As the debate over constitutionalism rages inside China, the China Media Project is pleased to announced the publication (or re-publication) of Heralds of History (历史的先声), a book that documents the articles and speeches that defined the Chinese Communist Party’s push for freedom, democracy and constitutionalism in the 1940s.
The book, edited by CMP fellow Xiao Shu (笑蜀), was first published in China in 1999, but was quickly banned by the authorities. It is an authoritative collection of speeches and articles outlining the CCP’s core goals and political beliefs from the early 1940s through the end of the war of resistance against Japan in 1945.
For example, there is Mao Zedong’s June 13, 1944, article in the Party’s Liberation Daily, in which the first paragraph from the “great helmsman” reads: “China has shortcomings, many shortcomings in fact, and the greatest of these, in a word, is that it lacks democracy. The people of China are in dire need of democracy, because only with democracy can our war of resistance have strength, can our internal and external relations be right . . . can we build a good nation — and only democracy can ensure unity in China once war has ended.”

[ABOVE: Front page of the July 13, 1944, edition of the Chinese Communist Party’s Liberation Daily newspaper, with article from Mao Zedong on democracy on the right.]
Then there is the July 3, 1945, piece in the Chinese Communist Party’s Xinhua Daily, the headline: “Fighting for Democracy is Something for All the People of the Nation.” “[T]his is already the century of the people,” the piece begins, “the age of democracy, and no country can stand alone outside the great democratic tide — so China must, and must urgently, realize democracy.”

[ABOVE: Front page of the July 3, 1945, edition of the Chinese Communist Party’s Xinhua Daily newspaper, with article on the need for democracy.]
Xiao Shu’s book, published by the Journalism & Media Studies Centre, is absolutely essential reading. You can purchase the book at Cosmos Books in Wan Chai or Kowloon.

But don’t take our word for it. The following is a review of the book — placing its publication nicely in the context of the current constitutionalism/anti-constitutionalism storm — in today’s Lianhe Zaobao. The review is written by Wu Wei (吴伟), a scholar of modern Chinese history who in the 1980s was a researcher at the Office of Political Reform of the CCP Central Committee, and served as secretary to the office’s director, Bao Tong (鲍彤).

“The CCP Should See its Political Promises of Yesteryear as ‘Positive Assets'”
Wu Wei (吴伟)
Lianhe Zaobao
Heralds of History, edited by Mr. Xiao Shu, has recently been reissued in Hong Kong. This book was first published in China in 1999, and at that time it bore the subtitle: “Solemn promises made a half century ago.” Perhaps it was this subtitle that touched on sensitive nerves, causing the book to be repeatedly banned, so that to this day few Chinese have ever heard of it.
A promise is the word of a trustworthy person that ensures something will happen. The political promises of a ruling party are this ruling party’s clear declarations of political attitude, political goals, a political contract made with the people of a nation in exchange for support and authorisation. They also amount to a political consensus reached with the people of the nation. They contract and define this Party’s future political actions, forming the basis of political power and legitimate government. And whether it abides by its political promises is a basic measure of the party’s political organization, its governing morals and political ethics.
Way back during the war of resistance [against Japan] in the 1940s, the Chinese Communist Party, as a “friendship party” with the ruling Kuomintang Party, issued a series of demands to limit the one-party dictatorship of the Kuomintang, calling for the implementation of democratic constitutionalism, initiating and leading a social movement to achieve democratic constitutionalism in China. Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai and other leaders of the Chinese Communist Party, the Liberation Daily, Xinhua Daily and other CCP media issued a torrent of discussions and articles criticizing the Kuomintang’s fascist formula of “one political party, one doctrine, one leader” (一个政党，一个主义，一个领袖). They expounded comprehensively on the supreme importance of democratic constitutionalism, freedom, equality, love for humanity and human rights for China’s political development.
Heralds of History includes a segment from Zhou Enlai’s 1944 “Address Concerning Constitutionalism and the Question of Unity” (关于宪政和团结问题的演说), which represents the Chinese Communist Party’s political demands at the time: “We believe that if we desire to achieve constitutionalism, we must first achieve a number of prerequisites of constitutional reform. We believe the most important prerequisites are three: the first is to ensure democracy and freedom for the people; the second is to lift the ban on political parties; the third is to exercise local autonomy. The people’s freedoms and rights are many, but right now what all the people need most urgently is freedom, freedom of residence (人身居住), freedom of assembly and association (集会结社的自由), freedom of speech and the press (言论出版的自由).” These calls and demands were a political declaration made against the dictatorship of the Kuomintang. They were solemn promises made by the Chinese Communist Party about the political goals it would pursue once it achieved political power. And they were the source of the serious care and support shown to the Chinese Communist Party by the masses and by various other democratic parties.
At a political conference held after the victory [in the war against Japan], through the combined effort of the Chinese Communist Party, the Kuomintang and other political parties, and through a process of political consultation, a draft emerged for a Western-style constitution. Even though the draft later failed, people could see that the Chinese Communist Party and other parties were working towards democratic constitutionalism. Later, as the Kuomintang struggled both politically and militarily to maintain authoritarian rule, these promises to realize democratic constitutionalism, to realize the dream that “farmers have land to till”, earned the Chinese Communist Party the broad political support and social foundation it needed to achieve political power — and in 1949 it won leadership of the entire country.
A half century has passed . . . but the CCP that gained political power has not truly fulfilled those promises it made back at that time. While China today does have a constitution, it does not have constitutionalism; while it has the words “republic,” what it has in effect is a one-party authoritarian system of exactly the same kind the Kuomintang had back at that time.
. . .
This book edited by Xiao Shu again raises those promises that the Chinese Communist Party made those many years ago. It lets the people of China know that the Chinese Communist Party of more than a half century ago was a political party in pursuit of democracy, that had pointed out a broad road for the development of the Chinese people. This book is a “positive asset” for the Chinese Communist Party, allowing it to protect and grow its wealth. Realizing these promises is China’s historical responsibility, and also the hope of the people of China. Only be realizing these promises can the Chinese Communist Party continue to preserve the basis for its leadership.
The problem is that there have always been people within the Chinese Communist Party who have spurned these promises. More than ten years ago, this book edited by Xiao Shu was banned entirely in mainland China. After the 18th National Congress [in November 2012], General Secretary Xi Jinping declared: “The life of the constitution is its implementation; the power of the constitution is in its implementation.” He talked about “raising the full implementation of the constitution to a new level.” He said also that [the Party] “must strengthen checks and monitoring of the exercise of power, putting power in the cage of regulation.” Just as most normal Chinese were celebrating this, thinking a beautiful “Chinese dream” was about to become real, a number of mainstream [Party] media pushed a wave of anti-constitutionalism. They talked about how “constitutionalism is a political system belonging to capitalism,” that it was “a trap by which imperialism hoped to bring about the peaceful evolution of China.” The people who wrote these things all completely forgot that in those years the leaders of the Chinese Communist Party themselves initiated the move toward constitutionalism, that they continually praised American-style democracy, that they continually declared that the Chinese Communist Party must, after it came to power, “avoid one-party authoritarianism at all costs,” “not allow one-party rule of the country.” Of course, not everyone has forgotten the promises, and some explain that this was merely a strategy at the time to gain political power. But that is tantamount to an admission that at that time the Chinese Communist Party used whatever means it could to deceive the people and gain political power, that it has no political morality or political ethics. So in order to deny constitutionalism, in order to deny the promises the Chinese Communist Party made in those years, some people are ready to push the Chinese Communist Party into a place without virtue, trust or justice, turning the Party’s governing legitimacy into a joke.
Yesterday, I saw Zhang Ming’s review of Xiao Shu’s book, in which he said he did not believe that the Chinese Communist Party was ready to simply toss out this period in its history, to write off the constitutional movement of its leaders. While I too don’t believe, I do feel uncertain. On the one hand, because of this anti-constitutionalism wave we are seeing. And on the other hand because it is as Zhang says, that realizing these promises and “accepting this legacy means a complete rebirth through political reform. This kind of reform is something the Kuomintang could not do when it governed China, but can today’s Chinese Communist Party do it?” I have little confidence.

There have been many reports lately suggesting the government might move soon to reform or dismantle its restrictive household registration, or hukou, system, an internal passport system that has left millions of rural migrants in China’s rapidly developing cities cut off from the full benefits of economic development and urbanization. It looks more likely, however, that pending reforms will mark only a slight shift, allowing rural migrants to gain local hukou status only in smaller cities. In the above cartoon, posted to Sina Weibo by artist “Cartoon Sinking Stone” (漫画沉石), a massive tanker is labeled “Hukou Reform,” but the ship is getting nowhere because it is propelled forward only by tiny, ineffectual oars labeled “pilot project.” It appears, meanwhile, that the ship is actually anchored on the opposite side.

There is now little doubt that the defining ideological debate in China this year will be that between constitutionalism and socialism.
For the beginnings of this story we have to wind back to early December last year, when Xi Jinping marked the 30th anniversary of China’s 1982 Constitution by saying: “We must firmly establish, throughout society, the authority of the Constitution and the law and allow the overwhelming masses to fully believe in the law.” Xi also said that “[no] organization or individual has the privilege to overstep the Constitution and the law, and any violation of the Constitution and the law must be investigated.”

[ABOVE: Xi Jinping speaks during 30th anniversary celebrations for China’s Constitution on December 5, 2012.]
Right on the heels of Xi Jinping’s speech, it became clear that political reform advocates in China were drawing strategic inspiration from Xi’s remarks, that they saw “firmly establishing the Constitution” as the ideal moderate strategy to push change on the basis of a document that already — or so they argued — constituted and represented a political consensus.
The Southern Weekly incident in January 2013 and the year’s inaugural edition of the journal Yanhuang Chunqiu (“The Constitution is a Consensus for Political Reform“) were a throwing down of the gauntlet. (READ: “Reformers Aim to Get China to Live Up to Own Constitution,” NYT, February 3, 2013.)
By late spring and early summer, the counterattacks against constitutionalism as a new way of framing the political reform debate had become relentless. Notable was a series of editorials in the Red Flag journal, which we wrote about here.
Most recently, there were three editorials in the overseas edition of the Party’s official People’s Daily, all issuing colorful attacks on constitutionalism (one likening it to “trying to catch fish in the trees”). The first of these editorials baldly declared: “Constitutionalism only belongs to capitalism, and it is not compatible with socialism” (宪政只属于资本主义，和社会主义无法兼容.).
It must be emphasized that the overseas edition of the People’s Daily IS NOT, exactly, the People’s Daily, by which I mean it cannot be construed as representing an official view to the extent that (albeit very problematically) the China edition of the People’s Daily can. That sounds complicated, I know. But just remember that even the hometown People’s Daily can become a battleground for internal Party struggles, and so is not a simple reflection of consensus. [READ: “What’s Up With the People’s Daily?“]
In this case, the overseas edition of the People’s Daily is being exploited by opponents of the constitutionalism drive, a case (if you will) of hitting line balls (打擦边球) politically. They are trading on the confusion over the nature and purpose of the overseas edition of the People’s Daily to try to suggest their views on constitutionalism are dominant and overriding.
There are still plenty of other voices out there on this issue that are worth reading. I’ll share just a couple.
Earlier this week, Yuan Ling (袁凌), the Caijing magazine feature writer and CMP fellow best known for his recent groundbreaking investigation of the Masanjia labor camp, wrote a long piece based on an in-depth interviews with the prominent legal scholar Jiang Ping (江平). In the piece, Jiang suggest the framing of this issue as a face-off between constitutionalism and socialism is entirely misleading, that the fundamental goals of both are compatible.
The following is just a taste:

“Jiang Ping: Socialism is a Good Thing, Not Incompatible with Constitutionalism”
August 12, 2013
Caijing, Yuan Ling (袁凌)
“I often say to He Weifang that socialism is a good thing, not something incompatible like fire and water with constitutionalism. Stalin and the Cultural Revolution, these were about dictatorship, not about socialism.” In his flat in Baolong Hot Springs Apartments, this is what the 83 year-old Jiang Ping has to say about the controversy over “socialism and constitutionalism.” This is the question he has thought about the most recently.
In Jiang Ping’s eyes, socialism is about fairness and justice, and this is inseparable from, and can work in concert with, the freedom and rule of law that constitutionalism represent, thereby arriving at the greatest point of commonality.

[ABOVE: Legal scholar Jiang Ping. Image by Caixin Online.]
A half century ago, a distortion happened between these two [socialism and constitutionalism] that resulted in a generation of disaster, and resulted also in the young Jiang Ping being branded a rightist. As Jiang Ping tells it, he was just one egg fortunate enough to have survived after the whole basket was overturned, though his shell had already been cracked.
But Jiang Ping suggests that a more apt metaphor might be a railroad tie under the train, that while it has been crushed by the force of the train going off the rails still remains unbroken, and still can bear up the pressures of the times and form a piece of the tracks leading on to rule of law; and then there is a new germination of ideas in its shade. This, perhaps, is one of the messages conveyed by the title of Jiang Ping’s oral memoir, Sinking and Rising (沉浮与枯荣).
The mind of this “railroad tie that is capable of thinking” is still turning, crying out, searching.

The next piece is written by Wang Jianxun (王建勋), an expert in constitutional law who also earned a PhD in political science at Indiana University-Bloomington. The piece, “How I See Constitutionalism,” appears in the latest edition of Yuanhuang Chunqiu.
Wang’s piece is framed as a straightforward explanation (Political Science 101) of what constitutionalism is all about — much needed considering the flood of claptrap the issue is getting.
Here is a taste:

“How I See Constitutionalism”
August 12, 2013
Wang Jianxun (王建勋)
Yanhuang Chunqiu
Recently, quite a number of publications have run pieces criticizing constitutionalism. This is something we’ve not seen very frequently over the past 100 years of our history. Since constitutional reforms were undertaken at the end of the Qing Dynasty, aside from those periods of totalitarian rule, the journey to constitutionalism has remained a fundamental bottom-line consensus for the people of our country.
Since these voices against constitutionalism emerged, not only have they been met with constant counter-criticism, but they have ignited a debate about constitutionalism within intellectual circles. We have seen in particular an ongoing debate between the “socialist constitutionalism camp” (社会主义宪政派 or 社宪派) and the “general constitutionalism camp” (泛宪派 or 普宪派). This debate has on the one hand exposed a deficiency of constitutional knowledge among the theoretical set (理论界), and on the other hand shown that people imagine very different things when they think about realizing constitutionalism. Against this backdrop, it’s of utmost urgency in China right now to clear up what constitutionalism actually means.
So what does “constitutionalism” mean? In a word, constitutionalism is a concept and a set of institutional insurances for checking the power of the government and protecting the basic rights and freedoms of individuals. Constitutionalism also entails a prescribed state of governance, in which checks on power and the primacy of law are effectively implemented. In this state, the power of the government is effectively limited, and the basic rights and freedoms of the individual are adequately protected. The core of constitutionalism is the limiting of power, and to this day, the most effective means discovered by humankind for the limiting of power is its separation, including horizontal decentralization (横向的分权) and vertical decentralization (纵向的分权). The first is what is called “separation of powers” (三权分立), and it means that legislative, executive and judicial powers are separate with mutual checks and balances. The latter is called “federalism” (联邦主义), and it means that national government and various local governments are separate with mutual checks and balances.

On August 8, close associates of Xu Zhiyong (许志永) released a video taken of the jailed rights campaigner during a recent visit to the jail in which he is being held by Chinese authorities. In the video, just over a minute long, Xu talks about the need for more citizens to stand up and defend their rights in “this age of absurdity.” [Here is an updated post of the video from the Wall Street Journal, with subtitles].
The video is taken by the visitor through the bars of a cell or visiting room where Xu is secured with handcuffs.

No matter how this society [of ours] is, how defeated or how absurd, this society needs brave citizens who can stand up and hold fast to their beliefs, who can take their rights, responsibilities and their dreams seriously. I’m proud to put the word ‘citizen’ before my name, and I hope everyone does the same, putting the word ‘citizen’ before their name. Let us unite, and work together to make our rights as citizens matter, to make our identities as citizens matter — working together to promote democracy, rule of law, fairness and justice in our country. Surely we can build a free, public-spirited, loving and good China.

Posts from journalists, scholars and activists have flooded across Chinese social media this afternoon reporting that Xiao Shu (笑蜀), the veteran Chinese journalist who recently issued an open call for the release of activist Xu Zhiyong, was taken into custody by security police in Beijing at around 2 p.m. today. CMP’s attempts to contact Xiao Shu directly through all known phone numbers and social media accounts have so far been unsuccessful.
Xiao Shu has been one of the most active proponents in recent months of broader citizen participation in social activism and change over a range of issues, what has been broadly called the New Citizen’s Movement.
Following the detention last month of social justice advocate Xu Zhiyong (许志永), Xiao Shu pushed actively for Xu’s release, demanding that those responsible be held accountable. Xiao Shu was also the author earlier this year of an open letter calling on China to ratify the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR).

A former commentator for Southern Weekend, the prominent paper at the center of nationwide protests over press controls earlier this year, Xiao Shu was most recently a member of the editorial board of Yanhuang Chunqiu, a leading liberal journal.
An investigative reporter for a prominent news magazine in China told CMP today that Xiao Shu has been under close scrutiny for months. Earlier this summer, the reporter was staying in the same hotel as Xiao Shu in Beijing’s Haidian District. At around 1 a.m. state security appeared outside Xiao Shu’s hotel room and asked that he join them downstairs. The investigative reporter accompanied Xiao Shu at first, but was immediately told to leave. Xiao Shu’s talk with state security went on for at least an hour, the reporter said. Xiao Shu later said they had insisted he leave Beijing. He refused, saying he had a right to remain in the city.

[ABOVE: A Weibo post by activist Tang Gula (唐古拉) reports that veteran journalist Xiao Shu has been “taken away.”]
The following is one of Xiao Shu’s latest writings, sent to CMP earlier this week. We will work on a translation of the piece over the next couple of days.

中间社会站出来
笑蜀
一
7月26日，天则经济研究所20周年庆典上，企业家任志强大声疾呼：许多人工的堤坝阻挡了鱼类洄游，威胁到鱼类的生存。必须拆除那些堤坝，让江河自由，让江河奔向海洋，不单自然界如此。这话刚落脚，马上响起雷鸣般的掌声。
早在十天前，即7月16日，企业家王石也有一段慷慨之辞。那天刚刚披露湖南企业家曾成杰的死讯。举国震惊。王石第一时间在微博上发声，承认在重庆企业家遭薄熙来黑打时自己“采取了不吭气的态度”，承认这是“懦弱错误的行为”。并宣示：对违反法律，侵犯财产、侵犯生命的权力部门，要明确说不！
而更早之前，当柳传志提醒“正和岛”同仁在商言商勿涉时政时，企业家王瑛就忍无可忍，不仅退岛以示抗议，而且发表了措辞强硬的声明，批评柳传志助长恐惧。她认为，恐惧没有道理，事实上企业家跟权力勾兑的风险才最高，相比之下，关心时政的风险低很多。王瑛的声明一经曝光，立即震动江湖，“在商言商”之争成了一个重大公共事件，而为媒体频频聚焦。
另一位重量级企业家王功权，则站出来力挺王瑛。他以一句话来概括他的态度：个体有选择自由，群体应承担更多责任。希望企业界同仁在中国的转型过程中发挥更大作用。
显然，上述个案没有一个是孤立的，它们是一连串事件。这一连串事件构成了一个趋势，那就是素来以懦弱、隐忍乃至犬儒著称的中国企业家，终于按捺不住了，终于要站出来说话了——站出来说话，以一个公民的姿态。
这是一个信号，中间社会觉醒的信号，处于体制内外结合部的中间地带崛起的信号。
二
必须承认，中国的确是一个过于复杂的国家。它不是一个通常意义上的国家，而是超国家体。而它之为超国家体，不是因为人口之众，也不是因为地域之广，主要就因为它之复杂。否则无法解释，为什么第三波第四波民主化摧枯拉朽，却都到中国的门口戛然而止。
第三波第四波让很多人有幻觉。他们眼里，中国巨变指日可待，因为苏东和北非提供了可复制的模式。但事实证明，这判断太乐观了。除了强化世界潮流浩浩汤汤的大叙事，在具体操作即战术层面，第三波第四波于中国转型而言，恰恰负面意义大于正面意义。因为苏东之变，对党内强化了反戈巴机制，以堵死内部变革之路。因为北非之变，对社会强化了反“颜色革命”尤其强化了网格化维稳，以堵死民间倒逼之路。而且不能不承认，这两方面的努力并非徒劳，党内反戈巴机制尤其大见成效，而令九零年代以来的每一届领导人无不战战兢兢，如履薄冰。
这就是历史的吊诡。别的转型国家每闯出一片天，即等于在中国关上了一扇门。我们刚刚还为别的国家的人民欢呼，回头却悲哀地发现自己脚下又少一条路。环球不同凉热，人家的节日，往往是我们自己的悲剧。竟有如斯结局，原因之一，是当局强大的反向学习能力。别的国家的每一次巨变，对当局都是一次难得的预警，让当局可以亡羊补牢。所以，第三波第四波往往不是动摇、而往往是固化了中国的专政体制。
既有三十年高增长所强化的国家财政能力，镇压和收买能力特别强大；更有史上罕见的特殊利益，保卫专政体制的动力特别强大；还有强大的反向学习能力，赋予专政体制特殊的柔韧性。同时拥有这三个层面的优势，是其他转型国家都不具备的。中国的复杂性可以多角度解读，但这三个层面的综合优势，则是所有复杂性中最重要的元素。
这就注定了中国的转型之路特别复杂、特别艰巨。突尼斯的一个小贩之死，马上延烧为全国性抗议，可中国有过多少比小贩之死严重百倍的人权惨案？台湾的一个美丽岛镇压，马上激怒整个社会，社会用选票把美丽岛受难者的太太、律师顶起来，形成新的抗争集群。但中国有过多少次美丽岛镇压？所有威权国家对转型的抵抗，相比中国都太小儿科了。所以，所有其他国家的转型经验，固然可以而且必须借鉴，但的确不可复制，不可照搬。在别的国家管用的办法，到中国的确往往失灵。
最典型的失灵，是中产阶级理论的失灵。通常认为，中产阶级崛起之后，将成为转型的主力。但在当下中国知识界，抨击“中产阶级”却成为时尚，主要就因为对中产阶级的失望，认为中国的中产阶级没有像其他国家的中产阶级那样，承担其推动转型的历史责任。这抨击不无道理，中国中产阶级的局限性确实太大。但问题是，中国的水土注定长不出符合国际标准的中产阶级，因而用国际标准来套，来责之中国的中产阶级，其方法论本来就是错误的。中国的中产阶级注定负荷不了那样沉重的期待。
中产阶级不行，哪个阶级行？工人阶级么？早在90年代国企改革时就整个解体了，成建制的工人阶级早就子虚乌有。农民阶级么？当代中国从来不存在完整的农民阶级，因为城市化尤其因为2.5亿农民工进城，农民阶级更无从谈起。农民工阶级么？原子化的农民工只有数量没有质量，根本就不构成一个阶级。资本家阶级么？大资本家早被权贵同化，中小资本家也在权力的宰制下支离破碎。
不独中产阶级无力，其实被统治者中的任何一个阶级，都是无力的，依靠任何一个单一的阶级，都是不靠谱的。如果没有社会各阶级的支撑，单单政治社会的两极对抗，则更不靠谱，因为政治社会的两极对比更不对等。
中国转型因此需要大战略，超越所有转型国家既有经验之上的大战略。尤其是超越单一阶级推动论，超越政治社会两极对抗，超越政治社会两极对抗基础上的推倒重来你死我活。它最重要的元素应该是开放和兼容。即最大限度地向体制内外开放，最大限度地争取体制内外一切可以推动转型的资源，尤其向处于体制内外结合部的、兼具了体制内外双重优势的中间社会开放。
这就是中间道路，即在政治社会之外，更凝聚整个中间社会的共识，集结整个中间社会的力量，形成最大限度的合力，倒逼中国转型。如前所述，中国转型的阻力是空前的，推动转型的力量也必须是空前的。惟有集结空前的力量、形成空前大格局的转型战略，才谈得上大战略。如果中间社会缺位，所谓空前的力量、所谓空前大格局就都徒托空言。如何调动中间社会，因而是转型大战略应当致力的关键突破。
三
这正是许志永们的意义，也正是新公民运动的意义。
许志永发起的新公民运动，概括地说，无非是以自由、公义、爱为共同价值，实现中间社会各阶级的互动互助，在此基础上推进跨阶级、跨行业的公民合作，尤其是同城公民合作，最终以公民合作的集体力量，走向公民社会，推动和平转型。
这也正是“新公民运动”尤其是许志永获咎之由。因为，中间社会的聚集、公民合作的扩大，给了不受制约的权力以巨大压力。反弹是必然的，“新公民运动”注定要遭遇劫难。
但我们不可因此沮丧。许志永们固然求仁得仁，以身伺虎。但他们的自我牺牲并不是没有价值。中间社会的坚决抗议就印证了他们的价值，也印证了新公民运动的力量。在相继抓捕15名新公民运动的参与者之后，有关当局最后朝许志永下手，显然是有备而来，要将新公民运动一网打尽，杀一儆百。有关当局的这个如意算盘，并非没有根据，通常情况下，镇压是起作用的。但这次不能不让他们意外和失望。当镇压的钢鞭高高举起，民间并没有如通常那样望风而逃，噤若寒蝉，反而一批一批公民迎着钢鞭勇敢地挺身而出，大声说不。新公民运动并没有被镇压下去，她的核心理念自由、公义、爱，反而因为镇压像闪电一样传遍全国，镇压反而成了新公民运动的活广告，成了新公民运动的反向推手。
最生动的例子，莫过于茅于轼等五人第一时间发起的联署抗议。尽管联署遭有关当局彻底封杀，所有网络通道都被掐断，只能依靠最原始的方式即口口相传的方式来传播，但仅仅一周时间，即已征集到两千多个公民的签名。这中间固然少不了王功权、王瑛等企业家，以及何方、郑渊洁等知识界名流，但占最大比例的还是普通人，他们抗风险能力低，却能在危难时站出来，这才是最感人的。他们中有厨师、酿酒师、理发师、设计师、工程师、会计师，有医生、程序员、销售员，有农民工、农民、个体户、的士司机、建筑工人、家庭主妇，有军人、警察、公务员，甚至有道人、僧人。几乎遍及所有的阶级、所有的行业，尤其遍及中产和底层，活生生一个中间社会的投影。
这从一个侧面反映了中间社会对新公民运动、对公民社会建设的广泛认同。这种广泛认同，和本文开篇记录的任志强、王石等工商巨子的公民宣示，恰成呼应，折射了当下中国最重要的趋势，即中间社会崛起的趋势，即普通人勇气下限提升的趋势。
为自己的理念受难，是幸运的。当此中间社会崛起之际、普通人勇气下限提升之际受难，则更幸运，因为这时受难，能把受难者的光和热发挥到最大限度，辐射整个社会。于此不难理解，为什么许志永们的一帧帧铁窗小影，都面带微笑。他们的心底是阳光的，他们的未来也是阳光的。可笑的只是有关当局：民不畏死，乃何以死惧之？呼啸而起的钢鞭再吓不住人了，一拨又一拨公民成长起来了，他们不怕了。许志永们将前赴后继。
（作者笑蜀，前南方周末首席评论员，现为北京《炎黄春秋》杂志编委，北京传知行社会经济研究所研究员）

“Correct guidance of public opinion,” the notion media must adhere to the discipline guidelines of the Chinese Communist Party in order to maintain social and political stability, remains the crux of press controls in China. But now, under the leadership of Xi Jinping, “correct guidance” is being retrofitted for the “Chinese dream,” the ruling Party’s latest leadership vision.
The first reaffirmation of the media’s propaganda role in the context of the “Chinese dream” came back in April, as scores of state-run media were lined up behind a statement called, “Creating Positive Energy for the Chinese Dream with a Fierce Sense of Social Responsibility.”

[ABOVE: Installed in a park in the southern city of Guangzhou, the ship of the Chinese dream spells out the slogan’s three central aspects: national strength, the rejuvenation of the Chinese people, and prosperity for the people.]
A piece posted today by the official Xinhua News Agency again emphasizes the need for media to adhere to “correct guidance” in order to create “positive energy” for the realization of the Chinese dream. Typical of Party writings about ideological discipline in the media, the tone of the piece is highly moralistic, suggesting media in China today have suffered a “downward slide” in values. They have erred from the “mainstream,” meaning the Party line, to cynically pursue negative coverage and amplify “rumours” emerging on the internet.
“[S]ome media workers have lost their sense of ideological place,” says the piece.
The answer is for media to remember their proper role as the “builders of socialism,” “encouraging the people to work tirelessly for national strength and general prosperity” and striving to “advocate the realization of the Chinese Dream as the loftiest note of the age.”
The tension remains between control, the highest imperative, and maintaining credibility, a tension we have seen at least since Hu Jintao’s 2002 policy of the “three closenesses.” Media must be truthful and relevant, because therein lies credibility and influence — but they must not forget to ensure that “truth” serves the Party’s fundamental interests.
Selected translations follow:

How Media Can Create Positive Energy for the “Chinese Dream”
July 29, 2013
In mid-April, the All-China Journalist’s Association and 25 [state] media including the People’s Daily, Xinhua News Agency, Seeking Truth, the PLA Daily, Guangming Daily, Economic Daily, China National Radio and China Central Television released “Creating Positive Energy for the Chinese Dream with a Fierce Sense of Social Responsibility” . . . Well then, how do media at various levels create positive energy for the “Chinese Dream” with a fierce sense of social responsibility?
1. Singing the Chinese Dream as the crescendo of the age, positively guiding and encouraging the people to work tirelessly for national strength and the prosperity of the people
In recent years, under market pressure, the value expectations of media and news workers have suffered a downhill slide, and in the media sphere market-driven media have now pressured mainstream [Party] media, and new media have pressured traditional media, passively resulting in a lowbrow atmosphere (媚俗之风), blurring the role of [media] as tools of the Party and government leadership, and some media have even sunk to the level of adopting online hearsay and transmitting online rumor. . .
In order to realize the Chinese Dream, media must take action and do their part. In this new historical era, news workers are not “crownless kings” separate from the masses, nor are they observers separated from actual reality. Rather, they have a sacred duty to “guide the people with positive public opinion” . . .
2. Adhering to positive guidance of public opinion, bearing responsibility as the documenters and promoters of development as they promote the Chinese Dream
News media are the magnifying glass of society, they are the amplifiers of public opinion in society. As diversity in society has challenged the mainstream [Party] ideology, some media workers have lost their sense of ideological place. They believe that journalists have discourse power and influence, and they have grown indifferent to positive channeling [of public opinion] and prefer to pile up negative reports. Some journalists are accustomed to presenting a one-side picture in their reports. For example, in carrying out supervision by public opinion [or investigative reporting], some news workers do not seek to relieve tensions by holding constructive standpoints, encouraging mutual understanding and respect in different groups, but rather seek to kick up a fuss, fan the fires and create opposition. In fact, the social impact of reports, whether political correct or incorrect, is immense. The is particularly true under the new circumstances we face, in which there is a whole series of new problems, the situation is complex, and there are many sensitive issues. This places even higher expectations on news reports, and it is imperative that editors and reporters play their proper role in doing their work.
3. Taking the truth as the life of the news, preserving the accuracy and impartiality of the news, raising the credibility of the media while advocating for the Chinese Dream
To sum up, only by positively guiding and encouraging the people to work tirelessly for national strength and general prosperity, only by taking on the responsibility of being constructors of socialism, the documenters of development, making earnest efforts to maintain the truth and impartiality of the news, by making the preservation of credibility one’s professional goal, accurately handling the relationship between social efficiency and economic efficiency, can [journalists] advocate for the realization of the Chinese Dream as the loftiest note of the age . . .

On July 17, 2013, watermelon vendor Deng Zhengjia died after being brutally beaten by urban management officers, or chengguan, in the city of Linwu in China’s central Hunan province. The chengguan are local authorities charged with maintaining order and cleanliness in China’s cities. Since their emergence in the late 1990s, the chengguan have earned a reputation for brutality in enforcing local regulations. The Deng Zhijia case once again exposed the lack of sufficient limitations on the conduct of chengguan in cities across the country. In the above cartoon, posted by artist Li Yongqiu (李永秋) to Sina Weibo, a watermelon violently cracked open bleeds across the pavement as the shields and clubs of the chengguan loom behind.

On July 20, 2013, a man identified in Chinese media as Ji Zhongxing detonated a homemade bomb in the Beijing International Airport. Ji, who claimed that he had been paralyzed in 2005 after a brutal attack by guards, had sought justice unsuccessfully for years. Ji’s act of violence prompted some soul-searching in China’s media and on the internet. Many said they understood Ji’s anger, and that violence was bred by growing inequality combined with an ineffective justice system. Wu Qiang, a political scientist at Tsinghua University said desperate acts like Ji’s “are the ultimate acts by those at the bottom of society who are unable to find justice.” [SEE ALSO: “Why a Reporter Feels Sympathy for an Airport Bomber.”] In the above cartoon, posted by “cartoon hobbyist” Li Yongqiu (李永秋) to Sina Weibo, a helpless lamb is pushed to a cliff’s edge, pursued by a pack of vicious wolves. As he awaits certain death, the lamb’s wordless dread gradually transforms over his head into a massive grenade, the fuse burning. The cartoon is called: How Bombs are Forged (炸弹是怎样炼成的).