Now Executive Director of the China Media Project, leading the project’s research and partnerships, David originally joined the project in Hong Kong in 2004. He is the author of Dragons in Diamond Village (Penguin), a book of reportage about urbanization and social activism in China, and co-editor of Investigative Journalism in China (HKU Press).
Over the weekend, Reference News (参考消息), the newspaper published by the official Xinhua News Agency that clips news coverage from around the world, ran an interview with Yan Xuetong (阎学通), director of the Institute for International Relations at Tsinghua University and one of China’s leading foreign policy experts. In the interview, Yan discusses the rise of China and substantial changes — but not yet fundamental, he says — to the global political and economic system.
At the website of Reference News, the interview carried the headline, “Push for Independence in Taiwan Would Be the Biggest Crisis in the Future for China-US Relations.” At the website Aisixiang (爱思想) the headline was instead: “‘Chaos and Disorder’ Are Becoming the Normal State of the World.”
The following is a partial translation of the interview with Yan, for whom the return of bipolarity in world affairs is clearly a fait accompli.
Editor’s Note:
As a well-known scholar of international relations, and director of the Institute for International Relations at Tsinghua University, Yan Xuetong (阎学通) has long observed the shift of global power and researched China’s foreign policy strategies. In his books Inertia of History: China and the World in the Next Ten Years and The Transfer of Global Power, he explicates his theory of “moral realism” (道义现实主义) and his views on “political determinacy” (政治决定论), that “the success of a rising power comes when its political leadership is stronger than that of dominant countries.”
This year, as the West bursts out with the concept of “sharp power” (锐实力), whipping up a fresh round of “China Threat Theory” (中国威胁论), and is reduced to a “New Cold War” (新冷战) mentality, the familiar old predicament of China’s rise (崛起困境) has emerged once again. How can [China] accurately grasp the development of world affairs and determine a strategy for China’s rise? How can China face the risks and challenges that attend its rise? How can China’s international leadership be constituted? With these questions, our reporters sought out Director Yan Xuetong. The Nature of the Global Order Has Not Fundamentally Changed Cankao Xiaoxi: In the world today, it seems that “chaos and disorder” have become the ordinary state of things. How do you see the state of affairs today? Yan Xuetong: We see different changes in the state of the world along different dimensions. When we compare today to the 20 years following the break up of the Soviet Union (1992-2011), we see that the world is moving now from a unipolar situation in which the United States is supreme, to a bipolar world in which the supreme powers are China and the United States. We are moving away from a state in which international norms are led by Western liberalism (西方自由主义) to a state where international norms are no longer respected; the international system is moving from a West-centered model to one in which power is redistributed; and [at the same time], the nature of the international system (国际体系) remains the hegemonic system of the post world war period, with no fundamental change in its nature.
The making of the new world order will take some time. The process of redistribution of power is the process of power devolution (权力分散) and the reconstitution of influence (势力重组), and so the normal state of things is chaos and disorder. In the midst of this process, as there is a lack of a dominant set of values, the bond of old norms is weakened, and new norms have not yet been built. The use of strategies of competition that do not respect norms or uphold commitments will become the normal state, and the worship of resourcefulness and lack of strategic credibility (战略信誉) will become a path that many countries are inclined to.
As nuclear weapons will prove a deterrent to war by any major power, these countries will tend to use economic sanctions as a means of competition, and protectionism will carry the day. Major powers will not wish to bear the costs of global governance and the preservation of order. Global governance and regional cooperation will stop in their tracks, and it’s possible that regionalization will see a reverse trend, including in the European Union. We could quite possibly be in a situation in which there is no global leader. The situation in the world right now has only undergone a change in degree (程度变化), and not a fundamental change in nature, a change in terms of the order but not a change in terms of systems — and this can’t be compared with the changes brought on by the two world wars. If we compare the situation of the past 50 years to what we face now, we can say that we are in an intermediate phase of change, because the changes now have not yet reached the immensity of what we saw with the end of the Cold War. A “Bipolar System” Will Take Shape Within Five Years Cankao Xiaoxi: Back in 2013 you predicted that by 2023 a bipolar system between China and the United States would establish itself. Is this still your view, and why? Yan Xuetong: After the Cold War, the United States became the absolute leading power in the world, but its leadership position of late is not like that of the 1990s. In 2013, I predicted complete bipolarization by 2023. Looking at things now, we can ascertain even more clearly that multipolarity is impossible, and a bipopular system (两极格局) within five years is extremely possible.
We can judge the international system by comparing the strength (实力) of the major powers and their strategic relationships. Lately, the world’s third-ranked power cannot in terms of national strength be compared on the same level as China or the United States. By 2023, this gap will widen even further. Strategic relationships have also become quite clearly a matter of other major nations choosing between the United States and China. The international system after 2018 will be decided by the relative development speeds of the major powers. I believe that there is no science to determining what the international situation will be like after 10 years. The most I’ll project ahead is 10 years. Within 10 years, there is no way that China will be on par with the United States. The growth of our country’s comprehensive national strength (综合国力) has already slowed down, and there is a risk that this rate of growth in strength could continue to decrease.
Once the bipolar system is established, there will be a real question of whether the concept of “the West” as it is now used in international relations will be applicable. “The West” was originally a geographic concept, later it became a cultural concept, and in the wake of the Cold War it became a political concept. The present [process of] bipolarization has meant that Western countries and developing countries alike are experiencing internal splits, and the remaking of political strength will very possibly not happen any longer along Western and non-Western lines, but along ideological lines. . . . When Western countries no longer influence international politics in a unified manner, the political concept of “the West” will no longer objectively suit the study of international relations. The Risks of Trump Uncertainty Cankao Xiaoxi: You have said before that with the rise of China, we will face greater troubles and threats. Trade tensions between China and the United States have impacted the bilateral relationship. In the future, what risks and challenges do we need to prepare for? Yan Xuetong: From the standpoint of international relations, within the next two years, one of the biggest problems we will face is how to deal with Trump’s unpredictability. Because he essentially makes decisions according to his own, there is little continuity between these decisions, and it is very difficult to predict, and so we must ensure that bilateral tensions do not spread to the ideological sphere. The core of the Cold War was about ideology, and only by preventing ideological tensions can we prevent a Cold War. Over the next five years, ideas of independence in Taiwan could develop further, bringing the risk of a full-fledged standoff between China and the United States, which we must be one guard against. Over the next 10 years, the biggest danger on the outside will probably be the question of Taiwan independence. For this we need to build effective prevention mechanisms to avoid [a crisis].
We have a number of important stories on China’s media this week. Two of these speak to the rapid and steady decline of traditional print newspapers in the country — first, the closure of a major commercial newspaper in Gansu province, following a string of similar closures on the east coast (as print revenues decline in the face of internet growth), and second, the ongoing leadership saga at The Beijing News, long regarded as one of the China’s top professional newspapers. Also this week, the release of the 2018 Blue Book on China’s Media, a media industry survey produced by Tsinghua University, helps to explain where the development is actually happening in China — think mobile internet, which now accounts for almost 70 percent of the total internet advertising market and has surpassed the entire advertising market for traditional media.
In legal news, a district court in Shanghai rejected a defamation case brought by a major medicinal wine brand against a WeChat public account, on the grounds that the article in question fell “within the scope of protected freedom of expression.” That case deserves further attention, as such decisions, on free speech grounds, are exceptionally rare in China. [ABOVE: Screenshot from a Pear Video report on operating family newsstands.]
This Week in China’s Media June 16 — June 22
➢ 2018 Blue Book of China’s Media released
➢ Approval of 5G SA standard paves the way for vommercialization
➢ Beijing Business Today (北京商报) editor-in-chief Li Hai becomes deputy chief editor of The Beijing News (新京报)
➢ Western Economic Daily (西部商报) closes its door on June 22, continuing trend of newspaper closures in China’s coastal and central regions
➢ Hong Mao, a medicinal wine brand, files suit against a WeChat public account for defamation, case rejected by court [1]2018 Blue Book of China’s Media Released
On June 21, the School of Journalism and Communication at Tsinghua University released 2018 Blue Book of China’s Media (传媒蓝皮书-中国传媒产业发展报告), the ninth in the annual series, which looks at media development in China across various segments of the industry.
The Blue Book shows that according to statistics from the Financial Affairs Department of the State Administration of Press, Publication, Radio, Film and Television (SAPPRFT) — an office that was recently slated for reform — revenues for television advertising in China for 2017 fell for the first time, dropping 1.84 percent from the previous year. Advertising revenues for print continued to drop in the double digits, down 14.8 percent from 2016, but the numbers for newspaper advertising were even worse — down 30 percent for a total of 15 billion yuan. Looking at traditional media, only publishing and film recorded growth for the year, but both were marginal in comparison to the internet. Online advertising, online games and online video were the three major engines of growth in the media industry, according to the Blue Book. The market size of the mobile internet has already surpassed that to the traditional internet, and mobile internet advertising now accounts for 69.2 percent of the total internet advertising market, and has itself surpassed the entire advertising market for traditional media.
According to the Blue Book report, the newspaper industry in China “reformed” and developed for around 40 years, enjoying a roughly 20-year golden period (辉煌时期). But faced with the challenge of new technologies, and new business models, newspapers were in an increasingly passive position. Some newspapers, said the report, had remained at the forefront of media convergence — for example the People’s Daily “Central Kitchen” (中央厨房), or “Media Hub,” designed to be a full digital convergence content supplier for a range of media clients. Other directions of development, the report noted, include “robot-generated news” (机器人新闻写作), virtual reality (VR) and augmented reality (AR) offerings and “data storytelling” (以数据讲故事), but these are not yet profitable businesses.
On the foundation of the capital invested in the big three Chinese internet companies — Baidu, Alibaba and Tencent, known collectively as “BAT” — links will continue to be made with other industries. Most of the leading news and entertainment media in China today are in some way or another tied to or dependent upon the big three, with examples including Jinri Toutiao (今日头条), Bona Film (博纳影业), Enlight Media (光线传媒), 21st Century Media (21世纪传媒), Youku (优酷), Tudou (土豆), Huxiu (虎嗅), Zhihu (知乎) and others. Key Chinese Reports:
Sohu Account “Newspaper Transition” (报业转型): 2018年中国传媒产业发展报告（完整版）
People’s Daily Online (人民网): 《2018年中国传媒产业发展报告》在清华发布 预计2020年中国传媒市场规模突破3万亿元 [2]Approval of 5G SA Standard Paves the Way for Commercialization
3GPP, the international standards body that governs cellular standardization, approved the 5G SA (standalone) standard, meaning that the commercialization of 5G is drawing closer, due for a possible rollout in 2020. With the support of the China Academy of Telecommunication Research of MIIT (CAICT), China Mobile and Datang Telecom Group have formed three national engineering laboratories, and these, according to the People’s Daily, will be the primary vehicles for 5G innovation in China.
Reporting on the approval of the 5G SA standard, China Business said that the core question now was what sorts of breakthroughs 5G SA might support, following on ground-breaking changes with previous standards — messaging with 2G, smartphone applications with 3G, and new video capabilities with 4G. CAICT has said that 5G advances could mean new services in such areas at 3D high-res video, cloud offices and gaming, mobile-based medical services, self-driving vehicles, smart cities and smart homes. Key Chinese Reports: People’s Daily (人民日报): 我国5G产业将全面启动 为2020年规模商用提供支撑
China Business (中国经营网): 拓展5G移动生态 万亿级应用市场待启 [3] Beijing Business Today (北京商报) Editor-in-Chief Li Hai Becomes Deputy Chief Editor of The Beijing News (新京报)
According to Shanghai’s The Paper (澎湃新闻网), former Beijing Business Today editor-in-chief Li Hai (李海) has been transferred to The Beijing News, where he is now deputy chief editor. The move could be an effort to address the hemorrhaging of top management from The Beijing News, which was once one of the country’s most respected professional newspapers — although the position of editor-in-chief position at The Beijing News remains vacant. Li Hai was a long-serving editor at Beijing Business Today, and was the deputy editor-in-chief before being promoted to the editor-in-chief position.
Beijing Business Today editor-in-chief Li Hai has been brought on to the editorial team at The Beijing News. SOURCE: The Paper.
In 2011, after The Beijing News was placed under the management of the Beijing Municipal Propaganda Department (北京市委宣传部), essentially downgrading its position as a national-level paper, two top leadership positions were designated, both to be appointed by the propaganda department: 1) director/Party secretary (社长/党委书记); 2) deputy secretary/discipline inspection secretary (副书记/纪委书记). The top editorial positions were to be held by one chief and four deputies (一正四副), with Wang Yuechun (王跃春) serving as editor-in-chief, and Wang Yue (王悦), Liu Binglu (刘炳路), Wang Aijun (王爱军) and He Longsheng (何龙盛) serving deputies. In 2015, both Liu Binglu and He Longsheng left the newspaper, Liu going to Ant Financial (蚂蚁金服) and He joining Kunlun Fight (昆仑决), a kickboxing entertainment company. Both of their positions were left vacant.
Since the end of 2017, The Beijing News has continued to lose top management. The paper’s former director exited to become the CEO of the Beijing Cultural Center Fund (北京市文化投资发展集团), and the position was taken up by Song Ganshu (宋甘澍), the chair of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference for the local district of Dongcheng. Finally, in December 2017, editor-in-chief Wang Yuechun announced her departure. Key Chinese Reports:
The Paper (澎湃新闻网): 北京商报总编辑李海调任新京报常务副总编辑
WeChat Public Account “Journalists Station” (记者站): 北京商报总编辑李海，调任新京报常务副总编辑 [Link Censored] [4] Western Economic Daily Closes its Doors, Continuing Trend of Newspaper Closures
At an internal meeting on June 20, the Gansu Daily Newspaper Group (甘肃日报报业集团) announced that it would close its commercial spin-off, the Western Economic Daily (西部商报). The newspaper, which was launched on January 1, 2000, has continually suffered deep losses in recent months and years — cited as the chief reason for its closure. The paper has reportedly also had serious problems competing for revenue with Lanzhou Morning Post, another commercial city newspaper launched in 1997.
Employees at Western Economic Daily told media that they had not been paid in some cases for as long as four months. “They haven’t come up with any severance plan, and they haven’t paid us what we’re owed,” said one staff member. “They just suddenly announced the paper is closed, and sent us home to wait for further news.”
For many years, perhaps up through 2010, China’s newspaper industry seemed immune from the storms pummeling traditional media in other parts of the world. But since that time, the rise of new internet platforms, and a corresponding decline in newspaper readership, has hit the industry hard. Newspaper groups in Shanghai, Zhejiang and other areas along the south and east coastal regions of China have progressively shut down many newspapers. The closure of Western Economic Daily could be understood as an indicator that the wave of closures is moving inland. Key Chinese Reports:
WeChat Public Account “Media Observer” (传媒大观察): 《西部商报》将于6月22日停刊 [5]Medicinal Wine Brand Hong Mao Files Defamation Suit Against WeChat Public Account, Is Rejected
According to a report by Jiemian News (界面新闻), the WeChat public account “Chengyuan Lawyers” (律师程远) was sued back in March by the medicinal wine brand Hong Mao, based in Inner Mongolia, after it published an article analyzing alleged illegal advertising by the company. Hong Mao accused the account of “infringing on its reputation” (侵犯其名誉权), and demanded that the offending article be deleted and a public apology made in addition to symbolic compensation of 1 yuan.
On June 13, Shanghai’s Minhang District Court rejected the lawsuit, saying that upon review of the article in question, which made use of Hong Mao advertisements, and reviewing government regulations concerning the management of advertisements, the opinions and advice provided by the public account were a matter of food and medicine safety and a public interest concern (食药品安全之公共利益的关注), and they should fall within the scope of protected freedom of expression (应属受保护的言论自由之范畴). Key Chinese Reports:
Jiemian News (界面新闻): 鸿茅药酒状告一律师公号文章侵犯其名誉权 法院驳回诉讼请求 Legal Daily (法制日报): 状告某新媒体名誉侵权被法院驳回 “鸿茅药酒”的正名之门被暂时关闭
Western media prejudice is a persistent theme for China’s state-run media, and Western sources — both real and apocryphal — are often used to purvey the view that anti-China prejudice is somehow coded in the DNA of the foreign journalist. Only this week, the official People’s Daily profiled the translation team behind the English-language edition of Xi Jinping’s The Governance of China. The paper quoted Scottish translator David Ferguson, identified as “the foreign expert,” as saying: “I think that many reports about China in the Western media are biased, and many of the writers have never even come to China, and so these reports mislead the people in these countries.”
Mr. Ferguson may or may not have actually said this. But we can say for sure that statements of this kind, most readily sourced to foreigners, have been leveled at “the West” and “Western media” for decades.
The cover of a book on the English language written by David Ferguson, a member of the team that translated Xi Jinping’s book, The Governance of China.
Way back in March 1949, six months before the founding of the People’s Republic of China, the People’s Daily ran an article called “Talking About America’s News Industry” (谈谈美国的新闻业). Written by Huang Caoliang (黄操良), the head of the paper’s international news desk at the time, the article argued that journalism and press freedom in the United States were undercut by capitalist ownership. To support his case, Huang recycled a single American author critical of contemporary media barons.
In January last year, the People’s Daily ran an “Expert View” column that bore the headline, “Under Money Politics There Is No Freedom of Speech” (金钱政治下，哪有新闻自由). The column essentially rehashed Huang Caoliang’s 1949 argument, that truth in Western journalism is fatally undermined by its capitalist foundations. Interestingly, the byline for the column was shared by a People’s Daily reporter and an assistant professor from the journalism department of an American university. This apparent fabrication — I understand it was unwelcome news to the assistant professor in question — was subsequently removed from the digital version of the paper, though without the public correction professional journalism standards generally demand in “the West.”
But while the theme of Western bias is sure to persist out of ideological force of habit, it seems that some minds within the Party couldn’t be happier with the treatment China and its powerful leader have received in the West (and in the rest) since the 18th National Congress of the CCP was held in November 2012, and since a cascade of shocks, from Brexit to the Trump presidency, have upset expectations of global leadership.
Last month, China Leadership Science (中国领导科学), a journal published by the Central Party School in Beijing, ran a series of articles billed as a deep study of “the international praise for Xi Jinping’s super-strong leadership in the New Era.” In a remarkable lead article accompanying its research — “Extraordinary Leader: A Study of the International Praise for the Super-Strong Leadership of Xi Jinping in the New Era” [PDF here] — the journal’s editorial department made the case for systematic research of the hurrahs and tributes enjoyed by Xi Jinping. Such study, they said, would serve the goal of “determinedly preserving General Secretary Xi Jinping’s core status throughout the Party, so that in our ideas, politics and actions we may willingly maintain a high level of uniformity with the Central Party of which Comrade Xi Jinping is the core.”
The most recent edition of the Central Party School’s journal China Leadership Science pushes for systematic study of praise for Xi Jinping overseas.
This knot of Party discourse, or New China Newspeak, essentially boils down to the idea that loyal Xi followers within the Party can help consolidate his power and standing by systematically channeling the praise he receives internationally. What the Party needs, in other words, is a dedicated School of Sycophantology. And the latest edition of China Leadership Science, you might say, is its manifesto — as much a profession of love as a declaration of mission. “China’s international standing,” the journal delights at the outset of its lead article, “is now at a high not seen in modern times.”
The term “super-strong leadership,” or chaoqiang lingdaoli (超强领导力), is a term that first emerged back in January this year at a “theoretical research conference” held by the China Leadership Science Academy (中国领导科学研究会), the organization within the Central Party School that publishes China Leadership Science. We will have to watch and see how and whether the term continues to be used in the official discourse.
The China Leadership Science piece is an interesting look at the Chinese Communist Party’s conflicted view on censure and praise from the international community, and from the West in particular. When coverage is critical, state media tend to militate against the prejudice of “Western media” generally, resorting to ad hominem attacks. When the coverage is positive, however, the same state media are quick to re-establish the authority of these flattering voices, pointing out that sources are “well-known international media” or “recognized websites.”
The editors of China Leadership Science seem more interested in cherry picking than systematic research when it comes to international coverage of Xi Jinping. But there can be little doubt that these are interesting times in terms of the reshaping of global narratives of leadership.
The journal concludes its piece with unmistakable optimism. Everyone in the world, from developed and developing countries alike, is “looking to the China Path and the China miracle.” Everyone craves “Chinese experience, Chinese wisdom and the China Solution.” And this must be why Xi Jinping’s books “continue to top the global sales charts.”
Are we sure? Have we checked those sales charts? But the editors are undeterred: “Under these circumstances,” they write, “China naturally receives the attention of the world, and the leadership ideas and grace of General Secretary Xi Jinping of course continue to dazzle international society.”
EXCERPT: “Extraordinary Leader: A Study of the International Praise for the Super-Strong Leadership of Xi Jinping in the New Era”
Since the Party’s 18th National Congress, General Secretary Xi Jinping has made comprehensively pathbreaking and historic achievements in leading the Party and the country, there has been a deep and fundamental historical transformation (变革), the people feel they have gained a great deal, and China’s international standing is now at a high not seen in modern times. The superlative (高超) leadership wisdom (智慧) and leadership style (领袖风范) [of Xi Jinping] has consistently drawn attention from international society, earning a high level of praise. Deeply studying the international praise for Xi Jinping’s super-strong leadership (超强领导) in the New Era will no doubt benefit us in further strengthening the “Four Consciousnessess”(四个意识), in persisting with the “Four Confidences” (四个自信), and in determinedly preserving General Secretary Xi Jinping’s core status (核心地位) throughout the Party, so that in our ideas, politics and actions we may willingly maintain a high level of uniformity with the Central Party of which Comrade Xi Jinping is the core（高度一致). 1. Overview of International Praise for the Super-Strong Leadership of General Secretary Xi Jinping in the New Era
Since the 18th National Congress of the CCP, the voices from international society praising General Secretary Xi Jinping’s super-strong leadership strength ( 超强领导力) in the New Era have continued to rise, their frequency, breadth and intensity unprecedented, and this can be seen in the following 6 aspects: First, the variety of media. International society’s praise for General Secretary Xi Jinping’s super-strong leadership perhaps includes all forms of media — for example specialized books, research articles, newspapers, magazines, radio, television, online commentary, etcetera. Relatively representative books include Xi Jinping’s Leadership (习近平的领导力), [Yuri Tavrovsky’s] Xi Jinping: The Chinese Dream (习近平 :正圆中国梦), The Age of Xi Jinping (习近平时代), Great Power Leader Xi Jinping (习近平复兴中国), Great Nation Leader Xi Jinping (大国领袖习近平). Aside from these, the New York Times, the Washington Post, the Wall Street Journal, the Times, Asahi Shinbun, Radio France Internationale, Deutsche Welle television, Voice of Russia (俄罗斯之声), the Economist, The Diplomat and other well-known international media, recognized websites or academic publications, whether through commentaries, essays or excerpts and interviews — all have offered their praise, giving rave reviews.
Second, the strength of personality (个人色彩). Since the Party’s 18th National Congress, China’s president has visited more than 50 countries on five continents, has received hundreds of visits from foreign heads of state and other government officials, and has hosted or appeared at a series of important international conferences and events. General Secretary Xi Jinping hs been active on the global stage, serving as a model of the mature political leader. He faces problems head on, taking them on personally, showing wisdom amid the confusion, inspiring affinity and attraction, continually drawing the attention of others wherever he goes, becoming the focus of discussion. His representative work, Xi Jinping’s Governance of China, has already spread across the world, so that in the case for example of the United States, libraries having the book exist in every state, covering essentially all public libraries and community libraries. The praise of international society for Xi Jinping’s leadership is not limited only to the realm of politics but has already become a matter of personal will for many people. Third, there is the sustained time period [of praise for Xi Jinping]. Beginning with the opening of the 18th National Congress in 2012, the praise for Xi Jinping’s leadership by international society has never ceased. He has remained a focus of international discussion, a topic to be followed, a priority for research.
Up to now, along with a number of major historical moments that have enriched China and impacted the world — the Party’s 18th and 19th congresses and various plenary sessions, focussing on the governance practices of the Party, the APEC Summit, the G20 Summit, the Davos Forum and other major events, and the overseas visits of General Secretary Xi Jinping — the praise for Xi Jinping’s leadership by international society has been grown day by day, repeated constantly. This sort of sustained praise for a national leader is something rarely seen. Fourth, there is the broad [geographical] scope [of praise for Xi Jinping]. Conscientious search and gathering, and systematic sorting, reveals that from the standpoint of geographic coverage (地域覆盖面), praise for the super-strong leadership of Xi Jinping from international society covers the entire globe. It comes from the United States, from Great Britain, Japan, Germany and other developed countries, and also from the vast majority of developing nations in Asia, Africa and Latin America. Since the 19th National Congress of the CCP, the Chinese Academy of Governance (国家行政学院) [within the Central Party School] has held many study events for overseas officials. More than 240 mid and high-level officials from 40 countries spanning Asia, Europe, Africa, Latin America and Oceania have expressed enormous admiration (极大赞赏) for the marvelous (极不平凡) and historic achievements made since the 18th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party [in 2012], and generally believe that General Secretary Xi Jinping has shown superlative leadership wisdom (高超领导智慧) and been a model leader in promoting socialism with Chinese characteristics and world peace and development. Fifth, there is a wide variety of people [praising Xi]. Looking at the praise overall, those in international society praising the leadership of Xi Jinping . . . include not just overseas politicians, well-known scholars and journalists, but also include well-known leaders from businesses and social groups, and also overseas Chinese. At the same time, they include international publics and internet users. Commentaries and praise of Xi Jinping’s leadership mostly appear on social media and in online comment threads. Among these there are people who are familiar with China and who research China, and also people who have come to be interested in China, and to research and understand China, through their interest in Xi Jinping. There are people in their 80s and 90s, and those who are just 16 or 17 years old. Sixth, there is the level of praise (赞誉程度高). Many international figures have offered extremely high level of praise of Xi Jinping. When General Secretary Xi was on a visit to the Netherlands, Mark Rutte, prime minister of the Netherlands, gave a heartfelt sigh: “China chose an excellent leader! Only an excellent leader like Xi Jinping could properly govern a country of China’s size, successfully resolving its various internal problems.” Former United States ambassador to China John Huntsman characterized Xi Jinping’s leadership as “unprecedented,” saying that he was the Chinese leader since Deng Xiaoping most vested with transitional character (最具转型色彩), and that he had earned widespread attention from world leaders. Former Mongolian President Tsakhiagiin Elbegdorj used a single Chinese character, “strong,” to express his view of Xi Jinping. He explained that “strong” could mean many things, including a strong capacity for work, a strong capacity for leadership, a strong ability to create cohesion, etcetera. . . .
Former German Ambassador to China and BMW Foundation chairman Dr. Michael Schaefer has said that one can see through the series of speeches Xi Jinping has made since becoming General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, that “Xi Jinping is an extremely great leader,” and he can surely create an even brighter future for China and the world. Yuri Tavrovsky, a China scholar and political commentator who is a professor at the Peoples’ Friendship University of Russia (RUDN University), believes that “an extraordinary leader has emerged in China.” America’s Time magazine listed Xi Jinping among the top 100 most influential people [for 2017].
For May 2018, we have just two Chinese Communist Party phrases topping the official discourse in the People’s Daily with “blazing” (沸) ratings. These are, perhaps not so surprisingly, “Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for the New Era” (习近平新时代中国特色社会主义思想), President Xi Jinping’s “banner term” (旗帜语), and “Belt and Road” (一带一路), China’s ambitious infrastructure-driven foreign policy program. Several other key terms saw relative cool downs in May. They include: “19th National Congress” (十九大); “China Solution” (中国方案); and “Two Centenary [Goals]” (两个一百年).
Which Party leaders got top billing in the People’s Daily? Xi Jinping was naturally in a league of his own, with 749 appearances (articles mentioning him) for the month. Premier Li Keqiang was a distant second, with 79 appearances. The next three members of the Politburo Standing Committee come in very close to one another, almost as though following an informal rule. They are: Wang Yang (汪洋), with 20 article mentions; Li Zhanshu (栗战书), with 19 article mentions; and Han Zheng (韩正), with 19 article mentions.
As for foreign leaders in the People’s Daily, Donald Trump still held the top position in May, with a total of 29 articles mentioning him. Relatively speaking, however, it was a cool month for the U.S. president, who had 49 mentions back in April.
We also take a look in this report at the phrase “Amazing China” (厉害了，我的国), inspired by the 90-minute propaganda film, billed as the highest-grossing documentary film in China’s history, that was released back in March. “Amazing China” peaked as a discourse phrase in the People’s Daily in March, but has since declined to zero. This follows rumors that the Central Propaganda Department ordered the documentary film’s removal from the internet back in April. That may have been the case, but we found that the film is still available online in a number of places, including at Tencent Video (腾讯视频) and Youku (优酷).
The full Chinese-language report, produced this month by Fei Yun, follows. Enjoy.
At the 19th National Congress last October, Xi Jinping’s new banner term, “Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era,” was enshrined in the Party’s constitution. This week, it looks like President Xi may have received another honor — his own ideology in the realm of news and public opinion. The Party’s official People’s Daily reported on June 14 that a discussion forum was held on June 13 on the topic of “Xi Jinping News Thought and Theory” (习近平新闻思想理论). This marks the first time that the phrase “Xi Jinping News Thought” (习近平新闻思想) has appeared in the People’s Daily — and could be a mark of the term’s ascendance.
THIS WEEK IN CHINA’S MEDIA June 9 – June 15
➢ United Front Work Department (中央统战部) holds forum of “online representatives”(网络代表人士)
➢ Party newspapers hold a forum on “Xi Jinping News Thought and Theory”(习近平新闻思想理论), and teaching materials on Xi Jinping News Thought are published.
➢ “People’s Express” platform jointly launched by People’s Daily and Baidu
➢ Video platform Tik Tok reports daily active users surpassing 150 million
➢ City of Xiamen forms first group of “cybersecurity volunteers.” [1]United Front Work Department Holds Forum of “Online Representatives”
On June 11, the United Front Work Department of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party (中央统战部) held a forum bringing together more than 50 so-called “online representatives” (网络代表人士), including executives from top internet companies, operators of new media and we-media platforms (自媒体平台), “Big V” (网络大V) internet celebrities, online writers and others to “jointly study the spirit of General Secretary Xi Jinping’s important speech to the National Work Conference on Cybersecurity (全国网络安全和信息化工作会议), held back in April. Among those in attendance were Zhou Hongyi (周鸿祎), the founder and CEO of the software company Qihoo, Zhou Yuan (周源), the founder and CEO of Zhihu, and Li Wu (李武), the founder of Blue Whale Media (蓝鲸财经).
Zhou Hongyi, the Qihoo founder, and also a delegate to the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference, told those gathered that cybersecurity has already bid farewell to the era of “information security” and now moved into an era of “big security” (大安全). In this new era, said Zhou, there could be no broader national security without ensuring cybersecurity — and there could be no way of building China into an “internet power” (网络强国). Echoing the language of the Party leadership, Zhou said that everyone must abide by “the correct view of cybersecurity” (正确的网络安全观), and must employ new cybersecurity strategies and methods, actively working to create the proper environment for cybersecurity. Key Chinese Reports:
WeChat public account “New Words on the United Front” (统战新语): 50余位网络代表人士齐聚中央统战部，共话网络同心圆！ [2]Party newspapers hold a forum on “Xi Jinping News Thought and Theory”
The Party’s official People’s Daily reported on June 14 that the newspaper held a discussion forum on June 13 on the topic of “Xi Jinping News Thought and Theory” (习近平新闻思想理论). This marks the first time that the phrase “Xi Jinping News Thought” (习近平新闻思想) has appeared in the People’s Daily — and could be a mark of the term’s ascendance. According to the report, scholars from the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, Tsinghua University, Peking University and other institutions were present at the discussion forum — and all “fully affirmed the People’s Daily‘s trailblazing role in implementing Xi Jinping News Thought.”
According to the People’s Daily, there was a consensus at the meeting that since the 18th National Congress of the CCP in 2012, there had been continued breaking of new ground in the Party’s news and public opinion work (新闻舆论工作), and that the fundamental reason for these advances had been the “scientific direction” (科学指引) provided by Xi Jinping News Thought.
Also on June 14, the official Xinhua News Agency reported that a new book called “Lessons in Xi Jinping News Thought” (习近平新闻思想讲义), edited by the Central Propaganda Department and published by the People’s Publishing House (人民出版社) and Study Press (学习出版社), was now available in bookstores across China. The report said the book was important teaching material in Xi Jinping News Thought. Key Chinese Reports: People’s Daily (人民日报): 高举旗帜 守正创新 人民日报召开习近平新闻思想理论研讨会
Xinhua News Agency (新华社): 《习近平新闻思想讲义（2018年版）》出版发行 [3]Launch Ceremony for “People’s Express,” a New Comprehensive News Platform
On June 11, the People’s Daily held a launch ceremony for “People’s Express” (人民号), a brand new news platform created in “comprehensive strategic cooperation” with the technology company Baidu. The AI-enabled platform, which has invited more than 2,000 mainstream news organizations, government agencies and other bodies to join up, claims to provide comprehensive mobile content production and distribution services. The platform will allow individual content producers to share income on the basis of content performance.
Linkage and cooperation with commercial media platforms is a major distinguishing characteristic of “People’s Express,” according to Chinese news reports. At the launch ceremony, the People’s Daily and Baidu formally signed a strategic cooperation agreement. The agreement involves the linking of “People’s Express” with “Baijiahao” (百家号), Baidu’s content search and distribution platform. Users registered on the “Baijiahao” platform will be green-lighted for opening “People’s Express” accounts, and users of “People’s Express” will benefit from traffic on the “Baijiahao” platform. Key Chinese Reports: People’s Daily (人民日报): 全国移动新媒体聚合平台“人民号”上线
Media Observer (传媒大观察): 国家队“人民号”进军自媒体平台，用户收益百度买单 [4]Daily Active Users of Tik Tok Surpass 150 Million, Many Government Bodies and Enterprises Join the Platform
On June 12, Tik Tok (抖音), the short video platform operated by Jinri Toutiao, made its first release of numbers on users of the platform, reporting 150 million daily active users. More than 40 percent of active users are in the 24-30 age group. The platform reports that more than 500 government organs and mainstream media have joined, including People’s Daily Online, CCTV News, the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission and others. According to a report from Xinhua News Agency, two of the earliest official organizations to join Tik Tok, the Chinese Communist Youth League and China Peace, a website operated by the Central Political and Legal Affairs Commission, both recorded more than a millions fans on the platform.
Tik Tok can be said to be an up-and-coming social media platform in China, but still lags behind WeChat and Weibo in popularity. Key Chinese Reports:
WeChat public account “Chief Editor Wen Jing” (主编温静): 抖音日活超1.5亿，与腾讯的竞争公开化底气在哪里？ [5]Xiamen Forms First Group of “Cybersecurity Volunteers”
According to a report from Xinhua News Agency, police in Xiamen have formed a “cybersecurity volunteer” (网络安全志愿者) group in order to “extensively mobilize the masses to participate in the governance of the internet.” The report said the group comprised a broad range of website managers, operators of popular WeChat accounts, security personnel at internet service companies, experts and scholars, university students and “ordinary city residents who care about cybersecurity.”
According to Chinese media reports, the “cybersecurity volunteers” of Xiamen will conduct propaganda activities concerning cybersecurity, and will be tasked with providing leads on online crimes and irregularities, “assisting the police in raising the level of prevention and control, and responsiveness, in internet security.” Key Chinese Reports:
Xinhua News Agency (新华网): 厦门成立首批“网络安全志愿者”队伍
As the June 12 meeting in Singapore between US President Donald Trump and North Korean leader Kim Jong Un draws nearer — Kim now settling in to his suite at the St Regis Hotel — discussion of the subject on Chinese social media is a matter of some sensitivity. China has a lot at stake in the outcome of negotiations over the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, and Party leaders are no doubt eager to avoid unwanted chatter. And one area of apparent sensitivity for the authorities in recent days has been the simple question of how exactly Kim is getting to Singapore. According to a report in The Straits Times, Singapore’s English-language broadsheet, Kim arrived in Singapore today on a jet belonging to the fleet of Air China, the People’s Republic of China’s flag carrier.
Over the past few days, posts on Weibo speculating that Kim would be flying to Singapore in an Air China 747 were deleted by censors. Previous media reports had indicated that Kim would be traveling on a Soviet-era Russian plan, but curiosity was aroused when a 747 originally thought to be scheduled for a return to Beijing from Pyongyang was reportedly rerouted to Singapore. A Weibo post at 6:56PM Beijing time on June 8 by well-known nationalist scholar Wang Xiaodong (王小东), the author of the 2009 book Unhappy China, was deleted in just under 40 minutes. “According to Japanese television reports,” Wang wrote, “[Kim] will be taken to Singapore on a China-branded airplane.”
Noting the speculation yesterday about the use of an Air China plane, and perhaps putting his finger on one point of sensitivity for China, Richard McGregor of the Lowy Institute, suggested on Twitter that China might be the “best-informed third party” at the Singapore summit:
Gosh, maybe Kim Jong-un will be flown to Singapore in an Air China plane. If true, there’s no doubt who’ll be the best-informed third party at this summit. https://t.co/VSgyx6JBn8
— Richard McGregor (@mcgregorrichard) June 9, 2018
A post at 2:07PM Beijing time today by Weibo user Xu Zhenyi (许振义), former director for Asia at the National University of Singapore (NUS), sharing a Twitter post from police in Singapore, read simply: “Singapore police will be shutting down traffic between the Changyi Airport and Tanglin Road within the next hour. It’s really possible [he’s taken] a [Chinese] national airline. Kim is coming.”
The post had been censored by 3:13PM.
Tanglin Road, referenced in Xu’s post, is the location of the St Regis Hotel, where Kim will reportedly be staying ahead of the summit.
But Kim’s flight seemed to remain a topic of some confusion. An afternoon report from South Korea’s Yonhap News Agency focussed attention on Kim’s official Soviet-era aircraft, Chammae-1, saying that it had passed through Beijing airspace and was heading southwest on a 7-8 hour journey to Singapore. And a post at 1:58 Beijing time by Chinese scholar Wu Ming (吴铭), sharing the gist of the Yonhap report, was deleted 36 minutes later.
Remember those days when China grumbled constantly about biased Western media and how they never let up in their criticism? Well, this week we have a markedly different voice quite close to the center of power — a publication of the Central Party school that rounds up praise from the West to show how Xi Jinping is respected around the world for his “superstrong leadership,” or chaoqiang lingdao (超强领导). A consummate piece of official flattery, the article glorifies in the “chaos of the West,” to which it says Xi Jinping offers a “clear alternative.” Also this week — speaking of strongmen — we had an exclusive interview with Russian President Vladimir Putin ahead of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) Summit in Qingdao. The interview was conducted by Shen Haixiong (慎海雄), the official who heads up the recently consolidated China Media Group (“Voice of China”), making him, you could say, one of China’s top-ranking journalists.
THIS WEEK IN CHINA’S MEDIA May 31 – June 8
➢ Central Party School publication runs a research article on the “superstrong leadership of Xi Jinpiing in the new era.”
➢ Ministerial level journalist Shen Haixiong (慎海雄) interviews Putin, heating up official coverage of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization Summit.
➢ The 2017 Annual Media Responsibility Report is released, indicators including “correct channeling” (正确引导) and “secure publishing and broadcasting” (安全刊播).
➢ Guangdong’s Cyberspace Office links up with other administrative departments to carry out a purge of so-called “online fake news” (网上假新闻) and “news extortion” (新闻敲诈).
➢ The head of the Central Political and Legal Affairs Commission says social media in political media affairs must be developed to “attract fans” — “so that tens of millions of online users and hear the voice of the Party in the midst of the cacophony.” [1]Party School Publication Runs Research on “Super-strong” Leadership of Xi Jinping in the New Era
In its second edition for 2018, China Leadership Science (中国领导科学), a quarterly publication by the Central Party School (中央党校), ran a research piece called “A Terrific Leader: A Study of International Praise for Xi Jinping’s Super-strong Leadership in the New Era” (了不起的领导人——习近平新时代超强领导力国际赞誉研究), which drew on foreign media reports and remarks from politicians to emphasize the “super-strong leadership” (超强领导力) of Xi Jinping. The article argues that the deep study of international praise for Xi Jinping’s “super-strong leadership in the New Era” will certainly “benefit us in further strengthening the ‘Four Consciousnesses’ (四个意识), in adhering to the ‘Four Confidences’ (四个自信), in resolutely preserving General Secretary Xi Jinping’s core status within the entire Party, and maintaining a high level of uniformity in ideology, politics and action with the central Party of which Comrade Xi Jinping is the core.”
The phrase “super-strong leadership” appeared back in January 2018 at a theoretical research conference by the China Leadership Science Academy (中国领导科学研究会) called “The Study and Implementation of the Spirit of the 19th National Congress, Forging New Leadership in the New Era” (学习贯彻十九大精神，锻造新时代新领导力), a conference organized by the Central Party School. Luo Zongyi (罗宗毅), the official in charge of education at the Central Party School, said in his opening remarks to the conference that Xi Jinping leadership ideas in the New Era, encompassed by Xi Jinping Thought of Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for the New Era and its exercise, provided a strong theoretical direction and practical guide to “the adherence to the Party’s leadership over all work.” Key Chinese Reports: China Leadership Science (中国领导科学): 了不起的领导人——习近平新时代超强领导力国际赞誉研究 [PDF Here: 了不起的领导人_习近平新时代超强领导力国际赞誉研究_本刊编辑部]
Central Party School Online (中央党校网): [January speech by Luo Zongyi on “superstrong leadership”] 在中国领导科学研究会“学习贯彻十九大精神，锻造新时代新领导力”理论研讨会暨第三届理事会换届大会开幕式上的讲话
People’s Daily Online (人民网): [2014 use of the term “superstrong leadership”]: 刘峰、刘志伟：习近平总书记的领导思想与领导风格 [2]Ministerial-level Journalist Shen Haixiong (慎海雄) Interviews Putin
On the eve of the summit of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), held in the city of Qingdao, Shen Haixiong, the head of the China Media Group (中国中央广播电视总台), the newly consolidated state-run broadcast network to be known outside the country as”Voice of China,” did an exclusive interview with Russian President Vladimir Putin.
In the interview, which ran 40 minutes long, Putin answered questions about his impression of Xi Jinping and the prospects for the Sino-Russian relationship and the SCO. He also remarked on the Belt and Road Initiative, the North Korean nuclear crisis and other international issues.
The Shen Haixiong interview with Putin comes just two months after Shen took over as head of the newly restructured China Media Group. On March 21, China National Radio, China Central Television and China Radio International held a high-level leaders meeting at which it the formation of the consolidated China Media Group was announced, and that Shen Haixiong would serve as director and Party secretary of the group. Key Chinese Reports:
CCTV.com: 中央广播电视总台台长专访普京 都聊了什么？
Media Tea Party (传媒茶话会): 总台台长慎海雄专访普京侧记：彻夜奋战只为最后的精彩
CCTV News App (央视新闻客户端): 有一种“网红”叫普京
CCTV News App (央视新闻客户端): 中国媒体广泛刊发总台专访普京报道 [3] 2017 Annual Report on Media Social Responsibility Released, Indicators Include “Correct Channeling” (正确引导) and “Secure Publishing and Broadcasting” (安全刊播)
On May 31, the 2017 Annual Report on Media Social Responsibility was released. The report is the fifth to be released since a pilot report was first issued in 2014. The report measures media organization performance over the past year along 8 key indicators, including “correct channeling” (正确引导), a reference to the official demand that media work to shape public opinion to suit the political demands of the Party and government leadership, “legal operation” (合法经营), “service provision” (提供服务), “cultural development” (繁荣发展文化), “secure publication and broadcasting” (安全刊播), “attentiveness of human affairs” (人文关怀), “respect for professional rules” (遵守职业规范) and “protection of news employee rights” (保障新闻从业人员权益).
According to a number of media-related WeChat public accounts that unpacked the most recent report, media organizations generally achieved the objective of “secure publishing and broadcasting” by exercising stronger controls over the social media accounts of the organization and its employees, by strengthening systems and mechanisms for “audit and review” (审读审核) of content, by applying a uniform content standard to both newspapers and social media (ensuring the latter do not report more freely), and by promoting the building of systems to gauge public opinion (舆情系统建设).
The 2017 Annual Report on Media Social Responsibility was expanded to include 40 media organizations, including 6 central-level organizations, 1 industry-specific media with national reach, and 33 regional media organizations from 29 provinces and cities. Key Chinese Reports:
Xinhua Online (新华网): 2017年度媒体社会责任报告正式发布 发布媒体社会责任报告单位增至40家
Xinhua Online (新华网): 40家媒体2017年度媒体社会责任报告
“Media Observer” WeChat Public Account (传媒大观察): 28家报社社会责任报告出炉 我们发现了17条安全刊播窍门 [4]Guangdong’s Cyberspace Office Announces Purge of “Online Fake News” and “News Extortion” (新闻敲诈)
The Guangdong office of the Cyberspace Administration of China (CAC) announced a coordinated effort with the public security department and other government agencies to purge so-called “online fake news” (网上假新闻) and “news extortion” (新闻敲诈) between now and the end of June 2018. The campaign will focus on rooting out unofficial and unauthorized news stories on major policies (重大政策), important events (重要活动), hot-button social issues (社会热点) and sensitive issues (敏感问题) — meaning in particular those stories posted without official approval for online news services (互联网新闻信息服务许可). Key Chinese Reports:
Cyberspace Administration of China (国家网信办网站): 广东网信办联合多部门开展网上假新闻和新闻敲诈问题整治工作
[5] Head of Central Political and Legal Affairs Commission: Develop New Media So the Voice of the Party is Heard
On May 24, Chen Yixin (陈一新), director of the Central Political and Legal Affairs Commission, led an official discussion on “strengthening propaganda and public opinion work in political and legal affairs in the New Era.” Chen said that new media (新媒体) were rapidly becoming the principal channels and platforms for information dissemination, and there was a need to develop what he called “five capacities” (五个能力) in work on political and legal affairs: 1) the capacity for “online struggle” (网上斗争能力), “resolutely safeguarding online ideological security” (网络意识形态安全); 2) the capacity for the “integrated development” (融合发展能力) between traditional and new media, pushing determinedly ahead in transitioning the focus to social media; 3) the capacity for “brand innovation” in the political and legal affairs arena, strengthening new media brands in politics and law, “so that tens of millions of online users and hear the voice of the Party in the midst of the cacophony (让亿万网民在众声喧哗中听到党的声音); 4) the capacity for agenda-setting by new media on political and legal affairs, fully utilizing the “discourse resources of politics and legal affairs” (政法话语资源) to create unique hot topics that allow “firm grasp of the initiative and discourse power by new media in the public opinion arena”; 5) the capacity for new media on political and legal affairs to “attract fans” (引关圈粉), becoming media than online users turn to. Key Chinese Reports: Legal Daily (法制日报): 中央政法委秘书长陈一新到法制日报社调研 “三四五六”创新举措引发政法媒体人头脑风暴
The People’s Court News and Communication Agency (人民法院新闻传媒总社): 陈一新在政法宣传舆论工作调研座谈会上提出 政法新媒体“三四五六”创新举措
As Vladimir Putin arrived in Beijing today for talks with Xi Jinping, the Global Times had to note that the relationship between China and Russia “has innovative significance for major power relations.” Read the headlines in China these days and “innovation” is everywhere. In whatever arena a question arises — technology, economics, politics, media, culture — the answer seems to be innovation.
Sure, innovation is a global buzzword. Benoit Godin, an expert on the history of innovation as a concept, has written that the term “is used and abused and has come to mean everything and nothing.” In China, though, under the rule of Xi Jinping, the term has become all-encompassing — the political, economic, technological, cultural and ideological fulcrum on which the legitimacy of the Party turns.
When Xi gave his speech at the Boao Forum last April, an opportunity to press his vision for the global economy, it was called “Openness for Greater Prosperity, Innovation for a Better Future.” The speech had to be understood in a Chinese context as a transformation (an innovation, if you will) of the vision set by Deng Xiaoping. If Deng was the great reformer, Xi Jinping is the great innovator. Xi’s vision, moreover, is global in scope, making him, at least in the Chinese Communist Party’s formulation, someone whose standard we should all follow. “Reform and innovation,” Xi said in his Boao speech, “are the fundamental driving force of human progress.”
When a concept takes hold at the commanding heights of political power in China, one can expect it to seize every crack and valley as well.
This is something we should remember as we observe the way “innovation” has taken hold in the arena of media and propaganda. At times, the word can actually point in a roundabout way to some form of change, including the new (if not exactly creative) application of technology. But very often, it does not. Very often, it is mere repetition, and as such is meant to confer power on the political idea and the political person, rather than signal or advocate real transformation.
Take, for example, a piece today written by a local propaganda chief from Baoji, a small city in China’s west, relating the results of a fact-finding mission to larger coastal cities in which leaders from Baoji sought to ascertain how they might get their city noticed. The answer:
We must ‘go out’ and strengthen our exchanges with more areas, drawing support from our cultural strengths, innovating our methods and styles, telling Baoji’s story in a lively way, doing high frequency publicity of Baoji, turning Baoji’s influence into Baoji’s competitiveness.
When the propaganda chief boils these concepts down to specific methods, however, they are underwhelming. If the voice of Baoji is to “actively go out,” resulting in “stronger public opinion power,” then the city must “strengthen the role of the internet,” the most effective way (can you feel it coming?) to “steadily innovate the channels and methods of communication.”
The team from Guangzhou Daily accepts an “innovation” award on June 7, 2018.
Yesterday, the Chinese Newspaper Association held the award ceremony for its 3rd annual Chinese Media Innovation Summit Hangzhou (中国传媒创新杭州峰会). The list of award winners reads like a portrait of traditional Party-run newspapers making the shift to more fully multimedia organizations that operate across online platforms.
In China’s media landscape, one of the most important meanings of “innovation” over the past three years has been the transformation of the Party press system through the application of new internet tools, and restructuring within Party-run media organizations to allow for cross-production of content.
For its “Central Kitchen” (中央厨房) project — which integrates various aspects of content production, including editing, design and technology, through a dedicated central desk — Guangzhou Daily, the official Party mouthpiece of the Guangzhou city leadership, won an award this year. Hunan Daily, the official Party mouthpiece of the provincial leadership in Hunan province, won an award for another “convergence” (融合) project called the “New Hunan Cloud Platform” (新湖南云), described as a multimedia platform that has “become the chief platform through which the provincial Party committee and provincial government release important policies.”
Last Friday, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), an international political, economic and security organization with members and observer states spanning Eurasia and South Asia, held its first Media Summit in Beijing. During the meeting, attended by representatives from more than 110 media organizations, the group released a “cooperation initiative” calling on all SCO members to use the opportunity of the upcoming summit in Qingdao to “drive media dialogue and cooperation to a new level.”
In a letter of welcome published on the front page of the overseas edition of the People’s Daily on Saturday, President Xi Jinping said the meeting was a positive opportunity to promote the “Shanghai spirit,” and to work toward “a community of common future [or destiny] for humankind,” the latter phrase now an important centerpiece of Chinese foreign policy. The “Shanghai Spirit,” a phrase often used in conjunction with the SCO, refers, according to the official Xinhua News Agency, to the spirit of “mutual trust, mutual benefit, equality, consultation, respect for cultural diversity, and pursuit of common development.”
In typical fashion, both English and Chinese language reporting of the SCO Media Summit in state media mostly failed to provide a concrete picture of the purpose of the meeting and the expected outcomes. Xinhua quoted Ainura Temirbekova, Kyrgyzstan’s deputy minister for culture and information, as saying the “Shanghai Spirit” was “not just confined to important statements, but proved by deeds.” Dmitrii Lukiantsev, Russia’s representative to the SCO, was quoted (or, rather, paraphrased) as saying that “the organization sets a good example for building a new type of international relations and the ‘Shanghai Spirit’ is of great relevance today.”
What deeds? What examples? What relevance? None of the foreign representatives name-dropped in Chinese state media coverage seemed capable of spelling it out — although, again, Xinhua said that Temirbekova said that “China has made concrete contributions, and the cooperation between SCO countries on the global stage is the only pathway to a shared future.”
So why is China bringing together more than 100 media organizations from across Asia? What are its strategic objectives here?
If we wade knee-deep through the swamp of Chinese state media platitudes, we can find just a bit of clarity. It comes in this passage of a report by the Economic Dailyquoting Fang Jiangshan (方江山), the deputy editor-in-chief of the Chinese Communist Party’s flagship People’s Daily. In the same report as it was run at People’s Daily Online, the passage was bolded for emphasis:
Declaration on International Public Opinion Environment
The strengthening and promotion of media cooperation within the Shanghai Cooperation Organization is a shared aspiration of all parties. People’s Daily deputy editor-in-chief Fang Jiangshan points out that the media constitute an important resource and means of national governance and global governance, and whoever controls discourse power has a grasp of great soft power, and therefore can better stand in a position of righteousness and justice (道义制高点). In the present international public opinion framework, the members of the SCO currently lack media organizations with global influence, and the media of many member states still seriously rely on Western news agencies for their international news reports. “The political security, economic development and social stability of SCO member states is upset by a massive gap in terms of digital technologies,” said Fang Jiangshan . . . . Fang believes that to change this situation, the SCO and its members states must place a strong emphasis on media development and media cooperation, further building mechanisms for media cooperation.
According to the Economic Daily report, the consensus coming out of the SCO Media Summit was that greater media cooperation among member states could help to “build a public opinion environment more beneficial to regional peace, development and stability.”
Make no mistake: the proper translation here is that China wants to work with its Asian partners in the SCO to break what it sees as Western dominance of the global narrative on governance. Imagine a world in which media and their audiences across Asia see global affairs not through the lens of the Associated Press, AFP, Reuters or the New York Times, but through the grand political vision offered by Xinhua.
It’s not difficult to ascertain which nation state, under such a “public opinion environment,” would come off as the beneficent protagonist.
There are plenty of media stories in China this week to pique one’s interest. Notably, we have some concrete numbers — and astonishing ones at that — for the vast internal censorship teams being put together by major internet businesses in China to accommodate the control demands of the Party; we have the first casualties of China’s new law against defaming heroes and martyrs, which took effect on May 1; and we have the return to form of a once prominent Chinese investigative reporter, Gao Qinrong (shown above), who was jailed for eight years more than a decade ago for exposing corruption in his native Shanxi province — and who has now brought down another official on his home turf.
THIS WEEK IN CHINA’S MEDIA May 21, 2018 to May 30, 2018
➢ Chaping (差评) returns investment made by Tencent after revelations of IP violations
➢ Internal content review team at Jinri Toutiao reached 10,000 members, and the video app Kuaishou (快手) censors a daily average of 700,000 videos deemed illegal
➢ As a law goes into effect in China protecting historical martyrs and heroes, the comic site “Rage Comics” (暴走漫画) is taken offline
➢ New figures (though from 2016) on salaries for top media company officials in China
➢ Veteran journalist Gao Qinrong exposes alleged corruption in Shanxi on his WeChat public account [1] Chaping Returns Major Investment
On May 23, the science and technology related we-media (自媒体) site “Chaping” (差评) announced that it had secured a 30 million yuan investment, with investment the Tencent’s TOPIC Fund topping the list. But on May 28, after Chaping faced a storm of criticism from other we-media operators over alleged copyright violations (essentially, taking other’s content and rebranding it as their own), the company announced that it had decided unilaterally to return Tencent’s investment. Zhang Jun (张军), Tencent’s top public relations executive, and CEO Ma Huateng (马化腾), both admitted over social media that the TOPIC Fund had gone ahead with the investment before conducting an adequate review. Key Chinese Reports: National Business Daily (每日经济新闻): 《腾讯能不能投资“差评”？》/《“差评”发文回应质疑背后：“洗稿”这件事，终于被摆上了台面》/《“差评”称主动退还投资，腾讯的尽调也不用做了》 The Beijing News (新京报): 《“差评”被差评后 主动退还腾讯投资》 [2] Content Review Team at Jinri Toutiao reaches 10,000 Members; Kuaishou Cleans Up Daily Average of 700,000 Content Items
On May 25, Pan Yu (潘宇), the director of media cooperation at Jinri Toutiao, revealed that in order to protect the “security” of the platform, Jinri Toutiao had built an enormous team allowing it to conduct content review on a 24×7 basis, “in order to create a positive energy climate conducive to socialist core values.” Pan also revealed that the platform had also created a team of expert advisors to enhance content supervision.
On May 27, Kuaishou issued a report on its handling of so-called illegal content for the month of May showing that on average 698,974 items of short video content had been removed on a daily basis. In addition, an average of 9,280 accounts had been blocked daily. At present, about 10 million short videos are uploaded each day to the platform, said Kuaishou, and it was doing its utmost to create “a positive, healthy, green and fair content environment.” Key Chinese Reports: Dahe Daily (大河报): 《今日头条媒体合作总监：背后有庞大的内容审核团队》
36Kr.com (36氪): 《在互联网行业做审核员，他见了太多人性的黑暗面 | 这个职业不太冷》 Blue Whale Finance (蓝鲸财经): 《快手通报5月处罚情况：日均清理违规内容近70万条》 [3] Heroes and Martyrs Protection Law Takes Effect, “Rage Comics” is Taken Offline
On May 16th and 17th, after the we-media account “Rage Comics” (暴走漫画) posted short videos that were deemed to insult the spirit and deeds of Communist heroes and martyrs in violation of a related law that took effect on May 1, Jinri Toutiao shut down offending accounts. Weibo, meanwhile shut down 16 accounts identified as serious violators, including @BaozouManhua (@暴走漫画), @BaozouDaShijian (@暴走大事件), @HuangJiguangZagang (@黄继光砸缸) and @DongCunruiInTheOffice (@办公室的董存瑞), while deleting a further 39 account aliases. Youku, the iQiyi (爱奇艺) online video platform, and the Zhihu question-and-answer website all removed content related to “Rage Comics” and put blocks into effect.
The “Law of the People’s Republic of China on the Protection of Heroes and Martyrs” (中华人民共和国英雄烈士保护法), which went into effect on May 1, stipulates the following: “No organization or individual may in public forums, online or through radio, television, film or publishing, etcetera, insult, slander or in other ways harm the name, representation, reputation or honor of heroes and martyrs.”
On May 23, two days before the official day commemorating Communist hero Dong Cunrui (董存瑞), a People’s Liberation Army soldier said to have blown himself up during China’s civil war in order to destroy a Kuomingtang fortification, Ren Jian (任剑), one of the creators of “Rage Comics” paid a visit to the Dong Cunrui Martyr’s Memorial Park, laying flowers on the memorial and offering a public apology. Key Chinese Reports:
People’s Daily Official WeChat Account (人民日报官微): 《“暴走漫画”等16个微博账号被关闭》
IT Home (IT之家):
《王尼玛暴走漫画致歉：下线全部视频节目，网站App无限期关停整改》 [4] Radio, Television and Newspaper Top Brass Earning Salaries of Up To 840,000 Yuan
According to a recently released report on salaries in the media industry for 2016, salaries for top media management positions in China generally fall between 400,000 yuan and 840,000 yuan per year, or around 62,000-130,000 US dollars. These numbers represent only a slight increase from previously recorded figures for 2015. Delays in reporting these salary figures in China of course mean that in some cases top managers of media companies have already moved on to new positions.
Top salaries at listed film and television companies generally topped out at around 1.17 million yuan per year, but salaries at 50 percent of listed media companies were actually lower than 600,000, meaning monthly salaries of around 50,000 yuan. Key Chinese Reports:
“Entertainment & Business” Public Account (微信公众号“文娱商业观察”): 《人均117万，你的领导挣多少？｜2017年A股影视公司高管人均年薪排行榜》 [5] Veteran Journalist Openly Accuses Discipline Inspection Official in Shanxi of Corruption; Official is Removed
On May 24, journalist Gao Qinrong (高勤荣), a native of Shanxi province, posted a report called “A Vulgar-Mouthed Disciplinary Inspection Official” (一个满嘴脏话的纪检委书记) on his WeChat public account, alleging that Cheng Wanying (程晚英), head of the Cadre Supervision Office (干部监察室) of the discipline inspection authority in Changzhi City (长治市), coordinated with the city’s top anti-corruption official, Ma Biao (马彪), to organize a campaign of intimidation against a local real estate developer, Chen Zhaoping (陈兆平), after Chen refused to pay a bribe to Cheng. At the end of his report, Gao Qinrong provided an audio recording of Ma Biao, the anti-corruption official, in which he cursed profusely. A few days after Gao’s report, Ma Biao was, according to sources, removed from his position in Shanxi for “ineffectively dealing with online opinion” (网络舆情处置不力).
Gao Qinrong has a long and painful personal history of exposing corruption in China. In 1998, he exposed an irrigation project in Shanxi province that was a scam, and for that work he was imprisoned for eight years. In 2007, Gao was awarded an International Press Freedom Award from the Committee to Protect Journalists. Key Chinese Reports: Beijing Time (北京时间): 《山西长治纪委书记突遭免职 曾因满嘴脏话被公开举报》
