herein lies the problem. When journalism is well and truly restrained, when leaders at every stratum of power have emulated the General Secretary’s attitude of dominance, ensuring the media are dutifully “surnamed Party,” when every particle of the Party’s molecular structure is vibrating with “positive energy” — how can problems be exposed and addressed at the higher strata of political power?
“Supervision by public opinion” provides a crucial, if hugely imperfect, feedback loop within China’s political system. And when press control brings too much quiet, this fact can be disquieting. When propaganda is too effective, the feedback loop is broken.
This is a very real dilemma now facing the Chinese political system and the media. As the Xinhua Daily Communication piece concludes, likening problems in society to the pests infesting the trees:

“Some scholars compare the supervision conducted by the media to woodpeckers who peck the parasites out of trees. Bad news does not originate with the messenger, and the trees are not sick because the woodpeckers seek out parasites. This simple logic should be understood by those propaganda officials who are ‘oversensitive to supervision by public opinion.'”

The metaphor sounds perfectly reasonable. But there is the simple logic of the woodpecker, and then there is the simple logic of the parasite. Can the two really coexist?

China's Propaganda Mission in 15 Characters

Written by David Bandurski on . Posted in Headlines and Hashtags.

In the latest edition of Seeking Truth (求是), the Chinese Communist Party’s chief official journal of theory, the president of Xinhua News Agency, Cai Mingzhao (蔡名照), conveys to his ranks the “spirit” of President Xi Jinping’s speech last month to a national conference on propaganda and ideology.
The text, naturally, is a dense layering of official terminologies, the vast majority of them generally familiar to those poor souls who routinely wade through the tide pools of Party discourse. Everything centers, tellingly, around the figure of Xi Jinping and his defining ideological concept.

Cai tells the front line soldiers of Xinhua that they must “maintain a high level of uniformity in terms of political positions, political orientation, political principles and political path with the Central Party with Comrade Xi Jinping as the core, firmly preserving the core status of General Secretary Xi Jinping within the Party’s Central Committee and within the entire Party.”
He tells them they must “take the propagation of Xi Jinping Thought of Socialism With Chinese Characteristics for the New Era as their chief and principal matter” (要把习近平新时代中国特色社会主义思想的宣传作为头等大事). They must “promote the penetration of Xi Jinping Thought of Socialism With Chinese Characteristics into the hearts of the people” (推动习近平新时代中国特色社会主义思想深入人心). They must “emphasize positive propaganda” (正面宣传为主), working to “raise the quality and level of positive propaganda” (提高正面宣传质量和水平), which means organization of such themes as, well, “Xi Jinping Thought of Socialism With Chinese Characteristics for the New Era at the Grassroots” (习近平新时代中国特色社会主义思想在基层).
Even when it comes to foreign propaganda and the battle for minds — which Cai, echoing Xi, calls a “public opinion struggle” — Xi Jinping’s banner term takes precedence, despite how counter-productive this may seem when the Party is dealing with audiences for whom CCP ideology and terminology is necessarily alien. Beginning a section on “applying energy to properly telling the China Story,” Cai writes: “[We] must innovate our discourse system for external propaganda, taking Xi Jinping Thought of Socialism With Chinese Characteristics for the New Era as the highest priority in discourse innovation.” This is meant to be the heart — the spirit — of the strategy by which “the governing concepts and strategies of the Chinese Communist Party are thoroughly explained to international society.”
Worthy of note in Cai’s piece, however, is the emphasis of what is being referred to since last month as the “15-character mission” (15字使命任务). This refers to:

  1. raising the banner (举旗帜) — about upholding a contemporary, 21st-century version of Marxism (with Chinese characteristics), and educating the population about its leading status in China
  2. gathering the hearts of the people (聚民心) — about creating social and political cohesion through control of the message, with related concepts such as “emphasizing positive propaganda” and upholding “correct guidance of public opinion”
  3. nurturing new people (育新人) — about educating the population, including the next generation, in socialist morals and “socialist core values”
  4. invigorating culture (兴文化) — about building a unique Chinese culture (the language strongly imbued with exceptionalism) that is under the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party, but in which “society participates”
  5. developing our [national] image (展形象) — about building up China’s international “discourse power,” raising its voice in the world, telling the Party’s notion of the “China story,” and explaining the Party’s unique forms of governance to the international community

Concerning the third of these, “nurturing new people,” we refer readers to a series on this topic at China Heritage.
A translation of the first section of Cai’s piece follows.

“Raising the Communication Power, Guiding Capacity and Credibility of News and Public Opinion”
September 16, 2018 / Seeking Truth (求是)
By Cai Mingzhao (蔡名照)
General Secretary Xi Jinping’s important speech to the National Propanda and Ideology Work Conference sparkled with the light of Marxist truth, and it is a programmatic document to guide propaganda and ideology work under the new circumstances. The study and implementation of the spirit of General Secretary Xi Jinping’s important speech is a major political task of those hereafter on the front lines of propaganda and ideology. Xinhua News Agency is the main force, main channel and main position of news and public opinion work, and we must set the example in the study and implementation of the spirit of Xi Jinping’s important speech, conscientiously raising our political position, strengthening our political consciousness, bringing our thought and conduct in line with the spirit of [Xi’s] speech, firmly holding to the position and demands that Central Party has for Xinhua News Agency, applying ourselves to foundational and strategic work, applying ourselves to crucial work and key points, applying ourselves in terms of work quality and level, thoroughly raising the communication power, guiding capacity and credibility [of our news], better carrying out the responsibility and mission given us by the Central Party.
. . .
General Secretary Xi Jinping pointed out that completing our mission for propaganda and ideology work under the new circumstances requires that we must take our guidance from the Thought of Socialism With Chinese Characteristics for the New Era (新时代中国特色社会主义思想) and from the spirit of the 19th National Congress of the CCP, strengthening the “Four Consciousnesses” (四个意识), adhering to the Four Confidences” (四个自信), consciously raising the banner, gathering the hearts of the people, educating the youth, invigorating culture and developing our [national image] . . . These 15 characters, raising the banner (举旗帜), gathering the hearts of the people (聚民心), nurturing new people (育新人), invigorating culture (兴文化) and developing our [national image] (展形象), all closely concern the realization of the “two centenary goals” (“两个一百年”奋斗目标) . . . . The political precondition for properly realizing this mission is the firm establishment of the “Four Consciousnesses,” and we must arm our minds with Xi Jinping Though of Socialism With Chinese Characteristics for the New Era, maintaining throughout a high level of uniformity in terms of political positions, political orientation, political principles and political path with the Central Party with Comrade Xi Jinping as the core, firmly preserving the core status of General Secretary Xi Jinping within the Party’s Central Committee and within the entire Party, firmly preserving the authority of the Central Party and its unified leadership. The ideological foundation for properly realizing this mission is the firm establishment of the “Four Confidences,” and we must find our ideological nourishment in the roots of the Chinese land, raising our confidence and courage, adhering to the use of Chinese theory to explain Chinese experience, and to the use of Chinese positions to observe international questions, so that our propaganda and ideology work has clear Chinese characteristics (中国特色), Chinese style (中国风格) and Chinese form (中国气派). In accomplishing this mission, adherence to the correct political orientation is crucial, [and we] must strictly implement a responsibility system in our ideological work, firm in our orientation, grabbing [correct] guidance, holding our position, strengthening the political and leadership responsibility of our team, implementing the principle of party nature (党性原则) and the policy of politicians running the agency (政治家办社方针) throughout the full process of our news reports and at every juncture.

Web Users Expose Faked Police Photo

Written by David Bandurski on . Posted in Headlines and Hashtags.

This week we had a range of Chinese media stories, including two debates happening online and in the news pages — one about a finance expert’s suggestion that China’s private sector should “yield” to the public sector in light of economic pressures and the need to concentrate national strength, and another about the authenticity of a police propaganda photo (above).
Also this week, a notice on changes at the National Radio and Television Administration (NRTA) suggests the body will no longer be responsible for the management of journalists’ press credentials in China,  news publishing, the printing business and other areas, but will focus instead on online video and strategies for convergence across networks (telecoms, radio and television and the internet).
Also on our list is the apology from Netease for unspecified content violations, which we covered several days back.
THIS WEEK IN CHINA’S MEDIA
September 8 to September 14, 2018
➢  Idea that “the Private Sector Should Leave the Field” Subjected to Criticism
➢  Special Funds Approved for Political and Ideological Education at Chinese Universities高校思想政治工作专项资金设立
➢  Netease Finance Announces “Rectification” of Platform
➢  Authenticity of Hunan Propaganda Photo Called Into Question
➢  National Radio and Television Administration Announces Personnel and Other Adjustments
[1] Idea that “the Private Sector Should Leave the Field” Subjected to Criticism
On September 12, finance expert Wu Xiaoping (吴小平) published an article online called “China’s Private Sector Has Already Achieved the Task of Assisting Public Sector Development, and It Should Now Leave the Field” (中国私营经济已完成协助公有经济发展的任务，应逐渐离场), arguing that the role of the private sector has been to “assist the public sector in achieving leapfrog development,” and that this goal has already been achieved. For this reason, wrote Wu, “in the next phase, it will not be so easy for the private sector to expand blindly.” Wu further noted that the United States and other developed economies have are coordinating to contain China’s rise, and the country would face unimaginable pressures and obstacles if it could not find ways to consolidate its national strength.
Wu Xiaoping’s arguments were attacked in many Party media. On the 13th, the Economic Daily, the China Business Times and The Beijing News all issued responses emphasizing the so-called “two unmovables” (两个毫不动摇) – the idea, emerging in the political report to the 19th National Congress of the CCP in October 2017, that both public and private sector development must be encouraged and supported. The WeChat public account “People’s Daily Commentary” (人民日报评论) said that in a period of difficult transition for the Chinese economy the role of the private sector was more crucial than ever.
Some commentaries appearing on WeChat argued that there was merit to Wu Xiaoping’s arguments and that the strong reaction reflected collective concern over the direction the economy was heading.
Key Chinese Sources:
People’s Daily (人民日报): 踏踏实实把民营经济办得更好（人民时评）
Economic Daily (经济日报): 对”私营经济离场论”这类蛊惑人心的奇谈怪论应高度警惕——“两个毫不动摇”任何时候都不能偏废
China Business Times (中华工商时报): 毫不动摇地坚持我国基本经济制度
WeChat Public Account “People’s Daily Commentary” (人民日报评论): 人民日报评民营经济：只会壮大、不会离场
The Beijing News (新京报): “私营经济应离场论”, 实为不懂国情之怪论
The Beijing News New Media (新京报新媒体) [link already disabled]: 建议“私营经济退出”，称”2018年A股大牛市”，吴小平是谁
WeChat Public Account “Phoenix Online Finance” (凤凰网财经): 私营经济应离场？谬论刺激的焦虑才是真问题!
[2] Special Funds Approved for Political and Ideological Education at Chinese Universities
Special funds from China’s Central Treasury have been approved for political and ideological work at China’s universities (高校思想政治工作专项资金), entering the overall budget for the Ministry of Education. In recent days, the Ministry of Education has released a document called Provisional Regulations for the Management of Special Funds for Political and Ideological Work at Universities (高校思想政治工作专项资金管理暂行办法), providing the specific applications, management and principles of the special fund at Chinese universities.
The provisional regulations stipulate that uses of the special fund include: carrying out study and propaganda campaigns at Chinese universities on Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism With Chinese Characteristics for the New Era; cultivating of “advanced models” (先进模范) and “superb exemplars” ( 优秀典型) for use in political and ideological education that have national relevance; developing lessons and methods for promoting praise for “excellent Chinese traditional culture” on campuses, and for creating a healthy campus culture; conducting research on political and ideological work at universities, and other programs.
Key Chinese Sources:
The Paper (澎湃新闻网): 教育部：设高校思想政治工作专项资金，建立监管长效机制
Guangming Daily (光明日报): 高校思政工作专项资金怎么用
Gov.cn (中国政府网): 教育部关于印发《高校思想政治工作专项资金管理暂行办法》的通知
[3] Netease Finance Announces “Rectification” of Platform

On September 11, Netease issued a “Rectification Notice” (整改公告) that said: “Owing to a number of serious problems that have occurred in the process of operating the Netease Finance Channel, it is decided that from September 11, [2018], effective 12PM, [the channel] will cease content refreshing and carry out a deep and thorough rectification, energetically purging illegal conduct.
Analysis of the incident by the WeChat public account “Mei Tong She” (媒通社) speculated: “[The reason is] perhaps that the ‘Daily Stock Market Conversation’ column contained idle (空类) commentaries that affected investor sentiment; [or it could be that] Netease Finance recently ran images speculating about the circumstances facing actress Fan Bingbing (范冰冰), and said ‘Fan has already been detained and will face legal repurcussions,’ but so far there has been no public statement from the government as to the handling of the shadow contract case against Fan Bingbing — and the risk entailed by the speculation from Netease Finance was high.”
Key Chinese Sources:
Zhejiang Online (浙江在线): 网易宣布停止财经频道更新 大力整顿违规行为
WeChat public account “Mei Tong She” (微信公众号“媒通社”): 好奇心日报恢复更新一周后，网易财经宣布停更整改
[4] Authenticity of Hunan Propaganda Photo Called Into Question

On September 9, many social media accounts in China heaped doubt on the authenticity of a photograph appearing at Hunan’s “Eternal Flash Photography Exhibition” (永恒瞬间摄影展), held to commemorate 40 years of reform in the province. Titled “Policeman Catching Falling Woman With His Bare Hands” (民警徒手接坠楼女子), the photograph shows a young woman in a white top and striped skirt caught in mid plunge from a building. Beneath her, a police offer steps up confidently to receive her in his arms.
Sharing the picture across numerous sites, internet users questioned whether a real-time photograph of such quality would ever be possible. On September 10, the propaganda office of the Hunan Provincial Public Security Bureau made a public explanation for the photo, saying that in fact it had been taken by a production team to reenact a scene from July 2016. It had been created especially for the exhibition.
Key Chinese Sources:
Jinri Toutiao (今日头条): 永恒瞬间摄影展照片：民警徒手接坠楼女
Beijing Youth Daily (北京青年报): “徒手接坠楼女”照片怎么来的 “精彩抓拍”引发照片真假争论 湖南警方释疑：系事后情景再现
[5] National Radio and Television Administration Announces Personnel and Other Adjustments
On September 11, the Central Institutional Organization Commission, an agency of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, published new guidelines on its website for the National Radio and Television Administration (NRTA). A comparison with similar guidelines released in 2013 for what was then the State Administration of Press Publication Radio Film and Television (SAPPRFT) shows a number of changes to personnel and departments within the NRTA.
The language of the notice removes reference to “responsibility for the supervision and management of the issuance of press cards for journalists nationwide” (负责全国新闻记者证的监制管理), and also removes content about the office taking responsibility for news publishing (新闻出版), copyright management (著作权管理), digital publishing (数字出版), printing business (印刷业务), and the coordination of national campaigns against indecent content (扫黄打非). However, in the area of management of online video programming, a great deal of language has been added — suggesting that this will be an area of focus for the agency.
The number of offices within the NRTA will now be 13, down from 22 previously. The new regulations stipulate that the responsibility of the “new media convergence development office” (新增媒体融合发展司) will be to “draw up major reform measures for radio and television, promoting the reform of systems and mechanisms; coordinating the convergence of the three networks (meaning telecoms, radio and television, and the internet), promoting the innovative and coordinated development of new media, new technologies and new industries.”
In terms of personnel, the office will be reduced almost to half, with 263 staff as opposed to 508. There will be one director and 4 deputy directors.
Key Chinese Sources:
Central Institutional Organization Commission (中国机构编制网): 国家广播电视总局职能配置、内设机构和人员编制规定
WeChat public account “Chuanmei Toutiao” (微信公众号”传媒头条”): 国家广播电视总局三定方案发布，这些变化要知道
WeChat public account “Chuanmei Cha Hua Hui” (微信公众号”传媒茶话会”): 广电总局“三定”方案出台！不再负责新闻记者证监制管理！

Netease Issues Apology for Content Lapses

Written by David Bandurski on . Posted in Headlines and Hashtags.

Netease, the Nasdaq-listed operator of one of China’s most recognized web portals, issued an apology today for unspecified violations of content regulations, saying it would shut down its Finance Channel (财经频道) and “carry out a deep and comprehensive rectification.” The company, based in the southern city of Guangzhou, provides services ranging from online news and advertising, to online gaming and e-commerce. Its market capitalization is roughly US$25 billion.
The Netease apology is the latest mea culpa from a Chinese tech firm in the midst of a broad tightening of controls on information in China, and like recent apologies — notably the self-confession, or jiantao (检讨), issued back in April by Zhang Yiming (张一鸣), the founder and CEO of Jinri Toutiao — this one is clearly imbued with a sense of shame and prostration. These apologies are notably distinct, in my view, from acts of so-called “self-discipline” (自律) we tended to see from tech and media sites before the Xi Jinping era.
It is not yet clear what content, or types of content, prompted what was no doubt and aggressive move from internet authorities. We provide a full translation of the notice from Netease below.

Over the recent period, a number of serious problems (严重问题) have occurred in the process of operating the Netease Finance Channel, and Netease has carried out a profound self-criticism (检讨) and reflection (反思), deciding to suspend refreshing of its Finance Channel effective 12PM on September 11 in order to carry out a deep and comprehensive rectification (整改), vigorously purging conduct in violation of laws and regulations.
Netease will bear in mind its social responsibilities, conveying to users and to all corners of society our honest attitude of rectification. At the same time, we invite users and all corners of society to conduct supervision of us and offer their aid. We will take the preservation of the orderly dissemination of internet information as our duty, working with other platforms in our industry to promote the healthy development of the industry, and actively create a clean and upright online space.
Netease
September 11, 2018

CCTV Kids Program Prompts Gender Debate

Written by David Bandurski on . Posted in Headlines and Hashtags.

This week we start off our list of media stories with an interesting constellation of debates centering around “First School Class” (开学第一课), a well-known kids education program that has aired on China Central Television since 2008. The high concentration of advertising coming ahead of the program, which airs at 8PM, after the Party’s official news cast, has prompted criticism from parents — particularly given the fact that many are compelled by schools to watch the program with their children.
But “First School Class” has also been the focus of discussion in recent days over the issue of gender identity, as some have criticized the appearance on the program of “effeminate” males guests, questioning whether such guests are appropriate role models for young boys — and others have spoken out against such narrow gender views, and in defense of diversity.
THIS WEEK IN CHINA’S MEDIA
September 1 to September 7, 2018
➢ Debate Erupts After CCTV’s “First School Class” Program Postponed by Advertisements
➢ Price Ratings Return With a Vengeance to Baidu Medical
➢ China Internet Media Forum Held, Releases Rankings
➢ Shanxi Province Initiates Propaganda Campaign to “Sweep Away Organized Crime”
[1] Debate Erupts After CCTV’s “First School Class” Program Postponed by Advertisements

Screenshot of “First Class Period,” an educational program airing at 8PM on CCTV.
On September 1, 2018, the program “First School Class” (开学第一课), usually broadcast on China Central Television at 8PM, was broadcast late because an additional 13 minutes of advertising content was allotted after the official nightly news program, Xinwen Lianbo (新闻联播). The additional advertising included advertisements for educational training and products. “First School Class” is jointly produced by China Central Television in cooperation with the Ministry of Education, with the demand that parents accompany their school-age children in watching the program. In some cases, schools even require that parents take digital photographs of the program on their televisions to document their participation, and that they share their written impressions of the program.
“First School Class” first went on the air in 2008, its programs directed toward current affairs and education in basic values and virtues. This year the program has frequently prompted anger from parents and the public for several reasons. First of all, the program has often begun late due to advertising and commercial promotion, and people have complained that this is essentially an executive order forcing parents and their children to consume advertising content. On September 2, the advertising center of CCTV (中央电视台广告经营管理中心) issued a public apology for the excessive advertisements ahead of “First School Class.” But many people felt this apology was coming from too junior a position, and that higher officials at the network should be held responsible.
Second, the program has featured film star Jackie Chan, who speaks directly to the children about his own history of struggle against adversity. But many parents have pointed to Chan’s failed marriage, and to the fact that his own son was arrested for drug use, to suggest the actor is a poor role model for their kids. Finally, some parents have expressed the concern that male singer Zhu Zhengting (朱正廷) and other guests have appeared on the program wearing makeup, which might confuse young boys watching the program. On September 6, Xinhua News Agency ran a commentary under the byline “Xin Shiping” (辛识平) called “The ‘Effeminate’ Trend Must Stop (“娘炮”之风当休矣), which said the phenomenon of “effeminization,” or niangpao (娘炮), was rejected by society because “the harmful effect of this perverse culture on youth cannot be underestimated.”

Singer Zhu Zhengting pictured on the Weibo account of “First School Class.”
On September 6, the WeChat public account “People’s Daily Commentary” (人民日报评论) posted a commentary called “What Kind of ‘Male Character’ Should We Have Today?” (什么是今天该有的“男性气质”), which was meant as a response to the Xinhua News Agency commentary. The WeChat piece rejected the notion that so-called “effeminization” or that phenomenon of “not male not female” (不男不女) or other forms of identity should be disparaged, and said “today’s society has further expanded the field of aesthetics, providing more diverse ways of living, and it has also presented a more diverse face where male beauty is concerned.”
Approaching the issue from the vantage point of gender socialization, China Women’s News (中国妇女报) said in its own article that notions like “male character” and “female character” (女性气质) were already discredited. Instead, the paper said, on the principles of equality and respect, the identity choices of each individual should be viewed with tolerance and respect, avoiding altogether terms like “effeminization” and “not male not female” that are derogatory.
Key Chinese Sources:
Sina Entertainment (新浪娱乐): 央视就《开学》广告多道歉：影响了家长和同学们
Dushikuaibao (都市快报): 《开学第一课》成了“广告第一课” 央视道歉 教育部表态
Xinhua News Agency (新华社): 辛识平：“娘炮”之风当休矣
China Women’s News (中国妇女报): 男性该有怎样的气质引发社会热议
WeChat public account “People’s Daily Commentary” (微信公众号“人民日报评论”): 什么是今天该有的“男性气质” | 睡前聊一会儿
[2] Price Ratings Return With a Vengeance to Baidu Medical
According to a report on China Central Television, many residents in the city of Shanghai searching online for information about medical treatments for various conditions have expressed concern that when searching on China’s Baidu search engine for “Shanghai Fudan University Affiliated Hospital” (上海复旦大学附属医院), they were directed at the top of their search results to a “Fuda Hospital” (复大医院) – a name that sounds like an abbreviated form of “Fudan University Hospital.” After spending enormous sums to treat their conditions, patients reported no improvement, and when they then visited other hospitals they found that their diagnoses were markedly different from those given at “Fuda Hospital.” When a reporter from CCTV looked into “Fuda Hospital,” they found that it was operating sites at 91 different web domains, all serving as destinations for different search terms. Searches for the city’s leading hospital, paired with search terms related to certain illnesses, were being directed to paid advertisements for “Fuda.”

Screenshot of CCTV coverage of Shanghai’s “Fuda Hospital,” to which unsuspecting patients were directed through online searches.


Baidu’s reputation suffered a serious blow back in 2016, when it was found that its search engine brought up misleading results directing patients to dangerous experimental treatments. In one prominent case, those results allegedly contributed to the death of a college student direct to an experimental cancer treatment.
Key Chinese Sources:
CCTV Online (央视网): 百度医疗竞价排名卷土重来？患者搜索医院遭遇“冒牌货”
And: [第一时间]搜李逵出李鬼！百度医疗竞价排名卷土重来 搜复旦附属医院却引来复大医院
The Paper (澎湃新闻网): 患者搜复旦附属医院被引入民营医院就诊，百度回应
And: 百度回应复大医院推广事件：将扩展品牌保护关键词库
[3] China Internet Media Forum Held, Releases Rankings

On September 6, 2018, the China Internet Media Forum was held in the city of Ningbo. The forum release a ranking of top sites in China in 2018 based on “communication power,” or chuanboli (传播力). Among official central-level news sites, the website of the People’s Daily was ranked at the top, with the sites of Xinhua News Agency and China Central Television coming in second and third. Among provincial-level news sites, eastday.com, a site operated by the leadership in Shanghai municipality, was ranked on top, with Chongqing’s cqnews.net coming in second, followed by rednet.cn from Hunan province.
Coverage of the rankings provided little in the way of supporting data, and it should be little surprise that the website operated under the banner of the Chinese Communist Party’s flagship newspaper, the People’s Daily, should be ranked first among “chief central media” — regardless of what the real numbers reflect.
Sun Yusheng (孙玉胜), the deputy director of China Central Television, opened the event with a speech in which he affirmed the key role of film and video, saying that its premier media status had not changed in the past 100 years and would not change in the future, though the channels themselves might change.
Key Chinese Sources:
WeChat public account “New Media” (微信公众号“网络传播杂志”): 2018中国网络媒体论坛成功举办 带你全程回顾！
WeChat public account “Media Circle” (微信公众号“传媒圈”): 孙玉胜：视频是传播的最高形态 未来也不会改变
[4] Shanxi Province Initiates Propaganda Campaign to “Sweep Away Organized Crime”
Lian Yiming (廉毅敏), the top propaganda leader of Shanxi province, held a meeting on September 7 called the “Sweeping Away the Black Concerted Struggle Propaganda Work Promotion Conference” (扫黑除恶专项斗争宣传工作推进会), which aimed at a coordinated series of propaganda reports dealing with the fight against organized crime. Lian demanded that propaganda officials at all levels across the province define propaganda reports on the struggle against organized crime as a “critical political task.”
Shanxi has sought in recent months to grapple with its reputation as a hotbed of official corruption. In 2015, Chinese Vice-Premier Ma Kai described the problem of corruption in the province as being “like a cancer.”
Key Chinese Reports:
WeChat public account “Shanxi Broadcast Television” (微信公众号“山西广播电视台”): 我省对深入推进扫黑除恶专项斗争宣传工作作出安排部署
Xinhua News Agency (新华网): 中央派出10个督导组实地“督战”扫黑除恶专项斗争
 
 

Speaking Politics 讲政治

Written by David Bandurski on . Posted in Dictionary.

There was a time in the Chinese language when “speaking politics,” or jiang zhengzhi (讲政治), meant simply to “discuss politics” (谈论政治). Over time, however, the word “talk” has slipped away from the colloquial notion of discussion and become a verb with deep and far-ranging meaning within the official discourse of the Chinese Communist Party.

Officials can now say things like: “We need not only to talk politics, but also to talk art” (不光要讲政治, 也要讲艺术) — which means, in the context of ideological policy in the arts, that works of art must have artistic merit even as they maintain the political standards set by the Party leadership.
The word “talk” can also suggest “doing” or “participating.” In 1957, in the midst of the Hundred Flowers Movement, some criticized the Chinese Communist Party, saying that “speaking politics is fine, but speaking science is not.” The implication here being that the Party should confine itself to political matters and not presume to meddle in the sciences.


But it was not until November 25, 1995, that the phrase “speaking politics” first appeared in a headline in the official People’s Daily newspaper.

In that headline there were three different “talks,” known collectively as the “Three Talks” (三讲) of President Jiang Zemin. They were: “speaking study” (讲学习), “speaking politics (讲政治) and “speaking rectitude” (讲正气). As the People’s Daily explained the first of these:


Speaking politics includes political orientation (政治方向), political standpoint (政治立场), political viewpoint (政治观点), political discipline (政治纪律), political discernment (政治鉴别力) and political sensitivity (政治敏锐性). . . . Leading cadres at various levels must maintain politically clear-headed and resolute, maintaining a high level of uniformity in their ideology and politics with the CCP Central Committee with Comrade Jiang Zemin as the core.


Clearly, things like “political standpoint” and “political discernment” were not matters of personal conviction but of unity and cohesion with the Party leadership. The need was to emphasize the Party’s politics and pay them special mind. There was nothing to discuss.


By the time the above piece appeared in the People’s Daily, Deng Xiaoping was already old and frail, a little more than a year away from his death. In order to firm up his political position,Jiang Zemin had already purged key figures like Yang Shangkun (杨尚昆) and Yang Baibing (杨白冰) from the Party and the military. So the ultimate meaning of “speaking politics” in this context was tied up with the idea of validating and affirming Jiang’s own “core” status.


This, in fact, is a use of the phrase that has made a comeback today, more than 20 years later. In its special section devoted to the study of Party buzzwords (关键词), People’s Daily Online noted that President Xi Jinping had used the phrase “speaking politics” 67 times — which is to say in 67 separate contexts or speeches — since coming to office.


At the Propaganda and Ideology Work Conference in August 2018, “speaking politics” reared its head again. Here is a passage from a recent commentary in the People’s Daily:


Propaganda and ideology work is political work, and [correct] politics is imperative in matters large and small. The strengthening of the Party’s comprehensive leadership of propaganda and thought work should be led by political building (政治建设), firmly establishing the “Four Consciousnesses” (四个意识), firmly defending the core status of General Secretary Xi Jinping, firmly defending the authority of the Central Party and its central, unified leadership, maintaining a high level of unity with the Central Party in terms of political positions (政治立场), political orientation (政治方向), political principles (政治原则) and political path (政治道路). The decisions of the Central Party must be carried out to the letter (不折不扣贯彻落实), and propaganda and ideology departments at all levels must . . . regularly synchronize themselves with the demands of the Central Party. [The Party] must maintain clear heads (保持清醒头脑), raising political sensitivity (政治敏锐性) and [the power of] political discernment (政治鉴别力), not allowing interference by static and noise (杂音噪音), not being tempted by erroneous ideas. [The Party] must strictly maintain the Party’s political discipline and political practices, taking the speaking of politics (讲政治) as a primary demand, and taking loyalty and reliability as the first standard, acting throughout as a person who understands politics (政治上的明白人) and is trustworthy [in their politics].

When it comes to “speaking politics,” that passage is a mouthful. But despite appearances, the language could scarcely be clearer: Xi Jinping is politics, and Xi Jinping’s power and status is the greatest politics possible. “Speaking politics” means firmly heeding what he has to say, and following his lead.

What to Say When You're a Party Official

Written by David Bandurski on . Posted in China Newspeak.

On December 4, 2012, just weeks after he became General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party, Xi Jinping sent a powerful message about the need to cut down on excess and extravagance. No more sumptuous banquets. No more grand motorcades that snarled traffic. Party officials had to get down to the serious business of governing. They had to focus on practical matters, and they had to speak about these matters in ways that were focused and concise.

But there was a problem, obvious to anyone who regularly feasts on the discourse of the Chinese Communist Party. Xi Jinping’s December 2012 declaration was yet another eight-course banquet, another formula Party officials across the country were obliged to indulge because the leadership in Beijing had set the table. It was called the “Eight Point Code of Conduct” (八项规定).

Point Three emphasized “shortening speech” (讲短话), “doing one’s utmost to avoid empty speech” (力戒空话) and also “conventional phrases” (套话). Point Four urged “active improvement of styles” (切实改进文风) — which, mind you, is unimproved language that when unpacked means essentially keeping things simple.

Point Six addressed the media aspects of the way the Party works, insisting that comrades in the Central Committee should decide on the basis of “work requirements” (工作需要), “news value” (新闻价值) and “social effect” (社会效果) whether or not something should be reported in the media. Leaders should, besides, “compress,” or limit, the number of reports (报道的数量), their length (字数) and their duration (时长).

But yesterday’s edition of the People’s Daily was a stark illustration of how the Chinese Communist Party ultimately finds it impossible to escape the bonds of its own discourse and the normative operation of power.

Just have a look at the front page. The headlines on the page are virtually identical, all mentioning that “Xi Jinping Received _____ President _____,” where readers may insert the proper African country in the first blank, and the name of that country’s leader in the second.

The only variation comes to the right of the paper’s masthead, where an image is shown of Xi Jinping greeting South African President Cyril Ramaphosa, and the headline tells us that Ramaphosa and Xi held “discussions,” or huitan (会谈), a notable difference from the simple reception, or huijian (会见), that the other African leaders had. The huitan suggests a bilateral exchange of views on “major political, economic, cultural or military matters” (重大的政治、经济、文化、军事问题). And such distinctions really matter within the Party’s refined system of discourse.


Relishing in the repetitive page design, and trolling through the monotonous coverage, one has to wonder: What happened to the 2012 injunction in Point Six to “compress the number of reports”? But it gets worse, of course, because the Party’s primary concern, here as always, is with the optics of power, and there are certain distinctions within the Party’s mapping of power that cannot be compressed.
And so, we give you page two of yesterday’s People’s Daily, noting that each photograph is carefully choreographed to ensure that the African leaders are standing in front of their respective national flags, with a balancing pair of Chinese national flags. If a picture is worth a thousand Party catchphrases, then 10 pictures of Xi Jinping shaking hands with African leaders amount to inestimable political capital.

The article with the bold headline immediately below the first two rows of photographs tells us that Xi Jinping will attend the 2018 China-Africa Summit and give an important speech that will be broadcast by China Central Television, China National Radio and China Radio International. Substance? What more do you need? Xi Jinping, as the “core” leader, is always the compression of news relevance.
And lest you still fail to understand that the primary and primal interest of the Party, over all issues of substance, is the reiteration of power and its proper arrangement, we have page three of yesterday’s People’s Daily. Here, the leaders of the Politburo Standing Committee are laid out in unerring order of status: Li Keqiang, Li Zhanshu, Wang Yang . . . .

Because there is nothing whatsoever incidental about these arrangements, we can generally assume they reflect the prevailing political circumstances. It is significant that we do not see Wang Huning here, despite the fact that he received a seeming vote of confidence from Xi Jinping at the work conference on propaganda and ideology last month. Wang was meeting with African leaders, but there might be an interest at play here in the People’s Daily to tone down his profile.

The Party’s impossible struggle against the vortex of its own political culture and language comes painfully into focus on the very next page. After the dull march of “news” about Xi Jinping and the China-Africa summit, we are treated to a commentary on the “spirit” of President Xi’s speech last month to the National Propaganda and Ideology Work Conference, the very event where he seemed to bolster Wang Huning and double-down on his policies over the past five years.

The commentary is bylined “commentator from this newspaper” (本报评论员), which means — again, if we know how to read the signs — that this piece is meant to represent the spirit of the Party’s Central Committee on matters of consequence. Such pieces are not written by individuals, but by a coterie of scribes within the paper whose job it is to refract the light emanating from the top leadership.

The first objective of the commentary is to pound home the point that the Party has complete and ultimate control over propaganda and ideology. Leaders at all levels must “firmly defend the core status of General Secretary Xi Jinping,” and they must maintain “a high level of unity with the Central Party.” What all of this means in practical terms is not exactly spelled out. Rather, it is indicated with more slogans and waving flags. Officials must dedicate themselves to “political building” (政治建设). They must “firmly establish” the “Four Consciousnesses” (四个意识). They must ensure that the “main theme” (主旋律) resounds, and that “positive energy” (正能量) is strengthened. In spite of all of this jargon, they must “maintain clear heads” (保持清醒头脑) — a phrase that actually means that they must understand the Party’s core position and ideology, and must not be tempted by “erroneous ideas.”

One could forgive a Party official for thinking that it is all too much. With such restrictions, put so indefinitely, what can anyone possibly say? It’s a good time to remember Point Seven of the “Eight Point Code of Conduct,” which cautions officials that the release of statements must be strictly handled, that “unless arranged by the Central Committee, individuals must not publish books or individual speeches, must not send out greeting cards, congratulatory telegrams, make dedications or inscriptions.”

Well then, surely the best thing for any Party official to do is simply to parrot the Party’s official discourse as it emanates from the top. If one “cleaves” — now that’s an active verb the Party adores — to the declarations of Xi Jinping, how can anything go wrong? Right?

Wrong.

As the page four commentary in the People’s Daily reiterates, doing a proper job of propaganda and ideology work also means officials must “persevere in the implementation of the spirit of the ‘Eight Point Code of Conduct,’ firmly correcting the ‘four winds’ (四风), especially formalism (形式主义) and bureaucratism (官僚主义).” This includes the injunction to speak simply and focus on practical matters, and to emphasize “news value.”

Combatting formalism means that Party officials must definitely avoid the temptation to simply parrot the utterances of their superiors and go through the motions. “Right now, departments at all levels are busy transmitting the spirit of the Central Party,” says the commentary. “But we must recognize that still we see fierce transmission on the surface, and sloganish and mechanical transmission, and transmission of that which is swallowed in one gulp but never digested, and transmission through slavish copying of one’s superiors.”

The commentary urges officials not to “become gramophones” (当”留声机”). It warns them not to “irrigate by flooding” (大水漫灌). Emphasize the “real,” it says. Avoid “vacuity” (虚).

Say only what we say. But in saying what we say, make sure you are not just parroting what we say. Better yet, say what we mean, and when you say it make sure you mean it too. If you catch our meaning.
And . . .

Let the Flag of the Party Wave High Over the Front Lines of Propaganda and Ideology
——On the Study and Practice of the Spirit of General Secretary Xi Jinping’s Important Speech to the National Propaganda and Ideology Work Conference
People’s Daily
September 3, 2018
Page 4, “commentator from this newspaper” (本报评论员)

In the great game of [Chinese] chess that is national governance, the Central Party is the “general” positioned at the central command tent, and the chariots, horses and cannons are deployed with their clear roles.

“Strengthening the Party’s comprehensive leadership of propaganda and ideology work, supporting with a clear banner the Party’s control of propaganda and the Party’s control of ideology.” At the National Propaganda and Ideology Work Conference (全国宣传思想工作会议), General Secretary Xi Jinping again emphasized the political responsibilities and leadership responsibilities of Party committees at various levels, and he raised clear demands for increasing the Party leadership and Party building on the propaganda and ideology front, clearly defining our direction, strengths and advantages in propaganda and thought work.

Since the 18th National Congress of the CCP, the Central Committee with Comrade Xi Jinping as the core has placed propaganda and ideology work in an important position, and has taken a series of significant decisions, implemented a series of significant actions, and has pushed propaganda and ideology work to make historic achievements, and to make historic changes, fundamentally reversing what for a time was a passive posture in the ideological sector, raising the “9 Persistences” (九个坚持) to deepen systematic understanding of propaganda and ideology work. The experiences of the past 5 years fully show that only by letting the flag of the Party fly high on the propaganda and ideology front can we ensure that the main theme (主旋律) resounds, that positive energy (正能量) is stronger, spurring the whole Party and the whole society to advance with unity and force.

Propaganda and ideology work is political work, and [correct] politics is imperative in matters large and small. The strengthening of the Party’s comprehensive leadership of propaganda and thought work should be led by political building (政治建设), firmly establishing the “Four Consciousnesses” (四个意识), firmly defending the core status of General Secretary Xi Jinping, firmly defending the authority of the Central Party and its central, unified leadership, maintaining a high level of unity with the Central Party in terms of political positions (政治立场), political orientation (政治方向), political principles (政治原则) and political path (政治道路). The decisions of the Central Party must be carried out to the letter (不折不扣贯彻落实), and propaganda and ideology departments at all levels must . . . regularly synchronize themselves with the demands of the Central Party. [The Party] must maintain clear heads (保持清醒头脑), raising political sensitivity (政治敏锐性) and [the power of] political discrimination (政治鉴别力), not allowing interference by static and noise (杂音噪音), not being tempted by erroneous ideas. [The Party] must strictly maintain the Party’s political discipline and political practices, taking the speaking of politics (讲政治) as a primary demand, and taking loyalty and reliability as the first standard, acting throughout as a person who understands politics (政治上的明白人) and is trustworthy [in their politics].

Effective styles give rise to fighting strength (好作风出战斗力). Strengthening the Party’s leadership of propaganda and ideology work also means we must strengthen the construction of working styles (作风建设), persevering in the implementation of the spirit of the “Eight Point Code of Conduct” (八项规定), firmly correcting the “four winds” (四风), especially formalism (形式主义) and bureaucratism (官僚主义). (NOTE: The other two “winds” are “hedonism” and “extravagance”). Right now, departments at all levels are busy transmitting the spirit of the Central Party. But we must recognize that still we see fierce transmission on the surface, and sloganish and mechanical transmission, and transmission of that which is swallowed in one gulp but never digested, and transmission through slavish copying of one’s superiors (上下一般粗). This must be given great attention, seriously researched, and conscientiously resolved. Putting the spirit of the Central Party into practice means we must apply them to our own circumstances [in the course of Party work], conscientiously studying and grasping [the spirit], and bringing it out in our own concrete work — not writing surface articles, not imitating and copying word for word, so that we become like gramophones (当”留声机”), not irrigating by flooding (大水漫灌); [we must] emphasize the “real,” do our utmost to avoid “vacuity” (虚), applying ourselves with precision and seeking practical results.

ABOUT US

CONTACT US

FOLLOW US (X)

COOKIE & PRIVACY POLICY

LINGUA SINICA NEWSLETTER