Author: David Bandurski

Now Executive Director of the China Media Project, leading the project’s research and partnerships, David originally joined the project in Hong Kong in 2004. He is the author of Dragons in Diamond Village (Penguin), a book of reportage about urbanization and social activism in China, and co-editor of Investigative Journalism in China (HKU Press).

All About Innovation

As Vladimir Putin arrived in Beijing today for talks with Xi Jinping, the Global Times had to note that the relationship between China and Russia “has innovative significance for major power relations.” Read the headlines in China these days and “innovation” is everywhere. In whatever arena a question arises — technology, economics, politics, media, culture — the answer seems to be innovation.
Sure, innovation is a global buzzword. Benoit Godin, an expert on the history of innovation as a concept, has written that the term “is used and abused and has come to mean everything and nothing.” In China, though, under the rule of Xi Jinping, the term has become all-encompassing — the political, economic, technological, cultural and ideological fulcrum on which the legitimacy of the Party turns.
When Xi gave his speech at the Boao Forum last April, an opportunity to press his vision for the global economy, it was called “Openness for Greater Prosperity, Innovation for a Better Future.” The speech had to be understood in a Chinese context as a transformation (an innovation, if you will) of the vision set by Deng Xiaoping. If Deng was the great reformer, Xi Jinping is the great innovator. Xi’s vision, moreover, is global in scope, making him, at least in the Chinese Communist Party’s formulation, someone whose standard we should all follow. “Reform and innovation,” Xi said in his Boao speech, “are the fundamental driving force of human progress.”
When a concept takes hold at the commanding heights of political power in China, one can expect it to seize every crack and valley as well.
This is something we should remember as we observe the way “innovation” has taken hold in the arena of media and propaganda. At times, the word can actually point in a roundabout way to some form of change, including the new (if not exactly creative) application of technology. But very often, it does not. Very often, it is mere repetition, and as such is meant to confer power on the political idea and the political person, rather than signal or advocate real transformation.
Take, for example, a piece today written by a local propaganda chief from Baoji, a small city in China’s west, relating the results of a fact-finding mission to larger coastal cities in which leaders from Baoji sought to ascertain how they might get their city noticed. The answer:

We must ‘go out’ and strengthen our exchanges with more areas, drawing support from our cultural strengths, innovating our methods and styles, telling Baoji’s story in a lively way, doing high frequency publicity of Baoji, turning Baoji’s influence into Baoji’s competitiveness.

When the propaganda chief boils these concepts down to specific methods, however, they are underwhelming. If the voice of Baoji is to “actively go out,” resulting in “stronger public opinion power,” then the city must “strengthen the role of the internet,” the most effective way (can you feel it coming?) to “steadily innovate the channels and methods of communication.”

The team from Guangzhou Daily accepts an “innovation” award on June 7, 2018.
Yesterday, the Chinese Newspaper Association held the award ceremony for its 3rd annual Chinese Media Innovation Summit Hangzhou (中国传媒创新杭州峰会). The list of award winners reads like a portrait of traditional Party-run newspapers making the shift to more fully multimedia organizations that operate across online platforms.
In China’s media landscape, one of the most important meanings of “innovation” over the past three years has been the transformation of the Party press system through the application of new internet tools, and restructuring within Party-run media organizations to allow for cross-production of content.
For its “Central Kitchen” (中央厨房) project — which integrates various aspects of content production, including editing, design and technology, through a dedicated central desk — Guangzhou Daily, the official Party mouthpiece of the Guangzhou city leadership, won an award this year. Hunan Daily, the official Party mouthpiece of the provincial leadership in Hunan province, won an award for another “convergence” (融合) project called the “New Hunan Cloud Platform” (新湖南云), described as a multimedia platform that has “become the chief platform through which the provincial Party committee and provincial government release important policies.”

Breaking the Grip of Western Newswires

Last Friday, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), an international political, economic and security organization with members and observer states spanning Eurasia and South Asia, held its first Media Summit in Beijing. During the meeting, attended by representatives from more than 110 media organizations, the group released a “cooperation initiative” calling on all SCO members to use the opportunity of the upcoming summit in Qingdao to “drive media dialogue and cooperation to a new level.”


In a letter of welcome published on the front page of the overseas edition of the People’s Daily on Saturday, President Xi Jinping said the meeting was a positive opportunity to promote the “Shanghai spirit,” and to work toward “a community of common future [or destiny] for humankind,” the latter phrase now an important centerpiece of Chinese foreign policy. The “Shanghai Spirit,” a phrase often used in conjunction with the SCO, refers, according to the official Xinhua News Agency, to the spirit of “mutual trust, mutual benefit, equality, consultation, respect for cultural diversity, and pursuit of common development.”
In typical fashion, both English and Chinese language reporting of the SCO Media Summit in state media mostly failed to provide a concrete picture of the purpose of the meeting and the expected outcomes. Xinhua quoted Ainura Temirbekova, Kyrgyzstan’s deputy minister for culture and information, as saying the “Shanghai Spirit” was “not just confined to important statements, but proved by deeds.” Dmitrii Lukiantsev, Russia’s representative to the SCO, was quoted (or, rather, paraphrased) as saying that “the organization sets a good example for building a new type of international relations and the ‘Shanghai Spirit’ is of great relevance today.”
What deeds? What examples? What relevance? None of the foreign representatives name-dropped in Chinese state media coverage seemed capable of spelling it out — although, again, Xinhua said that Temirbekova said that “China has made concrete contributions, and the cooperation between SCO countries on the global stage is the only pathway to a shared future.”
So why is China bringing together more than 100 media organizations from across Asia? What are its strategic objectives here?
If we wade knee-deep through the swamp of Chinese state media platitudes, we can find just a bit of clarity. It comes in this passage of a report by the Economic Daily quoting Fang Jiangshan (方江山), the deputy editor-in-chief of the Chinese Communist Party’s flagship People’s Daily. In the same report as it was run at People’s Daily Online, the passage was bolded for emphasis:

Declaration on International Public Opinion Environment
The strengthening and promotion of media cooperation within the Shanghai Cooperation Organization is a shared aspiration of all parties. People’s Daily deputy editor-in-chief Fang Jiangshan points out that the media constitute an important resource and means of national governance and global governance, and whoever controls discourse power has a grasp of great soft power, and therefore can better stand in a position of righteousness and justice (道义制高点). In the present international public opinion framework, the members of the SCO currently lack media organizations with global influence, and the media of many member states still seriously rely on Western news agencies for their international news reports. “The political security, economic development and social stability of SCO member states is upset by a massive gap in terms of digital technologies,” said Fang Jiangshan . . . . Fang believes that to change this situation, the SCO and its members states must place a strong emphasis on media development and media cooperation, further building mechanisms for media cooperation.

According to the Economic Daily report, the consensus coming out of the SCO Media Summit was that greater media cooperation among member states could help to “build a public opinion environment more beneficial to regional peace, development and stability.”
Make no mistake: the proper translation here is that China wants to work with its Asian partners in the SCO to break what it sees as Western dominance of the global narrative on governance. Imagine a world in which media and their audiences across Asia see global affairs not through the lens of the Associated Press, AFP, Reuters or the New York Times, but through the grand political vision offered by Xinhua.
It’s not difficult to ascertain which nation state, under such a “public opinion environment,” would come off as the beneficent protagonist.
 

A Veteran Investigator Makes a Return

There are plenty of media stories in China this week to pique one’s interest. Notably, we have some concrete numbers — and astonishing ones at that — for the vast internal censorship teams being put together by major internet businesses in China to accommodate the control demands of the Party; we have the first casualties of China’s new law against defaming heroes and martyrs, which took effect on May 1; and we have the return to form of a once prominent Chinese investigative reporter, Gao Qinrong (shown above), who was jailed for eight years more than a decade ago for exposing corruption in his native Shanxi province — and who has now brought down another official on his home turf.

THIS WEEK IN CHINA’S MEDIA
May 21, 2018 to May 30, 2018
➢ Chaping (差评) returns investment made by Tencent after revelations of IP violations
➢ Internal content review team at Jinri Toutiao reached 10,000 members, and the video app Kuaishou (快手) censors a daily average of 700,000 videos deemed illegal
➢ As a law goes into effect in China protecting historical martyrs and heroes, the comic site “Rage Comics” (暴走漫画) is taken offline
➢ New figures (though from 2016) on salaries for top media company officials in China
➢ Veteran journalist Gao Qinrong exposes alleged corruption in Shanxi on his WeChat public account
[1] Chaping Returns Major Investment 
On May 23, the science and technology related we-media (自媒体) site “Chaping” (差评) announced that it had secured a 30 million yuan investment, with investment the Tencent’s TOPIC Fund topping the list. But on May 28, after Chaping faced a storm of criticism from other we-media operators over alleged copyright violations (essentially, taking other’s content and rebranding it as their own), the company announced that it had decided unilaterally to return Tencent’s investment. Zhang Jun (张军), Tencent’s top public relations executive, and CEO Ma Huateng (马化腾), both admitted over social media that the TOPIC Fund had gone ahead with the investment before conducting an adequate review.
Key Chinese Reports:
National Business Daily (每日经济新闻): 《腾讯能不能投资“差评”?》/《“差评”发文回应质疑背后:“洗稿”这件事,终于被摆上了台面》/《“差评”称主动退还投资,腾讯的尽调也不用做了
The Beijing News (新京报): 《“差评”被差评后 主动退还腾讯投资
[2] Content Review Team at Jinri Toutiao reaches 10,000 Members; Kuaishou Cleans Up Daily Average of 700,000 Content Items
On May 25, Pan Yu (潘宇), the director of media cooperation at Jinri Toutiao, revealed that in order to protect the “security” of the platform, Jinri Toutiao had built an enormous team allowing it to conduct content review on a 24×7 basis, “in order to create a positive energy climate conducive to socialist core values.” Pan also revealed that the platform had also created a team of expert advisors to enhance content supervision.
On May 27, Kuaishou issued a report on its handling of so-called illegal content for the month of May showing that on average 698,974 items of short video content had been removed on a daily basis. In addition, an average of 9,280 accounts had been blocked daily. At present, about 10 million short videos are uploaded each day to the platform, said Kuaishou, and it was doing its utmost to create “a positive, healthy, green and fair content environment.”
Key Chinese Reports:
Dahe Daily (大河报): 《今日头条媒体合作总监:背后有庞大的内容审核团队
36Kr.com (36氪): 《在互联网行业做审核员,他见了太多人性的黑暗面 | 这个职业不太冷
Blue Whale Finance (蓝鲸财经): 《快手通报5月处罚情况:日均清理违规内容近70万条
[3] Heroes and Martyrs Protection Law Takes Effect, “Rage Comics” is Taken Offline
On May 16th and 17th, after the we-media account “Rage Comics” (暴走漫画) posted short videos that were deemed to insult the spirit and deeds of Communist heroes and martyrs in violation of a related law that took effect on May 1,  Jinri Toutiao shut down offending accounts. Weibo, meanwhile shut down 16 accounts identified as serious violators, including @BaozouManhua (@暴走漫画), @BaozouDaShijian (@暴走大事件), @HuangJiguangZagang (@黄继光砸缸) and @DongCunruiInTheOffice (@办公室的董存瑞), while deleting a further 39 account aliases. Youku, the iQiyi (爱奇艺) online video platform, and the Zhihu question-and-answer website all removed content related to “Rage Comics” and put blocks into effect.
The “Law of the People’s Republic of China on the Protection of Heroes and Martyrs” (中华人民共和国英雄烈士保护法), which went into effect on May 1, stipulates the following: “No organization or individual may in public forums, online or through radio, television, film or publishing, etcetera, insult, slander or in other ways harm the name, representation, reputation or honor of heroes and martyrs.”
On May 23, two days before the official day commemorating Communist hero Dong Cunrui (董存瑞), a People’s Liberation Army soldier said to have blown himself up during China’s civil war in order to destroy a Kuomingtang fortification, Ren Jian (任剑), one of the creators of “Rage Comics” paid a visit to the Dong Cunrui Martyr’s Memorial Park, laying flowers on the memorial and offering a public apology.
Key Chinese Reports:
People’s Daily Official WeChat Account (人民日报官微): 《“暴走漫画”等16个微博账号被关闭
IT Home (IT之家):
王尼玛暴走漫画致歉:下线全部视频节目,网站App无限期关停整改
[4] Radio, Television and Newspaper Top Brass Earning Salaries of Up To 840,000 Yuan
According to a recently released report on salaries in the media industry for 2016, salaries for top media management positions in China generally fall between 400,000 yuan and 840,000 yuan per year, or around 62,000-130,000 US dollars. These numbers represent only a slight increase from previously recorded figures for 2015. Delays in reporting these salary figures in China of course mean that in some cases top managers of media companies have already moved on to new positions.
Top salaries at listed film and television companies generally topped out at around 1.17 million yuan per year, but salaries at 50 percent of listed media companies were actually lower than 600,000, meaning monthly salaries of around 50,000 yuan.
Key Chinese Reports:
“Entertainment & Business” Public Account (微信公众号“文娱商业观察”): 《人均117万,你的领导挣多少?|2017年A股影视公司高管人均年薪排行榜
[5] Veteran Journalist Openly Accuses Discipline Inspection Official in Shanxi of Corruption; Official is Removed
On May 24, journalist Gao Qinrong (高勤荣), a native of Shanxi province, posted a report called “A Vulgar-Mouthed Disciplinary Inspection Official” (一个满嘴脏话的纪检委书记) on his WeChat public account, alleging that Cheng Wanying (程晚英), head of the Cadre Supervision Office (干部监察室) of the discipline inspection authority in Changzhi City (长治市), coordinated with the city’s top anti-corruption official, Ma Biao (马彪), to organize a campaign of intimidation against a local real estate developer, Chen Zhaoping (陈兆平), after Chen refused to pay a bribe to Cheng. At the end of his report, Gao Qinrong provided an audio recording of Ma Biao, the anti-corruption official, in which he cursed profusely. A few days after Gao’s report, Ma Biao was, according to sources, removed from his position in Shanxi for “ineffectively dealing with online opinion” (网络舆情处置不力).
Gao Qinrong has a long and painful personal history of exposing corruption in China. In 1998, he exposed an irrigation project in Shanxi province that was a scam, and for that work he was imprisoned for eight years. In 2007, Gao was awarded an International Press Freedom Award from the Committee to Protect Journalists.
Key Chinese Reports:
Beijing Time (北京时间): 《山西长治纪委书记突遭免职 曾因满嘴脏话被公开举报

The "Honor" of Simply Eating at Home

Media in the People’s Republic of China rarely, if ever, offer the straight scoop on what is happening politically. But sometimes the odd twist in the Party’s stiffened discourse can give us tantalizing clues — little morsels to feed our curiosity.
Appearing recently on the public account of the official People’s Daily on the popular WeChat platform, the following editorial prompted a wave of interest. The piece bore the headline: “Party Members and Cadres Should Find Honor in Returning Home for Dinner.”


Why the interest?
The construction “finding honor in ____” (以……为荣) is routinely used in the discourse of the Chinese Communist Party, with phrases like “finding honor in labor” (以劳动为荣) and “finding honor in hard work and frugal living” (以勤俭为荣) appearing relatively early in the Party’s history.
More recently, former President Hu Jintao introduced his own formula for the proper conduct of Party officials in 2006, the “Eight Honors and Eight Shames” (八荣八耻), which a government website at the time called a “new moral yardstick.” 
So why should the idea of “finding honor in returning home for dinner” (以回家吃饭为荣) be of interest to anyone?
First, we must consider those situations in which one might not return home for dinner — assuming one is a Party official. First, you might be too busy at work. Second, you might be treating others for a dinner out. This novel phrase, “finding honor in returning home for dinner,” is directed at the second scenario.
Sales of luxury Moutai liquor, which had dropped during the first years of Xi Jinping’s anti-corruption campaign, have now recovered. The drink, which can cost hundreds of dollars per bottle, has long been a mainstay of Chinese banquet-style dinners.
Back on January 22, 2013, quite early in his first tenure as general secretary of the Chinese Communist Party, Xi Jinping addressed Party leaders at a conference of the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection, the CCP’s anti-corruption body. In his speech, Xi urged leaders to “go out less for entertainment, and return home more often to have dinner” (少出去应酬,多回家吃饭). The admonition was directed against the widespread abuse of public funds by officials holding lavish dinners out, often with expensive liquor, while ostensibly doing the business of the Party-state.
For the idea of “returning home for dinner” to become mixed up with this moralistic discourse about “honor,” and for it to be elevated in this way politically, suggests that while the Party has actively pushed an anti-corruption agenda under Xi Jinping, and has sought to restrain the use of public funds for evening entertainment, the problem is still widespread enough to cause concern.
The People’s Daily public account pointed out that there are now people who “have transferred eating and drinking activities from hotels to private residences and work unit dining halls, who have gone from the extravagant use of public funds to relying on their bosses.” Also criticized was the conduct of some Party members in ostensibly using their own wallets to “organize the department” (组局) for dining out.
All of this subtly remonstrative language in the People’s Daily public account article, directed at officials inclined by force of habit and privilege to stuff themselves at public expense, drew mockery from internet users who lack even the opportunity to dine on public funds.
The response from one WeChat user, who identified himself as an 80 year-old man, was a mix of puzzlement and irritation: “What honor is there in returning home for dinner?” he asked. “For more than 70 years, I’ve returned home every single day to have dinner, and never have relevant government departments offered me some sort of merit certificate to do so. Where is the honor? Let me go looking for it.”
 

Proper Reverence

In recent days in China, a seemingly routine human resources document arising from a new media training conference at a Party newspaper has feverishly made the rounds on the Chinese internet.
The notice, dated May 22, is from Shaanxi Daily, the official Chinese Communist Party mouthpiece of Shaanxi province. It reports that on May 18, the newspaper held a conference on new media during which the director of the newspaper’s theory and commentary division (理论评论部), Wei Yan (魏焱), “whispered in another’s ear while a principle leader of the newspaper was speaking, showing lack of reverence consciousness [my emphasis], in violation of conference discipline.” A decision had been taken, the notice said, to garnish 50 percent of the director’s performance-related pay for the month.



The Chinese Communist Party has had myriad forms of what it likes to call “consciousness” throughout its history. There was an emphasis in earlier decades, of course, on “class consciousness” (阶级意识). But after the end of the Cultural Revolution, as economic reforms were in the offing, “commodity consciousness” (商品意识) emerged to define a shift in priorities. As reforms took root, there was then “opening consciousness” (开放意识).

Science writer Fang Zhouzi asks if the leader of Shaanxi Daily thinks he is a god.


In Xi Jinping’s so-called “New Era,” the emphasis has been on the “Four Consciousnesses” (四个意识): “political consciousness” (政治意识), “consciousness of the overall situation” (大局意识), “consciousness of the core” (核心意识) and “compliance consciousness” (看齐意识). I could write a pretty hefty book trying to explain the meaning and histories of each of these “consciousnesses” — but in the current context, they essentially boil down to just one simple demand: allegiance to Xi Jinping.

Up to this point, however, no one anywhere in the Party’s vast structure, from the top to the bottom, has apparently used the term “reverence consciousness” (敬畏意识) to describe so pointedly the expected attitude of subordinates to their Party superiors.

This is why the notice from Shaanxi Daily has drawn so much attention. Writing on Weibo, and on Twitter, the scientific writer Fang Zhouzi asked: “An employee had no ‘reverence consciousness’ toward leaders of his newspaper and was fined half a month’s wages. Does this leader at the newspaper think he is a god?”
The newspaper leader who was apparently disrespected by Wei Yan’s lack of “reverence consciousness” was reportedly Li Wei (李伟), pictured in the featured image above, who serves concurrently as director of Shaanxi Daily and as a deputy minister of propaganda for the province.

According to the Shaanxi Daily notice, Wei Yan, the offending whisperer, was also ordered to write a letter of contrition for failing to show proper reverence to his superior.

China Shutters Top Leftist Website

One key characteristic of Xi Jinping’s “New Era” has been the progressive elimination of all forms of ideological variance within the Party. Growing centralization of Party power has come with a pronounced narrowing of the discourse spectrum. Everyone must converge at the center — or remain silent.
Now comes the news, not altogether surprising, that Utopia, the leftist website espousing that “our only firm belief is in Mao Zedong Thought,” could be shuttered indefinitely.
Chinese-language media outside mainland China reported over the weekend that Utopia‘s website was no longer available, following the blocking on May 19 of its public account on the popular WeChat platform. Apple Daily cited speculation that one of the key issues was the need to maintain the central position of Xi Jinping’s ideological discourse — an argument that seems at least partly supported by CMP’s recent report on April 2018 discourse in the People’s Daily newspaper, which found legacy terms associated with Xi Jinping’s predecessors disappearing almost entirely.
Other sources speculated that Utopia‘s shutdown was a pre-emptive move by the authorities to neutralize any negative fallout from concessions China might make in the midst of trade negotiations with the United States. The fear, according to one commentator cited by Radio Free Asia, was that Utopia, a site that often harbors extreme nationalist views, might openly characterize Chinese concessions as an “act of treason” (卖国行动), inviting broader criticism from its readership. At the time of the blocking of its WeChat public account, Utopia had an estimated 130,000 followers on the platform.
Utopia has often taken up extreme positions that set it at odds with the Party’s mainstream. After North Korea said in February 2013 that it had successfully tested a miniaturized nuclear device, a move that upset China’s government and prompted rare criticism of North Korea in state-run media, the Utopia website ran a disaccording message of praise — even tossing in a propaganda term, “positive energy,” introduced by Xi Jinping not long before: “For the people of North Korea to conduct a successful test of an advanced nuclear weapon at this time is a contribution to peace in Northeast Asia,” it wrote. “It increases positive energy on the Korean Peninsula, and it adds more positive factors to the future of North Korea.”
Utopia and North Korea were joined in the news headlines last month when it emerged that 32 Chinese tourists killed in a bus crash on the Reunification Highway south of Pyongyang were visiting North Korea on a tour organized by Spark Travel, a company affiliated with Utopia. The website’s editor-in-chief, Diao Weiming (刁伟铭), was confirmed to have died in the crash.
Utopia has weathered temporary shutdowns in the past. The website was handed a one-month suspension in April 2012 and ordered to undergo rectification. The order, coming at the time from the State Council Information Office, reportedly resulted from writings seen as indirectly criticizing the state leaders and “improperly discussing” (妄议) the 18th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party, which at that time was several months away.
In other respects, on other issues, Utopia has been more in line with the views of the leadership. The site had long defined itself in critical opposition to Yanhuang Chunqiu (炎黄春秋), a respected journal of history and politics that frequently ran scholarship from more liberal Chinese intellectuals. The Utopia website, in fact, featured a regular special topic, or zhuanti (专题), on Yanhuang Chunqiu, a column reserved for fulsome rebuttals of the latest outrages committed by the journal — such as well-supported scholarship by historian and former CMP fellow Hong Zhenkuai (洪振快) that questioned the historical truth of a Communist Party myth called the “Five Heroes of Langya Mountain.”
Yanhuang Chunqiu has been effectively silenced as a source of liberal ideas within the Party since its hostile takeover by authorities almost two years ago.
Utopia routinely referred to the liberal journal disparagingly as “the great camp of historical nihilism” (历史虚无主义的大本营). In the context of Chinese Communist Party discourse, “historical nihilism” refers to any act or attitude of denying the Party’s politically convenient view of historical truth, however unsubstantiated. Utopia would seem, in this respect, to be in line with the objectives of the Party under Xi Jinping, which has prioritized the fight against “historical nihilism,” even listing it as number six on its roster of banned ideas laid out in the so-called Document No. 9 back in 2013.
But the fate of Utopia over the past week is a potent illustration of how determined the Party leadership now is to enforce and maintain ideological unity around the “core” figure of Xi Jinping. It is not acceptable for a liberal Party journal on the right to talk honestly about history and advocate constitutionalism as a means of solving China’s problems. Nor is it acceptable for a website on the extreme left to talk as though the way forward is a return to the ideology of Mao.
Right or left, all must come together at “the core.”
 

No Smooth Sailing for Comments on China-US Trade

The headlines on Sunday declared that China and the United States had agreed to pull back from a trade war and call an end to a round of escalating tariffs. The announcement followed a mission to Washington by Chinese vice-premier Liu He (刘鹤), a seasoned politician who is also known in China as one of the country’s top economists.
Details of the negotiations and the agreed-upon measures were as yet unclear, but there were reports that China had pledged to purchase more American goods and services, including agriculture and energy, in order to offset the trade imbalance.
As the news trickled back to China, comments on social media were mixed, with some users claiming that China got the upper hand and others suggesting President Trump — “the madman,” as some called him — managed to gain the advantage.
For reasons not entirely clear, quite a number of such posts offering speculation as to which side came out on top were deleted by censors from the popular Weibo platform. One reason might be that the authorities are keen to tone down any suggestion of having been forced into concessions. Another reason might be the impulse to offset language that seems to suggest bi-lateral trade is not, as China now likes to say, “win-win.”
In any case, the following is a selection of deleted Weibo posts. The last one deals with an obvious point of sensitivity, speculating (perhaps tongue in cheek) about whether or not it is possible that Google might “return” to China:

2018-05-20 04:23:55 | [Second round of China-US trade negotiations concluded, Premier He returns home] This round of China-US trade negotiations has ended, and He has returned to Beijing today. The Chinese side has concluded that “negotiations were positive, constructive and produced results.” The US gave no official assessment. Various information sources suggest: 1) China has agreed to increase imports of American products. The US side demanded that the Chinese side provide trade goals, tariff and non-tariff reforms, and new measures and results on the protection of intellectual property. 2) China’s concerted push for the US to let ZTE off the hook was unsuccessful.
2018-05-20 04:23:55 | 【中美贸易第二轮谈判结束,鹤总回国】这轮中美贸易谈判结束,鹤今天返京。中方结论是“谈判是积极的、有建设性的和富有成果的”。美方没有官方评价。从各种信息显示:1)中国承诺增加美国商品进口。美方要求中方提供贸易目标、关税和非关税改革和知识产权保护措施未果。2)中国极力让美国放行中兴未果。 ​
2018-05-20 02:50:05 | [Ceasefire in China-US trade war! China-US issue joint statement on trade negotiations] the two sides agreed: 1) to make a substantive decrease in the gap in trade between China and the US; 2) to significantly increase US exports of agricultural and energy products to China; 3) to discuss trade in industrial products and services; 4) to increase cooperation on intellectual property protection. http://t.cn/R38fYnw ​
2018-05-20 02:50:05 | 【中美贸易战停火!中美就经贸磋商发表联合声明】双方同意:1、实质性减少美对华货物贸易逆差。2、有意义地增加美国农产品和能源出口。3、就扩大制造业产品和服务贸易进行讨论。4、加强知识产权保护合作。http://t.cn/R38fYnw ​
2018-05-20 07:28:16 | Judging from the content released, the madman won. How is that? After all, you can’t enforce protections forever [on China’s side], and domestic consumers [in China] have received real benefit. Besides, when other things are discussed later on, it’s hard to say things won’t take a wrong turn. 
2018-05-20 07:28:16 | 从公布的内容看,疯子赢了。又如何呢?反正不可能永远护着,国内消费者也得到了实质利好。另外后续还有东西谈,说不准还会出岔子
2018-05-20 09:00:23 | The crux of China-US trade negotiations: the attempts by the American Empire to throttle the China 2025 plan have dematerialized. This is the most fundamental. The other points of compromise — or kneeling, to put it more sharply — are small matters. Of course, given Trump’s erratic character, and the fact that there is now already an anti-China consensus in America, this will not be the last we hear of this. I personally think that it’s far from over, especially with respect to the midterm elections. Friction between China and the US will get more and more severe. In order to satisfy the growing consumption of the Chinese people . . . . [Full text]
2018-05-20 09:00:23 | 中美协议的关键在于:美帝扼杀中国制造2025的内容已经消失了 这才是最根本的 其他暂时的妥协,乃至说难听点,跪,都是小节 不过按床铺反复的性格,以及美国内已经形成反华共识 这次不是是一张一弛,个人认为远未结束,特别是中期选举后,中美之间的交锋只会越演越烈 为满足中国人民不断增长的消费…全文: http://m.weibo.cn/1365426941/4241676820233822 ​
2018-05-20 08:14:58 | So, will Google be returning [to China] this time around?
2018-05-20 08:14:58 | 此次谷歌会不会回来? ​

 
 

Building the Party's Internet

In a ceremony in Beijing earlier this week, the director of the Cyberspace Administration of China (CAC), Xu Lin (徐麟), presided over the inauguration of the China Federation of Internet Societies (CFIS), a broad internet industry grouping whose stated purpose is to “promote the development of Party organizations in the industry.” The federation’s establishment is a clear sign of the growing involvement of the Chinese Communist Party in private internet firms, and further reflection of the broader trend of closer Party governance and scrutiny of all forms of media.
Prominent industry leaders, including Tencent chairman Pony Ma, Alibaba’s founder Jack Ma and Baidu chairman Robin Li, have been appointed as vice presidents of the new federation.
The Global Times quoted Zhao Zhanling of the Beijing-based Internet Society of China as saying that the formation of the federation was about leveraging the “voluntary” participation of internet companies in order to improve the governance of cyberspace. “Just relying on government authorities,” said Zhao, “is far from enough in administering cyberspace, and it’s more important that CFIS members voluntarily clean the cyberspace environment.”
But such industry groupings in China are never voluntary or independent. For many years the Party has used such intermediate structures as vehicles to assert control through means that appear more autonomous and legitimate. More than 10 years ago, I wrote about how the Beijing Association of Online Media, an organization claiming membership by some of the world’s top technology companies, including Intel and Nokia, served as an organ of state censorship.
According to a CAC press release appearing at People’s Daily Online and other state media sites:

The China Federation of Internet Societies said it would conscientiously study and implement the spirit of Xi Jinping’s Strategic Thought on [Building] an Internet Power (习近平网络强国战略思想) and the National Cybersecurity Work Conference, serving as leader for internet social organizations in upholding a correct political direction; serving as a motivator for internet social organizations in serving function roles [in internet governance]; serving as a protector of the interest demands of internet social organizations; serving as a promoter of Party building within internet social organizations; serving as a monitor of the regulated operation of internet social organizations; and promoting the healthy development of internet social organizations on the path of rule by law.

It appears that the primary role of the federation will be to exercise tighter Party control over the complicated ecosystem of various organizations, companies and groups involved in cyberspace governance. The Global Times quoted an official from the Institute of China Cyberspace Strategy as saying that “the Party should step up its guidance of CFIS members so that internet companies could raise their awareness in safeguarding China’s sovereignty and interests.”
The most crucial part of that strategy will be to build and strengthen Party units within these organizations and other CFIS members, including private internet companies. This is something we have already seen in recent months. We wrote last month about a Party study course held inside Beijing Byte Dance Telecommunications, the operator of Toutiao.
And yet somehow, against all reason, the Internet Society of China’s Zhao Zhanling managed to reassure the Global Times: “But the Party units will not interfere in the operations of these companies.”
 
 

The Revolution China Intends to Lead

Trade talks between China and the United States last week ended abruptly and with no discernible progress. Technology was one of the key sticking points, with the US pressing China to put a stop to state subsidies for technology firms under its “Made in China 2025” plan — a blueprint for establishing Chinese domination of advanced industries currently in development, what Axios recently called “the 10 biggest technologies of the future.”

But if we understand how the Chinese Communist Party perceives the need to secure the technologies of the future through the lens of the past, we can better understand just how much it has invested in the idea of Chinese dominance — and how difficult it likely will be to arrive at a compromise of the kind Trump’s negotiators are hoping for.
The following text is a very partial translation of a piece appearing yesterday on page 11 in China’s Guangming Daily, a newspaper published by the Central Propaganda Department. The piece, which was also posted at People’s Daily Online and other sites, was written by Zhi Zhenfeng (支振锋), a researcher in the Socialism With Chinese Characteristics Theoretical System Research Center of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences.
We translate the opening of the piece just to offer a taste of the official rhetoric surrounding China’s technological advancement and its link both to long-term national development and to the legitimacy and longevity of the Party itself. The reference to the building of an “Internet Power,” readers should note, refers more broadly to cyber technologies and their application across a range of industries.
The basic sense in Zhi Zhenfeng’s piece, which mirrors much official writing on new technologies, is that China, while globally pre-eminent in the agrarian phase of human history, missed out on the industrial revolution and therefore lost its rightful position in the world.
China — or so goes the story — will not make the same mistake again, as the world is on the brink of the next great revolution.

The Fundamental Path to Accelerating the Advancement of the Building of an Internet Power 
(加快推进网络强国建设的根本遵循)
May 7, 2018 / Guangming Daily
In his important speech to the National Cybersecurity Work Conference, General Secretary Xi Jinping stood in the midst of human historical development, at the heights of the overall situation of Party and government work, condensing human historical development and the experiences and knowledge of Chinese people, and accurately grasped the intrinsic principles of the advancing technological revolution and the precious transformation in social production (社会生产变革), scientifically analyzed transformative trends in digitalization and the historic responsibility we bear, systematically described the rich meaning of the Internet Power strategy, profoundly responded to a series of major questions concerning theories and experiences in the development of cyber tasks, and provided the fundamental path to seizing the historic opportunity of the information revolution, accelerating cybersecurity and digitalization work, and accelerating the promotion of definite forward progress in building an Internet Power. A magnificent blueprint drawn on a single sheet of paper, setting a start to a glorious cause. The notion of “the people as the center” established the basic tone woven through this important historical document, and “building an Internet Power” is the strong note advancing bravely in this beautiful symphonic movement.
Digitalization has brought the Chinese people the historic opportunity of a millenium
Humankind has experienced an agricultural revolution, an industrial revolution, and is now experiencing an information revolution. Every revolution in industry has immensely enriched the existence of humankind, bringing multidimensional change economically and politically. During the extended period of agrarian society, China was an economic power in the world, creating a resplendent culture, but it later missed out on the industrial revolution, missed an historic opportunity to progress along with the world, and it gradually slipped to a position where it was passively subjected to abuse. Through several generations of effort, we have never been so close as we are now to the goal of the Great Rejuvenation of the Chinese People, nor have we ever been so confident as we are today, or so capable of realizing the Great Rejuvenation of the Chinese people.
Now and in the coming period, our country’s development goal is to realize the “two millennial goals” as the objective of our struggle. The information revolution has enhanced the mental power of humanity, and it is bringing another flying leap in productivity, creating a broader economic and social transformation. New technologies have brought a new economy, and the new economy has engendered new businesses. . . .
As General Secretary Xi Jinping has pointed out: “Digitalization offers the Chinese people an extremely rare opportunity.”

Tech Firms Tilt Toward the Party

In the New York Times today, Raymond Zhong and Paul Mozur write about how China risks spoiling its innovative technology sector through increasingly heavy-handed intervention. While China has in recent years “defied the truism that only free and open societies can innovate,” they write, the country’s “tilt toward strongman rule” under Xi Jinping could put that reputation at risk.
Private technology firms in China are being drawn closer to the Chinese Communist Party across a range of technological development initiatives — from self-driving cars to social credit scoring, from voice and facial recognition to satellite navigation. At the same time, the Party is being introduced more forcefully into technology firms themselves. Zhong and Mozur deal with this latter aspect toward the end of their piece, noting how this is visible at the Shenzhen headquarters of Tencent, China’s largest technology firm:

A chart on the wall shows how many employees are party members (more than 8,000 this year). Another display lists the monthly schedule for employees’ party education. (This month’s offering: training sessions on “New Era, New Thought, New Journey.”)

Tencent’s mascot, a jaunty winking penguin, appears throughout with a hammer and sickle on its chest.

But what does the process of “party education” actually look like? In fact, we had a hint last week from China’s Economic Daily newspaper, which reported on a study session a one of China’s leading start-ups, Beijing Byte Dance Telecommunications Co. Ltd., which was harshly disciplined by authorities last month, its CEO issuing an abject apology.

Bytedance employees attend a Party study session led by Party secretary and editor-in-chief Zhang Fuping.
The Economic Daily reported on April 28 that “the CCP committee of Beijing Byte Dance Telecommunications Co. Ltd. (字节跳动) held a topic course on the conscientious study of the spirit of the National Cyberspace Work Conference (全国网信工作会议).” The work conference mentioned here was the latest forum on cybersecurity, at which President Xi Jinping delivered a speech in which he linked cybersecurity and national security, calling for “improved governance capacity in cyberspace.”
Concerning information controls, Xi said, according to Xinhua News Agency: “Internet media should spread positive information, uphold the correct political direction, and guide public opinion and values towards the right direction.”
The Bytedance study session was chaired by Party secretary and editor-in-chief Zhang Fuping” (张辅评), who according to the Economic Daily shared his own study and explained the link between the spirit of the conference and the company’s own situation.” The meeting was attended both by current Party members and by “those eager to join the Party.” There were reportedly a range of presentations from senior managers, including CEO Zhang Yiming — whose abject and overtly political apology last month was major news — on such topics as “doing a proper job of spreading positive energy” (a Party propaganda phrase) and “enhancing industry self-discipline.” Also on the agenda was the “building of a digital Silk Road” (数字丝绸之路), a tech reference to another of Xi Jinping’s signature policies, the Belt and Road Initiative.
But the chief message was control:

Party secretary and editor-in-chief Zhang Fuping said that the General Secretary had established the bottom line all technology enterprises must follow when he said that “[we] must stay true to the main responsibility of the enterprise, absolutely not allowing the internet to become a platform for the transmission of harmful information and rumors.” As a technology company with a media nature (具有媒体属性), Bytedance must place [correct] guidance and holding of responsibility in the first position, upholding not just its main responsibility but also social reponsibility and moral responsibility.

Control and development have remained in tension in China throughout the four decades of the reform era. Today, in what we might call the post-reform “New Era” of Xi Jinping, control and innovation (the new buzzword for development) are equally if not more in tension.
The Party is gambling its future on the right balance of both.