Now Executive Director of the China Media Project, leading the project’s research and partnerships, David originally joined the project in Hong Kong in 2004. He is the author of Dragons in Diamond Village (Penguin), a book of reportage about urbanization and social activism in China, and co-editor of Investigative Journalism in China (HKU Press).
Hah hah . . . Responses and comments have been turned off at Netease (163.com)// “Owing to Xu Caihou’s death, according to Article 15 of the Criminal Procedure Law of the People’s Republic of China, the Military Procuratorate has decided not to prosecute [the case against Xu], and the related bribery case will be handled according to the law.” Here is the news from Netease: “Xu Caihou Dies of Incurable Cancer of the Bladder” http://t.cn/RwkUFpO
Last Friday, as the curtain closed on the annual session of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Congress (CPPCC), China’s mostly nominal political advisory body, the group’s chairman, Yu Zhengsheng (俞正声), arrived at the Hunan Room (湖南厅) of the vast Great Hall of the People to meet with “journalist representatives” (记者代表) from core Party-state media.
Organizations in attendance included the usual suspects: the People’s Daily, Xinhua News Agency, China Central Television, Guangming Daily, the Economic Daily, China National Radio and the English-language China Daily. And as the CPPCC chairman always does, Yu Zhengsheng praised state media for their “cooperative” and “positive” coverage of the meeting, where a dizzying 6,000 proposals were reportedly submitted.
It hardly seems newsworthy to note that press controls in China continue unabated. Nor is it newsworthy any longer to note that the press remains more cowed under Xi Jinping than perhaps at any time under his predecessor, Hu Jintao, when in-depth and investigative coverage was being progressively reined in but still stood a better chance of slipping through.
Politburo Standing Committee member Yu Zhengsheng, chairman of the CPPCC, praises China’s state media on Friday, March 13, for their “cooperative” attitude.
But we can note, at least, that Xi Jinping’s notion of “positive energy” — by which he means positive and helpful news coverage and online opinion as opposed to critical and unhelpful news and views — continues to exert its influence alongside the old notion of “public opinion guidance.” Here is the summary of Yu Zhengsheng’s remarks that appeared in the official People’s Daily on March 14:
Central news units cooperated closely with, and tightly adhered to, the agenda of the meeting, maintaining correct guidance of public opinion, prioritising new methods of reporting, and fully reporting the fruitful results of the CPPCC in promoting the full building of a moderately well-off society, the comprehensive deepening of reforms, comprehensive rule of the nation according to law, and comprehensive efforts to implement strict administering of Party discipline. [The media] widely propagated the opinions and recommendations of the CPPCC Standing Committee on major questions of reform, development and stability as well as real issues of concern to the people, fully evincing the favourable impression that the CPPCC works for the good of the country and the people, and that it is doing its utmost. [The media] condensed the broader consensus [in their reporting], praised positive energy, and showed up the unified and democratic climate of the CPPCC.
In its English-language coverage of Yu Zhengsheng’s speech, in fact, CCTV America noted right in the lead that Yu had “called for continuing efforts to pool ‘positive energy’ to contribute to the country’s development.”
In China’s media, things are looking positively “positive.”
On February 9, 2015, China’s internet czar, Lu Wei (鲁炜), the director of the Cyberspace Administration of China, hosted a Chinese New Year banquet at the Diaoyutai State Guesthouse. At the event, attended by foreign dignitaries and representatives from internet companies, Director Lu delivered an address in which he reiterated the need for global internet governance that respects the “internet sovereignty” of various countries.
Repeating his frequent theme that freedom and order must work hand-in-hand, Lu imagined an international internet woven together from sovereign national internets — connected with a mind to respective national security interests.
“We live in a common online space,” Lu Wei told his guests. “This online space is made up of the internets of various countries, and each country has its own independent and autonomous interest in internet sovereignty, internet security and internet development. Only through my own proper management of my own internet, [and] your proper management of your own internet . . . can the online space be truly safe, more orderly and more beautiful.”
A separate news piece posted to the website of the Cyberspace Administration of China quoted several guests at the banquet as praising Lu’s remarks and the work of his office.
“2014 was a year in which China’s internet saw an explosion of positive energy,” said Liao Hong (廖玒), the president of People’s Daily Online, referring to Xi Jinping’s emerging propaganda concept. “Under the guidance of the Cyberspace Administration of China, the internet space grows clearer and brighter every day.”
“The Cyberspace Administration of China has played an instrumental role in terms of internet governance,” Cuban Ambassador to China Alberto J. Blanco Silva reportedly said.
A full translation of Lu Wei’s address to the Chinese New Year banquet follows.
Honored envoys from various nations, respected guests:
Ladies, gentlemen and friends:
And so we come to another year. As China’s Lunar New Year approaches, we are honored to invite everyone to gather here at the Diaoyutai State Guesthouse (钓鱼台国宾馆), to meet the season with cheerful friendship. On behalf of the Central Working Group on Cybersecurity, the Cyberspace Administration of China, and in my own capacity, I solemnly offer you all a warm welcome. The new year is the Year of the Goat. I wish you all warmth and radiance in your hearts.
2014 was a year of accelerated internet development in China, a year of greater openness and deep integration with the world. China created the Central Working Group on Cybersecurity, with Chairman Xi Jinping himself as leader, and [he] raised the international cyber governance concept (国际治网主张) of “building a multilateral, democratic and transparent system of international internet governance, building in common a peaceful, secure, open and cooperative online space” — [an idea] that won great favor and widespread agreement in international circles. Through common efforts on various sides, the international online space is now entering a new era of shared benefit and shared governance.
All of you, foreign envoys, company bosses and friends from the media, are the bridges and bonds developing China’s relationship with the world, and you’ve made important achievements in promoting dialogue and cooperation between China and the world in the online space. We often say mutual interaction brings mutual understanding . . . The web connects us and brings us together. In traditional Chinese culture, the character for “net” [or “web”] has multi-layered meanings, but there are at least three angles from which we can consider these meanings: 1. The “net” means to harvest gains and results. This is like the frequent saying Chinese have, that “the net gathers all under heaven” (网罗天下). Over the past year, China’s internet development has been striking, with the number of internet users reaching 649 million, websites surpassing four million, total online transactions topping 13 trillion yuan. Of the world’s top 10 internet businesses, four are Chinese, and the internet economy has become the greatest growth point in China’s overall economy. The world too has profited from the development of China’s internet. Many foreign enterprises have relatively high market shares in the Chinese market, and they have drawn in substantial earnings. These achievements and returns fully demonstrate the openness of China’s market and policies, that the environment is favourable. Moreover, they show to the fullest extent that we are correct in adhering to the path of socialism with Chinese characteristics. They fully attest to the strong, determined and correct leadership of the Chinese Communist Party. 2. The “net” means connecting and interacting. This is like what Chinese mean when they say, “As tightly woven as a net” (密如织网). Lately, the internet truly has turned the world into a global village, making it so that international society is more an more a place where I see myself in you, where we share a fate as a common community. For China and the world the internet has also created a friend groups with a global reach. We have actively created platforms for conversation, holding the first World Internet Conference and other major international events, making friends across the world and sharing intelligence and innovation, ultimately working toward a consensus to create a win-win situation for all. 3. The “net” means law and order. Chinese often talk about the “dragnet” (法网恢恢). In the online space, people all enjoy freedom, but freedom and order are inextricably linked and cannot be separated. Order is the guarantee of freedom. If we part with order, freedom does not exist. The more we move in the direction of freedom, the more we need order. Find a place without order, and that place will surely lack freedom. We [in China] actively study from the advanced experiences of various nations, promoting rule of law in the online space. Through legal means we preserve online freedom and order, resolutely protecting our internet sovereignty (网络主权) and our internet security (网络安全). We reiterate that China’s policy of openness to the world has not changed. So long as China’s laws are respected, so long as the national interests of China are not harmed, so long as the interests of Chinese consumers are not harmed, we welcome companies from other countries to develop in China, to invest here for a win-win future.
Ladies, gentlemen and friends . . . .
We live in a common online space. This online space is made up of the internets of various countries, and each country has its own independent and autonomous interest in internet sovereignty (独立自主的网络主权), internet security and internet development. Only through my own proper management of my own internet, your proper management of your own internet, and the proper interlinking of these respective internets, each preserving their own respective internet security — only then can the online space be truly safe, more orderly and more beautiful.
What we need its mutual support, not stepping over lines and meddling in the affairs of others. What we need is mutual respect, not attack and censure. The 1.3 billion people of China, open and confident, are now traveling along a correct path of their own choosing. They are realizing the great project of the Chinese dream. They are seeking a path of internet management with Chinese characteristics (中国特色的治网之道). We are ready to strengthen our dialogue and cooperation with the nations of the world, unleashing the pioneering creative force of the internet and promoting the “one road, one belt” strategy. [We are ready to] promote the shared governance and mutual benefit of the internet, better serving the countries of the world, particularly developing nations, and creating a better tomorrow for humankind.
Ladies, gentlemen and friends . . .
Let us raise our glasses,
for a better world,
for sincere friendship,
to the health of all,
for our mutual internet dreams in the Year of the Goat.
Cheers!
The following piece, published on Monday this week on the website of the official Party journal Seeking Truth, arguably speaks to the heart of China’s current political and ideological ethos. The piece pulls together quite disparate threads — an article from the Financial Times‘ Beijing bureau chief Jamil Anderlini, and a report almost a year ago from Bank of America Merrill Lynch — to paint a stark picture of foreign “hostile forces” colluding with domestic “agents” to foment a color revolution on Chinese soil.
The Seeking Truth piece, written by Hou Lihong (侯立虹), identified as a local government employee from Henan, speaks well enough, and colourfully enough, for itself. So I’ll avoid the temptation to say more.
Readers not new to hardline bombast of this kind will recognize the teeth-grinding, vitriolic tone. Hou writes at one point of “evil collusion between [overseas] master and [domestic] servant, and of “hostile forces working within China.” Voices like Anderlini and Bank of America Merrill Lynch are “flies flicking against the wall, droning on and on.”
Please enjoy.
“Defiling China’s Anti-Corruption Drive is Like an Ant Trying to Shake a Tree”
The extraordinary measures employed in China’s anti-corruption drive, and the brilliant achievements it has so far made, have already astonished the entire world, becoming a focus of international media coverage. For example, the Times of India, Singapore’s Lianhe Zaobao and Hong Kong’s South China Morning Post, . . . have all done positive coverage of the campaign against corruption in China’s government and military . . . Even certain [media in] some countries in Europe and America, like United Press International’s web-based report called, “Internet Users Help Expose Corruption,” and “Life and Death Struggle” in Britain’s Economist, have reported on the actions and attitudes of China’s leaders toward corruption . . .
Yet still certain Western countries and media, for whatever reason, with whatever goals, voice concern over China’s anti-corruption [campaign], and moreover take a hostile attitude, even conjuring things out of thin air, making conjectures, dragging the name of China’s anti-corruption effort through the dirt. This is outrageous. In its 2013 Human Rights Report, the United States, while giving a nod to China’s achievements in punishing corrupt officials, made groundless accusations about the selectivity of the anti-corruption drive, casting doubt on our Party’s internal discipline procedures. As I understand it, the United States has always prioritized its human rights reports, wielding them as clubs with which to beat other countries. For it to play the part of backseat driver in this way, in such an important government document, clearly violates the convention in diplomatic relations of not interfering in the internal affairs of other countries.
A cartoon on a Chinese website depicts corruption as a swarm of flies. The fly swatter, of course, represents China’s anti-corruption campaign.]
Even more cause for thought is the fact that this country’s Bank of America Merrill Lynch stated strongly that the anti-corruption drive had borne an economic cost running into hundreds of millions of US dollars, “perhaps equivalent to the entire economy of Bangladesh.” And with malice it said that “even clean and uncorrupt officials don’t dare right now to begin new projects, worrying that this will be construed as corrupt conduct, and so they simply stash their funds away in the bank.” Next, it made a great fuss over how “Beijing’s bans on consumption with public monies and mandated decreases in administrative spending had caused a dramatic drop in domestic consumer spending.” . . .
The implication in these statements . . . is that China’s anti-corruption drive has negative side effects. And if this is still rather obscure, well then, Britain’s Financial Times is undisguised [in its statements]. An article in this magazine attributed to [Jamil] Anderlini misrepresents outright, making crazy and ridiculous claims about China’s top leaders, labeling China’s anti-corruption campaign “authoritarian anti-corruption” (独裁式反腐), slandering determined anti-corruption as “a [political] movement,” in “Cultural Revolution style” (文革遗风). . .
Anyone with a bit of common sense knows that corruption is already a common enemy around the world. All countries, even those with reputations for clean governance, have corruption — and all should fight corruption, as successive world declarations against corruption have fully made clear. What is strange is that when corruption is raging in China, this draws attack from public opinion in the West. And now, when China is dealing resolutely with corruption, they are still spewing calumnies. This exposes their true faces, as determined at any time to set China up as the enemy.
It goes without saying that China’s anti-corruption drive is China’s own business, not something they need to say anything about. And yet these eminent Westerners (洋大人) not only oppose it but maliciously spread rumors with a mind to doing harm, labeling it in all sorts of [prejudicial] ways. This has reached the point of madness. Is it possible that China’s anti-corruption drive has set off their central nervous systems, jabbed at their sore spots, dug their graves? Clearly, for Western hostile ones (敌对分子) to oppose China’s anti-corruption campaign so vigorously, to so boldly blacken China’s leaders, demonstrates that our anti-corruption drive has already logged achievements that have left our enemies frightened. It demonstrates that China’s leaders are men of conscience who make our enemies jealous and fearful. It demonstrates that the anti-corruption momentum in China will root out the infiltrators hiding in their nests behind the curtain, that it will defeat the conspiracy by Western countries to change the color of China. So naturally anti-China forces in the West will stamp in rage.
The faces of the people of China are wreathed in smiles to look at today’s anti-corruption drive, and to think back on those years when the anti-China chorus was so loud. This certainly puts corrupt officials and hostile ones in a state of constant anxiety . . . so they must, like so many flies flicking against the wall, drone on and on . . . Like ants shaking the tree, their calumnies are doomed to fail.
When you compare the slanderous statements of Western hostile forces about China’s anti-corruption actions to certain domestic statements inhibiting or opposing anti-corruption, you can’t help but notice a similar stink about them. Concerning economic development, for example, there are some in China who say that anti-corruption has impacted economic development, and overseas there are others echoing them, saying China’s anti-corruption drive has cost 100 billion US dollars. Then, for example, you have some people saying domestically that anti-corruption is about eliminating opposition, and then right away overseas they slap on the label “authoritarian anti-corruption.” . . .
How, all in all, are we seeing such things of a similar nature? For this chorus to sing in such unison, like a seamless heavenly robe — if this is not foreign-domestic collusion, what then is it? If it is not evil collusion between master and servant, what then is it? We have always been alert to infiltrants; we have always been aware of hostile forces working within China to carry out a color revolution (颜色革命). We never thought these dangerous elements would be working right at our side, corrupt officials and “elites” (精英) making trouble. Their collaboration with forces from the outside demonstrates even more the necessity of the anti-corruption drive, and demonstrates even more the necessity of carrying the anti-corruption project to the end.
Western hostile forces and their domestic agents seek right now to use public opinion to launch crossfire from the inside and outside, attempting to kill the anti-corruption drive. In the future, they will employ even more base and insidious means to attack us. We must remain increasingly alert to this. . . If only the entire Party and all the people of our country are resolutely united around the Central Committee with Xi Jinxing as General Secretary, millions united as one man, can we surely carry the anti-corruption struggle through to the end, creating a brightness that raises the eyes of the world, and soon bringing to realization the Chinese dream.
(The writer’s office: Science and Technology Bureau, Xinxiang City, Henan province)
The following post from user “LifeTime” was deleted from Weibo sometime before 8:31AM today, February 10, 2015, less than 12 hours after it was posted. The post refers to the recent leak of client data from the Swiss branch of HSBC bank, and makes only passing reference to “Moral Sister” (道德姐), a nickname given to Li Xiaolin (李小琳), the daughter of former Chinese premier Li Peng. [Explore more deleted posts by using the Weiboscope, created by the Journalism & Media Studies Centre.]
How did the Swiss scandal involving “Moral Sister” begin? Yesterday social media all over the world were hotly discussing a list released by the International Consortium of Investigative Journalists (ICIJ). The news, unfortunately, is true. Hervé Falciani, a 43 year-old former employee of HSBC’s Swiss banking arm, is a computer engineer, and he made off with information about the banks customers. He was arrested in Lebanon in 2008 as he was selling the information. [NOTE: According to media accounts, Falciani was in fact arrested in Geneva after returning from Lebanon.] Somehow released later, Falciani fled to France, and since then he has openly released all of the [bank] customer information he stole.
In a reflection of the sheer variety of names in the data, others who appear are Li Xiaolin, the daughter of former Chinese Premier Li Peng, famous for his role in the Tiananmen Square massacre; Joseph Fok, a judge on Hong Kong’s highest court, and Prince and Princess Michael of Kent, the beloved cousin of Queen Elizabeth II of England and his wife.
The account that can be linked to the prince and princess was held in the name of their company, Cantium Services Limited. A representative for the couple said the account “never received nor held any funds” and was closed in 2009. Li Xiaolin is listed, along with her husband, as a beneficial owner of an account that held $2.5 million. Fok is listed as the holder of an account that was closed in 2002. They did not respond to requests for comment.
The following post by former CMP fellow Zhang Ming was made to his Sina.com blog on February 9, 2015. Zhang’s own follow-up post on Sina Weibo announcing the new blog entry was deleted just a few hours later, according to JMSC’s Weiboscope. Zhang’s piece clearly prompts the reader to make inferences about China’s current politics, in particular the apparently growing power of President Xi Jinping, and a corresponding unwillingness to stomach dissenting voices.
“Those Who Hear Only the Voice of Power” (只听得懂权力声音的人)
Media reported last September about the dumping of waste in the Tenggeli Desert by a chemical enterprise in the Alxa League’s Tenger Industrial Park (阿拉善盟工业园区) in Inner Mongolia. The story was irrefutable, a conspicuous pit of waste there for all to see, and noxious smells wafting across the landscape. And yet local government officials found a hundred different ways to shirk responsibility. Local environmental officials even personally attested that nothing whatsoever had gone wrong.
Fast forward one month. After written instructions from topmost national leaders, the situation changed dramatically. The denials promptly stopped. Authorities in Inner Mongolia called meetings to discuss solutions to what suddenly became a crisis. Everyone sprang so resolutely into action we could only look on tongue-tied. It was subsequently reported that the whole matter had been swept under the carpet four years earlier, after an initial round of press coverage.
The problem of pollution in China is severe. Mass incidents are common. Forced property demolitions proceed unstoppably. Justice is constantly trampled through the court system. But none of the serious local problems looming behind these cases have any hope of resolution in our country unless powerful leadership elites step forward with hand-of-God interventions.
There are those here in China who understand nothing but the voice of power. They may fear exposure by the media, but only as a proxy to the real fear, that leaders above them might find out. Only the latter fear will prompt them to manage a crisis, usually by paying up to ensure the problem disappears.
Since ancient times, those in the circles of power in China have always understood the voice of power best. Because only the voice of power can decide the fate of an official, whether he advances like the tide or sinks like a stone. Power had only one source in ancient China — the emperor. There was no power to speak of aside from imperial power. There was no true law. There was no real public opinion. There were no moral codes or ethical strictures.
In those days, the more forceful administrative power was, the easier it became for officials lower down the chain of command to understand and accede. There was no need for explicit commands. Just a whiff from the center of power, and everyone below would drift in that direction. And naturally, calls and clamors from other quarters were that much easier to ignore.
In any era, to have an officialdom that can act only as a function of fear, that cannot conduct itself in accord with a system of rules and laws — this is a tragedy for emperors, big and small, as well as for the people.
The Qianlong Emperor(September 25, 1711 to February 7, 1799) depicted in his court attire.
Imagine that across the breadth of the country, every chess piece played must be played at the pinnacle of power. If, as emperor, you don’t make a concerted move, that piece will move of its own accord. It is you who must be responsible for the outcome of the game, whether there is order or chaos. You must direct the movements of the pieces, not losing sight of a single one. If you tire in the course of the game, or if you let down your guard — well then, emperors big and small will make their own moves on all sides of you. Before long, other voices of power will emerge and hold sway, and then all bets are off.
In our ancient past, those emperors with a bit of wisdom understood that the world under heaven (天下) was for the people under heaven. This being the case, one person could not be expected to take responsibility for all.
When the media and the people are ignored — or in the most egregious case, persecuted — for trying to speak up and take responsibility for the world around them, we can be sure this will lead to chaos.
As the old saying goes, “Responsibility for the rise and fall of a nation rests with the common folk” (天下兴亡，匹夫有责). For centuries now have we shouted these words. But if the common folk are to take responsibility, it follows that they must have power. If they haven’t even the power to demand responsibility, then chaos is in store under heaven.
Read China’s official media these days and you could be forgiven for imagining that senior Communist Party officials have only recently learned to speak like actual human beings. Scarcely a day goes by without a prominent paean to the popular utterances of General Secretary Xi Jinping.
In his own inimitable style, we are told, the approachable “Uncle Xi” (习大大) peppers his “important speeches” with colourful metaphor. Hipper than your average leader of the world’s most populous nation, he tosses out web slang like, well, “like” — that buzzword popularised by Facebook, a service banned in China.
Xi Jinping: Do you “like” him?
Much of Xi’s likability, of course, is a concerted campaign by state media to reshape the popular sense of the Party’s own popularity and legitimacy — to close the gap, as it were.
And we can see this campaign at work in a great many pieces in the state media that read like fan pages — as though Xi Jinping is not just the CCP’s top dog, but also the country’s top trend setter. And, goodness, what will he say next?
Our latest example is a piece that ran today on at the top of People’s Daily Online, the website of the Party’s flagship People’s Daily newspaper. With a titter of seriousness, we provide our translation below.
HOT PHRASE 1: The Chinese Dream (中国梦) Xi: “Every person has ideals they pursue, their own dreams. Right now, everyone is discussing the Chinese dream. I think that the realisation of the great rejuvenation of the Chinese people is the modern era the great dream of the Chinese people.” Background: On November 2012, as Xi Jinping attended an exhibition on “The Road to Revival,” he fully explained the “Chinese dream” for the first time.
Madame Tussaud’s Wax Museum? No, indeed. This is the real Xi Jinping and other standing committee members visiting the “Road to Revival” Exhibition in 2013. HOT PHRASE 2: Bottom-line thinking (底线思维) Xi: “the method of properly applying bottom-line thinking is about preparing for the bad points and working at the same time to obtain the best possible results. It’s about being prepared, not panicking, and firmly grasping the initiative.” Background: According to the Study Times, Xi Jinping first emphasised [this phrase] at an important meeting in 2013. Since the 18th National Congress [in 2012], Xi Jinping has often emphasised using bottom-line thinking to advantage. HOT PHRASE 3: Tigers and flies (老虎, 苍蝇) Xi: “For the strict administration of the Party, the punitive hand must not go soft. We must persist in striking both ‘tigers’ and ‘flies,’ resolutely investigating violations of the law and of discipline by leading cadres. . .” Background: On January 22, 2013, Xi Jinping spoke these words in an important speech during the second full session of the 18th Central Discipline Inspection Commission. From the 18th National Congress to now, 61 officials at the vice-ministerial level or above have fallen, underscoring the unprecedented strength of the anti-corruption campaign and illustrating the determination of the Central Party led by General Secretary Xi Jinping. HOT PHRASE 4: Look in the mirror, attend to your wardrobe, wash yourself clean, and cure your ailments (照镜子、正衣冠、洗洗澡、治治病) Xi: “In carrying out our second group of education practice movements, we must adhere to the subject at hand, with the chief demands that we look in the mirror, attend to our wardrobe, wash ourselves clean, cure our ailments — that we oppose the ‘four winds’ with strict standards, strict measure and strict discipline, promoting the further elevation of our thinking and understanding. Our work style must be further transformed, the relationship between the Party and the masses made ever more intimate, so that our clean and practical image among the people is further established, and that our grassroots foundation is further solidified.” Background:On January 20, 2014, Xi Jinping made an important speech at a . . . conference for the Party’s Mass Line Education Practice movement. HOT PHRASE 5: Where has the time gone? Xi: “You know, in taking up the kind of work I do, you basically have no time for yourself. During Spring Festival this year, there was a song in China called, ‘Where Has the Time Gone?’. For me, the question is, Where has my personal time gone? And of course it’s all gone to work.” Background: Xi sighed these words during an interview in Sochi on February 7, 2014. Xi Jinping is deft at using popular common-folk language, giving a feeling of earnestness tinged with humour. . . HOT PHRASE 6: The button of life (人生的扣子) Xi: “This is like buttoning up when you get dressed. If you get the first button wrong, all the subsequent ones will go wrong too. In life, you need to get the buttons right from the start.” Background: Xi Jinping said this in a discussion with students at Peking University on May 4, 2014. Xi Jinping said that the values young people hold define the value orientation of an entire society. Young people, [he said], must grab this important period for the formation of their values. HOT PHRASE 7: The New Normal (新常态)
Xi: “Our nation’s development stands at an important era of opportunity. We must increase our confidence, departing from the point of our present phase and its particularities, adapting to the new normal, and maintaining a normal state of mind in terms of strategy. Background:In May 2014, Xi Jinping first spoke of the “new normal” on an inspection tour to Henan. Giving a speech the APEC Business Leaders summit on November 9, 2014 . . . Xi Jinping said the crux of whether or not [China] could adjust to the new normal was a question of the strength of the comprehensive deepening of reforms.” After this, the “new normal” expanded to the realms of politics and foreign relations, and it was echoed at the local and regional levels [in China] and hotly talked about in the international media. HOT PHRASE 8: One Belt and One Road (一带一路) Xi: “We must make overall layouts for the One Road One Belt [program], determining the schedule and road map for the next few years as soon as possible. We must have a plan and scope for our objectives in the early stage.” Background:On a visit to Kazakhstan in September 2013, Xi Jinping spoke of building a “Silk Road economic belt.” In October the same year, hosting the APEC Leaders Summit in Beijing, Xi Jinping expressed the wish to build a “maritime Silk Road for the 21st century” along with ASEAN countries. HOT PHRASE 9: APEC Blue (APEC蓝) Xi:: “Some people say that right now Beijing’s blue sky is ‘APEC blue,’ [because extreme measures were taken ahead of the APEC meeting to deal temporarily with pollution], something beautiful but fleeting, that will be gone after this moment. I hope and trust that through tireless efforts ‘APEC blue’ will be here to stay.” Background:These words were spoken in November 2014, as Xi Jinping hosted a banquet for the APEC Leaders Forum. Xi Jinping has dealt head-on with the pollution problem, calling it a “development annoyance” and saying that, “Dealing with pollution is a direction we’re working in, and clear water and green vistas are an important part of the Chinese dream.”
A report from the LA Times shows Beijing air on January 15, 2015, two months after Xi Jinping hoped ‘APEC blue’ would stick around. HOT PHRASE 10: “roughing through it”, and to “like”(蛮拼的, 点赞) Xi: “In order to do this work well, our cadres at various levels have roughed through it. Of course, without the people giving their support, it’s hard to do this work well. So I want to ‘like’ our great people.” Background:Xi Jinping spoke these words from his office in his year-end address on December 31, 2014. [The term “roughing through it” (也是蛮拼的), which means to try hard but not quite succeed, is internet slang in China, as of course is the term “to like,” the same meaning as to “like” a post on Facebook.] Xi Jinping gives a year-end address from his office on December 31, 2014. HOT PHRASE 11: Young people don’t need to pull all-nighters. Xi: “In those days when I was young, when I wanted to do something well, I would get good and sick about once every month. Why was that? Pulling all-nighters. I was often working through to daybreak. Later I felt that if I kept it up there was no way I would make it to adulthood. First settle your frame of mind, so that while you feel passion inside, you remain outwardly composed. Background:On January 12, 2015, Xi Jinping spoke with around 200 county-level Party leaders attending a training session at the Central Party School. He spoke about his own experiences as a country-level secretary, and said that “young people don’t need to pull all-nighters.” This heartfelt and natural sentiment was enthusiastically shared [on the internet] . . . HOT PHRASE 12: knife handle (刀把子) Xi: “[We must] foster and create a politics and law corps that respects the Party, respects the nation, respects the people and respects the law, ensuring the knife handle is grasped firmly in the hand of the Party and the people.”
http://paper.people.com.cn/rmrbhwb/html/2015-01/21/content_1523529.htm Background: on January 20, 2015, Xi Jinping said these words at the National Conference on Politics and Law. The “knife handle” is an expression used by Mao Zedong in 1926 to address the question of who should bear weapons and who they should be used against.
In today’s edition of the People’s Daily, Party elites continue to make their case that the building of “rule of law” in China — the topic of last fall’s Fourth Plenum — must happen on China’s terms. China cannot and must not, according to this argument, slavishly copy the systems of the West. Such copying is a means proposed by unspecified “hostile forces” who hope to upset the “leadership of the Chinese Communist Party.”
Says the quote at the outset of the piece, which, in fact, could be equally understood as encouragement to first try “Western” systems of rule of law: “Only when you try it on for yourself do you know if a shoe fits.”
The following are selected passages in translation from today’s page-nine piece in the People’s Daily. [Homepage Image: “Ruby Red Slippers” from Chris Evans, available at Flickr.com under Creative Commons license]
“The Healthy Road of Ruling the Nation in Accord with the Law: How We Should Understand Going Our Own Road in Building Rule of Law” People’s Daily
February 3, 2015
“Only when you try it on for yourself do you know if a shoe fits.” Rule of law is a basic method for governing a nation, but as for what rule of law mode a country puts into effect, and what rule of law path it takes, this must be a matter of what suits that country’s national conditions (国情) and social system. [A country] must “wear shoes that fit,” and it must travel its own road.
. . .
As for China, we are an ancient civilization with a history of 5,000 years, and we are also a socialist great nation (社会主义大国) under development. We have our own special rule of law traditions, our own special national conditions, our own special problems, and these determine that we must travel our own path in building rule of law.
Our rule of law path must be rooted in our own traditions. Although China’s autocratic traditions over thousands of years run deep, our forefathers began very early to explore the question of how to control human beings (驾驭人类自身). In the Spring and Autumn Period and the Warring States Period, China already had its own system and its own written code of law. In the Han and Tang dynasties a rather complete code of law emerged, and China’s legal system became its own unique school among a handful of legal systems in the world. . . In carrying out the building of rule of law today, we must take our roots in Chinese soil, mining out and passing along the essence of Chinese legal culture (中华法律文化精华). . .
Our rule of law path must be based on our own national conditions . . .
In summary, on political questions, there is no such thing as the best model or the “standard version” — there is only the choice that best suits oneself. We must borrow from the best fruits of rule of law culture overseas, but we must maintain ourselves and utility for us as the principal issue. We cannot pursue “full transplantation” (全面移植), copying [the systems of others].
. . .
After the Opium War, in order to save the people from destruction, many people with high-minded ideals advocated political reform. Many people recognized that the root of China’s backwardness was its old [political and social] systems. They sought to study and transplant (移植) the legal systems of the West, attempting constitutional monarchy, parliamentary democracy or “separation of the five powers” (五权分立) — all of these attempts failing. Only with the founding of the People’s Republic of China and the building of the socialist system were the political conditions in place and the systemic foundation laid for the true implementation of rule of law in the New China.
. . .
After the founding of the New China, on the foundations of the destruction of the old legal system of Republican China, we actively used our successful experiences from the base areas of the new democratic revolution, promoting socialist rule of law, quickly promulgating a series of important laws and regulations, including the first Constitution. . . Later, however, “leftist” errors occurred in the Party’s guiding ideology, and the legal system gradually lost priority. In particular, the “Cultural Revolution” led to serious destruction of the legal system, with grave prices paid. Our positive and negative experiences have led us to recognize: the method of rule of man (人治) is not the way forward, and only with rule of law can the country achieve long-term peace and stability.
. . .
I can be said that under the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party, through generations of hard exploration, [we have] realized the transition from “rule of man” to a “legal system,” and again a leap to “rule of law.” In summing up our nation’s accomplishments in terms of rule of law, we could list out more than a dozen, even scores, but what they come down to is that we have opened the road to socialist rule of law with Chinese characteristics (中国特色社会主义法治道路).
. . .
[From question: “How can we travel our rule of law road well?”]
By increasing our confidence in our road. In recent years, rule of law has been a hot topic in society. There is a debate as to what kind of road rule of law construction should take in our country. Hostile forces (敌对势力) take rule of law as their own “weapon,” hyping Western rule of law concepts and rule of law models, their objective being to use “rule of law” as an opening to deny the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party and our country’s socialist system. We must be clearly alert to this, increasing our strategic force and resolutely taking our own road.
Today, as we approach the Year of the Goat, Hu Yong (胡泳), a former CMP fellow and one of China’s top internet experts, posted a list to Twitter and Facebook of five events in the past year that defined overall social and political trends in China.
Hu Yong’s notes follow, with relevant passages added from the Chinese material to which he links. They reflect the deepening of ideology and broad tightening of intellectual space in China that is becoming — as the Global Times said contentedly earlier this month — the “new normal,” or xin changtai (新常态).
What Happened in 2014? 1) The formation of a “joint police and propaganda regime” (警宣联动机制) that are far more formidable than the previous stability preservation regime.
From Hong Kong’s Oriental News (on.cc):
“This round of again whipping up the Guo Meimei case reveals the idiocy of official planners . . . In order to shame and target a person or organization, the police are first employed, a waste of state resources and violence, to conduct an investigation against this person or organization, without consideration of cost, grasping onto some “moral” or “legal” scandal — then the propaganda organs of the state leap into action all at once, conducting a detailed smear campaign. As for those facts that complicate the official narrative, they are prohibited entirely. For now I’ll just call this a “joint police and propaganda regime.” This system is far more terrible that the stability preservation regime. If the stability preservation regime was about “holding on,” the joint police and propaganda regime is about advancing. It’s about the blackening and twisting of public opinion . . . so that the people can’t tell up from down.”
“Chinese writer Xu Xiao was recently taken away and detained by the authorities [in China], the stated reason being ‘damage to national security (危害国家安全). The case possibly deals with the fact that she was the editor of a volume on constitutionalism written by recently deceased June Fourth scholar Chen Ziming (陈子明), and she printed and distributed several dozen copies. Xue Ye (薛野) and Liu Jianshu (柳建树) of the non-profit Liren University were taken away the same day. Intellectuals in China face a season of uncertainty.”
“Owing to reasons of insufficient evidence and unclear facts, the Pu Zhiqiang case has been referred back to the police for investigation, while hearings in the Gao Yu case have been postponed. . . “
4) For many Chinese aspiring to live globalized lives, the prospect of a total restriction on VPN services in China is dispiriting. Add to this the spectre of pollution and the serious crackdown on dissident ideas, and many Chinese say they feel they are being pushed to the edge.
The New York Times (January 29, 2015):
“‘If it was legal to protest and throw rotten eggs on the street, I’d definitely be up for that,’ Ms. Jing, 25, said.”
5) On January 6, 2015, the [Chinese-language] Global Times runs a piece called, “The Proper Standard for a ‘Chinese Internet User'” (“中国好网民”应有哪些标准). It argues that being Chinese not only means having the courage to be a “50 center” (五毛), [or paid online propagandist], or part of the “praise party” (点贊党), but they must also be “bring your own grainers” (自干五), [50 cent-like positive propagandists who work for free]. They must, said the article, be forces of positivity on the internet and for mainstream values. Global Times (January 6, 2015):
“A report pointed out [recently] that in the past year our internet has been fresher and cleaner, that positive energy online has been much greater, and that the internet is beginning to enter a ‘new normal’ (新常态) . . . Without a doubt, in order to preserve this ‘new normal,’ we must all be ‘good web users.’ This is the most reliable force in returning sunny and clear skies to the internet, and the most important foundation for the development of the ‘new normal.'”
