Author: David Bandurski

Now Executive Director of the China Media Project, leading the project’s research and partnerships, David originally joined the project in Hong Kong in 2004. He is the author of Dragons in Diamond Village (Penguin), a book of reportage about urbanization and social activism in China, and co-editor of Investigative Journalism in China (HKU Press).

Welcome Back Google? Not So Fast

Highlights from our round-up of top-five Chinese media stories from the past week include messaging from the central Party media on the need for the country to steady itself and be ready for “wind and rain” given domestic and international pressures on the Chinese economy, and a surprising hat-tip to former President Jiang Zemin in a provincial-level Party paper.
Also of interest, a brief invitation from the overseas edition of the People’s Daily for Google to return to China is pulled from Facebook and Twitter.

This Week in China’s Media
August 4, 2018, to August 10, 2018
➢ Central Media Issue “Declaration” on the Domestic Economy 
➢  People’s Daily (overseas edition) Welcomes Google Back to China on Facebook and Twitter, Then Deletes Post
➢ Shaanxi Daily Looks Back on Jiang Zemin Inspection Visits in 40th Anniversary of Reform Coverage
➢ New Tax Procedures Introduced to Combat “Unreasonable” Pay Levels in Entertainment
➢ Puyang Broadcast TV in Henan Demand Wages
[1] Central Media Issue “Declaration” on the Domestic Economy 
On August 7, the official Xinhua News Agency ran an article called “Creating a Good Life Come Rain or Shine” (风雨无阻创造美好生活) that amounted to a “declaration” (宣言) of purpose on China’s future and development in times of adversity. “It is normal for there to be wind and rain,” the article said, using a two-character phrase frequently used in Chinese to denote hardship and adversity. “But regardless of what kind of wind and rain, there is no way it can impede the march of the Chinese people toward good lives.”
The article, which was carried the next day on the front page of the People’s Daily and many other newspapers, was the fourth time in recent months that such “declarations” were released by state media. While references to the United States” or “Sino-US [relations]” did not appear in the article, it can be read as a response to ongoing trade tensions. At one point, the article said, directing its ire clearly at the Trump administration: “There are certain people who don’t wish to see the lion stir or the dragon rise into the air, who don’t want to see 1.3 billion people living good lives, and so they seek unilateralism, protectionism, trade bullying (贸易霸凌主义). This is something that cannot be avoided, and must be challenged and met.”


At the recent session of the Party’s Politburo on July 31, the phrase “change in the midst of steadiness” (稳中有变) was raised. China News Service, the country’s second official newswire, reported that “change” related to a number of news problems and challenges internally in China, and to clear changes in the “external environment” (外部环境). In its own assessment of the macroeconomic situation in the past three years, the Guangming Daily, a paper published by the Central Propaganda Department, said that China had made progress in “preventing and resolving major risks” (防范化解重大风险), but that the trade war with the United States and other external environmental challenges had “clearly expanded uncertainty.”
Key Chinese Sources:
Xinhua News Agency (新华社): 宣言:风雨无阻创造美好生活
Xinhua News Agency (新华社): 宣言:改革开放天地宽
People’s Daily (人民日报): 宣言文章为何刷屏?穿越“风雨”说信心
China News Service (中国新闻网): 政治局定调中国经济:“稳中有变”如何应对?
Guangming Daily (光明日报): 经济运行稳中有变 改革开放勇往直前
[2] People’s Daily (overseas edition) Welcomes Google Back to China on Facebook and Twitter, Then Deletes Post
On August 6, the overseas edition of the CCP’s official People’s Daily turned to Facebook and Twitter, both services blocked in China, to say amidst speculation that Google planned a return to China that the company was welcome, but that the precondition was that it abide by China’s laws and regulations. The posts have already been deleted. On August 8, Hong Kong’s Wen Wei Po newspaper posted images of the posts to its official Weibo account (@香港文汇网). These too have now been deleted.

According to a report from Hong Kong’s Ming Pao on August 9, some university students inside China reported that they could access Google Scholar from campus, but the service was unavailable if they were not on the campus internet network.
Key Chinese and Other Sources:
Sohu.com: 人民日报发文欢迎谷歌回归 但前提是“遵守中国法律”
Free Weibo (自由微博): 香港文匯網:【人民日报发推欢迎Google回归后又删除】
Newsweek: Google Welcome in China but Must Comply With Censorship: State Media
Business InsiderChinese state media tentatively welcomed Google back to China, then deleted all trace of its invite
Ming Pao News (明报新闻网): Google學術搜尋重返內地校園
[3] Shaanxi Daily Looks Back on Jiang Zemin Inspection Visits in 40th Anniversary of Reform Coverage
On August 10, Shaanxi Daily, the official newspaper of the Shaanxi Provincial Party Committee, published a four-page series called, “Comrade Jiang Zemin Inspects Shaanxi” (江泽民同志视察陕西) as part of an ongoing series dealing with the 40th anniversary of Reform and Opening. By August 12, the text of the online electronic version of the print page was already unavailable, although the image of the page itself could still be viewed. In 2018, news mentioning “Jiang Zemin” has been extremely rare in China, in part a reflection of the dominance of Xi Jinping — and this is the first time Jiang has appeared this year in a provincial-level Party publication.

The “Comrade Jiang Zemin Inspects Shaanxi” article looked back on five visits Jiang made to Shaanxi province between 1989 and 2002, and emphasized how Comrade Jiang Zemin cared for the development of Shaanxi and had defined the direction for the province in terms of reform and “socialist modernization” (社会主义现代化).
Key Chinese Sources:
Shaanxi Daily (陕西日报): 江泽民同志视察陕西
[4] New Tax Procedures Introduced to Combat “Unreasonable” Pay Levels in Entertainment
News reports this week in China said that since August 1 this year a new taxation system had been applied to the film industry, with taxes on incomes rising suddenly from 6.7 percent previously to 42 percent, and that authorities were demanding that tax payments be made in a lump sum every six months. On August 11, iQiyi, Youku, and Tencent Video joined with major production companies Daylight Entertainment (正午阳光), Huace Film and TV (华策影视), Ciwen Media (慈文传媒), Youhug (耀客传媒) and New Classics Media (新丽传媒) to issue a document called “Joint Declaration on Inhibiting Unreasonable Compensation and Preventing Negative Trends in the Industry” (关于抑制不合理片酬,抵制行业不正风气的联合声明). They pledged in the document to jointly resist “sky-high” payments for entertainers and tax evasion, and to be open about contracts. The statement specified clear standards for paying of star entertainers, with the maximum not to exceed one million RMB for individual episodes, and 50 million RMB for films.
According to Xinhua News Agency, the Central Propaganda Department and the State Administration of Taxation jointly issued a “Notice” in June demanding that the problem of excessive pay be dealt with and a system of “sunshine contracts” (阴阳合同) be put in effect in order to ensure the healthy development of the industry.
Key Chinese Sources:
36KR.com (36氪): 抵制天价片酬!9家公司联合声明:单个演员片酬不超5000万
National Business Daily (每日经济新闻): 天价片酬,再见!每经影视对话联合声明方:明星片酬税费由演员承担
Central News Agency Taiwan (中央通讯社): 傳中國官方出手 明星稅率從6%飆至42%
WeChat Public Account “Black Bamboo Zhang” (微信公众号”紫竹张先生”): 税务总局出手了,明星税率从6%改为42%
China News Service (中国新闻网): 明星天价片酬再见!5000万,不能再多了
Xinhua News Service (新华社): 中宣部等部门联合印发《通知》 治理影视行业天价片酬“阴阳合同”偷逃税等问题
[5] Puyang Broadcast TV in Henan Demand Wages
This week, images made the rounds in WeChat private message groups and on social media in China of employees from Puyang Broadcast TV in Henan province gathering at the local Petition Office (信访局) to demand unpaid wages.

In June this year, internet users posted images on Weibo and WeChat reporting that journalists at Qiqihar Broadcast TV in Heilongjiang province were demanding payment of back wages, and that the station was already three months behind in payment.
Key Chinese Sources:
Baidu Tieba “Puyang Bar” (百度贴吧”濮阳吧”): 最近网上濮阳电视台讨薪的事是真的么?有人知道吗???
WeChat Public Account “Fanren Fanyu” (微信公众号”凡人钒语”): 不要以为戴顶“党媒”的帽子,就可以搞特权!
WeChat Public Account “Riji Bu Fanhuang” (微信公众号”日记不泛黄”): 又见广电职工拉横幅讨薪,媒体界还有铁饭碗吗?

Dazzling Surveillance

Over the past year, international media and human rights groups have reported actively on the deteriorating human rights situation in Xinjiang in China’s northwest, where unrelenting and virtually ubiquitous state surveillance using a range of technologies has become a fact of life for millions of ethnic Uyghurs. In one of the strongest reports, the Wall Street Journal wrote of China’s “total surveillance state” in Xinjiang as a “vast experiment.”

Mobile news from state media. The headline reads: “Director of Central Political and Legal Affairs Commission: Ensuring Full Coverage of Public Surveillance By 2020”
But the experiment is already expanding across the breadth of China. At a conference back in June — a video conference, no less — Chen Yixin (陈一新), the director of the Central Political and Legal Affairs Commission, urged the rapid and full implementation of what the Chinese Communist Party calls “Project Dazzling Snow” (雪亮工程). Chen spoke in glowing terms of the project, a comprehensive video surveillance network intended to cover communities in rural China down to the village level, as a “thousand-mile eye” (千里眼) protecting the security of the people.
It was the duty of all officials involved, Chen said, to “make even bigger contributions to promoting the modernization of social management and the building of a peaceful China.”
When it was first approved by the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party back in 2016, “Project Dazzling Snow” was envisioned as having “full geographic coverage, full network sharing, full time coverage, and full operational control,” meaning that the system would be nationwide, capture every nook and cranny with the exception perhaps of private homes, and would be readily accessible to law enforcement with 24/7 data — at the push of a button, to use an old-fashioned term.
In a political culture in which digitalization is often treated as a noble political end in itself, the project would “raise the digitalization of law and order and prevention in society,” and would “efficiently protect the life and property of the masses.”
But how did such a delightful image, that of glistening and crystalline snow, come to describe a project that to a great many people outside of China’s control obsessed political culture must seem a devilish ambition?
In Chinese, the phrase “dazzling snow” refers to brightness and clarity. In the 1940s, the phrase was most usually associated in discourse of the Chinese Communist Party with words like “sword” (刀剑) and “eyes” (眼睛). For example, there were phrases like, “sword as dazzling as snow” (雪亮的战刀), and “the eyes of the people are as dazzling as snow” — the latter phrase meaning that China’s masses are discerning, or penetrating.
In fact, the phrase “The eyes of the people are as dazzling as snow” has long been a standard within the official Party media in China. It has been used to declare China’s resistance against imperialism, against the Kuomintang, and in support of class struggle. The image below is of a 1955 report in the People’s Daily on the suppression of the so-called “Hu Feng Counter-Revolutionary Clique,” referring to the campaign launched against the writer Hu Feng, who argued among other things that writers should have autonomy and not be directed by politicians.

The name “Project Dazzling Snow” derives directly from “the eyes of the people are as dazzling as snow.” The project first emerged under this name in Sichuan province.
By September 2015, when the National Development and Reform Commission, the Central Public Security Comprehensive Management Commission and other departments jointly issued an “Opinion” on increasing nationwide video surveillance for public security reasons, the phrase had come into use across the country. Finally, in January this year, the phrase “Project Dazzling Show” entered a Number 1 Central Document (中央一号文件) for the first time, being mentioned in a document called “Opinion from the Central Committee of the CCP and the State Council Concerning Implementation of the Village Revitalization Strategy” (中共中央国务院关于实施乡村振兴战略的意见).
The notion of “village revitalization,” or xiangcun zhenxing (乡村振兴), which also appeared in Xi Jinping’s political report to the 19th National Congress of the CCP last fall, seems to have become closely associated with blanket public security surveillance of the countryside — a less catchy cousin of “Project Dazzling Snow.”
The coming of age in the state media of “Project Dazzling Snow” happened more than a year ago, on June 14, 2017, as the phrase appeared for the first time in the Party’s official People’s Daily .

The People’s Daily report dealt with implementation of video surveillance in the Jin’e Subdistrict of Longchang County in Sichuan province, where 10 villages were brought into the new system of “Project Dazzling Snow.” The article described the set up of “command centers” at the county and subdistrict levels, a “platform” at the level of each local police station, and a “[computer] workstation” (工作站) in each village. All of the major streets and roads, said the report, were covered by 24-hour, 360-degree video surveillance.
“Project Dazzling Snow” is now in the midst of a concerted nationwide implementation push, with Chen Yixin emphasizing in his June meeting that full national coverage was to be achieved by 2020, just two years from now. The chilling implications of mass video surveillance in Xinjiang are already being felt, and now the rest of the country can expect to be equally “secure.”

Discourse Climate Report: July 2018

The CMP discourse climate report for the month of July 2018 is now available. The biggest trends this month? Well, we see, not surprisingly that two terms continue to dominate: “Belt and Road” and “Xi Jinping Thought of Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for the New Era.”
And what about the terms related to Xi Jinping’s predecessors? There has been some talk in recent months about “disappearing Deng Xiaoping”. So what do we see in the discourse? This month we actually see a slight downturn in reference to all three banner terms of Xi Jinping’s predecessors: “Deng Xiaoping Theory” (Deng); the “Three Represents” (Jiang Zemin), and the “Scientific View of Development” (Hu Jintao). Judging from the context in which the terms were used in May and June, this decline has to do with the completion of events to commemorate the 200th anniversary of the birth of Karl Marx.
Also this month, we take a look at the various terms related to “MeToo” in China, as a number of high-profile allegations of sexual harassment, in particular by prominent members of the Chinese media, became an issue of focus across social media.
 

7月语象速递|米兔,迷途
By 喵酱
2018年进度条已经过半。一眼望去,词云还是熟悉的模样:图中16字长语和一带一路已连续霸屏6个月。

根据香港大学新闻及传媒研究中心中国传媒研究计划(CMP)划分的六级语温梯度(沸、烫、热、暖、温、冷),7月关键词语温分布如下:


数据来源:人民日报图文数据库 *以上语温等级,均使用占比方法测定。参见《钱钢语象报告:党媒关键词温度测试
7月,这组词语的语温变化几乎都是一级升降,唯一的例外是“系列重要讲话”,跳动两级,由冷入暖。
结合前几个月看,六月给一些热词短暂降了温。七月,它们又纷纷恢复到烫词。这些词一部分和十九大相关,如:以习近平同志为核心、人类命运共同体。
由热回烫的还有:放管服、全面深化改革。放管服为简政放权、放管结合、优化服务的简称。这个说法由李克强在2016年《政府工作报告》中首次提出。与此相应,简政放权、权利清单/责任清单、人民日益增长的美好生活需要和不平衡不充分的发展之间的矛盾由暖升热。
此外,国家安全、从严治党、党的领导、全面深化改革也是本月“新烫”,上月为热词。
维稳、司法公正、三严三实、红船精神、中国特色社会主义法治体系向上窜了一窜,从冷变温。

13个关键词


本月邓小平理论、三个代表、科学发展观三词从暖降为温。5月、6月纪念马克思诞辰200周年的活动结束,三词热度随之下降。
凉了好几个月的“经济体制改革”由冷变暖,“市场经济”由热变烫。同时,“民主政治”也变多了,由冷变暖。
当然,不变的是16字长语,久居沸点。

中央政要


毫无悬念,领先的还是他(703次)。7月有31天,算下来,他平均每天出现22次还多。小时候萦绕耳畔的一句广告不禁在我脑海响起:大宝,天天见。
但,有时候居然不是一下就能看到他。7月9日,他不在头版。回头细看,这原来不是第一次,也不是仅有的一回。7月,有那么四天,头版标题里没有他。
李克强持平为烫词,共出现76次,较上月(55次)有所上升。本月,他出访欧洲,见了德国总理默克尔。李总理6月28日发表转变政府职能电视电话会议的讲话,刊登在7月13日出版的人民日报上。会议主题为深化“放管服”改革,促进政府治理体系和治理能力的现代化。
除了这两位,其他人出现频率如上图。随习出访非洲,参加金砖国家论坛的中央外事工作委员会办公室主任杨洁篪(42次),中央书记处书记、中央办公厅主任丁薛祥(33次)都属热级。
栗战书(28次)、王晨(22次)、汪洋(18次)跟在后面,也是热级。韩正出现13次,有所下降,成为暖。王沪宁由暖转温(5次)。
李希、张又侠虽然仍为冷词,但是出现了。前者在一篇开创司法体制改革的文章被提到,后者会见了越南、塞尔维亚国防官员。
7月,人民日报上没有见到中央军委副主席许其亮、天津市委书记李鸿忠的身影。

地方政要


从地方官媒曝光量来看,和六月份一样,西藏党委书记吴英杰(109次)是第一,广东省委书记李希(79次)第二。广西省委书记鹿心社(69次)这个月跃居第三,几个月以来,曝光率稳步提升。随后是河北省委书记王东峰(67次)和吉林省委书记巴鲁朝音(66次)。
本月曝光量变动比较大的有黑龙江省委书记张庆伟,和河南省委书记王国生。前者从上月的70次,下降到本月36次。后者从上月的34次,上升至本月的62次。

外国元首


本月外国政要曝光排名有了大变化。一向位居第一、偶尔第二的特朗普本月大幅下降,排名第五,只出现13次。
先来看看他前面都有谁。7月的金砖会议带动了与会国的曝光率,东道主南非总统拉马福萨一马当先,出现36次。
随后就是习“最知心的好朋友”普京(21次)了。7月,趁着金砖会议,两人在约翰内斯堡又见了面,并且“巩固了6月北京会晤成果”。
巴西总统特梅尔(18次)位居第三。金砖另一位政要印度总理莫迪出现12次。
再往下是默克尔(15次),7月李克强出访德国进行第五轮中德政府磋商,两人一起出席了经济合作论坛,会见记者。
然后,这才终于看到特朗普(13次)。7月,中美贸易争端不断升级。美国东部时间7月6日凌晨0:01分,美国正式开始对340亿美元的中国产品加征25%的关税。此前,7月5日,中国商务部在记者会表示,如果美方征税,中方将被迫进行反制。
加税消息发出当天,不少网友的目光被一条在黄海上狂奔的美国货船吸引。船装满大豆,目标大连港,数次提速,加足马力向前冲。然而来不及了!它最终没能赶上中美互征关税的deadline。据《卫报》消息,这意味着它要多支付25%关税,成本将增加约600万美元。而今,这艘大豆船还在公海漂流,没有找到它的归宿。
受关税消息影响,沪深股市全线低开。7月,人民币对美元汇率连续贬值,6月中旬至7月底累计贬值幅度超过6%。
此前几个月,特朗普在《人民日报》出镜率在外国元首中,基本第一,只有6月输给普京,成了第二。本月,特朗普退至第五。提到他,《人民日报》表示“关税措施加重美国经济内伤”、“扰乱全球经济,危害美国自身”。

本月聚焦

#Metoo,米兔,迷途

7月底,米兔成为舆论焦点。米兔不是小米官方的那只吉祥物,而是反对性侵Metoo运动的音译。
置身风暴之前,我们先来看看米兔是怎么变成米兔的。
2017 年,十多位女性联名向《纽约时报》和《纽约客》指认好莱坞圈内大佬哈维·韦恩斯坦性骚扰。其中一位女星,莎莉·米兰诺在社交媒体上号召被性侵或者性骚扰过 的女性,都站出来,用Metoo作为他们的标签。指认就是反抗,借助互联网,Metoo跨越国家、语言和圈层,成为世界范围内反对性骚扰的一个标语。
2017年底,香港曾先于内地一步,讨论性侵。香港跨栏运动员吕丽瑶在Facebook上传一张她举着METOO牌子的照片,公开自己8年前曾被教练性侵。特首林郑月娥责成警务处长积极跟进。
到了内地,Metoo开始有了不同叫法,一种随音译,曰米兔。7月,性侵舆论风口浪尖时,微博上Metoo和米兔的帖子遭遇审查。这之后,微博热搜突然出现一个新词,“俺也一样”。微博上的同类标签还有:
#我也是#
#米兔运动#
#我都係#
#私も同じ#
#yo también#
#吾亦如是#
#anche a me#
#俺也是#
#我都系#
#ミーツー# #私も#
#저도요#
7月25日,一篇名为《章文,请停止你的侵害》的文章称作者被媒体人章文性侵。随后文章在微信、微博等平台热传。其实,就在前几天,7月23日,公益圈知名 人士雷闯被举报性侵,已经引起一波米兔的讨论。这场讨论有多火,我们通过“微信指数”看一看。微信指数没有收录“性侵”一词,我们以近义词“性骚扰”替代。


话题的高低起伏非常明显,这场讨论始于个案,开始得突然,声势一下子涨上去。米兔作为一个音译说法,它的表现远不及性侵事件主人公。
再来看看米兔单独的曲线。

峰值出现在7月28日。前一天晚上,学者刘瑜在自己微信上发了一篇《关于metoo》,认为Metoo高歌猛进之时,有可能造成误伤。第二天,公知圈反应剧烈,女权主义者批评文章中受害者应该自我保护的观点;有人认为米兔才刚开始,担心矫枉过正为时尚早;也有人指出文章中将网络举报比喻成文革时期大字报不妥。
在这一天,米兔的讨论走向峰值。
在中文语境下,性侵这两年几次成为热点话题。2017年4月,台湾作家林奕含自杀。她的作品《房思琪的初恋乐园》就是以自身经历为蓝本,写了一个女生被老师诱奸的故事。在生前最后一个采访中,她说,“人类历史上最大规模的屠杀是房思琪式的强暴。”
2018年4月份,北大毕业生实名举报前北大教授沈阳,曾性侵95级学生高岩,后者在98年自杀离世。沈阳任教的南大文学院,建议他辞去教职。
性侵几次进入公共视野之后,终于越过个体事件,引起了多层次的讨论。这次讨论触发了很多议题,比如性和权力的关系,女性的社会角色,性侵在法律上的判定。也 将媒体圈、公知圈、公益圈许多人曝光出来,光环不再。那么现在,网络举报了,然后呢?米兔下一步会如何?米兔带来了讨论,但还未有确定答案。米兔仿佛在一片迷途中,寻找出口。
另外,性侵话题刚热起来时,曾有人担心这是一出调虎离山之计,为此前引起巨大舆论的疫苗事件分担流量。但是,从微信指数上来看,即使在性骚扰/米兔讨论得最热烈的几天,两个话题的热度也不可相提并论。

四十年关键词之“党内民主”

改革开放四十周年,当年雨后春笋般涌现的一批词,现在如何?7月,我们来看“党内民主”。


党内民主不是改革开放后的新词。1948年4月25日,习仲勋在土改期间就曾说过,“整党要采取党内民主与党外民主结合办法”。
1978 年创造了“党内民主”四十年曲线的第一个高峰,它成了暖词。邓小平曾于改革开放之初,大力倡导党内民主,“党内要畅所欲言”,“党内斗争要有原则”。 1978年1月,《人民日报》发文《不许压制批评》,提到,“充分发扬党内民主,认真开展批评和自我批评…是我们党区别于其他政党的一个显著标 志。”1978年底十一届三中全会前的中央工作会议,党内创所欲言,叶剑英称赞为“党内民主的典范”。
但这个蜜月期是短暂的,如同华国锋的执政期,也是短暂的。1981年,“党内民主”的频率直线下降,成为冷词。直到80年代末,它曾有小幅回转,享有一点温度。随后,整个90年代,它都是冷的。
再就到了21世纪,“党内民主”不断攀升。十六大做出了“党内民主是党的生命”的论断,同时,“人民民主是人民共和国的生命”。从2005年到2011年,有那么段时间,“党内民主”基本上是暖词,偶尔成为温词,并且在2009年和2012年再造两个高峰。
但到了2013年,它重重摔了下来,从热词连跳两级,成为冷词。比1981年那次直线下降,斜率更大。在这之后,“党内民主”没再热过。到了十九大,2016年和2017年“党内民主”成为温词,如同列席会议一样地出现了。
2018年的七个月,“党内民主”共出现了5次。上半年出现的频率,约等于90年代初期。

China Gets a New Cyber Czar

This week we have news of some important reshuffling at the top of the Cyberspace Administration of China (CAC). Zhuang Rongwen (庄荣文), a deputy director at the CAC who was previously in the Overseas Chinese Affairs Office of the State Council, will now take over as director of the CAC, replacing Xu Lin (徐麟), a close ally of Xi Jinping. State media would say only that Xu would be “assigned to other responsibilities,” but it is very likely Xu will be announced this month as the new head of the State Council Information Office, in charge of China’s overseas propaganda strategy.
In other CAC news, it was reported this week that formal charges of corruption have been brought against former CAC chief Lu Wei.
One of the most important stories of the week, however, might be sharp criticism leveled by Chinese state media at the Apple Store for alleged “loopholes” that have resulted in the provision of “illegal” apps for download. One focus of the reporting is the need for more comprehensive regulation of app sales in China — and that could mean greater scrutiny in the not-too-distant future.

This Week in China’s Media
July 28, 2018 to August 3, 2018
➢ Former Deputy Propaganda Minister Lu Wei (鲁炜) Formally Charged in Corruption Case
➢ Zhuang Rongwen (庄荣文) Appointed Director of the Cyberspace Administration of China, Xu Lin Set For New Appointment
➢ Cybersecurity Authorities Nationwide Shut Down 720,000 Accounts in 2nd Quarter 2018, Ministry of Culture and Tourism Investigates 27 Websites
Apple Store Criticized by China Central Television and Other Central Party Media
The Beijing News Criticizes Calls at Tsinghua University for the Firing of Hu Angang
[1] Former Deputy Propaganda Minister Lu Wei (鲁炜) Formally Charged in Corruption Case
According to a notice made on the website of the Supreme People’s Court on July 30, the corruption case against former deputy propaganda minister and Cyberspace Administration of China chief Lu Wei (鲁炜) has now been referred to the prosecutor’s office in Ningbo, Zhejiang province, for investigation and prosecution (审查起诉).
Prosecutors have listed Lu Wei’s alleged crimes as follows: “The plaintiff Lu Wei used the opportunity offered by his positions as a member of the Party leadership group, secretary and deputy director of Xinhua News Agency; as a member of the municipal standing committee, minister of propaganda and deputy mayor of the people’s government of Beijing; as director of the State Internet Information Office (国家互联网信息办公室); as deputy director of the State Council Information Office; as head of the office of the Central Leading Group for Cybersecurity and Informatization; as a deputy director of the Central Propaganda Department and other positions, in order to seek benefit for his own person. [He] used the convenience of his personal position and status, and the conduct of other national government staff, to obtain improper benefits for himself, illegally accepting substantial sums and goods of value (巨额财物), and he should face criminal responsibility for graft and bribery in accord with the law.
Key Chinese Sources:
The Supreme People’s Procuratorate of the People’s Republic of China (高检网): 检察机关依法对鲁炜、莫建成、张杰辉三案提起公诉
[2] Zhuang Rongwen Appointed Director of the Cyberspace Administration of China, Xu Lin Set For New Appointment
On July 31, the Cyberspace Administration of China held a conference of cadres at which Zhou Zuyi (周祖翼), deputy director of the Organization Department of the Chinese Communist Party announced that Zhuang Rongwen (庄荣文) had been appointed the new head of the CAC, replacing Xu Lin (徐麟), who was appointed to the post in June 2016. It is not yet clear what new position was being prepared for Xu Lin, but some have speculated that he is due to take over as head of the State Council Information Office, taking charge of China’s external propaganda efforts.
In related news, the “Office Leadership” section of the CAC website was updated this week, showing that Liu Liehong (刘烈宏) has been serving since last month as deputy director of the CAC. According to Liu’s online resume, he was previously the chief executive officer of China Electronics Technology Group, a state-owned technology equipment manufacturer.
Key Chinese Sources:
China News Service (中国网信网): 中央网信办召开干部大会
People’s Daily Online (人民网): 刘烈宏任中央网信办副主任
[3] Cybersecurity Authorities Nationwide Shut Down 720,000 Accounts in 2nd Quarter 2018, Ministry of Culture and Tourism Investigates 27 Websites
In the second quarter of 2018, the Cyberspace Administration of China and its local and regional offices expanded their enforcement operations across the country, according to state media reports. Inspections were conducted for various types of websites suspected of hosting illegal content. An estimated 446 websites were called in for discussions by authorities, and warnings over illegal content were issued to 167 sites. Jointly with Chinese telecoms authorities, cyberspace authorities cancelled permits and shut down 1,888 sites, and referred 336 cases for investigation by judicial authorities. Violation by the websites in question resulted in the closure of an estimated 720,000 accounts hosted on these web-based platforms.
Focusing on Bilibili (哔哩哔哩), the video sharing site, Kuaikan Comics (快看漫画) and other animation and video sites, the Ministry of Culture and Tourism has instructed its local Cultural Market Enforcement Teams (地方文化市场行政执法总队) to conduct inspections (link to Beijing local office here).
Key Chinese Sources:
China.com.cn (中国网): 传播危害国家安全信息等 1888家网站72万账号被关闭
China National Radio Online (央广网): 文化和旅游部集中执法检查27家网站 下线10万条违规视频
[4] Apple Store Criticized by China Central Television and Other Central Party Media


On July 31, the “Live News” (新闻直播间) program of CCTV News directly criticized the Apple Store for management “loopholes” (漏洞) in the services offered to Chinese users, alleging the offering of “illegal” apps, including those offering online gambling. At the same time, China Youth Daily, a newspaper published by the Chinese Communist Youth League, ran a report called “How a Disguised Lottery App Made It Onto the Shelves” (“伪装”博彩App是如何上架的). The report interviewed Chinese lawyers to suggest that while the domestic Chinese app market is managed by a wide array of departments, including the Cyberspace Administration of China, the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology, the State Administration for Market Regulation, the Public Security Bureau and others, there is still no management system directly dealing with apps. The report argued the need for new policies to better and more directly regulate the app industry.
Key Chinese Sources:
CCTV (央视) “Live News” (新闻直播间): 苹果官方应用商店管理存漏洞 非法APP借马甲上架 逃避监管
China Youth Daily (中国青年报): “伪装”博彩App是如何上架的
[5] The Beijing News Criticizes Calls at Tsinghua University for the Firing of Hu Angang
On August 3, The Beijing News, a newspaper administered by the top leadership of Beijing municipality, ran a commentary responding to calls online by Tsinghua University alumni for the removal of Hu Angang (胡鞍钢), the director of the university’s National Situation Research Center (国情研究院), for his controversial comments over the past year — including in his book “China in 2020: A New Type of Superpower” — that many argue over-hype China’s strengths.
Key Chinese Sources:
The Beijing News Online (新京报网): 高校“浮夸学风”问题需认真对待
Sina.com (新浪网): 胡鞍钢终于说清楚:中国综合实力是怎么超越美国的?
 

In the Highest Position

In the dictionary of the Chinese Communist Party, the term “one position as the highest authority,” or dingyuyizun (定于一尊), has for decades been used in a decidedly negative sense — to suggest power and position that escapes necessary constraints. But in recent weeks this negative phrase seems to have been dusted off, and a fresh coat of paint applied. It now rings as an affirmation of the need for resolute leadership. 
On July 5, the People’s Daily reported a speech Xi Jinping made to a national work conference on Party appointments, known as “organization work,” or zuzhi gongzuo (组织工作), that was held in Beijing from July 3-4. “The Central Party is the mind and the backbone,” the paper quoted Xi as saying, “and the Party must have one position as the highest authority (定于一尊), making the final decisions.”
Less than two weeks later, according to a report from China’s Legal Daily newspaper, Chen Yixin (陈一新), secretary-general of the Central Political and Legal Affairs Commission (and the former Zhejiang official and key Xi ally who oversaw the controversial push to remove crosses from churches), said at a commission study session: “We must firmly defend the core status of General Secretary Xi Jinping, firmly defend the Central Party as the one position of highest authority, making the final decisions . . . ”
Back at last year’s 19th National Congress, Xi Jinping actually made use of the phrase, but not with positive connotations. In one section of his voluminous political report, Xi Jinping said of China’s political system: “No one political system should be regarded as the only choice; and we should not just mechanically copy the political systems of other countries.” Here I have italicized and bolded those words in the official English translation of the political report that correspond to the Chinese phrase dingyuyizun. The idea here is that when it comes to political systems in the world, there is not one choice above all others. The right system, in other words, is a matter of social, cultural and historical context.
Dingyuyizun is a classical phrase with origins in the Records of the Grand Historian (史记), a work by court official Sima Qian dating back to 94BC. In the Records of the Grand Historian, the three-character phrase dingyizun (定一尊) is used to describe the centralized rule of Qin Shihuang, the first emperor of China.
Since the People’s Daily was launched in 1946, the phrase “one position as the highest authority” has appeared 76 times in this reference book of official discourse. In nearly all of these instances the phrase is used in negatively — to criticize the ideas of feudal society, to criticize bureaucratism (官僚主义) within the Communist Party, to criticize the fascist rule of the Gang of Four. In the 1990s, the phrase was even used to criticize the Falun Gong spiritual movement. Here are just a handful of examples of the phrase at work in the Party’s history:

August 11, 1956: “Vicious criticism is not frightening. What is frightening is to allow viciousness to take on a leading role, with one position as the highest authority.”
April 18, 1988: “History has already shown that banning diverse schools of thought, and setting one position as the highest authority necessarily results in the suppressing of the people (钳制人口), widespread fear of speaking out (万马齐喑), and the throttling of thought.”
September 19, 1988: “Persecution for one’s writing is an extreme manifestation of feudal autocratic politics, and it is really about feudal rulers seeking to shackle thinking, suppress opinion and reach one position as the highest authority in politics.”

As we gaze across the expanse of People’s Daily time, we find that the first time that “one position as the highest authority” was ever used in a positive way occurred just a year ago, on June 16, 2017. Not surprisingly, that article dealt with the standing of Xi Jinping within the Party. “Various central departments of the state unswervingly defend through their real actions, the final decision-making authority and single position in highest authority of the Central Party with Xi Jinping as the core.”
Lest you be in any doubt that the one position of highest authority is Xi Jinping himself.

Impatient China

China has a serious problem with inflation. No, I’m not talking about inflationary pressures on the economy, though those numbers have been up. I’m talking about inflation of the national ego. The country, encouraged by relentless state propaganda, has grown full of itself — and this may dangerously diminish its basic capacity for self-reflection.
This, in any case, is the concern being voiced by a number of influencers inside China in recent weeks. And it may be the concern, as the SCMP reports, driving the reshuffle at the top of the State Council Information Office, which is responsible for the country’s overseas messaging.
But these reservations about the dangers of over-confidence have been brewing for some months, particularly in light of growing evidence that China’s more aggressive foreign policy stance, and its grandly stated ambitions to lead the world in areas ranging from technology and innovation to economic and political systems, has spooked many countries. For some in China, trade tensions with the United States are a much-needed wakeup call — even, perhaps, a reminder of the genius of the Deng Xiaoping injunction to “hide our strengths and bide our time.”
Back in September of last year, weeks ahead of the 19th National Congress, where Xi Jinping’s stature was political inflated to an extent we have not seen since perhaps the Mao era, Luo Jianbo (罗建波), head of the China Foreign Policy Center at the Central Party School, wrote a clear warning about the prematurity of China’s coming of age as a global power.
Luo’s article, in which he suggests that China is its own worst enemy, is still trending on WeChat. We offer a quick translation.
 

The curtains have closed on the Belt and Road Forum hosted by China. This is certainly the first time up to now that China’s call has received such widespread attention internationally. Chinese have reason to proud and encouraged. But the blanket praise by domestic media and scholars, and the emotions of conceit being expressed online, are cause for concern.
I still recall when the G20 meeting was held in Hangzhou in 2016, and everyone, whether officials or scholars, was saying that China had the “medicine” to cure the world of its economic woes. I remember this feeling that everyone was drunk and we were alone, that all nations were in decline and we were rising.
At this Belt and Road Forum some went even further, starting off on this drunken dream about how China now has “world leader” status. Some even wrote about how China is now the “savior” of the world.

Luo Jianbo (罗建波), head of the China Foreign Policy Center at the Central Party School.
Whether at the Hangzhou International Conference Center or at Yanqi Lake near Beijing, every time foreign leaders walk down that 50-meter stretch of red carpet and shake hands with Chinese leaders, many of us are overcome with excitement. And this precocious yet definitely immature sense of national greatness is still perhaps undergoing rapid inflation.

This premature sense of national greatness is shown not only in the Great Leap Forward mentality of “surpassing Britain and America,” and in the blind optimism about our own development achievements. It can also be seen in the explosion of narrow-minded nationalism and exclusionism that has followed recent frustrations and difficulties in our foreign relations. And again it is expressed in the disdain, contemp and superciliousness expressed toward certain smaller nations. In fact, these attitudes actually show a deficiency of true confidence among our people, and an immature sense of national greatness.
My goal in writing this is not to disparage China itself, but rather to explain that in the process of progressing toward status as a world power, Chinese must develop a sense of maturity, a steady big nation feeling and mentality.
Chinese should recognise with confidence that China is a developing nation, but that it is by its nature a big nation. In times of insufficient national strength, Mao Zedong, Deng Xiaoping and other leaders of the older generation never viewed our country as a small country or a weak country.
Chinese must also see that a national spirit with patriotism at the core is necessary to the achievement of national development and national rejuvenation. A certain degree of national pride, confidence and responsibility is also prerequisite in fostering national unity and in stimulating national growth.
Therefore, fostering a mature sense of national strength is necessary. It is about confidence without arrogance, pride without conceit.
We cannot forget. It was just a few years ago that people were still discussing how to understand the [Deng Xiaoping] injunction to “hide our strengths and bide our time, doing what we can.” But recently this has become a thing of the past. Concerning China’s development and the history of its foreign realtions with Chinese characteristics, some are already disatisfied with the incremental approach and want to push more forcefully. However, it is still my view that we need to have a clear understanding of our own development and our place in the world.
What does it mean to be a great world power?
Being a major world power is not just about having a massive economy and market, but requires also strong production capacity in terms of science and innovation and knowledge. It means having a global military presence as well as strong cultural influence, and it means having a voice that is heard in international institutions.
In terms of being a major world power, it is extremely important to do your part to contribute to the global economy, but you alsoo need to have a strong influence in addressing major world problems like global warming, and that you play a role in building global consensus and even provide the direction for global development.
China now has more and more “presence” in the world as a major power, but it lacks international influence and international discourse power in a full sense. Some foreign experts refwr to China as a “partial power” — and while that may not be music to the ears there is a lot of sense in it.
To accurately understand China’s basic national circumstances and its stage of development, we need pay close attention to the dialectical relationship between 3 things that haven’t changed, and 3 things that are unprecedented.
The report to the 18th National Congress of the CCP emphasized that “our country is still for the long-term in the primary stages of socialism and this basic national situation has not changed, and the daily increasingly material and cultural demands of the people remain in tension with social production, so the international status of our country as the world’s largest developing country has not changed.”
On this basis, the General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party pointed out that “we are approaching the center of the world stage to an extent that is unprecedented, we are approaching the realization of the great rejuvenation of the Chinese people to an extent that is unprecedented, and we have capacity and confidence to reach this goal to a degree that is unprecedented.
These three unchanged situations demand that we observe our own inadequacies, that we maintain strategically fixed and historically patient. The three unprecedented situations should motivate us to maintain optimism and confidence while we break new ground and stride ahead.
China has never realized the great rejuvenation of its people, has never become a major world power in the full sense. At this critical stage, maintaining an appropriately low profile (低调) has clear meaning for our long-term development goals.
The genius of “hiding our strengths and biding our time” was in avoiding the major barbs and tensions in the world, enabling us to avoid becoming the focus of tensions in the world. In the world before, this was essentially about remaining modest and guarding against pride and impatience, working to resolve our own problems and build up our core national competitiveness. At the same time, it means actively developing our relationships with the outside world, preserving and extending strategic opportunities for Chinese development.
Previously, we would declare earnestly to Americans time and again that empires faded because of the over-extension of the strength. But we must constantly remind ourselves that it is even more crucial for a major nation that is rising to conceal its strengths and bide its time, gathering strength. The recklessness and impetuousness of Germany, Japan and the Soviet Union in the 20th century are all classic examples.
If we take a fact-based attitude, we discover that America took a calm and unhurried approach in its rise as a major power that perhaps we should learn from. The GDP of the United States in 1900 had already surpassed that of Great Britain, but it was only at mid-century that it fully took on its role as world leader. In the midst of several major crises in the 20th century, including the Great Depression of the 1930s and the Vietnam War of the 1960s, the United States was able to reconsolidate its national power through strategic adjustments. Beginning with the Obama presidency, and continuing with a strengthening of an American-style “hide our strengths and bide our time” under Trump, we are seeing another instance of America making strategic adjustments to deal with a set of difficulties. At this time, as the US is more focused on domestic development and applying its strengths to create hard power, there is important practical meaning [for China] in the strategic thinking of “hiding one’s strengths and biding one’s time.”
From the standpoint of overseas relationships, China must be practical and steady in advancing its strategies internationally, including the “Belt and Road” construction that is so heatedly debated right now. As a call for cooperation, “Belt and Road” without a doubt helps promote China’s rejuvenation and global development, and could be called a representative practice and innovation of major nation foreign relations with Chinese characteristics (中国特色大国外交). However, in the actual implementation there have been substantial concerns such as “premature advance” (战略冒进), “rejoicing in grandiose deeds” (好大喜功) and “having too great an appetite” (贪大求全). If we are more cautious (低调), we might envision “Belt and Road” as a comprehensive elevation of China’s opening to the outside world, its significance in mutual connections and communication, production cooperation and human-to-human interaction — all to promote the transition of China’s development and its full moving out into the world . . .
However, relevant [government and Party] organs have placed such a degree of priority on the program and its strategic unpacking by experts that “Belt and Road” has been portrayed as a major strategy (大战略) — [ie., as more of a movement]. The repeated declarations by China’s government, and the anxiousness of relevant departments to see an “early harvest [of results]” (早期收获)”, in particular the full-fledged rush into the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor without a consideration of costs, has given people outside China a sense that China is too impatient in the building of its “Belt and Road,” and this has fed a sense of concern internationally.
As a call for cooperation, of course the advancement of “Belt and Road” cannot be separated from government direction, but its focus should be on enterprises, social organizations and public initiatives, and it should advance in an orderly way, with full consultation and comprehensive assessment processes — prudently and dependably. But the implementation of “Belt and Road” has come with a degree of disorder and messiness, with various departments and regions and industries all fighting to be first to the door, to become advance soldiers on the beachhead of “Belt and Road.”
In Venezuela and other countries, hefty loans from China have put them in a real bind. In Myanmar, Thailand, Sudan and elsewhere, problems arising from development loans, and the lack of clear business gains from China-invested enterprises in many countries, have long ago sounded warning bells.
At an economic level, the focus with “Belt and Road” is on “going out” [into global markets], but the real difficulty is in coming back — meaning to find real capital growth, or the enrichment of experience and technology.
Many of the glories [of “Belt and Road”] are just not real. To give just a small example, over the past few years, in order to meet the needs of relevant government departments, many works of classical literature, or works on political governance by Chinese scholars, have flowed out of China’s gates on a massive scale. Behind this push is a vast expenditure of state resources, but no real demand from the international market. This sort of clamor and enthusiasm is not based on any market logic, and it cannot continue indefinitely.
So what exactly is “Belt and Road”? If we define it was an economic cooperation platform and a channel for the interaction of cultures, its meaning is already important, and the work that has been done is already substantial. But if we impatiently see it instead as a major “global governance” platform, seeking not only to resolve development challenges facing the world, but also to resolve the even more complex questions about governance globally, this is clearly too much too fast — and it might give us a great deal more responsibility than we are capable of handling. So-called global governance is about coordinating the strong and consoling the weak, and at its core it is a matter of the redistribution of global responsibilities and obligations.
. . . .
We must recognize that China’s has very little knowledge or experience in its history of “going out.” The voyage of Zheng He in the 15th century, while it raised prestige and made friends, bringing visits to China for a time, was a major drag on national power for 30 years until it came to a sudden end, leaving scarcely a mark on the history of sea navigation. Nor did it have much influence on China’s development or its consciousness of sea power.
In the 1950s and 1960s, China’s reached out to countries in Asia, Africa and Latin America, and while there were clear gains in its foreign relations, the emphasis was only on political cooperation, overlooking economic interests. The accounts were only political. And in the 1980s there were major policy adjustments on this front. Today, as China is a major overseas investor, we face another era of massive “going out.” The big questions now are how to achieve sustainable development, and how to advance our own interests while attending to the interests of others. “Belt and Road” must draw on the lessons of history.
The Chinese have long cherished the notions of datong (大同), or Great Harmony, and tianxia (天下), or All Under Heaven. At the same time, Chinese culture cares greatly about the “middle way” (中庸之道), or maintaining balance and harmony . . . about introversion and self-examination. . . .
Most important, perhaps, is that we should work to resolve our own internal development issues. Over the past few decades, China has achieved rapid economic development and amassed many experiences and ideas that deserve consideration. Scholars at home are busiest trying to work out the secret of China’s development model, or describing its experience managing state affairs. But we have, intentionally or unintentionally, overlooked the fact that we have not yet worked our way through the “middle-income trap” (中等收入陷阱), for which we might look to countries that in their development successfully achieved political transition (like South Korea), or countries that successfully achieved good governance (like Singapore).
As China faces the “middle-income trap,” Chinese must not indulge in blind optimism. We need to sincerely and practically consider how we might resolve challenges and problems emerging in the course of our development. In fact, we can do our best to refute the idea of a “China threat,” or to line up evidence against the argument that China is a “fragile superpower.” But if we think about things cooly, we realize that the extreme difficulty of such problems as the gap between rich and poor, social tensions, environmental pollution, slow-moving economic structural reforms and political reform, all point to the fact that domestic problems are where China must put its fullest focus, and expend its energy.
The hopes of ordinary Chinese are generally very simple. They want a more harmonious society, a fairer social order, and more prosperous lives. We must actively work to answer these desires, and this is the basic precondition of all of our internal work and foreign affairs.
I recall a topic hotly debated online by young internet users: Who is really China’s enemy? Is it America? Japan? Russia?
If we think about things cooly, perhaps none of them are. China’s enemy is itself.
If China’s economy continues to develop, if people’s lives improve, if our style of governance grows clearer, society more harmonious, the environment more beautiful, and if on this foundation China’s national strength steadily grows, we could certainly see China’s  international image improving and its prestige gaining, and the realization of the Chinese dream of rejuvenation will happen. I eagerly await the arrival of that day.

Discourse Climate Report: June 2018

At long last, the CMP discourse climate report for the full month of June 2018 is available. The biggest takeaway for the month?  The report shows the emergence of various forms of “Xi Jinping _____ Thought” (习近平xx思想). For example, on June 14, the People’s Daily referred for the first time to “Xi Jinping News Thought” (习近平新闻思想).
We can also glimpse in the media the following related forms:
* Xi Jinping Economic Thought (习近平经济思想)
* Xi Jinping Foreign Policy Thought (习近平外交思想)
* Xi Jinping Literature and Art Thought (习近平文艺思想)
* Xi Jinping Strong Military Thought (习近平强军思想)
* Xi Jinping Education Thought (习近平教育思想)
* Xi Jinping Ecological Civilization Thought (习近平生态文明思想)
* Xi Jinping Party Building Thought (习近平党建思想)
* Xi Jinping Rule of Law Thought (习近平法治思想)
Besides these we have others that come with quotation marks:
* Xi Jinping “Three Sector Convergence Thought” (习近平”三产融合思想”)
* Xi Jinping “Tackling Poverty Thought” (习近平”脱贫攻坚思想”)
* Xi Jinping “Rural Revitalization Thought” (习近平”乡村振兴战略思想”)
In our view, the proliferation of various forms of “Xi Jinping Thought” across policy areas suggests that we are nearing the point where President Xi Jinping’s “banner term,” or qizhiyu (旗帜语), the unwieldy “Xi Jinping Thought of Socialism With Chinese Characteristics for a New Era” (习近平新时代中国特色社会主义思想), becomes normalized as “Xi Jinping Thought.” It’s very likely this process could happen within the year.
 

6月语象速递:思想是一种很玄的东西
2018年过半,下图那个长语(以下简称“16字长语”)已牢牢占据语象第一把交椅5个月。“十九大”一词完成使命,逐渐隐没在背景板里,另有些新词破土而出,尚未进入视野。
别急,夏天才刚刚开始。


先看云图。关键词语温根据香港大学新闻及传媒研究中心中国传媒研究计划(CMP)划分的六级语温梯度(沸、烫、热、暖、温、冷),分布如下:

数据来源:人民日报图文数据库 *以上语温等级,均使用占比方法测定。参见《钱钢语象报告:党媒关键词温度测试》
像下了场降温的大雨。不少词的热度降了一个等级。尤其“烫”系列里,有一半多降温,大多与十九大关联,也有一些经济词汇。一同降温的还有“撸起袖子”、“两学一做”、“道路自信”等特色词汇。
逆势上升的则有由热至烫的“国家治理体系和治理能力现代化”和连跳两级至烫的“生态建设”。一些冷词稍有升温,如“政治建军”、“人民情怀”、“全球生态文明建设的重要参与者、贡献者、引领者”等。

13个关键词测温
6月“政治文明”和“民主政治”降温遇冷,“经济体制改革”也降到冰点;其他词持平。
观察近半年变化,“经济体制改革”坐了个过山车,在两会期间到达峰值。“经济体制改革”本是改革开放四十周年的热词,从3月开始却凉凉,可持续关注。
频率稳定的是“16字长语”和“党内民主”、“和谐社会”等词,只不过前者在高位,后者在低位。“党内民主”只在年初出现过两次,此后销声匿迹。
 
中央政要
数据来源:人民日报图文数据库
习(677次)占绝对版面,李(55次)随其后。6月政治局委员中,中央外事工作委员会办公室主任杨洁篪(34次)很忙,不仅列席多个习的外交会面,且赶赴上合组织青岛分会,还在南非出席了第八次金砖国家安全事务高级代表会议。
紧跟其后的是全国人大常委会委员栗战书(30次),全国政协主席汪洋(29次)和国务院副总理韩正(23次),均保持了上月热度。
中央书记处书记、中央办公厅主任丁薛祥(22次)自上月遇冷后重回热层。李希、张又侠、陈全国6月提及仍为零。
纵观今年上半年,中央军委副主席许其亮和张又侠、天津市委书记李鸿忠、中央政法委书记郭声琨曝光率下降,国务院副总理孙春兰、胡春华、刘鹤曝光率稳中有升。
王岐山(8次)曝光率仍不温不火,但月末一条其获聘中国红十字会名誉会长的新闻引人注目。此职位的历任者有江泽民、胡锦涛,和已卸任所有职务、今年3月份后消失在人民日报上的原国家副主席李源潮。
 
地方政要
数据来源:前方报刊数据库
6月领跑的是西藏党委书记吴英杰(90次),在两个月之后重回地方官媒曝光榜第一位;第二位是广东省委书记李希(84次),从开年的几乎零曝光到近两月稳定在前列;黑龙江省委书记张庆伟(70次)排名第三,自5月曝光率加倍后保持稳定。
山东省委书记刘家义(68次)在《大众日报》上的曝光量比起5月翻了一番,海南省委书记刘赐贵和重庆市委书记陈敏尔(38次)则只有5月一半不到的曝光量。
外国元首
数据来源:人民日报图文数据库
习“最好的知心朋友”(人民日报,2018年6月14日)普京这个月成了座上宾,还得到了一枚金色的“友谊勋章”——一枚据说是首次颁发的中国对外最高荣誉勋章。乘着上合组织青岛峰会和世界杯的东风,普京(35次)的曝光率甚至超过了特朗普(28次)。
这也是特朗普今年第一次丢失王座。不过他仍然活跃,除了和习达成中美两军关系的“重要共识”,他还出现在各种关于美国的负面报道中:退出人权理事会、非法移民“零容忍”政策、加增贸易关税等——也都是他自己的锅。
此外,印度总理莫迪(16次)位列第三。德国总理默克尔(9次)、朝鲜领导人金正恩(9次)和法国总统马克龙(8次)平分秋色。
四十年关键词之“实事求是”
今年是改革开放40周年,我们选择若干词语,观察40年轨迹。
邓小平在改革开放初期创造了许多新词,“实事求是”是其中被反复述说、引用,有黄钟大吕般效果的一个词。40年过去,这个词经历了怎样的起落?请看下图:

1978至1979年,“实事求是”在《人民日报》上的出现频率达到峰值。那时正值“真理标准大讨论”,与“两个凡是”相对应的,就是至今仍广泛被引用的金科铁律:实践是检验真理的唯一标准。“实事求是”本是毛语,为纠正他的错误,可行的办法就是以毛之矛,攻毛之盾。此后十年,“实事求是”一直是烫词。
2001年,江在位时,“实事求是”有个小高潮。次年,江提出“三个代表”(海外理解为“资本家入党”),这在党建理论上是突破。“实事求是”的小高潮,似是为推出新的旗帜语“三个代表”做铺垫。
2013年以来,“实事求是”处于低位(但仍属“热词”)。除了继续搭档“解放思想”,它还被融入了党的十八届六中全会精神,“忠诚老实、光明坦荡、公道正派、实事求是、艰苦奋斗、清正廉洁”,是党员必须恪守的价值观。在纪念改革开放40年之际,“实事求是”一词在40年前具有的最重要语义——“不唯上,不唯书”,还会被强调吗?
再观经改语象
去年年中CMP的一篇经改语象观测(链接:https://mp.weixin.qq.com/s/vF5NQOjJV_SYuldOvXc5OQ)分析了“权威人士”提出的改革话语,发现虽然“权威人士”口中经济形势严峻、改革局势迫切,“经济体制改革”在2013至2016年间《人民日报》上的传播却日渐式微。最近两年情况又如何?

统计过去一年半左右的数据,我们发现“经济体制改革”一直徘徊在“温”、“暖”之间,今年3月份两会期间上升至“热”,但很快又逐级下降,到了6月已近冰点。与之走向相似的的是“中国制造2025”,除了在每年3月份达到“烫”级,其余时间或热或暖,最近两个月更是降至“冷”级,6月份一次都没有出现。
同时,权威人士口中的供给侧改革“五大任务”:去产能、去库存、去杠杆、降成本、补短板,自2016年以来热度就直线下降,2018年上半年更是出现次数寥寥,每个月仅出现一两次。以“去产能”为例,2017年下半年“热”了一阵后,今年上半年转“暖”,6月则变“冷”。
权威人士提示,改革中应避免的“金融风险”。笔者检索了2013年以来该词在人民日报上的表现,结果如图:

2013年以来的11个半年中,2018年上半年“金融风险”的出现次数最多,是2013年同期的2.8倍。警钟声清晰可闻。
6月聚焦
6月有一个词在《人民日报》上首秀。
6月14日,人民日报头版头条一篇题为《风雨兼程,与党和人民同行》的文章回望人民日报创刊70周年,选的故事颇耐人寻味:除了毛和邓的批示,有习近平回忆中的1966年和1990年的焦裕禄报道,有习1974年担任梁家河书记时读到农村沼气利用报道后的亲身实践,有习1984年任河北正定县委书记时的来稿《中青年干部要“尊老”》, 更有习2016年元宵节来到人民日报编辑室录制音频的“轶事”。

文章最后一段升华了主题:“在习近平新闻思想指引下,牢记党的重托和亿万人民的期望,七十华诞的人民日报将焕发青春再出发,在实现中华民族伟大复兴中国梦的新征程中,续写新华章,再创新辉煌!”
没错,这个首秀词就是“习近平新闻思想”。六月份它共出现在13篇文章中,其中还有两次是标题。人民日报专门召开了“习近平新闻思想理论研讨会”,请了一流高校的各方学者“深入学习研讨”。

什么是“习近平新闻思想”?定义太长,我只记住一句话,“习近平新闻思想是习近平新时代中国特色社会主义思想的重要组成部分”。
此前的2017年,在人民日报上冒头的“习近平xx思想”不止一个:3月7日提出的用来指导“经济发展和改革开放”的“习近平经济思想”;6月11日在外长王毅记者会中首秀的“习近平外交思想”;9月8日由作协主席铁凝撰写文章中首次提及的“习近平文艺思想”;10月25日中共十九大闭幕时提出的“习近平强军思想”,11月9日首次出现的“习近平教育思想”。其中,强军思想的出现频率最高,提出之后共出现了130多次。
今年5月,国务院副总理韩正的一次讲话带出了“习近平生态文明思想”;而6月初“习近平党建思想”和“习近平法治思想”也现诸报端。
仿佛慢慢显形的拼图,十九大正式提出且写入党章的“习近平新时代中国特色社会主义思想”,其理论框架逐渐落实。6月20日,陕西省社科院发布的《“梁家河大学问”课题研究公告》,则是真正展开架势,要“撸起袖子”认真研究一番“思想”们了。摘抄其中的几个课题:

你是否感到熟悉又陌生?缩减了“新时代”后,这些思想会不会出现在下个月、下下个月的人民日报上?
不妨下一个大胆的判断,16字长语“习近平新时代中国特色社会主义思想”正日益接近最终的缩略,旗帜语”习近平思想”年内有可能出台。
另有一个课题引起我的兴趣:梁家河“大学问”与红色文化基因研究。“红色文化基因”的说法,隐隐有“血统论”的味道。6月18日,中央军委印发的《传承红色基因实施纲要》指出,“大力传承红色基因,是新时代政治建军的战略任务和基础工程”。
“红色基因”起源于军队。 我发现这个词早在2007年就出现在《解放军报》上:


当时正值建军80周年,“红色基因”作为军队用词,意在传承红四军的“铁军”精神。同年8月,它也出现在了《人民日报》上,也是军队语境。之后,它在“共产党人”、“青年学生”等身上也开始“代代相传”。
2009年《人民日报》副刊的一篇《星火燎原》出版50周年纪念文章写道,“信仰是共产党人的红色基因”。这部党史书籍也被称为“献给后世的红色基因”。

统计“红色基因”的词频可发现,其自2014年下半年开始爆发性增长。这正是“新古田会议”,即全军政治工作会议召开的时间点。

这次会议上,习近平着重强调了“党指挥枪”的根本原则,并抓紧军队政治工作。
军报上一篇有趣文章《用红色基因抵制“政治转基因”》解释了“红色基因”的重要性:它是用来抵制“军队国家化”、“颜色革命”等“政治转基因”的。

“正如清除旷野杂草最好的办法是种上庄稼一样,” 文章写道,“抵制‘政治转基因’,就要把红色基因牢牢植入头脑。”
军队的口号推向全国,是个值得注意的政治话语现象。文革酝酿期,“突出政治”、“顶峰论”、“精神原子弹”等大量源自军队的口号潮水般涌向社会,文革中的“大树特树……绝对权威”的口号也由军队首创。检索2014年到2018年6月的全国报纸,可以看到“红色基因”的喷发:
数据来源:前方报刊数据库
一条黑线,一条红线,2018年上半年,“金融风险”和“红色基因”比翼双飞。这一对词语,有神秘的联系吗?

A Brief Timeline of the Vaccine Scandal

We were pleased to discover today that RUC News Workshop (RUC新闻坊), the official WeChat account of Renmin University of China’s School of Journalism and Communication, has posted a helpful timeline and summary of the development of the ongoing vaccine scandal in China. We share a translation of the timeline below.
This is obviously a story with potentially huge implications for China’s leadership. Under Xi Jinping, the Party has managed quite effectively to keep scandal out of the headlines, something evident before Xi’s hardline February 2016 speech on media policy. This story, with its clear indication of deeper institutional problems, will surely be aggressively curtailed by censors in coming days. But its development is in many ways eerily familiar — not unlike the bursts of coverage, and often decent reporting, that we grew accustomed to seeing in the heyday of the commercial press in China, up through the Hu Jintao era.
RUC News Workshop notes that the incident, which is being referred to in Chinese as the “Changsheng Bio-Tech Problem Vaccine Incident” (长生生物问题疫苗事件), first unfolded on July 15, but was slow to gain public attention — finally culminating yesterday with an official response from Premier Li Keqiang. RUC News Workshop divides the scandal so far into three phases.

  1. July 15-July 20: The vaccine scandal goes on for 6 days, but failed to draw strong attention from media and from the public [on social media].
  2. July 21: An article called “Vaccine King” (疫苗之王) posted to a WeChat public account is shared widely through WeChat groups, “lighting the fuse” of commentary and analysis of the story.
  3. July 22: The vaccine scandal is fiercely discussed and steadily heats up. Finally, CCTV News, the People’s Daily, The Beijing News and other “mainstream,” meaning Party-run, media finally make their voices heard.

Our translation of the RUC News Workshop timeline follows, with some edits and cuts for clarity — and a few notes and links here and there.

TIMELINE
July 15, 2018
A notice issued by the China Food and Drug Administration says that fabricated productions records had been discovered for rabies vaccines produced by Changchun Changsheng Life Sciences Limited (长春长生生物科技有限责任公司), known for short as Changchun Changsheng (长春长生). According to the notice, the company had been ordered to stop production, and its Good Manufacturing Practice (GMP) certification (生产质量管理规范证书) had been revoked. According to a news report by the Shanghai-based outlet Jiemian, the investigation had been prompted by an older staff member working inside a production facility who had come forward.
July 16, 2018
Changchun Changsheng’s share price sinks and several large shareholders dump their holdings.
July 17, 2018
Changchun Changsheng issues a public response to the situation, assuring customers there are no problems. Changchun Changsheng’s parent company, “Changsheng Bio-Technology Company” (长生生物科技股份有限公司), known for short as Changchun Bio-Tech (长生生物), issues a statement saying that all rabies vaccines that have entered the market comply with quality regulations and there is no cause for concern.
July 19, 2018
The incident is further fueled as Changchun Bio-Tech issues a statement saying that its subsidiary, Changchun Changcheng, had previously received a penalty notice (处罚书) from health authorities in Jilin province notifying them that a batch of their DPT vaccines did not comply with safety regulations. The notice [which dated the start of the investigation to October 2017] said that the company’s DPT vaccines had been deemed “inferior medicines” not meeting standards. The company had been fined 3.44 million yuan, and some of its vaccine stocks were seized.

The first page of the notice issued by authorities in Jilin province to Changchun Changsheng. SOURCE: The Paper.
July 20, 2018
The news, based on the previously mentioned notice, that problems with the vaccines had apparently been discovered, prompting an investigation, by October 27, 2017, drew anger from many Chinese. According to the timestamp accompanying the notice as it was made public on the official website of the Jilin Food and Drug Administration, it had not been posted until July 18. The gap between now and the start of the investigation by the Jilin Food and Drug Administration into the sale of these 250,000 doses of vaccine in Shandong was already close to 9 months. But Changchun Changsheng had made no mentioned whatsoever of the notice from health authorities in its 2017 annual report.
It is worth noting that in November 2017 another batch of DPT vaccines had shown problems, this time from Wuhan Institute of Biological Products Co. Ltd. (武汉生物制品研究所有限责任公司) — [whose website is now taken down]. And in 2016, another batch of DPT vaccines from Changchun Changsheng had failed to pass inspection.
July 22, 2018
Responses come from official media. CCTV Finance runs a report saying the vaccine problem must be thoroughly investigated, and that “comprehensive oversight mechanisms” (完善的监管机制) and emergency response systems must be put in place. The official Xinhua News Agency points out that mishaps cannot happen when it comes to vaccines, and that “loss of confidence” [in vaccines] is even more terrible than “loss of efficacy.” The Food and Drug Administration issues a notice on the case, saying it has already ordered vaccine manufacturers across the country to inspect their processes, ensuring production is strictly compliant with GMP production standards. The Food and Drug Administration says it will also carry out unannounced inspections across the country, dealing strictly with lawbreakers.
At 11PM on July 22, an article appears on the website of China’s central government: “Li Keqiang Issues Official Comment on the Vaccine Incident: We Must Give the People of the Country a Clear Explanation” (李克强就疫苗事件作出批示:必须给全国人民一个明明白白的交代). The article says: “Premier Li Keqiang has issued official comments on the vaccine incident: This vaccine scandal has crossed a moral red line for the people, and we must give the people of the country a clear explanation.”In his official comments, Li Keqiang demands that the State Council immediately dispatch an inspection team, conducting a thorough investigation of the entire chain of vaccine manufacture and distribution. The full facts must be ascertained, he says, and those companies and people responsible be “resolutely punished and in no way appeased.”

Baozou Comic Apology, and Other News

Two stories this week underscore the Party’s determination to strengthen control over all activities and content on cyberspace by ensuring companies and staff are tied as closely as possible into the process of enforcing “guidance.” This is essentially the progressive application to cyberspace of the notion of “Party spirit” in the media, which Xi Jinping reiterated in his February 2016 speech on news and public opinion.
First, we have the founding of the Party committee of the China Federation of Online Social Organizations (中国网络社会组织联合会), a group created back in May this year, and about which very little has been reported. The federation essentially groups together, under the watchful eye of the Cyberspace Administration of China, organizations that are registered with the Ministry of Civil Affairs but deal in some way or another with cyberspace. Second, we have a public apology by Baozou Comic, which had its social media accounts closed down back in May for content violations, combined with an interesting set of articles on the service’s website attempting to make amends for its political errors. The Baozou Comic case — following on the abject apology from Toutiao in April — is another clear example of how the Party is more readily using public shaming techniques to enforce loyalty and implement its censorship guidelines.
 

This Week in China’s Media
July 14 — July 20
Party Committee Formed for the China Federation of Online Social Organizations to Strengthen Party Control
➢ Four Agencies Coordinate to Launch “Sword Web 2018” Campaign Against Online IP Infringement and Piracy
➢ Baozou Comic Issues Apology, Says It Has Corrected Its Problems and Will Start Over
➢ Douyin Makes First Announcement of Global Monthly Users, Scale Outstrips Weibo
 
[1]  Party Committee Formed for the China Federation of Online Social Organizations

On the afternoon of July 19, the Party committee of the China Federation of Online Social Organizations (中国网络社会组织联合会) was formally founded in Beijing. Attending the ceremony, Gao Xiang (高翔), deputy director of the Cyberspace Administration of China, said the Party needed to “properly grab and practically grab the effective coverage of online social organizations, the federation’s Party committee guiding, supervising and inspecting the 300 member units to raise the Party’s organizational strength, working to implement the Party’s full coverage of organizations.” This was Party code for the need for the Party to exercise full control over all social organizations operating in cyberspace. The China Federation of Online Social Organizations, founded in Beijing in May 2018 in a ceremony attended by the CAC’s top official, Xu Lian (徐麟), now represents 300 of online social organizations, which a June 2017 document from the CAC defines as “social organizations registered with the Ministry of Civil Affairs that carry out work on the cyberspace domain.”
Examples of participants in the China Federation of Online Social Organizations include the China Electronics Chamber of Commerce (CECC)  the Cybersecurity Association of China (中国网络空间安全协会), and the China Youth New Media Association (中国青少年新媒体协会) associated with the Chinese Communist Youth League. But members apparently also include executives from major tech firms and online media, such as Alibaba (CEO Jack Ma is listed as a vice-president) and People’s Daily Online (CEO Ye Zhenzhen is listed as a vice-president).
At the founding back in May, state media identified the group as “our country’s first national, federated and hub-type social organization that voluntarily connects online social organizations, formed by 10 national online social organizations with the Cyberspace Administration of China as a sponsoring institution.” The stated mission of the federation is to “promote the development of online social organizations . . . under the leadership of the Party and the government.”
Key Chinese Reports:
Online Communication Magazine WeChat public account (网络传播杂志): 重磅!中国网络社会组织联合会党委成立大会在京举行
Cyberspace Administration of China Website (中国网信网): 中国网络社会组织联合会在京成立
[2] Four Agencies Coordinate to Launch “Sword Web 2018” Campaign Against Online IP Infringement and Piracy
Four government agencies announced on July 16 that they would coordinate in a campaign to strike hard against intellectual property right violations and piracy on the internet. The special action, they said, had begun in early July and would extend for four months. The agencies include the Cyberspace Administration of China, the National Copyright Administration, the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology and the Ministry of Public Security.
According to the notice, the campaign will focus on three particular areas of violation according to China’s Copyright Law: 1. reposting of copyrighted content, focusing on so-called “WeMedia,” or zimeiti (自媒体) on WeChat public accounts and other platforms that illegally copy and share material; 2. sharing of short videos in violation of copyright, focusing on such platforms as Douyin, Kuaishou, Watermelon Video and Bilibili; 3.violations in priority areas such as animation, video streaming and audiobooks.
Key Chinese Reports:
China Intellectual Property News (知识产权报): “剑网2018”专项行动将重点整治短视频等领域侵权行为
Beijing News Online (新京报网): “剑网2018”专项行动将重点整治短视频等领域侵权行为
[3] Baozou Comic Issues Apology, Says It Has Corrected Its Problems and Will Start Over
Baozou Comic, the popular comic sharing site that had its accounts on Weibo and WeChat shut down indefinitely by authorities back in May, has now posted an apology dated July 11 on its website, saying its “fundamental error was that our education in socialist core values was insufficient.” In an effort to rectify its problems, underscore its missteps and begin operating afresh, Baozou has posted several sections on its website as part of a “‘New Start’ Special Series.” These include a section called “Journey With The Homeland’s Martyrs, Making Deep Apologies” (英烈故土行,深刻致歉), which describes visits by the Baozou CEO and staff to official memorials to martyrs and heroes across the country.

Key Chinese Reports:
IT Home (IT之家): 暴走漫画活了,发致歉信称改正错误重新出发
Online Communication Magazine WeChat public account (网络传播杂志): “暴走漫画”发致歉信!自媒体应有怎样的“网络伦理操守”?
[4] Douyin Makes First Announcement of Global Monthly Users, Scale Outstrips Weibo
On July 16, the short video app Douyin announced that its global active monthly users have reached 500 million. This is the first time the app announced global figures. The app announced last month that its domestic active monthly users had reached 300 million. Douyin said 40% of its users were now in the 24-30 age group, surpassing previously dominant 18-24 age group.
Key Chinese Reports:
36KR.com (36氪): 最前线 | ​抖音全球月活用户突破5亿,这个消息比预想的早了半年
Media Observer (传媒大观察): 3分钟速览每日传媒大事记(7月18日)

Foes and Competitors

Messaging from US President Donald Trump on trade and China continues to be a sensitive area on Chinese social media, prompting deletion of posts on Weibo. In an interview with CNBC this week, Trump told “Squawk Box” host Joe Kernen that he was prepared if necessary to impose tariffs on all of China’s imports to the United States — citing the figure of 505.5 billion US dollars for 2017.
Sharing a link to this story in Chinese today, Feng Wei (冯玮), a professor of history at Shanghai’s Fudan University, who has more than 167,000 fans on Weibo, offered three observations:

2018-07-21 12:14:45 | 【Trump Prepared to Impose Tariffs on 505 Billion in Chinese Imports】Assessment: 1. This shows that Trump anticipates that China will not make concessions that satisfy him, and so the big door to negotiations is closed; 2. 505 billion concerns China’s entire manufacturing industry, its effect underestimated; 3. I fully oppose the harm done by the careless puffing of those so-called “experts” who are an abuse of public funds. It’s already clear, and the lessons are profound! http://t.cn/RgQJN43 ​
2018-07-21 12:14:45 | 【特朗普准备对5050亿美元中国进口商品开征关税】评:1、此举显示,特朗普判断中国不会作出令他满意的让步,因此关闭谈判大门。2、5050亿将涉及中国涉美所有加工制造业,影响低估。3、我始终反对的那些滥用国帑胡乱吹的“专家”的危害,已经显现,教训深刻!http://t.cn/RgQJN43 ​

Feng was presumably referring in his third comment to experts in China who have downplayed the impact of trade tensions with the United States, and played up Chinese strengths. In any case, his post, made at around 12:15PM Beijing time, had been removed by approximately 3:39PM.
Similar posts by Phoenix TV commentator Song Zhongping (宋忠平), with over 9 million fans, and from the official Weibo account of Hong Kong Economic Daily (香港商報), were also removed today.
Trump’s July 15 remarks to CBS Evening News anchor Jeff Glor, in which he answered a question about the United States’ biggest “foes” — apparently not understanding the difference between foe and competitor — were also among the deleted posts on Weibo. In that interview, Trump said “China is a foe economically, certainly they are a foe.”

Screenshot of Trump interview with CBS Evening News, shared by Miaopai on Weibo.
At 2:46PM Beijing time today, Weibo user Dan Bin (但斌), a corporate executive with close to 12 million followers, shared a video link to the Trump interview, which he had posted to Weibo’s video channel. “Trump directly explains his views on trade,” Dan Bin’s post said. It was deleted in less than an hour, by 3:35PM, but the video remained on Weibo, with comments apparently disabled.