In coverage — or lack of coverage — of the floods in Shandong province this week by traditional media outlets in China, we have further illustration of the changing nature of the media environment. No longer are magazines and newspapers pursuing in any way in-depth reports or analyses, as they might have done before the Xi Jinping era, and social platforms are taking the lead, to the extent that coverage is available at all.
Also this week, an important change at the Information Office of the State Council, with close Xi Jinping ally Xu Lin (徐麟), formerly CAC chief, taking over as director there, where he will be in charge of China’s foreign propaganda. Meanwhile, the CAC is pressing online video platforms very hard to ensure that they get rid of unwanted content and more loudly promote “positive energy,” this being a Xi Jinping era term for content that emphasizes positive and uplifting stories and views of Chinese society, and which builds up the Party’s position within that narrative of positivity.

THIS WEEK IN CHINA’S MEDIA
August 18 – August 24, 2018
➢ Questions of Human Cause Behind Flooding in Shouguang, Social Media Fill the Information Gap
➢ Party Media Criticize Rights Defense by Jasic Workers in Shenzhen, Saying it is Supported Financially By Outside Organizations / “Leftist Youth” Come to the Fore
➢ Xu Lin Promoted As Director of the State Council Information Office, Bi Jingquan Sacked as Deputy Chief of the State Market Regulatory Administration in Beijing in Wake of Vaccine Scandal
➢ Documentary “Looking Back on Yan’an” Airs, Emphasizing Role of Core Leadership
➢ Cyberspace Administration of China: Online Short Videos Must Be Full of Positive Energy
[1] Questions of Human Cause Behind Flooding in Shouguang, Social Media Fill the Information Gap
In the wake of Typhoon Rumbia, which battered the coastal province of Shandong, a debate emerged online in China about whether human error might have contributed to loss of life and property, particularly around the city of Shouguang. So far, 24 deaths have been reported in the area, 3 people are still missing, and economic losses estimated at 9.2 billion yuan (US$1.34 billion). On August 17 and 18, as heavy rain pounded the area, local authorities in Shouguang grew concerned about the integrity of upstream reservoirs and whether they could bear the strain. They decided to release floodwaters to the reservoirs. As the floodwaters surged downstream, river currents were said to actually flow backwards along certain stretches, inundating many villages in the process.
According to state media reports, villages in the Shouguang area received notice on August 19 that he reservoirs would begin releasing flood waters, but they were given no time to remove livestock and other possessions. Flood waters had inundated the area by that night, and by the 20th Shouguang had already become a disaster zone. The strategic release of floodwaters from the reservoirs continued through August 21.

During a high-level conference on propaganda and ideology held this week, President Xi Jinping held his ground, and seemed to reaffirm his confidence in Wang Huning, the top Party leader in charge of ideology. To help us understand the significance of Xi’s keynote speech at the event, I’ll focus first on two points of background and one point of timing.
The first point of background is the criticism Xi Jinping has received since July this year. Not long after the “ink-splashing incident” (泼墨事件), in which a young woman, later confirmed to be Dong Yaoqiong (董瑶琼), posted a video to the internet in which she throws ink on an image of the president, a wave of criticism of Xi appeared both domestically and internationally. This criticism has included more open denunciation of excessively positive and exuberant propaganda, of which the documentary film “Amazing China” has been one of the most representative examples.
The second point of background is the upcoming 40th anniversary of the start of economic reforms in China. How this anniversary will and won’t be commemorated in the state media has been an important, lingering question this year.
Finally, regarding timing. It was five years ago, on August 19, 2013, that Xi Jinping held another important conference on propaganda and ideology during which he introduced the notion of “public opinion struggle,” or yulun douzheng (舆论斗争), coming several months after the release of the so-called “Seven Don’t Speaks,” a communique circulated by the Party’s General Office that banned discussion of a range of issues. The fifth anniversary of the “8.19 speech” was commemorated by Party media over a period of several days, so this also presented the perfect opportunity for Xi to hold another important conference.
A High-Level Affirmation of Propaganda Work
Xi’s latest speech is essentially an affirmation of his speech on propaganda and ideology from five years ago. In this recent speech, he says, “The policy decisions and deployments of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party on propaganda and ideological work are completely correct, and the broad masses of officials on the front lines of propaganda and ideological work entirely deserve our confidence.”
The conference was chaired by Wang Huning (王沪宁), the standing committee member in charge of ideology whom many suspect has been a key mastermind of Xi’s projection of authoritarian resolve and national strength. This is the second of two high-profile appearances Wang Huning has made this month — the first being his solo reception of a visiting delegation from Vietnam. We can interpret these as a process of endorsement (背书) by which Xi is signaling that Wang has his confidence.
As for the speech itself, we can see no obvious differences from the speech five years ago. As far as we can glean from official reports of the speech (as yet, no full-text version has been made available), Xi Jinping does not appear to have mentioned the hardline phrase “public opinion struggle.” However, there was another hardline phrase: “We must adhere to the truth with a clear banner, firmly refuting falsehoods” (要旗帜鲜明坚持真理，立场坚定批驳谬误).
Those inclined to a normative Western reading of “truth” and “falsehood” should understand that this is not an affirmation of truth as you might understand it — but rather an affirmation that it is the Party’s prerogative to define that truth, and its obligation to do so according to the clear direction of the top leadership. Which is why Xi follows immediately with: “We must exert pressure to ensure Party organizations at all levels act without negligence, exercising unflagging control of the [Party’s] position, unequivocal in holding those responsible [for lapses] to account.”
One clear difference in the recent speech versus that 2013 speech is Xi’s emphasis on his own stature and position. Five years ago, he had not yet introduced his banner term, “Xi Jinping Thought of Socialism With Chinese Characteristics for the New Era” (习近平新时代中国特色社会主义思想), or the notion of the “Four Consciousnesses” (四个意识), first on the list being “consciousness of the core” (meaning the primary leadership role of Xi himself). This time, he calls on the entire Party to study and implement his own “thought,” though he does not in this instance combine “thought” with “Xi Jinping.” He urges them to “firmly establish the Four Consciousnesses, resolutely protecting the authority and centralized leadership of the Central Committee, firmly grasping the correct political orientation.”
Party discourse notwithstanding, this is a far more direct injunction: Listen to me, follow me.
Reform Anniversary: Where are Mao, Deng and Jiang?
2018 marks the 40th anniversary of China’s Opening and Reform policy. In his speech, Xi does not mention this fact as a point of background. And there is one phrase in particular that deserves attention: “To raise the banner, we must hold the banners of Marxism and of Socialism With Chinese Characteristics up high, persevering in using Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for the New Era to arm the entire Party, to teach the people, and to promote our work.”
According to past practice within the mainstream Party discourse, when speeches come to the part about the development of ideologies, Marxism must come along with a string of others — “Leninism,” “Mao Zedong Thought,” “Deng Xiaoping Theory,” the “Three Represents” (Jiang Zemin) and the “Scientific View of Development” (Hu Jintao). In his recent speech, Xi Jinping omits five of these six. This is particularly significant because one of these, “Deng Xiaoping Theory,” is of course intimately linked with China’s reform path over the past four decades.
For Xi to neglect mention of Deng altogether gives us an inkling of the fuller picture. No mention of Deng + no mention of opposing the extreme left + an emphasis on the Party’s and his own authority + an affirmation of the ideological direction set five years ago. All of this added together equals resolute opposition to the right.
 

It has been more than a week since education authorities in the Beijing district of Shijingshan notifed parents through their official WeChat public account that one of the areas oldest and largest migrant schools, Huangzhuang, was to be closed, effectively immediately. The notice, “A Letter to Parents” (致家长的一封信), said the students would be redistributed, but the details of this redistribution are as yet unclear, according to reports from overseas Chinese media. Meanwhile, more than 300 migrant children who were enrolled in a summer program at the school have been shut out, their parents without clear short-term options.
The school’s principal, Chen Enxian (陈恩显), told overseas Chinese media that local authorities had closed the school without prior notification, padlocking the gates and preventing anyone from entering. [Caixin’s August 16 slideshow of photos taken of the empty school grounds.]

China’s nightly official newscast, Xinwen Lianbo, is not generally the kind of programming that gets the blood flowing. Its regurgitation of the political news of the day is a political ritual, more about the Chinese Communist Party’s construction of power than about relevance to television viewers. But when Xiang Ligang (项立刚), chief executive of the telecom industry news site cctime.com, remarked on social media over the weekend that “those who don’t watch Xinwen Lianbo are generally low-quality people,” things got very heated indeed.
Made just before midnight on August 18 to Weibo, here is what Xiang’s post said:

“Those who don’t watch Xinwen Lianbo are generally low-quality people. They don’t need to know the major things happening in the country, and they aren’t capable of doing great things. People in China who do great things must watch Xinwen Lianbo.”

Many internet users, infuriated by the apparent political-class implications of Xiang’s remarks and his supercilious toadying to the Party, leapt to the attack. Where did Xiang get off deciding who was “low-quality” and who was “high-quality”?

“Low-quality people?” wrote journalist Yan Lieshan (鄢烈山) on Weibo. “They’ve never watched China Central Television, but watch the Cantonese programming on Hong Kong television instead. I stopped watching Xinwen Lianbo a long time ago, and only occasionally come across it in the hotel when traveling. Or maybe I spot it on the TV in some buffet restaurant. If Xiang Ligang is a high-quality person, then I’ll happily be a low-quality person.”
“That’s just what I am, a low-quality person who can’t do great things,” wrote Weibo user Jiang Guangda (@江广达_41207). “So from this day forward I am boycotting cctime.com, up until the point it goes bankrupt!”

 
In his rebuttals to critics online, Xiang Ligang suggested that “low-quality people” were those who had “glass hearts” (玻璃心), or were overly sensitive, and who refused to take responsibility, to which user Qiuyue Changsa (@秋月长飒) responded: “I’d like to ask you: When you turned off the comments on your Weibo post, would that be considered having a glass heart, and refusing to take responsibility?”
The tiny spark of Xiang Ligang’s phrase “low-quality people,” or xiadengren (下等人), caused such an online conflagration that even China’s commercial media pitched in on the story. The following is a short interview Xiang did with Guangzhou’s Southern Metropolis Daily.

SMD: why did you send out the Weibo post with the phrase, “Those who don’t watch Xinwen Lianbo are generally low-quality.”?
Xiang Ligang: It started when I noticed that in the Taiwanese news, aside from some political discussion programs and some entertainment programs, there wasn’t much in the way of content, compared to a science and technology program I’d seen on CCTV-2 that had a lot more value. So I posted an said that.
Later someone commented on that post that in China there was only Xinwen Lianbo, and that made me angry, so I wrote a Weibo post about Xinwen Lianbo, and in that I said the thing about low-quality people not watching Xinwen Lianbo. 。
SMD: How do you view the way things have developed and been communicated?
Xiang Ligang: I never thought this thing would escalate to the point it has. It’s definitely been played up by just a few people. And I don’t really want to waste my time on this matter.
This was just my own personal attitude, something I shared within a small group. And most of my fans are those who pretty much share my outlook on things. But later certain Big V’s started started pushing this and seized on that phrase, “Those who don’t watch Xinwen Lianbo are generally low-quality,” so things really spread like wildfire. These people, you could say, have values really opposed to mine, and they seized on this phrase to launch an attack against me.
SMD: What did you mean when you said “low-quality people” in your post?
Xiang Ligang: I have a very clear definition about low-quality people. In my eyes, high-quality people are first and foremost those who do real things. People who have ideals and who take things on. People who face life with courage and strive for self-improvement. And finally, people who love themselves, love their family, love their hometown, and love their country. It’s not at all how it was made out online, just referring to people who have money and are living well. Who are low-quality people? People that are lazy and greedy, who are ungrateful, who don’t take responsibility — they harbor dissatisfaction and hatred toward society.
SMD: How do you view the critical responses online?
Xiang Ligang: I’m essentially a conservative. I believe that right now social stability and economic development are good. This is my basic outlook on life.
So why are many people attacking me? Some ordinary internet users are just seeing that one line and feeling it’s totally unacceptable, and I can understand why they are upset. I think its normal for them to attack me. Then there’s another group of people who know what my values are and who just despise me. Later a bunch of people told me that they despise me because I support the idea of patriotism. These people, in my view, are low-quality people. This kind of person really rubs me the wrong way. This is just my attitude in life.
These people don’t have an effect on me. I just go about my own business. I don’t rely in this life on Weibo, or on seeking conflict.

Chen Jieren (陈杰人), the blogger and popular “Big V” taken into custody by authorities in Hunan province back in June, appeared in court yesterday. But this was not a court of prosecutors and defenders, of cross-examinations, legal arguments or objections. It was the court of the People’s Daily. The court of Xinhua News Agency. The court of the Global Times.
In a raft of reports, central state media attacked Chen as an “internet pest” who had “polluted the online space,” who had deceived millions of online fans into believing he is a man who cares deeply about truth and justice. In fact, the reports said, he is a deranged profiteer, raking in millions through intimidation and extortion, all in the name of watchdog journalism.
As Chen’s lawyer, Tong Zongjin (仝宗锦), rightly pointed out in a Weibo post that was promptly censored, these attacks in the state media — and their reported “confessions” — are a flagrant violation of the principle of presumption of innocence, and amount to trial by the media. “Neither Xinhua News Agency nor the law enforcement officers who told Xinhua reporters about the case have the right to ‘hand down a judgment’ in a case that is still under investigation,” Tong wrote.
It might be possible to debate the facts in Chens’ case, if they were available and transparent, and ask whether there is any basis at all to the allegations made against him. But the crushing, schoolyard-bully language of the state media attacks offers another kind of transparency. The reports are an illuminating gaze into the dark insides of a system that will enforce, through violence when necessary, its supreme right to the truth, that will dismiss as “fake news” all facts that are politically inconvenient or challenge vested interests — a tactic that goes back many decades within the Party discourse, no reference needed or intended to Donald Trump.
The real target of the state media barrage is the claim to independence — of journalism, of thought, of conscience — and the tools that potentially empower those claims. “The development of the self-media must be legal and orderly,” says the People’s Daily piece, referring to the universe of public accounts that have emerged on platforms like WeChat in recent years. “They cannot be allowed to develop barbarously, or even to become online criminal forces.” The kicker is a lingering threat: “The police will not rest in bringing to justice those ‘harmful pests’ of the internet, who pollute the online space with malicious hype seeking illegal profit, regardless of how popular they may be, or how much they manage to package themselves as bright defenders of justice.”
The facts in the Chen Jieren case, laid out like damning exhibits in the state media attacks, are nothing more than a distraction, a bonfire of shame and invective to send a signal to the whole of Chinese society: Do not dare claim the truth for yourself; it is the Party’s through and through.

Maliciously Hyping and Provoking Trouble, Frenzied Profiteering Through Extortion
— Getting to the Bottom of Online Big V Chen Jieren
(People’s Daily, August 17, 2018, page 9)
“Actually, I cheated you all. On the surface, I appeared bright and blameless, a Big V flying the flag of equality and justice — when in fact I was angling for personal gain, and I committed many shady acts and was essentially an online parasite.” This was the confession of online Big V Chen Jieren as he faced interrogation. “I apologize to you all for betraying your goodwill and trust. The internet is a place where information can be very confusing, and the last thing you need is for your eyes to be betrayed by a hypocrite like me.”
Over the past few years, Chen Jieren has made a name for himself through his self-media account (自媒体账号) as someone who “criticizes the government,” “dares to speak” and “dares to expose information,” to the extent the his fans reached into the hundreds of thousands. But on the afternoon of July 7, a notice from police in Hunan caught people off guard: suspect Chen Jieren had already been taken in by the police and subjected to compulsory criminal measures.
As the police have progressed more deeply into the case, the true face of Chen Jieren has gradually been uncovered. The Chen Jieren case is a “clan-style” gang offense of online criminal forces (网上黑恶势力性质的), and this gang has donned the cap of the law and of supervision by public opinion [OR: “watchdog journalism”], taking the internet as a criminal platform, and unrestrainedly conducted extortion and blackmail, wantonly seeking profit, so they are suspected of the crimes of extortion and blackmail, and of carrying on illegal business activities. Over a period of several years, the Chen Jieren gang established 21 accounts, including the “Jieren Observation Viewpoint” (杰人观察视角), “Jieren Observation Heights” (杰人观察高度), on Weibo, WeChat, Toutiao and other self-media services, issuing more than 3,000 posts of various negative forms, hyping, attacking and exposing, and altogether they manufactured around 200 negative public opinion situations (负面舆情) in 11 provinces, raking in funds in the 10s of millions, seriously misleading members of the public watching and listening, seriously disturbing online order, and doing serious damage to grassroots governance and to social stability. . . . 

Chen Jieren was born in Qingshuping Township (青树坪镇), Shuangfeng County of Hunan province, to an ordinary peasant family. His parents were disabled, and the household was struggled with poverty. He worked in the local government and for well-known media, but he was fired by news media because of fake news (假新闻).
In recent years, information technologies have developed. These days, “Everyone has a microphone,” and Chen Jieren clearly recognized the commercial opportunity. He neglected the general knowledge that “on the internet there is not land outside the law,” and he discarded the principle that “self-media must also have professional journalism integrity.” Through unrestrained packaging and hyping, he steadily expanded his influence, seeking fame and fortune.
Open Chen Jieren’s self-media accounts and you find that they are filled with shiny but spurious titles like “veteran media professional,” “scholar of legal culture,” “expert on brand development” and “crisis management,” that he was selected to the list of “top 100 influential Chinese thought leaders” . . . . Read the posts in his accounts and their eye-catching headlines, the enumerations of “evidence,” and add to this the inflammatory nature of his writings, and all of this might easily give you the impression that Chen Jieren is someone who “calls for the truth and upholds justice.”
From 2003 to now, Chen Jieren has been involved in the media industry for many years, and he is clear about how to write articles so that they attract eyeballs. When he realized that writing articles could mean huge economic gain, he started to see this as a road to making money, and he saw the law and journalism as tools for earning money,” Chen Jieren’s lover Liu X said during interrogation. On May 31, 2018, Zhao X Geng (赵某庚), the driver for a certain transport company in Shaodong County, Hunan province, felt unwell on the job, and three days later passed away. Zhao X Geng’s family sought out Chen Jieren for help in seeking compensation. Chen Jieren instructed his brother, Chen Weiren (陈伟人), to negotiate, and the first time he met with the niece of the victim, Peng X, he accepted 26,000 yuan as a consultation fee and reached an agreement: for a settlement [with the company] of under 400,000 yuan, they would take a 10 percent service fee; for anything exceeding 400,000 yuan they would take a 30 percent service fee.
After this, Chen Jieren directed his younger brother Chen Weiren to post “Li X Yan, Black-Hearted People’s Congress Delegate From Hunan’s Shaodong County, Causes Death.” Chen Jieren also arranged for the child [of the victim] to appear outside the transport company with a banner . . .  putting pressure on the local government and the transport company.
Right after, Chen Jieren and the others demanded that Li X Yan compensate the Zhao family. “At the time, I took charge getting the compensation down to 700,000 yuan. A few minutes later, older brother called to cuss me out, saying I had to keep with to the 880,000 previously agreed,” says Chen Weiren. Ultimately, Chen Jieren and the others received a profit of 263,000 illegally from the deal.
“Considering myself a lawyer, when I would write things online to manufacture a disturbance, I would normally employ legal analysis, creating the impression that I was speaking from the law, but behind the scenes it was connected to a lot of personal gain, and this is something that the masses of internet users had no idea about.” In Chen Jieren’s eyes, writing essays, manufacturing public opinion, making social media posts, all of it could be turned into business.
. . . . [Long list of alleged crimes removed here] . . . .
The dignity of the law cannot be trampled, and the goodness of the people cannot be abused. Chen Jieren has ultimately been brought to justice. “I wrongly believed that without belonging to any particular media, I could act in my own way. For the sake of profit, I habitually spoke selectively and with bias, polluting the online space, and violating the overall spirit and direction of the national legal and regulatory system for the internet. I should pay the price for my own illegal actions,” Chen Jieren says with remorse.
The development of the self-media must be legal and orderly. They cannot be allowed to develop barbarously, or even to become online criminal forces. We must cut away those law-breakers who seek to gain underhanded profit by the internet.
“The masses in society must be alert to all instances of those with impure motives masquerading as justice, raising their ability to distinguish. If they are blackmailed by someone, they must not give in, but must use the weapon of the law to protect themselves; relevant departments and units should also ensure robust systems of entry, content review, responsibility etcetera are in place for self-media, creating a proper and healthy online environment,” the police said. The police will not rest in bringing to justice those “harmful pests” (害虫) of the internet, who pollute the online space with malicious hype seeking illegal profit, regardless of how popular they may be, or how much they manage to package themselves as bright defenders of justice.