Now Executive Director of the China Media Project, leading the project’s research and partnerships, David originally joined the project in Hong Kong in 2004. He is the author of Dragons in Diamond Village (Penguin), a book of reportage about urbanization and social activism in China, and co-editor of Investigative Journalism in China (HKU Press).
The following post from user “LifeTime” was deleted from Weibo sometime before 8:31AM today, February 10, 2015, less than 12 hours after it was posted. The post refers to the recent leak of client data from the Swiss branch of HSBC bank, and makes only passing reference to “Moral Sister” (道德姐), a nickname given to Li Xiaolin (李小琳), the daughter of former Chinese premier Li Peng. [Explore more deleted posts by using the Weiboscope, created by the Journalism & Media Studies Centre.]
How did the Swiss scandal involving “Moral Sister” begin? Yesterday social media all over the world were hotly discussing a list released by the International Consortium of Investigative Journalists (ICIJ). The news, unfortunately, is true. Hervé Falciani, a 43 year-old former employee of HSBC’s Swiss banking arm, is a computer engineer, and he made off with information about the banks customers. He was arrested in Lebanon in 2008 as he was selling the information. [NOTE: According to media accounts, Falciani was in fact arrested in Geneva after returning from Lebanon.] Somehow released later, Falciani fled to France, and since then he has openly released all of the [bank] customer information he stole.
In a reflection of the sheer variety of names in the data, others who appear are Li Xiaolin, the daughter of former Chinese Premier Li Peng, famous for his role in the Tiananmen Square massacre; Joseph Fok, a judge on Hong Kong’s highest court, and Prince and Princess Michael of Kent, the beloved cousin of Queen Elizabeth II of England and his wife.
The account that can be linked to the prince and princess was held in the name of their company, Cantium Services Limited. A representative for the couple said the account “never received nor held any funds” and was closed in 2009. Li Xiaolin is listed, along with her husband, as a beneficial owner of an account that held $2.5 million. Fok is listed as the holder of an account that was closed in 2002. They did not respond to requests for comment.
The following post by former CMP fellow Zhang Ming was made to his Sina.com blog on February 9, 2015. Zhang’s own follow-up post on Sina Weibo announcing the new blog entry was deleted just a few hours later, according to JMSC’s Weiboscope. Zhang’s piece clearly prompts the reader to make inferences about China’s current politics, in particular the apparently growing power of President Xi Jinping, and a corresponding unwillingness to stomach dissenting voices.
“Those Who Hear Only the Voice of Power” (只听得懂权力声音的人)
Media reported last September about the dumping of waste in the Tenggeli Desert by a chemical enterprise in the Alxa League’s Tenger Industrial Park (阿拉善盟工业园区) in Inner Mongolia. The story was irrefutable, a conspicuous pit of waste there for all to see, and noxious smells wafting across the landscape. And yet local government officials found a hundred different ways to shirk responsibility. Local environmental officials even personally attested that nothing whatsoever had gone wrong.
Fast forward one month. After written instructions from topmost national leaders, the situation changed dramatically. The denials promptly stopped. Authorities in Inner Mongolia called meetings to discuss solutions to what suddenly became a crisis. Everyone sprang so resolutely into action we could only look on tongue-tied. It was subsequently reported that the whole matter had been swept under the carpet four years earlier, after an initial round of press coverage.
The problem of pollution in China is severe. Mass incidents are common. Forced property demolitions proceed unstoppably. Justice is constantly trampled through the court system. But none of the serious local problems looming behind these cases have any hope of resolution in our country unless powerful leadership elites step forward with hand-of-God interventions.
There are those here in China who understand nothing but the voice of power. They may fear exposure by the media, but only as a proxy to the real fear, that leaders above them might find out. Only the latter fear will prompt them to manage a crisis, usually by paying up to ensure the problem disappears.
Since ancient times, those in the circles of power in China have always understood the voice of power best. Because only the voice of power can decide the fate of an official, whether he advances like the tide or sinks like a stone. Power had only one source in ancient China — the emperor. There was no power to speak of aside from imperial power. There was no true law. There was no real public opinion. There were no moral codes or ethical strictures.
In those days, the more forceful administrative power was, the easier it became for officials lower down the chain of command to understand and accede. There was no need for explicit commands. Just a whiff from the center of power, and everyone below would drift in that direction. And naturally, calls and clamors from other quarters were that much easier to ignore.
In any era, to have an officialdom that can act only as a function of fear, that cannot conduct itself in accord with a system of rules and laws — this is a tragedy for emperors, big and small, as well as for the people.
The Qianlong Emperor(September 25, 1711 to February 7, 1799) depicted in his court attire.
Imagine that across the breadth of the country, every chess piece played must be played at the pinnacle of power. If, as emperor, you don’t make a concerted move, that piece will move of its own accord. It is you who must be responsible for the outcome of the game, whether there is order or chaos. You must direct the movements of the pieces, not losing sight of a single one. If you tire in the course of the game, or if you let down your guard — well then, emperors big and small will make their own moves on all sides of you. Before long, other voices of power will emerge and hold sway, and then all bets are off.
In our ancient past, those emperors with a bit of wisdom understood that the world under heaven (天下) was for the people under heaven. This being the case, one person could not be expected to take responsibility for all.
When the media and the people are ignored — or in the most egregious case, persecuted — for trying to speak up and take responsibility for the world around them, we can be sure this will lead to chaos.
As the old saying goes, “Responsibility for the rise and fall of a nation rests with the common folk” (天下兴亡，匹夫有责). For centuries now have we shouted these words. But if the common folk are to take responsibility, it follows that they must have power. If they haven’t even the power to demand responsibility, then chaos is in store under heaven.
Read China’s official media these days and you could be forgiven for imagining that senior Communist Party officials have only recently learned to speak like actual human beings. Scarcely a day goes by without a prominent paean to the popular utterances of General Secretary Xi Jinping.
In his own inimitable style, we are told, the approachable “Uncle Xi” (习大大) peppers his “important speeches” with colourful metaphor. Hipper than your average leader of the world’s most populous nation, he tosses out web slang like, well, “like” — that buzzword popularised by Facebook, a service banned in China.
Xi Jinping: Do you “like” him?
Much of Xi’s likability, of course, is a concerted campaign by state media to reshape the popular sense of the Party’s own popularity and legitimacy — to close the gap, as it were.
And we can see this campaign at work in a great many pieces in the state media that read like fan pages — as though Xi Jinping is not just the CCP’s top dog, but also the country’s top trend setter. And, goodness, what will he say next?
Our latest example is a piece that ran today on at the top of People’s Daily Online, the website of the Party’s flagship People’s Daily newspaper. With a titter of seriousness, we provide our translation below.
HOT PHRASE 1: The Chinese Dream (中国梦) Xi: “Every person has ideals they pursue, their own dreams. Right now, everyone is discussing the Chinese dream. I think that the realisation of the great rejuvenation of the Chinese people is the modern era the great dream of the Chinese people.” Background: On November 2012, as Xi Jinping attended an exhibition on “The Road to Revival,” he fully explained the “Chinese dream” for the first time.
Madame Tussaud’s Wax Museum? No, indeed. This is the real Xi Jinping and other standing committee members visiting the “Road to Revival” Exhibition in 2013. HOT PHRASE 2: Bottom-line thinking (底线思维) Xi: “the method of properly applying bottom-line thinking is about preparing for the bad points and working at the same time to obtain the best possible results. It’s about being prepared, not panicking, and firmly grasping the initiative.” Background: According to the Study Times, Xi Jinping first emphasised [this phrase] at an important meeting in 2013. Since the 18th National Congress [in 2012], Xi Jinping has often emphasised using bottom-line thinking to advantage. HOT PHRASE 3: Tigers and flies (老虎, 苍蝇) Xi: “For the strict administration of the Party, the punitive hand must not go soft. We must persist in striking both ‘tigers’ and ‘flies,’ resolutely investigating violations of the law and of discipline by leading cadres. . .” Background: On January 22, 2013, Xi Jinping spoke these words in an important speech during the second full session of the 18th Central Discipline Inspection Commission. From the 18th National Congress to now, 61 officials at the vice-ministerial level or above have fallen, underscoring the unprecedented strength of the anti-corruption campaign and illustrating the determination of the Central Party led by General Secretary Xi Jinping. HOT PHRASE 4: Look in the mirror, attend to your wardrobe, wash yourself clean, and cure your ailments (照镜子、正衣冠、洗洗澡、治治病) Xi: “In carrying out our second group of education practice movements, we must adhere to the subject at hand, with the chief demands that we look in the mirror, attend to our wardrobe, wash ourselves clean, cure our ailments — that we oppose the ‘four winds’ with strict standards, strict measure and strict discipline, promoting the further elevation of our thinking and understanding. Our work style must be further transformed, the relationship between the Party and the masses made ever more intimate, so that our clean and practical image among the people is further established, and that our grassroots foundation is further solidified.” Background:On January 20, 2014, Xi Jinping made an important speech at a . . . conference for the Party’s Mass Line Education Practice movement. HOT PHRASE 5: Where has the time gone? Xi: “You know, in taking up the kind of work I do, you basically have no time for yourself. During Spring Festival this year, there was a song in China called, ‘Where Has the Time Gone?’. For me, the question is, Where has my personal time gone? And of course it’s all gone to work.” Background: Xi sighed these words during an interview in Sochi on February 7, 2014. Xi Jinping is deft at using popular common-folk language, giving a feeling of earnestness tinged with humour. . . HOT PHRASE 6: The button of life (人生的扣子) Xi: “This is like buttoning up when you get dressed. If you get the first button wrong, all the subsequent ones will go wrong too. In life, you need to get the buttons right from the start.” Background: Xi Jinping said this in a discussion with students at Peking University on May 4, 2014. Xi Jinping said that the values young people hold define the value orientation of an entire society. Young people, [he said], must grab this important period for the formation of their values. HOT PHRASE 7: The New Normal (新常态)
Xi: “Our nation’s development stands at an important era of opportunity. We must increase our confidence, departing from the point of our present phase and its particularities, adapting to the new normal, and maintaining a normal state of mind in terms of strategy. Background:In May 2014, Xi Jinping first spoke of the “new normal” on an inspection tour to Henan. Giving a speech the APEC Business Leaders summit on November 9, 2014 . . . Xi Jinping said the crux of whether or not [China] could adjust to the new normal was a question of the strength of the comprehensive deepening of reforms.” After this, the “new normal” expanded to the realms of politics and foreign relations, and it was echoed at the local and regional levels [in China] and hotly talked about in the international media. HOT PHRASE 8: One Belt and One Road (一带一路) Xi: “We must make overall layouts for the One Road One Belt [program], determining the schedule and road map for the next few years as soon as possible. We must have a plan and scope for our objectives in the early stage.” Background:On a visit to Kazakhstan in September 2013, Xi Jinping spoke of building a “Silk Road economic belt.” In October the same year, hosting the APEC Leaders Summit in Beijing, Xi Jinping expressed the wish to build a “maritime Silk Road for the 21st century” along with ASEAN countries. HOT PHRASE 9: APEC Blue (APEC蓝) Xi:: “Some people say that right now Beijing’s blue sky is ‘APEC blue,’ [because extreme measures were taken ahead of the APEC meeting to deal temporarily with pollution], something beautiful but fleeting, that will be gone after this moment. I hope and trust that through tireless efforts ‘APEC blue’ will be here to stay.” Background:These words were spoken in November 2014, as Xi Jinping hosted a banquet for the APEC Leaders Forum. Xi Jinping has dealt head-on with the pollution problem, calling it a “development annoyance” and saying that, “Dealing with pollution is a direction we’re working in, and clear water and green vistas are an important part of the Chinese dream.”
A report from the LA Times shows Beijing air on January 15, 2015, two months after Xi Jinping hoped ‘APEC blue’ would stick around. HOT PHRASE 10: “roughing through it”, and to “like”(蛮拼的, 点赞) Xi: “In order to do this work well, our cadres at various levels have roughed through it. Of course, without the people giving their support, it’s hard to do this work well. So I want to ‘like’ our great people.” Background:Xi Jinping spoke these words from his office in his year-end address on December 31, 2014. [The term “roughing through it” (也是蛮拼的), which means to try hard but not quite succeed, is internet slang in China, as of course is the term “to like,” the same meaning as to “like” a post on Facebook.]
Xi Jinping gives a year-end address from his office on December 31, 2014. HOT PHRASE 11: Young people don’t need to pull all-nighters. Xi: “In those days when I was young, when I wanted to do something well, I would get good and sick about once every month. Why was that? Pulling all-nighters. I was often working through to daybreak. Later I felt that if I kept it up there was no way I would make it to adulthood. First settle your frame of mind, so that while you feel passion inside, you remain outwardly composed. Background:On January 12, 2015, Xi Jinping spoke with around 200 county-level Party leaders attending a training session at the Central Party School. He spoke about his own experiences as a country-level secretary, and said that “young people don’t need to pull all-nighters.” This heartfelt and natural sentiment was enthusiastically shared [on the internet] . . . HOT PHRASE 12: knife handle (刀把子) Xi: “[We must] foster and create a politics and law corps that respects the Party, respects the nation, respects the people and respects the law, ensuring the knife handle is grasped firmly in the hand of the Party and the people.”
http://paper.people.com.cn/rmrbhwb/html/2015-01/21/content_1523529.htm Background: on January 20, 2015, Xi Jinping said these words at the National Conference on Politics and Law. The “knife handle” is an expression used by Mao Zedong in 1926 to address the question of who should bear weapons and who they should be used against.
In today’s edition of the People’s Daily, Party elites continue to make their case that the building of “rule of law” in China — the topic of last fall’s Fourth Plenum — must happen on China’s terms. China cannot and must not, according to this argument, slavishly copy the systems of the West. Such copying is a means proposed by unspecified “hostile forces” who hope to upset the “leadership of the Chinese Communist Party.”
Says the quote at the outset of the piece, which, in fact, could be equally understood as encouragement to first try “Western” systems of rule of law: “Only when you try it on for yourself do you know if a shoe fits.”
The following are selected passages in translation from today’s page-nine piece in the People’s Daily. [Homepage Image: “Ruby Red Slippers” from Chris Evans, available at Flickr.com under Creative Commons license]
“The Healthy Road of Ruling the Nation in Accord with the Law: How We Should Understand Going Our Own Road in Building Rule of Law” People’s Daily
February 3, 2015
“Only when you try it on for yourself do you know if a shoe fits.” Rule of law is a basic method for governing a nation, but as for what rule of law mode a country puts into effect, and what rule of law path it takes, this must be a matter of what suits that country’s national conditions (国情) and social system. [A country] must “wear shoes that fit,” and it must travel its own road.
. . .
As for China, we are an ancient civilization with a history of 5,000 years, and we are also a socialist great nation (社会主义大国) under development. We have our own special rule of law traditions, our own special national conditions, our own special problems, and these determine that we must travel our own path in building rule of law.
Our rule of law path must be rooted in our own traditions. Although China’s autocratic traditions over thousands of years run deep, our forefathers began very early to explore the question of how to control human beings (驾驭人类自身). In the Spring and Autumn Period and the Warring States Period, China already had its own system and its own written code of law. In the Han and Tang dynasties a rather complete code of law emerged, and China’s legal system became its own unique school among a handful of legal systems in the world. . . In carrying out the building of rule of law today, we must take our roots in Chinese soil, mining out and passing along the essence of Chinese legal culture (中华法律文化精华). . .
Our rule of law path must be based on our own national conditions . . .
In summary, on political questions, there is no such thing as the best model or the “standard version” — there is only the choice that best suits oneself. We must borrow from the best fruits of rule of law culture overseas, but we must maintain ourselves and utility for us as the principal issue. We cannot pursue “full transplantation” (全面移植), copying [the systems of others].
. . .
After the Opium War, in order to save the people from destruction, many people with high-minded ideals advocated political reform. Many people recognized that the root of China’s backwardness was its old [political and social] systems. They sought to study and transplant (移植) the legal systems of the West, attempting constitutional monarchy, parliamentary democracy or “separation of the five powers” (五权分立) — all of these attempts failing. Only with the founding of the People’s Republic of China and the building of the socialist system were the political conditions in place and the systemic foundation laid for the true implementation of rule of law in the New China.
. . .
After the founding of the New China, on the foundations of the destruction of the old legal system of Republican China, we actively used our successful experiences from the base areas of the new democratic revolution, promoting socialist rule of law, quickly promulgating a series of important laws and regulations, including the first Constitution. . . Later, however, “leftist” errors occurred in the Party’s guiding ideology, and the legal system gradually lost priority. In particular, the “Cultural Revolution” led to serious destruction of the legal system, with grave prices paid. Our positive and negative experiences have led us to recognize: the method of rule of man (人治) is not the way forward, and only with rule of law can the country achieve long-term peace and stability.
. . .
I can be said that under the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party, through generations of hard exploration, [we have] realized the transition from “rule of man” to a “legal system,” and again a leap to “rule of law.” In summing up our nation’s accomplishments in terms of rule of law, we could list out more than a dozen, even scores, but what they come down to is that we have opened the road to socialist rule of law with Chinese characteristics (中国特色社会主义法治道路).
. . .
[From question: “How can we travel our rule of law road well?”]
By increasing our confidence in our road. In recent years, rule of law has been a hot topic in society. There is a debate as to what kind of road rule of law construction should take in our country. Hostile forces (敌对势力) take rule of law as their own “weapon,” hyping Western rule of law concepts and rule of law models, their objective being to use “rule of law” as an opening to deny the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party and our country’s socialist system. We must be clearly alert to this, increasing our strategic force and resolutely taking our own road.
Today, as we approach the Year of the Goat, Hu Yong (胡泳), a former CMP fellow and one of China’s top internet experts, posted a list to Twitter and Facebook of five events in the past year that defined overall social and political trends in China.
Hu Yong’s notes follow, with relevant passages added from the Chinese material to which he links. They reflect the deepening of ideology and broad tightening of intellectual space in China that is becoming — as the Global Times said contentedly earlier this month — the “new normal,” or xin changtai (新常态).
What Happened in 2014? 1) The formation of a “joint police and propaganda regime” (警宣联动机制) that are far more formidable than the previous stability preservation regime.
From Hong Kong’s Oriental News (on.cc):
“This round of again whipping up the Guo Meimei case reveals the idiocy of official planners . . . In order to shame and target a person or organization, the police are first employed, a waste of state resources and violence, to conduct an investigation against this person or organization, without consideration of cost, grasping onto some “moral” or “legal” scandal — then the propaganda organs of the state leap into action all at once, conducting a detailed smear campaign. As for those facts that complicate the official narrative, they are prohibited entirely. For now I’ll just call this a “joint police and propaganda regime.” This system is far more terrible that the stability preservation regime. If the stability preservation regime was about “holding on,” the joint police and propaganda regime is about advancing. It’s about the blackening and twisting of public opinion . . . so that the people can’t tell up from down.”
“Chinese writer Xu Xiao was recently taken away and detained by the authorities [in China], the stated reason being ‘damage to national security (危害国家安全). The case possibly deals with the fact that she was the editor of a volume on constitutionalism written by recently deceased June Fourth scholar Chen Ziming (陈子明), and she printed and distributed several dozen copies. Xue Ye (薛野) and Liu Jianshu (柳建树) of the non-profit Liren University were taken away the same day. Intellectuals in China face a season of uncertainty.”
“Owing to reasons of insufficient evidence and unclear facts, the Pu Zhiqiang case has been referred back to the police for investigation, while hearings in the Gao Yu case have been postponed. . . “
4) For many Chinese aspiring to live globalized lives, the prospect of a total restriction on VPN services in China is dispiriting. Add to this the spectre of pollution and the serious crackdown on dissident ideas, and many Chinese say they feel they are being pushed to the edge.
The New York Times (January 29, 2015):
“‘If it was legal to protest and throw rotten eggs on the street, I’d definitely be up for that,’ Ms. Jing, 25, said.”
5) On January 6, 2015, the [Chinese-language] Global Times runs a piece called, “The Proper Standard for a ‘Chinese Internet User'” (“中国好网民”应有哪些标准). It argues that being Chinese not only means having the courage to be a “50 center” (五毛), [or paid online propagandist], or part of the “praise party” (点贊党), but they must also be “bring your own grainers” (自干五), [50 cent-like positive propagandists who work for free]. They must, said the article, be forces of positivity on the internet and for mainstream values. Global Times (January 6, 2015):
“A report pointed out [recently] that in the past year our internet has been fresher and cleaner, that positive energy online has been much greater, and that the internet is beginning to enter a ‘new normal’ (新常态) . . . Without a doubt, in order to preserve this ‘new normal,’ we must all be ‘good web users.’ This is the most reliable force in returning sunny and clear skies to the internet, and the most important foundation for the development of the ‘new normal.'”
We are now approaching the seven-year anniversary of China’s National Ordinance on Open Government Information (政府信息公开条例). This important national legislation obligates government bodies to archive documents generated in the course of official work, make them available to the public, and submit regular reports on their progress with respect to information disclosure.
Implemented in May 2008, the ordinance on open government information (OGI) was a watershed event in the sense that it changed the general presumption that all government information in China is “secret.” It outlined a whole range of information types to be “actively released” (主动公开) by government bodies, and put mechanisms in place for formal filing of open information requests by citizens. (Here is some valuable early background on the legislation from the Yale Law School).
So how is the ordinance faring well on the way toward a decade of implementation? The results, not surprisingly, are deeply mixed.
In fact, this review written two years into implementation by Jamie Horsley, a leading expert on OGI in China, still holds true. Essentially, citizens seem to be keenly interested in using this new channel to uphold their rights and interests. And in far rarer cases, journalists have used the legislation to effect — as when a reporter obtained a copy of an environmental impact assessment for a chemical plant in the city of Zhangzhou. But “government agencies,” as Horsley wrote, “have generally been reluctant to provide information on government operations and policies.”
In this cartoon by Wang Weibin (王伟宾), from a July 2008 article in China’s Legal Daily, a citizen tries to pry “government information” loose from the hands of a monstrously imposing official with the OGI Ordinance.
That reluctance is still the main thread of the OGI story in China.
In a report late last week, Guangzhou Daily, the official mouthpiece of the Guangzhou leadership, offered a rare glimpse at just how infrequently information requests are handled in favor of the applicant. Citing numbers from Guangdong’s Supreme People’s Court, the paper said a total of 273 requests under China’s open information ordinance had been handled in 2013, up 73 percent over 2012. In 2014, the court had logged 379 requests, up 39 percent over 2013.
Those numbers reflected rising interest in open government information, Guangzhou Daily said, with one official noting: “Over the past two years, the dramatic increase in the number of administrative proceedings for open information has shown that more and more city residents are willing to go through a process of judicial rights defense (司法维权) in order to promote ‘sunshine government.'”
But the proportion of “failed” requests — meaning authorities did not, for whatever reason, release the information requested — represented a “huge contrast” with the sharp rise in case numbers. In 2013, just 10 percent of requests for open information were granted. Last year, that number rose very modestly to 12 percent.
So what is going wrong, exactly? Recent coverage in China’s press of the numbers from Guangdong’s Supreme People’s Court side-stepped the Central question of the “reluctance” Horsley wrote about. Instead, it chalked up the failures to improper applications on the part of citizens. These were of two basic kinds:
1. Only those government agencies responsible for “generating” the documents in question can be made responsible for releasing them when they fall within the scope of the ordinance. The suggestion here is that requests might have been made to the wrong departments, which would then have denied requests on those grounds. 2. Is what is being requested actually “government information”? An expert quoted in Guangzhou Daily said: “If members of the public want to apply effectively for the release of government information, they must first make clear whether the information they are requesting is indeed government information.” This could involve a range of proper denials and official rationalisations. For example, it seems requests for information pertaining to organs of the Chinese Communist Party, and not strictly speaking the government, generally yield refusals. Also, requests should reference concretely specified documents, and they should not demand explanations about policies, for example, rather than specific files.
Here is how sources from Guangdong’s Supreme People’s Court explained to the Yangcheng Evening Post a request submitted by Ou Shaokun, a well-known grassroots campaigner in Guangzhou referred to in the article only as “a certain Ou”:
In April 2014, a certain Ou (区某) applied to the Guangzhou City Government Central Office to the facts, circumstances and reasons why the Guangzhou City Government’s Notice from the Guangzhou Municipal Committee of the Chinese Communist Party and the Guangzhou City People’s Government Central Office On Interim Measures for the Management of Public Vehicle Use By Party and Government Organs in Guangzhou (hereafter called the @Notice”), and Interim Measures for the Management of Public Vehicle Use By Party and Government Organs in Guangzhou (hereafter called the “Measures”) had been designated as secret documents. . . The same month [Mr. Ou] received an Open Government Information Notice with the following response: The “Notice” and the “Measures” were a single document, and the Central Office of the Guangzhou Municipal Committee of the Chinese Communist Party had been responsible for designating it as secret.
Mr. Ou then brought a case in court demanding the court establish the illegality of the [open government information] notice from the Guangzhou City Government, and that the information [in question] be released.
The Guangzhou Intermediate Court held that as the document in question was handled and designated secret by the Guangzhou Municipal Committee of the CCP, the Guangzhou City Government had no duty to make it public (无公开的职责), and it rejected Mr. Ou’s claims. When Mr. Ou appealed the case, the Provincial Supreme Court ruled that the content Mr. Ou was requesting be made public amounted to asking the Guangzhou city government to provide an explanation on the question of the open government request itself . . . and was not a request for information created and held by the government, and so it did not accord with the requirement of “government information.” The appeal was rejected on the grounds that this did not involve government information.
Having met Ou Shaokun, the inimitable “Uncle Ou,” I know just what he is getting at. The misuse of Party and government-issued vehicles, a brazen waste of public funds and a wanton abuse of power, has obsessed Ou for years. One of his most relentlessly effective tactics has been to photograph instances of abuse — like wives of officials taking their luxury “official” sedans, with driver, on shopping expeditions — and then post the photos to social media.
Ou Shaokun wants hold his government to account for how it spends money drawn from the proverbial pockets of China’s citizens. So Mr. Ou wants to know why local regulations on the issue of “public vehicle” use are not public knowledge. His question to the government is crystal clear: what is the policy, and why can’t we see it and discuss it? But his OGI request was denied, we are told, because he did not make it properly. It was a request for an “explanation” rather than for specific “information.”
Theoretically, he could make a request, I suppose, for the actual document explaining the decision to make the “Measures” secret. But there are two problems. First, the niggling issue that Ou first needs to know that such a document actually exists, and what specifically it is called. Second, the far bigger problem — the decision to designate the “Decision” as secret was made not by the government but by the Party.
Let’s go back to the court ruling: “[As] the document in question was handled and designated secret by the Guangzhou Municipal Committee of the CCP, the Guangzhou City Government had no duty to make it public.”
There are two hands, you see. The right and the left. And while the left hand is obligated to some extent under the law to show its cards, the right hand is above such business.
And there, where we always find it, is the rub: the law is defined and restrained by a Party that is, for all practical purposes, above the law. This is the giant elephant in the room in all discussions of rule of law or “ruling the nation in accord with the law” (the subject of last fall’s Fourth Plenum). It is also the core question behind the ultimate effectiveness of the National Ordinance on Open Government Information.
But for now, we’ll just blame the citizens.
It is heartening that their sense of engagement with their own rights and interests is growing. It is touching that they are trying their best to wrangle information from the government that spends their hard-earned tax dollars, or takes their farmland for a pittance in the “public interest” (translation: “luxury housing development”). Still, we wish they would just get their act together and file open government information requests properly.
Really, come on, folks. Is it so difficult? First, make sure you’re asking for specific “government information.” Second, make sure you’re requesting information from the proper government agency — the one that created it and put it on file. As one official cutely told the Yangcheng Evening News: “If you go to a pharmacy to buy flowers, you definitely won’t be able to buy what you want.”
Rest assured, if you fill out your requests improperly, the government will not be held responsible for your failure.
For those Chinese citizens who can afford it, it might be wise to seek legal assistance in preparing your open government information request. The paperwork should be a cinch. Then you can just sit back and watch as your lawyer deals with the political ordeal that follows.
Concerning Chen Danqing (陈丹青), I really don’t understand him. But as for his words, I definitely must criticize them: always speaking the truth and exposing wickedness, that’s a terrible thing. Concerning Zhou Yongkang (周永康), I don’t understand him. But as for his words, I definitely must praise him: he spoke what he must, Deng Xiaoping Theory, the Three Represents, the Scientific View of Development, the Chinese Dream — oh, so wonderful. And concerning the servants currently up on stage, I don’t understand them. But I raise both my hands in support of them: first they let their kids and grandkids head off to the West, and then they teach us that we can’t travel the crooked road of the West. So amazing!
The following image was posted with the above Weibo post. It depicts an imperial-style official holding up two government chops. One chop says, “Comrades, we will resolutely fight corruption!” The other chop says, “What is said in meetings is said for others — it can’t be taken at face value.”
For years now, the notion of advancing China’s “cultural soft power” has exercised the collective mind of the country’s political elites — a priority iterated at the most senior levels ever since Joseph Nye‘s phrase first made its way into a five-year political report in 2007.
Much of the animus behind China’s soft power imperative is the idea that China continues to suffer the stigma of Western-imposed negativity, what one writer of scar literature once called the “third affliction.” According to this view — premised on a visceral sense of historical wrong — China’s own cultural influence must be mobilised against the contempt of the Western world.
Soft power has become strategically important for China because cultural productivity and influence are now regarded as important components of comprehensive national power, or zōnghé guólì (综合国力), China’s own indexible measure of general nation-state power.
Six lanterns hang on a pole labeled “comprehensive national power.” The lanterns represent six aspects: national behaviour (国民素质); cultural image (文化形象); cultural industry (文化产业); cultural resources (文化资源); cultural innovation (文化创新); and the knowledge economy (知识经济). From wenming.cn, a website dedicated to China’s cultural diplomacy efforts.
While China’s notion of soft power encompasses both the economic and the cultural, the chief emphasis in recent years has been culture, and discussions often center on what is referred to as “cultural soft power,” or wénhuà ruǎnshílì (文化软实力). The “enhancing” of China’s “cultural soft power” was the subject of the twelfth collective study session of the Chinese Communist Party’s politburo on December 31, 2013, where the agenda was captured with a two-part phrase: “Building a socialist cultural strong nation; prioritising the enhancement of national cultural soft power.”
What did President Xi Jinping have to say at that time about this important national priority?
Xi Jinping emphasised that [we] must pay attention to the shaping of our country’s national image, focusing on bringing out the richness and profundity of Chinese history, the diversity in unity of our various peoples, the image of a great and civilised nation with a rich and harmonious culture . . . the image of a great nation contributing to humankind, and the image of a great socialist nation more open to the outside, of greater affinity, full of hope, and full of vitality.
Xi Jinping pointed out that the enhancement of national cultural soft power must work toward raising international discourse power (国际话语权). [We] must strengthen the building of international transmission capacity . . . utilising the capacity of newly-emerging media to raise the creative strength (创造力), charisma (感召力) and credibility (公信力) of our external discourse, telling Chinese stories well, transmitting China’s voice (中国声音) well, interpreting Chinese characteristics (中国特色) well. We must strengthen the intensity of positive propaganda on the excellent culture and glorious history of the Chinese people, enhancing patriotic education, collectivism and socialist education through education, theoretical research, historical research, films and works of literature — leading the people of our nation to establish and maintain correct historical views, ethnic views, national views and cultural views, increasing their integrity and confidence in being Chinese people.
Appropriately, Xi Jinping’s language in this last passage — the final one of the original Xinhua News Agency explication — ends at a point of emotional insecurity. It assumes a chronic lack of confidence, that Chinese feel (or worse, that they have been made to feel) deeply insecure about themselves. Indeed, the discourse of soft power in China goes hand-in-hand with the language of shaken confidence.
The rhetorical trap here is that the Chinese people require the Chinese Communist Party to pull them out of the quagmire of cultural insecurity. And this is where, tragically, culture gets lost.
Once it is conceived as merely a mined resource of comprehensive national power, culture is limited by the priorities of the leadership. It must have “Chinese characteristics” — whatever those are. It must foster “patriotism” — whatever that is. It must manifest “correct historical views” — everyone knows what those are. And it must be heralded with “positive propaganda.”
“China’s voice,” the supposed substance of its soft power, is pre-recorded in a hermetic sound-room of Party precepts before it is finally exported to the world. The problem with this narrow conception of “soft power,” which assumes robust controls on cultural creativity, is that it tends to create what historian Yuan Weishi called “ideological trash.”
And trash isn’t attractive.
Now, this does not mean that China’s centralised soft power push has not paid dividends. Some observers argue that it certainly has, particularly in Africa. But wouldn’t China benefit by a softer, less rigid, less government managed, approach to soft power?
That is exactly the argument made last week in the Party’s official People’s Daily by Zhou Hong (周虹), the director of the Cultural Division of the Overseas Chinese Affairs Office of the State Council.
Zhou is someone who has been closely involved with China’s public diplomacy efforts over the years — for example, here, here and here — and it is refreshing to hear a bit of soul searching (in the Party’s flagship newspaper, no less) about the limitations of soft power as a micro-managed state project.
Zhou Hong addresses a forum on overseas Chinese affairs in December 2012. Zhou recently wrote about China’s soft power push in the People’s Daily.
Among Zhou’s arguments in the page-five People’s Daily piece, which follows, is that the “government tint” of China’s soft power push must be mitigated. He also suggested that the preponderance of “arts troupes” in China’s going-out cultural programs gave a kind of circus quality to Chinese culture as it is perceived elsewhere in the world.
“The habitual reliance on government planning and financing, and the one-side pursuit of larger scales, instant [impact] and sensational effects,” Zhou wrote, “all with a surfeit of public money and a thick government tint — even leads to greater suspicion and resentment [about the events].”
Zhou, it seems, is not entirely free of the notion of state agency. He talks at one point about creating attractive and saleable products and then “hiding culture in these products (在产品中蕴藏文化), which smacks unnecessarily of conspiracy. But here, in any case, is our translation:
“How Can Chinese Culture Better ‘Go Out’?” (中华文化如何更好“走出去”)
Zhou Hong (周虹) People’s Daily
January 22, 2015, page 5 Whether or not Chinese culture can overcome barriers and stride out [into the world] depends to a great extent on whether or not we can sell our own outstanding cultural products to the outside world.
Along with the continued increasing of China’s comprehensive national power, and the constant deepening of economic globalization, the overseas transmission of Chinese culture has in recent years made great strides. But insufficiencies still remain.
On the field of overseas cultural transmission the following point of awkwardness often pertains: owing to barriers of language and culture, “going out” is often caught up in superficialities, and products that offer an in-depth introduction to Chinese history, or that portray China’s current state in positive terms, are woefully lacking. Those who come to cultural events where foreigners are the targeted audience are generally “familiar faces” there because they already support [Chinese culture], so that external cultural dialogue changes into a matter of personal amusement (对外文化交流演变成自娱自乐). The belief that culture equals the arts means that overseas performances are almost without exception arts troupes — giving foreigners the impression that Chinese culture is all about singing and dancing. The habitual reliance on government planning and financing, and the one-side pursuit of larger scales, instant [impact] and sensational effects — all with a surfeit of public money and a thick government tint — even leads to greater suspicion and resentment [about the events].
The above-mentioned issues have their reasons in both history and present fact. Since the Opium War [in the 19th century], perhaps every Chinese individual has hankered for the prosperity of the country, for national rejuvenation. Today, when we are closer than we have ever in history been to reaching this goal, it is natural to feel anxious in our hearts that others will accept us. As such a time, we must take both historical and international views in order to seek out new ways of thinking, finding experience and sustenance within the history of cultural exchange between China and the outside world, abandoning our impatience and impulsiveness.
First of all, we should take things as they come (顺其自然). Cultural transmission is something that should come naturally and be a gradual process. The history of China and the world instructs us that the prosperity of a nation goes hand-in-hand with the greater external influence of its culture. The influence in Chinese history during vibrant dynasties [like the Tang] was not an intended outcome, but rather a necessary outcome of the favorable development of the nation and society. Therefore, so long as we maintain the momentum of our development, turning our energies to our own work, there should be a qualitative leap in the international influence of Chinese culture.
Next, we must rely on trade. The transmission of culture has never been an independent form of social conduct, but rather has attended commerce and other activities. It was over the Silk Road and across the sea channels that much foreign culture, including the three great religions, entered China, and traditional Chinese philosophy as well as technologies such as paper-making and printing were conveyed to the world along with silk, ceramics and tea. Today, as the German “Benz” and “BMW,” and the American film industry and “Apple,” profit through commercial activities [in China], they carry the “German influence” of rigor and pragmatism and the “American value” of the pursuit of novelty with them.
These examples tell us that relying on such things as providing free reading materials, or creating free cultural spectacles, is not a long-term and sustainable way [of transmitting Chinese culture]. China must create more quality works that the world can enjoy — hiding culture in these products (在产品中蕴藏文化), and transmitting [China’s cultural] spirit through business. In this sense, the question of whether or not Chinese culture can overcome barriers and stride out [into the world] depends to a great extent on whether or not we can sell our own outstanding cultural products to the outside world.
Third, the people must be our foothold. The root and the spirit of Chinese culture lies in the masses of ordinary people, and without the broad participation of the people, the external propagation of culture not only loses its meaning, but also loses its intrinsic energy. Limiting government participation, and lessening the official tint [of cultural events], is now the dominant trend in the field of international cultural exchange. It is also generally the method used to lessen the misunderstanding of other countries. Government departments should further transition their roles, prioritising the removal, in terms of the system and mechanisms, of fetters and barriers on cultural development — fully harnessing the energy of the Chinese public and of overseas Chinese, and allowing the talent and force of the people to fully unleash their capacity in international competition.
Fourth, [we] must create respect. The peoples of various countries around the world have their own unique traditions and cultures, and these have together created the rich diversity we have in human civilisation today. Chinese culture must use its on unique means to obtain the same result, having an attitude of tolerance, respecting the traditions and cultures of each country, encouraging “going out” and “inviting in” together, avoiding the impression that Chinese culture is being forced out unidirectionally. Modesty is a Chinese traditional value praised highly by many of our foreign friends. Against the backdrop of increasing national power, we must be particularly careful not to rise straight from abasement into lofty arrogance. In this way, Chinese culture can be welcome and attractive, so that Chinese culture travels farther and smoother overseas.
(The author is director of the Cultural Division of the Overseas Chinese Affairs Office of the State Council).
In September last year, as China saw a series of media scandals, we ran several articles addressing the phenomenon of media corruption. We refer readers back to “Who Warped China’s Media?“; “China’s Corrupt Media“; and “Why News Extortion is So Hard to Uncover.”
Today we offer an excellent follow-up on the issue from one of China’s most knowledgeable media scholars, Foreign Languages University professor and former CMP fellow Zhan Jiang (展江).
Back on October 22, 2014, Zhan Jiang took part in an online discussion at 21ccom.net about media corruption, its causes and possible solutions. The website published the full text of Zhan’s interview yesterday.
Professor Zhan Jiang discusses media corruption in China with 21ccom.net in October 2014.
As much discussion of media corruption inside China centers on rotten journalists, as though the only relevant dimension is moral, Zhan Jiang’s interview is refreshingly frank. He explains why media corruption is endemic and, you might say, institutionalized.
We’ve translated only about half of the interview, but we strongly encourage readers of Chinese to study the rest.
Host: Hello everyone, I’m 21ccom.net editor Jiang Baoxin (蒋保信). I’m also the hosts of today’s conversation. Hello, Professor Zhan. This is the second time you’ve been a guest in the studio at 21ccom.net, isn’t it? Zhan Jiang: That’s right. It’s been two or three years since the last time. Host: After we pre-announced this online discussion, we promoted it on our WeChat public account as well, and web users submitted many valuable questions. Today we’d like to seek your expertise on these questions, which I’ve gathered today along with my own questions. Why don’t you first say hello to our web users. Zhan Jiang: OK. Hello, everyone. 21ccom.net is a very influential sit for gathering social consensus and sharing ideas, and I’m really honored to be your guest. Host:Looking back on the last couple of years, I think we can say it has been quite an eventful period for the media. If I can use one phrase to sum up my own feelings, I think it would be “a land of wailing and despair.” This has to do, I think, with the Chinese media’s own problems, and also with the larger backdrop of [China] in transition. I think this is a good time, Professor Zhan, to have you speak on the theme of “The Troubles Facing Chinese Media, and the Way Out” (中国媒体的困境和出路). China Leads the World in Media Corruption Host: In 2014, the anti-corruption drive advanced into the media. First, we saw an investigation into CCTV2, with Guo Zhenxi (郭振玺), Rui Chenggang (芮成钢) and others being arrested. After that, we had the investigation into the 21st Century Business Herald, where erstwhile angels of professional journalism became prisoners. This was a great shock to media colleagues. One of the major social roles of media is supervision, but we see that China’s media itself has become a corruption disaster zone (腐败的重灾区). What happened? Zhan Jiang: First of all, media corruption is an outgrowth of political corruption and commercial corruption. A general level of corruption persists in our political and commercial cultures, and so the media cannot be the exception.
Specifically, corruption in China’s media also has to do with the pressures and challenges brought on by new media. And it has to do with the problems facing journalists themselves. For example, is it corruption for journalists to accept red envelopes? Even though everyone accepts red envelopes, this too is a form of corruption. And so, if we talk about the intrinsic and extrinsic reasons for corruption, there are many.
However, regardless, the level of corruption in China’s media is staggering. How staggering exactly? Search across the world and I’m sure you won’t find another country facing media corruption as serious as what you find in China. To be a bit less polite about it, China’s leads the world in media corruption. Two Forms of Media Corruption: Collusion and Extortion Host: How do we we see this corruption manifesting? Zhang Jiang: From what we’ve seen exposed most recently, we’re talking chiefly about corruption that involves blackmail. This is about using the pressure of a prospective news report to squeeze economic benefit from the other side. In the past this was exercised in a subtle way. Later, it became explicit.
This sort of blackmail happens as companies take out advertising in the newspaper [in order to stave off negative coverage]. Or in some cases it means media establishing “strategic cooperation partnerships” (战略合作关系) with local [governments and/or companies]. In fact, this is little more than a [mafia-style] “protection fee” (保护费). Commercial enterprises and local government exchange economic benefits in order for the media to abstain from negative reporting on their activities, or negative editorials. Sometimes it even means deleting negative posts from internet users on various online media. This is what we can call extortion-style corruption (勒索型腐败).
Judging from recent events, it seems that this extortion-style corruption is particularly serious in China — and its easier to expose. When there is a particularly severe conflict between the extorter and the extorted — for example, you extort money from me [as a hush fee] — and afterward I find a way to expose this fact.
But there is another type of media corruption that is harder to expose, but its consequences are at least as severe. I call it collusive corruption (勾结型腐败). The traditional way is to demand from you an “open-mouth fee” (开口费). I do positive propaganda for you, filing a story for you, or I get you on the TV screen in exchange for some sort of favor. This sort of collusion is also shocking, but it’s far more difficult to detect, because it generally happens through private exchange, and both sides in the exchange benefit. It’s difficult to expose.
Collusive corruption is different from extortion-style corruption in the sense that it tends to happen at more powerful media. More vulnerable media, like weaker small Party media, industry publications — few people read these anymore. Their circulations and ability to attract advertising are very weak. Who is going to seek them out? Those who want to be seen in the media are naturally going to opt for powerful official media, especially state media. And of course they may also choose more powerful regional media. These days when we see “positive propaganda” (正面宣传) being done in the media that is not at the behest of senior Party leaders, there is very often corruption involved. The media accepted payment from them. . .
When we look at media corruption [in China], we have to look at both types of corruption. We Must First Punish Media Personnel Involved in Illegal Acitivities Host: Corruption in China’s media isn’t a matter of one or two bad apples, isn’t that right? It’s systemic. Zhan Jiang: That’s right. Without question it is corruption for reporters to accept red envelopes, but this isn’t the most serious. In China, which do you think is greater, the number of journalists who take red envelopes, or the number of journalists who don’t? Right now, the journalist who doesn’t take the red envelope is seen as somehow unusual. And in some places, media bosses understand that journalists will accept red envelopes as a matter of course, and so they’ll factor red envelope money into their basic pay. A few years back I heard the female editor at a television station in the capital of a certain northwestern province say that their wages weren’t very high, only about 3,000 yuan per month, but their media bosses knew that every month they would be accepting red envelopes on the job. They considered that every red envelope would contain around 400 yuan, so five red envelopes would come to 2,000 yuan. So they logged their actual wages as 5,000 yuan.
Today, if we want to deal with the problem of media corruption, the difficulty is immense. Generally speaking, most journalists probably will not go and carry out news extortion. But for them, accepting red envelopes is nothing. Everybody does it. Changing this habit is very difficult. I hope that in dealing with media corruption, we first punish those media personnel carrying out illegal activities, and then move toward greater regulation in the industry. But of course this has to be a process. Host: So is it a Chinese thing for reporters to accept red envelopes? Zhan Jiang: Yes. It’s ordinary for journalists to receive red envelopes when attention a news conference, and journalists will accept free travel as well, which is something not permitted in American or European media. Of course, in Western media history, there were cases of journalists accepting “red envelopes” or some such thing, but in these cases they were severely criticized, because it is generally believed that this damages the reputation of the media . . .
As I understand it, in Western countries journalism wasn’t a very high paid career from the start, and so most people were mentally prepared for this before they entered the industry. If the income level wasn’t something you could accept, you didn’t choose this profession. In Britain, the United States, France and Germany — in none of these countries are journalists paid high salaries. Perhaps only Japan is the exception, where journalists do earn high salaries. In comparison, I think the average income of journalists in China is probably somewhere in the middle, not high and not too low.
I once asked a French journalist why anyone would want to be a journalist when the wages were so low. He joked that with the global economy being so bad he was happy to have a job at all. Then he said: In France, we think journalism is an interesting profession, and so it’s OK if the pay is lower [than for other professions]. Host: What ideas do you have about how to solve the problem of media corruption in China? Zhan Jiang: As I’ve said before, media corruption in China is tied up with political and commercial corruption. In fact, corruption exist in many sectors of Chinese society — including healthcare and education. So dealing with media corruption isn’t an isolated matter. Fortunately, China’s anti-corruption drive is going well, and corruption is being targeted in politics and business.
Corruption is an interconnected chain, with links among various industries and sectors. There is a tight relationship between business and the media, and so if corruption can be combatted in the business sector this will help to restrain media corruption to some extent. That’s the larger perspective.
In terms of specifics in the media, I think some of the following things can be done.
First, there should be an exit system for media. If a certain media doesn’t suit social demand, if it cannot attract and audience and advertisers, then it should fold.
Not having an exit system is a major problem. I’ll give you an example. There is a certain industry publication that has been mentioned repeatedly over the years by the General Administration of Press and Publications because of its news extortion activities.
To put it another way, this newspaper relies on blackmail to survive. If it didn’t conduct itself this way where would the advertising come from? And how would it support its large newspaper staff? But the paper has not shut down. Why? Because its sponsoring institution (主管部门) is a certain department of the State Council. As the paper was being disciplined, the department sprang into action to successfully save the paper. Ultimately, the punishment against the newspaper was to refer the head of its Henan bureau to the justice system. China Central Television even did a program about this earlier this year. It was called, “The Secret of a Press Station” (记者站的秘密).
This is a specific case of systematic news extortion. But because there was no exit system [for this government-backed newspaper], the paper was ultimately allowed to live through a process of sacrificing the pawn to save the queen. And how will it survive from now on? Will it continue to extort money with the threat of news reporting? Must the state financially support such a publication?
There is no way, in fact, that the publication will be able to rely on state support. Because only a handful of official media, like the People’s Daily, Xinhua News Agency and a number of treasured Party publications, are now able to receive support. For those more peripheral official media that no longer have a place, the only possibility is an exit system. Under the current tough situation facing even the most competitive of media, they have no choice available to them other than extortion.
Therefore, we must build an exit system [for media like this]. Actually, the former head of the General Administration of Press and Publications, Liu Binjie (柳斌杰), floated this idea quite some time ago, of letting the sun set on those media that are no longer relevant. This is the right idea. But this idea can’t be implemented, because media are still regarded as primarily an ideological industry (意识形态产业), having their own special function [aside from profit and sustainability], and for the sake of this function — and the interests of certain government departments — it’s very difficult to shut these media down.
